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Econ 2230: Public Economics
Econ 2230: Public Economics Lecture 16: Auctions Competitive mechanisms Lotteries increase public good provision relative to VCM Lottery purchase imposes a negative externality on others. This effect counteracts the positive externality that results from giving to the public good. Do other competitive mechanisms have a similar effect? Winner pay auctions ? Charity auctions typically held at social events in the form of English auction ((gpitem awarded to bidder with the highest value at a price equal to the value of the second highest bidder) standard oral ascending auctions silent auction – write down increasing bids by a certain time Internet charity auction same items offered for sale both in for-profit and not-for profit auctions (e.g., eBay and eBay Giving Works). Auctions 1. Charity auction 2. Winner pay auction a. Charity auction vs. non-charity auction b. Lottery vs. winner pay auction 3. All pay auctions a. Laboratory b. Field 1. Charity auctions Will winner pay auctions give rise to same negative (counteracting) externality as that seen for lotteries? Negative externality: raising bid decreases likelihood that others will win item Additional benefits of winner pay auction? Advantage over lottery? Winner deterministically determined – highest value bidder wins the price. Disadvantage of winner pay auction relative to lottery? Only winner pays bid (vs. lottery where all pay) 1. Charity auctions Related Burkart (1995) bidding among creditors in bankruptcy auctions Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994) bidding among heirs for a family estate Goeree et al (2005) Model: independent private value offf the prize and incomplete information bidders’ values independently and uniformly distributed on [0,1] auction’s proceeds accrue to a public good that benefits the bidders. -
Loss Aversion and Sunk Cost Sensitivity in All-Pay Auctions for Charity: Experimental Evidence∗
Loss Aversion and Sunk Cost Sensitivity in All-pay Auctions for Charity: Experimental Evidence∗ Joshua Fostery Economics Department University of Wisconsin - Oshkosh August 30, 2017 Abstract All-pay auctions have demonstrated an extraordinary ability at raising money for charity. One mechanism in particular is the war of attrition, which frequently generates revenue well beyond what is theoretically predicted with rational bidders. However, what motivates the behavioral response in bidders remains unclear. By imposing charity auction incentives in the laboratory, this paper uses controlled experiments to consider the effects of loss aversion and sunk cost sensitivity on bidders’ willingness to contribute. The results indicate that revenues in incremental bidding mechanisms, such as the war of attrition, rely heavily on bidders who are sunk cost sensitive. It is shown this behavioral response can be easily curbed with a commitment device which drastically lowers contributions below theoretical predictions. A separate behavioral response due to loss aversion is found in the sealed-bid first-price all-pay auction, which reduces bidders’ willingness to contribute. These findings help explain the inconsistencies in revenues from previous all-pay auction studies and indicate a mechanism preference based on the distribution of these behavioral characteristics. Keywords: Auctions, Market Design, Charitable Giving JEL Classification: C92, D03, D44, D64 ∗I would like to thank Cary Deck, Amy Farmer, Jeffrey Carpenter, Salar Jahedi, Li Hao, and seminar participants at the University of Arkansas, ESA World Meetings, ESA North America Meetings, and the SEA Annual Meetings for their helpful comments at various stages of the development of this project. yContact the author at [email protected]. -
NASCAR for Dummies (ISBN
spine=.672” Sports/Motor Sports ™ Making Everything Easier! 3rd Edition Now updated! Your authoritative guide to NASCAR — 3rd Edition on and off the track Open the book and find: ® Want to have the supreme NASCAR experience? Whether • Top driver Mark Martin’s personal NASCAR you’re new to this exciting sport or a longtime fan, this insights into the sport insider’s guide covers everything you want to know in • The lowdown on each NASCAR detail — from the anatomy of a stock car to the strategies track used by top drivers in the NASCAR Sprint Cup Series. • Why drivers are true athletes NASCAR • What’s new with NASCAR? — get the latest on the new racing rules, teams, drivers, car designs, and safety requirements • Explanations of NASCAR lingo • A crash course in stock-car racing — meet the teams and • How to win a race (it’s more than sponsors, understand the different NASCAR series, and find out just driving fast!) how drivers get started in the racing business • What happens during a pit stop • Take a test drive — explore a stock car inside and out, learn the • How to fit in with a NASCAR crowd rules of the track, and work with the race team • Understand the driver’s world — get inside a driver’s head and • Ten can’t-miss races of the year ® see what happens before, during, and after a race • NASCAR statistics, race car • Keep track of NASCAR events — from the stands or the comfort numbers, and milestones of home, follow the sport and get the most out of each race Go to dummies.com® for more! Learn to: • Identify the teams, drivers, and cars • Follow all the latest rules and regulations • Understand the top driver skills and racing strategies • Have the ultimate fan experience, at home or at the track Mark Martin burst onto the NASCAR scene in 1981 $21.99 US / $25.99 CN / £14.99 UK after earning four American Speed Association championships, and has been winning races and ISBN 978-0-470-43068-2 setting records ever since. -
COVID-19 and Its Impact on Auction Houses
Sotheby's Institute of Art Digital Commons @ SIA MA Theses Student Scholarship and Creative Work 2020 Business Interrupted : COVID-19 and its impact on auction houses Carolina Sagardoy Sotheby's Institute of Art Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.sia.edu/stu_theses Part of the Business Analytics Commons, and the Other Business Commons Recommended Citation Sagardoy, Carolina, "Business Interrupted : COVID-19 and its impact on auction houses" (2020). MA Theses. 84. https://digitalcommons.sia.edu/stu_theses/84 This Thesis - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship and Creative Work at Digital Commons @ SIA. It has been accepted for inclusion in MA Theses by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ SIA. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Business Interrupted: COVID-19 and its Impact on Auction Houses By Carolina Sagardoy A Thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the Master’s Degree in Art Business Sotheby’s Institute of Art 2020 Word Count: 14,658 Business Interrupted: COVID-19 and its Impact on Auction Houses By: Carolina Sagardoy Abstract This study aims to thoroughly analyse how auction houses are coping with the conditions imposed by the Coronavirus pandemic in the short-term and what the virus’ long-term impact on the business will be. The study will look at upcoming marketing campaigns and the quick migration to online sales, and will analyse the data within those sales. The study is unique in its aim to also analyse buyer and seller psychological behaviours and how they will be impacted as a result of forced or voluntary distancing when live sales return. -
Kentucky Speedway Arca Records 2000-2015
KENTUCKY SPEEDWAY ARCA RECORDS 2000-2015 CAR PERFORMANCE AT KENTUCKY CAR MAKE ENTRIES WINS RUNNING % RUNNING AVG. PURSE TOTAL PURSE WON Chevrolet 367 2 229 62 NA NA Ford 251 11 166 66 NA NA Dodge 108 6 81 75 NA NA Pontiac 40 0 22 55 NA NA Toyota 43 3 37 86 NA NA TOP FIVE FINISHERS 205-MILE RACES YEAR FIRST (Started) SECOND THIRD FOURTH FIFTH 2004 Ryan Hemphill (2) Billy Venturini Mark Gibson Ken Weaver Christi Passmore 2003 Kyle Busch (4) Frank Kimmel Matt Hagans Shelby Howard Jason Jarrett 200-MILE RACES YEAR FIRST (Started) SECOND THIRD FOURTH FIFTH 2002 Chad Blount (3) Frank Kimmel Austin Cameron Jason Jarrett Mark Gibson 2001 Frank Kimmel (1) John Metcalf Billy Venturini Todd Bowsher Chase Montgomery 2000 Ryan Newman (1) Tim Steele A.J. Henriksen Billy Venturini Bobby Gerhart 155-MILE RACES YEAR FIRST (Started) SECOND THIRD FOURTH FIFTH 2002 Frank Kimmel (2) Chad Blount Jason Rudd John Metcalf Andy Belmont 150-MILE RACES YEAR FIRST (Started) SECOND THIRD FOURTH FIFTH Sept. 26, 2015 Ryan Reed (9) Travis Braden David Levine Ross Kenseth Grant Enfinger Sept. 19, 2014 Brennan Poole (8) Matt Tifft Mason Mitchell Cody Coughlin Daniel Suarez Sept. 21, 2013 Corey Lajoie (13) Mason Mitchell Spencer Grant Enfinger Chad Boat Gallaher 2009 Parker Kligerman (2) Grant Enfinger Justin Lofton Craig Goess Brian Ickler 2009 James Buescher (1) Justin Lofton Jesse Smith Brian Ickler Frank Kimmel 2008 Scott Speed (6) Sean Caisse Justin Allgaier Frank Kimmel Brian Scott 2008 Ricky Stenhouse, Jr. (15) Scott Speed Ryan Fischer Ken Butler III John Wes Townley 2007 Michael McDowell (2) Cale Gale Bobby Santos Alex Yontz Erin Crocker 2007 Erik Darnell (5) Erin Crocker Bobby Santos Scott Lagasse, Chad Blount Jr. -
Charity Auctions for the Happy Few∗
Charity Auctions for the Happy Few¤ Olivier Bosy April 16, 2007 Abstract Recent literature has shown that all-pay auctions raise more money for charity than winner- pay auctions. We demonstrate that the first and second-price winner-pay auctions outper- form first-price all-pay auctions when bidders are sufficiently asymmetric. To prove it, we consider a framework with complete information. This analysis is relevant for two main reasons. On the one hand, complete information is more realistic and corresponds to events which occur for instance in a local service club (like in a voluntary organization) or in a show business dinner. Potential bidders are ac- quaintances or know one another well. On the other hand, our model keeps the qualitative predictions of a private value model under incomplete information in which bidders are ex ante asymmetric that is to say different bidders’ values are drawn from different distribu- tions. Furthermore, we also analyze second-price all-pay auction. Finally, we show that individual minimum bids could improve the relative revenue performance of first-price all- pay compared to first-price winner-pay auction. Keywords: All-pay auctions, charity, complete information, externalities JEL Classification: D44, D62, D64 ¤I would like to thank Gabrielle Demange, David Ettinger, Philippe Jehiel and Laurent Lamy for helpful conversations. All errors are mine. yPSE (Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques/Paris School of Economics), 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France. Email: [email protected], phone: (+33)143136314. 1 1 Introduction More and more voluntary organizations wish to raise money for charity purposes through a partnership with firms. -
C Mmittee Report REGULAR CALENDAR
C mmittee Report REGULAR CALENDAR April 26, 2018 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES REPORT OF COMMITTEE The Committee on Commerce and Consumer Affairs to which was referred SB 316, AN ACT relative to the regulation of online auctions. Having considered the same, report the same with the recommendation that the bill OUGHT TO PASS. R p Michael Costable FOR THE COMMITTEE Original: House Clerk Cc: Committee Bill File COMMITTEE REPORT Committee: Commerce and Consumer Affairs Bill Numbei.:. Sl3 316 Title: relative to the regulation of online auctions. Date: April 26, 2018 Consent Calendar: REGULAR Recommendati9 OUGHT TO PASS STATEMENT OF INTENT This bill exempts internet auctions from the requirements of RSA 311-B, the Auctioneers' Practice Act. Under current law anyone that lists items online at popular web sites (like eBay) must obtain an auctioneer's license, unless they are selling their own personal property, however, personal property obtained for the purpose of re-selling also requires an auctioneer's license. Forty three states do not regulate online auctions and 23 states do not regulate auctioneers, including New York and California. To qualify in New Hampshire for an auctioneer's license one must either go to auctioneer's school or apprentice for a minimum of six months and the apprenticeship must include activities such as bid calling and running etc, then one must register for a $75 exam, pay a $200 fee for a two year license and be bonded for minimum of $25,000. The majority on the committee felt that this process is overly burdensome, unnecessary and unenforceable to any significant degree. -
Putting Auction Theory to Work
P1: FCH/FFX P2: FCH/FFX QC: FCH/FFX T1: FCH CB610-FM CB610-Milgrom-v3 October 27, 2003 16:27 PUTTING AUCTION THEORY TO WORK This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of “optimal auctions” and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation. It shows how seemingly different auction designs can lead to nearly identical outcomes if the participating bidders are the same – a finding that focuses attention on (1) attracting bidders and (2) mini- mizing the cost of running the auction and bidding in it. It shows how new auc- tion designs can accommodate complicated procurement settings and sales with many interrelated goods. Paul Milgrom is Leonard and Shirley Ely Professor of Humanities and Social Sciences and Professor of Economics at Stanford University.He has also taught at Harvard University and MIT. -
Auctions for Charity: the Curse of the Familiar∗
Auctions for Charity: The Curse of the Familiar∗ Jeffrey Carpenter† Damian S. Damianov‡ Peter Hans Matthews§ February 17, 2017 Abstract Recently there has been considerable interest in the use of raffles and auctions to fund public goods. Economists have developed theories that predict which of the standard mechanisms should do well and they have run a variety of experiments to test the per- formance of these mechanisms. One aspect that has been largely overlooked, however, is whether new mechanisms can yield even more of the public good. We run fundrais- ing events in the field at the meetings of a well-known service organization across the United States to examine the properties of five mechanisms: one that is common in the literature (first-price all-pay auction), two that are familiar to practitioners in the field (the English/live auction and the raffle), and two that are new (the \bucket" auction and a lottery-auction hybrid). Consistent with theory, we find large differences in per- formance between the two most familiar formats but these disparities are dwarfed by the differentials achieved using the new and less common formats. Our results demon- strate the continued potential of mechanism design to inform the provision of public goods and fundraising. Keywords: Public Good, Raffle, Lottery, Auction, Fundraising, Mechanism Design, Field Experiment. JEL Codes: C93, D44, D64, H41 ∗We thank Catherine Collins, Brent Davis, Ryan Freling, Joshua Foster, Ellen Green, Daniel Jones, Malcolm Kass, James Kelly, Andrew Kloosterman, Peter Kriss, Nick Lovejoy, Jens Schubert and Anand Shukla for research assistance. We also acknowledge the financial support of Middlebury College and the National Science Foundation (SES 0617778). -
KEVIN HARVICK Mobil 1 Racing Team Report Round 3 of 36 – Auto Club 400 – Fontana
KEVIN HARVICK Mobil 1 Racing Team Report Round 3 of 36 – Auto Club 400 – Fontana Car No.: 4 – Mobil 1 Ford Mustang PR Contact: Joe Crowley, True Speed Communication (704) 875-3388 ext. 808 or [email protected] Primary Team Members: Driver: Kevin Harvick Crew Chief: Rodney Childers Hometown: Bakersfield, California Hometown: Mooresville, North Carolina Car Chief: Robert Smith Engine Builder: Roush Yates Engines Hometown: Whitewater, Wisconsin Headquarters: Mooresville, North Carolina Engine Specialist: Robert Brandt Spotter: Tim Fedewa Hometown: Mobile, Alabama Hometown: Holt, Michigan Over-The-Wall Crew Members: Gas Man: Evan Marchal Front Tire Changer: Shayne Pipala Hometown: Westfield, Indiana Hometown: Frankfort Square, Illinois Jackman: Stan Dolittle Rear Tire Changer: Daniel Smith Hometown: Ninety Six, South Carolina Hometown: Concord, North Carolina Windshield: Shawn Hopkins Tire Carrier: Mike “Shrek” Morneau Hometown: Chesterfield, Virginia Hometown: Oxford, Maine Road Crew Members: Truck Drivers: Rick Hodges and Stephen Mitchell Tire Specialist: Jamie Turski Hometowns: Raleigh, North Carolina and Woodville, Ohio, respectively Hometown: Trumbull, Connecticut Engineer: Dax Gerringer Engineer: Stephen Doran Hometowns: Gibsonville, North Carolina Hometown: Butler, Pennsylvania Mechanic: Richie Bean Mechanic: Allen Mincey Hometown: Bradford, Vermont Hometown: Fort Lauderdale, Florida Fontana Notes of Interest: Dynamic Duo: While this is Harvick’s 20th year in the NASCAR Cup Series, it’s his seventh with crew chief Rodney Childers, which is the longest pairing of any current driver-crew chief combination. Since joining forces at Stewart-Haas Racing (SHR) in 2014, Harvick and Childers have combined to produce 26 points-paying victories, a victory in the non-points-paying 2018 NASCAR All-Star Race at Charlotte (N.C.) Motor Speedway, 25 Busch poles, 107 top-five finishes and 155 top-10s while leading 9,703 laps. -
Bayesian Inference for Plackett-Luce Ranking Models
Bayesian inference for Plackett-Luce ranking models John Guiver [email protected] Edward Snelson [email protected] Microsoft Research Limited, 7 J J Thomson Avenue, Cambridge CB3 0FB, UK Abstract Luce can be achieved via maximum likelihood estima- This paper gives an efficient Bayesian method tion (MLE) using MM methods (Hunter, 2004), we for inferring the parameters of a Plackett- are unaware of an efficient Bayesian treatment. As we Luce ranking model. Such models are param- will show, MLE is problematic for sparse data due to eterised distributions over rankings of a finite overfitting, and it cannot even be found for some data set of objects, and have typically been stud- samples that do occur in real situations. Sparse data ied and applied within the psychometric, so- within the context of ranking is a common scenario ciometric and econometric literature. The in- for some applications and is typified by having a small ference scheme is an application of Power EP number of observations and a large number of items (expectation propagation). The scheme is ro- to rank (Dwork et al., 2001), or each individual ob- bust and can be readily applied to large scale servation may rank only a few of the total items. We data sets. The inference algorithm extends to therefore develop an efficient Bayesian approximate in- variations of the basic Plackett-Luce model, ference procedure for the model that avoids overfitting including partial rankings. We show a num- and provides proper uncertainty estimates on the pa- ber of advantages of the EP approach over rameters. the traditional maximum likelihood method. -
Minutes for the Tennessee Auctioneer Commission Meeting On
TENNESSEE AUCTIONEER COMMISSION 500 JAMES ROBERTSON PARKWAY NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE 37243 615-741-1831 Commission Meeting Minutes for February 24, 2020 First Floor Conference Room 1-B Davy Crockett Tower The Tennessee Auctioneer Commission met on February 24th, 2020 in the first-floor conference room of Davy Crockett Tower in Nashville, Tennessee. Chairman Thorpe called the meeting to order at 9:00 a.m. and the following business was transacted: COMMISSION MEMBERS PRESENT: Jeff Morris, John Thorpe, Randy Lowe, and Kimball Sterling COMMISSION MEMBERS ABSENT: None STAFF MEMBERS PRESENT: Roxana Gumucio, Glenn Kopchak, Anna Matlock, Kristen Downey, Robert Hunter, and Angela Nelson ROLL CALL Chairman Thorpe called the meeting to order at 9:00 a.m. Director Kopchak took roll and established that a quorum was present. NOTICE OF MEETING Director Kopchak read the notice of the meeting into the record as follows: “Notice of the February 24, 2020 meeting of the Auctioneer Commission was posted to the website on February 18, 2020.” AGENDA Chairman Thorpe requested that the Commission move the Rulemaking Hearing under New Business to account for the fact the hearing was not scheduled to begin until 10:00 a.m. Mr. Lowe made a motion to adopt the agenda as amended to move the Rulemaking Hearing. This was seconded by Mr. Morris. The motion carried by unanimous voice vote. MINUTES Mr. Morris made a motion to adopt the minutes from the November meeting as written. This was seconded by Mr. Lowe. The motion carried by unanimous voice vote. EDUCATION REVIEW Director Kopchak presented the Commission with the continuing education courses submitted by the Tennessee Auctioneers Association (TAA).