Did the Aim to Persuade? Author(s): Michael Gagarin Source: Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of , Vol. 19, No. 3 (Summer 2001), pp. 275-291 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the International Society for the History of Rhetoric Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/rh.2001.19.3.275 . Accessed: 04/03/2014 06:46

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This content downloaded from 147.52.233.137 on Tue, 4 Mar 2014 06:46:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions MichaelGagarin

Didthe Sophists Aim to Persuade?

Abstract: Ever since Plato,the Sophists have been seen asteaching “the artof persuasion”, particularlythe art(or skill) ofpersuasive speaking in the lawcourtsand the assembly on which success in life depended. Iargue thatthis view is mistaken. Although describes logos asworking topersuade Helen, he does not present persuasion asthe goalof his own work, nor does any other see persuasion asthe primary aim ofhis logoi.Most sophistic discourse wascomposed in the form ofantilogies (pairsof opposed logoi),in which category Iinclude works like Helen where the other side—the poetictradition Gorgias explicitly cites ashis opponent— is implicitly present. The purpose ofthese works is primarily to display skill in intellectual argument, aswell astogive pleasure. Persuasion may beagoalof some sophistic works, butit is not their primary goal;and teaching the artof persuasion wasnot amajor concern ofthe Sophists.

eallknow that for the Greeks rhetoricwas the artof W persuasion.Indeed, thisis so well knownthat George Kennedy’s standardhandbook is entitled not“ Rhetoricin Greece”, but TheArt ofPersuasion in Greece .1 Wecantrace the idea backto ’ s Rhetoric,where atthe beginning of 1.2we read (in Kennedy’s translation)“ Letrhetoric be [deŽned as]an ability , in each[particular] case, to see the availablemeans of persuasion” , 2 andwe canalso Ž nd itin the earlier analysisof rhetoric in Plato’s Gorgias,where GorgiasidentiŽ es his techneˆ—his“ craft”or “ art”— as heˆrheˆtorikeˆtechneˆ (“the rhetoricalart” ) anddeŽ nes itas follows:“ Isay itis the powerto persuade by speech ( peitheintois logois )jurorsin the

1 GeorgeA. Kennedy, TheArt of Persuasion inGreece (Princeton: Princeton Uni- versity Press, 1963). 2 Aristotle, Aristotle on Rhetoric:A Theoryof CivicDiscourse ,transGeorge A. Kennedy(New York:Oxford University Press, 1991)p. 36. ©TheInternational Society forthe Historyof Rhetoric, Rhetorica, Volume XIX,Number 3 (Summer2001). Send requests forpermission to reprint to:Rights andPermissions, University of CaliforniaPress, JournalsDivision, 2000Center St, Ste 303,Berkeley ,CA94704-1223,USA 275

This content downloaded from 147.52.233.137 on Tue, 4 Mar 2014 06:46:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 276 R H E T O R I C A jury-court,councilors in the council,assemblymen in the assembly, andin every othergathering” (452e). From this Socrates concludes thatrhetoric is a “craftsmanof persuasion” ( peithous deˆmiourgos) and thatits power is “ toproduce persuasionin the mind( psycheˆ) of the audience”(453a). Thus, for Aristotle and Plato, and even (it appears) forGorgias, and by extensionfor the Sophistsin general, rhetoricis the artof persuading others,especially largegroups of people in the lawcourts or political forums. Onthe otherhand, given Plato’s well knownhostility to the Sophistsand to rhetoric in general, we maylegitimately wonder whether he isaccurately representing Gorgias’s views.So we must alsoexamine whatGorgias says in hisown words. He doesnot use the word“ rhetoric”( rhe ˆtorikeˆ)—indeed, noone doesbefore the fourth century (or,tobe moreprecise, the word rheˆtorikeˆ doesnot occur in anysurviving text before the fourthcentury andmost likely wasnot coineduntil then). 3 ButGorgias does include afamousdiscussion of logos (“word, speech, argument”) in his Encomium to Helen . Here we Žnd thatthe powerof logos,whichoverwhelmed anypersonal will Helen mayhave had, comes directly from its association with persuasion,which is added to logos (13).The persuasivenessof logos is alsolinked tomagic,which enchants and persuades (10), to falsehood (11),to compulsion(12), to pleasure whichis achieved throughskill (techneˆ),notthrough truth (13), to belief (13),and Ž nally todrugs(14). In otherwords, Gorgias portrays logos asusing anarrayof toolsto persuade othersto do its bidding, andthe view thatrhetoric, or at least logos,isthe artof persuasion seems to be conŽrmed even by Gorgias’s ownwords. Since thisis the only sophisticdiscussion of logos thatsurvives, it iscommonto infer fromit that for the Sophistsin general, asforPlato andAristotle, rhetoric was primarily concerned withpersuasion. If further conŽrmation is needed, itcan be found in the widely acceptedtradition that rhetoric was invented by Coraxand Tisias afterthe overthrowof the tyrannyin Syracuse in 467,when the riseof democratic institutions including the assemblyand especially the lawcourts made it important to be able tospeak well—that is,to be able topersuade jurorsand assemblymen to accept one’ s arguments.T omeet thisneed Coraxand Tisias invented the art ofrhetoric, wrote the Žrsthandbook or techneˆ onthe subject, and

3 See EdwardSchiappa, “ Did Plato Coin Rheˆtorikeˆ?”, American Journal of Philology 111(1990)pp. 457–70; Thomas Cole, TheOrigins of Rhetoricin (Baltimore: JohnsHopkins University Press, 1991).

This content downloaded from 147.52.233.137 on Tue, 4 Mar 2014 06:46:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Did the Sophists Aim toPersuade? 277 hadsuccessful careers teaching rhetoric to those seeking justice in courtor aspiring to political careers. And followingtheir example the Sophistsbecame richand famous by teachingothers how to speak persuasively.In otherwords, not only wasrhetoric the art ofpersuasion from its very beginning but itcame into existence in responseto the need tospeak persuasively,andthe Sophists,teachers ofrhetoric, continued toserve thisneed. Thisaccount of sophistic rhetoric as the artof persuasionis ac- cepted, asSchiappa hasrecently noted,by virtuallyall scholars since Blass,more than a century ago. 4 And even recent scholarslike Cole, Poulakosand Swearingen, whoapproach sophistic rhetoric from new perspectives thatdownplay its connection to persuasion, have not di- rectlyquestioned the connectionbetween rhetoricand persuasion. 5 Explicitly orimplicitly mostscholars agree thatfor the Sophists,to speak well meantto speak persuasively andto teachrhetoric was to teachthe artof persuasion.Scholarly consensus is always comforting, but (asthe readermay suspect) my aimin thispaper isnot to reafŽrm the consensusbut ratherto reconsiderthe whole issueand ask, did the Sophistsreally aimto persuade? The answer,Iwill suggest,is thatpersuasion was only one goalof sophistic logoi,andnot the most important.I will begin by consideringGorgias’ s Helen; I will then setthis work in the contextof sophistic Antilogiai,andwill conclude witha brief lookat whatother Sophists say about persuasion. Helen hasattracted considerable scholarly attention in recent years,especially since CharlesSegal’ s groundbreaking studyalmost fortyyears ago. 6 Accordingto Segal, “the Helen expressesa view of literatureand oratory which touches closely Gorgias’ s ownpractice andprobably hisown beliefs. Hence the speech mayeven have

4 EdwardSchiappa, TheBeginnings of RhetoricalTheory in Classical Greece (New Haven:Y ale University Press, 1999);cf. , Die attischeBeredsamkeit , vol. I, Von Gorgias biszu (Leipzig:Strauss & Cramer,1887). 5 Cole, Originsof Rhetoric ;JohnPoulakos, SophisticalRhetoric in Classical Greece (Columbia,SC: University of SouthCarolina Press, 1995);C. JanSwearingen, Rhetoric andIrony: Western Literacyand Western Lies (New York:Oxford University Press,1991). Amore direct challenge to the role of persuasion is posed byJames Porter, “The Seductions of Gorgias”, Classical Antiquity 12(1993) pp. 267–99), though his picture of Gorgiasas “ seducing”is quite different frommine. 6 CharlesP .Segal,“ Gorgiasand the Psychologyof the Logos”, Harvard Studiesin Classical Philology 66(1962)pp. 99–155. The most scholarly edition of Helen is Thomas Buccheim ed., Gorgias vonLeontinoi: Reden, Fragmente und T estimonien (Hamburg:Felix Meiner, 1989),but MacDowell’s text, translationand commentary are Ž nefor the purpose ofthis paper(Douglas M.MacDowell ed., Gorgias, Encomiumof Helen (Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 1982)).

This content downloaded from 147.52.233.137 on Tue, 4 Mar 2014 06:46:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 278 R H E T O R I C A servedas a kind of formalprofession of the aimsand methods of hisart” (Segal, p. 102).Segal’ s conclusion,that the descriptionof logos in Helen represents Gorgias’s ownview of logos,isnow widely accepted.But is it correct? Gorgiasstates that his overall goal is to praise Helen anddefend her againstthe poetictradition which blamesher forrunning off withParis and causing the TrojanW ar.She isnot to blame forthis act,he argues,because she wascompelled toact by someoneor somethingshe couldnot resist. The Žrstpoint to note is that this entire line ofdefense isa novelty.Gorgiaswas not the Žrstto defend Helen; she hasdefenders atleast as early as the sixth-centurylyric poet Stesichorus,whose famous palinode maintainedthat Helen never even wentto T roybut stayedin Egypt throughoutthe war. 7 ButGorgias sets himself the moredifŽ cult task of defending Helen while stillaccepting the traditionalstory that she didgo to T roy withParis. Even if the roughly similarposition taken by Helen herself in Euripides’s TrojanWomen (914–65) is earlier (asseems unlikely),8 Gorgias’s argumentis far more elaborate and innovative thananything in Euripides. Gorgiasbegins by assertingthat Helen probably didwhat she did because ofone offour possible agents—the gods(or other su- perhuman forces),physical force, logos, or eroˆs.He then arguesthat whichever ofthese agentswas involved, it, not Helen, wouldbe re- sponsible forher actions.Thus, he needs toshowthat each of these potentialagents is so powerful asto be irresistible.Since the Žrst two,the godsand physical force, were traditionallyregarded as all- powerful, he spends littletime on them and devotes the bulk ofthe work(8– 19) to the othertwo, logos and eroˆs. For logos (8–14) this is a particularlydifŽ cult challenge, since there wasalong-established tra- dition that logos andpersuasion are alternatives to force, 9 but Gorgias argues that logos in factis a powerful forcethat can compel people to act.He makesa similarargument with regard to eroˆs,whichironically wastraditionally a toolby whichwomen exerted controlover men, notvice versa,as here.

7 Thepalinode is Žrst reported in Plato’s Phaedrus 243a-b.V ariationsof this account canbe found in Herodotus2.113– 20 andEuripides’ s Helen. 8 Trojan Women was produced in 415B. C.Thereare no goodgrounds for dating Gorgias’s work (cf. Buccheim 1989:VII-XI), but since hewas bornc. 490,it seems likely thathe composed Helen before 415,when he would havebeen around 75. 9 See R.G.A.Buxton, Persuasion inGreek Tragedy:A Studyof “Peithoˆ” (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1982).

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Much hasbeen writtenabout Gorgias’ s fascinatinganalysis of logos,but thisis not my concernin thispaper. Rather,Iwantto try todetermine whether there isany reason to takethis analysis as Gor- gias’s ownview of logos,asit is generally assumedto be. Consider Žrstwhat Gorgias himself tellsus about logos in the restof Helen (out- side 8–14). He begins by assertingthat the kosmos or“ adornment”of logos istruth (1). Whatever the precise meaning of kosmos,10 this claim implies aconnectionbetween logos andtruth such that even if truth isonly anexternal feature of logos, a logos canandshould in Gorgias’s view containthe truth.His second sentence supportsthe claimthat a logos shouldaccurately represent reality,though italso problematizes thisclaim: “ itis necessary to honorwith praise what is praiseworthy andplace blame onwhatis blameworthy” . The problem, ofcourse, isthat although Gorgias writes as if “praiseworthy”were aquality thatcould be determined separately,he iscertainly aware that it is actuallya judgment thatpresupposes the argumentthat Helen ought tobe praised.Thus Gorgias’ second claim is a tautology;but itseems toafŽ rm, nonetheless, his initial postulate that a goalof his logos is truth.In Helen’s case,Gorgias continues, someone who speaks cor- rectly (orthoˆs)shouldrefute ( elenxai)thosewho blame her (2).And thisis precisely Gorgias’s intention,to addsome reasoning ( logismon) to his logos in orderto demonstrate that those who blame Helen are lying, torevealthe truth,and to put astopto ignorance. Gorgias thus begins hiswork with the strongassertion that by using reasonhe will expressthe truthabout Helen, howeverproblematic that might be, andhe identiŽes truth as the proper goalof logos in general. In the brief narrativethat follows (3– 4), Gorgias proceeds to relate factsabout Helen thathis audience wouldhave accepted as true because they areconsistent with the traditionalaccount of Helen in Homerand elsewhere. Indeed, hequickly stopshis account because these factsare so well known(5). Up tothis point, then, hisaccount ofwhat Helen didwould have been perceived astrue even by those whodid not accept his argument for her innocence. By giving a factuallytrue accountGorgias does fulŽ ll hisclaim that his logos will tell the truth,but hisclaim that he will praisewhat is praiseworthy remainsmore problematic and difŽ cult to assess. Gorgiasalso indicates another aim for his logos in additionto telling the truthwhen he declines tonarrate the well-known facts aboutHelen because “totell thosewho know what they knowcar- riesconviction ( pistis)but brings nopleasure ( terpsis)”(5).T otell

10 Buccheim translates kosmos by Zier (“adornment”); MacDowell has“ grace”.

This content downloaded from 147.52.233.137 on Tue, 4 Mar 2014 06:46:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 280 R H E T O R I C A people whatthey knowis to speak the truth,and this, he implies, isin itself persuasive. 11 Butdespite itspersuasiveness, Gorgias aban- donsthis simple factualtruth because itbrings nopleasure. Thus anothergoal of his logos isto bring pleasure, whichis something sep- aratefrom truth and persuasion. W eshouldnote that this complex structureof relationships— persuasion is linked totruth but sepa- ratefrom pleasure— is reversed in the laterdescription of the effect of logos onHelen, where GorgiasŽ rstconnects the powerof logos withignorance rather than truth (11): if everyone in the audience hadknowledge, “logos wouldnot have the sameeffect” (that is, it wouldnot be sopowerful orso persuasive). 12 Laterhe links plea- sure andpersuasion and again separates both from truth (13): a logos “pleasesand persuades because itis skillfully writtennot because itistruthfully spoken”. These discrepanciesbetween Gorgias’s own logos and the logos that(as he describesit) persuaded Helen arebut one indicationthat the analysisof logos in 8–14 may not represent Gorgias’s ownview of logos andits effect. The four argumentsabout Helen’ s innocence occupy mostof the rest of Helen,but atthe end (21)Gorgias reminds his audience ofthe dualaims of his logos,truthand pleasure: “Ihavetried to eliminate the injustice ofblame andthe ignoranceof opinion. I wantedto write this logos asan encomiumfor Helen andfor myself anamusement (paignion)”.Leaving asidequestions about the Žnalword paignion,13 wemaynote that the twogoals, truth and pleasure, cancoexist, for Gorgiashas told the truthabout Helen andhas also brought pleasure, certainlyto himself andpresumably toothersas well. In short,the statedgoals of Gorgias’s own logos aretruth and pleasure; persuasion isonly positedas agoalof logos inthe courseof hisdiscussion of the effect of logos onHelen, where hisargument requires him topresent logos aspersuasiveforce.

11Gorgiasmay have taken this ideafrom Parmenides, for whom “the one[route]— that [it] is, and that [it] cannotnot be ,is the pathof Persuasion, for it attendsupon truth”

),trans.David Gallop, Parmenides of Elea:Fragments (Toronto:University ofTorontoPress, 1984)pp. 54–55. 12Thetext is corrupt here,but most scholars understandit to meanthat the effectiveness (i.e. the persuasive power) of logos depends ona certain degree of ignorancein the audience. 13Somescholars feel thatthis conclusion turns the entire work into nothingbut “agame”(MacDowell), but most continue to see aserious point to Gorgias’s work, even if it is also,in some respects, anamusement.

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Wemay,ofcourse, question Gorgias’ s claimthat truth is a goal of his logos.Speakers alwaysclaim to speak the truthand rarely say explicitly thattheir aimis to persuade, let alonethat their persuasion will utilize falsehood,deception, andmagic. Only afoolwould take Gorgias’s truth-telling claimat face value.This objection is quite valid:Gorgias’ s assertionscertainly do notprove thathis goal is truth ratherthan persuasion. But the discrepancybetween hisanalysis of the effect of logos on Helen andhis claim about the aimsof hisown logos isat leastsuggestive, and encourages us to lookfurther . The nextstep is to considerthe workas awhole.If Gorgias’s goal isto persuade, does he succeed? Orif not,can we atleastsay that he is trying tomake his logos persuasive?The answerto both questions is no.Not only areaudiences notpersuaded by Gorgias’s logos, but far fromtrying topersuade, he seemsto go out of hisway not to makehis logos persuasive.Of the four causeshe proposesfor Helen’ s conduct, the Žrsttwo— the godsand human force— are traditional. 14 He could havemade a reasonablypersuasive case on these twogrounds alone: he couldignore logos asapossible causeand could incorporate eroˆs intohis argument that the godsare responsible; in the sameway Jasondenies Medea anycredit for helping him in the pastby argu- ing thatthe responsibilitywas Aphrodite’ s alone(Euripides, Medea 527–28). Gorgias, however ,treatsthe Žrsttwo causes only briey, almostperfunctorily (6–7), and dwells instead on the othertwo pos- sibilities, logos and eroˆs,neither ofwhichwould be likely toprovide apersuasivejustiŽ cation for Helen’ s behavior.The picture he gives of logos,moreover,emphasizes its sinister association with decep- tion,drugs and magic, which wouldmake many listeners even less sympatheticto Helen. And eroˆs wastraditionally the causeof many atrociouscrimes committed by women.Hardly anyone in Gorgias’s largely maleaudience wouldbe receptive tothese arguments,and yet hedwellsat length onthese andvirtually ignores his potentially strongerpoints. It thus seems that his goal must be somethingother thanpersuasion. TounderstandGorgias’ s strategyin Helen itwill help if weput hiswork in the broadercontext of sophistic logoi.The oldestand mostin uential Sophist,Protagoras, is associated with two impor- tantstatements about logos:that“ there aretwo logoi onevery sub- ject opposedto one another”,andthat he taughthow to “ makethe

14Theargument that the godsare to blamecan be traced backto Penelope in the Odyssey,who saysthat Helen would not haveslept with Parisif shehad known the consequences, “but agodinduced herto dothe shamefuldeed” ( Od . 23.222).

This content downloaded from 147.52.233.137 on Tue, 4 Mar 2014 06:46:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 282 R H E T O R I C A weaker logos stronger”.15 These viewsled him tocompose pairs of speeches presenting different sidesof the sameissue, a formof com- positioncalled Antilogiai (“Opposing Logoi”),or(as I shallterm it) “antilogy”. Protagoraswas undoubtedly inuenced by the tradition of politicaland legal debate whichwas embodied in the agoˆn, or contestbetween twosides, 16 andmost sophistic logoi reect this con- cept of an agoˆn andthe antilogyform. Examples of full antilogiesare Antiphon’s Tetralogies —hypotheticalcourt cases with two speeches oneachside— and the DissoiLogoi (“Double Arguments”), where the authormarshals arguments for and against several propositions (for example, “goodand bad are the samething” and “ goodand bad arenot the same”). Anotherexample fromperhaps the beginning ofthe fourthcentury isAntisthenes’ s Ajax and —opposing speeches fromthe famouscontest over the armsof Achilles. Lessobvious as an antilogy ,perhaps,is a logos attributedto the supposed inventorsof rhetoric, Corax and Tisias (who were mentioned briey above),the only logos oftheirs that is likely tobe authentic.In Aristotle’s version( Rhetoric 2.24.11,1402a17– 28), which he attributesto Corax, 17 aftera Žghtbetween aweakman and a strongman, the weakman gives aprobability argumentto the effect thatit is not likely thathe, aweakman, assaulted a strongman; the otherreplies witha reverse probability argument,that he isnot likely tohave assaulted a weakman, since he, astrongman, would immediatelybe suspected ofthe crime.In otherwords, because he waslikely todoit,he wastherefore unlikely todoit.

15Protagoras,Fragment 6a: (=fragment24 in EarlyGreek PoliticalThought from to the Sophists,ed.Michael Gagarinand Paul Woodruff(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)p. 187). Fragment 6b: (=fragment27, Gagarin-Woodruff,p. 188). 16Thetragic andcomic agoˆn regularlytake the formof an antilogy,asdo many ofthe speeches of .The fullest studyof the agoˆn logoˆn is Walter Johannes Froleyks, Der inder antiken Literature (diss. Bonn,1973). For a good, briefer account, see HarveyY unis, “TheConstraints of andthe Rise of the Art of Rhetoric”, in DeborahBoedeker and Kurt A.Raaaub eds, Democracy, Empire, andthe Arts inFifth-Century (CambridgeMA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1998), pp. 223–40 (esp. pp. 234–40). 17Plato attributes aslightly different version of the argumentto Tisias,but it is clearly the same logos.Ihaveargued that Aristotle’ s version is probablycloser to the original;see Michael Gagarin,“ Probability andPersuasion: Plato andEarly GreekRhetoric” , in IanWorthington ed., Persuasion: Greek Rhetoricin Action (London: Routledge, 1994)pp. 46–68 (p.51).

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Scholarsrarely recognize that Corax’ s logos is,in fact,an antilogy, apairof opposedarguments. So toois another logos thatis attributed toCorax and Tisias by alatesource and is probably notauthentic but maybe derived froma Žfth-century sophisticoriginal, since the same storyis told about Protagoras and a pupil. 18 The storyis that Tisias wasCorax’ s pupil, but afterhis lessons ended he refused topay for hisinstruction. Corax took him tocourt, where Tisiasargued that if he wonthe case,then accordingto the verdicthe wouldnot have to pay;but if he lost,he shouldnot be madeto pay because itwould be clearthat Corax’ s teachingwas worthless. Corax answered with exactlythe opposite logos:if he won,Tisias should pay accordingto the verdict,and if Tisiaswon, then clearlyhe hadlearned avaluable lessonand should pay forit. This antilogy has the specialtwist that the two logoi areexactly the same,only reversed. 19 Strictlyspeaking, anantilogyconsists of apairof logoi, but some sophistic logoi thatare not composed in pairsmay best be understood in the contextof thisagonistic form of composition as implicit parts of anantilogy.Alcidamas’s Odysseus,forinstance, which isOdysseus’ s prosecutionspeech atthe trialof Palamedes,is clearly intended tobe readas aresponseto Gorgias’s Palamedes,aversionof Palamedes’s speech fromthe sametrial. Alcidamas’ s speech presupposes Gor- gias’s andforms an antilogy together with it. Similarly Gorgias’s single speeches, Helen and Palamedes,arealso implicit antilogies. In the formerGorgias explicitly refers tothe familiar logos of the poets thatHelen wasto blame, and he poseshis own logos as a counter totheirs. Similarly the defense of Palamedes presupposes andin a sense incorporatesthe prosecution’s case,which was familiar from the poetictradition. Each work thus presupposes the opposing logos asitexists in the poetictradition, and each can be seen asanantilogy in which one ofthe twoopposed logoi ispresent only implicitly. 20 Now,in mostcases an antilogy,takenas awhole,does not point to anyspeciŽ c conclusionor give anyindication which logos wins. When itdoes, as in Aristophanes’s Clouds,the verdictis usually problematic andthe audience isleft wondering whether the winning argument

18Forreferences see Ludwig Radermachered., Artium scriptores:Reste dervoraris- totelischenRhetorik (Vienna:Rudolph M.Rohrer,1951) pp. 15–16. For Protagoras see Diogenes Laertius 9.56. 19Cf.Sextus Empiricus’s version of the story( AdversusMathematicos 2.96–99), where henotes thatthe pupil “used the sameargument, altering nothing.” 20Wemayalso include in this categoryGorgias’ s OnNot-Being ,which arguesto beginwith thatnothing exists, since Gorgiasquite probablywrote this work asin some sense aresponse to Parmenides’famous argument that only Being exists.

This content downloaded from 147.52.233.137 on Tue, 4 Mar 2014 06:46:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 284 R H E T O R I C A really deserved towin. Thus, the purpose ofan antilogy cannot normallybe topersuade the audience ofaspeciŽc conclusion.This isone difference between anantilogyand the actual logoi delivered inthe courtsor the assembly:the latterare almost always intended to persuade their audience, though even here there maybe exceptions: the intent ofSocrates’ s defense speech, forexample, atleast in Plato’s version,does not seem tobe primarilyto persuade the jurors.But the authorsof antilogies are not trying topersuade their audience ofaspeciŽc conclusion. Onthe otherhand, they mayperhaps be trying tomake each individual logos ofan antilogy as persuasive as possible. But often even the individual logoi donot appear intended topersuade. In the caseof the strongman and weak man, for example, the author’s maininterest is certainlythe strongman’ s logos:because Iwaslikely tostart the Žght,therefore Iwasunlikely tostart the Žght.This is anovel andingenious argument,but ithardly seems persuasive or even intended topersuade. Tobe sure,persuasiveness is a subjective judgment, but itis signiŽ cant that although this type ofreverse- probability argumentis also used in Antiphon’s First Tetralogy , which isanother antilogy ,we never Žnd itin anactual court speech, 21 whereasthe ordinarytype ofprobability argument, of which the weak man’s logos isan example, isfound throughoutforensic oratory . Litigantsin court,where persuasivenesswas important, would use traditionalprobability arguments,which were likely tosucceed,but they avoidedthe reverse-probability argumentinvented by Corax. Much asit may have appealed tothe intellectual interestsof the Sophists,it was not likely topersuade realjurors. Twofeatures of antilogiesare relevant here. First,they are composedfor hypothetical situations, often drawnfrom traditional myths.Because of this the authorhas no stake in anydecision or verdictin favorof one ofthe two logoi.There maybe much atstake, however,in termsof reputationor career,depending onhow the au- dience assessesthe antilogyas awhole,but thisassessment cannot depend primarilyon the criterionof persuasiveness. Second, most sophisticantilogies are like Corax’s inthatone oftheir logoi presents anobviousor traditionally authorized position, whereas the otheris novel andoften appearsimplausible— Protagoras’ s “stronger”and “weaker” logoi.ForCorax, the weakman’ s argumentthat being weak

21Aspeakermay argue, as in Lysias7.12– 19, that he did not commit the crime because hecould not havehoped to doso and get awaywith it, but this is not the same asarguingthat he did not commit the crime precisely because he was likely to doso.

This content downloaded from 147.52.233.137 on Tue, 4 Mar 2014 06:46:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Did the Sophists Aim toPersuade? 285 he wouldnot have attacked the strongman Ž rstis traditional and unremarkable;it surely required littleeffort oringenuity tocompose. Butthe opposing logos isquite untraditionaland even implausible. Thispresents a challenge tothe author:how can one makean ar- gument thatthe strongman was not the aggressor?Corax’ s solution wasthe clever reverse-probability argument:the factthat I waslikely todo it in itself mademe unlikely todo it. This novel argumentis especially ingenious in turning the weakman’ s probability argument rightback at him,and, not surprisingly ,itmadeCorax famous. Clearlya Sophist’s reputationdepended noton his success in presenting atraditionalargument, but onhisskill atŽnding anovel andclever waytoargue anuntraditional view thatmight at Žrstseem implausible oreven absurd.It would have been easyfor Gorgias to present the traditionalargument that Helen wasto blame forthe TrojanW arand only slightly moredifŽ cult to argue,as othershad, thatshe wasnotto blame because she never wentto T roy.The position he argues,however ,thatshe wasnot to blame despite the factthat she wentto T roy,isnot only novel,but wouldhave struck most of hisaudience asimplausible. And the argumentsabout logos and eroˆs thathe choosesto rely onmakethe caseeven morenovel andless plausible. If Gorgiaswere really trying topersuade hisaudience of Helen’s innocence, he couldhave chosen a different strategywith amuch greaterchance of success. But if hispurpose wasrather to enhance hisreputation and demonstrate his intellectual virtuosity, then he mayhave felt thatthe moreimplausible the caseappears initially,the morechance he hasto show his skill in arguing forit, aswell asto develop novel perspectives onthe issuesinvolved, such ascausationand responsibility . Totakeother examples, the authorof the DissoiLogoi (written c. 400 B. C.)22 cannotreally be trying topersuade hisaudience thatgood andbad are the samething, for his case is in one sense obviousbut in anotherpatently fallacious: he argues,for instance, that in anathletic contestvictory is good for the winner andbad for the loser,or that waris bad for those who die in itbut goodfor the undertaker.He cannotexpect hisaudience simply toacceptthe conclusionthat good andbad are the same.What his purpose is,is disputed: perhaps he istrying todemonstrate his ingenuity in devising someargument forthis position, however implausible; perhaps he istrying toclarify

22Translatedin Gagarin-Woodruff,cit. in n.15 above, pp. 296–308. There is a full text, translation,introduction andcommentary by T. M. Robinson, Contrasting Arguments:An Edition of the“ Dissoi Logoi” (New York:Arno Press, 1979).

This content downloaded from 147.52.233.137 on Tue, 4 Mar 2014 06:46:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 286 R H E T O R I C A waysof thinking orspeaking aboutsuch paradoxes. But in anycase, heisnot primarily trying topersuade. Similarly,even scholarswho think Gorgias’s On Not-Being isa seriouswork do not think he is really trying topersuade hisaudience thatnothing exists. Gorgias mayhave a seriouspurpose, justas Zeno certainly does in his famousparadoxes. But Gorgias did not persuade anyonethat in factnothing exists, nor did anyof Zeno’ s colleaguesbelieve thata realAchilles wouldnever be able tocatch up toarealtortoise. Still, these argumentshave intrigued andenlightened thinkers downto our own day. The sameis true of Helen.Gorgiascould have concentrated on the traditionalarguments about force and the gods,which could relativelyeasily be madepersuasive, and then omittedthe arguments on logosand eroˆs.Butwhereas the Žrsttwo arguments are of little or no interest,the lasttwo still interest scholars today and surely interested Gorgias’s contemporaries,for it is in these thatGorgias forces people tothink aboutspeech andemotion in new ways.It does not matter whether anyone ispersuaded of Helen’s innocence; the important thing isthat Gorgias’ s argumentsopen up new waysin whichto think aboutlanguage, emotion,causation, and responsibility .Hiscase may be shocking,even perverse; itmay be completely unconvincing; but his logos remainsone ofthe mostinteresting andintellectually stimulatingworks of the sophisticperiod. Much the sameis true ofGorgias’s style.In awell-known passage DiodorusSiculus reportsthat in 427Gorgias “ amazedthe Athenians by the strangenessof hisstyle” . 23 Whether the logos in questionwas Helen orsomeother work, amazement is an understandablereaction toGorgias’s style,and I imagine he probably expected andperhaps even hoped forthis reaction. Modern criticsgenerally condemnthe style,24 andsome of Gorgias’ s moretraditionally-minded contempo- rariesmay have felt the sameway .ButGorgias was a popular and successfulpublic speaker,andeven if hisaudiences did notenjoy his style,many of them must have appreciated its virtuosity .And aswith the contentof hisworks, Gorgias’ s stylewas probably notintended tomake his argument more persuasive but ratherto demonstrate

23Diodorus Siculus 12.53.3: ; see Buccheim, cit. in n.6above,p. 110. 24See,for example, J.D.Denniston, Greek Prose Style (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1952)p. 12: “ Startingwith the initial advantageof havingnothing in particular to say,he was ableto concentrate all his energies upon sayingit.” Denniston wonders how Gorgias“ was ableto get awaywith it”.

This content downloaded from 147.52.233.137 on Tue, 4 Mar 2014 06:46:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Did the Sophists Aim toPersuade? 287 the Sophist’s skill in creatinga novel,outrageous, and even perverse style,but one thatcontinues to attract attention today . Even when asophistic logos presentsthe moreplausible or “stronger”argument,we mayquestion whether the goalis really persuasion.The casepresented in Gorgias’s Palamedes,forexample, shouldprobably be takenas the stronger logos,because itwas tra- ditionallythe justcase (though itcould be the weaker logos because it lost),25 but even here, where the aimis not to shock his listeners, Gorgiasmay have other goals in mind.The speech presentsa sample ofcommon arguments, including aproem(1– 5) on the importance ofhis reputation, his opponent’ s wickedness,and his uncertainty howto proceed; then (6–12) a point-by-point demonstrationof the improbabilityof the accuser’sscenarioof betrayal;next (13–21) a cat- alogue ofhispossible motiveswith probability argumentsrefuting eachpossibility; then (22–27) alistof speciŽc weaknessesin the prose- cution’s case;then (28–32) adescriptionof hisown accomplishments andcharacter; and Ž nallyan epilogue (33–37) with generalizations aboutjustice andinjustice. Of course,persuasion is in asense agoal ofthe speech: the mythicalcharacter Palamedes is presumed tobe trying topersuade the hypotheticaljurors hearing the case.But the primaryaim of Gorgias’s logos isnot necessarily to persuade hisown audience thatPalamedes is innocent (which everyone alreadyknew), but ratherto display for them every possible argumentfor the de- fense in one speech. Arealforensic speech wouldconcentrate on thosefew argumentsthat were mostpersuasive, but Palamedes, de- spite itsforensic setting, is in essence anepideictic speech. Itsprimary aimis notto persuade but todemonstrateGorgias’ s skill tothe audi- ence, whoare not jurors in courtat Palamedes’trial but intellectuals, studentsand others. Quite similarin thisregard is the speech of Lysiasin Plato’s Phaedrus,inwhichthe non-lovertries to persuade aboy toyield to him.Within itshypothetical context of seduction, the assumedgoal ofthe speech isto persuade the beloved toyield tothe non-lover; Lysias’s (orPlato’ s) true goal,however ,isto impresshis own audience ofintellectuals with his skill in defending amostimplausible case. Tobe sure,the successof thissort of speech maydepend in parton the degree ofpersuasiveness the authorimparts to it,but thisdoes

25Up throughthe Žfth century the tradition wasunanimous in agreeingthat Palamedeswas unjustly accused of treasonby Odysseus and convicted; see further TimothyGanz, EarlyGreek Myth:A Guideto Literaryand Artistic Sources (Baltimore: JohnsHopkins University Press, 1993)pp. 603–8.

This content downloaded from 147.52.233.137 on Tue, 4 Mar 2014 06:46:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 288 R H E T O R I C A notmean that his goal is topersuade hisaudience, whomhe isnot trying toseduce (atleast not in anyliteral sense). Norshould we assumethat such a displayis aimed at teachingsomeone else howto persuade abeloved in arealsituation; for this purpose itwould be far better todemonstrate more ordinary arguments that would be more relevantto real situations (the realnon-lover, after all, will notbe trying toseduce the boy he doesnot love). The aimof thisand other similarspeeches isintellectual, not practical, and persuasiveness is nota majorconcern of the author. One mayargue,of course, that even epideictic oratoryis intended tobe persuasivein the sense thatthe authorwants to persuade the audience ofhis ability to give agoodepideictic speech. Indeed one cansay that every speaker triesto persuade hisaudience of something— acomedian,for instance, could be saidto be trying topersuade hisaudience thathe isamusing. But stretching the meaning of“persuasion”in thisway to include alldiscourse would render meaninglessthe conclusionthat the aimof sophisticrhetoric ispersuasion.It is worth keeping the distinctionbetween aimingto shockor give pleasure ortell the truth,and aiming to persuade, and itis thus legitimate to conclude thatthe Žrstset of goals— shock, pleasure andtruth (or enlightenment)— were moreimportant for mostsophistic logoi thanpersuasion. Finally,we mayapproach the questionof the persuasiveness ofsophisticrhetoric by examining otherreferences topersuasion in sophisticwritings. Outside Helen,where persuasionis always used withreference tothe logos thatpersuades Helen (6,8– 14, 15 and 20), Gorgiasonly mentionspersuasion twice, and both times Palamedes stressesits ineffectiveness. Firsthe askshow he couldhave hoped torule the Greeks afterbetraying them:“ By persuasion?By force? They certainlywould not willingly be persuaded,nor do I havethe powerto force them” (14). Here persuasion,which is assumed to be analternative to force, is seen asineffective. LaterPalamedes tells the jurorsthat since they are“ the foremostof the Greeks in factand inreputation,I shouldnot persuade you withthe aidof friends or entreatiesor pity”(33). Again persuasionis scorned as ineffective. Thisdepreciation of persuasion is common in otherSophists too. Acomputersearch of sophistic fragments using the TLGdatabase ofGreek texts 26 turnsup manyoccurrences of peithoˆ and related words,but mostof these arefrom later writers who cite the Sophists

26See Luci Berkowitz, andKarl A. Squitier, ThesaurusLinguae Graecae: Canon of Greek Authors andWorks ,3rdedn (New York:Oxford University Press, 1990).

This content downloaded from 147.52.233.137 on Tue, 4 Mar 2014 06:46:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Did the Sophists Aim toPersuade? 289 and,like Plato,see persuasionas a primarygoal of their work.In the Sophists’own writings, however ,persuasionis only common in Antiphon’s Tetralogies,where itoccurs nine times. 27 In these workspersuasion is occasionally a positiveforce but moreoften isdepreciated, as itnormally is elsewhere. In Antiphon’s Truth (44B cols.6– 7) justice iscriticized for not serving the needs ofa victim, whomust rely onpersuasion rather then directknowledge ofthe factsto prove his innocence. In Critias’s Rhadamanthys (5–6) a man iscriticized for being “pleased tospeak unhealthy thoughtsand persuade hisneighbors withhis evil daring”, andin the lasttwo versesof the famousfragment from Sysiphus the speaker concludes, “thussomeone Ž rstpersuaded mortalsto believe there wasa race ofgods” — clearlya falsepersuasion in the speaker’sview.Asimilar linking ofpersuasion to the workingof evil isfound in Antisthenes’s Ajax (6) andAlcidamas’ s Odysseus (20).The only approvingmention ofpersuasion is by Antisthenes’Odysseus, who is traditionally the scoundrelin the contestwith Ajax; the factthat he criticizesAjax for refusing tobe persuaded thathe, Odysseus,is right only conŽrms thatthe Sophistsgenerally convey alowopinion ofpersuasion. These examplesreveal that in the survivingfragments the Soph- istsgenerally expresstheir disapprovalof persuasionas either inef- fective orworking evil. The factthat Gorgias in Helen exploitsthis view ofpersuasion and even enlarges itscorrupting in uence in or- der toabsolveHelen ofblame only conŽrms the conclusionthat the Sophistsfully understoodand openly acknowledged the harmful powerof persuasion. This does not mean, of course, that they never triedto be persuasivethemselves. My argumentis not that persua- sionwas never agoalof a sophistic logos,but thatin mostcases persuasionis in the backgroundand is less important than several otherobjectives, such as the seriousexploration of issues and forms ofargument, the displayof ingenuity in thought,argument and style ofexpression, and the desire todazzle,shock and please. Thisconclusion is based, to be sure,on those works of the Sophiststhat survive; we mustnot forget that the vastmajority of their writingshave been lost.But it would be perverse toinsistthat the survivingworks are not representative of the Sophists’thinking andteaching, just as it is perverse, in my view,tosee the Sophists’ maingoal as teaching others how to argue persuasively in forensic ordeliberative situations.W orkslike Helen excited Gorgias’s con-

27Iexclude the court speeches of Antiphon. TheT etralogies andall the other sophistic works referred to aretranslated in Gagarin-Woodruff,cit. in n.15above.

This content downloaded from 147.52.233.137 on Tue, 4 Mar 2014 06:46:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 290 R H E T O R I C A temporariesnot because these workstaught others how to speak better in court(surely few if anylitigants sought to imitate Gorgias’ s argumentsor hisstyle) but because they opened up new andexciting perspectives onthe majorintellectual issuesof the day.In hissatire of sophisticteaching Aristophanes may show Strepsiades enrolling in Socrates’s schoolin orderto be taughthow to win alawsuit( Clouds 112–18), but the contentof Socrates’s teaching(as Aristophanes por- traysit) hasnothing to dowith practical training in public speaking; ratherit consists almost entirely ofuseless knowledge, suchas how tomeasure the distancea eajumps. And when Strepsiadesin the end doesuse hisnewly acquiredknowledge toward off hiscreditors (Clouds 1214–1302), he usesvarious absurd and irrelevant arguments thatno one wouldattempt in actuallitigation. 28 Iwouldnot go so far astoinsist that no Sophist ever taughtanything useful forforensic or deliberative argument;indeed, the “useless”intellectual skillsand argumentsthey taughtprobably didin ageneral wayhelp others become moreeffective speakers.But the Sophists’primary goal was notto teachpersuasive speaking. In sum,the characterizationof rhetoricas simply “the artof per- suasion”and the heavy focusamong scholars of classicalrhetoric ontechniques ofpersuasionhas distorted our understanding of the sophisticcontribution to whatwe callrhetoric. The Sophistshave a uid, multi-faceted understandingof logos,in which persuasionwas but one feature, andnot necessarily the mostimportant. They often haveno intention of persuading, aswhen Gorgiasargues that nothing is,or that Helen isinnocent because she waspersuaded, or when the strongman argues that he isunlikely tohave started the Žght simply because he waslikely todo so. In these andother sophistic logoi, displaying ingenuity andcontributing new andinteresting ideasare moreimportant than persuasion— for the speaker andfor his audi- ence. Justas in much ethicaldiscussion today ,the contextof sophistic discoursewas normallynot a realsituation but amythologicalor hy- potheticalcase, in whichpersuasion is part of the backgroundbut not the mainconcern. For the mostpart the Sophiststreated persuasion asineffective orharmful, and they distancedthemselves and their logoi fromit. Plato was happy tobring up thisnegative aspectof logos in hisown attack on sophistic culture, Žrstisolating persuasion as the solepurpose ofrhetoricand then further limiting rhetoricto the falseand deceptive persuasionof the masses.His characterization of rhetoricas “ the artof persuasion”carried the day,but the remains

28OnAristophanes’ s Clouds see Schiappa, Beginnings,cit. in n.4 above,pp. 70–72.

This content downloaded from 147.52.233.137 on Tue, 4 Mar 2014 06:46:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Did the Sophists Aim toPersuade? 291 ofactual sophistic logoi revealthat before Platothe artof logoi was bothless and much morethan this. For the Sophists, logos was more a toolfor thinking thanfor persuading. 29

29Brief versions of this paper were presented atthe ISHRmeeting in Amsterdam in July 1999and at the annualmeeting ofCAMWS in Knoxville in April 2000.Fuller versions were presented atNorthwestern University (January2000), the University of Aarhus(March 2000), and the University ofT exas(September 2000).I amgrateful to the audiences onall these occasions, aswell asto the readersof Rhetorica,forhelpful suggestions andadvice.

This content downloaded from 147.52.233.137 on Tue, 4 Mar 2014 06:46:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions