PRESENTATION TO THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE OF TRANSPORT
13 FEBRUARY 2018
1 Purpose of the Presentation
1. Progress on train accidents investigations
2. Plan to prevent accidents in the future
3. Progress on support for affected families and victims in train accidents
4. Update on Board management issues
5. Update on Board oversight issues
6. Response to #UniteBehind issues.
2 Content
• PRASA Mandate • A History of PRASA Assets Destruction • Impact on PRASA Asset Performance • Progress on Accidents – Kroonstad Level Crossing Accident – Geldenhuis Rear-End Accident – Interventions • Communication • Conclusion
3 PRASA Mandate
PRASA, as the implementing arm of the National Department of Transport, the sole shareholder, is primarily focused on the mandate contained in the Legal Succession Act of South African Transport Services (SATS) Act of 1989, as amended in November 2008. The main objective and main business of PRASA is to: • Ensure that, at the request of the Department of Transport, rail commuter services are provided within, to and from the Republic in the public interest, and • Provide, in accordance with the Department of Transport, for long haul passenger rail and bus services within, to and from the Republic in terms of the principles set out in section 4 of the National Land Transport Transition Act, 2000 (Act No. 22 of 2000) The second objective and secondary business of PRASA is that: • PRASA shall generate income from the exploitation of assets acquired by it, which include real estate and property portfolio. • A further requirement is that, in carrying out its objectives and business, PRASA shall have due regard for key Government, social, economic and transport imperatives and policy objectives.
4
A History of PRASA Assets Destruction INTRODUCTION
Prasa has rolling stock that is more than 50 years old Over the past 15 years Prasa has been keeping the system running despite its age Government has contributed significant funds to keep the system from total collapse Keeping the system running is exacerbated by the on-going asset destruction The on-going asset destruction and vandalism has put a further strain on the already stretched capacity of the old system to operate at acceptable levels of service
6 BACKGROUND CAUSES TO THE ACCIDENTS
Lack of investments in the system over 30 year period.
Age of the system, with obsolete technology and cost to modernise the system.
Human Error (Manual Authorisations under degraded operating conditions)
Open nature of the system leading to theft, vandalism and operational incidents.
Availability of spares and equipment due to age of the system.
High levels of community unrest , protest and dissatisfaction on service delivery.
7 PRASA ASSETS UNDER SIEGE
8 Train Fires
9 Rolling Stock Vandalism
• Stripping trains for “Shelter” material
10 Destruction of the Infrastructure
Bonteheuwel Example • Substation destroyed Central Line (5 months to repair • PRASA overhead traction cable recovered at scrap dealers
11 Destruction of Infrastructure
• Ticket office robbery remains a high risk threat to PRASA Rail
12 Destruction of infrastructure at stations
13 Vandalism at Stations
14 Crimes on PRASA Assets: Cable Theft Incidents
15 Crimes on PRASA Assets: Signalling Equipment Theft
16 Impact on PRASA Asset Performance Rolling Stock capacity – fleet availability (End Dec 2017)
March 2016 December 2017 Motor Trailer Motor Trailer Coaches Coaches Coaches Total % Coaches Coaches Total % In Service 727 2 221 2 948 65% 613 1 810 2 423 53% Out of Service - Vandalised & Maintenance 330 557 887 19% 350 856 1 206 26% Non-Operational - Repair (GO/Wreck) 264 466 730 16% 358 578 936 21% Total Fleet 1 321 3 244 4 565 1 321 3 244 4 565 • During 2015/16 a total of 250 coaches were vandalized and affecting fleet availability – between January to December 2017 - 1 441 coaches vandalized
18 Metrorail Service Performance December 2017
Except in the Eastern Cape there has been a severe shortage of rolling stock due to vandalism and asset theft.
Metric YTD Dec 2017 Target YTD DEC 2017 Actual Sets Short Metrorail 295 219 -26%
Train set Gauteng 141 124 -12% Requirements Western Cape 88 55 -38%
KZN 57 43 -25%
19 TRAIN PERFORMANCE: Comparison YTD Dec. 2015 with YTD Dec. 2017
Train Availability and Service Performance
YTD YTD % Change Dec-15 % Dec-17 % on 2015 Trains Scheduled 493 911 485 100 -2%
Trains Cancelled 19 299 4% 58 895 12% 205%
Trains Delayed 89 542 18% 107 714 22% 20%
Train/Coach Configuration 59.5% of trains ran with shorter sets than required 12 coach configuration = 288 635 trains. Gauteng: • 60% trains ran as short configured trains. (2015 59%) Western Cape: • 90% trains ran as short configured trains. (2015 43%) KwaZulu-Natal: • 46% trains ran as short configured trains. (2015 xx%)
20 Overcrowding caused by vandalism and destruction Summary of Impact on Train Operations
Theft of Signal Cable Train delays, driver forced to proceed on sight, train not protected by othe signals . History shows high potential for rear end collisions and signals passed on danger. Theft of Perway Equipment Risk of train derailments and consequential disastrous impact. Theft of Rolling Stock Equipment/component Train delays and cancellations, trains departs with doors not functioning which have a direct impact on railway safety. Vandalism of signal cables Train delays, driver forced to proceed on sight, train not protected by other signals. History shows high potential for rear end collisions and signals passed on danger. Theft of Signal Equipment Train delays, driver forced to proceed on sight, train not protected by other signals. History shows high potential for rear end collisions and signals passed on danger. Root cause for commuter backlash and possible burning of trains Train delays and cancellations
22
Insurance Impact Impact of damages on Insurance
Region Location of Incident Date of Loss Description of Incident Value of Loss Rm Western Cape Kraaifontein 15-Apr-17 METRORAIL: Train Fire (11 Coaches damaged) 32 Gauteng Braamfontein 16-Apr-17 METRORAIL: Train Fire (3 Coaches damaged) 9.5 Gauteng Houtheuwel 27-Apr-17 METRORAIL: Train Fire (2 coaches damaged) 9.5 Western Cape Retreat 27-Apr-17 METRORAIL: Train Fire (2 coaches damaged) 9.5 KZN Umbogintwini – Isipingo 15-May-17 PRASA Rail: Storm Damage 28 Gauteng Wonderboom 18-May-17 METRORAIL: Train Fire (5 coaches damaged) 14.5 Kwaggastroom – Gauteng 19-May-17 METRORAIL: Train Fire (2 coaches damaged) 5 Houtheuwel KZN Briardene – Temple 24-May-17 METRORAIL: Train Fire (3 Coaches damaged) 16 Gauteng Elandsfontein 01-Jun-17 METRORAIL: Collision 25 METRORAIL: Train Fire (Several coaches Western Cape Cape Town Station 12-Jun-17 45 destroyed)
Western Cape Koelenhof 14-Jun-17 METRORAIL: Train Fire (2 coaches damaged) 5
Western Cape Nyanga 19-Jun-17 METRORAIL: Train Fire (2 coaches damaged) 8
Western Cape Van Der Stel 15-Jul-17 METRORAIL: Train Fire (1 coach damaged) 5
KZN Various 10-Oct-17 PRASA RAIL – Storm Damage 150
Western Cape Akasia Park 21-Nov-17 METRORAIL: Train Fire (3 Coaches damaged) 12
Free State Kroonstadt 04-Jan-17 Shosholoza Meyl: Level Crossing Accident 60
Gauteng Geldenhuis 09-Jan-17 METRORAIL: Rear-end Collision 5
Grand Total 439
24
Progress on Accidents
Kroonstad Level Crossing Accident KROONSTAND LEVEL CROSSING ACCIDENT
2 KROONSTAND LEVEL CROSSING ACCIDENT
KROONSTAND RAIL LEVEL CROSSING INCIDENT
Passenger Injuries and Fatalities Bereaved Family Support
Passengers from point of departutre 713 Provided Counselling to affected families Yes Number of Stations travelled before accident 13 Provided medical assistance to injured passengers Yes Number of passengers that had disembarked 118 Covered all the funeral expenses to affected families Yes
Number of passengers not injured 416 Number of passengers injured and hospitalized 264 Number of Reported Deceased 24 Number of Bodies/Remains Recovered from Scene 21 Funerals Already taken place Males 8 Females 5 Eastern Cape 03-02-2018 2 Children 4 Gauteng 03-02-2018 5 2 undetected Free State 03-02-2018 9 DNA Test Results Positive DNA Testing/Matching Results 20 Negative DNA Testing Results 1 Still reported missing 3
*More remains have been discovered since 31 January 2018
28
Geldenhuis Rear-End Accident GELDENHUIS REAR-END COLISSION
On Monday 22nd January 2018, the Board commenced with site visit (Geldenhuis Station –incident site and George-Goch Signal Cabin).
From Tuesday 23rd January 2018 to date, the Board resumed with interviews of witnesses and these were conducted at uMjantshi House 8th floor boardroom, Braamfontein.
Seventeen witnesses have been interviewed, data and voice loggers were interrogated.
Completion and submission of the report will be made not later than Friday 16th February 2018.
30
Interventions DISTRIBUTION OF INTERVENTIONS
25 interventions identified for safe working during authorization of train movement
Interventions divided into short, medium and long term
Long Distribution of Expected time to complete term, 4 interventions Short interventions: (16%) term, 16 (64%) a) Short term 0 – 6 months Medium b) Medium term 6 – 12 months term, 5 (20%) c) Long term 12 months and more
32 INTERVENTIONS CLUSTER
33 SHORT TERM INTERVENTIONS
Focus areas:
1. Review of Train Working Rules.
2. Speed Monitoring.
3. Shift handover process – CTC personnel.
4. Train Driver Communication.
5. Refresher Training on Abnormal Working (frequency).
6. New TWR for Re-Signalling Programme.
7. Monitoring and Compliance.
8. Human Factors Management.
34
SHORT TERM INTERVENTIONS …(cont)
9. Management of high level of Authorities issued daily.
10. Safety Awareness Campaigns with Staff and all Stake Holders.
11. Safety Management System.
12. Maintenance of Trunk Radios (Inadequate Reliability and Maintainability).
13. Protection of Level Crossings.
14. Improve securitisation of system with SAPS and Security Technology (alarms, CCTV, drone technology, etc.)
15. Address high levels of Vandalism affecting Abnormal Operating
16. Conditions.
35
MEDIUM TERM INTERVENTIONS
Focus areas:
1. Implementation of the New TWR for the roll out of Re-Signalling Programme. 2. Recruitment of additional Section Managers to improve Supervision
3. Repair and Replacement of Vandalised and Stolen Units. 4. Internal Capacity for maintenance of train Communication System. 5. Shift Handover – CTC personnel handover to occur during off peak.
6. Improve Securitisation of system with SAPS and Security Technology (alarms, CCTV, drone technology, etc.)
36
LONG TERM INTERVENTIONS
Focus areas:
1. Shift handover – CTC personnel handover to occur during off peak. 2. Obsolete Signaling Technology – Re-signaling Programme. 3. TCO – Train Driver Voice Communication – network maintenance. 4. GSM-R operationalization. 5. Elimination of Level Crossings. 6. Accelerate Fencing Projects to protect rail servitude against illegal entry and vandalism.
37
ACCELERATED TURNAROUND PLANS
ROLLING STOCK
Increase train set availability
Ad-hoc contractor coach recovery 20 coaches per month
In-house Rolling Stock Coach recovery 30 coaches per month
GO program delivery
Wreck coach recovery – Approval for appointment through regional SCM
SET RECOVERY TARGETS
0 - 3mths 3 – 6mths 6 – 9mths 9-12mths 12-18mths 18-24mths
SETS 60 sets 65 sets 75 sets 80 sets 83 sets 88 sets
CONFIG 70% short 60% short 50% short 35% short 25% short 0%
38 ACCELERATED TURNAROUND PLANS
ROLLING STOCK Increase reliability • Secure availability of rotating machines and wheels
. Expedite processes to procure components
. Localisation / Regionalise components contracts
. Confinement of unique items suppliers
Availability of materials and spares
. Approval of contracts for suppliers
. Finalise regional tender process for materials and components be started
. Expedite procurement processes
39 ACCELERATED TURNAROUND PLANS
INFRASTRUCTURE
IMPROVE SYSTEM AVAILABILITY AND RELIABILITY
Reduce Signal infrastructure related delays
. Rehabilitation of conventional signalling systems (relays, panels & cables ) . Migration of copper to fibre . Fund and Procure mission critical spares . Vandal proofing of signalling equipment . Improve System Redundancy . Completion of the new Interlocking (Signalling) System
Reduce perway infrastructure delays
. Procurement of on track machine . Fast tracking procurement of rail components ( rails and turn outs ) . Approve contracts with TFR . Implement National Rail Contract
40
Proposed Security Solutions: Drones
41 Proposed Security Solutions: Drones
• Day and night surveillance with real time video and location feedback during operations.
• Integrated intelligence driven operation based on crime pattern analysis and profiling of suspects.
• Identifying, reporting any suspicious activity during operations and guide armed Response Teams and SAPS to scenes of suspected crime in progress,
42 Proposed Security Solutions: Drones (Cont…)
• Utilise Forensic Specialists to respond to crime scenes, collect and process evidence to ensure successful arrest. (Current conviction rate <5%) • Utilise advanced forensic laboratories and techniques to ensure successful prosecution and conviction of perpetrators.
43 Command Vehicle
All equipment and spares are contained in the RPS vehicle. This includes the following:
- Battery Charger - Full suite of spares - Telemetry Radio - Tools - RPS - Generator - Weather Station - Electrical supply - Fire Fighting Equipment
Three stations/screens: 1) Flight commander operating station 2) Sensor operations station 3) Security Management to assist in determining the location of trespassers by utilising their local knowledge Conclusion
o Time to migrate to the use of modern technology used worldwide (International Best Practice) o Create ability to “SEE AT NIGHT” without criminal being aware (EYE IN THE SKY) o Link to tactically correct deployed ground support capable of responding within minutes to apprehend criminals in the act. o Supported by Law Enforcement to follow criminals (with the EYE IN THE SKY) to their hiding places to ensure successful arrests. o Provide evidence which will lead to successful prosecution. (Video/Photographs) o Drones can provide the quickest reaction to alarms once in the air on “Silent” patrol, and follow the criminals to their end destination. o The nature of the operation is as such that no further information can be disclosed in a public presentation without compromising the intended operation. o Added advantage
45 Securing Rail Corridors
47
48 The cut-out part of the wall used in the Agrément test showed that just 5 cm of the 20 cm thick wall was impacted by the fire – after a record three hours!
We plan to have another fire test in Knysna (necessary to convince over 1,000 families who lost homes) that this is ideal for their new homes.
It will be showcased with the Public Employment Programme Inter- Ministerial Committee.
We shall have VIPs inside.
We plan to have an international live feed on YouTube – including to Portugal and the USA. 49
50 video
Attempting to demolish the WCCW 200 mm after fire test of three hours @ 1 100 0C The labour-intensive nature of the Light House concept is shown here. In order to build a new structure, the only equipment needed is a truck, chipper, small cement mixer, cement vibrator, shuttering (which can be re-used repeatedly, and will be made through the Eco-Furniture Programme), scaffolding and various small items. It means that Light Houses will be able to be built simultaneously all over the country, with on-site capacitation of previously unemployed people (as here in Lisbon, next to the Kruger National Park). Partnership with the City of Cape Town Proposed Solution:
Metals Theft Unit
100 Officers o 60 Commuter safety o 40 Infrastructure protection Upskilling of 1500 PRASA Security Employees to Law Enforcement Officers All Staff to be under Command and Control of the City of Cape Town 50 additional staff to be trained as Peace Officers, Traffic Warden and Tactical Street survival skills MoU to be signed over the next 7 days
54 Partnership with Transnet Reduction of Speed Restrictions
Type of Rail Steel Grade Length Units Total Length Delivery Destinations 57 kg/m R350 LHT/320 Cr 60 m 144 8640 Cape Town 57 kg/m R350 LHT/320 Cr 60 m 10 600 Durban 57 kg/m R350 LHT/320 Cr 60 m 250 15000 Gauteng 24240
Type of Rail Steel Grade Length Units Total Length Delivery Destinations 48 kg/m R350 LHT/320 Cr 60 m 294 17640 Cape Town 48 kg/m R350 LHT/320 Cr 60 m 240 14400 Durban 48 kg/m R350 LHT/320 Cr 60 m 150 9000 Gauteng 41040 GRAND TOTAL 65280
56 Communication Communication Plan
Modernisation Station On-Board General Future Plans Communication Communication Communication
58 Integrated Communication and Commuter Engagements
59 Integrated Communication and Commuter Engagements
60 Marketing & Communications Platforms
61 Conclusion
ACTIONS AGAINST VANDALISM AND THEFT
Vandal proofing of critical operating infrastructure
Relocation of informal settlements encroaching on rail reserve
Concrete walling in high risk areas
Professionalizing the security department
Declaring critical areas like staging yards national key points
Revision of the Legal Succession Act on fines & penalties
Successful pilot of technology aided asset protection (tagging & micro- chipping of equipment, kinetic detection sensors, CCTV surveillance & analysis, rapid response capability & lighting)
Engagement with senior provincial and national SAPS structures
63
ACTIONS AGAINST VANDALISM AND THEFT (CONT.)
Joint planning & deployment with RRRU & Copperheads
Apply Criminal Matters Amendment Act
Armed security guards appointed to escort train crew
Implement Law Enforcement Joint Project with the Cities
64 THANK YOU 66