Author's Personal Copy

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Author's Personal Copy Author's personal copy Provided for non-commercial research and educational use only. Not for reproduction, distribution or commercial use. This article was originally published in the International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition, published by Elsevier, and the attached copy is provided by Elsevier for the author’s benefit and for the benefit of the author’s institution, for non-commercial research and educational use including without limitation use in instruction at your institution, sending it to specific colleagues who you know, and providing a copy to your institution’s administrator. All other uses, reproduction and distribution, including without limitation commercial reprints, selling or licensing copies or access, or posting on open internet sites, your personal or institution’s website or repository, are prohibited. For exceptions, permission may be sought for such use through Elsevier’s permissions site at: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/permissionusematerial From Edelman, L., Galanter, M., 2015. Law: The Socio-Legal Perspective. In: James D. Wright (editor-in-chief), International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition, Vol 13. Oxford: Elsevier. pp. 604–613. ISBN: 9780080970868 Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. unless otherwise stated. All rights reserved. Elsevier Author's personal copy Law: The Socio-Legal Perspective Lauren Edelman, University of California - Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA Marc Galanter, University of Wisconsin - Madison, Madison, WI, USA Ó 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Abstract The sociolegal perspective on law portrays law as dynamically intertwined with society, politics, markets, science and technology, culture, and other social institutions. In this view, law is seen as a set of socially institutionalized norms of varying degrees of formality, ranging from statutes and judicial decisions at the formal end of the spectrum to socially institutionalized norms and cultural understandings that become embedded in everyday life at the informal end of the spectrum. Law is envisioned as deeply embedded in society rather than as autonomous in relation to the citizens and organizations that it is designed to regulate. The sociolegal perspective tends to emphasize three broad dimensions along which law matters to social life: regulatory, procedural, and constitutive. Introduction Albiston, 2005; Engel and Munger, 2003; Ewick and Silbey, 1998; Merry, 1990; Nielsen, 2000; Sarat, 1990), governance The sociolegal perspective is our portmanteau term for a set of processes in private organizations and other nonstate entities diverse but overlapping views of legal phenomena and their (Edelman et al., 1993; Edelman and Suchman, 1997; Edelman settings. It originally evolved in reaction to what was perceived et al., 1999; Nelson and Bridges, 1999; Stryker, 2000; Suchman as an overly formalistic emphasis in law schools and legal and Cahill, 1996), dispute resolution and barriers to the analysis on law as a rational set of edicts emanating from the mobilization of justice (Felstiner et al., 1980; Michelson, 2007; state, applied by the courts, and followed by citizens. As part of Miller and Sarat, 1980; Morrill et al., 2010; Nielsen and Nelson, the ‘Law and Society Movement’ of the mid-1960s, sociolegal 2005; Albiston et al., 2014), the operation of power and scholars offered a broader and more socially and empirically inequality in legal processes and institutions (Curran, 1977; grounded understanding of law. The sociolegal perspective Galanter, 1974; Mayhew and Reiss, 1969) and in the legal understands law as much broader than the statutes, judicial profession (Galanter and Palay, 1994; Handler, 1967; Heinz decisions, and administrative regulations that are the primary et al., 2005; Rosenberg et al., 1993), and the limits of law in focus of law schools and practicing lawyers, and as dynamically remedying inequalities on the basis of class, race, gender, and intertwined with society, politics, markets, science and tech- other social dimensions (Albiston, 2010; Best et al., 2011; nology, culture, and other social institutions. Generally, law is Crenshaw, 1991; Frohmann and Mertz, 1994; Gómez, 2000, viewed as a set of socially institutionalized norms of varying 2010; Gorman, 2005; Haney-López, 2007; Obasogie, 2013; degrees of formality, ranging from statutes and judicial deci- Pager, 2007; Suk, 2010). Psychologists often study jury behavior sions at the formal end of the spectrum to socially institu- (Diamond and Casper, 1992; Diamond and Rose, 2005) and tionalized norms and cultural understandings that become perceptions of justice and legal institutions (Tyler, 1990; Tyler embedded in everyday life at the informal end of the spectrum. and Huo, 2002), whereas economists tend to focus on the Law is envisioned as deeply embedded in society rather than as efficiency of various formal legal rules and rule-making regimes autonomous in relation to the citizens and organizations that it (Becker, 1968; Cooter and Rubinfeld, 1989; Donahue and is designed to regulate. Law varies substantially across social Heckman, 1991; Posner, 1975). Increasingly, humanities contexts, moreover. Not only do formal laws differ across scholars have entered into the sociolegal arena and have nations and subunits of nations, but the understandings and brought attention to the operation of law through texts, social implementations of law vary across contexts even when formal constructions, and meaning making outside of the legal realm laws look similar. (Constable, 2009; Lokaneeta, 2010; Reichman, 2009). The boundaries of the sociolegal perspective are fluid and These disciplinary orientations do not have hard bound- evolving, varying somewhat across disciplinary orientations. aries, however, and sociolegal scholarship is characterized by Political scientists tend to emphasize rules in the public sphere, interdisciplinary innovation and cross-disciplinary attention to focusing on judicial decision making (Epstein and Knight, various sociolegal problems. New sociolegal problems in the 1998; Segal and Spaeth, 2002), as well as voting (Burch, areas of human rights, social movements, environment, tech- 2011; Erikson, 1995), street-level bureaucrats in public nology, reproduction, globalization, and the creation and agencies (Lipsky, 1980; Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2012), breakdown of markets generate new areas of sociolegal schol- the politics of criminal justice (Feeley, 1992); constitutions, arship. The sociolegal perspective is a ‘big tent’ involving constitutionalism, and constitutional courts (Elkins et al., 2009; multiple epistemologies, methodologies, and disciplinary Klug, 2000; Moustafa, 2003); and ‘soft law’ (Abbott and Snidal, perspectives, unified primarily by its understanding of law as 2000; Bothe, 1980; Chinkin, 1989; Gruchalla-Wesierski, 1984; a set of norms or institutionalized rules. Seidl-Hohenveldern, 1999; Tammes, 1983). Sociologists tend Because of the breadth and lack of uniformity within the to emphasize legal meaning making by citizens and the subtle sociolegal perspective, any effort to characterize it will neces- influence of ‘legal consciousness’ in everyday life (Abrego, 2011; sarily be imperfect and incomplete. There is a tension between 604 International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition, Volume 13 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.86148-6 International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Second Edition, 2015, 604–613 Author's personal copy Law: The Socio-Legal Perspective 605 emphasizing founding principles and evolving understandings disciplinary and methodological boundaries, allowing greater and debates. Nonetheless, we think that the sociolegal understanding of the ways in which the regulatory, procedural, perspective tends to emphasize three broad dimensions along and constitutive facets of law are dynamically intertwined. which law matters to social life: regulatory, procedural, and Substantive foci are also loosely correlated with these three constitutive (Edelman and Suchman, 1997). The regulatory dimensions. For example, studies of judicial behavior are dimension involves studies or theories of law as a set of formal primarily conducted by political scientists using quantitative rules, informal norms, and principles underlying legal policies methodological techniques. These studies examine the regula- that are either meant to shape or control social behavior. tory dimension of law to the extent that they focus on the Studies of the legal impact, compliance and noncompliance, substantive doctrine that judges devise or the impact of judicial and the role of extralegal normative orders generally emphasize attitudes or politics on judicial decisions, and they examine the the regulatory dimension of law. The procedural dimension procedural dimension of law to the extent that they focus on involves studies or theories of law as a set of tools, practices, the impact of judges’ strategic efforts to avoid being overturned resources, or strategies that may be mobilized for creating, or to mobilize legitimacy for the court. Studies of law and challenging, and resolving claims, disputes, and rule ambigui- social movements are mostly conducted by sociologists, ties; for seeking strategic advantages vis-à-vis other parties; for although some political scientists also work in this area, and seeking to rationalize transactions; and the like. Studies of tend to use qualitative methods. Many of these studies focus
Recommended publications
  • Law and Literature
    OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Mon Jul 14 2014, NEWGEN chapter 6 LAW AND LITERATURE simon stern∗ i. Introduction: The Literatures of Criminal Law True-crime stories of outlaws have been a part of popular culture in England since the Middle Ages. Tales of criminality gained increasing circulation in print through the Old Bailey Sessions Papers (1674–1913) and the “dying confessions” published in broadside form by the Ordinary of Newgate in the eighteenth century.1 The confes- sional broadsides were designed as warnings for their audience; though sometimes inclined to revel in the details of an offender’s crimes, these exemplary tales of con- dign punishment typically presented their narrators as penitent reprobates, and they ∗ For comments and suggestions on earlier drafts, thanks to Alan Brudner, Vincent Chiao, Lindsay Farmer, Marty Friedland, Nicola Lacey, and particularly Markus Dubber. 1 On the genre of “dying confessions,” see Daniel A. Cohen, Pillars of Salt, Monuments of Grace: New England Crime Literature and the Origins of American Popular Culture, 1674–1860 (1993); Andrea McKenzie, “From True Confessions to True Reporting? The Decline and Fall of the Ordinary’s Account,” (2005) 30 London Journal 55; Frances Dolan, True Relations: Reading, Literature, and Evidence in Seventeenth-Century England (2013); Joy Wiltenburg, Crime and Culture in Early Modern Germany (2012), 65–87. Ruth Ahnert discusses much earlier forms of writing from within prisons in The Rise of Prison Literature in the Sixteenth Century (2013). The Old Bailey Sessions Papers (now avail- able online, see the References) have attracted a significant amount of attention from scholars inter- ested in their narrative implications.
    [Show full text]
  • The Law-In-Action of the International Criminal Court
    2005] DEVELOPMENTS AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT THE LAW-IN-ACTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT By Mahnoush H. Arsanjani and W. Michael Reisman* When we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. -Missouri v. Holland (Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.,J.) As the International Criminal Court (ICC) moves from an exhilarating idea to a carefully negotiated document and finally to an operational institution, the cogency of its conception will be tested by the manifold realities of international politics, not the least of which will be the practical and financial limits those realities may place upon investigation and prosecution. The drafters of the Rome Statute' benefited from important previous experiments-the Nuremberg Tribunal and the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. But once the Court is launched, the predecessors and prototypes that were so helpful in the drafting stages will be of less and less assistance. The ICC must operate in a substantially different context than the earlier efforts, and the problems it will encounter (and already is encounter- ing) will be different from and may prove more formidable than those facing its prototypes. Analytically, there are two types of international criminal tribunals. The first, exemplified by the tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, may be called expost tribunals, in that they are established after the acute and violent situation in which the alleged crimes occurred has been resolved by military victory or political settlement.
    [Show full text]
  • Jurisprudence and Ethics Roscoe Pound
    NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW Volume 23 | Number 3 Article 1 4-1-1945 Law and Morals -- Jurisprudence and Ethics Roscoe Pound Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Roscoe Pound, Law and Morals -- Jurisprudence and Ethics, 23 N.C. L. Rev. 185 (1945). Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol23/iss3/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 1945] LAW AND MORALS-JURISPRUDENCE AND ETHICS RoscoE POUND* I PRELIMINA Y :1 MORALS AND MORALITY The relation of law to morals was one of the three subjects chiefly debated by nineteenth-century jurists, the other two being the nature of law and the interpretation of legal history. Jhering said that it was the Cape Horn of jurisprudence. The juristic navigator who would over- come its perils ran no little risk of fatal shipwreck.2 Commenting on this, Ahrens said that the question called for a good philosophical com- pass and strict logical method.3 But Jhering showed later that the root of the difficulty lay in juristic and ethical vocabulary. On the one side, there was a poverty of terms which required the one word which we translate as "law" to carry many meanings. On the other side, there was in German an abundance of words of different degrees of ethical connotation with meanings not always clearly differentiated.
    [Show full text]
  • When Is Law in Action?
    Vol. 77] OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL FURTHERMORE 59 When Is Law in Action? REBECCA L. SANDEFUR In response to Pamela Foohey, When Faith Falls Short: Bankruptcy Decisions of Churches, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1319 (2015). TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 59 II. CHURCH BANKRUPTCY AS LAW IN ACTION ................................... 60 III. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS: REVEALING WHERE THE LAW IS (AND IS NOT) IN ACTION ............................................................ 62 IV. CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 64 I. INTRODUCTION Sociolegal scholars long ago noted a difference between the “law in the books” and the “law in action.”1 The difference is paralleled in two distinct understandings of how law should be properly understood. The first holds that law is, one way or another, the rules. For example, law may be what we have enacted through legislation or executive order (formal rules). Or, law may be the rules that are logically or analytically emergent from legal decisions (e.g., ‘discovering’ the law through the case method). Or, law may be a deeper, immutable truth that we can discover and which our enactments approximate but may not quite always match (e.g., natural law). The second understanding of how law should be properly understood is interested in “law in action,” in what actually happens with legal phenomena. Sometimes this work compares what actually happens to the “law in the books” and explores how well or poorly the two correspond;2 at other times this work simply explores what happens as a way of understanding what law is. A robust body of work in the law-in-action tradition focuses on the mobilization of law, asking when and how social actors of different sorts—for example, people, families, formal organizations, social movements—turn to law to get something done.3 Faculty Fellow, American Bar Foundation and Associate Professor of Sociology and Law, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
    [Show full text]
  • Review of Jurisprudence by Roscoe Pound
    BOOK REVIEWS Jurisprudence. By RoscoB PouND. St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1959. 5 Vols. Pp. xxvii, 547, 466, 738, 543, 855. $90.00. It has proved extremely difficult for me to work out a review of this book- chiefly, I think, because the book will mean such different things to different groups of men. Thus if you are the ordinary reasonably intelligent but very busy lawyer, a review ought probably to state that this holds rather little for you, and, so far as it does hold anything, is too expensive, at its enormous price, and that it is too sprawling in its organization to be accessible. But if you are a lawyer with an interest in the wider aspects of his profession who is also taking some time off for serious reading, this may be a very good book for you indeed. One thing is sure: there is nothing gathered in English which reports the same general range of legal thinking as does this. In the main, moreover, the ideas, like their sources, are translated into language- and often into application-which we can all understand. And the whole is infused with the powerful and critical home-grown insight about us-folk, our legal problems, and our legal ways, which has been the foundation of Pound's greatness and which has been so strikingly absent in so many (I do not mean, e.g., Radin or the Cohens or Seagle or Cairns) who have quarried abroad not to enrich, but to substitute. If you are this inquiring lawyer, you will meet skillful presentation and critique of law-directed thinking especially from the Latin, the German and the French, informed by an encyclopedic acquaintance with Anglo-American judicial writing up to say 1930 which few have ever matched.
    [Show full text]
  • Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action
    ARTICLES MYTH OF MESS? INTERNATIONAL CHOICE OF LAW IN ACTION CHRISTOPHER A. WHYTOCK* Choice of law is a mess—or so it is said. According to conventional wisdom, choice-of-law doctrine does not significantly influence judges’ choice-of-law deci- sions. Instead, these decisions are primarily motivated by biases in favor of domestic over foreign law, domestic over foreign litigants, and plaintiffs over defen- dants. They are also highly unpredictable. This Article argues that these “mess” claims do not accurately describe at least one domain of choice of law—international choice of law—and it demonstrates what is at stake in this debate for global governance. Part I provides a brief overview of choice-of-law doctrine in the United States. Part II documents the mess claims. Part III then shows how the mess claims, if correct, would be bad news for global governance. Choice-of-law doctrine can increase or decrease global economic wel- fare, enhance or undermine transnational rule of law, and facilitate or hinder trans- national bargaining. The extent of these effects, and whether they are beneficial or harmful, depends largely on the degree to which choice-of-law doctrine actually influences judges’ international choice-of-law decisions and the extent to which those decisions are biased and unpredictable. The mess claims thus imply that if choice of law has any systematic effects on global governance they are likely to be harmful. Part IV uses statistical analysis of an original dataset of published international choice-of-law decisions by U.S. district courts in tort cases to present evidence that choice-of-law doctrine indeed influences these decisions; that these decisions are not biased in favor of domestic law, domestic litigants, or plaintiffs; and that they are actually quite predictable.
    [Show full text]
  • CONTRACTS: LAW in ACTION (2016–Pub.3025) CONTRACTS: LAW in ACTION
    CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION (2016–Pub.3025) CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION Volume I The Introductory Course Fourth Edition Stewart Macaulay Professor of Law Emeritus University of Wisconsin Law School William Whitford Professor of Law Emeritus University of Wisconsin Law School Kathryn Hendley William Voss-Bascom Professor of Law and Political Science University of Wisconsin Law School Jonathan Lipson Harold E. Kohn Chair and Professor of Law Temple University Beasley School of Law Copyright © 2016 Carolina Academic Press, LLC All Rights Reserved Looseleaf ISBN: 978-1-52210-406-3 ISBN: 978-1-5221-0404-9 Library of Congress Control Number: 2016939504 Carolina Academic Press, LLC 700 Kent Street Durham, NC 27701 Telephone (919) 489-7486 Fax (919) 493-5668 www.caplaw.com Printed in the United States of America (2016–Pub.3025) Preface to the Fourth Edition New editions of Contracts: Law in Action allow us to offer new cases and statutes to keep our materials up to date. In this edition, we continue the philosophy and the coverage of the first three editions; once again, we are republishing the preface to the second edition, in which that philosophy is described. As in previous editions, the cases have been edited to make them easier to read. We have used ellipses whenever substantive text has been omitted from the body of an opinion, but some case citations and many footnotes have been omitted without indication. The footnote numbers in our text do not match the footnote numbers in the cases, since we number our footnotes sequentially by chapter. When we reproduce footnotes from cases, we have indicated the original footnote number by putting it in brackets: [ ].
    [Show full text]
  • Judicial Review of Executive Orders' Rationality
    ARTICLE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS’ RATIONALITY DAVID M. DRIESEN* INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1014 I. REASONABLENESS REVIEW DURING THE LOCHNER ERA ..................... 1019 A. Arbitrary and Capricious Review of Executive Orders ............. 1019 B. Lochnerism: A More Activist Approach .................................... 1022 II. THE SPLIT: REASONABLENESS REVIEW AND THE NEW DEAL.............. 1025 A. The Rational Basis Test ............................................................. 1026 B. The Constitutional Justification for Deferential Review of Legislation ................................................................................. 1028 1. The Collective Judgment Rationale .................................... 1028 2. The Functional Rationale .................................................... 1029 3. The Democratic Rationale .................................................. 1030 C. Arbitrary and Capricious Review of Administrative Decisions ................................................................................... 1030 D. Contrasting Reasonableness Review of Legislation with that of Agency Decisions ...................................................................... 1034 III. THE MISSING PIECE: ASSESSING EXECUTIVE ORDERS’ REASONABLENESS AFTER THE NEW DEAL ...................................................................... 1036 A. Exempting the President from APA Review .............................. 1036 B. Constitutional
    [Show full text]
  • BROP!Dp,FING-FIVE CENTS ',Oar P°I the BUSINESS'°" Uot~Jfrfootg ND RADIO
    IEPTEMBER 19, 1960 THIRTY BROP!dP,FING-FIVE CENTS ',Oar p°I THE BUSINESS'°" uoT~jFrFOoTg ND RADIO T ' XI.Tsaa.+tun >rtteTpuI Now official: network option time sliced by 30 minutes Page 29 Another toll tv showdown: FCC orders a second hearing Page 58 Stern disqualifies three applicants in Miami ch. 7 case Page 71 Federal Aviation Agency moves for final say on towers Page 78 ...... 'ASTI .T ti, D. C.;"tiE{'T).111B CC Settles FM Allocations and Rules 53 Stations proposed to be added within the 50 in Farts 1, 2 and 3 of the present Get Frequencies; Licensees uv /m contour live in rural areas regulations. The new form brings or in construc- r communities smaller than together rules governing H t. 25 to File 10,000." tion, licensing and operation of The designation of frequencies in F the 88 -108 me hand w = stated that even- These were the headlines in Broadcasting just 15 years ago. And in the same September 17 issue, there appeared an advertisement highlighting the formation of the predecessor company to Avery - Knodel, Inc. In the decade and a half that followed, fabulous growth came to this industry. And to Avery - Knodel, too ... from six employees in two offices Inds Total Time Sales to almost 100 people in seven strategically located offices ... a selling organization full\ ere $246,339,532 in 1944 qualified and really dedicated to sales ano ME sales for the major and re- kw power were reported at ¡196; service. nal networks an increase 24% over and 875 standard 247, of 1911 With this record of healthy growth, we are adcasting stations during 1944 Clear channel unlimited t1 tailed $240,339,¢32, the FCC rer tions of five to 20 kw pleased to celebrate our Fifteenth Anniversary rted last Friday.
    [Show full text]
  • Law in Action a Little History How It Affects the Student Experience
    Law in Action By Kenneth B. Davis, Jr. Former Fred W. & Vi Miller Dean, UW Law School A Little History "Law in Action" is hardly a new concept, nor did the term originate at Wisconsin. The first reference I've found is in a 1910 article by Roscoe Pound, the Harvard Law School dean whose work was a forerunner to the legal realism movement. But at Wisconsin the concept quickly took hold and developed a distinctive form. It was energized both by the school's appreciation of the value of other social sciences in understanding how law works and by the "Wisconsin Idea" – the commitment to service embodied in the slogan that "the boundaries of campus are the boundaries of the state." According to former Duke Law School Dean Paul Carrington and Professor Erika King, in their 1997 article on the Wisconsin Idea. One effect of the Wisconsin Idea was to bring the university’s new, young law teachers into contact not only with public affairs, but also with academic colleagues in other disciplines who possessed useful expertise. The law school established a liaison with the political science department in 1907, a liaison designed with the purpose of “relating” legal instruction “to modern social and economic conditions.” Between 1904 and 1910 law faculty, Gilmore in particular, similarly collaborated with economics faculty such as John Commons and Richard Ely in a large-scale endeavor to document the history of labor in America. By 1915 law school bulletins actively advocated a mixture of law classes with history, economics, political science, and philosophy classes.
    [Show full text]
  • Law As a Foreign Language: Understanding Law School
    LAW AS A FOREIGN LANGUAGE: UNDERSTANDING LAW SCHOOL Ken Vinson t TABLE OF CoTENrs I. Cracking The Law School Code ....................... 7 A. Rite Of Passage .................................... 7 B. Formalism And Realism ........................... 12 C. Ambiguity In Language ........................... 14 II. Introduction To Legalism ............................. 18 A. So Many Words, So Few Answers .................. 18 B. Acquiring A Legal Mind ........................... 20 C. The Ideal And The Real .......................... 22 D. What Is A "Chicken"? ............................. 28 III. Pursuit Of Deathless Rules And Wily Foxes ............ 33 A. Chasing After The Law ............................ 33 B. Judge And Jury .................................... 39 C. Negligence Or Battery ............................ 43 D. Brooding Omnipresence In The Sky .............. 46 E. Never On Sunday ................................. 48 F. Due Process Of The Law .......................... 53 IV. Legal Science Spawns Casebook ....................... 54 A. Origins Of Casebook .............................. 54 B. Dissecting The Opinion ........................... 62 C. Plain And Fancy Hocus-Pocus ..................... 69 V. Legal Reasoning - And Other Dirty Stories .......... 74 A. The Unaccompanied Suitcase Case ................ 74 B. Analogical Reasoning ............................. 80 C. The Abortion Case ................................ 84 VI. Torts In A Devil's Nutshell ............................ 87 A. Modem Rise Of Negligence Doctrine ............
    [Show full text]
  • Viewbook.Pdf
    10 Reasons to Choose Wisconsin ANDY MANIS 1. Our law-in-action approach 5. A dynamic student 8. A world-class legal education community that is diverse, at a Midwestern price An extensive curriculum, 2. supportive, and friendly small classes, and a wealth 9. A vibrant, internationally of opportunities to work 6. A supportive network of renowned Big Ten university closely with faculty alumni employed coast to with diverse academic and coast and in more than forty cultural offerings One of the largest clinical 3. countries around the world programs in the country 10. Madison, the capital of 7. Diploma Privilege, which Wisconsin—a stunningly Faculty members who are 4. gives graduates from beautiful city with leading scholars, nationally Wisconsin law schools opportunities to work in and globally the ability to practice in government or the judiciary Wisconsin without sitting for a bar exam 1 Welcome from the Dean Welcome to the University of Wisconsin Law School! In these pages, running as a new lawyer. Wisconsin's you’ll discover what makes the University of Wisconsin a special place curriculum provides an extraordinary range of opportunities for clinical and to study law. Of course, this book is just the beginning. I invite you to experiential learning. We offer clinics— visit our website at law.wisc.edu and to tour the Law School to learn hands-on work with live clients—in more about the experience of being a UW Law student. As you start areas as varied as criminal law, health- exploring, let me encourage you to take a close look at several features care advocacy, and business law and entrepreneurship.
    [Show full text]