Political Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo.Indd

C M C M

Y K Y K

CTP do B2

011/242 2298

Edited by Slobodan Cvejić

INFORMAL POWER NETWORKS, POLITICAL PATRONAGE AND CLIENTELISM IN SERBIA AND KOSOVO*

Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC

Papir: 300g • Mat plastika• Tiraz 200 sa zvezdicom 100 bez zvezdice.

C M C M

Y K Y K

Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* Edited by Slobodan Cvejić Edited by Slobodan Cvejić Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

Publisher SeConS

Reviewers Dr Zoran Stojiljković - Chairman of the Board of An -Corrup on Agency Dr Vladimir Vule ć – Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade Dr Danilo Vuković - Faculty of Law, University of Belgrade

Design and Print Dosije

ISBN 978–86–89515–08–4

Circula on 200

The RRPP promotes social science research in the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia). Social science research aids in the understanding of the speciﬁ c reform needs of countries in the region and in iden fying the long-term implica ons of policy choices. Researchers receive support through research grants, methodological and thema c trainings as well as opportuni es for regional and interna onal networking and mentoring. The RRPP is coordinated and operated by the Interfaculty Ins tute for Central and Eastern Europe (IICEE) at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland). The programme is fully funded by the Swiss Agency for Develop- ment and Coopera on (SDC), Federal Department of Foreign Aﬀ airs. The views expressed in this publica on are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent opinions of the SDC and the University of Fribourg. Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

Edited by Slobodan Cvejić

Belgrade, 2016 TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... 5

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... 7

INTRODUCTION...... 9

Jelena Pešić, Dragan Stanojević INFORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN POLITICS AND ECONOMY IN POST-SOCIALISM...... 11

Marija Babović, Dragan Stanojević, Jelena Pešić, Slobodan Cvejić, Dragana Gundogan METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS ...... 23

INFORMALITY AND CLIENTELISM IN SERBIA Marija Babović, Slobodan Cvejić, Jelena Pešić HISTORICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF INFORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ACTORS IN SERBIA...... 29

Dragan Stanojević, Marija Babović, Dragana Gundogan ACTORS, RESOURCES AND MECHANISMS OF CLIENTELISM IN SERBIA ...... 44

Jelena Pešić, Slobodan Cvejić SOCIAL REPRODUCTION THROUGH INFORMAL SPHERE – THE STRUCTURE AND THE SYSTEM OF CLIENTELISM IN SERBIA ...... 65

INFROMALITY AND CLIENTELISM IN KOSOVO* Adnan Hoxha, Dina Milovanović, Yllka Buzhala HISTORICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF INFORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ACTORS IN KOSOVO...... 77

Adnan Hoxha, Dina Milovanović, Yllka Buzhala ACTORS, RESOURCES AND MECHANISMS OF INFORMALITY AND CLIENTELISM IN KOSOVO . . . . 87

Adnan Hoxha, Dina Milovanović, Yllka Buzhala INFORMALITY AND CLIENTELISM IN KOSOVO EXPLAINED ...... 110 * * *

Slobodan Cvejić, Dragan Stanojević VARYING CONTEXTS OF POLITICAL CLIENTELISM – COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SERBIA AND KOSOVO* ...... 123

SUMMARY...... 133

REZIME...... 136

PËRMBLEDHJE...... 139

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

his publica on is based on the research or- ovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia). Social ganized within the project ‘Informal Prac- science research aids in the understanding of the T ces of Capturing Economic Resources by specifi c needs for reform and in iden fying the Poli cal Elite: Exploring Party Patronage in Kos- long-term implica ons of poten al policy choic- ovo and Serbia.’ The project was made possible es. Researchers receive support through research through the support of the Regional Research grants, methodological and thema c trainings, and Promo on Program (RRPP) which is operated as well as opportuni es for regional and inter- by the Interfaculty Ins tute for Central and East- na onal exchange and networking. The RRPP ern Europe (IICEE) at the University of Fribourg is coordinated and operated by the Interfaculty (Switzerland) and has been fully funded by the Ins tute for Central and Eastern Europe (IICEE) Swiss Agency for Development and Coopera on at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland). The (SDC), the Federal Department of Foreign Aff airs. programme is fully funded by the Swiss Agency The research was implemented by SeConS – De- for Development and Coopera on (SDC), Federal velopment Ini a ve Group from Belgrade and Department of Foreign Aff airs. Center for Research, Documenta on and Publi- ca on (CRDP) from Prish ne. More on website: www.rrpp-westernbalkans.net SeConS, CRDP and the authors would like to thank Peter Rodgers, from the University of SeConS Development Ini a ve Sheffi eld, for his invaluable comments and sugges ons during the process of defi ning the theo- Group re cal framework and establishing the methodol- ogy. We would also like to thank many colleagues SeConS was founded by a group of sociolo- who took part in the October 2015 ‘Informality in gists and social researchers, who for many years Central and Southeast Europe: Linkages Between worked on issues of social development at the Poli cal and Economic Actors’ interna onal con- university and in civil society organiza ons in the ference (h p://secons.net/conf/) which was held country and abroad. In 2005, this group of ex- in Belgrade and had been organized as part of perts decided to become more socially engaged this project. Extended gra tude is given to those and use their knowledge and experience in order colleagues who had contributed insight and in- to contribute to long-term socio-economic devel- forma on on earlier versions of this work. We opment and improvement of living condi ons of are also thankful to the Rectorate of the Univer- individuals and social groups in Serbia and the sity of Belgrade for suppor ng the conference. region. Lastly, we owe many thanks to all our col- SeConS is an independent think-thank or- leagues from SeConS and CRDP who were part ganiza on with experts who conduct empirical of this project and who helped to facilitate the research, analyze policies and processes, specifi c research process. Their eff orts in the prepara- social and economic challenges, educate, and on of policy deliverables of this project were train and empower diff erent actors. Data col- extremely valuable. lec on and analysis conducted by SeConS are a reliable basis for development of methodolo- gies, recommenda ons and policies. This is an Regional Research Promo on important contribu on to the development and Programme in the Western Balkans implementa on of na onal, regional and local (RRPP) policies. SeConS mission is to contribute to ade- The RRPP is aimed at fostering and pro- quate and eff ec ve socio-economic development mo ng social science research in the Western policies and programs and to contribute to eff ec- Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kos- ve work of various stakeholder from the public,

7 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* private and civil sector for development on the The SeConS Research Team: na onal, regional and local level. Main fi elds of ac vity where SeConS has yielded exper se and Marija Babović is a full- me professor spe- high quality results are: social inclusion, gender cializing in the courses Sociology of Labor and equality, rural development, regional and local Economic Sociology at Department of Sociology, sustainable development, migra on, ins tu on- Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade and aliza on, organiza onal reform, development of serves as the Director of Programs at SeConS. the public sector, management and development Slobodan Cvejić is an associate professor of human resources. specializing in the courses Sta s cs in Social Sci- More on website: www.secons.net ences and Economic Sociology at Department of Sociology, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade and serves as the Director of Research Centre for Research Documenta on at SeConS. and Publica on (CRDP) Dragana Gundogan is a PhD student and an associate researcher at the Ins tute for Socio- Centre for Research, Documenta on and logical Research, in the University of Belgrade. Publica on – CRDP was established in 2010 with Jelena Pešić is a teaching assistant in the a mission to promote mechanisms of transi onal courses General Sociology and Sta s cs in Social jus ce that can normalize local and regional rela- Sciences at Department of Sociology, Faculty of onships and aid Kosovo in addressing its history Philosophy and a researcher at the Ins tute for of human rights viola ons. CRDP endeavours to Sociological Research, in the University of Bel- be the focal point for transi onal jus ce in Kos- grade. ovo, represen ng the needs of ethnic minori es and the vic ms of confl ict. Through the years Dragan Stanojević is an assistant professor CRDP has pursued its mission via research, advo- in the courses Sociology of Family and Sociology cacy, networking and event organiza on, engag- of Religion at Department of Sociology, Faculty of ing with partner civil society organiza ons, schol- Philosophy and a researcher at the Ins tute for ars, decision-makers and ins tu ons at na onal, Sociological Research, in the University of Bel- regional and EU level. grade. CRDP is part of RECOM an ini a ve concerned with human rights viola ons commi ed The CRDP Research Team: during the confl icts in the former Yugoslavia. In Nora Ahmetaj is founder of CRDP, Re- order to assist the vic ms in Kosovo CRDP moni- searcher and Expert on Transi onal Jus ce. Ms. tors the law for martyrs veteran and invalids as Ahmetaj was engaged as a consultant for the Eu- result of the war. CRDP also is involved in creat- ropean Commission, and worked for a variety of ing the human security index in Kosovo and ex- interna onal organiza ons such as HLC, UNDP, ploring party patronage and its eff ect in Kosovo’s ICG, AI and HRW. society. Adnan Hoxha is a researcher and an expert The main funding organiza ons of CRDP in project management and economics. He was include the European Union, Konrad Adenauer engaged as a Senior Researcher in this project. S ung, Embassies of the US, Switzerland and Netherlands, Kosovo Open Society Fonda on, Dina Milovanović is a researcher and an Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Charles Stuart Mo expert on minority issues. She worked with Fonda on, Balkan Civil Society Development number of CSOs and interna onal organisa ons Network, Pon s Fonda on, The German Marshall in Kosovo*. In this project she did research on Fund of the United States, Techsoup Global, For- Serb non-majority community. eign Cmomonwealth Offi ce, Regional Research Yllka Buzhala is a sociologist. She worked Promo on Programme, Swiss Agency for Devel- as a researcher in various empirical research opment and Coopera on. projects organized by diff erent research compa- More on website: www.crdp-ks.org nies and NGOs.

8 INTRODUCTION

his book presents results from empirical re- 2004, 2006; Nee, 2003; Nee and Ingram, 1998), search on the informal rela ons between poli cal patronage and clientelism (Hopkin, Tpoli cal and economic elite, and of the 2004, 2006; Kitschelt, 1995, 2000; Kitschelt and spectrum of poli cal and economic actors from Wilkinson, 2007; Kopecky and Scherlis, 2008; Ko- Serbia and Kosovo*1. Informality represents an pecky and Spirova, 2011; Lauth, 2000; Robertson important feature of post-socialist socie es. In- and Verdier, 2013; van Biezen, 2004) and poli cal formal and personal networks that predate the capitalism (Antonić, 1993, 2006; Arandarenko, socialist period are an important legacy for the 2000; Holcombe, 2015; Kolko, 1963; Lazić and development of democra c systems and market Pešić, 2012; Weber, 1922)2. economy in former socialist countries. Par cu- Through research, valuable empirically- larly in the context of weak and blurred ins tu- based evidence had been collected therefore onal and norma ve frameworks, individuals tend to rely more on the informal ins tu ons providing the team with a clearer descrip on of and prac ces. The assump on was that these in- the actors involved in poli cal patronage and cli- formal rela ons inside and between the poli cal entelism as well as a solidly-grounded scien fi c and economic spheres were based on high asym- elabora on of the mechanisms of clientelis c metry of power and a high level of dependence exchange and the detec on of resources being (where usually economic actors depend on will exchanged – through various informal prac ces of poli cal power holders). Therefore, pa erns – all of which have helped form the mechanisms of clientelism and the ques on of the ‘culture of clientelism. Moreover, such a thorough inves- of informality’ became important facets for un- ga on of the phenomena of informal power derstanding the contemporary trajectories in the networks, clientelis c exchange and the abuse of poli cal and economic subsystems of former so- public resources has opened a space for deeper cialist socie es. theore cal insights. Within this space, analy cal insights were then able to address the following The general aim of this research was to ques on: are informality and clientelism wide- iden fy the main forms, determinants and social spread and rooted enough to shape the whole eff ects of informal norms, rela ons and prac ces system of poli cal capitalism? Finally, in compar- –through which poli cal elite captured economic ing Serbian and Kosovan experiences and dis n- resources in Serbia and Kosovo*. The literature guishing between the similari es and diff erences used to complete this research includes elabora- of the two, it became easier to emphasize the ons and cri ques of the concepts of: informality importance of some of the factors that signifi - (e.g. Chavance, 2008; Misztal, 2000), informality cantly shaped the trajectories of the Serbian and in former socialist countries (e.g. Aliyev, 2015; Kosovan systems of poli cal patronage and clien- Burawoy and Verdery, 2000; Grødeland and telism. Aasland, 2007; Ledeneva, 1998, 2013; Smith and The book is organized in ten chapters. Stenning, 2006; Stark, 1992, 1996; Wedel, 1986, In the fi rst chapter, Jelena Pešić and Dragan 1992), rela on between formal and informal Stanojević present a conceptual framework that ins tu ons (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; provides insights and sugges ons on the applica- De Soysa and Ju ng, 2007; Helmke and Levitsky, on of the theore cal approach for further elab- 1 * Designa on for “Kosovo” is without prejudice to ora ons. In the second chapter, Marija Babović, posi ons on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declara on of In- 2 See the reference list in chapter 2 ‘Theore cal dependence. framework.’

9 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

Dragan Stanojević, Jelena Pešić, Slobodan Cvejić Buzhala wrote the sixth chapter that covers his- and Dragana Gundogan present basic methodo- torical context. In the seventh chapter, the same logical considera ons that help shape the proc- authors have presented a descrip on of the ac- ess of data collec on and analysis. The next part tors, mechanisms and resources exchanged in of the book presents results of the analysis for clientelis c networks in Kosovo*. In the eighth Serbia. In the third chapter, Marija Babović, Slo- chapter, Adnan Hoxha, Dina Milovanović and Yl- bodan Cvejić and Jelena Pešić describe an his- lka Buzhala discussed, in more theore cal terms, torical context in which informal prac ces and the characteris cs of informal networks between clientelism were shaped in Serbia. In the fourth poli cal and economic actors in Kosovo*. Finally, chapter, Dragan Stanojević, Marija Babović in the ninth chapter, Slobodan Cvejić and Dragan and Dragana Gundogan widely describe actors, Stanojević show the results of the compara ve mechanisms and exchanged resources in clien- analysis of Serbian and Kosovan systems of cli- telis c networks in Serbia. In the ﬁ h chapter, entelism. The book ends with a brief summary Jelena Pešić and Slobodan Cvejić provide more of the research and the major ﬁ ndings, respec- theore cal elabora ons on the nature of infor- vely. mal networks and poli cal patronage in Serbia. The same outline is applied in the sec on where the results of the analysis for Kosovo* are presented. Adnan Hoxha, Dina Milovanović and Yllka Belgrade, 2016 Slobodan Cvejić

10 ä Jelena Pešić ä Dragan Stanojević

INFORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN POLITICS AND ECONOMY IN POST-SOCIALISM

he main subject of the research presented and blurred ins tu onal and norma ve frame- in this book are informal rela ons, prac ces work, individuals tend to rely more on informal Tand norms (meaning structures) which are ins tu ons. Because of that, pa erns of clien- established between members of the poli cal telism and the ques on of the “culture of infor- elite (on central and local levels), and economic mality” (Grødeland, 2007: 218) are prevalent in actors, including members of the economic elite the contemporary literature concerning the post- in Serbia and Kosovo* a er socialism. Having in socialist context and development of democra c mind the extent of their infl uence on poli cal poli cal ins tu ons. This is usually connected structures and behaviours as well as their poten- with studies dealing with corrup on, which is al to build parallel structures and norms, it be- perceived as one of the crucial problems in the comes clear why analysing informal ins tu ons transi onal period (Karklins 2005; Kotkin & Sajo (such as personal and patron-client rela ons 2002; Miller et al. 2001). networks, clientelism and patronage) is impor- Diff erences between informality in post- tant for understanding the modern governance. socialist countries and in other parts of the Hayoz (2013: 52) stresses: “Governance is then world have not been thoroughly inves gated in happening somewhere between the poles of the exis ng literature, although several studies formality and informality”. Similarly, Helmke and have shown that post-socialist informal prac- Levitsky point out that: “good ins tu onal analy- ces are not only widespread and historically sis requires rigorous a en on to both formal and entrenched, but also represent important parts informal rules. Careful a en on to informal in- of everyday life of the popula on (Aliyev, 2015). s tu ons is cri cal for understanding the incen- Studies on”Russian blat (Ledeneva, 1998), Polish ves that enable and constrain poli cal behavior. zalatwic’sprawy (Butler, 1995) and Bulgarian blizki Poli cal actors respond to a mix of formal and (Begg and Pickles, 1998) demonstrates that over informal incen ves, and in some instances, in- the last 20 years the importance of informality formal incen ves trump the formal ones”(2004: in post-communist countries did not signifi cantly 726). decrease” (Aliyev, 2015:185). Evidence suggest Informality represents an important fea- that far more people in post-socialist socie es ture of post-socialist socie es. David Stark point rely on informal social capital and networks (such out that social actors create strategies and ins - as friends, family members, acquaintances) than tu ons not “on the ruins of communism”, but people in developed capitalist countries or peo- “with the ruins of communism” (Stark, 1996: ple in socialist countries (Rose, 1997; Grødeland, 995). Although o en disregarded in analyses of 2007; cf. Aliyev, 2015). new ins tu ons, informal networks established Many authors point out the diff erent char- in the socialist period play crucial role in their acter of informality in post-socialist countries as crea on and maintenance. As the old system compared to developed ones. In addi on to that, with its state’s monopoly was crumbling, infor- some authors also emphasise the importance mal groups and networks successfully managed of analysing specifi city of informality in diff er- to fi ll the ins tu onal voids (Burawoy et al. 2000; ent post-socialist contexts. A path-dependency Wedel, 2006). Especially in the context of weak theorist explains that the reason why ins tu ons

11 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* remain so long is not only due to legi macy, but Finally, although capitalism represented a also because “powerful individuals or groups targeted model of transforma on, it entails vari- have a vested interest in maintaining the status ous levels of formality and “diff erent degrees of quo. Moreover, like organiza ons, ins tu ons generality and specifi city in formal ins tu ons” face powerful iner al forces that are not only (Chavance, 2008:64There are no unique typical interest–based, but locked into inter-related in- capitalist formal ins tu ons. They get various s tu onal structures” (Nee & Cao, 1999: 800). forms, depending on various factors, such as cur- This theory put forth an idea that pre-exis ng rent poli cal and economic contexts, inherited ins tu ons are con nued to be used in spite of ins tu onal framework and external infl uences changed circumstances. Nee and Cao (1999: 802) (e.g. interna onal organisa ons). Introducing explain that in the following way: “path depend- new formal rules is not an easy process and it of- ency is embodied in the persistence of long- ten creates many problems: new rules may pro- standing ins tu onal arrangements, despite at- duce unexpected outcomes or inten onally col- tempts to change them.” “(I)ns tu onal change lide the exis ng rules; also, their low legi macy is likely to involve mul ple equilibria in which hinders the possibility of their implementa on certain ins tu ons can persist despite compe - (Chavance, 2008). on from others that once established might be equally or even more viable. The consequence of previous events can determine which ins tu- THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS onal arrangement will prevail. Once a solu on OF INFORMAL RELATIONS is reached, powerful interests lock into emergent BETWEEN POLITICS AND ins tu onal arrangements, making it diffi cult to exit from them”. Ins tu ons are not merely the ECONOMICS sources of resistance to changes that had to be overcome, but also the resource for new rou- Social context: post-socialist poli cs nes to be made. David Stark (1992) deals with and economy the issue of plurali es of transi onal changes in diff erent post-socialist countries as well as within In order to perceive and understand de- single coun es where diff erent social spheres velopments in formal and informal spheres of undergo the transi on diff erently. According to post-socialist poli cs and economy in Serbia him, ins tu onal gaps of post-socialism became and Kosovo*, we need an adequate conceptual a frui ul material for those who want to engage framework. Basic theore cal considera ons rel- in building a new social order and reconstruc ng evant to our research begin with Weber’s dis nc- poli cal and economic ins tu ons. The way it on between the legal-ra onal and patrimonial would be done largely depends on the way how government. His no on of poli cal capitalism is the system dissolved. Restructuring of the new of key importance for understanding the transi- ins tu onal regime is thus constrained by the onal context in Serbia and Kosovo*. In order to exis ng set of ins tu onal resources. Therefore point to diff erent forms of development of capi- it is necessary to “highlight the diff erent condi- talist socie es, Max Weber (1978) made a dis- ons of embeddedness, that is, historically se- nc on between economic development driven lec ve processes within which some embedded by ra onal planning and market calcula ons, in condi ons are transformed into specifi c ins tu- which the main objec ve of economic actors is onal confi gura ons of development” (Ghezzi & to achieve profi t (ra onal capitalism) and devel- Mingione, 2007: 18). opment specifi c to oriental and an c socie es where profi t was gained by non-ra onal means, Kopecky and Spirova (2011) are basically state monopolies, benefi ts, fi nancial specula ons whistling the same tune as Stark: communist so- and corrup on (poli cal capitalism). In the soci- cie es, in their opinion, were not cra ed on the e es of poli cal capitalism, economic success is same type of socie es and same type of ins tu- not dependent on market mechanisms but on onal structures that preceded them. Instead of the privileges assigned by the state. It represents the monolithic view on socialist socie es, they such a system of social rela ons in which poli - propose the no on of plurality of communist re- cal and economic elites cooperate for their mu- gimes (Kopecky & Spirova, 2011; cf. Aliyev, 2015: tual benefi t. “The economic elite infl uences the 187).

12 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* government’s economic policies to use regula- Informality on, government spending and the design of the tax system to maintain their elite status in the Apparently, for understanding the rela- economy. The poli cal elites are then supported ons between the poli cal and economic elite, by the economic elite which helps the poli cal informality is one of key concepts. Informality elite maintain their status; an exchange rela on- can be defi ned in numerous ways. The term it- ship that benefi ts both the poli cal and econom- self emerged in the 1940s and 1950s in order to ic elite” (Holcombe, 2015: 41). describe dual economic models which comprised formal and informal economic spheres. Over the In their study on why na ons fail, Acemog- past two decades research of “informality” has lu and Robinson (2012) categorize poli cal ins tu- been established within the studies of ins tu- ons as inclusive (developmental) and extrac ve onal economics, (Aliyev, 2015: 183). As a result, (predatory). According to them, inclusive ins tu- numerous defi ni ons have been created, the ons enable prosperity, economic development majority of which tend to “encapsulate primarily and sustainable democra c ins tu ons. On the the economic nature of informal sector, informal other hand, extrac ve ins tu ons are created to sphere, employment and more generally, infor- please the interests of poli cal elites rather than mal economy” (Ibid: 183). In the literature, the the general popula on with the nega ve eff ect on term ‘informality’, however, also implies various development of inclusive economic ins tu ons types of organisa ons and phenomena, includ- and society as a whole.However, as Holcombe ing kingship groups and inter-personal networks noted, poli cal capitalism is not, contrary to Ace- (Granove er, 1973). The context of poli cal in- moglu and Robinson’s argumenta on, restricted s tu ons and a broader sociological context only to poor countries, but it implies that elites have recently become relevant in analyses of in- can, even in developed countries, design poli cal formality, contribu ng to the increased gap be- ins tu ons for their own benefi t: “Poli cal capi- tween the economic and socio-poli cal meaning talism is more than just an explicit recogni on of this term. Furthermore, “unlike the informal that poli cs infl uences the economic system—an sphere of developed capitalist states, informality idea that is well recognized in the public choice in the developing world is o en diffi cult to grasp literature. Rather, it is a system in which the po- in terms of binary formal-informal divisions.” (Al- li cal and economic elite design the rules so that iyev, 2015: 184). On the other hand, in develop- they can use the poli cal system to maintain their ing countries this rela on is much more visible, elite posi ons” (Holcombe, 2015: 43). as formal ins tu ons are weak while importance The idea of closeness and inseparability of informal ins tu ons is very big. Having all this of poli cal and economic ins tu ons is not new. in mind, we understand informality as a broad Karl Polanyi (2001) has argued that economic in- generic concept that encompasses a wide range s tu ons are embedded and enmeshed in other of ac vi es – social, poli cal and economic – oc- economic and noneconomic ins tu ons. Accord- curring outside the formal sphere. ing to him, the ins tu ng of the economic process vests that process with unity and stability; it Informal and formal ins tu ons and produces a structure with a defi nite func on in norms society. “The economic process, in other words, consists in a system of social rela ons and in To understand the content and the scope of shared rules and beliefs, which reveal con nu- informality one needs to defi ne its rela on to the ity and impose constraints on individuals while formal sphere. New ins tu onalism theorists, de- at the same me opening up opportuni es to veloping Polanyi’s idea of embeddedness, argue them. Ins tu ons have to be understood as so- that ins tu ons, as webs of interrelated norms cially constructed en es in which economic – formal and informal – which govern social re- processes are culturally codifi ed in such a way la onships by structuring social interac ons, are that the fl uidity inherent in economic move- embedded in a wider framework of historical, ments acquires stability” (Maucourant & Plocin- structural and cultural legacy of the given society iczak, 2013: 514). This involves understanding (Nee & Ingram, 1998: 19; Granove er, 1973). Ac- the specifi city of the culture in which economic cording to Ghezzi and Mingione “embeddedness ins tu ons were formed. expresses the no on that social actors can be

13 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* understood and interpreted only within rela on- through channels widely accepted as offi cial”. al, ins tu onal and cultural contexts and cannot The la er encompasses state ins tu ons and be seen as atomized decision-makers maximizing legal framework, but also offi cial organiza onal their own u li es” (Ghezzi & Mingione, 2007:11). rules of the poli cal par es, interest groups, cor- Nee (2003:8) points out that ins tu ons “com- pora ons, etc. prise the formal and informal social constraints However, Helmke and Levitsky (2004) that shape the choice-set of actors. Conceived as stress the necessity of making a clear dis nc on such, ins tu ons reduce uncertainty in human between informal ins tu ons and other informal rela ons by specifying the limits of legi mate ac- phenomena, such as weak ins tu ons, informal on in the way that the rules of the game specify behavioural regulari es, informal organiza ons the structure within which players are free to and culture. pursue their strategic moves using pieces that have specifi c roles and status posi ons. Norms 1. Informal ins tu ons are not the same as weak are implicit or explicit rules of expected behav- ins tu ons. Many formal ins tu ons may be iour that embody the interests and preferences ineff ec ve, with exis ng wri en rules that are of members of a close-knit group or a commu- widely circumvented or ignored. However, in- nity.” Informal norms, on the other hand, are s tu onal weakness does not automa cally defi ned as rules of the social groups which rely imply the existence of informal ins tu ons. on informal mechanisms of monitoring (such as Departure from formal rules may end up social approval or disapproval). Although both crea ng informal ins tu ons (such as clien- formal and informal norms govern interpersonal telism), but it also may result in non-ins tu- rela ons by constraining or facilita ng behaviour onal behaviour (the absence of ins tu on- (providing the structure of incen ves), formal alized checks on execu ve power) (Helmke & rules are explicit and rely on formal mechanisms Levitsky, 2004). for their monitoring and enforcement. Nee and 2. Informal ins tu ons should also be dis n- Ingram further stress out that interac on be- guished from other informal behavioural reg- tween formal and informal norms is quite com- ulari es. As the authors pointed out, “not all plex. “When the formal norms are perceived to pa erned behaviour is rule-bound or rooted be congruous with the preferences and interests in shared expecta ons about others’ behav- of actors in diff erent subgroups, the rela onship iour. Behavioural regulari es may be a prod- between formal and informal norms tends to be uct of a variety of incen ves. (...) To be con- closely coupled”, mutually reinforcing each other sidered an informal ins tu on, a behavioural and lowering the costs of monitoring and en- regularity must respond to an established rule forcement (by using informal mechanisms) (Nee or guideline, the viola on of which generates & Ingram, 1998:33–34). In such a case, formal some kind of external sanc on” (Helmke & and informal norms and ins tu ons tend to be complemen ng. Formal and informal norms may Levitsky, 2004: 725). decouple in cases when formal norms represent 3. Informal ins tu ons are not the same as infor- a ceremonial structure that is designed to sa sfy mal organiza ons. Poli cal or economic actors external cons tuencies and provide legi macy, (as members of specifi c organiza ons) should whereas informal ones guide prac cal ac vi es. be dis nguished from the more or less per- However, if formal ins tu onal sanc ons are manent set of rules they follow (ins tu ons). weak in rela on to contradic ng group interests, As we can analy cally dis nguish formal ins - then informal norms tend to become “opposi on tu ons and organiza ons, the same applies norms” that encourage individuals to oppose the for informal ones. Although informal rules formal rules (Nee & Ingram, 1998: 35). may be embedded within informal organiza- In a similar manner as Nee, Helmke and ons, as Victor Nee (2003) showed, they may Levitsky (2004: 725) defi ne informal ins tu ons also be a part of formal organiza ons. as “socially shared rules, usually unwri en, that 4. Finally, even if informal ins tu ons can be are created, communicated, and enforced out- shaped by the culture of a given society or side of offi cially sanc oned channels. By con- community, the two should be analy cally trast, formal ins tu ons are rules and procedures dis nguished. The authors propose that infor- that are created, communicated, and enforced mal ins tu ons should be defi ned in narrow

14 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

terms of shared expecta ons (which are be- the given rela ons. For example, informal ins tu- ing expressed in certain norms) rather than ons which obstruct the formal ins tu on may shared values. These shared expecta ons at the same me boost its func on or even sub- may or may not be rooted in broader societal s tute it completely. Therefore, they introduced values. The proposed dis nc on allows us a two-dimensional matrix for classifying the rela- then to analyse poten al causal rela onships ons between formal and informal ins tu ons: between culture and informal ins tu ons and 1. the degree to which formal and informal in- make statements on whether broader societal s tu onal outcomes converge and 2. the eff ec- values reinforce or undermine informal ins - veness of relevant formal ins tu ons. The fi rst tu ons (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). Helmke & dimension captures the dis nc on between situ- Levitsky (2006: 7) point out that broader social a ons in which informal rules produce similar or values are not always ones which create infor- diff erent results from those expected from strict mal norms as in case of formal ins tu ons. To adherence to formal rules. Thus, the outcomes put it diff erently, some informal ins tu ons can converge or diverge. The second dimension are strongly embedded in a society’s culture refers to the extent to which wri en rules and and tradi on; however, others are rather a procedures are reinforced and complied with in product of modern ins tu onal changes and prac ce. inven ons with no root in tradi on. The la er Based on these two dimensions, authors norms are more likely to be subject to rapid made a fourfold typology of informal ins tu- changes in comparison to the ones strongly ons: connected to tradi onal features of a society. 1. Complementary informal ins tu ons build up Accordingly, De Soysa and Ju ng point the func oning of eff ec ve formal ins tu ons out that, when explaining informal ins tu ons, ruled by some formal wri en rules. However, researchers have to take into account both meta- these rules are applied along with the infor- ins tu ons (culture and iden ty) and contextual mal ones. Informal ins tu ons thus fi ll in the (historical) variables, as exogenous factors: “infor- gaps of the formal rules, either by “address- mal ins tu ons are largely self-enforcing through ing con ngencies not dealt with in the formal mechanisms of obliga on, such as in patron-cli- rules or by facilita ng the pursuit of individual ent rela onships or clan networks, or simply be- goals within the formal ins tu onal frame- cause following the rules is in the best interests work” (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004: 727). This of individuals who may fi nd themselves in a situ- type of informal ins tu ons o en may en- a on in which everyone is be er off through co- hance effi ciency, but also, they may serve as a opera on.” (De Soysa & Ju ng 2007: 33). founda on for formal ins tu ons, crea ng or strengthening incen ves to comply with formal rules that would otherwise exits merely The modes of informal – formal on paper. Good examples are norms, rou nes rela onship and opera ng procedures that facilitate deci- As we saw in the case of norms within an sion making and coordina on within bureauc- organiza on, formal and informal ins tu ons racies. may also interact in a variety of ways. Helmke 2. Accommoda ng informal ins tu ons are and Levitsky (2004) have, therefore, developed a those that combine eff ec ve formal ins tu- typology of these rela ons, star ng from sharp ons and divergent outcomes, crea ng in- classifi ca on of func onal (or problem solving) cen ves for behaviour that is altering the and dysfunc onal (problem crea ng) rela ons. substan ve eff ects of formal rules, without In the fi rst case, informal ins tu ons may pro- directly viola ng them. “They contradict the vide solu ons to problems of social rela on- spirit, but not the le er, of the formal rules” ships within formal ins tu ons contribu ng to (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004: 727). “They are of- a be er performance, while in the second case, ten created by those actors who are not sat- informal ins tu ons undermine the perform- isfi ed with the outcomes generated by the ance of formal ins tu ons. However, as these formal rules, although they are not able to authors have noted, this simple division proved change or openly violate those rules.” (Helm- to be insuffi cient in capturing the complexity of ke & Levitsky, 2006: 15). Accommoda ng

15 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

informal ins tu ons within formal ones usu- perspec ves: the fi rst includes mo va on ally foster increased compa bility of mutual of individuals or collec ve actors to cre- interest the two, in that way enhancing the ate and maintain them, while the second stability of formal ins tu ons by amor zing argues about broader structural and sys- demands for ins tu onal change. A good ex- temic factors that encourage emergence ample of accommoda ng informal ins tu on of informal ins tu ons. is blat, as a set of informal norms emerged In the eff orts to answer the ques- in Soviet poli cal and economic life in which on about incen ves that encourage dif- strict adherence to formal rules did not al- ferent actors to create informal ins tu- low personal needs and state targeted goals ons, Helmke and Levitsky (2006: 19–22) of enterprises to be met. In such a situa on, propose the following classifi ca on of mo- personal networks of exchange served the ves: need for individuals to obtain essen al goods and services and for managers of enterprises When formal rules are not suffi ce to meet state targets, by fi nding a way around to address a problem, actors linked to the established procedures. formal ins tu ons are prompted to create the norms and procedures enabling them 3. Compe ng informal ins tu ons are those that to do so. coexist with ineff ec ve formal ins tu ons and divergent outcomes. Their func oning di- Even though preferring a formal rectly violates the formal rules (examples are solu on, actors may opt to crea ng an clientelism, clan poli cs or corrup on). informal ins tu on as a way of solving a 4. Subs tu ve informal ins tu ons are those problem that otherwise they would not be that combine ineff ec ve formal ins tu ons able to solve within a formal ins tu on. with compa ble outcomes. These ins tu ons Some mes, formal ins tu ons exist only are employed by actors who seek outcomes on paper but do not fulfi l their role. Also, that are convergent with formal rules and actors some mes fi nd it less costly and procedures, in environments where formal me-consuming to create an eff ec ve in- rules are not rou nely enforced. Therefore, formal ins tu on than a formal one. subs tu ve informal ins tu ons appear when Informal ins tu ons are also cre- formal ins tu ons exist, but fail to achieve ated in order to sa sfy the need for imple- their goals. For example, subs tu ve ins tu- men ng ac vi es that are either unpopu- ons tend to emerge where state structures lar or illegal. An example is development are weak or lack authority (Helmke & Levit- of formally democra c ins tu ons in some sky, 2004). post-communist transi onal socie es along with various informal authoritarian Origins of informal ins tu ons mechanisms exerted. However, in addi on to understand- To fully comprehend the role of informal ing the actors’ mo va on to create and ins tu ons in social reproduc on of a given so- maintain informal ins tu ons, there is the ciety, it is not enough to analyse its performance ques on of the role of the formal system in current circumstances (Helmke & Levitsky, in this process. The fact that formal ins - 2006). They should also be analysed in historical tu ons o en lack adequate solu ons to perspec ve. One of the most important ques- many problems is not suffi cient for explain- ons in analyzing informal ins tu ons is addressing the issue of their origin. Such approach o en ing the causes of their forma on (Helmke includes interpreta on of a phenomenon in the & Levitsky, 2006). That is why mechanisms light of its cultural and historical origin, however of crea on of informal ins tu ons must disregarding the process of changes and trans- be inves gated. Making of informal ins - forma ons of the informal ins tu ons. tu ons is completely diff erent than formal ones, primarily in terms of their transpar- The crea on and reproduc on of ency and u lized channels (Helmke & Lev- informal ins tu ons, alongside formal itsky, 2004). Being hidden from the public ones, can be analysed from two diff erent and enforced through informal channels,

16 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

the origin of informal ins tu ons is o en 3. changes of wider societal condi ons that blurred. That is why it is usually diffi cult sustained informal ins tu ons (for example, to iden fy main actors, coali ons and in- changes in diff erent poli cal or economic terests involved in their crea on. Further- spheres may lead to changed distribu on of more, such process usually produces in- power and resources in a society, weakening equality in distribu on of resources and those actors who benefi ted from par cular consequently confl icts between the in- informal ins tu ons and strengthening those volved actors. who wanted to change them, etc.); 4. pping (meaning that if a suffi ciently large As Helmke and Levitsky (2004) warned, number of actors become convinced that the forma on of informal ins tu ons may vary: new and be er alterna ves exist, and if a some mes it is a “top down” process, when in- mechanism through which to coordinate ac- formal ins tu ons appear as part of the elite tors’ expecta ons exists, a shi from one set design, or they may emerge independently from of norms to another may occur quite rapidly) elite strategies. On the other hand, informal (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). rules can be created in a decentralised process by many diff erent actors (examples of corrup on or clientelism). In this context, authors stress out Clientelism the need for inves ga ng the crea on of infor- Clientelism is another concept important mal ins tu ons in terms of focal points, repeat- for understanding of informal rela ons between ed interac ons and bargaining. Also, confl icts or poli cs and economy. Patronage and clientelism compromises on some issue can uninten onally are used as synonyms by some authors (Kitschelt lead to the crea on of informal ins tu ons to & Wilkinson, 2007). However, some point out deal with that issue. that “clientelism is a much broader phenomenon than patronage, with patronage being simply one Informal ins tu ons and the process of specifi c type of clientelis c exchange” perhaps ins tu onal change restricted to “the use of resources and benefi ts that fl ow from public offi ce” (Hicken, 2011: 295, Although it is o en thought that informal cf. Robinson & Verdier, 2013: 262). ins tu ons are resistant to change or change rather slowly (Lauth, 2000), Helmke and Levitsky In our view, party patronage represents (2004; 2006) present quite opposing argumenta- a term that relies on a dis nc ve type of poly- on: namely, they argue that informal ins tu ons centric poli cal system in which poli cal par es not only change, but o en may change rather are compe ng over public resources. The patron- quickly, depending on the sources of change. age network func ons as a pyramidal structure Several factors may serve as impetus for informal with the patron at the top and number of clients ins tu onal change: (‘brokers’) who themselves represent patrons at the lower hierarchical level with their own clien- 1. changes of formal rules: telis c network at the ground fl oor of the system a. change in formal ins tu onal design, (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Gashi & Emerson, which may aff ect the costs and benefi ts of 2013). The main mechanism of the party patron- adhering to related complementary or ac- age includes clientelism, as a type of informal re- commoda ve informal rules; la ons. By clientelism we will assume such rela- b. changes in formal ins tu onal strength and ons that rest on the forms of exchange between eff ec veness, when change in the level of poli cal par es and other agents, wherein one enforcement of formal rules may alter the side provides benefi ts that the other side seeks, costs and benefi ts of adhering to informal in order to insure poli cal support and loyalty. ins tu ons that compete or subs tute for “This exchange is focused on par cular classes of those rules, or may simply weaken infor- goods, though the feasibility and persistence of mal ins tu ons; clientelis c reciprocity is not determined by the type of goods exchanged” (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2. evolu on of wider societal values (leading to 2007: 7). This exchange o en implies uneven rather slow and incremental informal ins tu- distribu on of resources, which is in accordance onal change);

17 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* with uneven power distribu on between actors, have to build expensive organiza onal surveil- even when they consciously accept the terms of lance and enforcement structures” (Kitschelt & the exchange (Kopecky & Scherlis, 2008; Kitschelt, Wilkinson, 2007: 8). 2000). Clientelist rela ons may appear in various Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007: 7) stated forms: at one end of the con nuum of informal that clientelism represents: “a par cular mode poli cal exchange lies personalis c clientelism, of ‘exchange’ between electoral cons tuencies “based on face-to-face rela ons with norma ve as principals and poli cians as agents in demo- bonds of deference and loyalty between patron cra c systems”. According to them, this kind of and client, but without legal codifi ca on; at the exchange implies long-term rela ons which func- opposite end to this tradi onal clientelism stands on within hierarchical exchange networks ruled the modern clientelism of anonymous poli cal by shared norms (2007: 3–4). Furthermore, they machinery” (Kitschelt, 2000: 849). Although cli- dis nguish: “electoral clients at the ground fl oor entelism is o en perceived as a form of personal of the system, various levels of brokers organized exchange, Kitschelt (2000) argues that only the in a pyramidal fashion and patrons at the top” tradi onalist type of clientelism implies a rela- (2007: 8). Finally, the crea on and maintenance onship based on a direct exchange between of the clientelist networks is organized in a se- poli cians and their clients who are ed by fi rm cre ve manner (2007: 19). For them, three com- obliga ons. Even if “clientelist rela ons involve ponents that represent cons tu ng elements of exchanges between par cular individuals and clientelis c exchange are: con ngent direct ex- small cons tuency groups arranged in hierarchi- change, predictability and monitoring (Kitschelt cal poli cal machines, the la er may be highly & Wilkinson, 2007: 9). However, clientelism is ins tu onalized (and thus impersonal) in the not only limited to exchange between poli cal sense that actors express stable expecta ons vis- par es and other actors; this kind of rela onship à-vis the nature of the players and the interac- also exists within the poli cal par es. ve linkage that they have entered” (Kitschelt, 2000: 852). Some authors stress that the clien- Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) consider telist rela on is dyadic in its nature (patron-client that countries with a mul party system and a However, some other actors may also par cipate low level of economic development are frui ul in this rela on, such as mediatory brokers, who places for the development of the clientelist rela- represent clients of the patrons. These brokers ons. In a similar manner, Robertson and Verdier can parallely act as patrons to the clients at the (2013) point out rela ve importance of clien- bo om of the pyramid. Unlike the patron, the telism in less developed countries with high level broker has no independent control over resourc- of inequality: loyalty of clients is less expensive es but only distribute some resources to the cli- and easily bought in such countries while em- ents under the patron’s control (Muno, 2010). ployment off ers are here o en included in the clientelis c exchange. Clientelist exchange between principals and agents is not usually simultaneous but takes place over me, which imposes the risk of a par- Party patronage and clientelism ty in the exchange process (e.g. voter and poli- Another important term is party patron- cian) to abandon the deal as soon as they are age. Kopecky and Scherlis understand “party “paid” (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007) Therefore, in patronage as the power of a party to appoint order to sustain, clientelism requires an obligato- people to posi ons in public and semi-public life, ry rela onship of the involved par es where ful- considering the scope of patronage to be the fi lment of at least one of the following condi ons range of posi ons so distributed” (2008:356). As is necessary: 1. cogni ve condi on (expecta ons we men oned, we connect the term with clien- of predictable behaviour of cons tuencies), 2. telism and use them to depict dynamics of creat- mo va onal condi on – self-induced consent of ing and maintaining (power) networks. The clear involved par es to voluntary engage in mutual dis nc on is possible on a conceptual, and in clientelis c rela onship. When these condi ons postsocialist context, very diffi cult on empirical are not met, “poli cians may develop ways to level. monitor defec on from the bargain and capabili- es to punish free-riding groups and individuals Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007: 30) stress based on that knowledge. In order to do so, they that “par es make more eff ort to build princi-

18 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* pal–agent linkages of accountability whenever fi eld have interests at the expense of the public “compe veness” is intense”. However, whether good. The main goal which leads poli cal par es being based either on clientelis c or program- is to survive on the poli cal scene and remain in ma c principles, it is largely dependent on of power. In this game for power, the main risk for socio-economic development. They “defi ne party increasing clientelism lies in the way par es are systems as compe ve when ci zens and poli - funded (Hopkin, 2004; 2006). cians have strong incen ves to try hard to win Dangers of clientelism are especially prev- supporters at the margin for one or the other alent in developing and post-socialist countries par san camp”. These situa ons occur when: 1. (Protsyk, Wilson, 2003, Roper, 2002). The poli - rival blocks, iden fi able as alterna ve govern- cal par es exchange with their clients diff ernet ing teams by voters, are closely posi oned in goods and services such as “non-material status terms of expected votes; and 2. suffi ciently large improvements, jobs in the civil service, jobs in number of undecided voters who can dictate the public-sector fi rms, government contracts and rela onship between poli cal actors. However, licenses, subsidies and grants (including tax re- they point out that elec ons are also relevant liefs), public construc on works” in order to in terms of resource control by the government. achieve party goals (Muller, 2000:141– 142). Namely, “they are compe ve only if small changes in electoral support might bring about large shi s in public policy or control of patron- Networks: power and personal networks age” (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007: 28). Oligopolis- c poli cal environment create the most intense Diff erent networks intersect poli cal par- compe veness as poli cal alterna ves are dis- es, state, public ins tu ons and economy, and advantaged and distribu on of public resources create power networks at the top. According to is fully controlled. In this context, it is crucial to Ledeneva (2013:13) “power networks operate know the loca on of fl oa ng voters, while the on principles similar to other informal networks outcome of their vo ng is quite certain (Kitschelt and impose certain norms of reciprocity and in- & Wilkinson, 2007: 30). Finally, “under the condi- formal constraints on people in offi cial posi ons: ons of democra c contesta on, ethno cultural (a) blurred boundaries between friendship and pluralism may represent a signifi cant catalyst of the use of friendship; (b) helping friends at the intensifying cilentelism, as compe on between expense of public/corporate resources or access; par es usually tends to be in line with ethnic and (c) recruitment into networks according to a divisions” (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007: 33). In par cular logic – it could be loyalty, dependence, ethnically mixed socie es, in which ethnic groups or compliance based on transgression/compro- have their own poli cal representa ves, it is very mised recrui ng – rather than the logic of com- diffi cult to organize poli cal life on the basis of pe on and professionalism”. These networks universal values. The clearer the ethnic lines and are based on strong and weak es intersec ng the greater distance between the ethnic groups, the private and public domain. Inside these net- policies are more focused on the distribu on of works actors can be located according to their public goods in accordance with the ethnic lines. func on. Ethnicity is probably the most prominent form of social solidarity, which fi nds its expression in the individual Strong es poli cal fi eld. There are also other forms of net- 1. “Inner 3. “Core working, such as class, genera onal or regional, circle” contacts” which can take on similar characteris cs and fi nd Private Public se ngs a poli cal ar cula on. se ngs 4. “Medi- (de-centered) (centered) 2. “Useful ated, or For this purpose, we will use Van Biezen’s friends” periphery, (2007: 241) defi ni on of “party clientelism”: “a contacts” form of representa on based on the selec ve release of public (material) resources – 1. contracts, Weak es Ins tu on 2. housing, 3. subsidies, 4. pork-barrel legisla- on, etc. – in order to secure electoral support Figure. 1 Types of networks, Source: from individuals or selected sectors of society”. Ledeneva (2013:55) In other words, individuals and groups in poli cal

19 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

As Ledeneva points out: “The inner circle Cellarius, Barbara. 2004: In the Land of Orpheus. serves to back up a leader and to ‘programme’, Madison: Wisconsin Press. ‘filter’ and ‘develop’ the power network. Useful Chavance, Bernard. 2008: Formal and informal in- friends benefit from ‘authorized’ business oppor- s tu onal change: the experience of postso- tuni es, outside the ver cal power, and generate cialist transforma on, The European Journal resources for the survival of the power network of Compara ve Economics, Vol. 5, n. 1, pp. and/or increasing its financial base. Core contacts 57–71. are more likely to benefit from public appoint- De Soysa, Indra and Jonannes Ju ng. 2007: In- ments within the power ver cal and serve as formal Ins tu ons and Development: How safeguards of both the hierarchy’s and the net- They Ma er and What Makes Them Change, work’s interests. The mediated contacts are used in: Ju ng et al (eds.), Informal ins tu ons. for outreaching, ‘switching’ to a diff erent mode How social norms help or hinder develop- and channelling changes” (Ledeneva, 2013:82). ment. Development Centre of OECD. Gashi, Drilon and Shogi Emerson. 2013: A Class of Its Own: Patronage and its impact on Social LITERATURE Mobility in Kosovo. Prish na: Democracy for Development. Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. 2012: Why Na ons Fail?. New York: Crown Publish- Ghezzi, Simone and Enzo Mingione. 2007: Embed- ing. dedness, Path Dependency and Social Ins - tu ons. An Economic Sociology Approach, Aliyev, Huseyn. 2015: Post-Soviet informality: to- Current Sociology, vol. 55 no. 1, pp. 11–23. wards theory-building, Interna onal Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, Vol. 35, No. Grabher, Gernot and David C. Stark, eds. 1997: Re- 3/4, pp.182 – 198. structuring Networks in Post-Socialism. Lega- cies, Linkages and Locali es. Oxford: Oxford Antonić, Slobodan. 1993: Srbija između populizma University Press. i demokra je; poli čki procesi u Srbiji 1990– 1993. Beograd: Ins tut za poli čke studije. Granove er, Marc. 1973: The Strength of Weak Antonić, Slobodan. 2006: Elite, građanstvo i slaba Ties, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 78, država. Beograd: Službeni glasnik. No. 6, pp 1360–1380. Arandarenko, Mihail. 1995: Srbija devedese h: Granove er, Marc. 1985: Economic Ac on and So- prvobitna akumulacija ili poli čki kapitali- cial Structure: The Problem of Embedded- zam, Srpska poli čka misao, god. II, br. 4, ness, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 91, 35–50. pp. 481–93. Arandarenko, Mihail. 2000: Ekonomska stvarnost Grødeland, Åse Berit and Aadne Aasland. 2007: In- Srbije, u: Lazić Mladen (ur.), Račji hod. Be- formality and Informal Prac ces in East Cen- ograd: Filip Višnjić. tral and South East Europe. CERC (Contem- porary Europe Research Centre, University Begg, Robert and John Pickles, 1998: Ins tu ons, of Melbourne) Working Papers Series, No. 3 social networks and ethnicity in the cul- / 2007. tures of transi on: industrial change, mass unemployment and regional transforma on Hale, Henry. 2011: Formal cons tu ons in informal in Bulgaria, in Smith, A. and Pickles J. (Eds): poli cs: ins tu ons and democra za on in Theorising Transi on: The Poli cal Economy Post-Soviet Eurasia, World Poli cs, Vol. 64, of Post-Socialist Transforma ons, pp. 115– No. 4, pp. 581–617. 146. London: Routledge Hall, Peter and David Soskice. 2011: Varie es of Burawoy, Michael and Katherina Verdery, eds. Capitalism: The Ins tu onal Founda ons 2000: Uncertain Transi on. Ethnographies of of Compara ve Advantage. Oxford; Oxford Change in Postsocialist World. Lanham, Boul- University Press. der, New York and Oxford: Rowman and Lit- Hayoz, Nicolas. 2013: Observa ons on the Changing tlefi eld Publishers INC. Meanings of Informality, in: Giordano, Chris- Butler, Amy. 1995: The impact of social welfare pol- an and Nicolas Hayoz (eds.), Informality in icies on self-ini a ve and family structure: Eastern Europe. Pieterlen: Peter Lang. the case of Poland, Social Service Review, Helmke, Gretchen and Steven Levitsky. 2004: Infor- Vol. 69, No. 1, pp. 1–30. mal Ins tu ons and Compara ve Poli cs: A

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22 ä Marija Babović ä Dragan Stanojević ä Jelena Pešić ä Slobodan Cvejić ä Dragana Gundogan

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

n order to iden fy, describe and explore the c) In the area of exper se –specialists and informal prac ces of capturing economic re- experts; Isources by poli cal elite, we have chosen qualita ve research design. The research goal Interviews were chosen as the primary was thus accomplished in two steps: method for collec ng data, mainly because they enable researchers to learn more (and in greater 1. Analy cal reviewing of relevant literature and depth and detail) about respondents’ experienc- data sources with the aim of recognizing: es and perspec ves on a specifi c topic. a) trends in rela ons between economic and With the informa on gathered through poli cal elite over the last 20 years; desk research and mul ple workshops the re- b) current state-of-art research and analysis; search team was able to agree on a theore cal framework to use. Out of this framework, several The research relied heavily on social sci- hypotheses were formulated and therefore used ence journals and books in order to grasp a bet- as tools to help: build the data collec on, con- ter understanding on the historical legacies and struct the fi eld research instruments and target changes in the social context of the two socie- the analysis and elabora on of fi ndings. es. Hypothesis 1: Poli cal party patronage is 2. Semi-structured face-to-face interviews with present on the central and local levels of govern- three groups of respondents1: ance and among all key poli cal par es, those a) In poli cs –people occupying high posi- being either in the rule or in opposi on in Serbia ons in public administra on, infl uen al and in Kosovo*. people in poli cal par es (on the na onal and local level); Poli cal patronage represents an asymmetric exchange of resources, with b) In economy –execu ves/managers in pri- the ul mate purpose to provide poli cal vate companies (small, middle and big en- par es be er chances or opportuni es for terprises). entering –or remaining – in power within the system of poli cal compe on. This 1 From an ethical perspec ve, all par cipants were clearly informed about the objec ves of the study, is frequently accompanied by transi onal were given the right to remain anonymous, and socie es. were guaranteed confi den ality. All of the interviews were recorded. Keeping in mind the sensi v- Pa erns of poli cal patronage –at ity of the issue, all respondents were approached the central and local levels– hold a certain individually and interviewed at places of their number of similar characteris cs. Char- choosing or discre on. With the aim of establishing acteris cs of patronage prac ces may in- and maintaining an open, trust-based “discussion,” clude: all responses – including those that were viewed as controversial – were met with an honest, benevo- lent and respec ul a tude by all interviewers.

23 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

1) appointment of loyal party members to the 2) economic resources such as: money for fi - managing (managers, board members) posi- nancing poli cal campaigns, contracts, jobs ons of important public enterprises; in public or private enterprises (for voters or 2) providing jobs and employment opportuni es poli cians’ post –poli cal occupa on); for loyal party members or other clients; 3) the regula on of prices on certain products; 3) informal agreements about control over pub- 4) informa on –usually informa on that gives lic enterprises between poli cal par es; feu- an advantage to the client over other compet- daliza on of the public sector; itors (during tender procedures, license grant- 4) public contrac ng, tenders, awarding licenses, ing, giving concessions, priva za on process- concessions, gran ng monopolies (or tolerat- es); ing the monopoliza on of certain market seg- 5) other favors –votes, poli cal agita on in favor ments); of one poli cal party (patron’s party), expand- 5) contrac ng the private sector out of free ing networks of voters, etc. compe on (‘se ng the business’) –contracts that are not part of the public sector and not Hypothesis 5: Poli cal patronage rela ons subjected to the public tender procedures, develop between various types of actors: but are pre-arranged and exclude free compe on, such as prin ng party materials, 1) poli cal actors –party members, members of ren ng premises to par es, catering, etc.; governments at all levels; 6) corrup on and manipula on during priva za- 2) economic actors –entrepreneurs, managers, on processes; ci zens (cons tuents, second degree clients, such as rela ves of loyal party members or 7) changing laws in favor of the interests of cer- other important clients); tain lobbyists, interest groups; 3) interlocking brokers (individuals taking posi- 8) gran ng protec on from legal consequences ons at the intersec on of two elite circles even when legal norms have been broken. –poli cal and economic. Hypothesis 2: Party patronage unfolds Hypothesis 6: Through the process of po- through formal, informal and mixed exchange li cal patronage, clientelis c networks emerge: prac ces. Due to the development path of Ser- bian and Kosovan socie es, it is to be expected The dynamics of establishing and that the rela ons between formal and informal reproducing clientelis c rela ons are very ins tu ons today, will be frequently compe ve complex. And as a result of poli cal pa- although they have func oned, in historical per- tronage rela ons, whole clientelis c net- spec ve, as complementary and even subs tu- works can emerge. These networks can ve. take various forms, but are generally dis- Hypothesis 3: Informal prac ces are sup- nguished as personal networks and pow- ported or framed by the culture of informality. er networks. That culture includes specifi c norms, rituals, customs, language, places. Interviews were conducted on non-random Hypothesis 4: Under party patronage, po- samples of poli cians, businessmen and experts li cal par es capture public resources and use in Serbia and Kosovo*, taking into considera on them to their own advantage (collec ve and in- the representa on of women and ethnic minori- dividual). es. The research was conducted on the central and local level (two local communi es –each in Resources exchanged through clientelis c Serbia and Kosovo*). rela ons may include: In order to recognize poten al pa erns 1) power posi ons –within party ranks, local of changes in informal rela ons, both levels of government and in the central legisla on of research –i.e. na onal and local– have encom- execu ve power; passed both current and former offi ce holders.

24 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

SAMPLE PLAN FOR RESEARCH ON The samples were iden ﬁ ed and selected THE CENTRAL LEVEL as the following:

Subsamples (each in Serbia and Kosovo*): # of Respondents 1. Poli cal elite: 25 representa ves of the fi ve Category of Respondents largest poli cal par es in the last 5 years; The Kosovo* Serbia interviewees were high and middle range Poli cal Elite 40 55 poli cians who had, or used to had, important posi ons within the poli cal structures Central level 25 30 and public administra ons; Local level 15 25 2. Economic actors: 15 entrepreneurs/top man- Economic Actors 20 26 agers of big, medium and small-sized, privately– and publicly-owned enterprises (excluding Central level 15 20 members of the poli cal elite); Local level 5 6 3. Interlocking brokers: 10 persons occupying Experts 10 8 poli cal and economic power posi ons at the same me, thus linking and bridging the polit- Interlockers 10 9 ical and economic elite (poli cians on boards Total 80 98 of public companies, as well as big entrepreneurs or tycoons in poli cal power-holding posi ons); In the fi rst phase of analysis, data were 4. Experts: 10 experts – representa ves of state coded, depersonalized and decomposed to com- and independent bodies that deal directly or ponents that responded to respec ve hypothe- indirectly with relevant issues (such as the ses, while in the second phase, all data was proc- An -corrup on Agency or the An -corrup on essed in NVivo so ware and analyzed. Council) as well as representa ves of civil society organiza ons dealing with these issues and independent experts from the academic Disclaimer Regarding Northern Kosovo community. For the purpose of this research, four northern municipali es (Mitrovica North, SAMPLE PLAN FOR RESEARCH ON Zvecan, Zubin Potok, Leposavic) have been THE LOCAL LEVEL en rely excluded as the issues of poli cal patronage and informality in the north were Two local communi es were selected not researched for three main reasons: –each in Serbia and Kosovo* (one of two was 1) northern municipali es fi rst had local mul -ethnic): elec ons within the Kosovo* system in Serbia: Velika Plana and Novi Pazar (the 2013 and those local governances are s ll Bosniak minority cons tutes 77% of the popula- not fully opera onal due to a number of on); issues; Kosovo*: Prish na and Gračanica (the Serb 2) most of the poli cal patronage and infor- minority cons tutes 68% of the popula on); mality relates to Serbia rather than Kos- ovo*, thus a diff erent research approach The subsamples in each local community: would be needed to cover the other mu- 1. Poli cal elite: 15 representa ves of the fi ve nicipali es; largest poli cal par es in the local commu- 3) most of the interlocutors provided state- nity; ments such as: “depending if you ask 2. Economic actors: 5 managers or entrepre- about the north or the south, as those neurs of local public or private, big, medium are two diff erent worlds.” and small-sized enterprises.

INFORMALITY AND CLIENTELISM IN SERBIA

ä Marija Babović ä Slobodan Cvejić ä Jelena Pešić

HISTORICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF INFORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ACTORS IN SERBIA

n our a empts to explain the causes of per- shaped structural and norma ve grounds of sistence of informal rela ons between poli - informality in the pre-socialist period, leading Ical and economic actors in Serbia, we una- to establishment of the specifi c type of infor- voidably pay a en on to weak ins tu ons and mal culture. The culture of informality in the troublesome ins tu onal change that marked pre-modern Serbia had a strong foothold in the the whole modern history of Serbia. By apply- non-ins tu onal way of dealing with social and ing historical analysis we can dis nguish be- poli cal problems. In some cases informal prac- tween longue duree historical processes that ces were the consequence of lacking formal aff ect deep structures and cultural pa erns in ins tu ons, while in others, they were devel- the society on the one hand and current actors oped besides and parallel to formal norms and and processes that mark the poli cal scene and ins tu ons, subs tu ng, compe ng or comple- norma ve framework on the other. Further on men ng them. we will present interplay between formality and Un l the early 19th century, Serbia rep- informality in social reproduc on in three his- resented a peripheral and weakly integrated torical stages, all of which contributed by their province within the O oman Empire. Not only own specifi ci es to the development of con- had its development been petrifi ed within the temporary informal prac ces: 1. pre-socialist subsistence economy of extended families (as period marked by late and rather slow mod- economic units) and feudal social rela ons, erniza on, leading to establishment of informal but also Serbian popula on, mainly residing in structures and ins tu ons, which were internal- remote and isolated rural areas, was not inte- ized through socializa on processes as parts of grated either into the O oman state admin- common culture of the society; 2. heritage of istra ve apparatus or urban economy, lacking the socialist system with its revolu onary inter- almost any formal ins tu onal and norma ve ven ons in the norma ve system and cons tu- structure. O oman policy was not aimed at ac- on of public good; 3. prolonged post-socialist complishing fi rm integra on of rather heteroge- transforma on, resul ng in establishment of a neous parts of the empire, leaving to the local specifi c type of capitalist system on peripheral elders to independently and in tune with the grounds (poli cal capitalism, with elements of tradi ons solve issues of local social and admin- neopatrimonialism and party patronage). istra ve organiza on (tax collec on or arrangements of family rela ons, for example). For the Chris an popula on, this meant existence of a PRE-SOCIALIST HISTORICAL certain autonomy (self-government of the lo- LEGACIES cal communi es, which were in the territories inhabited by Serbian popula on organized as In the fi rst part of this chapter we will districts, municipali es and coopera ves, based address the issue of historical processes that on collec ve ownership of land and the princi-

29 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* ples of egalitarian distribu on of goods), but also founda on for the modern ins tu onal building. preserva on of tradi onal organiza onal forms For example, the extended family, based on the of societal life. In this way, the state appeared as autarchic peasant society, provided increased an absolute, abstract and distant (foreign) central security of property, life, commercial ac vi es government towards the local popula on, as well and administra ve preroga ves of local poli cal as an immediately visible local authority embod- leaders in the period that followed the retreat- ied in foreign representa ves and in local village ing of Turkish authori es from Serbian territories elders. As a consequence, ambivalent a tude (Pavlović, 2004). Therefore, in the newly formed towards state ins tu ons was developed: on the state, despo c rule of the sovereign (knjaz) at one hand the uncondi onal acceptance of power state level was homologous to the patriarchal of the central authority and patriarchal seniority nature of basic social rela ons at lower instances within the local community, and on the other, of societal organiza on – local community and resistance to its direct manifesta ons embodied extended family. in the form of a lower Turkish administra ve and The legi ma ng basis of the state repre- repressive apparatus (Lazić, 2005: 15). The Ser- sented peasantry – encompassing the majority of bian Orthodox Church represented the only in- the popula on – encouraging the maintenance s tu on that remained from the statehood and of egalitarian syndrome and preven ng stronger that func oned autonomously under the O o- social diff eren a on and cons tu on of local man rule. Although ins tu onally undeveloped bourgeoisie that is reproduced on market prin- (Radić, 1994: 349), in some cases it represent- ciples. At the same me, this created a poli cal ed an ins tu onal channel for nego a on with obstacle to rapid moderniza on and establish- Turkish authori es thanks to a small clergy caste. ment of the ra onal– legal apparatus of power, However, for the most part, the social life of this since the central poli cal role was given to the popula on took place outside of towns, signifi - supreme ruler as a mediator between the mass cantly infl uenced more by tradi onal norms and of poor peasants and the underdeveloped and less by formal rules (Turkish authori es defi ned a poli cally dependent rising bourgeoisie (Lazić, minimum set of rules for Chris an subjects and 2011). In this way, during the fi rst half of the 19th le most of their life to be ruled by customary century, the state apparatus had the character- norms of these peoples). is cs of personalized power, where public offi - th Star ng from the early 19 century, Serbia cials o en represented personal servitude of the entered a decade long process of gaining state higher levels of the sovereign, while formal rules autonomy and na on building. In the fi rst half of and ins tu ons were s ll in the process of slow th the 19 century, Serbia was faced with a com- forma on. This lack of certainty, formal rules pletely underdeveloped ins tu onal structure of and ins tu ons, however, induced occurrence the state administra ve, judiciary and repressive of armed revolts of the local elders, disenfran- apparatus that had to be built from scratch. The chised and marginalized traders and clerks (most main feature of this period was specifi c symbio- of which were severely suppressed). sis of poli cal and economic factors that led to amalgama on of private and public interests. For the poor and poli cally dependent The new state elite emerged from the insurrec- commercial bourgeoisie, clerical service in the on movement, encompassing local poli cal state apparatus represented almost the only leaders and members of the young commercial mechanism of protec on of their own econom- bourgeoisie (developed mostly by cross-border ic interests. In this way, the poli cal sphere ab- livestock trading with Austria) that took public sorbed almost all valuable human resources, posi ons in the state apparatus, using them for crea ng a society in which poli cs infl uenced the further accumula on of their own private capital structuring of almost all social rela ons – from (Čalić, 2004). In this way, common public interests economic to private (Stojanović, 2013). As a re- were strongly interlaced with private interests of sult of this intertwining of poli cal and economic the newly arisen elite, while the state apparatus processes, growing rich of a small class of peo- served the need for strengthening the authority ple ran in parallel with the process of se ng up of the sovereign (Lazić, 2011). Since the new state the administra ve, judicial and repressive appa- was lacking in formal ins tu ons and structures, ratus. On the one hand, taking a higher posi on tradi onal patriarchal structures were used as a within the apparatus ensured the acquisi on of

30 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* economic capital, while accumula on of capital, rules of conduct, made the state appear alien on the other hand, allowed taking senior poli cal and foreign at the micro-level. The state appears posi ons. However, it is indica ve that acquisi- as an external force that people are afraid of, at on of the posi ons within the state apparatus the same me trying to cheat on it. This “distrust took precedence over economic accumula on of the subjects and the government does not (Lazić, 2011). represent a fer le ground for widening domains The second half of the 19th century was of freedom and ra onality” (Bogdanović 1994: marked by the slow, but steady process of mod- 182). erniza on of the state apparatus, introduc on of The specifi c dynamics of poli cal par es formal norma ve-ins tu onal structures, pro- (formed in the 1860s, but started with ins tu- fessionaliza on of the state administra on and onal work within the parliament in the early establishment of legal-ra onal power (the rela- 1880s), which were formed almost exclusively in vely modern 1869. cons tu on to some extent the capital by a narrow group of clerks and urban constrained the sovereign rule by introducing intelligentsia, was marked not only by par san independent legisla ve and judiciary power and and non-par san poli cal interests and mo ves by gran ng certain level of autonomy to the lo- but also by strong infl uence of personal rela on- cal communi es). Parallel to that, the local bour- ships, services and animosi es (Stojanović, 2010), geoisie slowly started to develop independently crea ng a specifi c poli cal system. Poli cal par- from the state apparatus, although remaining es were understood as a form of extended fam- economically weak. ily, while party leaders had a strong paternalist Modern poli cal ins tu ons were not func- role, making this ins tu on a semi-personal do- oning according to the envisioned model: domi- main in which public and personal interests and nant pre-modern understanding of the poli cs, rela ons were intertwined. Poli cal rela ons which relied on tradi onal autocra c elements, were o en reduced to personal affi ni es, making hindered and stul fi ed democra c ins tu ons the whole public domain fi lled with elements of that ended up being empty forms without ad- informal and personal rela ons. equate content. Over me, the once established In the economically underdeveloped and ins tu ons were derogated and formal norma- poor society, poli cal par es had another impor- ve rules made pointless. Division of power was tant role – establishing and maintaining informal frequently violated, while laws were broken even economic rela ons with the members of the eco- by the government itself. The deroga on of state nomic elite. Historians tes fy to close rela ons of ins tu ons made space for the monarch to take almost all poli cal par es with fi nancial ins tu- over jurisdic ons not granted by the law and ons – mostly banks – which served as fi nancers to infl uence poli cal and economic processes of their party ac vi es (Stojanović, 2013). Close (Stojanović, 2013). rela ons of the bourgeoisie with poli cal actors, Parallel to that, the process of strong op- therefore, s ll represented a mechanism of proposi on to formaliza on of the rules within the tec on and improvement of their economic in- ins tu onal structure of the state went on. The terests, in this way crea ng a system based on largest poli cal party at the me – the Radi- a specifi c clientelist network. Closeness to the cal party– strongly opposed the liberal concep- ruling regime provided state granted businesses, on of the state, op ng for people’s democracy, forcing even those rare fi nancially strong mem- emana ng absolute sovereignty of the people. bers of the economic elite to close coopera on Representa ves of the Radical party expressed with the state. In this way, the weak business a scep cal a tude towards the state and formal elite remained dependent on the poli cal posi- ins tu ons (relying on the already deeply rooted on holders and vulnerable to poli cal turbu- suspiciousness of the peasantry with the O o- lences. Established party patronage relied on a man state), trying to push the state centralism in system based on state monopolies, prolifera ons, favour of the local governments and reduce the gran ng concessions and control of the market state bureaucra c apparatus (including schools, (Stojanović, 2013). gendarmerie and diploma c missions) (Zund- In this way, fragile democra c ins tu ons hausen, 2009). Such resistance to centralized became even more derogated and reliant on the authority and to subjec ng to the strict formal capital and money fl ows. Not only members of

31 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* the economic elite became dependent on the followed the lines of ethnic division). Carteliza- poli cal power holders, but poli cal par es also on of industry and establishment of monopolies became fi nancially dependent on their fi nancers, (which were mostly in the hands of foreign capi- making the autonomous poli cs of the par es tal) relied on clientelist and informal networks compromised by the reciprocal expecta ons of of economic and poli cal elites. As Dimitrijević poli cal and economic actors. Furthermore, in (1958) noted, concre on of foreign capital with an economically poor society, membership in a the Yugoslav state apparatus was enabled by the poli cal party became one of the main mecha- use of the already established clientelist network, nisms of social promo on and mobility, bringing consis ng of poli cal power holders, foreign in- substan al privileges to its members. Therefore, vestors and domes c mediators. In addi on to the internal structure of the par es also took tolera ng monopolies and illegal concentra on the form of clientelist network. Remaining in of ownership, the state used other mechanisms power (or gaining power) represented the most to protect foreign capital: it made changes in important aim of poli cal ac vity, since the loss customs policy, adopted the laws which were of power usually brought the loss of almost all directed against the domes c industry, made ex- economic and social privileges, making clientelist emp ons from taxes and du es, providing state networks, beside the use of violent means, the jobs, privileges and concessions, etc. (more on most important instrument of poli cal struggles. corrup on aff airs that shook mid-war Yugoslav Finally, the establishment of the Kingdom society, see in: Dimitrijević, 1958). of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918) introduced Apart from that, in the mid-war period, new elites in the poli cal fi eld and created alli- the state appeared as one of key economic play- ances based on ethnic interests (Bakić, 2004). A ers, not only in regula on of economic ac vi es, very turbulent party life but also signifi cant abuse but also in ini a ng and organizing them. In this of offi cial posi ons, arbitrary interpreta on of way, the state emerged as the largest single in- laws and regula ons as well as the arbitrari- vestor, entrepreneur and employer in the coun- ness of power marked this period (Stojanović, try, by the late 1930s, establishing a specifi c form 2013). In the structure of the division of powers of state-centred capitalism. The whole process between the monarch and the parliament, with was characterized by the state’s widening control ethnic compe on between Croats and Serbs, a over strategic sectors of the economy and crea- lot of space was opened for composing informal on of state monopolies (Lazić & Pešić, 2012). coali ons and cliques o en with the idea of vio- In conclusion, in a weak ins tu onal en- lent, illegal or illegi mate realiza on of interests. vironment and in specifi c socio-historical con- Parliamentary instability and turbulent di ons (marked by late moderniza on and poli cal confl icts led to frequent blockades of inclusion into the world capitalist system on the parliament, genera ng deep poli cal crisis. peripheral grounds), clientelism and informal- Encouragement of the confl icts by the monarch ity represented one of the structuring principles and his branched royal-clientelist network ena- of socio-economic and poli cal development of bled him to widen his poli cal infl uence which Serbian society. In this way, informality was not culminated in dissolu on of the parliament, re- only induced on the macro-structural level of the peal of the cons tu on and introduc on of mon- society, but also penetrated into the micro-level arch’s dictatorship. of everyday life. In the absence of formal rules and ins tu ons, people relied on tradi onal or Strong involvement of the state in the invented informal ins tu ons, thus crea ng a economy (especially in the 1930s), together with specifi c culture of informality. massive infl ow of foreign capital, made the domes c, ethnically divided bourgeoisie poli cally dependent (from poli cal par es established on INFORMALITY DURING SOCIALISM ethnic grounds) and economically weak. Cor- rup on of the members of the state apparatus In the beginning of socialism, informal reached enormous propor ons in the mid-war prac ces established in the former period were period, in which the most prominent clients were challenged by profound societal changes that af- representa ves of foreign capital, but also the fected every aspect of social life: economy, com- domes c business elite (clientelist network here muni es, family, ins tu ons, etc. However, as

32 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* the system was developing, the strength of the only depending on class rela ons defi ned in the culture of informality built in previous mes was formal norma ve and ins tu onal framework, increasing and also ge ng new forms adapted but also in a way characteris c for local cultural to prevailing ins tu onal se ng and norma ve and social specifi ci es (ineffi cient bureaucracy, framework. Therefore, informality in Serbia dur- uncompleted na onal state forma on, dominant ing socialism was a mul -faceted phenomenon. rural popula on, etc.). It played a signifi cant role in maintenance and While applying the func onal-structural development of the system and in consolida on approach to analysis of informality, we neglect of class posi on of the ruling class in par cular. neither the role of informality in individual histo- In order to defi ne its real determinis c value, we ries, as manifested in coping strategies of millions have to reveal its scope, forms and main actors. of households, nor its substan ve importance for Here we will approach informality in social- survival of many, especially the poorest ones. ist Serbia as a social mechanism relevant for the However, we assume that similarity of behav- dominant mode of social reproduc on – that of ioural pa erns in combining formal and informal the reproduc on of the class of collec ve own- resources among large numbers of households ers (Feher, Heler, Markus, 1984). Naturally, re- and individuals (which formed typical models produc on of the posi on of the dominant class for peasants, unskilled manual workers, skilled in socialist Serbia assumes refl ec on on the re- manual workers, nomenklatura, etc.) points to produc on of the posi on of other social classes pre-determina on of their social ac on caused and social strata (through imposing laws, manag- by prevailing class rela ons. In other words, ing resources, etc.), as well as unintended con- what might seem as deliberate ac on based on sequences deriving from ambivalence of ‘ra onal free will, in most cases turns out to be reac ve ac on’ of actors pursuing their interests in com- behaviour based on necessity and restricted by mand economy (Lazić, 1994b: 151–162)1. Here vola le law-making and fear of unpredictable informality will be observed as the sphere of so- and o en oppressive implementa on of rules by cial reproduc on complemen ng the dominant the holders of control func ons in ‘party state’ formal processes established through norma ve administra on. For example, a skilled manual and ins tu onal se ng or opposing them, de- worker would be tolerated to commit unregis- pending on the historically specifi c circumstanc- tered paid work a er formal working hours (or es in the development of the socialist system. even unpaid if serving a member of nomenclat- However, system relevant social rela ons repro- ura), but would not be allowed to open a private duced in private sphere, through social networks shop while working in a state owned company of diff erent kinds, will be treated not as a parallel and even his/her moonligh ng would be pun- sphere, but as a sphere func onally dependent ished (the law would be applied) if it exceeded on the workings of the formal system. Therefore, the tolerable limit. It was only the members of informality in socialist Serbia will be analysed as the class of collec ve owners, rela vely small in yet another fi eld of emana on of basic class re- number, whose informal prac ces were freer and la on and arguments for such an approach will more deliberate, but this freedom also evolved be off ered. As such, informality in Serbia during over me. It could be said, actually, that the socialism went through several stages of devel- sphere of informality evolved over me, from its opment following transforma on from its begin- ini al stage (end of WWII) when the Communist ning a er the end of WWII to its end during the Party dominated in all spheres of life, with zero 1980s and 1990s. Being defi ned in such historical ‘degrees of freedom’ from the ‘iron hand’ le way, it necessarily falls in line with the process for individual or collec ve ac on, to a developed of social transforma on of longer dura on that stage in which the system matured and its class assumes persistence of elements of former sys- structure crystallized thanks to, among other fac- tems, their norma ve and cultural components, tors, informal prac ces that paralleled offi cial as well as structural agencies. This means that in- interpreta on of laws. What was important was formality during socialism was transforming not that in me formally egalitarian access to diff erent resources (jobs, informa on, educa on, fi - 1 Ra onal u litarian individual behavior of members nancial resources, housing...) diff eren ated as to of the ruling class ul mately led to economic irra- onality of the whole system and implosion of Euro- emphasize the class structure of Serbian society pean socialism. and much of this diff eren a on was based on in-

33 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* formal prac ces. Although informality, counted changed the previous society. The new Cons tu- per head, was more present among the lower on was enacted which negated private owner- classes (small farmers’ unregistered produc on, ship, with the excep on of small farm holdings manual workers moonligh ng, etc.), it was the and some shops. In the coming years, a new upper class that captured much more available ins tu onal order was built as to introduce po- resources (usually formally state owned) through li cal control of the Communist Party over eve- infl uencing important decisions in the economy ry sphere of social and economic life. The new and poli cs. Communist party membership was order, based on closeness to the Soviet regime, condi onal to entering the circle of power, but was built with strict discipline and severe punish- informal es were important for staying in and ment for disobedience. being promoted. The middle class was gener- On the other hand, this was also the be- ously compensated through diff erent benefi ts ginning of unprecedented wave of moderniza- (higher salaries, be er housing, easier access to on of Yugoslavia. In several years, large parts public educa on) for providing transmission to of the country were urbanized and industrialized the system and it was o en based on informal which completely reshaped the social structure. networks (‘social es’). Thousands of hundreds of new class posi ons For the above reason, here we will pay were opened mostly for the rural popula on of most a en on to informal prac ces of the class Serbia and as many ci zens experienced upward of collec ve owners. We will analyse how they social mobility. combined formal and informal means in order However, recruitment to any important so- to pursue their individual interest and how ul- cial posi on, from the local to the central level, mately their class interest prevailed over the in economy or administra on, was carefully con- 2 common (public) interest of all . trolled and directed by the poli cal establish- Historical sequencing of transforma on of ment. Loyalty to the Communist Party was con- the role of informality in reproduc on of social di o sine qua non of social promo on, however living during socialism would be the following: informal es were also important. Very o en members of party commi ees as well as admin- 1. totalitarian stage, 1945 to mid 1950s istra on offi cials and company managers were 2. liberaliza on stage, mid 1950s to beginning of selected on the basis of war companionship, kin- the 1980s ship or local origin. In this way, circles of power 3. na onalis c stage, beginning of the 1980s to were established parallel to the offi cial system beginning of the 1990s of promo on, which helped their members keep important posi ons in the system and benefi ts Of course, historical occurrences evolved resul ng from them. Nevertheless, it could be in a more con nuous manner and elements of said that informality was not very developed. each stage were gradually formed during former At the bo om of the social ladder, small farm- stages. Such clear cut sequencing is theore cally ers were severely oppressed and their economic produced for the sake of more precise analysis reproduc on was kept at the level of bare sur- and refl ects the dominant form of legi macy at vival, while the response to the demand for extra each stage which will be explained below. hours of the rising class of industrial workers in the informal sphere was limited mostly to sea- sonal support to their parents’ farm holdings. At TOTALITARIAN STAGE the top of the social ladder, informal es were also challenged all the me by vola le decisions A er the end of WWII, in former Yugosla- of the narrowest circle around Josip Broz Tito via the totalitarian regime was established under (Kuljić, 2004: 151). the rule of the Communist Party. The new state The whole system with a monolithic po- was born from social revolu on that radically li cal party at the core was legi mated through 2 It is important to stress that there is no much evi- the quasi democra c poli cal system and heavy dence on this (anyway well hidden) phenomenon propaganda. Things started changing slowly with from the socialist me due to authoritarian charac- the breaking of close es with the Soviet Union ter of the rule and lack of independent sources of informa on.

34 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* in 1948 and infl ux of economic support from the 1995: 168–169). Withdrawal of the state from USA in the beginning of the 1950s. the economy and introduc on of elements of compe ve market raised the social posi on of company managers to a high level (Lazić, 1994b: LIBERALIZATION STAGE 117–121). In the weak ins tu onal surrounding and with underdeveloped culture of the rule of By the mid 1950s several changes were law they just needed proper legi miza on from made in the legisla ve and ins tu onal se ng the Communist Party offi cials to access state that marked the entry to the liberaliza on stage budget, avoid taxa on, take a loan, and so on, of Yugoslav socialism. The economy transferred in order to establish a ‘successful’ business for from the eta st model to a par cipa ve model their companies. On the other hand, poli cians of self-management which assumed more inde- counted on managers to pacify social unrest dur- pendence for enterprises, broader worker rights ing the mes of crisis and used their social es and elements of market prac ces and most en- in rota ng between top posi ons in poli cs and terprises were given over to their employees to economy throughout their career. manage them. Also, private ownership was allowed in agriculture, some services, transport, It was s ll a mono-party system with tourism and cra s, but this insignifi cantly con- poli cs penetra ng each pore of social life, but tributed to the overall GDP (Gapinski, Škegro, decentraliza on brought diff eren a on within Zuehlke, 1988: 32). the Communist Party and forma on of cliques. This meant that posi oning inside the party de- At the beginning it seemed that self-man- pended on membership in informal networks, agement was bringing libera on of work, direct which was favourable for spreading clientelis c democracy and economic growth. ‘From 1952 to rela ons. What happened in the meanwhile was 1965, Yugoslavia witnessed the golden age of its that economic inequali es had tremendously in- economy, rivalling Japan as the fastest growing creased. Although on the other side of the so- worldwide economy (...) In par cular, the year cial ladder small farmers increased their informal 1960 saw Yugoslavia riding a wave of unprec- economic ac vity and moonligh ng and small edented prosperity. Agricultural yields, the rise in stealing from the factories became common be- imports, demand in consumer goods along with haviour, informal prac ces of lower class mem- extended lines of consumer credit were as high bers poorly compensated for growing class ine- as ever. Yugoslavia, the “diff erent” Communist quali es. These were refl ected not only in wages state, a racted worldwide a en on (...) By 1962, and total incomes of the households, but also in overextension of credit, a rapid decline—and access to educa on, quality health care, hous- eventual deple on—of personal savings, and a ing and other social services (Lazić, 1987: 41). failure in industrial output to match the boom in Research in class mobility in Serbia showed that demand brought serious consequences that the already in mid 1970s class structure of the Ser- miracle of the 1950’s could not sustain’ (Neal, bian society became closed and that major social 1997, in Lio a, 2001: 18–19). The most visible classes were self-reproducing to a large extent structural consequence of this period was forma- (Cvejić, 2006). This meant that many posi ons in on of the stratum of company managers, a new higher class, but also in the middle class, were component of higher class to become increas- transferred from parents to children through the ingly infl uen al for reproduc on of social life in complex process of socializa on, important part the coming years. of which was ac va on of (informal) social es During the a empts to bring economy at major points in building a life career (enroll- back on prosperity tracks, a lot of space for in- ing in university, ge ng the fi rst job, being pro- formal prac ces among top managers and poli - moted, etc). cians was opened. S. Woodward states that loos- However, it should be stressed that, pre- ening state control over fi nancial accountability cisely due to a more democra c character of Yu- in order to release available resources for man- goslav self-management socialism as compared ufacturers led to the rise in corrupt misuse of to the dominant Soviet model, informality in this measure and further abuse of funds as they socialist Serbia was not brought to that systemic were made available to enterprises (Woodward, level as in the USSR (Aliyev, 2015: 186). ‘Self-man-

35 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* agement in its true sense, nevertheless, provided beginning of the 1980s), civic ac ons (groups of a number of advantages over a Marxist-Leninist- dissidents, ar sts) or poli cal confl icts (between Stalinist type economy. Not only did the system cliques inside the Communist Party). These were allow for compe on between similar enterpris- circumstances in which informal rela ons es- es, it allowed equally for worker and manager tablished in the former period gained in impor- innova on and the prac ce of free market-type tance. While the whole system was s ll formally rela ons’ (Lio a, 2001: 34). This openness and func oning in accordance with the form of self- exposure to the market provided more fl exibil- management and democra c socialism, tenden- ity and manoeuvring space for formal prac ces. cies towards na onal sovereignty were gaining Nevertheless, it only meant that the breakdown in strength. However, even na onalis c tenden- was postponed and inherent weaknesses of the cies were just a cover for reconstruc on of the system (lack of entrepreneurial spirit, unaccount- higher class (Mirić, 1985: 13). Na onalism was a able management, lack of fi scal discipline, etc.) legi miza on principle for realignment of poli - ul mately led to its terminal stage. cal and economic elites who were maintaining or increasing their power and wealth through failed investments and increase of indebtedness (ibid: NATIONALISTIC STAGE 149). Informal networks were important in two aspects: one was for strengthening na onalis c It is quite common that analysts of post fac on(s) inside the Communist Party in order WWII Yugoslavia recognize the Cons tu on of to provide poli cal legi miza on for the separa- 1974 as the birth place of its destruc on. The on, while the other was for maintaining control Cons tu on of 1974 is considered as Tito’s at- over state owned enterprises in order to provide tempt to pacify rising ethnic elites and their na- fi nancing for this act. onalis c claims, but decentraliza on formalized through it only postponed the bloody breakdown In conclusion, a er signifi cant scaling down (Sekulic, D., G. Massey and R. Hodson, 1994; Li- at the beginning of socialism, informality gradu- o a, 2001). Viewed from the angle of our topic, ally increased during this period and reaffi rmed this was ini a on of signifi cant social change that itself as an important sphere of social structuring led to the na onalis c stage in the development by the end of the 1980s. It was based on diff er- of Yugoslav socialism. During the 1980s the Com- ent legi miza on principles during this period, munist Party was losing its power due to internal but served the same purpose throughout: it em- divisions along ethnic lines. Instead of a single phasized economic inequali es and supported poli cal structure, several independent poli cal class diff eren a on. For the lower classes it ap- elites were formed which, a er Tito’s death in peared as a mode of survival, while for the upper 1980, more or less openly opted for having their classes it served for more effi cient concentra on own piece of economy to control. ‘Confl icts over of poli cal and economic power. The outcome substan ve policy were redefi ned as confl icts was extremely high economic inequali es at the over the distribu on of money—over budgetary end of a seemingly egalitarian regime and main- revenues and tax policy, transfers and subsidies, tenance of poli cal control over economy. and the locus of control over monetary policy, foreign exchange alloca on and banking’ (Wood- INFORMALITY AFTER SOCIALISM ward, 1995: 335). Yugoslav economy was already damaged As it was diff erent from other European by constant crises in the last 15 years. On the socialist countries in the nature of the socialist other hand, economic liberaliza on led to higher system, Yugoslavia was also diff erent in the way expecta ons among ci zens, while poli cal de- socialism was dismantled. The Fall of the Berlin centraliza on weakened control power of the Wall which symbolized the end of a socialist era Communist Party and opened space for stronger in Central and East Europe, followed by introduc- voices of social groups that felt like losers in the on of reform packages meant to quickly de- everyday more visible process of social diff eren- velop basic elements of capitalism on the ruins a on. Social unrests were taking faces of class of socialist ins tu ons, were not the main way confl icts (the rapidly rising number of worker of dismantling socialism in Yugoslavia. Instead, strikes), ethnic uprisings (Kosovo Albanians in the fi erce wars and violence were the way through

36 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* which both – socialism and the state – were dis- The process of blocking transforma on mantled. which lasted for years, enabled former nomen- The period a er the fall of socialism in Ser- klatura members to convert their previous posi- bia is usually divided into two broad stages: pe- onal capital into private economic capital. Re- riod of blocked transforma on during the 1990s search on the recruitment pa erns of the elite and the period of intensive reforms a er 2000. in Serbia during the early 1990s shows a high In each of these stages informality and rela ons level of reproduc on of elites. About one third between poli cal and economic actors were of large entrepreneurs in 1993 were descendants shaped in diﬀ erent ways. of the persons who held command posi ons in the socialist system (mainly managerial echelon). Moreover, almost 45% of large entrepreneurs BLOCKED TRANSFORMATION belonged to the command hierarchy (managerial IN SERBIA or poli cal posi on) before they became entrepreneurs (Lazić, 2000: 133). The consequence of The socialist ruling class in Serbia man- this process of conversion was an extremely high aged to swi ly convert their posi onal capital rate of entrance of nomenklatura members into accumulated during socialism into poli cal and the new economic elite during the early 1990s economic capital more appropriate to the new (Lazić, Cvejić, 2006). situa on marked by (at least formal) poli cal At the same me, the poli cal elite showed pluralism, introduc on of private property and signs of closure. While in the socialist period it market liberaliza on. This capital was based on was heterogeneous by social origin of its mem- the interlocked posi ons of economic and poli - bers, in the early period of post-socialism its cal dominance and it was used to block transfor- social background was more homogenous as ma on, to postpone the development of market its members were prevalently from middle and economy and poli cal compe on which could higher strata (Lazić, 2000: 134–135). undermine its dominant posi on (Lazić, 2000). As the social group who ‘possess concen- The new-old elite in Serbia managed to trated control over accumulated resources that postpone reforms and processes of transforma- are necessary for reproducing the basic condi- on in order to consolidate its new posi on af- ons upon which a given (or poten al) social ter breakdown of its former socialist basis of le- mode of produc on rests’ (Lazić, 2000: 126), the gi macy and social reproduc on. The ‘blocked elite has the essen al role in the processes of transforma on’ was marked by following key building up new ins tu onal framework. During features: the 1990s, there was huge debate about elite circula on or reproduc on (see more in Selenyi and 1) Pseudo-democra c poli cal system, which Selenyi, 1995; Lengyel and Highley, 2000). ‘Circu- was formally cons tuted as a pluralist parlia- la onists’ argued that there was a new elite on mentary democracy, but it persisted basically the scene, and that new elite was created by new as an authoritarian regime, characterized by pa erns of recruitment based on new criterions. poli cal power highly concentrated and cen- ‘Reproduc onists’ claimed that elites showed a tralized in the narrow circles of the ruling par- 3 high degree of reproduc on a er state socialism, ty (par es). meaning that former nomenklatura members 2) Control over economic resources and the eco- had an important part in the composi on of the nomic system, maintained by several instru- elite. In addi on to these two standpoints, a third ments: postponement of priva za on process- one argued that post-socialist socie es faced the es, crea on of inter-organiza onal networks, adap ve reconstruc on of elites, which meant co-opta on of important big entrepreneurs in that ‘with a new reproduc on basis and new so- poli cal power circles. This dimension is very cial roles, a er state socialism breakdown, elites were being forged from the old socialist cadres 3 Firstly there was one ruling party (Milosevic’s So- at the same me that they were inﬁ ltrated by cialist Party of Serbia). Later, as legi miza on crisis outsiders. These elites were construc ng a social deepened, the coali on between SPS and The Jugo- slav Le (Milosevic’s wife’s party) was established, order in which they will form the core of a new and at the end of the 1990s, a coali on between ruling class’ (Lazić, 2000: 139). SPS, the Jugoslav le and Serbian Radical Party (Vo- jislav Seselj) was established.

37 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

important because it ensured the economic es and overall impoverishment of the popula- basis for the poli cal elite reproduc on and on, general insecurity in the society engaged in prevented the processes of power redistribu- surrounding wars, these were all main features on. Postponement of priva za on (with only of living condi ons in Serbia during blocked sporadic priva za on, and o en illegal priva- transforma on. In the fi rst years of the decade za on), together with control over economic of 1990, the volume of informal economy was resources prevented social promo on of po- rising and peaked in 1993, when it accounted ten ally autonomous economic actors, whose for 54% of the recorded na onal product. In power could be uncontrolled by the poli cal the coming years, the volume of informal econ- elite. omy gradually dropped, reaching around 1/3 of 3) Control over ins tu ons, organiza ons and the na onal product by the end of this period social channels necessary for interac ons and (Krs ć et al., 1998: 7). In 1996 the Gini coeffi cient interests ar cula on of autonomous social reached 37.8 indica ng signifi cant increase in in- groups, such as free media, universi es, trade equali es (Bolčić, 2002: 40). Research at the end unions, social movements and NGOs. of the 1990s and beginning of 2000 showed that 4) Informal economy, with two main roles: to informal economy was rather a generator than pacify lower social strata whose socio-eco- suspensor of inequali es. The benefi ts of the nomic posi on had deteriorated during the tax evasion were distributed more in favour of prolonged economic crisis (Cvejić, 2002), but the employers than the employees, while lesser at the same me, to give the opportunity to budget infl ows and consequently expenditure members of the elite or actors close to them were at the expense of public services for ci - for accumula on of economic capital. zens and support for growing groups of vulner- 5) Isola on from the interna onal community4 able people (Cvejić, 2002). that prevented the impact of external trans- Some authors describe the new system in forma onal infl uences. In the short run, isola- Serbia as poli cal capitalism since members of onist policy of Serbian regime favoured the the old socialist elite a empted to get unrestrict- process of elite reproduc on, preven ng the ed control over collec ve property through proc- impact of external infl uences, and by creat- esses of priva za on (Antonić, 1993). According ing specifi c paternalis c connec ons between to this view, the early phase of poli cal capital- some social groups from the bo om of society ism was marked by various forms of manipula- and the elite. But in the long run, by deepen- on, including smuggling, in the situa on where ing the economic crisis, isola on undermined interna onal economic sanc ons were imposed the economic basis of elite reproduc on and on Serbia, and overwhelming corrup on. The induced diff erent social groups (especially economic system became the arena for various middle strata) to sharpen their interests for fi nancial specula ons and new fi nancial-specu- changes (Babović, 2002). la ve companies managed to accumulate capital at the expense of industrial enterprises and Blocking transforma on processes had devasta ng consequences on Serbian society and ci zens (Antonić, 1993). One of the main factors its popula on. It led to the destruc on of ins tu- that enabled monopoly over public assets and ons, the social structure, culture and the overall their conversion into private hands of the poli - social system. In the absence of func onal ins - cal elite was the postponed priva za on which tu ons, informal actors, networks and prac ces retained about 85% of the capital in the state took the roles of providing func ons necessary ownership during this early post-socialist phase for the reproduc on. The scope of destruc on (Antonić, 2006). This enabled members of the was so broad that some authors were using the poli cal elite to control both spheres – poli cal term ‘destroyed society’ to describe the society and economic – and to convert poli cal capital of Serbia in the fi rst half of the 1990s (Bolčić, into economic. During this process they broad- 1994; Lazić, 1994a). ened the network of regime clients. Individuals included in the protégé network could expect The rise of informality in every aspect but some kind of profi t, depending on their posi on par cularly in the economy, increase of inequali- within the hierarchy. At the top of the hierarchy, 4 Sanc ons against Serbia, as a consequence of the there were members of the economic elite who regime’s war-oriented poli cs. could get high profi ts due to the trade monopo-

38 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* lies on goods from public stocks, involvement started to contradict interests of the new eco- in barter arrangements, illicit tobacco and arms nomic elite. Withdrawal of this elite’s support of trade, purchase of building lots under preferen- the regime, increasing dissa sfac on among the al condi ons, etc. (Antonić, 1993). According to popula on in Serbia that was massively pauper- the same author, the middle posi oned mem- ized, consolida on of opposi on par es and help bers of the network could rely on somewhat from the Western countries, fi nally led to the re- lower rewards, such as undisturbed businesses, gime change in 2000 (Lazić, Cvejić, 2006: 99). secure employment, right to buy state owned housing under favourable condi ons, while the lowest ranks were people who could count on UNBLOCKED TRANSFORMATION keeping their jobs or on being le alone during smuggling ac vi es. The author concludes that The second stage of post-socialist transfor- in the fi rst period of post-socialist transforma on ma on in Serbia, o en labelled as ‘unblocked’, specifi c structures were established with a neo- ‘reac vated’ transforma on (Lazić, M Cvejić, patrimonial state in their centre. S: 2005, Bolčić: 2004), began in the autumn of 2000 by dismantling of the regime of Slobodan Describing the network made of inter- Milosevic and establishment of legisla ve and locked poli cal and economic elites in the fi rst execu ve power by the broad coali on of oppo- phase of post-socialist transforma on in Serbia, si on par es. This stage was marked by eff orts some authors conclude that at the top of this to build new ins tu ons and transpose those power pyramid were ministers-managers, per- which developed during the 1990s within the sons who had shared experience in the poli - informal “para-system” into formal order. Even cal and economic elite, followed by the layer of during this period the remains of Milosevic’s managers of big public enterprises who were at regime (and even earlier periods) slowed down the same me members of coordina on com- the change and hindered development. This was mi ees in the government. The third layer was evident from the fact that organized crime was made of managers of medium and small public undermining the new founda on of poli cal enterprises while at the bo om were managers power5 as well as from the widespread culture of whose poli cal loyal es were ques onable and corrup on and lack of trust in ins tu ons which small entrepreneurs. Depending on their po- remained high even a er Milosevic’s opponents si on in this pyramid, actors had access to im- took power (Cvejić, Babović, Pudar, 2011: 22). portant resources and assets, such as contracts in profi table businesses (oil, gas industry or The poli cal scene in Serbia during a ma- similar), export or import licences, benefi cial ex- jor part of the period a er 2000 was marked by change rates, credits with low interest rates, etc. poli cal instability. Premature elec ons, frequent (Arandarenko, 2000). changes of governments, shi ing coali ons and changes in the balance of power in parliament Complementary processes – blocking trans- and government, were main features of the forma on and transferring economic (and other poli cal system during this period. Numerous social) func ons into the informal system – even- poli cal par es were established and then dis- tually contributed to the reconstruc on, division appeared from the poli cal scene6 a er a few and even confl ict among elite fac ons. Here it years. Consequently, this period is featured by is important to note that the shi of centre of power from poli cs to economy had occurred as absence of a clear poli cal strategy, as the result the consequence of conversion of members of of compromise between the coali on partners in the poli cal elite into big private owners. Simul- power (Cvejić, Babović, Pudar, 2011). taneous priva za on ‘from above’ (through conversion of posi on to private economic capital by 5 The murder of pro-reform Prime Minister in 2003 by former nomenklatura members) and ‘from be- members of organized crime and paramilitary forces indicated the power and strength these groups s ll low’ (through gradual accumula on of economic had in the new phase. capital by entrepreneurs and professionals com- 6 A er enactment of the Law on poli cal par es in ing from middle class) created condi ons, by the 2009, about a hundred poli cal par es were regis- end of the 1990s, in which the con nued poli cal tered and presently there are 101 poli cal par es domina on of the regime of Slobodan Milosevic registered at the Ministry of Jus ce and Public Ad- ministra on, h ps://archive.is/HOR0N

39 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

Another important process that occurred had a high share in the recorded GDP – almost during this period was decentraliza on. The new 40% (Schneider, 2004, Cris e and Holzner 2004, Cons tu on and legal reforms enabled certain in Krs c and Sanfey, 2010). Informal employment transfer of power and responsibili es to local au- was s ll high before the outbreak of the eco- thori es (i.e. taxa on, some fi scal preroga ves, nomic crisis, as the percentage of the informally economic and social policies and services, etc.) employed was 35% in 2007 (Krs c and Sanfey, which also made room for increased importance 2010). According to the Survey on Business Envi- of local poli cal actors and structures. ronment in Serbia, informal economy was at the Lack of poli cal stability throughout the level of 21% of the recorded GDP in 2012 (Krs c period of post-socialist transi on was fer le et al., 2013: 6). ground for growth of importance of informal Since 2008, in conjunc on with the global rela ons among major poli cal actors. Informal economic crisis, Serbian economy started de- poli cal es were a major tool for acquiring po- clining. No stable trend of economic growth has li cal power and the whole process of poli cal been achieved since then. Recession and weak stabiliza on was made sacrifi ce to illegi mate in- economic performance, coupled with austerity terests of a few. measures lead to signifi cant cuts in welfare provi- Concerning economic features and trends sions and social policy measures. Despite recent of the ‘unblocked transforma on’ era, two dis- slight improvements, the labour market situa on nc ve stages could be iden fi ed. The fi rst stage, remained unfavourable. In 2014 the unemploy- 2001–2008, was the period of economic stabili- ment rate of the working age popula on (15–64) was 19.7%, while the unemployment rate of the sa on and growth, while the second period, a er 8 the breakout of the interna onal economic crisis young popula on (15–24) was 47.1% . The social situa on in Serbia is marked by high risks of pov- in 2008 un l present me, has been marked by erty and social exclusion. According to SILC data, recession cycles and stagna on. the at risk of poverty and social exclusion rate in During the ‘growth’ phase, macroeconom- 2014 amounted to 43.2% (RZS, 2015). ic stabilisa on and favourable economic growth rates were achieved, priva sa on was intensi- During the en re period of unblocked transforma on, the state performed a strong fi ed, considerable economic restructuring was interven on in the economic life (Lazić, Pešić, conducted, while the popula on experienced 2012). Through selec ve implementa on of pri- general increase of the standard of living (poverty va za on laws the state enabled the process of rate dropped from 14% in 2002 to 6.6% in 2007) conversion of poli cal into economic capital and (RZS, 2008). During this period, investments in legaliza on of illegal or semi-legal profi ts of ty- the economic infrastructure doubled7, and new coons and criminal structures. Coordina ng the technologies and equipment represented an im- process of priva za on and restructuring which portant factor of growth (Jakopin, 2009). Howev- was several mes postponed, redefi ned, the er, economic growth during this period was not state maintained control over key resources, accompanied by growth in employment (jobless such as electricity, telecommunica ons to some growth). On the contrary, intensive restructuring extent, etc., using them to keep social peace. of the economy which occurred through simulta- Besides, preserva on of state monopolies in im- neous ownership and sector transforma on proc- port and trade of some strategic goods such as esses, resulted in the growth of unemployment, oil and electricity, and subsidizing losses of big and consequently, in structural inconsistencies of public companies, places state companies in a the supply and demand of labour. Basic market privileged posi on on the market, distor ng the indicators showed a constantly low employment regulatory func ons of market compe on. The rate but some posi ve trends (increase of em- over-regulated labour market and burdensome ployment and decrease of unemployment rates) tax system, as well as complicated market en- were recorded towards the end of this period try and exit procedures, led to inadequate for- (2007 – 2008) (Cvejić, Babović, Pudar, 2011). eign investments and slow development of small During the early years of unblocked trans- and medium size enterprises (Lazić, Pešić, 2012: forma on (2002–2003) informal economy s ll 8 Sta s cal Offi ce of Republic of Serbia, Labour Force 7 In 2007, share of investments in GDP was 23.4%. Survey Bulle n, 2014.

40 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

96–97). However, the opposite trends were also During the post-socialist period, informal- evident. During the last stage withdrawal of the ity had developed to high levels. A decade of state from large segments of the economy and blocked transforma on represented the age of further development of market ins tu ons to- informality as the main pa ern of structuring gether with advances in priva za on and re- func ons and prac ces necessary for the repro- structuring, led to substan al increase of the duc on of society and all social groups. The pe- private sector, including increase of entrepre- riod of ‘unblocked transforma on’ also brought neurship ‘from below’. The state withdrew from transforma on of informality forms. Despite the some sectors of the economy almost completely problems in economic performance and poli cal (banking and non-banking fi nancial sectors, capi- stability, or in line with them, capitalism has been tal and security markets) (Lazić, Pešić, 2012: 99). consolidated in Serbia, as well as the new ruling The described trends provided grounds for fl our- class, which set a new scene for the rela ons be- ishing of diverse economic actors, from those ap- tween poli cal and economic actors. New forms pointed to manage public economic resources in of rela ons between economic and poli cal ac- state enterprises, big tycoons who emerged from tors developed, marked by mutual interdepend- illegal or semi-legal business, to entrepreneurs ence, as poli cal par es needed funds coming who appeared from the bo om, through new from economic actors, while economic actors market business ac vi es which reached various had to secure poli cal support for the benefi t of scales, but among which dominate micro, small maintaining or growing a business. However, this and medium size businesses. rela onship is also marked by the level of greater autonomy in comparison to the previous decade, as a certain level of detachment of the economy CONCLUDING REMARKS from poli cs is a necessary precondi on for market economy (Lazić, Pešić, 2012: 52). To sum up, in a weak ins tu onal environ- The described changes in socio-economic ment and in specifi c socio-historical condi ons and poli cal context at the same me led to the (marked by late moderniza on and inclusion reproduc on and transforma on of clientelist re- into the world capitalist system on peripheral la ons and structures. As it will be described in grounds), clientelism and informality represent- the following chapters, a variety of actors within ed one of the structuring principles of socio-eco- and across poli cal and economic systems have nomic and poli cal development of Serbian soci- been exchanging through these rela ons a mul- ety. In this way, informality was not only induced tude of resources that are underpinning their on the macro-structural level of the society, but structural posi on and interests. These exchang- also penetrated into the micro-level of everyday es are unfolding through diverse mechanisms life. In the absence of formal rules and ins tu- that are revealed by the survey implemented at ons, people relied on tradi onal or invented the central and local level among poli cal and informal ins tu ons, thus crea ng a specifi c cul- economic actors. ture of informality. A er signifi cant scaling down at the beginning of socialism, informality gradually increased LITERATURE during this period and reaffi rmed itself as an important sphere of social structuring by the end Antonić, Slobodan. 1993: Demokra ja u Srbiji – of the 1980s. It was based on diff erent legi mi- stvarno i moguće, u Antonić, Slobodan (ur.), za on principles during this period, but served Srbija između populizma i demokra je. Be- the same purpose all the me: it emphasized ograd: Ins tut za poli čke studije. economic inequali es and supported class dif- Antonić, Slobodan. 2006: Elita, građanstvo i slaba feren a on. For the lower classes it appeared as država. Beograd: Službeni glasnik. a mode of survival, while for the upper classes Arandarenko, Mihail. 2000: “Ekonomska stvarnost it served for more effi cient concentra on of po- Srbije” Lazić, Mladen (ur.), Račji hod. Be- li cal and economic power. The outcome was ex- ograd: Filip Višnjić (335–372). tremely high economic inequali es at the end of Babović, Marija. 2002: Akteri blokade društvenih a seemingly egalitarian regime and maintenance promena i akteri transformacije, u: Bolčić, of poli cal control over the economy.

41 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

Silvano i Anđelka Milić (ur.) Srbija krajem Kopecký, Petr and Maria Spirova. 2011: ‘Jobs for the milenijuma: razaranje društva, promene i boys’? Pa erns of party patronage in post- svakodnevni život. Beograd: ISIFF, str: 67–93. communist Europe”, West European Poli cs, Bakić, Jovo. 2004: Ideologije jugoslovenstva između Vol. 34 No. 5, pp. 897–921. srpskog i hrvatskog nacionalizma 1918–1941. Krs ć, Gorana et al. 1998a: Analiza sive ekonomi- Zrenjanin: Gradska narodna biblioteka Žarko je u SR Jugoslaviji sa procenama za 1997. i Zrenjanin. preporukama za njenu legalizaciju. Beograd: Bogdanović, Mira. 1994: Modernizacijski procesi u Ekonomski ins tut. Srbiji u XX veku, u: Perović, La nka (ur.) Sr- Krs c, Gorana and Peter Sanfey. 2010: Earnings in- bija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka. equality and the informal economy: evidence Beograd: Ins tut za noviju istoriju Srbije. from Serbia. European Bank for Reconstruc- Bolčić, Silvano. 1994: Tegobe prelaska u on and Development. preduzetničko društvo. Beograd: ISIFF. Krs c, Gorana et al. 2012. The Shadow Economy in Bolčić, Silvano. 2002: Post-socijalis čka transfor- Serbia. New Findings and Recommenda ons macija i društvene nejednakos u Srbiji u for Reform. Belgrade: USAID, FREN. kompara vnoj perspek vi u Bolčić, Silvano i Kuljić, Todor. 2004: Tito. Sociološkoistorijska studija. Anđelka Milić, (ur.) Srbija krajem milenijuma: Zrenjanin: GNB ‘Žarko Zrenjanin’. razaranje društva, promene i svakodnevni život. Beograd: ISIFF (str. 35–48). Lazić, Mladen. 1987: U susret zatvorenom društvu. Zagreb: Naprijed. Čalić, Mari-Žanin. 2004: Socijalna istorija Srbije 1815–1945. Beograd: Clio. Lazić, Mladen. 1992: Prisoners of the Command Economy. The Managerial Stratum and the Cvejić, Slobodan. 2002: Neformalna privreda u post-socijalis čkoj transformaciji: “Siva Disintegra on of ‘Actually Exis ng Social- ekonomija” u Srbiji 90-ih u Bolčić, Silvano i ism’, in Lengyel, G, C. Off e and J Tholen, eds. Anđelka Milić (ur.) Srbija na kraju mileniju- Economic Ins tu ons, Actors and A tudes: ma. Beograd: Ins tut za sociologiju. East-Central Europe in Transi on. Working papers. Budapest: Budapest University of Cvejić, Slobodan. 2006: Korak u mestu. Društvena Economic Science, Department of Sociology. pokretljivost u Srbiji u procesu post- socijalis čke transformacije. Beograd: ISI FF. Lazić, Mladen. (ur.) 1994a: Razaranje društva, Be- ograd: Filip Višnjić. Cvejić, Slobodan, Marija Babović i Gazela Pudar. 2011: Studija o humanom razvoju Srbija Lazić, Mladen. 1994b: Sistem i slom. Raspad socijal- 2010. Izvori i ishodi socijalnog isključivanja. izma i struktura jugoslovenskog društva, Be- Program za razvoj Ujedinjenih nacija, Be- ograd: Filip Višnjić. ograd. Lazic, Mladen. 2000) “Serbia: The Adap ve Recon- Dimitrijević, Sergije. 1958: Strani kapital u privredi struc on of Elites”, in Higley, J., Lengyel, G. bivše Jugoslavije. Beograd: Nolit. (eds.), Elites A er State Socialism, Rowman Feher, Ferenc, Agnes Heller and Gyorgy Markus. and Li lefi eld Publishers, 123–142. 1984: Dictatorship over Needs. London: Basil Lazić, Mladen. 2005: Promene i otpori. Beograd: Blackwell. Filip Višnjić. Gapinski, James H., Borislav Škegro and Thomas W. Lazić, Mladen. 2011: Čekajući kapitalizam. Beograd: Zuehlke. 1988: Modeling the Economic Per- Službeni glasnik. formance of Yugoslavia. New York: Praeger. Lazić, Mladen i Slobodan Cvejić. 2006: Changes in Goa , Vladimir. 2004: Par je i par jski sistem u Sr- the Recruitment Pa erns of the Economic biji. Niš: Odbor za građansku inicija vu i Ogi and Poli cal Elites in Serbia, Sociologija, Vol. centar. XLVIII, No. 2: 97–112. Jakopin, Edvard. 2009: Izveštaj o razvoju Srbije u Lazić, Mladen and Jelena Pešić. 2012: Making and 2008. Beograd: Republički zavod za razvoj. Unmaking State-centered Capitalism in Ser- Kitschelt, Herbert. 1995: Forma on of party cleav- bia. Belgrade: ISI FF. ages in post-communist democracies. Theo- Lenyiel, Gyorgy, and John Higley (eds.). 2000: Elites re cal proposi ons, Party Poli cs, Vol. 1, No. A er State Socialism, Boston: Rowman & Lit- 4, pp. 447–472. tlefi eld Publishers.

42 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

Lio a, Peter H. 2001: Paradigm Lost: Yugoslav Self- Republički zavod za sta s ku 2014: Anketa o radnoj Management and the Economics of Disaster. snazi, izveštaj za 2014. Beograd. Balkanologie, Vol. V, No. 1–2. (h p://balka- Sekulic, Dusko, Garth Massey and Randy Hod- nologie.revues.org/681#body n17, accessed son. 1994: Who Were the Yugoslavs? Failed on 28.07.2015). Sources of a Common Iden ty in the Former Madžar, Ljubomir. 1990: Suton socijalis čkih privre- Yugoslavia. American Sociological Review, da. Beograd: Ekonomika. 59/1. Mirić, Jovan. 1984: Sistem i kriza. Zagreb: CEKADE. Stojanović, Dubravka. 2010: Ulje na vodi. Beograd: Neal, Fred Warner. 1997: Yugoslavia at the Cross- Peščanik. roads. Atlan c Unbound (from the original Stojanović, Dubravka. 2013: Iza zavese. Beograd: December 1962 Atlan c Monthly ar cle), 3 Udruženje za društvenu istoriju. December. Szelenyi, Ivan and Sonja Sezelenyi. 1995: Circula- Pavlović, Stevan. 2004: Srbija. Istorija iza imena. on or Reproduc on of Elites during the Beograd: Clio. Postcommunist Transforma on of Eastern Radić, Radmila. 1994: U caj razvoja Srpske pravo- Europe: Introduc on. Speciall issue, Theory slavne crkve na modernizacijske procese u and Society 24 (October). Srbiji i Jugoslaviji, u: Perović La nka (ur.) Sr- Woodward, Susan. 1995: Socialist Unemployment: bija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka. The Poli cal Economy of Yugoslavia, 1945– Beograd: Ins tut za noviju istoriju Srbije. 1990, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Republički zavod za sta s ku 2015: Siromaštvo i Zundhausen, Holm. 2009: Istorija Srbije. Beograd: socijalna nejednaksot u Republici Srbiji. Be- Clio. ograd. Republički zavod za sta s ku (RZS) 2008: Studija o merenju životnog standarda: Srbija 2002– 2007, Beograd.

43 ä Dragan Stanojević ä Marija Babović ä Dragana Gundogan

ACTORS, RESOURCES AND MECHANISMS OF CLIENTELISM IN SERBIA

ACTORS OF CLIENTELISM AND used to arrange, structure, build and reconstruct PARTY PATRONAGE IN SERBIA power networks in line with confi gura ons based on certain interests. Within governance poli cal n this chapter, the actors in the poli cal ac on, power generated in the poli cal par es is and economic fi eld, resources which are ex- transferred onto ins tu ons, governance struc- Ichanged and mechanisms which provide in- tures. Finally, the third power area/func on is formal arrangements will be described. related to the establishment of linkages between the poli cal and economic system. Very rarely can one poli cal actor perform all three func- Mapping the key actors ons, and there is usually a certain func onal division between poli cal actors. Based on the respondents’ statements, it is possible to dis nguish the following actors which On the other side, the primary fi eld of pri- are relevant to the situa on inside the poli cal vate entrepreneurs is the economy. As we will see and economic fi eld: 1. Formal organiza ons / in the forthcoming chapters, they rely on public poli cal par es 2. Networks of trust consisted of resources to great extent. Actors in this fi eld dif- individuals who form more or less stable power feren ate according to their economic strength networks and they are divided onto the one con- which is connected with the formal and informal sisted of: a) poli cians b) interlockers and c) pri- strength to infl uence the general and par cular vate business people, 3. Interna onal factor (em- business condi ons. bassies and foreign mul na onal companies). On every level (republic, regional and lo- The following graph shows the key actors, cal), more or less stable arrangements based on the fi elds of their ac vi es, resources which are the informal agreements are formed between exchanged and networks the actors create. The these actors. The networks which form these primary fi eld of poli cal par es are state ins tu- agreements are real power networks because in- ons and coming to the controlling posi ons of side those networks the key decisions concerning public enterprises through them. In this process, func oning of the rela on between the poli cal poli cal actors are divided into three subgroups and economic sphere are made. based on the func ons they perform: the ones For all actors, except economic actors in who are in charge of the ac vi es inside ins tu- the private sector, poli cal infl uence is based on ons (government and administra on), the ones the engagements in poli cal par es (by the direct who work in the economy (public enterprises) poli cal career in the party, or by doing favours and poli cians who primarily work inside the and loyalty rela ons with the party leadership). par es themselves. Par es represent the primary fi eld for compe - There are three areas of exercising poli - on in which the individual and networks form cal power: intra-party, governance posi ons and the posi ons of power inside the party and then brokerage between the poli cal and economic inside the ins tu ons and public enterprises. system. Within poli cal par es, the power is In that sense, the key actor is the very complex

44 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

Field of Political Infl uence poli cal party structure. Without the party or- or manager posi ons. These actors are o en ganiza onal infrastructure, informal networks, called interlockers, because they are the key histories, individuals who are ac ve in the party actors through which poli cal and economic would not have importance. 1 power are interlinked. 3. Economic actors with no (at least direct or 1. Poli cal actors who interact with or infl uence formal) poli cal background which include economic actors whether in the public or pri- top managers in the private sector and entre- vate sector, but do not occupy any economic preneurs as actors who are at the same me posi on in public or private enterprises. They owners of the capital and who perform lead- can be considered as purely poli cal actors, ing management roles in their enterprises. but their interac on with economic actors Their background lies primarily in the econ- depends on the posi on in the power hier- archies at central or local level, as well as on omy, entrepreneurship and their recruitment their specifi c social capital represented by the channels are from entrepreneurial or profes- linkages and loyal es shared and exchanged sional circles. with specifi c power circles. As we will see from further presenta on of 2. Poli cal actors who presently or formerly research fi ndings, intensive dynamics of diverse occupied a posi on in the public economic rela ons is unfolding between these actors dur- system. Although at some point they were ing the en re observed period (unblocked trans- posi oned in both systems, their source of forma on a er 2000) and at all levels. Poli cal power relies on poli cal power and their re- actors interact with economic actors in various cruitment channels are clearly from poli cal ways and with diff erent intensity and dynamics. circles. They are usually appointed to board A small group of ‘gate keepers’ (if we observe from the perspec ve of the economic system) 1 Many examples can prove that when individuals or ‘network brokers’ (if we observe from the po- lose the support of a party they can lose public poli cal system perspec ve) can be iden fi ed, in si ons, and it rarely goes in the opposite direc on. Most of poli cal aff airs which were induced outside the sense used by Burt to describe persons who the party which had the aim to discredit some poli- bridge structural holes, (in this case the hole be- cian (even though they are jus fi ed from the legal tween poli cal and economic elites) and who in- point of view) were not successful if the poli cians terlink the two systems, as we will see in a man- had full support from their party.

45 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* ner that refl ects rela ons deeply entrenched in informal se ngs far from the public, decisions clientelism. These brokers or gatekeepers are and plans are just formally presented and ac- mandated by highest poli cal power to control cepted in offi cial mee ngs.3 the access to poli cal power and state resources Even though it is very centralized, the available to the economic sector through poli - power inside the party structures is based on cal power circles. These actors are not even nec- the loyalty networks in which the party leader is essarily party members, but they are persons of one of the actors. Loyalty networks are created high loyalty to the most powerful poli cal actors in the long term and o en are rela vely stable and are socially, o en privately, closely linked to structures of trust (unless there is a big overturn them. They are also less visible than other actors inside the party). These networks are colloquially who occupy more visible posi ons in the govern- called groups (“ekipe”) and they intersect party ment, at the top of poli cal par es or in the high structures horizontally (inside the Board, Coun- level business circles. cils and Presidency etc.) and ver cally (from the Presidency to local boards). The infl uence of the 1. Poli cal par es party network is big as long as the network man- ages to hold intraparty discontent at minimum The structure of power within a poli cal using distribu on of resource or party discipline. party. The formal aspect of the poli cal party organiza on is consisted of the Assembly, Main Every me someone comes to the board, Presidency, Execu ve board, diff erent top of the party his/her group comes along councils and a network of municipal Boards. Ac- to the spot, his/her trustworthy people. cording to the organiza onal scheme, the power There is no democracy inside the party, should be moved from local Boards, through the there never was. People vote as they agree Assembly to the Main and Execu ve board and beforehand. As an example, you can follow the Presidency. The reality is completely diff erent how 5–6 people inside the party vote and since the par es are extremely centralized. if they are part of the same group they will all vote in the same way for ten years. Basically, it is a mul -level system with local, city and state level and every (male respondent, poli cal elite) level decides on relevant topics. Of course, all promo ons start and end on the top Networks inside a poli cal party. Certain- and then go to the lower posi ons. On the ly, the poli cal par es are not a monolithic struc- lower level, members have just to imple- ture and confl ict emerges as a result of prevalent ment decisions taken on higher levels. disagreements. The respondents indicate that debate inside a party is rarely about the poli cal (male respondent, expert) program or ideology, but rather there are inter- And while most formal procedures inside ests that connect and divide party members. As par es are nominally followed, the key decisions in all organiza ons, there are oligarchic tenden- are crystalized, nego ated and made in closed cies within diff erent interest groups which tend circles which represent the informal loyalty to present their own interests as the general networks inside the par es. Behind the formal (shared) ones. Discontents and frac ons emerge structure, our respondents reveal the complex mostly in the top of the party, and mostly dur- and hidden structure with informal connec ons, ing the periods of delega on of strategic posi- networks and centres of power crea ng the in- ons inside the party and public func ons a er formal structure of the party. This informal party the elec ons. In these situa ons, individuals and pyramid plays a crucial role in shaping the party networks which have been excluded or “underes- life, having a strong eff ect on the promo ons, party poli cs and coali ons. It is the way to prepare the audience and companions for implementa ons of new ideas. The respondents state that the decisions made in formal mee ngs are usually already ne- 3 This sort of ‘bonding’ between close poli cal comrades usually takes place behind closed doors and go ated and discussed in previous smaller, infor- in a more informal atmosphere. Some respondents mal and in mate mee ngs.2 A er agreement in claimed that the tradi onal Serbian kafana is s ll an important site for diff erent sorts of informal meet- 2 Some mes, more personal mee ngs are used to ings and nego a ons where people can speak freely test some ideas or plans, check reac ons of others. and openly.

46 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

mated” in the distribu on generate discontent President, while some mes the President which can result in latent or manifest confl icts. will be the most powerful person. We had Furthermore, confl ict can emerge between dif- Tadic and Cvetkovic and now we have Vucic ferent party levels, which was the case, for ex- and Nikolic. This is the only diff erence. The ample, in the SRS and SNS while they were part formal posi on is not so important. More of the government. Another example is DS a er important is the centre of power, how it losing power. Namely, the fi rst party echelon can was formed essen ally.’ par cipate in the power (legislature) and achieve (male respondent, businessman) certain benefi ts for themselves, but the majority of party infrastructure members are excluded Even though there is no complete consist- from par cipa on in the power and they do not ency in the respondents’ answers, the power gain any benefi ts which come from posi ons in network on the highest level is consisted of the power (employment and access to other public Prime Minister, several infl uen al ministers, im- resources). Pressures from below to open poli - portant persons from the party, several poli - cal space for promo on or achieving key posi- cal actors with signifi cant social capital acquired ons can be signifi cantly strong by a part of the while they were in power in previous govern- poli cal leadership– new group. Open confl ict ments and several wealthy individuals. comes at the end a er nego a on and “trial of strength”. The end result can be a rela vely ‘Vučić is making all decisions, but I peaceful overturn of power inside the party or have the impression that he asks a few of even party division which leads to the crea on his collaborators. People say that he trusts of new poli cal par es. In another case, party di- a lot to Zorana Mihajlović....Divisions in- vision is performed horizontally and ver cally to side the party exist but they are not so im- the level of municipality boards. portant at this moment since everything seems under control. 2. Governance The current Prime Minister and no- Interes ngly, almost all respondents agree body else. He is the “alpha and omega”. that major power is in the narrow poli cal circles He knows everything and he is deciding on and interna onal community, while they disagree everything.’ about the role and infl uence of big local econom- (male respondent, poli cal elite) ic actors. Majority of respondents indicate the concentra on and centralisa on of power in a Respondents state that the importance of narrow circle around the Prime Minister, backed the Parliament is very low. The greatest part of by strong interna onal infl uence of the EU and the power is concentrated in the hands of the the USA, or some mes only by several countries Government, concretely in certain circles. More- perceived as most infl uen al (most o en the over, judiciary is to a great extent under the infl u- USA, Germany, the UK). ence of these networks. This is most no ceable There is a widespread impression that the in cases when the persons from the network are present Prime Minister has key power and noth- the subject of the dispute. ing can be done without his consent. Concentra- Similar percep on of centralized and con- on and centraliza on of power is perceived as a centrated power can be found among respond- long-las ng phenomenon, though there is clear ents in regard to local communi es. Only the percep on that in the present government they actors are slightly diff erent. Here, the Mayor or reached much higher levels. President of the municipality is recognized as the most infl uen al persons. In addi on to these, ‘This is universal; it is not linked to na onal-level poli cians origina ng from a par- this government. There has always been cular municipality who are some kind of power one circle, a number of people who have brokers that bridge local power circles with cen- essen ally cons tuted a key power and tral level power are perceived as important ac- who lead the country, regardless of their tors and when eff ec ve they can bring resources formal posi on. Some mes, the Prime from the central level to the local community. Minister can have more power than the

47 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

3. Economic actors – private and public loquially called tycoons), being the major fi nan- sector ciers of poli cal par es, are poli cally relevant at the na onal level. Their access to ins tu onal Public sector – interlockers resources is almost exclusively enabled in an in- There are two types of actors in the pub- direct way, namely through power networks. lic sector: 1. Directors of public companies and ‘They mainly gravitate towards the 2. Public companies’ Board members. Directors leaders, at least the strongest ones, or to- of public companies are most o en the cadres wards infl uen al party members at a lower of poli cal par es. They are appointed to leader- level helping them in the campaign. Busi- ship posi ons through ins tu onal mechanisms. nesspeople have a strong ins nct which They are required to sa sfy double require- party will become poli cally signifi cant in ments: formal and informal ones. On the one a certain period of me and accordingly hand, they are expected to adequately manage they are quickly approached and off ered a public company which is why skilled and ex- good services to be returned by the party’s perienced cadres are appointed to these posi- coming to power at any level.’ ons. On the other hand, they are expected to (male respondent, local level poli cian) execute informal requests of their party (as we will see later: employment, ‘tuning’ of tenders, However, in certain cases, they can have fi nancing of par es, etc.). The la er requires ad- direct representa ves in the government and indi onal skills related to nego a on and adapt- s tu ons. One respondent said that one of the ability. These actors are the most trustworthy in richest businessmen had bought a posi on in the core network because the fi nancial situa on one of the government agencies dealing with the of the party depends largely on them. They are priva za on process for a six-fi gure sum. A quali- also signifi cant in terms of making connec ons fi ed person was appointed to that posi on and between poli cal actors and the part of econom- their duty, among other things, was to take ac- ic actors. Their media on is crucial when making count of the interests of the real employer. a great part of informal arrangements with small The respondents nevertheless point out and medium businesses and a signifi cant part of that the economic players at any level (na onal, such arrangements with big companies. regional or local), regardless of the amount of capital and the size of the company they own Private sector (large, medium or small enterprises), are usu- The importance of the economic elite is ally secondary and that the real power remains perceived diff erently among respondents. Some in the hands of poli cal par es and the poli cal perceive big business actors, and par cularly part of the power networks that form the gov- tycoons as those who are together with key po- ernment. Economic actors usually adapt to the li cal actors mainly infl uencing policies and the current state either by knowing the rules of the business environment in Serbia. On the other game or by an cipa ng future developments hand, some respondents indicate low infl uence within the poli cal sphere. Among the economic of the private sector.4 When it comes to busi- actors with a certain power within the poli cal nesspeople, only large private companies (col- fi eld at na onal level, the richest businessmen, such as Miroslav Miskovic, Milan Beko, Miodrag 4 Percep on of the interviewed businessman is that Kos c and others, were men oned. The respond- the government did not use their poten als to fos- ents state that the posi on of economic actors ter development in an appropriate way. ‘There was no systema c coopera on, public, ins tu onalized, is rather unstable long-term. They dis nguish through which the government could use private the ones able to manage to economically sur- sector resources (knowledge, advice and other re- vive every poli cal change while retaining their sources) to advance economic policies and develop- wealth, business and o en their privileges in the mental processes. There were occasional a empts to develop a coopera on mechanism such as that in market from those who happen to disappear 2008 a er the breakout of the economic crisis. The from the economic life or dras cally lower their government organized a big mee ng with private infl uence with the diminishing of a poli cal op- sector representa ves and announced that during on. According to a highly posi oned poli cian, the crisis, such consulta on mee ngs will be held on a monthly basis, but this was not the case.’ if someone wanted to follow the clear direct re-

48 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* la on between the economy and poli cs, they 4. Interna onal actors would have to look at companies that ceased to operate a er some par es had failed to join the Interna onal actors are recognized as im- government and which new ones emerged as important on two levels. At one level, they infl u- portant market actors. A er these changes, the ence, guide and control the ins tu onal and pol- logic of the business remains the same, mean- icy reforms. At the other level, they are donors ing an exchange where one side represents the and investors and their economic role is per- investment in fi nancing a poli cal party and the ceived as important. Respondents perceive em- other one enabling a business (under privileged bassies as important instruments of channelling condi ons). interna onal infl uence and resources, but they The economic actors who manage to es- no ce there is hierarchy among foreign actors, tablish a connec on with the (future) elec on depending on the strength of the country. winners during the elec on campaign (or ear- There are also opinions that a certain level lier) or immediately a er the elec ons, will have of infl uence rests at the side of big mul na on- the opportunity to keep their business and sur- als who come to Serbia and who have huge prof- vive the government transi on process without its, poten al to employ a large number of peo- major hitches. One strategy is to fi nance several ple, to provide compara vely higher salaries, to poli cal par es, both those in power and those introduce new modes and culture of work and in opposi on. The unforgivable sin of business- who create a compe ve environment for Ser- people is direct interfering in poli cal aff airs. This bian companies. way, they may become compe tors and not part- The respondents recognize the existence ners while such a situa on most o en leads to of a good network among the foreign poli - showdowns. Several respondents gave two strik- cal and economic elites currently present in the ing examples of the events from the past decade: country. They further recognize that protec on confi sca on of part of Bogoljub Karic’s property and judicial prosecu on of Miroslav Miskovic. of the interests of economic arrangements is On the other hand, some respondents recognize done through poli cal channels. According to the that there have been some examples, e.g. in the respondents, these arrangements are some mes media sphere, of rela vely easy transi on and a part of the formal agreement through which a uning to the new authori es. The most com- foreigners want to protect their investments and mon example given by the poli cians is business ensure legal work of fi rms from their own coun- opera on of the consor um owning TVB92 and tries. However, there are o en pressures requir- Prva as well as several marke ng companies. ing opera ons under privileged condi ons. These pressures are outside from the fi eld of formal ‘I think every government has its fa- agreements. Also, there are cases when foreign vourites, its major investors. And depend- poli cians (ambassadors) do not work only in fa- ing on the rota on of power, there is the vour of others, but also in the interest of their rota on of these major local businessmen own company. – I’m talking about the last ten years. The government led by Kostunica had its own large domes c investors, too, who had a RESOURCES certain impact.’ The majority of respondents perceive mon- (male respondent, expert) ey and fi nancial benefi ts as a key resource that is Although it cannot be measured precisely, being exchanged between actors. However, there due to the qualita ve nature of the research, are other resources of importance as well, such there is an impression that among local level re- as jobs, contracts, informa on, acquaintances at spondents there is stronger percep on of impor- right posi ons and various kinds of benefi ts. tance of large economic actors. This is probably Money is the most important resource for due to the stronger infl uence these enterprises exchange, but it fl ows in various ways, between have as major employers in small communi es, poli cal and economic actors, some legal and where dependency of the local budget and popu- formal while some neither formal nor legal: la on wellbeing on these companies is stronger.

49 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

• as compensa on for board members appoint- rela ves of party members or persons from the ed by the party place of origin of some infl uen al party mem- • as salary for people employed by interven on bers. The mechanism of exchange that unfolds of the party through employment will be elaborated later, here, it is important to no ce that respondents • as fi nancial support to the party by a public value diff erently jobs in diff erent sectors. Jobs enterprise that par es can provide are divided into three • as fi nancial contribu on to the party by the types: 1) job in public administra on or a public people who got the employment thanks to enterprise for an indefi nite period of me, 2) the party interven on same job but with a contract for a specifi ed period of me and 3) temporary or permanent job The interest to be appointed to the management board of a public enterprise is mainly in the private sector. The fi rst two op ons can be mo vated by economic interests as compensa- implemented by appointed cadres directly in ac- ons can be rela vely high in comparison to cordance with the possibili es. The fi rst op on regular salaries. According to some respondents, is the most desirable and such jobs are occupied party members appointed to economically strong by the most loyal cadres; the second one repre- enterprises could reach monthly compensa on sents a kind of stage mode and a second-best of several thousands of Euros. Therefore, the solu on. However, experience shows that these compe on for these posi ons is high among people lose their job fi rst a er the power shi s. and within the par es (more described in the The third way of providing jobs implies includ- sec on on mechanisms). ing personnel issues in informal agreements with Managers appointed to public enterprises private companies. The businesspeople are o en by poli cal par es have the obliga on to provide required to reserve some vacancies for the par- fi nancial support to the party in return. Accord- ty’s cadres when opening a new plant or branch. ing to some tes monies, the circle of public en- ‘Those who are employed through a terprise managers is important within the party poli cal party, they don’t want to work for hierarchy. private employers because there is no security and you have to work hard.’ ‘These managers are very important as party sub oligarchy. They are not (male respondent, poli cal elite) party workmen, nor chargers, but they are Volunteering work for the party is a re- behind the party oligarchy, the most pow- source exchanged in favour of being provided erful group in the party. Their enterprises fi nance the party. This has been done very with employment. People who are employed by cau ously and that circle wants to stay in poli cal party interven on in return have to con- the game at any cost.’ duct some voluntary work (in addi on to monthly fi nancial contribu on extracted from the salary). (male respondent, poli cal elite) This is par cularly expected during elec on cam- Financial support to the party is not pro- paigns. They have the obliga on to par cipate vided only by public and private enterprises, but in the campaign and even to engage their fam- also by persons employed through party inter- ily members in party tasks. This is considered an ven on. Some respondents indicate existence of expression of gra tude for being found employ- a ‘standard party fee’ which was at the level of ment by the party. 5–10% of the salary regardless of the job. In-kind resources are diverse and accord- Jobs became a par cularly important re- ing to tes monies usually include: travels, ac- source a er the breakout of the economic cri- cess to quality health care, vehicles, lunches and sis in 2008, when unemployment signifi cantly dinners. Although many of these resources are increased. Jobs are provided on request of the exchanged more on the individual level, some poli cal party or an infl uen al poli cian in public in-kind exchange occurs at the collec ve level as administra on, public enterprises or the private well. The examples are prin ng services, promo- sector. Jobs are provided for party ac vists, for onal material, space in media for party promo- lower echelons of party members, for friends and on and similar.

50 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

Changes in laws and regula ons are a exchanged for other favours and some mes they resource needed mostly by private business ac- have a monetary price. tors, requested o en in exchange for fi nancing “Right places”. This basically means to poli cal par es. This includes legal solu ons and have appropriate social capital, which can be of rules related to certain aspects of business and diff erent composi on for diff erent actors. For economy that enable more favourable condi ons example, for private businessmen, this mostly for running a business in some industries and are includes persons in poli cal posi ons who can an important resource that the private sector in open doors for tenders, contracts, investments, the economy can obtain from the poli cal elite. or persons in public administra on who can fa- Respondents say that the EU integra on process cilitate obtaining of licences, documenta on, narrowed the space for outside interven on be- etc. For poli cal actors this can mean infl uen al cause legal solu ons are usually already done as people inside a party, in the government or in a a part of the EU accession process. However, sev- public administra on posi on who can provide eral stated that it was clear there were examples access to various resources: promo on, jobs, in- of such infl uence. forma on or something else. Further, for poli - cal actors this can also include persons at the top ‘Tycoons in the past (also now) were of public companies or private enterprises, who o en able to rewrite laws rela ng to their can provide economic resources (jobs, money or interests by mee ng someone from the in-kind benefi ts and services). party leadership and off ering them (or the party itself) certain monetary compensa- on. Not only tycoons had an impact in the MECHANISMS poli cal fi eld. Such infl uence was extended to the banking sector.’ Here we will describe mechanisms through which the previously iden fi ed actors exchange (male respondent, poli cal elite) the noted resources. Diff erent mechanisms are The use of control mechanisms: A signifi - used for the exchange within a poli cal party, cant way of using public resources is by u lizing between a party and ins tu ons and between ins tu onal opera onal control mechanisms. poli cal actors and economic actors in the pub- These imply the work of the judiciary, police and lic and private sector of the economy and there- inspec ons in the service of power networks. fore, they will be presented separately. The key Bearing in mind that the control mechanisms are mo ve underlying the mechanisms is to provide ul mately based on the use of the force appa- long-term posi oning of poli cal par es in pow- ratus, establishing control over the key posi ons er for what they need: 1. enough people to vote of the police apparatus is a prerequisite. Control for them and 2. suffi cient fi nancial resources to mechanisms can be used either by applying legal secure poli cal infl uence. norms overzealously or by not applying them at all. In this way it is possible to provide benefi ts Within par es to some stakeholders and also to put pressure on others. The most common form of employing The respondents point out three criteria the mechanisms of control over economic actors for taking key posi ons and climbing the leader- is by u lizing inspec on services, i.e. the services ship ladder of their poli cal party: 1) the ability in charge of issuing and revoking licenses. to raise funds/money for the party, 2) organiza- onal/communica on skills and 3) personal loy- Informa on is considered one of the key alty. resources, par cularly in the private business Firstly, climbing the poli cal party ladder sectors. This includes informa on about laws and is infl uenced by the ability to provide money legal changes, about government decisions, mar- for the party. Within the networks, persons who ket related informa on – i.e. who are the new in- have the ability to provide party fi nancing means vestors, who plans to invest in Serbia in a certain from public or private sources are especially re- industry, under which condi ons, tender-related spected. Beside formal5 funding channels, there informa on, etc. Informa on is usually gathered through informal conversa ons with persons on 5 In Serbia, the legal framework in fi nancing of poli - the appropriate posi ons. They are some mes cal par es is regulated by the Law on fi nancing polit-

51 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* is the so called “black funding” which is not pre- problems. In order to get a key posi on, a party sented in fi nancial reports of poli cal par es. member should be “stable, obedient and taking There are two main sources for funding poli - care about party interests”. In selec ng poli cal cal par es: the state budget and its public sector and bureaucra c personnel, loyalty and trust are and private companies. Through mechanisms to of par cular importance, since they shape the be presented later in more detail, money for reg- informal structure underneath the formal hier- ular func oning of poli cal par es is provided. archy. According to the respondents, obedience, Such ac vi es are par cularly intensifi ed during poltroon and loyalty infl uence promo on. the elec on campaign. The origin of the money The basis of this trust is shared decision raised allows non-transparency of the fi nancial making in the alloca on and occupa on of stra- opera on. It is associated with the possibility tegic resources of the party and public resources but also the request for the networks within the as well as joint involvement in ac vi es with party to perform some ac vi es outside the in- ques onable legality. The network is hence re- s tu onal party frameworks (out of mee ngs, produced in accordance with the principle of fi nancial records, without accountability towards watching (one’s own) back. the party’s bodies and without the possibility of pu ng their issues on the offi cial agenda). In this way, the networks within the party are strength- Between par es and ins tu ons ened securing an informal milieu. Regardless of the fact that modern ins - Secondly, beside the money, it is impor- tu ons are represented by a set of established tant to have organiza onal skills; this especially rules and prac ces that (should) express the applies to people who are in charge of human common good, they are not exempt from the resource management. Some ac vists earn their infl uence of individuals and social groups. Given posi ons within the network by working on the that they represent a legi mate fi eld of power establishment and maintenance of formal and within which it is possible to infl uence the for- informal structures of the party. Bearing in mind mula on of rules, alloca on of resources and that the formal organiza on is a prerequisite for enabling/disabling of access to resources, the re- the development of informal networks in the po- la on towards ins tu ons is complemen ng the li cal fi eld, work on harmoniza on and reconcili- already presented forms of informality, i.e. the a on of these two structures requires signifi cant importance of formal channels and procedures eff ort. These ac vi es include making horizontal for poli cal ac on. and ver cal connec ons within the informal net- There were two occasions when a poli cal work in the party structure, taking into account party (the Socialist Party of Serbia), which nur- the cadres’ policy, providing compensa on for tured the legacy of socialism and had access to members of the network and the struggle / ne- all available public resources, began to withdraw go a ons with compe ng networks. from ins tu ons leaving other poli cal par es Thirdly, the inevitable criterion for promo- the opportunity to manage the ins tu ons and on is to be loyal. Posi on and reputa on in- resources. The fi rst one was losing power in sev- side the party structure are infl uenced by “con- eral major ci es a er the local elec ons in 1996 tribu on to the party func oning and ability to and the second one was withdrawal from the express and bring quality to poli cal ac vi es”. republic government in 2000 and 2001. These The party nomenclature had to perceive a cer- changes infl uenced intensifi ed struggles between tain candidate as a trustworthy person who can the poli cal par es as the control over public re- “fi nish the job in party interests” without making sources became the key mechanism of survival of the ruling party. Though a er the changes there ical ac vi es. Parliamentary par es are funded from was an idea to share func ons and sectors not budgets based on the number of depu es in the only in propor on to the elec on votes but also Parliament. Every year, par es are obliged to give a fi nancial statement to the An -Corrup on Agency, in a way that several poli cal par es have their which has the right to directly and undisturbedly representa ves in every public body and sector access bookkeeping records and documenta on ensuring mutual control, this model was rapidly as well as fi nancial statements of poli cal en es dropped along with introducing the so-called and to engage appropriate experts and ins tu ons. model of feudaliza on of public ins tu ons. Feu- Other formal and legal sources for party fund raising are: affi lia on fees and private dona ons. dalism refers to an agreement between poli cal

52 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* par es where the whole sector or management and they get whatever remains. Here, we of the public company falls under the control of should also bear in mind that during the one party. It is stated in the interview that “poli- coali on government each party uses a cians perceive ministries as their trophy or feu- variety of tricks to weaken partners. If coa- dal property”. li on partners happen to start strengthening their ra ngs, the warning bells start to Well, unfortunately, a er October 5, ring. only Djindjic’s Government, actually only (male respondent, expert) Djindjic, did not allow feudaliza on of ministries, but appointed ministers from one The key ques ons that every party asks it- party and minister assistants from other self are how to pass the threshold and how to par es in the same Ministry. Following his provide suffi cient funds to fi nance the party’s assassina on and forma on of Kostunica’s infrastructure and ac vi es providing it posi ve government, Ministries were divided be- publicity. A part of the answer to both ques ons tween G17, DSS (Democra c Party of Ser- lies in ensuring control over public resources: bia) or who had already been in the gov- money, management boards, public offi ces, con- ernment; SPS (Socialist Party of Serbia) was trol mechanisms and jobs in the public sector. As not formally in the government but they poli cal actors say, categorizing of all public of- got, let’s say the Railways. And so SPS had fi ces, companies and other posi ons starts again survived, being fi nanced from the funds of a er the elec on in accordance with their im- the Railways. Regarding the issue we are portance. Also, posi ons are an important topic now talking about, SPS are the biggest of pre-elec on coali on agreements. These func- hustlers simply because of their many dec- ons become par es’ loot and there is no real ades long experience, or let’s say, if we ne- external control over the work of appointed peo- glect communism in the one-party system, ple. Whole sectors and public companies become it was simply not necessary because there party feud and they can do whatever they want, was only one party which had all sources while they report only to their party. of funding. But, for example, as from Milo- sevic’s mul party system, they have been Party loyalty learning it and they have become experts. Simultaneously with the rise to power and All the other par es that came to power the distribu on of sectors and posi ons, there is have learned it from SPS. another process related to the selec on of cad- (male respondent, expert) res to occupy public offi ce and run sectors and public companies. Here, several selec on criteria The respondents recognize that the logic intertwine. The fi rst and most important criterion behind this division is an essen ally ruthless is work in the party and party loyalty. The high- struggle and compe on between poli cal par- est posi ons are reserved for offi cials who have es. The model of opera on had been set in the been the most engaged in party work before the period of socialism when the party controlled the elec ons and who usually occupy managerial en re reproduc on of the social system. Howev- func ons within the party. People who other- er, electoral race and the necessity of providing wise occupy high posi ons in the party usually the electoral threshold (which guarantees poli - already take part in the established network of cal clout to the party) led to intensifi ca on of the loyal es within the party. As we shall see, these struggle and establishment of new mechanisms networks result from infi gh ng and they repre- of control over public resources. sent the teams to perform key func ons a er A er the elec ons, in accordance the elec on. Each team has a core consis ng of with the coali on agreement and the per- several closest persons, then a wider circle and centage of votes, division of spoils starts. fi nally the support to the base (municipal coun- The strongest gets the most signifi cant cils). How many posi ons a party can take will part and if they have a large majority in depend on the amount of resources available the parliament, the blackmailing poten- a er the elec ons. The principle is appoin ng al of smaller coali on partners weakens confi dants certain posi ons whose signifi cance

53 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* depends on their place in the party’s pyrami- the one who assess who can do it best and dal structure. In addi on to the designated po- that means not becoming the front page si ons, par es strive to have loyal people at all of Kurir tomorrow. levels of sectors, public administra on and pub- (female respondent, poli cal elite) lic enterprises. People in leadership posi ons on all management levels are replaced a er the Personal networks change of power, as they guarantee (non)fl ow of informa on and execu on of tasks, both those The second, equally important selec on important for everyday normal func oning of criterion is personal loyalty of individuals who are work organiza on and those falling in the ambit not necessarily poli cal party members. These of informality and clientelism. are most o en friends and rela ves of poli - cal party’s leadership. The respondents pointed There were always diff erent teams out personal friendships of the former president within the party. The mo ve to be in a Boris Tadic from high school or sports ac vi es, team is ensuring a posi on to win the kinship rela ons of the current president’s advi- power together with your group of people. sor and many other examples. Although some- To become a part of the crew who is go- mes they are also poli cal party members, it ing to be in charge. To have an established is of secondary importance (and it o en comes network of associates so that you are able a er the appointment) as their credibility is not to know who you’re working with when drawn from their work in the party but from per- you come to power. sonal rela onships with powerful individuals in (male respondent, interlocker) the party and the state. They occupy various posi ons, but mostly opera onal and not the high- Bearing in mind that poli cal par es are est ones (such as ministerial posi ons); they are highly centralized with a highly important leader- o en secretaries of cabinets or sectors, advisors, ship structure, closeness to the president of the directors of public companies. Their real respon- party and infl uen al people is a very important sibili es are signifi cant and o en have infl uence criterion, primarily to be part of the team and in the poli cal fi eld which overcomes the respon- then to obtain a public offi ce tenure. The goal of sibili es of their formal posi on. ambi ous party members is to become the core team members, as these posi ons guarantee Personal rela onships are important, maximum power within the party but also within mostly loyalty. When he appoints someone ins tu ons in case the party is part of the gov- the director of NIS, through him he is go- ernment. This is the reason why many respond- ing to fund the party, do money laundering ents emphasize loyalty (which implies proof in while trus ng he is able to make a profi t of terms of the quality of the tasks’ performance) let’s say 5 million Euros, something for the as the key mechanism for the selec on of party party, something for himself. cadres for public offi ce. (male respondent, big entrepreneur) Ge ng close to the boss is important, the ability to execute due responsi- Basically, these are people who are bili es being the director of that company, on good terms with the party chairman, including fi nancing of the party. whether as their friends or people they trust and it is also in order that the party (male respondent, poli cal elite) could benefi t from it, primarily fi nancially. Roughly speaking, it is the familiar- (female respondent, local poli cian) ity and closeness to the boss, but when I say closeness to the boss, I don’t think...I As men oned, the infl uence of these per- mean, no leader is so stupid as to put sons is based on personal rela onships with the someone who is unable to work on a po- party leadership, which is recognized by other si on that is a poten al source of income party members. The rela on towards this prac- for the party. Though, perhaps many ce is ambivalent. Even though party members would like to be chosen, but the leader is recognize the reasons why this happens, there

54 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* is also dissa sfac on (because prize is not guar- organiza onal or symbolic capital. We are talking anteed no ma er the engagement within the about people who have made a career either in party). another poli cal party, organiza on or business and who are considered to be useful in public I have an example where in one of posi ons for various reasons. Symbolic capital is the previous governments a minister ap- essen al if a poli cal party wants to raise the rat- pointed his godfather the president of a ings by appoin ng socially and culturally signifi - large public company and he was not even cant people to prominent posi ons interes ng to a party member. Everyone in the party was the media. 6 On the other hand, people whose dissa sfi ed but it was clear that he needed social capital is developed are more likely to take a loyal man there. opera onal posi ons with usually li le publicity. (male respondent, interlocker) Most o en these are the people who collaborate with several poli cal par es and who have had T: Do you mind when some non- a role in several governments. Their importance party persons take posi ons, and leaders lies in the possibility to make links between the decide so without consulta on? old and new poli cal actors, to establish chan- I: Everyone does. But I’m used to nels of communica on and exchange on a rea- that prac ce. I am aware that no one will sonable basis. get an important posi on as an expert. A special category of actors are the so Educa on is irrelevant in poli cs, Serbia is called fl yers, i.e. persons appointed to posi ons a witness. with guaranteed immunity and the opportunity T: Why is this happening? to have their own mandate, who leave their parent party and join some other during the man- I: Because it is easier that your busi- date. Usually, they are republican and provincial ness is done by someone you trust to some MPs or local councillors who join another po- extent. Things are done faster and con- li cal party and become loyal to it. The reasons trived more easily. for such change are rarely related to a principle (male respondent, businessman) (disagreement with parent party’s policy) but far more o en to personal benefi t, money and/or In this way, the party’s core achieves dou- posi on for themselves and their support net- ble benefi ts. On the one hand, it receives a per- works. When a poli cal party is out of power, son of trust in the important offi ce, a person with party control is weaker because there are fewer whom it has already established loyalty on some resources the party relies on. other basis. On the other hand, this person is cut off from the party’s infrastructure resources. In addi on to personal social capital, infor- Hence, he/she hinges exclusively on one or sev- mal organiza onal capacity of the party becomes eral persons from the core network, which makes very important in the longer term. If it is in power long enough, the party has a good chance to the person more dependent and therefore more form a solid network of loyalty in the ins tu ons loyal. Taking certain posi ons in the public sector (ministries, public administra on, enterprises, (par cularly a public company) by party cadres etc.). Even a er the formal withdrawal from the brings along the danger of gradual forma on of government, social capital can make a party a parallel networks of personal loyalty to a person good partner. One respondent says that the im- in posi on, i.e. the network that can become portance of URS (United Regions of Serbia) a er compe ve to the one that currently dominates. the 2012 elec ons was proved, among other Therefore, the equilibrium in the party is realized things, by the existence of a developed network either by trading resources (posi ons) or by en- of party loyalty in ins tu ons. These networks suring party discipline in case individuals are not were ready-made to be surrendered to the rul- content with the current division. ing coali on just coming into the posi on of power without loyalty networks developed deep Actors with symbolic and social capital The third type of actors is represented by 6 For example, the current Minister of Culture Taso- vac, Finance Minister Krs c, sportspeople Sapic, persons or cliques important due to their social, Udovicic, etc.

55 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* in state administra on and public companies’ in- like-dislike, like-dislike, un l the least im- frastructure. This capital has made URS a partner portant func on is linked to the money or to the government although having failed to get power. Nobody competes for the posi on suffi cient votes to pass the elec on threshold in the library, but OK, even the library is and hence to become a parliamentary party. part of the booty, because the party cannot be fi nanced by the library like it can be Between the poli cal and economic fi nanced from Serbiagas. Then some peo- system ple who are not powerful are appointed to the library and they will be grateful and they will contribute to the campaign, they Between the poli cal and public sector have some circle of friends who are probably powerful in art or science.’ Party ‘conquest’ of management structures of public enterprises. This mechanism (male respondent, poli cal elite) represents the ‘take over’ of a public enterprise by poli cal par es. To clarify, the procedure of Within the par es, more infl uen al and appointment of poli cal party representa ves powerful party members manage to get a board membership posi on in best enterprises. It is in- to the boards of public companies is a fully le- teres ng how respondents describe the process gi mate and legal process, regulated by the law. of appointment of party members to the boards Selec on of top managers of public enterprises of public enterprises. Decisions are made mostly is also usually conducted in line with the law and by party leaders or in very small circles of lead- formal procedures of compe on and selec on. ing party members. This selec on mechanism is However, informal processes and interac ons reported by respondents from all par es, regard- that have been taking place behind these legal less of their size or posi on in the poli cal spec- and formal processes can be, and according to trum. the tes monies from our research, o en are conducted in the way that poli cal actors control or Our respondents are of diff erent opinions use economic resources of public enterprises for when competences of the party nominated man- their personal and their party benefi t. In some agers of public enterprises are in ques on. Some cases, par cularly when stronger and strategical- are very cri cal sta ng that party leaders deliber- ly more important public enterprises are at stake, ately appoint incompetent loyal persons to these this can be pure capturing of public economic re- posi ons in order to be able to manipulate them sources through human resource management more easily and achieve their/party interests. and informal prac ces of exchange. Others claim that although loyalty is the most signifi cant criterion, it is in the best interest of Among and within the poli cal par es, the leader and the party to appoint somebody compe on for pres gious posi ons in manage- who is competent because only in this way will ment boards (economically stronger enterprises) the enterprise be successful and funds will fl ow can be fi erce according to some tes monies. into the party structures. The third category of Usually par es with more seats in the Parliament respondents is very op mis c. They perceive sig- and Government get more posts in public enter- nifi cant changes that slowly eliminate the previ- prises and par cularly in those which are more ously described prac ces. They recognize the important. Among the respondents, a frequently important role of the Law in such changes, since used word to describe the distribu on of posts the new Law s pulates that members of supervi- in management structures of public companies sory boards in public enterprises can be appoint- is ‘booty’, which symbolizes the economic value ed only with university educa on7, and managers they a ribute to these posi ons and benefi ts of public enterprises cannot be members of po- they drain from these posi ons (more about this li cal par es8 . They also recognize the infl uence in the sec on on the culture of informality). 7 According to the Law on Public Enterprises, Ar cle ‘Why are nego a ons about the 16, Point 2 (“Offi cial Gaze e of Republic of Serbia”, government always so long, even when no. 119/2012, 116/2013 and 44/2014). there is no coali on government? Be- 8 According to the Law on Public Enterprises, Ar cle cause there are nego a ons behind, like: 22, Point 5 (“Offi cial Gaze e of Republic of Serbia”, no. 119/2012, 116/2013and 44/2014).

56 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* of new restric ve policies related to employment of budget funds: 1. through alloca on of budget in public administra on, which limits the room subsidies and 2. through public tenders. In both for manoeuvre of party directed employment cases, budget funds are allocated to the actors prac ces. According to these tes monies, the with whom pre-made informal arrangements changes are already visible in higher compe on have been done or to the partners who were for poli cal posi ons. They expect that this high- provided informa on in advance which made er compe on will increase the quality of intra- them more compe ve in the formal compe - party structures. on with other actors/companies. We are talk- Our respondents o en indicate that party ing about informa on on the preferred prices, cadres are awarded for their contribu on to the business condi ons, service standards and other party by being appointed to the board posi ons. informa on the knowledge of which makes one They are some mes presidents of the municipal actor privileged in rela on to others. or city board of the party, and they are rewarded Not only that the favoured company gets for their fi eld work and for strengthening party the opportunity to perform a certain job, but it structures in their communi es. also means that the profi t made from the job can mul ply by addi onal informal arrangements However, the ‘capture’ of a public enter- agreed in advance. Most o en, during the proc- prise does not end with taking control over the ess of works’ execu on, the annexes to the main top of the company. The next step in ‘taking contract are signed in order to extend the scope over’ the enterprise is to replace important staff of work and increase the price. Recent regula- in lower important posi ons with party cadres ons have limited the amount of funds that can or people who are not party members but who be claimed for addi onal work to a maximum of trade their loyalty to the party for the interests 25% over the originally agreed amount. A former of an advancing career. director of a public company says that annexes Our respondents reveal interes ng dy- are o en signed for some ac vity that has not namics in rela ons between poli cally appointed been done. By the law, it is possible to sign a con- board members and managers of public com- tract for up to 125%; in 100% of cases, contracts panies. According to some tes monies, general have been signed to 125% and even for jobs that managers are more powerful than board mem- have not been done. Most of the money is u - bers. Usually board members accept decisions lized as extra profi t for a private fi rm and a poli - reached by the manager. However, if there is cal party that has a uned the tender. confl ict, it is usually solved outside of the enterprise, through poli cal party structures. Basically, For example, I publish a tender off er the power of poli cal par es is mirrored in the for road construc on from point A to point composi on of management boards of impor- B. There should be 20km of road construct- tant enterprise. ed in my municipality..., for example. The tender off er is published. The tender com- Financing of poli cal par es by public en- mission has been formed by the Ministry terprises is the key benefi t that poli cal par es of transporta on and infrastructure. Five gain through establishment of control over the construc on enterprises apply for the ten- enterprise and this has been conducted through der. They (the tender commission) develop various mechanisms. Some of the most frequent- criteria that a company has to fulfi l. But ly indicated are described further below. these criteria are developed for a par cu- Budgetary funds are another very impor- lar company. The real price of the work is, tant resource available to the poli cal actors. let’s say 10 million euros, but the company Deploying them in accordance with informal ar- which set the price at 13 million euros wins rangements, poli cal actors can obtain several the tender. They win, they invest 10 mil- benefi ts: to enable a subcontrac ng company (of lion in the road, which was the real cost. importance to poli cal actors) to get a benefi cial Some mes the diff erence can be bigger. contract and to get profi t, to transfer part of the For example, they state that the road will fi nancial resources (due to the diff erence of real be 10 cm thick, but they make it 5cm thick. costs and presented costs) to individuals or polit- This is a huge amount of money which can ical par es. There are two main methods of use hardly be controlled. Plus those 3 million

57 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

of diﬀ erence...they put it in their pockets, ing, mediocre welders and now they are en- they share it with those who gave them the trepreneurs, dealing with huge amounts of contract (the president of tender commis- money and they drive crazy cars. The state sion, for example, plus the Minister, etc.), pays, he got it because he provided the best and the manager of the public enterprise bid and that’s it...who can prove anything. records that all 13 million were spent. That’s just the same money laundering (male respondent, poli cal elite) as with sports players. The Director signs you’re worth three million and he pays you Even more serious cases are those in which back. You’re worth a million. You give two despite the legal obliga on public tenders have million back to him, and he says that his not been published and contracts were agreed in es mate was that you’re worth more and informal mee ngs between poli cal actors, pub- you are obligated to prove that by your lic enterprise managers and private sub-contract- sports results. How are you going to as- ing companies. sess the sport scores? ... Money is returned The mechanism of exchange means that a to individuals or the team that made the part of the money is given back to the poli cal deal. Here, you sit down and make a story party in charge of the sector that calls the tender. and there’s enough for everybody. It’s like As several respondents say, the party has certain in life. Thugs gather and see where they expecta ons of such arrangements, however, can take the money. They are not like some without clear rules on expected monetary com- scholars who do everything in line with the pensa on, which leaves room for manoeuver for regula ons, but they know how to fake the agreement par cipants to obtain a certain papers to seem that all is going well. The amount for themselves. agreement is made, they transfer the money to your account, and you do some work. When the party appoints you a po- He meets you at the corner, you give him si on, it knows how much it can expect; his part and how are you going to prove when a leader appoints people, he does anything. That’s everywhere, all over Eu- not deal with the people he does not know rope, wherever there is this system, this well, these things are not transparent. democracy. Now you imagine when you There are people in the party who are in manage to join that canal and when you charge of it, they obtain money for the say now it is my me. My team, my people party, the others are dealing with other and my me, no ideology, you believe that ma ers. Public procurement is s ll a ﬁ c- there is someone here because of ideology. onal thing. You call a tender, you submit And there’s no way to catch them, it can a bid and you provide two other formal only be if one is completely sunk in so that bids. Part of the money is given to the par- they do not know where and how much is ty, someone will ask money for themselves taken. Thus, if they work smart, drop by personally, and someone won’t. There is drop, unprovable, even if they admit, you no party control, only expecta ons... can’t harm them anyhow. (male respondent, local poli cian) (male respondent, businessman)

Some respondents say that in some cases Another mechanism described by the re- it is possible to accomplish only personal gain out spondents is use of marke ng services as chan- of rigged public procurement without knowledge nels for money ﬂ ows. A public enterprise pays and involvement of the poli cal party. Although for adver sements or some marke ng campaign in these cases party cadres are also the main ac- services to the marke ng agency. The real price tors, agreement and distribu on of funds take of those services is much lower than the amount place within the private informal network. of money transferred to the agency as compensa on for their services. The marke ng Agency There is huge room for all sorts of processes the payment like it was fully spent scams. I don’t have to do anything, but I on services, but the diﬀ erence is transferred to tell you where to go and what to say and the account of the poli cal party as a dona on. that’s it. You’ve got people who were noth- Therefore, many respondents indicate the sig-

58 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* nifi cant role of marke ng agencies, sta ng that An interes ng example is the one of a pub- control over marke ng agencies is part of gain- lic enterprise in which one of our respondents is ing and maintaining the power of poli cal par es employed at one of the middle range manage- and leaders. ment posi ons. Since the decision was enacted It works in the following way: Direc- on the city level that employment in public en- tor of a public company gives money for a terprises should be reduced and accordingly a commercial to the marke ng agency. He new employee could be engaged only a er three gives let’s say 5 million dinars (RSD) while employees went into re rement, our respondent adver sing costs are let’s say 500 Euros reached an agreement with the General Manag- (60,000 RSD). The rest is transferred to the er to get the quota for employment on behalf of party’s account and booked like the full her party at the level of one third. amount has been allocated. I came to the Manager and told him: (female respondent, business woman) ‘I am fully aware that you will be exposed to pressures, as I am exposed to pressures. One of the ways for transferring money We can make a deal: one of every three to the poli cal party that respondents described new employees is mine’. He said: ‘Agreed, was informal fi nancial transac ons. Some pub- I understand’. He was really great. So I lic companies conduct some part of their busi- managed to employ three persons in one ness off the record. They receive compensa on year. Among these three persons only one in cash and they transfer the cash to the poli - was from the party, since I had to employ cal party. This requires strong poli cal support a cousin. There was no pressure from the which can prevent work of inspec ons and dis- party to employ more people because peo- closing this kind of transac ons. Among our re- ple in the party are reasonable. They know spondents, this was found more at the local level, exactly how much you can do in your posi- where clientelist networks seemed ghter, which on. made them easier to avoid inspec on (linkages between par es and ins tu ons and the local (female respondent, interlocker) and central level of government). However, this According to our respondents, jobs in the mechanism is unreliable, harder to implement public sector are more pres gious than employ- today than 7–8 years ago and it is reported less ment in private companies, because they are o en among our respondents than other mecha- considered more secure and less work intensive. nisms. Party directed employment. The network ‘Those who are employed through a of loyalty of party members and their personal poli cal party, they don’t want to work for networks (family, neighbours, friends) are formed private employers because there is no se- in order to ensure loyalty of the party cadre and curity and you have to work hard.’ the electorate. These networks are ul mately (male respondent, poli cal elite) based on the promise that the party will provide jobs (either in the public or in the private sector). Between the poli cal and private sector At the moment when the party wins power, its primary goal becomes to provide as many jobs in Mechanisms that have been developed in the public or private sector for their membership the cross-sec on between poli cal actors and and (poten al) voters. the private business sector are diff erent from In this way the party can reward their the previous. Although money as the most valu- members for their work and loyalty by fi nding able resource for exchange appears here as well, employment for them or their close persons. The there are other important resources and mecha- mechanisms of party employment vary, but the nisms for fi nancial exchange which are slightly one always present is through informal contacts diff erent. between a party member and an infl uen al per- Lobbying for legisla ve and administra- son within the enterprise. Some mes, almost ve ‘favours’. This is one of the mechanisms formalized mechanisms of party regulated em- through which business actors get benefi ts from ployment are established. poli cal actors in exchange for economic re-

59 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* sources. Prac ces through which this mechanism found among those businessmen who have or func ons include complex nego a ons, bargain- had poli cal aspira ons, the desire to ‘contribute’ ing at mee ngs that include various actors from to the changes. In these cases (not so numerous both sectors. among our respondents) fi nancing of a poli cal party is considered almost as an investment in a For example, there was a mee ng of be er socio-economic environment which is also the Business club, at which it was conclud- a be er business environment. ed that it would be good to invest in agri- Another type of (semi)voluntary fi nancing culture, but there was some bylaw that did of poli cal par es can be found among entre- not suit us. It would prevent us from mak- preneurs who understand that this is ‘the rule of ing a profi t... the profi t would be halved. In the game’ and they accept it as a part of doing these cases, we speak with poli cians and business. This type of economic actors does not if they es mate that it is somehow also in resist to requests for payments made by poli - their interest, then they ini ate revision of the law or bylaw. cal par es. Some of them indicate that their contract with a public company was prolonged only (male respondent, big entrepreneur) a er such payments to poli cal par es.

Financing poli cal par es. Mechanisms Like it or not, we have to maintain for fi nancing poli cal par es are diverse. One our rela ons with poli cians. In my case way is through founda ons, associa ons, dona- this does not mean that I regularly at- ons, sponsorships. One respondent illustrated it tend cocktails at poli cal par es, or par- by the example of building a church in one local cipate in their regular ac vi es, but I try community. A company makes a dona on to the to be at their disposal when they need me church for reconstruc on. The church presents – whether it is about design, prin ng of that all was spent on the reconstruc on, while party brochures, prin ng documenta on in reality only a part was spent on reconstruc on and the rest is transferred to the poli cal party. for party conferences or adver sements in digital media. I could say that clients and In some cases communica on between colleagues with poli cal background some- poli cal actors and businessmen is rather direct. how always have advantage in my compa- Well, a party leader tells you his ny (even if it is not in the best interest of price and then you see if you will pay it or my company, such as pro bono work). Sim- not (laughing). I think that poli cal par es ply, I follow my intui on for survival of the present this money as sponsorship. This is business and today, this means that you not the same as ‘harac’9 (meaning regular should be at disposal (to poli cal par es). payments to a poli cal party), but this is (male respondent, entrepreneur) some kind of ‘free’ dona on. The dilemma of this type of economic ac- (male respondent, big entrepreneur) tors is not whether they should fi nance poli cal Money is some mes paid directly to some par es, but rather which par es they should fi - bank account that par es open only for this occa- nance. Some shi swi ly from one party to an- sion. A er the payment, money is transferred to other guessing the next elec on winner or a er some other account or abroad, and this account the establishment of new power structures. Oth- is closed, elimina ng the traces of payments. ers fi nance diff erent par es, expec ng that they will keep a privileged posi on whoever wins the Based on the tes monies of our respond- elec ons. ents we can no ce that two forms of fi nancing poli cal par es could be observed based on the The third type of economic actors is those mo va on of business actors: voluntary and com- who are reluctant to fi nance poli cal par es, pulsory (or extor on). Voluntary fi nancing can be those who resist such requests. They report various forms of ‘punishment’ for their refusal 9 Turkish word for taxes that the non-Muslim popu- to fi nance par es. Some mes this is intensive la on had to pay to Turkish authori es symbolizing inspec on of their work during longer periods, submission to the Sultan’s power during Turkish rule in the Balkans some mes termina on of contracts or warning

60 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* others not to do business with the ‘blacklisted’ agreed earlier, in our offi ces with wine and company. Among these respondents the request a friendly chat between our Manager and for fi nancing is perceived as extor on. Accord- the then Advisor of the President of state. ing to their tes monies some mes they are ap- (male respondent, entrepreneur) proached by representa ves of a poli cal party directly, and some mes by other businessmen In cases of small scale public procurement, who already ‘cooperate’ with the party. when there is no legal obliga on to announce Then one man came to my offi ce and the tender off er, there are common manipula- said that we have a really nice autumn col- ons. According to the rules three off ers should lec on and that he would like to cooper- be submi ed, among which the best one should ate with us. I asked him who he was? I be chosen. The invita on for compe on is sent thought that he was somebody who had a to selected companies. And what is usually done chain of stores, so we could distribute our is that there is actually a deal with one company, products via his stores...But he said: ‘I am which calls two other friendly companies to ap- a businessman who is close to the govern- ply with a smaller off er, so its success is guaran- ment, so if you want to be close to them teed. On another occasion this company will re- as well, I am your cket in’. I was so sur- turn the favour to the other companies. And this prised, shocked...I refused...and so...I was is how the circle of intertwined public, private so naïve...a er this we were visited by the and poli cal network is created around specifi c inspec on every second day – sanitary, la- economic resources and through series of coop- bour, fi nancial inspec on – so I decided to era on occasions. But essen ally, the process is move the offi ce abroad. controlled by the poli cal actors. (male respondent, big entrepre- At the local level, according to some tes - neur) monies, local poli cal power can act as the gate- keeper for all external investments. Some mes, Public tenders. This is the same mechanism like in the case of public enterprises, but if they do not recognize benefi t for their circle this me seen through the eyes of the private (individual or party-related), they would even sector. Although there are opinions of some re- prevent the investment. Respondents described spondents that presently it is not easy to manip- some cases when investments in par cular local ulate this mechanism, since it is public compe - communi es were coordinated from the na onal on there are legal rules governing the process, level (government). Even if these investments s ll many respondents claim that the major part would bring benefi ts to the development of their of public tender procedures is manipulated. This local community and consequently enhance sup- is usually done by se ng the criteria that match port to their poli cal power, they prevented such a par cular company, by leaking the informa on arrangements, because they were not in control about price off ers of the compe on, by provi- of such investment plans. sion of an already semi-prepared off er, or simi- The use of control mechanisms. A very sig- lar. nifi cant way of use of public resources is through Once, the company in which I was opera onal control mechanisms. They are used employed par cipated in a public tender to enable infl uence in two following ways: 1) By that was opened for development of a web enabling economic actors to do business regard- site and digital channels of one public en- less of the legal framework. In these cases, even terprise. My company received a version of though the business violates some norms (most- the already half-fi lled tender documents. ly ones related to an -monopoly regula on and I found it on my desk in a folder labelled quality standards), procedures deliberately tune ‘confi den al’. The other agency who was results and business is misrepresented as legal compe ng against us received a com- and legi mate. 2. By pu ng pressure on disloyal pletely diff erent set of documents, which I and non-collabora ve economic actors by threat- found out later from a colleague who was ening them with prosecu on for viola on of the working on that tender in that agency. We rules if they fail to meet the expecta ons set got the job. It was clear that the ‘deal’ was outside the formal procedures and channels.

61 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

In the fi rst case, this means that the pros- struc on companies to increase their profi ts to ecu on, court, police services, inspec on organs an extent that would not be possible to achieve of all kinds will look away and they will not re- if opera ng within legal framework. act to the viola on of legal procedures. Infor- Another way of u lizing the opera onal mal channels within the ins tu ons are used for control mechanisms is through the pressures on sending the signal to key persons in the operat- economic actors with the inten on to prove that ing posi on to issue a permit, sign the statement they did not comply with the procedures and on the quality control and enable smooth func- standards in some segment of work. This meth- oning of someone’s business. On that occasion, od of u lizing, most o en the inspec on servic- the rules are violated while the par cipants in es, has a func on to get some actors out of the the process are aware of it. market game or to persuade them to start informal coopera on. These are usually the economic Everything is veiled in secrecy, all players who used to be loyal to another poli - things are done away from the media, cal op on so that a er the poli cal change their various permits are arranged, but very few place is taken by another company (usually in people benefi t from these opera ons of obtaining work arrangements guaranteed by the the Big Ones in the country. These are all state) or they are required to maintain informal combina ons made among friends. arrangements with the new government. In prac- (female respondent, local poli cian) ce, it works in the following way: the inspec on services intensively monitor the conduct of these These mechanisms are very diffi cult to companies. Bearing in mind that they used to be detect as all formal procedures have been im- under certain protec on of former authori es plemented offi cially and, on paper, all is done in and due to the privileged posi on clearly vio- accordance with the regula ons. One example lated legal norms, it would not be hard to fi nd given by a public company’s director is related to some evidence against them. the construc on of a public ins tu on building. The director, who shared the responsibility for There are party companies. These the construc on with the municipal government, are fairly clientelist fi rms which manage stopped construc on works personally and re- to win public biddings. It’s hard to say ex- fused to tes fy by signature that it had been actly how, they will always fi nd a reason done according to the regula ons (such ac ng why their company was the best, but you also had a poli cal background as he belonged can clearly see the coincidence that a fi rm to a poli cal party which was about to leave the wins public bidding while a certain party is ruling coali on at that me). The building was in power, then that it later loses bids, that not built in accordance with the standards set they are more o en controlled by all kinds in the public invita on. On this occasion, he was of inspectorates, labour, fi nancial, etc. Then pressured by the supervisory organs and head of some other companies start to bloom. the municipal administra on. He was told that (male respondent, poli cal elite) there was nothing to worry about if the head of the administra on and supervisory authori es One of the current poli cians who had signed. Although he refused to sign that the work previously worked in the fi nance inspectorate ex- was done properly and although he informed plains how it works. He believes it is very unlikely relevant ins tu ons, there was no consequent that there are the businessmen who use public reac on about the issue and no addi onal qual- funds out of reach of informal poli cs’ require- ity control was carried out. The fact that such ments. things actually do happen becomes clear during each pre-elec on campaign, when the public get The fi rst kind of pressure is that if to know more about privileges of some compa- you start a company, someone immediately nies on the market. One of the most signifi cant sends an emissary with a list and a number examples was a long dispute over whether the of people to hire ...these are always the MAXI retail had a monopoly on the domes c party’s voters. Another way is fi nancing of market, as well as many examples of viola ons of campaigns, i.e. dona ons to poli cal par- construc on standards repeatedly enabling con- es. If you want neither one thing nor the

62 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

other, a new form of pressure comes in the to build the facility he had to abide by their deci- form of an inspec on and it is now a ques- sion. He had previously invested 330,000 Euros on whether you want four inspec on vis- in the business. By informal channels, he was in- its in a month, and they can always fi nd formed there had been other ways things could something. I worked as an inspector for 8 have been resolved. This would include bribing years and inspectors are exempt from their urbanism inspectors. The sum of 5,000 Euros own mistakes. Even if someone does every- was men oned. He says he wanted to do busi- thing according to the law, you can always ness without paying it, because he was sick of all write a complaint that he is unable to re- the inspectors racketeering businessmen. He respond, but has to pay a lawyer and thus fused the off er and was never given permission spend some me and that is annoying. The to work. inspector has the right to make a mistake At the highest level of poli cs, the infor- and has no related consequences. People under this kind of pressure most o en give ma on obtained by the police and secret servic- up and say, “OK, so what, I’ll hire another es becomes a method of control. Poli cal actors two or three people, it’s be er for me to be say that informa on about individuals (especial- on good terms with them than to be con- ly their economic and poli cal arrangements), stantly under some kind of surveillance.” stored in police fi les accessed by some members of the power network, is an important mecha- (male respondent, big entrepreneur) nism for controlling behaviour and discredi ng Barriers to certain actors can be set by poli cal and/or economic opponents. manipula ng legisla on and procedures, while state offi cials have a right to their accurate in- CULTURE OF INFORMALITY terpreta on. Favouring one and excluding the other businessmen is done this way as well. One of these (disprivileged) individuals was a great Language entrepreneur who wanted to expand his busi- It is interes ng which terminology some ness to the territory of a major city. He bought respondents use to describe the economic as- the land, obtained all the permits necessary for sets over which compe on evolves a er the the construc on of a wholesale facility and a gas elec on and establishment of new poli cal pow- sta on. Although he had submi ed all required er structures. Booty is the used term, and the construc on projects and assessments in accord- process of distribu on of posi ons is described ance with all regula ons and although he had as bargaining over booty a er a successful con- paid all taxes and fees and submi ed complete quest ac on. documenta on, he waited four years to get the permission to start construc on works. As per Why are the nego a ons about the legal framework, this had to be resolved government always so long, even when within 30 days. A er the fi rst calls and a er the there is no coali on government? Be- insistence of his lawyers, he received verbal an- cause there are nego a ons behind, like: swers that the case was about to be resolved like-dislike, like-dislike, un l the least im- (it lasted more than six months). A er that, he portant func on is linked to the money or was informed that there had been a change in power. Nobody competes for the posi on the legal framework and if he wanted to re-ap- in the library, but OK, even the library is ply, he must re-submit the complete documen- part of the booty, because the party can- ta on, with the new standards. That would re- not be fi nanced by the library like it can be quire not only me but also new taxes he had fi nanced from Serbia gas. Then some peo- already paid. He complained to such interpreta- on as the new law s pulated that its provisions ple who are not powerful are appointed to were to be applied only to new projects and not the library and they will be grateful and those which had already been in procedure. The they will contribute to the campaign, they response of the city authority for urban planning have some circle of friends who are prob- and construc on was that it had not been their ably powerful in art or science. interpreta on of the law and that if he wanted (male respondent, poli cal elite)

63 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

Norms networks are fully grounded on the interest for money and profi t making, while in poli cs they Norm of loyalty. Paradoxically, loyalty is are diff erent, they are being built and rebuilt one of the most important norms regula ng rela- from the lowest levels of engagement, such as onships within the par es and between poli cal s cking posters on walls during campaigns, up to and economic actors, but at the same me, there the highest ranks. is the broadly accepted norm of shi ing loyal es in line with someone’s interests. The party grants access to economic resources to those who are Places of transac on loyal and who can provide sa sfactory exchange Our respondents indicated various places of values, but it is completely acceptable for loy- which are typically used to reach informal agree- alty to be broken when another party or poli - ments. One of the most common places, very cal circle can provide be er opportuni es for the much linked to the business culture in Serbia is person. Therefore there is the broadly acceptable ‘kafana’ (tavern). norm of shi ing loyal es if backed by economic interest. Best business deals are s ll agreed In order to be loyal to someone, in ‘kafana’, whether they are small deals or you have to cancel your loyalty to others. strategic projects. It is because ‘kafana has But this is not the problem. In every occa- no ears’, and with good food and drinks sion you assess your opportuni es – with everything seems much easier. In such a whom it would be be er, who can protect relaxed se ng I o en got addi onal deals. my interests be er. And this is fascina ng, The agreement was set in the offi ce only how fast, without any scruple people can for one project and when we were leaving shi from one side to another... and no- ‘kafana’, we had three signed contracts. body even blames them. The majority does So my a tude about informal mee ngs is that. Those who do not do this, they dis- mostly posi ve. At the end this is a part of appear. If you don’t have your team, you our Balkan culture. disappear. (male respondent, entrepreneur) (male respondent, local poli cian) Other places that respondents men oned Some respondents indicate that norms are: private homes and public places such as of loyalty are completely diff erent in the po- walkways along river banks or similar. People li cal and economic sphere. In business, loyalty think that nobody can tap a wire there.

64 ä Jelena Pešić ä Slobodan Cvejić

SOCIAL REPRODUCTION THROUGH INFORMAL SPHERE – THE STRUCTURE AND THE SYSTEM OF CLIENTELISM IN SERBIA

he fact that coexistence of informal prac c- er, it is also evident that the sphere of informality es such as clientelism, corrup on and pat- has been evolving and changing its actors, mech- Trimonialism with new democra c, market anisms and forms in modern history of Serbia in and state ins tu ons is typical for post-socialist accordance with the changes of the formal sys- countries is well known (Burawoy and Verdery, tem, which means that informal power rela ons 2000; Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; Ledeneva, have been intertwined with formal ins tu onal 2013). We analysed informal rela ons between se ng and therein established structures (social, poli cal and economic elites and inside poli cal economic, poli cal). This varia on in size and im- par es in Serbia as an important form of power pact of informality also aff ects everyday lives of rela ons that aff ect reproduc on of the whole people, ranging from providing basic social sur- society. Our aim was to recognize major actors, vival (ge ng a job, accessing quality health care, mechanisms and forms of informal prac ces and par cipa ng in local community) to an alterna- to conclude which is the character of the rela on ve strategy for increase of income. Based on between formal and informal ins tu ons, conver- high importance of informal power rela ons for gent or divergent. Based on earlier researches on func oning of formal ins tu ons and reproduc- the topic we expected that informal ins tu ons on of the whole society, we made an inquiry prevented normal func oning of formal ins tu- into the essence of these rela ons. What is the ons and deepened economic inequali es, that size and strength of informal structures in Serbia way endangering nurturing of trust and solidarity today and how much and in which ways do they as main ingredients of social cohesion. Ul mate- aff ect the lives of all ci zens? ly, we wanted to know if informal structures have Having this ques on in mind, the fi rst grown to the level at which they dominate repro- important issue to address is related to the ex- duc on of the whole system. Our empirical data tent of clientelist networks: whether the ben- served as the basis on which we wanted to make efi ts (rents) remain restricted only to the elite a conclusion on the nature of the social system members, contras ng them to the masses, or being established and reproduced in post-social- the clientelist networks have the ability to exist Serbia (by comparing and contras ng them to pand across and down the social pyramid. While the theore cal model of poli cal capitalism, orig- Holcombe’s (2015) model of poli cal capitalism inally described by Weber (1922) and further de- implies that rents are restricted only to elite veloped by Kolko (1963) and Holcombe (2015)). members, Kopecky and Sherlis (2008) argue that The economic and poli cal history of Ser- since clientelism implies an asymmetrical nature bia (and the Balkans in general) shows that lack of the linkage between actors of diff erent status of strong ins tu onal heritage, slow economic and power, it preserves and reproduces inequali- development and weak democra c culture make es, and is, therefore, more likely to be found in fer le ground for establishment of informal prac- economically undeveloped socie es, involving all ces that provide subsistence to many ci zens as social strata. well as informal structures that protect private The next ques on that has to be answered interests at the cost of public resources. Howev- is related to the nature of clientelist rela ons

65 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* established in post socialist Serbia: is it the sys- levels at which the resources are being captured? tem of rela ons that involves tradi onal types As Helmke and Levitsky state, ‘...informal rules of asymmetrical social exchange (based on obli- shape formal ins tu onal outcomes in areas ga on, personal loyalty, duty, servant mentality, such as legisla ve poli cs, judicial poli cs, party etc. – “old clientelism”) or the characteris cs of organiza on, campaign fi nance, regime change, “new clientelism” (based on impersonal, more federalism, public administra on and state build- democra c and less dependent nature of the re- ing’ (2004: 726). The wide dispersion and deep la on, wherein loyal es of the clients are more penetra on of informality might ul mately char- fl uid, changeable and instrumental – see: Hopkin, acterize the whole system as poli cal capitalism. 2006) which prevail? Do government and ruling party changes lead to the forma on of new clientelist networks or are they able to survive po- THE EXTENT OF CLIENTELIST li cal changes? Or, in other words: are clientelist NETWORKS networks durable and stable or dependent on the changes in the poli cal arena? Are we faced with Holcombe’s (2015) model of poli cal capi- a single clientelist network or several opposing talism implies that the system is being repro- networks? Another important issue that is being duced based on the clear division between elit- derived from the nature of clientelist rela ons is es and masses (between ‘1 percent’ versus ‘99 the type of networks established: whether these percent’), with restricted entry to rent-seeking networks tend to be more personal or based in only for the fi rst group. The model implies that power posi ons? Or, in other words, whether within the poli cal capitalism framework, rents and on what grounds are personal and power are limited solely to the elite members, i.e. to networks intertwined? those who write rules in order to create entry The third important issue is to determine barriers for those not in the elite group. By re- the nature of resources that are being exchanged stric ng rents, elite members become sole rent and the type of recipients: are these resources benefi ciaries at the expense of others, and there- more or less private/excludable or are the goods fore welfare costs of rent seeking do not equal and services off ered to narrow or wider groups? the en re amount of the rents. For Holcombe Hopkin (2006) suggests that the more the re- (2013), an essen al element of poli cal capital- sources are provided for individual clients rather ism is the elites maintaining their status rela ve than to narrow or wider groups or organiza ons, to the masses and at their expense. the more the clientelist nature of exchange pre- Vast poli cal sciences literature on party vails. Or, in other words, the more the resources patronage and poli cal clientelism (Kopecky and are excludable, the nature of rela ons tends to Scherlis, 2008; Kitschelt and Willkinson, 2007; be more clientelist. Van Thiel, 2008, etc.) shows that the phenom- Having in mind the variable and adap- ena, especially in economically poorly developed ve nature of informal structures as well as the socie es, may also include crea on of wide clien- specifi c nature of post-socialist transforma on telist networks that are cross-sec oning the so- in Serbia, the next issue to be addressed, in the cial stra fi ca on pyramid, involving hierarchical light of our empirical results, is the nature of organiza on of protégés, with electoral clients at power distribu on between poli cal and eco- the ground fl oor of the system, various levels of nomic actors: whether the power is, ul mately, brokers organized in a pyramidal fashion, and pa- concentrated in the poli cal or economic subsys- trons at the top (Kitschelt and Willkinson, 2007: tem (and consequently in the hands of poli cal 3–4). Polycentric poli cal systems, with fi erce or economic elites), and whether the changes in compe on between poli cal par es, are prone global and local economic and poli cal contexts to establishment of principal–agent linkages of are leading to shi s in the centres of power? accountability (Kitschelt and Willkinson, 2007: Related to the former is the ques on of 30). how much the informal ins tu ons and rules Our empirical fi ndings suggest that both penetrate the formal system and whether infor- models are applicable and not necessarily incom- mal rules represent an obstacle to the forma- pa ble. The system of poli cal clientelism estab- on of formal ones; what are the sectors and lished in Serbia strongly relies on the rela ons es-

66 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* tablished between poli cal par es and business tom of the pyramid, inequali es are established elites (which consequently enables elite mem- between those who are able to get public sector bers to be prime rent seekers), but the compe - jobs and those who are not. Our empirical evi- ve nature of the poli cal system (that rests on dence also show that increasing inequali es are weak ins tu ons and democra c procedures) is being established not only between those that ending up in crea on of vast clientelist networks are included or excluded from the clientelist net- among actors at all levels (including common work, but also within the network itself: scarcity electorate, at the bo om of the pyramid). A er of available public resources leads to increasing the introduc on of a mul -party poli cal system diff eren a on between clients included in the in the 1990s and its consolida on a er the year network at same hierarchical level (a good exam- 2000, strengthening of democra c poli cal ins - ple are diff erent types of contracts within public tu ons (precisely free elec ons and representa- sector jobs or diff eren a on between public and ve democracy) has infl uenced the shi of the (‘extorted’) private sector jobs that are off ered to model of poli cal clientelism, too. Unlike during loyal party ac vists). socialism, the patrons now needed to exit the narrow circles of power and win support of the electorate if they wanted to maintain an infl uen- THE CHARACTER OF CLIENTELIST al poli cal posi on. And if their inclina on was NETWORKS: DURABLE AND/OR towards maintaining informal control over pub- FLUID NETWORKS, PERSONAL lic resources, they needed to bring large parts of the party structure into clientelis c rela on. That AND/OR POWER NETWORKS, was how the clientelis c pyramid was built. To- OLD VERSUS NEW CLIENTELISM? day, a highly compe ve poli cal system (under polycentric condi ons) together with a poor lev- Another important issue is the character of el of economic development (enhanced by eco- clientelist networks established between poli cal nomic recession) makes the winning of poli cal and business actors and their stability in rela on power an even more valuable goal that enables to poli cal changes. Or, in other words: whether par es to control the authorita ve alloca on of we are faced with stable and durable networks public resources in an unconstrained manner. Or, that are cross-sec oning poli cal par es (and in other words, poli cal par es are the main ac- are, therefore, the object of poli cal exchange tors that are capturing various state resources, and trade) or these networks tend to cons tute distribu ng them either to business elites, or to as parallel, opposing and alterna ve? In order to their own electorate in exchange for diff erent answer this ques on we have to address the is- kinds of support (fi nancial support, dona ons, sue of the nature of clientelist rela ons: whether in-kind contribu ons from business actors and they predominantly rely on hierarchical, personal votes or volunteer work from the electorate). es, du es and obliga ons (to which Hopkin re- Although prime rent-seekers are the mem- fers as ‘old clientelism’), or they tend to be more bers of the economic and poli cal elite, the cli- impersonal, democra c, changeable and instru- entelist network has the ability to expand at all mental (‘new clientelism’)? levels, retaining and even widening old (hierar- The structure of clientelism in Serbia is chical), but also shaping new (lateral) social in- quite complex. It assumes combina on of net- equali es between those that are included and working and (poli cal) organizing. It seems that excluded from the clientelist network. In the sit- both types of es (old and new clientelism) are ua on of increasing economic recession, lateral present on all hierarchical levels of the clientelist inequali es (that are being established between pyramid. At the top, their presence shapes pow- actors at the same level of social stra fi ca on er and personal networks, o en making them scale) tend to gain more importance: at the top of only analy cally dis nguishable, but in prac ce, the pyramid, inclusion in the clientelist network clearly intertwined. However, most o en, per- diff eren ates elite members and their companies sonal networks at the top level are being formed that are able to get public tenders, bailouts, state on the basis of friendship or kinship, but also subven ons or to shape regulatory policies and assuming some level of personal dependence. use control mechanisms in their own interests As Ledeneva stated (2013:13) “power networks from those that are excluded, while at the bot- operate on principles similar to other informal

67 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* networks and impose certain norms of reciproc- even at the top level. Under the circumstances of ity and informal constraints on people in offi cial economic crisis and increased compe on over posi ons”. Power networks based on close per- economic resources, the most probable outcome sonal es (friendship of kinship) and maintained of increased chance of opportunis c defec on by shared lucra ve interests dominate at the top is strengthening of informal personal networks of the clientelis c hierarchy. There it has two through increase of con ngent direct exchange, modes: one is the rela on between poli cal and predictability and monitoring (the 3 cons tuents economic elites and the other is the rela on be- of clientelis c exchange – Kitschelt and Wilkin- tween most infl uen al party members. However, son, 2007: 9). This means that networks on the it has to be said that dominant power networks top are slowly transforming from the personal are being formed within poli cal par es, in the mode to power mode. form of ‘ekipa’, the more tradi onal type of cli- Inclusion of business actors in the network entelism, where mutual exchange of resources may be voluntary (when business actors enter the (money, poli cal support, valuable informa on, clientelist networks before elec on, an cipa ng tenders and other favours) at the end brings the winning party, or a er elec ons, accep ng benefi t to all members of the network, but the the rules of the game, or being a part of compet- patron dictates the rule of distribu on. ‘Ekipe’, ing clientelist networks established by diff erent at the top of the clientelist hierarchy are being poli cal par es) or involuntary (under threat or formed mostly out of the party core members, use of various forms of force, most o en by ma- some mes involving loyal friends that are not nipula ng with diff erent control mechanisms and a party member, but rarely including economic semi-state agencies or by changing regulatory elite members. Poli cal par es represent a suit- mechanisms, but ul mately, also by using physi- able organiza onal framework which enables cal violence). In the fi rst case, rela ons tend to be establishment of fi rm power networks, while more instrumental in their nature (with fl uid and economic elite members mostly func on as at- mul ple loyal es of economic actors towards dif- omized satellites of these networks. Down the ferent poli cal par es), while in the second case hierarchy we can fi nd more asymmetric rela ons they tend to get the form of coercion. with clients being more dependent on resources, decisions and direc ons from the patron and his At the lower level of the clientelist pyra- personal network, but with op ons for establish- mid, we also found a combina on of instrumen- ing smaller clientelis c nodes at the local level tal and dependence clientelis c rela ons. Al- or in certain domains, too. By being successful though there were tes monies of the presence in soaking public resources in public posi ons of “fl yovers” and vote traders, one could say that they hold, or in their local communi es and/or there were two types of clientelist rela ons that providing signifi cant poli cal support among the serve two diff erent but func onally dependent electorate, some clients qualify for strengthening purposes. One has the purpose to prevent op- personal posi on and entering the ‘ekipa’, thus portunis c defec on and strengthen the core of gaining higher benefi ts later in their career. the power network and is made of those mem- However, democra za on has also infl u- bers of the hierarchy who get posi ons in local enced the persistence of the ‘old’ clientelism administra ons or local public enterprises, or at the top, since patrons now know that their get an employment or some other direct benefi t poli cal longevity depends on other infl uen al through poli cal party channels. In return, they members of the poli cal and economic elite, perform diff erent tasks in reproduc on of the cli- so they have to maintain both formal rules and entelis c hierarchy and in this way par cipate in ins tu ons at least seemingly working properly con ngent direct exchange, which increases pre- and protect main poli cal compe tors ‘in the dictability and allows for monitoring of the net- game’ by not raising charges against them for work performance. The other type of clientelis c their former clientelis c conducts. These circum- rela on at the lower level of the pyramid has the stances make their poli cal power more tradable purpose to bring votes in the elec ons and win and the rela on inside the power network less wider poli cal support. Here, the mode is more asymmetric. This increases rivalry among diff er- instrumental and individuals give their votes or ent ‘ekipe’, which heightens the chance of op- even do some voluntary work with the expecta- portunis c defec on (Kitschelt and Wilkinson) on that the promises given by the elite aff ec ng

68 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* their personal or group interests will be fulfi lled informal ins tu onal arrangements. The more (non-con ngent, indirect poli cal exchange). the party networks are established within certain Evidence also suggests that clientelist loy- territorial (local) units, the harder it gets for their al es and even whole networks can be the ob- members to be involved in loyalty trading (op- ject of trade. Poli cal change does not always portunis c defec on), contribu ng to forma on imply forma on of a new network from scratch, of durable networks and fi rmer loyal es (which, but most o en a new clientelist network is being addi onally can be supported by personal and formed by comprising elements of the already ethnic/tradi onal loyal es). established networks, with key posi ons being fi lled by “new”, loyal members. The usage of the exis ng network is more pronounced if the INCLUDABLE/EXCLUDABLE party is coming to power for the fi rst me and RESOURCES: WHO ARE does not have its own clientelist “infrastructure”, THE MAIN RECIPIENTS? especially within government bodies and regulatory agencies. Evidence also show that during As Hopkin (2006) suggested, the fi nal re- the fi rst phase of unblocked transforma on, in cipients of resources that are being exchanged a more unstable poli cal environment, the net- may vary: in more tradi onal models of clien- works tended to be alterna ng, while in the pe- telism, they are usually individuals or narrow riod of poli cal stability and increased economic groups (cores) gathered around the patrons; in instability (with reduced public sector resources), democra c and contemporary se ngs, these network infrastructures tend to be more durable, recipients tend to be wider groups (within ruling but with fl uid loyal es. par es or par es as a whole), although the na- Power networks (‘ekipe’ at the top) are ture of clientelist rela ons inevitably involves ex- being formed out of members of poli cal elites clusion of some groups and parts of the society. occupying crucial government posi ons, inter- Our data for post-socialist Serbia suggest locking agents (poli cians appointed to manage- that we are faced with both groups of the re- rial boards of public enterprises), top members cipients: the prime recipient is poli cal party as of the economic elite and actors that occupy key a whole (and diff erent party members are evalu- posi ons within ruling par es, but without any ated primarily on the ground of their contribu- public (poli cal and economic) func ons. They ons that are benefi ng the party as a whole are called a power network because of the posi- and are being recognized as such); the secondary ons they occupy. Members of the power net- recipients are members within party networks work may or may not be involved in personal (wider groups); however, recipients can also be networks (based on personal loyal es, such as the members of the power networks at central kinships or friendships), formed around the core and local levels (party cores and other relevant members of the ruling party. However, power individuals). Although wide distribu on of re- networks usually tend to become personal net- sources to the recipients is the most eff ec ve, works (either by posi oning loyal core members in terms of ge ng support and maintaining loy- in power posi ons or by establishing personal alty, scarce resources o en lead to their distribu- rela ons with power posi on holders that were on only to the certain members of the party or, previously not a part of the core). most o en, to the members of power network Forma on of diff erent (tradable) networks (good example is the posi oning at the most de- characterizes diff erent poli cal par es, but can sirable func ons of loyal core members that are also be found within them (following the for- not being recognized as most dis nc ve mem- ma on of party fac ons). These networks are bers of the party). Finally, the fi nal recipients can cross-sec oning all hierarchical levels of the also be people that are not either core or party party (formed from the top to the bo om), and members, i.e. that are not part of power or per- although poten ally formed as parallel and op- sonal networks, but by ge ng posi oned on the posing, they are usually intertwined. Networks grounds of their favors (whom Ledeneva (2013: can be established around formal structures of 55) calls ‘useful friends’). the party, but inevitably, as empirical evidence The character of the resources exchanged show, they include, to a greater or lesser extent, through clientelis c and corrup ve rela ons is

69 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* ul mately concentrated on fi nancial benefi t. All profi t, but their very existence might be chal- the resources like: valuable informa on, control lenged. That is why they seek government regu- over money fl ow, capacity to control and ob- la on of the economy in order to preserve the struct other actors opera ons, capacity to infl u- status quo, by stabilizing the exis ng state of the ence legisla ve, control of media, management aff airs and making it diffi cult for someone outside of poli cal party and its organs, and even ‘vol- the elite to replace them. However, Holcombe unteering’ poli cal ac vity are ul mately fi nan- (2013) no ces that regulatory capture creates a cially compensated, either directly (salaries or di- dependence of those fi rms on the regulatory re- rect cash transfers) or indirectly (in kind benefi ts gime that benefi ts them, so they must support otherwise sold in the market, jobs ‘won’ in ten- the poli cal structure that maintains that regime ders, etc.). By the alloca on of these ‘selec ve or they will suff er transi onal losses. Although benefi ts’ (Hopkin, 2006: 7) inside the hierarchy the capture theory suggests that benefi ts go one and especially inside the power network we can way, to the business elite capturing public re- dis nguish between old and new clientelism, the sources, transi onal gains trap theory off ers ex- fi rst one characterizing primarily the power net- plana on on why the process is reciprocal: busi- work and the second one characterizing prima- ness elites became dependent on the regula ons rily the clientelis c hierarchy. However, it should for their con nued profi tability, so poli cal elites be stressed, in line with earlier conclusions about are in the posi on to extort benefi ts from eco- poli cal democra za on in Serbia and shi to- nomic elites in exchange for benefi cial legal and wards more compe ve poli cal market, that regulatory framework they desire. even at the top of clientelis c hierarchy (inside In the historical-contextual chapter of the the power network) the character of the clien- analysis of Serbia’s post-socialist transforma on telis c exchange is shi ing from old to new cli- we saw that the situa on appeared to be more entelism. complex: in the fi rst phase, the poli cal elite managed to establish domina on on both poli - cal and economic subsystems and by controlling POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC POWER the priva za on process and legal, semi-legal and illegal economic ac vi es (in the situa on The next issue we need to address is the of wars and economic isola on) to convert poli - nature of power which generates clientelist re- cal and organiza onal resources into economic la ons. Developing the model of poli cal capi- capital. The process led to the reconstruc on of talism by examining specifi c historical forms of the new economic elite that gradually started capitalism established in American society that to diff eren ate on the basis of the dominant were related to stronger government involve- mechanism of reproduc on: one group consisted ment in regula on of economic ac vi es, Hol- of those whose posi ons were dominantly be- combe (2015) points out that the system implies ing reproduced by retaining close rela ons with twofold and reciprocal rela ons between the the state (interlocking agents who hold both po- members of poli cal and economic elites; the li cal and economic posi ons – directors of large system is being reproduced on the mutual ben- state owned companies that were, at the same efi t of both groups. However, an important ques- me, highly posi oned func onaries of the rul- on is whether the power is concentrated in the ing party); the second group consisted of those poli cal or economic arena? Or, in other words, who entered the elite circles through use of state what is the dynamics of the rela ons between granted benefi ts (and involvement in legal, semi- organized interest groups coming from the busi- legal and illegal ac vi es that the state tolerat- ness sphere and those that hold poli cal power ed), but whose reproduc on gradually started to and are in posi on to determine the nature of rest on market mechanisms. There is no doubt economic regula ons? that the fi rst phase of the process was marked Kolko (1963: 6) argues that ‘major eco- by domina on of poli cal power. However, economic interests’ themselves design constrains nomic strengthening of the la er group within under which they act, in order to retain a domi- the economic elite and the need for stable and nant posi on. The economic elites recognize that regulated markets, led to a gradual (although not crea ve destruc on of capitalism works against complete) shi of power from the poli cal to the them, and that, in the long run, not only their economic arena. As a consequence, the once

70 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* monolithic and unshakable Milosevic’s regime electoral support for the currently leading Ser- was dismantled, announcing the new period in bian Progressive Party, confi rmed in two conse- which the posi on of economic elites changed. quent elec ons, marked the height of the proc- With the dismantling of the system of single ess in which the power shi between the two party poli cal dominance, the vacancy for outer arenas occurred (the whole process is referred to fi nancing of compe ng poli cal par es opened. as ‘new authoritarianism’ in poli cal sciences lit- Once almost fully dependent on Milosevic and erature – see: Džihić, 2012). Major economic in- its inner circle, members of the economic elite terest fell into the transi onal gain trap, becom- were now in a posi on to infl uence government ing dependent on regulatory policies and public policies and market regula ons to their own in- resources provided by poli cal elites, who are terest in exchange for fi nancial support to new, in the posi on to extort benefi ts from economic unstable poli cal elites. Poli cal instability at the elites (‘rent extrac on’). In addi on to that, ac- celera on of the European integra on process ini al stage of poli cal pluralisa on marked by that Serbia entered tapers the manoeuvring increased poli cal compe on, frequent gov- space for making benefi cial legal arrangements ernment changes, fl uid poli cal coali ons (due for major economic interests, making them even to a large number of poli cal par es that were more dependable on informal and clientelist net- unable to form stable governments), etc., led to works established by poli cal par es in power. the establishment of a poli cal system in which par es had to rely on vast clientelist networks in To conclude, the system established in order to gain leading posi ons and stay in power. post-socialist Serbia represents an empirical The clientelist network that was established be- model that is far more complex than Holcombe’s tween members of poli cal and economic elites ideal type of poli cal capitalism (constructed included such a system of exchange in which in rela on to developed western socie es). Al- business provided fi nancial support in exchange though it implies reciprocal rela ons between for: 1. legal and regulatory arrangements that poli cal and economic elites, the concentrated enabled them to exclude other actors from busi- power is shi ing between the poli cal and the ness ac vi es and con nue to extort profi ts; and economic arena, depending on the wider eco- 2. use of public resources (tenders, subven ons, nomic and poli cal processes. Furthermore, the state-granted jobs). In this way, an unstable polit- transi onal character of the society (with sub- ical system together with fi nancial strengthening stan al state and public sectors of the economy), together with rather late inclusion of Serbian of the economic elite (in the phase of macroeco- economy into the global capitalist system on pe- nomic stabiliza on and economic growth) gradu- ripheral grounds, implies the existence of rather ally led to power shi ing from the poli cal to the strong rela ons between the state and business, economic arena. Our respondents stated that in leading to establishment and preserva on of in- this period members of economic elites had interlocking actors and networks belonging to both creasingly controlled crucial economic processes poli cal and economic spheres. in the country and captured state resources. Star ng from the year 2008 and the economic recession, fi nancial strength of the eco- INFORMAL AND FORMAL nomic elite decreased (on the impacts of the INSTITUTIONS global fi nancial crisis on Serbian economy, see: Praščević, 2013). Simultaneously, the poli cal sys- Post-socialist transforma on of Central tem entered the phase of rela ve stability, with and Eastern European socie es is commonly un- major poli cal par es in control over the majori- derstood as (re)cons tu on of parliamentary de- ty of parliament seats. This phase was marked by mocracy and market capitalism. The crucial com- the declining infl uence of economic elites, which ponent of this transforma on is establishment of became more dependent on state interven on in ins tu ons that defi ne and prac ce a new nor- the economy (and ‘too big to fail’ policy, where ma ve framework that sets formal ‘rules of the state underwrites the losses of major compa- game’. However, it is also commonly perceived nies), together with gradual strengthening of po- that the whole process of ins tu onal change li cal elites which controlled the much needed occurs in an environment of inherited social rela- public resources and regulatory policies. Major ons and cultural forms, in a certain framework

71 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* of informality. To paraphrase David Stark (1996), Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). Clientelis c rela- the new socie es are not built on the ruins of ons penetrated to a higher or lesser extent all socialism, but with the ruins of socialism. This major ins tu ons relevant for the func oning of interpreta on means that old societal pa erns the system: parliament, judiciary, government, have been transferred into new ins tu onal ar- local administra ons, poli cal par es and media. rangements infl uencing thus the whole process When needed, even the civil society organiza- of social reproduc on. This fact enabled evolu- ons get involved in clientelis c transac ons, es- onary transfer to the new system on the one pecially some trade unions or non-governmental hand, but on the other it built into the founda- organiza ons. It is only a few of the regulatory, ons of the new ins tu ons’ vulnerability to independent bodies (the Ombudsman, the Trus- informal concentra on of power. As shown in tee for protec on of personal informa on, An - historical review, the beginning of post-socialist corrup on agency, etc.) and several social media transforma on in Serbia was marked by almost pla orms and ini a ves that maintain pressure unrestricted power of one poli cal party and its to strengthen formal ins tu ons and restrict in- leader to direct major determinants of social and formal ones. economic living. Clientelis c rela ons and infor- According to Helmke and Levitsky’s mal concentra on of power were developed as scheme, if the change in the current situa on the rule of the game from the very beginning. would happen at all, it could go into two direc- The whole history of ins tu onal transforma on ons. Based on the indica ons from our research a er that was parallel development of the role the less probable scenario would be that the elit- of formal ins tu ons and strengthening of infor- es forming the power network in Serbia would mal ins tu ons of poli cal patronage and clien- change their interests and goals making thus the telism. As Holcombe no ced, “... poli cal capital- outcomes of informal ins tu ons func oning ism is more than just an explicit recogni on that more convergent to the outcomes of formal in- poli cs infl uences the economic system—an idea s tu ons. Such an ‘enlightenment’ of the elites that is well recognized in the public choice litera- would make the shi from compe ng to subs - ture. Rather, it is a system in which the poli cal tu ve informal ins tu ons, but it seems improb- and economic elite design the rules so that they able having in mind that almost all poli cal par- can use the poli cal system to maintain their es compe ng for poli cal power in Serbia today elite posi ons” (Holcombe, 2015: 43). Due to the have a history of contribu ng to the cons tu on strength of informal power networks during the of clientelism. The more probable change would most part of the post-socialist period in Serbia, lead to accommoda ng informal ins tu ons, formal ins tu ons were more, to use Acemoglu those allowing power networks to adjust their and Robinson’s (2012) terms, extrac ve than in- divergent goals to the growing strength of for- clusive, which in the end led to an economic fall mal ins tu ons. This again means that, together down and increase of inequali es. with the pressure coming from the civil society, Another ques on is whether the rela on at least a part of the poli cal elite should be re- between the formal and informal ins tu ons can formist enough to support accountable govern- change for the benefi t of the whole society and ance, independent judiciary, closing down of how? Here we will use Helmke and Levitsky’s public enterprises, effi cient administra on, and approach to rela ons between informal and for- independent media. mal ins tu ons. As shown in the descrip on of informality in Serbia, informal ins tu ons could be characterized as compe ng, which means IN CONCLUSION that they produce incen ves that are incompat- ible with the formal rules and thus lead to cli- Our analysis of informal rela ons, party entelism, clan poli cs and corrup on. This state patronage and poli cal clientelism in Serbia, dur- of aff airs has been challenged by increased coming the period of post-socialist transforma on, pe on between diff erent poli cal par es and relied on a Weberian no on of poli cal capital- power networks, but it could be said that due ism as theore cal framework that explains wide to blocked socio-economic development this contextual condi ons in which these phenomena compe veness led to clientelis c rather than occur. Our goal in this chapter was to examine programma c responsiveness (Van Thiel, 2008; empirical fi ndings and conclude which type of

72 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* clientelist system is being established in Serbia (1990s) has been marked by rela ve regime sta- and furthermore weather these fi ndings support bility (due to the formed clientelist network, but the thesis on development and reproduc on of also due to use of state repressive apparatus), the poli cal capitalism. second phase was characterized by poli cal in- As we know, in Weber’s original conceptu- stability, frequent government changes, instable aliza on, poli cal capitalism represents a system coali ons, and so on. However, as Antonić (2006) in which the exploita on of opportuni es for no ced, the structure of power was not changed, profi t arises from the exercise of poli cal power although ins tu onal and personal elements (and, ul mately, from the use of violence). In were altered. In his interpreta on, economic sys- other words, it rests on usage of state monopo- tem remained under poli cal domina on, where lies, benefi ts, fi nancial specula ons and corrup- power and privileges were concentrated in the on, wherein economic success does not depend hands of small group of people. Power holders on the market but rather on the privileges given formed new protégé networks, the strengthen- by the state (Veber, 1976: 130–131). ing of which was jus fi ed by a need for priva - za on. Antonić (2006) dis nguished two types However, in contemporary interpreta- of rela ons within clientelist networks, accord- ons (Holcombe, 2013), poli cal capitalism is ing to the type of capital: in the case of foreign described as dis nc ve (poli cal and) economic investments, the protégé networking started to system in which economic and poli cal elites co- obtain some characteris cs of comprador rela- operate for their mutual benefi t. Although it is ons, while in the case of domes c capital the depicted as system relying on reciprocal rela on- emphasis was on the elements of personal and ship between two elites, wherein business elites party clientelism. In our research we focused on are capturing public resources, becoming, at the the second type of clientelis c rela ons. Priva - same me, dependent on the regula ons for za on or bankruptcy of state owned companies their con nued profi tability, so that poli cal elit- represented an opportunity for members of the es are in posi on to extort benefi ts from them economic elite to acquire more capital, while at (“rent extor on”) in exchange for making desira- the same me, for workers in these companies ble legal and regulatory condi ons (trapping rent that could mean the loss of jobs, in which the recipient into dependence), Kolko (1967) and government had the fi nal say. Holcombe (2013), argue that it is the system in which the power is ul mately concentrated into Although the transforming system in Ser- economic arena (“organized interest groups”, as bia implied forma on of interlocked poli cal and Olson (2002) calls them, or “major economic in- economic elites (Antonić, 2006; Arandarenko, terests”, in Kolko’s approach). 2000), there is no doubt that, in interpreta ons of these authors, the main source of the power, On the other side, the nature of poli cal during the fi rst (“blocked”) period of transforma- capitalism formed in post-socialist context of Ser- on, lied in poli cal arena. However, complemen- bia, involved, as Antonić (1993) no ced, members tary processes of blocking transforma on and of poli cal elite (ex-socialist nomenklatura mem- conversion of poli cal into economic resources, bers), which have managed to gain control over led to gradual reconstruc on, division and even poli cal and economic spheres (in situa on of confl ict among elite fac ons, implying shi of wars and interna onal isola on of the country), power from poli cal into economic arena. These conver ng poli cal and organiza onal resources (rather early) fi ndings were confi rmed through into economic (Lazic, 2000). In Antonić’s interpre- our empirical analysis. Transi on of ins tu ons ta on, poli cal elites have managed to establish and society didn’t end with lessening of state hierarchical clientelist network of protégés, at and public sectors of the economy. Besides that, the top of which were members of the economic Serbia was late with including its economy into elite who could get high profi ts due to the trade global capitalist system on peripheral grounds, monopolies on goods from public stocks, involve- which led to rather strong rela ons between the ment in barter arrangements, illicit tobacco and state and business. As a consequence, interlock- arms trade, purchase of building lots under pref- ing actors and networks belonging to both poli - eren al condi ons, etc. (Antonić, 1993). cal and economic spheres were established and Period of un-blocked post-socialist trans- preserved which supported sustainability of Ser- forma on that roughly started a er the regime bian poli cal capitalism. change in 2000, has been marked by compe on of poli cal par es over gaining and keeping pow- A complex informal system of power con- er posi ons. If the fi rst period of transforma on centra on and resources distribu on was set and

73 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* maintained based on informal, but quite strict Holcombe, Randall. 2015: Poli cal Capitalism, Cato rules and on hidden, but very func onal roles. Journal, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 41–66. Through several mechanisms these roles have Highley, John and Gyorgy Lengyel eds. 2000: Elites been reproduced and both puni ve and reward- A er State Socialism. Lanham, MD: Rowman ing rules applied as to favour extrac ve mode of & Li lefi eld Publishers, Inc. formal ins tu ons func oning. The ongoing eco- Hopkin, Jonathan. 2006: Conceptualizing Poli cal nomic crisis is sharpening the edge of poli cal cli- Clientelism: Poli cal Exchange and Demo- entelism: compe on between and inside infor- cra c Theory. Paper prepared for APSA an- mal networks and poli cal par es serving them nual mee ng, Philadelphia. Panel 46–18. over ever more scarce resources will lead either http://personal.lse.ac.uk/hopkin/apsahop- to addi onal pressure to discipline the informal kin2006.pdf. system and prevent defec on, or to fragmenta- on and weakening of poli cal power. The later Kitschelt, Herbert and Steven Wilkinson. 2007: Pa- scenario might lead either to strengthening of tron, Clients and Policies, Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press. inclusive formal poli cal ins tu ons or to switch to yet another stage of dominance of economic Kolko, Gabriel. 1963: The Triumph of Conserva- elite inside Serbian poli cal capitalism. sm: A Reinterpreta on of American History 1900–1916. New York: Free Press. Kopecky, Petr and Gerardo Scherlis 2008: Party Pa- LITERATURE tronage in Contemporary Europe. European Review, Vol. 16, pp. 355–371. Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. 2012: Lazic, Mladen. 2000: The Adap ve Reconstruc on Why Na ons Fail?. New York: Crown Publish- of Elites, in Highley, J. and Lengyel, G. eds. ing. Elites A er State Socialism. Lanham, MD: Antonić, Slobodan. 1993: Srbija između populizma Rowman & Li lefi eld Publishers, Inc. i demokra je; poli čki procesi u Srbiji 1990– 1993. Beograd: Ins tut za poli čke studije. Ledeneva, Alena. 2013: Can Russia Modernize? Sis- tema, Power Networks and Informal Govern- Antonić, Slobodan. 2006: Elite, građanstvo i slaba ance. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University država, Beograd: Službeni glasnik. Press. Arandarenko, Mihail. 2000: Ekonomska stvarnost Olson, Mancur. 2002. The Logic of Collec ve Ac on. Srbije, u: Lazić, Mladen. (ur.), Račji hod. Be- Cambridge. Massachuse s: Harvard Univer- ograd: Filip Višnjić. sity Press. Burawoy, Michael and Katherina Verdery, eds. Praščević, Aleksandra. 2013: Dome ekonom- 2000: Uncertain Transi on. Ethnographies of ske poli ke u prevazilaženju efekata glo- Change in Postsocialist World. Lanham, Boul- balne ekonomske krize na ekonomiju srbije, der, New York and Oxford: Rowman and Lit- Ekonomski horizon , Januar – April 2013, tlefi eld Publishers INC. Godište XV, Sveska 1, 17 – 30. Dzihic, Vedran. 201: Crisis of Democracy or Ren- Stark, David. 1996: Recombinant property in East aissance of Authoritarinism? Authoritar- European capitalism, American journal of so- ian Challenges to New Democracies in the ciology, Vol. 101, No. 4, pp 993–1027. Western Balkans, presenta on at Woodrow Wilson Center (h ps://www.wilsoncenter. Van Thiel, Sandra. 2008: Poli cal appointments in org/event/crisis-democracy-or-renaissance- Dutch public sector organiza ons: old and authoritarinism-authoritarian-challenges-to- new forms of patronage. h p://soc.kuleu- new-democracies). ven.be/io/egpa/org/2008Rot/papers/Van- Helmke, Gretchen and Steven Levitsky. 2004: Infor- Thiel.pdf (accessed on June 3rd, 2015). mal Ins tu ons and Compara ve Poli cs: A Veber, Maks. 1976: Privreda i društvo. Beograd: Research Agenda, Perspec ves on Poli cs, Prosveta. Vol. 2/No. 4, pp 725–740. Weber, Max. 1978: Economy and Society: An Out- Holcombe, Randall. 2013: Producing Prosperity: line of Interpre ve Sociology. edited by G. An Inquiry Into the Opera on of the Market Roth and C. Wi ch. Berkeley: University of Process. London: Routledge. California Pres.

74 INFROMALITY AND CLIENTELISM IN KOSOVO*

ä Adnan Hoxha ä Dina Milovanović ä Yllka Buzhala

HISTORICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF INFORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ACTORS IN KOSOVO

he issue of informality con nues to be a top- countability of such leaders was rather obscure. ic of discussions among leading research- Further, according to some Austrian observers of Ters and policy makers, as its impact on the that me, respec ve public administra on was overall economy is signifi cant. It represents a co- not dis nguished as eff ec ve, whereas access to herent issue whose magnitude is rather spread public resources was limited only to a few per- at the world-wide level, expressed mainly in the sons, closely and informally linked to the elite. developing countries, which a racts much of the The economy of that me resembled that of a global workforce and resources (Chen, 2012). feudal system, where agriculture was the main In Kosovo, a dis nc ve pa ern of collabo- economic sector; yet, in urban areas, other eco- ra on between poli cal authori es and bands of nomic ac vi es such as ar sans of leather, metal irregulars can be traced back to O oman rule. and silver (fi ligree), and produc on of weapons Armed clan1 chiefs were not only co-opted as could be found (Malcolm, 1998). auxiliaries during military campaigns, but also for Overall, people of the me adhered more extrac ng taxa on, protec ng trade routes and to certain informal rather than formal rules; par- monitoring borders in mes of peace (Kasaba & cular rural customs, tradi ons and norms were Barkey, 1994). amalgamated in a specifi c book tled “Canon of Lekë Dukagjini” (Sellers & Tomaszewski, 2010). It transformed informality into a publicly spread PRE-SOCIALIST PERIOD reference point for various aspects of social life, playing a pivotal role in social organiza on and Similar to other Balkan territories, Kosovo self-governing of respec ve Albanian tribes for was also administered by the O oman Emperor. centuries to come. Simultaneously, communi es In par cular, the largest por on of its territory living in urban areas were organized rela vely belonged to the Vilayet of Kosovo. Despite hav- more based on certain religious (Islamic) founda- ing a rather powerful central authority, decision ons. Similar trends, although with varying inten- making power had been to a signifi cant level si es con nued un l the end of the XIX century. delegated to local/regional structures named In general, Kosovo has a controversial his- Sanjacs, Kazajas and Nahija (Riza, 1985). Further, tory of linkages between formal and informal like in the rest of the Empire, in the territory of ins tu ons throughout its whole history. Large today’s Kosovo, there were local self-governing parts of its poli cal elites, who were integrated structures called “hykymetler” – family and tribe into the O oman Empire aristocracy, began in- based structures, led by Albanian leaders (ashiret) tensifying their requests for reforms during the (Riza, 1985). Informal prac ces and norms were na onal revolu on of the XIX century. In par cu- present throughout social segments, and ac- lar, they ar culated those requests in the form of 1 “A group of close-knit and interrelated families” (Ox- an extended autonomy up to the establishment ford, 2015) of a unique Vilayet. In addi on to that, even

77 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* while Kosovo was part of the Serb, Croat and tedly, clientelism and bribery became the domi- Slovene Kingdom, formal ins tu ons opera ng nant ways of fi nding jobs, leading to the loss of at the me were not fully func onal. The Alba- legi macy of the socialist poli cal and economic nian poli cal elite in Kosovo of that me estab- system. In addi on to that, clientelism in Kosovo lished the “Xhemje ” Party, and cooperated with was also ethnically oriented. The offi cial sta s cs radical as well as democra c par es, a emp ng for this period show that Serbs were dispropor- to advance Albanian na onal interests. Delegates onately more employed at the managerial and of Xhemje in Belgrade were occupied by advo- white-collar posi ons and received rela vely ca ng the interests of O oman “çifl igar”– land- higher wages than Albanians (Pula, 2004). lords; yet, o en they raised issues pertaining to The unmet promises of the CPY pertain- the living condi ons in Kosovo (Malcolm, 1998). ing to the Kosovo Albanian popula on’s request for autonomy, in addi on to the ins tu onal expulsion followed by violent measures under- SOCIALISM taken against those who sought reforms, including members of the Kosovo branch of Commu- Socialist era was the me when informal 3 rela ons got specifi c forms and became the nist Party (Albanian component of it), were necessary components of the system func on- the main reasons for a rela vely abrupt loss of ing. The key player during the Socialist period the CPY’s infl uence over that community a er in Kosovo, same as in other areas of Yugoslavia, the introduc on of pluralism in Kosovo. Not- was the CPY (Communist Party of Yugoslavia). withstanding, throughout the 1950s, Kosovo Through various formal and informal channels, it enjoyed a rather symbolic territorial autonomy, exercised its infl uence in economic, cultural, and whose cons tu onal status was equalized with poli cal spheres. Since Kosovo had been incorpo- that of the northern province in Serbia, Vojvo- rated within the People’s Republic of Serbia, the dina. Such a situa on prevailed un l the late la er through its CPY branch in Kosovo adminis- 1960s, when repressive measures undertaken by tered the fl ow of public resource ownership and the Serbian secret force were publicly exposed, distribu on (Pula, 2004). and the League of Communists of Serbia made According to the Yugoslav census counts major concessions in terms of giving back more taken in 1948 and 1981, Albanian popula on powers to its provinces. In par cular, it was the in Kosovo made about 68% and 77% of total, cons tu onal amendments passed during the respec vely. The change in ethnic structure in period of 1969–1971, that changed the status of Kosovo was highly correlated to demographics such provinces into territorial units at the federal trends, namely the diff erence in fer lity rates level, giving them powers equal to those of the between Albanians and Serbs (KAS, 2014; Pula, republics. That was the period in which the Alba- 2004). The cons tu onal amendments in the late nian popula on were rela vely more integrated 60s and early 70s made Kosovo a top priority for into formal ins tu ons, which in return lead to the Federal funded projects aiming for economic the crea on of a percep on among the local development.2 However, the economic crises of popula on about the formal ins tu ons being the late 70s heavily aff ected Kosovo too, already rela vely more legi mate. However, this period one of the poorest regions in Yugoslavia. Conse- did not sustain long enough to change major pat- quently, the labor market could not absorb the terns of rela ons between formal and informal new entrants, while the public sector employ- ins tu ons. ment outpaced that on the industrial produc on. The poli cal elite during the socialist era Namely, the unemployment rate in Kosovo by was composed of communists, whose roots date 1980s reached 60%, whereas it is es mated that back to the Na onal Libera on Movement (NLM) around 100,000 people le the country. Admit- in WWII. Although they acted quite independently, quickly they were “recycled” by the Ser- 2 A growing (socialist) industrial base enabled the bia’s Communist Party whenever making some crea on of strongly poli cal-related economic elit- poli cal moves “unpleasing” to the Party. The es. Indeed, Kosovo, once an agriculture-oriented economy, began its major shi towards extrac ve economic elite of that me consisted of higher industries built on its mineral wealth. An expand- rank offi cials in the public administra on and ing industrial base and public sector a racted many people to move from the rural into urban areas. 3 Kosovo’s provincial Assembly.

78 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* managers of the socially owned enterprises. Hav- On the other hand, in the post-socialist pe- ing close es with the communist leaders was riod, the Albanian parallel ins tu ons sought to the key to ge ng such jobs. Nonetheless, a er ensure their legi macy through holding elec ons 1980, par cularly a er the Serbian Communist in 1992. This was the me when Mr. Ibrahim Party’s cons tu onal reforms led by Milosevic Rugova won a signifi cant share of votes for Presi- that resulted in Kosovo losing its autonomy, such dent of Kosovo. While the respec ve Serbian re- elites were eradicated (Pula, 2004). gime defi ned such elec ons as unoffi cial, others cri cized them for lacking transparency and real internal compe on. POST-SOCIALIST In the absence of a well-set poli cal elite, TRANSFORMATION they were mainly professionals, fi red from their workplaces, who engaged into poli cal cam- Similar to the rest of the Balkans, Kosovo paigns against such measures. The recently es- went through specifi c poli cal-economic con- tablished LDK (Democra c League of Kosovo) juncture during the 1990s: the end of the social- fi lled the void at the poli cal level. It served as ist system brought social destructuring through- a unifying organiza on of most of the societal out the region. The crumbling of the poli cal segments, later to be recognized as a parallel sys- and social economic systems (and the norma ve tem.4 Such a system was rela vely well-structured standards they embodied), and the transi on to and mainly composed of LDK ac vists, but also a market economy were turbulent processes, in teachers and health service professionals, as the which the not-so-invisible hand of mafi as gave educa on and health system were its two main protec on, assistance and contract enforcement pillars. The economic elite of that me mainly (Strazzari, 2008). consisted of private small businesses that were The peculiarity of Kosovo of that me was domes c-market oriented by and large, while the transfer of regime from a communist/monist remi ances from diaspora provided the cri cal system to the pluralis c one, including ten years source of “energy” for sustaining the men oned of ins tu onal boyco s (establishment of a par- economy in general. Besides, LDK highest hierar- allel system), and ending up with armed confl icts chical circles also controlled the fi nance and who and war (NATO interven on). It was the me got what posi ons within such a system. Such an when many members of the communist elites approach to poli cal management was cri cized transferred into new elites. Simultaneously, there even by the insiders such as the Prime Minister was a rise of the new members of the elite; yet, of the Government of Kosovo in exile, Bujar Bu- they did not gain signifi cant infl uence among Al- koshi5 (Sannar, 2004). banian masses un l the moment when Kosovan Albanians began perceiving the pacifi st route, Informal economy and ‘Parallel System’ fana cally promoted by the old members of the in Kosovo during 1990s poli cal elite, as no longer the most viable way of accomplishing their goal (independence). Our a empt to explain informality in Kos- ovo up to the late 1990s was especially enhanced Changes in the recruitment pa erns by the analysis of poli cal economy. Indeed, dis- crepancies within poli cal elites had a direct and of poli cal and economic elites during signifi cant eff ect on the overall economy. Such a post-socialist transforma on correla on was rela vely more emphasized by In the post-socialist period, most of the the end of the socialist era, and the beginning of Kosovo leaders derived their legi macy from peaceful resistance and dissident roles in the 4 Please see the subsec on on informal economy in Kosovo for more details about it. 1990s, or na onal libera on contribu ons dur- 5 Former Kosovo Prime Minister-in-Exile Bujar Bu- ing the 1998/99 insurgency. Other factors such koshi told the German magazine Der Spiegel that as their perceived contribu on towards Kosovo’s there was widespread corrup on in Kosovo. Buko- independence, their business(es), and regional shi served under Ibrahim Rugova prior to and during or clan based roots and backing helped them the armed confl ict in the late 1990s. Bukoshi also helped co-found Rugova’s Democra c League of build their personal infl uence and form informal Kosovo (LDK), which he le in April 2002, when he power networks. founded his Kosovo New Party (NPK).

79 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* the Cons tu onal constella on of that me, with vian project of an equal federa on for all the na- regard to the Cons tu onal status of Kosovo.6 onali es. By informal leadership, we mean the Namely, the term informal economy in infl uen al (intellectual) people of the local and the post-socialist context captures a scope wider regional communi es who happened to disbe- than the economic ac vi es or rela ons between lieve that such a mul -na onal organiza on as enterprises and their workers. Instead, it encom- Yugoslav Federa on had delivered its proclaimed passes links/rela ons between the actors in eco- standards, especially in the case of Albanians. nomic and poli cal sectors, where the former The response from Serbia was the suspen- defi ni on is just one of their integral parts. In the sion of all the Kosovo’s provincial ins tu ons (po- case of Kosovo, such rela ons were of rela vely li cal, economic, and cultural ins tu ons), mark- high importance, as, besides pure economic in- ing the beginning of the establishment of the terests, they were considered by Albanians also parallel system in Kosovo (Pula, 2004). Resiliency as an alterna ve for reaching their poli cal goal through informal channels and pacifi st ac ons – independence (Pula, 2004). were the main components of the response of Albanians to such a situa on. Faced with ins tu- The struggle of Albanians’ parallel struc- onal blockage and discrimina on, Albanians or- tures for sovereignty over the territory of Kosovo ganized themselves around certain vital societal was off set by the rela vely stronger ins tu ons sectors. The educa on and health sector were of Serbia. When the Regime of Milosevic re- cornerstones of the Parallel system (Pula, 2004), moved from offi ce the Kosovo provincial leader- followed by print media, small business and pri- 7 ship in 1988, hundreds of thousands of Albani- vate proper es, trade unions, poli cal and hu- ans marched into protests. This gave them more manitarian organiza ons, and professional and confi dence to con nue on their path. Only a few ci zens’ associa ons (Maliqi, 2011). months later, a hunger strike by Trepca miners marked another turning point of the Albanian Despite the appearance of the new poli - cal elite on the surface of this parallel system, grassroots resistance. The reply from Serbian 9 authori es was imprisonment of the provincial those who laid down its “legal” founda ons and and miners’ leadership and declara on of state led its internal and external strategic policy were some of the key poli cal fi gures belonging to the of emergency. The Albanian delegates and the 10 Albanian masses considered such measures of previous Albanian communist nomenclature. Serbia’s regime as uncons tu onal. In Septem- The most infl uen al among them was Fehmi 11 ber 1990, fused by the mood of the la er, the Agani who facilitated the poli cal processes of former secretly gathered in a small town in Kos- 1990–1992 that precluded the establishment of ovo (Kacanik), and declared independence from the parallel structures (Maliqi, 2011). Serbia (Maliqi, 2011). Admi edly, protec ng the The main structures of the parallel system autonomy of Kosovo was proclaimed to be their were the poli cal elite12, government-in-exile, lo- main goal, yet, history showed that it was just a mask for a more radical one such as independ- 9 Yet, the Serbian authori es perceived them as ille- ence (Maliqi, 2011). Indeed, only six months lat- gal. er, the Kosovo’s provincial Assembly8 declared its 10 Fehmi Agani, Mahmut Bakalli, Gazmend Zajmi and goal to achieve sovereignty. Such a “rebellious” Pajazit Nushi were among the most important ones (Maliqi, 2011). act by a formal ins tu on of that me marked 11 He was the intellectual ideologue of the demand for the unifi ca on of the formal and informal Alba- a republican status for Kosovo through the demon- nian leadership, to be led from that point by the stra ons of 1968. He was also able to establish re- LDK. By formal leadership here, we mean those la ons with some communists leaders who agreed who were included in the ins tu onal life of that with the compromise of the double status (part of me and somehow had embraced the Yugosla- Serbia but also equal unit within federal system) for Kosovo that the Yugoslav leader, Tito, had conceded to. (Maliqi, 2011). Later he refused to publicly de- 6 At this par cular me, Kosovo was one of the Yugo- nounce the demonstra ons of students in 1981, for slav provinces. an upgrade of the status of Kosovo from an autono- 7 They were forced to leave their posi ons. mous province to that of a republic; he was expelled 8 There is a lack of relevant source on the ethnic from the Communist League (party). He was mur- composi on of the Kosovo Assembly of the me, dered in 1990s (Partos, 1999). although the presump on is that Albanians domi- 12 Various poli cal movements joined the parallel nated it. movement led by the LDK and its leader Rugova.

80 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* cal fi nancial councils, social assistance networks, non-violent resistance (mainly upon the approval educa onal and cultural ins tu ons, and health of its leader Rugova), that arbitrarily decided services. All of the ac vi es undertaken through about the way such resources were to be allo- that pla orm were defi ned as illegal (informal) by cated, presumably in accordance with the Party’s the formal federal authori es, however the exact objec ves. Such a constella on was transformed opposite existed among Albanians (Pula, 2004). into the one where many poli cal par es had to The system ensured its sustainability mainly compete for the same public resources – evolv- through money from abroad (Albanian diaspora), ing of poli cal pluralism (Pula, 2004). local community money and in-kind dona ons, in A look into the nature and management addi on to “informal tax revenues,” which were of parallel educa on reveals a system in which collected by the following informal mechanism: repression and poli cs created a number of sig- the government-in-exile and LDK-controlled fi - nifi cant outcomes. In this regard, the Alliance of nancial councils that were established through- Albanian Teachers (LASH) and the Independent out Kosovo (Pula, 2004). Teachers Union (SBASHK) were the key players According to Jusuf Buxhovi, the respec ve behind the parallel educa on system. Instead in Government of Kosovo as the execu ve branch schools, students mainly had to learn at garages, of the Parallel system defi ned a 3% contribu on private houses, and basements. In addi on to in personal incomes and incomes mainly from di- this, the health parallel system mainly derived aspora. From a fi nancial statement of the Central as an outcome of similar expulsion measures ap- Council for Finance, during the seven-year peri- plied in the educa on sector. In 1990, all public od, it appears that 81% of the funds were spent clinics and hospitals were closed. Doctors sought for the needs of primary educa on, 3.3% for the a er private clinics, whereas the most important University, 0.5% for research ins tutes, 3.8% for actor was Mother Teresa Associa on, which of- Kosovo ins tu ons and municipali es, 0.3% for fered free medical services for up to 300,000 culture, 0.2% for sport, 0.4% for health, 1.2% for people by 1998 (Pula, 2004). In fact, according to social assistance, 2.1% support for vulnerable re- its leader, Rugova, the main reasons why this sys- gions and 3.8% for vulnerable families. tem was successfully established and sustained were the tradi on of endurance and culture of During the period October 1991 – Sep- solidarity (Maliqi, 2011). Moreover, this could tember 1999, the Government of Kosovo dis- also be interpreted as an opportunity for the de- posed from its funds and other resources a total velopment of the exis ng and establishment of of more than 217,666,570.60 DM 3.632.099.67 new informal rela ons. USD 30,566,699.17 CHF and 24,120 GBP (Kosovo, In the mean me, other poli cal par es Jusuf Buxhovi, p. 511). In an a empt to deliver apart from the LDK emerged. A former LDK dep- those funds in accordance to domes c needs, in- uty, Hydajet Hyseni and Rexhep Qosja formed a cluding but not limited to fi nancing opera ons of rival party – the New Democra c League of Ko- the Government, educa on, health, culture and sovo (NDLK). Another radical, though not very social solidarity, the respec ve government cre- infl uen al, poli cal element of that me was the ated the Central Council of Democra c League of Popular Movement for the Republic of Kosovo Kosovo. What is more, in order for the funds al- (LPRK), which launched guerrilla a acks on the loca on to be ins tu onalized and aligned with authori es. domes c needs, the respec ve Government of Kosovo, upon the proposal of the Central Coun- cil of the Democra c League of Kosovo decided POST-ARMED CONFLICT PERIOD to establish the Central Council for Finance in March 1992. In the late 90s, at the beginning of the armed confl ict, a new poli cal elite mainly con- Similar to the period of socialism where sisted of the previous non-violent movement every public resource was actually under the and Kosovo Libera on Army (KLA) leadership.13 control of the Communist party, during the parallel system in Kosovo all of the money was col- 13 The Kosovan Albanian emigrants in the Western Eu- lected by LDK. Then, it was the persons high in rope were the key founders of KLA along with rela- the hierarchy of LDK, the leading poli cal com- vely small-armed groups in Kosovo. Its fi rst public appearance occurred in November 1997 (Crampton, ponent within the grassroots movement of the 2014)

81 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

Obviously, the legi macy of the former group years a er the armed confl ict. Ever since, such was derived from the me of the parallel sys- poli cal constella ons have dominated the polit- tem, while the la er one, consis ng mainly of ical and the rest of societal aspects of the society warlords, benefi ted from their military legi macy in one way or another. and reputa on of na onal heroes, on their way Contrary to the socialist system and to a to becoming the new state-makers (Montanara, large extent the parallel system era, in the post- 2009). A erwards they formed their own poli - armed confl ict period, the only way for poli cal cal par es (PDK and AAK as the most important par es to ensure their existence was through ones). On the fi rst elec ons a er the armed con- votes. Fear of losing votes brought various forms fl ict, held in October 2000, it was their old “rival” of informal norms that quite o en prevailed over (LDK) from the pre-armed confl ict period, mainly the formal ones. Clientelism, party patronage16 oriented to the pacifi st resistance, that won the and irregulari es with regard to public procure- elec ons. The poli cal elite was complemented ment were some of the main mechanisms for by the UN presence through its special Mission – the mobiliza on of more votes. United Na ons Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). UN- MIK had a rather wide scope of power and au- Furthermore, many cases were recorded thority, but was at the same me unaccountable about confl ict of interests, when close family to the people of Kosovo. Its scope of work and members of the poli cal elite got managerial po- infl uence was signifi cantly downsized a er the si ons at the public agencies/ins tu ons, as well Kosovan ins tu ons declared their independ- as enterprises at both central and local levels (EC, ence in 2008. 2014). Other illicit prac ces, which tend to have pervasive consequences on the overall develop- While in the pre-armed confl ict period, ment of the country, by diver ng resources from ac vists were mainly ac ng under the LDK’s po- projects of the higher returns and making biased li cal pla orm; its end brought the development decision, are: “manipula on of policies, ins tu- 14 of numerous poli cal par es. Except the LDK, ons and rules of procedure in the alloca on which had inherited the poli cal philosophy of of resources and fi nancing by poli cal decision- the mes of resilience, none of the poli cal par- makers, who abuse their posi on to sustain their es had a clearly developed poli cal program, power, status and wealth” (TI, 2014: 3). and had a “cul vated” rela vely tradi onal po- As far as the key labor market fi gures are li cal support. As far as the new poli cal par es concerned, despite a slight improvement, they were concerned, the most important ones were remain at levels of cri cal concern. The issue of those established by the previous KLA leaders.15 unemployment remains at a rela vely high rate, Nonetheless, they too lacked a clear poli cal with females and youth being aff ected more, program, hence, most of their poli cal support rela vely speaking. In fact, the general unem- derived out of their previous contribu ons and ployment rate in 2014 was 30.9%, whereas that rela ons comprising mainly of KLA members and of females and males was 40% and 28.1%, re- their friends and families. Regionalism was also spec vely. The unemployment rate among those an important element, at least during the fi rst of 15–24 age, 2014 rela ve to the year before increased from 55.9% to 61%, respec vely. In 14 Lead by Mr. Ibrahim Rugova (Pren ce, 2006) addi on to this, labor force par cipa on of fe- 15 PDK, AAK, and lately Vetevendosje comprise the main KLA leadership and are led by Mr. Hashim Tha- males in 2014 was 21.4% or 1/3 of that of males qi, leader of the Poli cal branch of the KLA (MFA, (61.8%) (KAS, 2014). 2015a), Mr. Ramush Haradinaj, Commander of the According to the European Agency for Re- Dukagjini KLA Branch, in the western part of Kos- construc on (EAR) the share of grey economy ovo bordering upon Albania and Montenegro, and Mr. Visar Ymeri (who came a er the founder of the as a percent of GDP in 2004 and 2006 was 27 % party, Mr. Albin Kur , former KLA General Secretary Assistant), respec vely, although rela vely smaller 16 Following the last local elec ons in Kosovo, the new por ons of such category of people belong to the Mayor of Prish na submi ed to the Court 70 fi les LDK and other rela vely smaller par es too. The lat- accusing well-known poli cal fi gures of the poli cal est Parliamentary elec ons, held in 2014, con nued party of the previous Mayor of corrup on and in- to show similar trends to the past with the domina- stalla on of the clientelis c networks in almost all on of the PDK and LDK with 30.38% and 25.24%, of the local public companies. Upon the last na on- respec vely, followed by the AAK(9.54%), and in- al elec ons, the previous Mayor was elected as the creasing one of the VV (13.59%)(CEC, 2014). Prime Minister of Kosovo (Gazetaexpress, 2015).

82 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* and 35%, respec vely, while 85% of that came This period was characterized with UNMIK from workers who paid no taxes. The same EAR playing a dominant role, although the process assessment showed that informality is mostly of transferring this role to the PISG ins tu ons spread in the construc on, trade, tourism, trans- had started in 2003 (Freedom-House, 2004). port and agriculture sector (Krasniqi & Topxhiu, During this process, there were many cases of 2012), which are, at the same me, the most de- intensive rivalry between the PISG and UNMIK, veloped sectors (KAS, 2014). as the former were pushing for faster and more signifi cant transfer of competences. A clear re- Informality in the frame of dual fl ec on of those rela ons is found in the process ins tu onal system of priva za on (Freedom-House, 2004), which is par ally explained by the dominance of informal Since the end of the armed confl ict in 1999, networks that fused the formal mechanisms, as the poli cal system in Kosovo was characterized this process turned to be one of the most dis- by a mul ple stakeholders’ par cipa on, which putable of all in the post-armed confl ict period. in this case we will refer to as a dual system. The The one thing that did not change much, how- ra onale behind such a defi ni on mainly belongs ever, were the rela ons between the PISG and to the con nuous existence of domes c and in- the Serb parallel structures. Hence, this period is terna onal ins tu onal se ngs whose roles and marked with Kosovo being incapable of extending responsibili es have undergone signifi cant trans- its authority in the Northern part whatsoever. forma ons. The second stage started in 2008, with Following the immediate post-armed the PISG (Assembly) declaring Kosovo’s inde- confl ict period, the main actors in the Kosovan pendence. This act had tremendous implica ons socio-poli cal scene were NATO, UNMIK, Ko- in every societal aspect, as well as on rela ons sovo Provisional Ins tu ons of Self-Govern- between the newly established Kosovan ins tu- ment (PISG), Serbia-dictated parallel structures ons and other above-men oned stakeholders. (schools, hospitals and provisional councils), ICO Indeed, Kosovan ins tu ons slowly developed since 2000, but technically received most of their and EU ins tu ons (Commission Liaison Offi ce, power from UMNIK only a er they declared in- EULEX, EUSR). For the sake of be er explaining dependence. On the other hand, despite the fact the evolu on of such a system, we have divided that the Kosovan Ins tu ons received the major- our analysis into two sub-periods: fi rst, the lim- ity of responsibili es that once were under the ited autonomy period, encompassing the me UNMIK’s mandate, there was s ll a signifi cant period from 1999–2008, and second, supervised presence of the interna onal community, but and controlled independence (Fracnik, 2007). this me transformed into monitoring and advis- One of the most important players in the ing format. Throughout these periods, both be- poli cal scene, both at the central and local lev- fore and a er 2008, the interna onal as well as el was UNMIK. Its scope of mandate was rather Kosovan structures had poli cal power, with no- wide, while its authority was o en expressed ceable shi s, from which we derived the term above that of the Kosovan ins tu ons at both “dual system” (dual governance), seeking to ex- levels. Such authority was pragma cally translat- plain such co-existence of authori es. That dual ed into four main pillars: Pillar I – humanitarian system of governance diff ered from the parallel aff airs (done by the UN), Pillar II – civil adminis- system, as in the case of former, the interna on- tra on (done by the UN), Pillar III – democra za- al and local authori es mainly served as comple- on and ins tu on building (done by the OSCE), mentarians to each other (ICG, 2011). and Pillar IV – economic reconstruc on (directed At the beginning of this “second phase”, by the EU). In par cular, UNMIK was mandated it was rather confusing who the real “boss” in to run the fi scal policy, administra on and priva- Kosovo was. On the one side, it was the UNMIK, za on of public u li es, elec ons, transport and as the only fully UN recognized ins tu on, fol- telecommunica on, foreign rela ons, and minor- lowed by the EU’s special mission organiza ons ity rights and returns (Freedom-House, 2004). such as the ICO and EULEX, and on the other The IV pillar represents the component wherein side the (mainly) freely elected Kosovan ins tu- the EU had the key responsibili es (Mahncke, ons. One of the main reasons which contributes Ambos, & Reynolds, 2004). to this complexity is the fact that interna onal

83 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* mechanisms present in Kosovo operate within es in Kosovo, Serbia maintained their separate the status-neutral framework of the United Na- security forces, courts, schools, hospitals, mu- ons, even though they recognize the existence nicipal governances, that were mainly fi nanced of and cooperate with the Kosovan ins tu ons. by the Serbian Government to whom they were That is so due to the fact that the newly declared accountable (OSCE, 2003). Those ins tu ons are independent country, Kosovo, is not yet a UN perceived as the parallel ones, in rela on to the member17, nor has it been recognized by all the Kosovan ins tu ons, similar as the parallel in- EU member states18 as such en ty (UN, 2014). s tu ons of the 1990s, with, of course, certain poli cal diff erences. In me some of those ins - tu ons got dislocated in Serbia (security forces Poli cal par cipa on of Kosovo Serbs and courts), and some remained in Kosovo un l from 1999 to 2015 the present me (schools, hospitals, municipal governances/provisional councils). Nonetheless, Par cipa on of the Serb community in the within the Brussels agreement, the issue of the poli cal scene in Kosovo has gone through diff er- ins tu ons remaining in Kosovo is presumed to ent phases. In the fi rst parliamentary elec ons, be solved by forming of Associa on/Community coali on Povratak (Return) won 22 seats in the of Serb Municipali es – ASM (Zajednica srpskih assembly, s ll being the largest poli cal repre- opš na), which is presumed to have some auton- senta on of the community.19 In me, poli cal omous power within the Kosovo’s legal frame- par cipa on was changing, depending on the work. This ma er aroused much controversy and support of Serbia. If poli cal leadership in Ser- refusal, especially by the opposi on poli cal par- bia were against Serbs’ par cipa on in the local ty with na onalist ideals. Indeed, upon agreeing and parliamentary elec ons in Kosovo – both the by representa ves of both governments on the par cipa on and the turnouts would be minimal, general principles/main elements for establishing and vice versa. The largest boyco of both the in- the ASM, the Cons tu onal Court of Kosovo has ruled some of them as not fully in compliance s tu ons and the work of the interna onal com- with the Cons tu on of Kosovo. Correspondingly, munity took place a er the biggest post-armed that whole process has been frozen, where am- confl ict ethnic violence in Kosovo that occurred biguity and uncertainty are the terms best and in March 2004. For the most recent local and most o en assigned to its end (Hopkins, 2015). parliamentary elec ons, held in 2013 and 2014, The issue of informality con nues to hinder there was direct support from Serbia, which re- the development of Kosovo economic sustain- sulted not just in high turnouts, but also in hold- ability; and the refusal of the Republic of Serbia ing elec ons in four northern municipali es for and fi ve EU countries to recognize its status, af- the fi rst me. Through the EU-facilitated dialogue fects the affi rma on of Kosovo interna onal sub- between poli cal representa ves of Serbia and jec vity and European integra on. Kosovo, also known as the Brussels dialogue, the rela on between two sides changed in the manner of jointly addressing certain poli cal/social/ LITERATURE economic issues (but not the status of Kosovo). From the perspec ve of Kosovan ins tu- Central Elec on Commission. 2014: Results of the ons, the northern part, dominated by the Serb Parliamentary elec ons in Kosovo 2014. community, represents a completely grey sector Retrieved from h p://www.kqz-ks.org/Up- of economy, and not only that. A er 2000, Serbs loads/Documents/Rezultatet sipas Subjeket- did not recognize the UNMIK ruling nor the Kos- eve – 20140526 Party Results – Kosovo Lev- ovan ins tu ons. Subsequently, in all municipali- el_jywcwsfyts.pdf. 17 Kosovo has been formally recognized as an inde- Chen, Martha Alter. 2012: The Informal Economy: pendent State by 96 countries (MFA, 2015b) Defi ni ons, Theories and Policies. Retrieved 18 Out of 27 EU member states, these fi ve have not yet from h p://wiego.org/sites/wiego.org/fi les/ recognized the independence of Kosovo: Slovakia, publica ons/fi les/Chen_WIEGO_WP1.pdf. Romania, Spain, Greece and Cyprus. Crampton, Richard J. 2014: The Balkans Since 19 It is important to no ce that coali on Povratak had direct support of main representa ves of the Ser- the Second World War. Routledge. Re- bian Orthodox Church in Kosovo, such as Father Ar- trieved from h ps://books.google.com/ temije and Father Sava Janjic. (Deda, 2009, 6) books?id=0tEFBAAAQBAJ&pgis=1.

84 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

European Commission. 2014: Kosovo* Progress Malcolm, Noel. 1998: Kosovo: A Short History. New Report 2014. Retrieved from h p:// York: University Press. ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_ Maliqi, Shkelzen. 2011: Why nonviolent resistence documents/2014/20141008-kosovo- in Kosovo failed. (A. Idrizi, Ed.). Prish na: progress-report_en.pdf. Kolana MM. Fracnik, Petra. 2007: Priva za on Process in Kos- ovo: An Overview and Some Recommenda- Ministry of Foreign Aff airs. 2015a: Biography – on. University of Ljubljana. Retrieved from Hashim Thaqi. Retrieved from h p://www. h p://www.cek.ef.uni-lj.si/u_diplome/farc- mfa-ks.net/?page=2,8. nik3121.pdf. Ministry of Foreign Aff airs. 2015b: Countries that Freedom-House. 2004: Na ons in Transit 2004: have recognized the Republic of Kosova Democra za on in East Central Europe – Ministry of Foreign Aff airs – Kosovo. Re- and Eurasia. Rowman and Li lefi eld. Re- trieved June 20, 2015, from h p://www. trieved from h ps://books.google.com/ mfa-ks.net/?page=2,33. books?id=AsJlnVU4ipoC&pgis=1. Montanara, Lucia. 2009: The Kosovo statebuilding Gazetaexpress. 2015: The employment scheme of conundrum: Addressing fragility in a contest- the LDK in Prish na. Retrieved July 14, 2015, ed state. FRIDE. Retrieved from h p://fride. from h p://www.gazetaexpress.com/lajme/ org/download/WP91_Lucia_Montanaro_Ko- skema-e-punesimeve-familjare-te-ldkse- sovo_Statebuilding_Conundrum_3dic.pdf. 78543/?archive=1. Organiza on for Security and Co-opera on in Eu- Hopkins, Valerie. 2015, November 10: Kosovo Court Defers Serb-Majority Governance Deal. Bal- rope. 2003: Parallel Structures in Kosovo. Re- kan Insight – Pris na. Retrieved from h p:// trieved July 4, 2015, from h p://www.osce. www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo- org/kosovo/42584?download=true. court-defers-serb-majority-governance-deal- Oxford. 2015: Oxford Dic onary. Retrieved from 11-10-2015. h p://www.oxforddic onaries.com/us/defi - Interna onal Crisis Group. 2011: North Kosovo: ni on/american_english/clan. Dual Sovereignty in Prac ce. Retrieved from Partos, Gabriel. 1999, May: Fehmi Agani. The http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/ Guardian. Retrieved from h p://www.the- europe/balkans/kosovo/211 North Kosovo guardian.com/news/1999/may/28/guardi- –-– Dual Sovereignty in Prac ce.pdf. anobituaries2. Kosovo Agency of Sta s cs. 2014: Access to Sta- Pren ce, Eve-Ann. 2006: Ibrahim Rugova. The s cal Data for All. Retrieved from h ps:// askdata.rks-gov.net/PXWeb/pxweb/en/ Guardian. Retrieved from h p://www.the- askdata/?rxid=0b4e087e-8b00-47ba-b7cf-1- guardian.com/news/2006/jan/23/guardian- ea158040712/. obituaries.balkans. Kasaba, Resat & Karen Barkey. 1994: Bandits and Pula, Besnik. 2004: The emergence of the Kosovo Bureaucrats: The O oman Route to State “parallel state,” 1988-1992. Na onali es Pa- Centraliza on. Contemporary Sociology. pers. h p://doi.org/10.1080/009059904200 h p://doi.org/10.2307/2076066. 0296131. Krasniqi, Floren na & Rahmije Topxhiu. 2012: The Riza, Skeder. 1985: General History – New Time Informal Economy in Kosovo: Characteris- (1453 – 1789). Koha e Re. Pris na: ETMM- cs, Current Trends and Challenges. Jour- KSAK. nal of Knowledge Management, Econom- ics and Informa on Technology, II(2), 1–25. Sannar, John. 2004: A review of current events. Retrieved from h p://www.scien fi cpapers. Balkan Watch, 6.14. Retrieved from h p:// org/wp-content/fi les/1260_Floren na_Xhe- publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/ lili_Krasniqi_The_informal_economy_in_Ko- wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Balkan_ sovo-characteristics_current_trends_and_ Watch.9Aug_04.pdf. challenges.pdf. Sellers, Mor mer & Tadeisz Tomaszewski (Eds.). Mahncke, Dieter, Alicia Ambos & Christopher Rey- 2010: The Rule of Law in Compara ve Per- nolds. 2004: European Foreign Policy: From spec ve. New York: University of Bal more Rhetoric to Reality?. Brussels: Peter Lang. – Center for Interna onal and Compara ve Retrieved from h ps://books.google.com/ Law. h p://doi.org/10.1007/978-90- 481- books?id=kT3-tmB7SlQC&pgis=1. 3749-7.

85 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

Strazzari, F. (2008). L’Oeuvre au Noir : The Shadow UNMIK. 2014: UNMIK Background. Retrieved Economy of Kosovo’s Independence. Interna- June 20, 2015, from h p://www.un.org/ onal Peacekeeping, 15(2), 155–170. h p:// en/peacekeeping/missions/unmik/back- doi.org/10.1080/13533310802041378. ground.shtml. Transparency Interna onal. 2014: Kosovo* – Overview of poli cal corrup on. Retrieved from h p://www.transparency.org/ﬁ les/ content/corruptionqas/Kosovo_Over- view_of_poli cal_corrup on_2014.pdf.

86 ä Adnan Hoxha ä Dina Milovanović ä Yllka Buzhala

ACTORS, RESOURCES AND MECHANISMS OF INFORMALITY AND CLIENTELISM IN KOSOVO

osovo represents a specifi c case of “poli - relates to the post-armed confl ict establishment cal marketplace” in various dimensions. In of the new interest groups which penetrated the Kthis context, the term poli cal marketplace economic and poli cal elite, and the prevailing describes a pla orm where the highest bidder legal vacuum even though the UN Administra- purchases poli cal loyalty; simultaneously, hold- on was present (Sadiku, 2010). Moreover, dur- ers of power are interested to maintain the cur- ing this period Kosovo was cri cally weak along a rent status quo, but also a certain degree of state number of axes, including its legacy of powerful fragility and instability. Typically, it includes a regional clans, a criminal-poli cal nexus, its ex- violent tendency to achieving certain objec ves, treme ethnic polariza on, dynamics of parallel which means keeping compe tors out of the ac- authori es compe ng for legi macy and its deep cess to ins tu onal sovereignty. In par cular, economic stagna on (Montanaro, 2009). The in- Kosovo has been defi ned to follow the trend of terna onal administra on that was in charge of violent mone za on of such marketplace, as its governing Kosovo for a number of years a er poli cal sphere comprises various transac ons the 1999 sacrifi ced the par cipa on of ci zens between the public and private sector during the or transparency at the expense of rebuilding the elec ons me period especially, entrance of new state (Spector et al. 2003). As a result, a rather sources of revenue and easily achieved fi nancial fer le ground was created for corrup ve prac c- deals (Anten, Briscoe, & Mezzera, 2012). es to evolve such as bribery, speed money, fraud, extor on, favori sm, nepo sm, infl uence ped- A category that could be useful in describ- dling and others. ing corrup on in Kosovo is that of a “neo-patri- Furthermore, the persistent existence of monial state”, where public resources are exploit- 1 ed by the ruling elite and distributed to those in inward-looking social capital in Kosovo, rooted their clan, party and those from their region in in clan and regional es and interests, cons tute the primary causes of the current diffi cul es in order to ensure their loyalty. Clans tend to pro- building a social contract. What used to be a mote the material, social and poli cal interests cultural and poli cal inequality between various of their members, instead of public goods. As a ethnic groups (ethnic Albanians and Serbs) dur- result, ins tu ons mandated to distribute the ing the socialist system, was mainly replaced with public goods are mostly perceived as unworthy intra-Albanian inequali es, although the former (Anten et al., 2012). The relevance of this cate- ones s ll exist. Dis nguished tradi on of patron- gory is confi rmed by the weakness of both the age along with rela vely high and persistent lev- rule of law and ins tu onal capacity; this neo- els of poverty resulted with many local “bosses,” patrimonial dynamic aff ects the way the demo- responsible for managing their local areas and cra c transi onal process unfolds, and pervades dealing with the central power on their behalf. a poli cal and administra ve system constructed on an offi cial and legal basis (Montanara, 2009). 1 According to the OECD, Social Capital represents Such pa erns of corrup on are argued to “the links, shared values and understandings in soci- mainly belong to the recent history of Kosovo. It ety that enable individuals and groups to trust each other and so work together” (Keeley, 2007:152).

87 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

The trend of capturing public assets for In collabora on with civil society and municipali- personal wealth, and tac cal placing of cronies, es, the KACA developed a ‘hot line’ website2 began earlier, during the Milosevic era in Serbia where anyone can report corrup ve prac ces (Anten et al., 2012). Simultaneously, during his they know or face (EC, 2014). regime, people developed a rela vely greater Another rather important, but a much tolerance for arbitrariness of the government technical level ins tu on, is the An -corrup on and became pessimis c about its role in serving task force. The Special Prosecu on established to the public interests (Spector, Winbourne, & this Unit in 2010, aiming to inves gate economic Beck, 2003). The discrimina on Albanians faced, and fi nancial crimes. Simultaneously, Police of par cularly since 1989, along with the armed Kosovo established its economic and corrup on confl ict, are crucial forma ve experiences, and Directorate, whereas Inspec on departments nega ve references that infl uence several gen- have been established in relevant authori es and era ons in the way they perceive and form their ins tu ons to tackle corrup on and criminal be- nascent state. Besides, when societal inequali- havior within such organiza ons (EC, 2012). This es get prolonged, once they are removed, a Task force has had limited results so far, though new elite usually develops out of marginalized (EC, 2014). groups, which while trying to gain and protect power, may u lize illegal ac ons and feel rather Despite the establishment of such formal vindicated (Anten et al., 2012). and informal rules, the prevailing systema c prac- ces of corrup on signal for their overrun by the informal ones. Admi edly, corrup on prevailed INSTITUTIONS in public procurement especially (EC, 2014). The eff ec veness of the relevant ins tu onal setup is As Kosovo goes through the ailing process seriously hindered due to its complexity, lack of of consolida on between its poli cal par es and poli cal support, inadequate fi nancial resources democracy, clientelism damages the la er in two and analy cal capaci es (EC, 2014). Overall this main aspects: at the government ins tu onal system is fragmented with unclear roles and re- and societal level (Smajljaj, 2011). Some of the sponsibili es of the stakeholders (EC, 2013). most vulnerable ministries within the govern- Similar to other post-socialist countries, the ment are the Ministry of Public Services, Ministry issue of informality has been argued to emerge of Health and Ministry of Educa on. Ministry of also because of the discrepancy between the Public Services is responsible for providing ad- governmental ins tu ons’ morality and that of ministra ve services of government and running the society. In such case, the likelihood of vicious a professional civil service. Educa on and health circles where entrepreneurs undermine formal services get the largest grants from the Central rules at concerning level and engage into infor- Budget of the state. Within the health service, mal prac ces is rather high. Interes ngly, long the greatest threat is within the pharmaceu cal term ins tu onal reforms that would be er align sector, with a signifi cant propor on of irregulari- formal and informal ins tu ons were argued by es in the process of procurement and dissemi- Williams and Vorley (2014) to be an eff ec ve na on of drugs. In the educa on sector the big- alterna ve to reduce the above-men oned dis- gest problem is in hiring prac ces that are highly crepancy. poli cized on all levels; the USAID ques onnaire from 2003 portrays public opinion of the level of corrup on; the most corrupted sectors by the MAPPING THE KEY ACTORS public are energy, customs, healthcare, educa- on and public services (Spector et al., 2003). Percep on on relevant poli cal actors in As far as relevant local ins tu ons are con- Kosovo goes beyond poli cal representa on in cerned, the leading ins tu on in monitoring the 2 Such an online pla orm is funded by the UNDP. It implementa on of the relevant legisla on in the “off ers opportuni es for all Kosovo ci zens to report area of an -corrup on, preven on of confl icts on corrup on, fraud, confl ict of interest as well as of interest, and the law on the declara on of as- on other cases such as abuse of offi cial posi on, sets of public offi cials is Kosovo An -Corrup on negligence, endangering human rights of Kosovo cit- izens or endangering general interest”(KACA, BIRN, Agency (KACA), established in 2006 (EC, 2012). Internews, & LENS, 2014).

88 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* governing ins tu ons. Our respondents listed six riod as oppressive and discriminatory toward the diff erent actors. Under the category of poli cal domes c ins tu ons, as it created an overall im- actors fall poli cal par es as the “most obvious” pression of them as inapt for self-governing. On ones, along with interna onal actors, who were the other hand, most interlocutors agreed that marked as direct poli cal actors in the period be- interna onal infl uence was not bad concerning fore the declara on of independence. A erwards the outcome it produced. The pressure of the in- they were perceived as independent actors in terna onal actors on Kosovan leadership to abide charge of oversight, rather than establishment of by certain EU and/or interna onal standards was the state of aff airs. The second important group argued as rather posi ve, especially in regard of of poli cal actors are “parallel” ins tu ons run imposing certain laws and regula ons.3 by the Republic of Serbia, which con nue to ex- The eff ec veness of the system that exist- ist in Kosovo upon the end of the armed confl ict. ed in the pre-independence period was depend- Economic actors are marked as important ones, ent on coopera on between both interna onal especially those “abusing” public resources and and domes c stakeholders. Their coopera on crea ng informal clan-based networks with po- was reported to have been eff ec ve mainly be- li cal par es/individuals. For the establishment cause of great servility4 of domes c actors. Al- and maintenance of those networks, intermedi- though that servility was publicly presented as aries are needed, here described as interlocking a form of “respect” to interna onal community, actors. The last on the list of relevant poli cal ac- primarily reasoned by the argument that the lat- tors men oned were also nongovernmental or- ter had supported the libera on of Kosovo, an- ganiza ons and clubs, holding leverage for policy other perspec ve is that this was signifi cantly in- making and for obtaining funds. cen vized by certain informal rela ons grounded All the foregoing actors hold certain po- on personal economic and poli cal gains. Subse- li cal leverage, and as such, are important in the quently, vicious cycles evolved between certain overall “scheme” of poli cal patronage in Kos- interna onal and local informal clans, who took ovo. Even though it is hard to measure the exact advantage of their respec ve legal mandates, infl uence and power of each actor individually, and extracted benefi ts for themselves. especially in informal networks, our interlocutors “...some sort of marriage in paradise made some presump ons based on their experi- between some of the interna onal diplo- ences and knowledge. Here we focused on roles mats and some local poli cians, married in and prac ces, in order to shed light on each ac- corrup on. ...o en we have had infl uence, tor individually, but in rela on to each other as even physical interven on on the work of well. the Assembly.” (Respondent, poli cal elite) POLITICAL ACTORS – The main poli cal par es in the pre-inde- INTERNATIONAL ACTORS pendence period were LDK – winner of all na- AND POLITICAL PARTIES 3 This might be one of the main reasons why, at least Following the end of the armed confl ict, on paper, newly dra ed laws in Kosovo are per- UNMIK was granted with exclusive power over ceived as rela vely well done (harmonized with the every state branch, leaving the leading poli cal EU Acquis). Consequently, as so many laws were sponsored by external sources, the Kosovan offi - par es – the PISG (LDK, PDK, and AAK) rather cials o en lacked basic understanding of these laws, limited in terms of assigned legal mandate. In which is why they failed to explain them when faced this period, UNMIK and other interna onal ac- with the respec ve parliamentarian working groups. tors worked on establishing the governing in- What is more, most of the interlocutors noted that Kosovo fails at implemen ng those laws, as they are struc ons in Kosovo, along with crea ng a new not adapted to Kosovo, and they exceed the capac- legal system, as the previous one was not in ity of local ins tu ons to implement them. power anymore. The perspec ve on the volume 4 A great majority of our Albanian respondents con- of interna onal infl uence diff ers among inter- sider the obedience of Kosovan leaders to interna- locutors, along with the perspec ve on the out- onal actors in par cular as an obliga on, taking come of that infl uence. Some considered this pe- into account that the former supported Kosovo in its eff orts for independence from Serbia.

89 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

onal elec ons, PDK – the one that controlled certain posi ons within their par es and certain the execu ve branch for the most part, and AAK public ins tu ons. that held execu ve powers for less than a full mandate. While they were in power, par cular “I consider that certain cases of such individuals, or groups of individuals from those nomina ons are made more because of par es, took advantage of their mandates to cre- some personal interests of par cular indi- ate “room” for their clan members to enter the viduals within par es, at the expense of public sector. Such clans were more ac ve in the the party itself, or in order to perform cer- cases of rela vely big investments, and process- tain tasks since such a person is considered es of appoin ng board heads and members, and to be more fl exible in terms of viola ng the managerial posi ons within public administra- law.” on. In fact, those were the topics that triggered (Respondent, poli cal elite) some of the greatest inter and intra poli cal party grievances, as those posi ons were consid- Also, it was argued that party leaders con- ered as very important in serving as medium for nuously maintained close es with representa- accessing other public resources. ves of the main interna onal factors in Kosovo Other cri cal actors at this period were (Quint Embassies6), in order to synchronize their Quint Group and European Commission – EC, fol- ac ons. lowed by the rest of foreign offi ces (to be transformed into embassies in the next sub-period). “In fact, the overwhelming major- They worked very closely with PISG5 in enhancing ity of laws are sponsored by somebody their capaci es, but at the same me exercised a outside the Government, be it embassies signifi cant infl uence over them; examples of such or corpora ons... One of the reasons why infl uence were pointed out with regard to sud- they (MPs) do not recognize them (laws) is den changes of vo ng behavior of certain mem- because they have not seen them, ... may- bers of the Parliament, or requests for cleaning be a half an hour before coming to com- up vo ng lists of certain par es while indirectly mi ee, assembly, and as a result they do alluding to specifi c individuals. not know how to defend them...” Kosovan leadership was rather infl uen al (Respondent, poli cal elite) as it mainly consisted of fi gures well known for their contribu on during the peaceful (Ibrahim Another reason why those leaders en- Rugova – LDK) and armed resistance (Hashim gaged into such rela ons was to maintain con- Thaqi – PDK, Ramush Haradinaj – AAK, Albin Kur trol and superiority against intra and inter party – LVV) against the regime of Milosevic. Their ac- compe tors. Typically, party councils served as vi es from that period had brought them great discussion forums where a rather small group respect among the masses (Albanians). A er the of members presented contrary views to party armed confl ict, they spread and established dif- leaders. If those “incompliant” voices became a ferent poli cal par es. Essen ally, those par es barrier, party leaders would move them out of were defi ned as feudal by the style of organiza- the vo ng list in the following elec ons. on. The general hierarchy of a poli cal party Further, an extreme point of view was put consisted of its leader, council members, party forward on the ma er of power within and of members and informal clans, linking the repre- poli cal par es. This viewpoint defi ned poli - senta ves of all these layers with one another cal par es as non-existent in terms of infl uence as well as with external actors. Usually heads of and decision-making power; instead, the party the par es were the ones who made decisions leaders and their rela vely small clans7 were the in coopera on with their informal clan. That is only ones who really ma ered. In fact, the great especially the case when party leaders arbitrarily decide about certain individuals being placed at 6 It consists of representa ves of the US, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy, later to be 5 Typically, they met only with party leaders more in transformed into offi cial embassies of their respec- order to convey than to discuss their decisions; sub- ve countries. sequently, the party leaders brought those decisions 7 They were o en led or related to high rank poli - back to their party heading councils, repea ng what cal fi gures, whose infl uence extended to other state former actors told them. branches and independent agencies.

90 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* majority of our respondents ini ally began lis ng than economic ones.8. Some of the most conspic- names of party leaders (men oned above) rather uous phenomena of the kind occurred ini ally than actual par es, when we asked them about within the LDK, and con nued in the rest of polit- the most important actors in the poli cal scene ical spectrum. Indeed, upon the death of Rugova of Kosovo. This implies the existence of leader- (2006), in the ba le for party leadership, Nexhat centric organiza ons. Throughout the post- Daci, then-speaker of parliament, departed from armed confl ict period, those leaders have been the LDK and formed his own party (2007), the able to keep their infl uence at rela vely same Democra c League of Dardania (LDD) (BallkanIn- levels. Excep ons were made a er the death sight, 2010). Likewise, Fatmir Limaj, a former KLA of Rugova (leader of LDK), establishment of the Commander, Minister of Transport and Telecom- new poli cal movement (party) LVV, Alliance for munica on, and lastly lawmaker and one of the New Kosovo (AKR) and NISMA. Excep onal cases most popular poli cal fi gures in general, along are the establishment of new and growing poli - with Jakup Krasniqi, Speaker of Parliament, who cal movement of LVV, where a new party ac v- le the PDK, established in 2013 their own party ist, Visar Ymeri, replaced its leader and founder, NISMA. The reason behind that was said to be Kur . Other changes occurred with regard to the the intellectuals being ignored and suppressed failure of AKR to pass the threshold on the last by the new party structure (Tota, 2014). na onal elec ons, whereas NISMA, a new po- The above-men oned clan-based men- li cal party established by the former leaders tality was said to have been developed, among (founders) of the PDK, successfully passed it and other things, due to the context in which poli - joined the ins tu onal life. cal fi gures operated. Poli cal scene was reported of being heavily dominated by a mentality where poli cians (ministers, mayors and others holding Party networks lower ranked posi ons) were evaluated based on their contribu on to their poli cal party and Intra-party contest for top hierarchical po- those affi liated with it. The term contribu on si ons between individuals and certain informal here was usually associated with the 1) number clans was men oned as one of determining fac- of party members employed in the public ins tu- tors for the development of poli cal patronage. ons which they led, 2) funds allocated by a min- Each party member needs to win the above- ister for projects to be implemented in a munici- men oned contest, prior to entering inter-party pality governed by a mayor of the same poli cal compe on for top hierarchical posi ons, at party, 3) support given to sectors or projects out public en es. Fiercer compe on evolving be- of which members or voters of their poli cal par- tween certain interest-based clans was argued to ty were the main benefi ciaries. Very rarely was represent a signifi cant exploratory factor of the a poli cal fi gure evaluated based on his/her job (ins tu onal) origin of poli cal patronage. Once performance while being a public servant. a candidate or party wins enough votes to, for There was disagreement among interview- example, become a mayor of a municipality, or ees on whether the poli cal patronage is more the governing party, their “victorious” informal spread at the local level of governance or at the clans bring their clientelist pa erns along with central level. While some argued that the local them at public ins tu ons. Subsequently, mem- level poli cians are more likely to get involved bers of those clans are the ones who are ap- in various informal ac vi es, other claimed that pointed to the highest posi ons at public ins tu- this is only ostensibly the case, as the local level ons and benefi t primarily, if not exclusively, due is more see-through in their ac ons, while the to their patronage penetra ng those ins tu ons central level is be er at hiding its traces. Chang- and their resources along the way. es of mayors are followed by almost automa c For those reasons, especially a er the changes of every head of directorate, changes of elec ons are over, many highly ranked poli cians board members of respec ve public local com- move from one party to another, establish their panies, followed by changes at those posi ons at own par es, or completely re re from poli cs rela vely lower hierarchical ranks. By doing so, (some return later on). Excep ons are made in mayors create opportuni es for themselves, and cases when such moves are made by members of governing par es, as they are perceived mainly 8 Na onalist mo ves were reported to have been rather limited, especially a er the declara on of in- as outcomes based on ideological reasons, rather dependence in 2008.

91 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* their clans, to exercise their infl uence in almost ons in Kosovo employ the majority of Serb com- every process (policy-making, alloca ng public munity members, leaving only a small percent- budget, hiring and fi ring persons at diff erent lay- age employed in the Kosovo-run ins tu ons (in ers of hierarchy or in diff erent public ins tu ons most cases those employees hold the so-called such as schools or hospitals) within those public “poli cal posi ons”). All this makes “parallel” in- en es. Those who benefi t the most are clan/ s tu ons relevant for the community, and hence party members of mayors, along with family rela- present a good resource for poli cal patronage. ves and friends. Interlocutors men oned two most common scenarios: “Parallel” ins tu ons 1) Paying it twice, doing it once/misuse of budgetary lines – Survey commi ee for assess- A er the armed confl ict, public ins tu ons ment of expenditures of budget alloca on of run by Serbia in Kosovo con nued with their work the Republic of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija11, un l the present me. These ins tu ons were referred to as the “parallel” ones since newly es- found that in the period of 2000–2012 there tablished poli cal power “UNMIK has never ac- were misuses of budgetary lines in each of the cepted these Serbia-controlled structures, which budget categories: restora on from earthquake operate in parallel to the UNMIK administra on” damage; buying houses; infrastructure building; (UNMIK, 2003 5). In me some of the “parallel” building homes for returnees; educa on, health ins tu ons were closed (such as security struc- and local government expenditures. One of in- tures and courts), or more precisely they were terlocutors explained one of the most o en used dislocated in towns in Serbia, while others (ed- methods of misuse: uca on and healthcare ins tu ons) remained For example, there were some in- func onal within Kosovo. Along with that, Ser- bia kept its municipal governments, for two rea- frastructural projects that were fi nanced sons: fi rst, for providing services to the ci zens, through the Ministry for Kosovo and Me- and second for execu ng/demonstra ng poli cal tohija, from the budget of the Republic of power. The structure of those municipal govern- Serbia, which were in fact implemented by ments changed in me, but the competences re- the Municipality of Gracanica with Kosovo mained the same. Currently provisional councils budget. For example, Municipality of Gra- run the municipal governments.9 Persons holding canica wants to build the sewerage sys- execu ve places in provisional councils are usu- tem in one of its villages, someone form ally the same persons as those holding execu ve the “parallel” municipality fi nds that out places in Kosovo-run municipali es with the Serb and off ers/suggests the same project to majority. the Government of Serbia. Municipality of Gracanica implements the project with There is a number of social and economic the Kosovo budget, “parallel” municipal- factors that give the “parallel” ins tu ons social/ ity documents that (i.e. takes pictures of poli cal/economical leverage within the Serb the u li es) and sends the pictures to the community. First, there is the issue of a lack of Government of Serbia as the proof of suc- trust in Kosovo-run ins tu ons, based on the cessful implementa on of the project. One percep ons of Serb community toward those in- of the reasons for this was lack of commu- s tu ons, coming from personal experience and nica on among the two governments, and the accounts of others. Second, the access to the two systems of local governance. services of Kosovo-run ins tu ons for minority communi es is o en challenging for a number of (Respondent, poli cal elite, male) reasons.10 In addi on to that, Serbia-run ins tu-

9 Provisional councils are established by the decision of the Government of Serbia, by direct appointment language is the offi cial language of Kosovo, accord- of three persons in charge over each provisional ing to the Kosovo Cons tu on, Ar cle 5. council. 11 More on the report: 10 One of the most common problems with regard to h p://www.parlament.gov.rs/upload/archive/fi les/ access to services is poor transla on of public docu- lat/doc/izvestaj_odbori/VERZIJA%20IZVESTAJA%20 ments (laws, by-laws, regula ons, diff erent forms) NS%2014.%20APRIL%20FINAL%20LAT.doc (Accessed or lack of transla ons at all; even though Serbian 27 November 2015)

92 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

2) Exchange of “resources” of the two sys- Government, and even main poli cal par es,15 tem of governance– takes place when the same when they failed to act “appropriately”. Bearing persons are in a governing posi on both in the in mind the historical contribu on of the USA to “parallel” municipali es and Kosovo-run munici- the Kosovo, such infl uence was swi ly adopted. pali es (happens in cases where the communi- However, some of the interlocutors de- ca on between the two systems of local govern- fi ned that infl uence as detrimental16 in cases ances does exist). Having in mind that “parallel” when, thanks to certain informal rela ons that municipali es hold jobs in all “parallel” ins tu- certain segments had within domes c and inter- ons in the respec ve municipality, they use na onal actors, it was used to advocate specifi c those jobs as a bargaining chip with poten al laws, policies and/or projects, which were ben- voters for the local and na onal elec ons in Kos- efi cial primarily, if not exclusively, to a par cular ovo.12 Other type of resources exchange between interest group. two systems may take place as well. Nevertheless, EULEX was established with a mandate consis ng of exclusive execu ve pow- Interna onal actors ers and of technical assistance to relevant Kos- ovan ins tu ons in the area of the rule of law. Upon declara on of independence, the Having more than one central power within the role of interna onal actors in the poli cal sphere judiciary and security state branches resulted in in Kosovo changed from direct to indirect, that a signifi cant decrease of the overall eff ec veness is from decision makers, to the observers of de- of those cri cal branches. Despite being crucial cision makers. This meant transferring execu ve and raising great expecta ons, EULEX performed power to Kosovan ins tu on, while keeping the rather poorly,17 resul ng in failure of its mis- limited scope of offi cial power to itself. The most sion.18 important interna onal actors from 2008 un l today (2015) have been EULEX, EC, KFOR, Embas- our respondents men oned the case of the ra fi - sies of Quint Group and other foreign embassies, ca on of Agreement for normaliza on of rela ons along with the EU and the USAID. with Serbia, also known as The Brussels Agreement. Although Kosovan ins tu ons became the In essence, under great pressure, MPs agreed to vo ng for some documents about which they had main authority, they were supervised by the ICO no or li le informa on. The only persons who had that had the right to veto the former’s decisions. the informa on were ambassadors, high rank poli - This was the case during the fi rst years in the af- cal fi gures and specifi c (economic) interest groups. termath of the declara on of independence, un- 15 Some of our respondents men oned the cases l the ICO completed its mission. In this period, when interna onal community intervened on poli - all the same, Kosovan ins tu ons were given cal par es’ vo ng list by reques ng to include or exclude certain candidates. Interlocutor from poli cal leeway, at least to a certain degree, to operate elite. as they saw fi t to the presumably public interest. 16 There was the case of building the highway linking On the other hand, the ambassadors of Quint Kosovo and Albania, for which the US Ambassador Group and that of the USA13 remained the focal was reported to have been rather in favor of it and point whenever there was a need for “educa ng” taken an ac ve role to make that happen. Certainly, domes c leadership, or when the deep discrep- it was done, but at a three mes higher cost. Coinci- dentally, the implemen ng company was an Ameri- ancies erupted among other infl uen al types of can Consor um; what is more, a er fi nishing his actors. In certain cases, the USA ambassador diploma c mission, the Ambassador was hired by directly intervened on the Na onal Assembly,14 that par cular company. 17 Recent leaks showed its offi cials to presumably be 12 It is important to men on that the government of involved in corrup ve aff airs, by in mida ng par- Serbia directly appoints provisional councils in “par- cular segments of Kosovan leadership in order to allel” municipali es, while the posi ons in Kosovo- ensure their support for their personal gains. For run municipali es are obtained through regular vot- more informa on, please refer to the link: h p:// ing system. www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/kosovo-corrup on. 13 The USA ambassador’s role was crucial during the yh5/ (accessed on 23 November 2015) indecisive mes among Kosovo leadership over 18 In a recent declara on, the head of EULEX himself, what state symbols, fl ag and hymn should be used Gabriele Meucci, admi ed that his organiza on has for their new country. Interlocutor from poli cal failed to meet its expecta ons. For more informa- elite. on, please refer to this link: h p://indeksonline. 14 To illustrate the infl uence of interna onal commu- net/?FaqeID=2&LajmID=156294 (accessed on 23 nity on Kosovan ins tu ons (Assembly), a couple of November 2015)

93 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

Interna onal actors Interna onal donors had, and s ll do, a great infl uence over ins tu onal se ng in gener- A dis nguishing sub-group of actors that al. There were many interna onal organiza ons played a similar role as the above-men oned ac- contribu ng in diff erent areas including, but not tors were the representa ves of foreign offi ces. limited to, humanitarian aid, reconstruc on of Their infl uence was present in cases of big public burned houses, private sector development, in- investments (such as construc on of highways) frastructure and ins tu onal capaci es develop- and designa on of par cular economic policies ment. The leading donors were and con nue to (trade and manufacturing policy, the FDI incen- be USAID and major European economies. ves, and regional integra on). They sought to In the immediate years a er the armed gain personal benefi ts and/or advancing inter- confl ict, Kosovo was rather destroyed, and the ests of par cular companies from their country idea of an economic recovery resembled more of of origin. Two examples were men oned in this an illusion. For that reason, the support of do- regard by one of our respondents from the poli - nors was a key to individual and society’s survival cal elite: fi rst, the vice ambassador of the US had as a whole. Indeed, rela vely large funds were ordered poli cal par es to go back to the Parlia- distributed to various segments of Kosovan soci- ment’s Auditorium, because a certain law was ety. However, as was the case with other types of being stopped, it was the Law on Construc on...” actors, poli cal patronage found its ways to es- and second, “Christopher Dell who has reached tablish certain informal rela ons with par cular the agreement with Bechtel...” segments of this category as well. In this regard, Dis nc vely, some respondents defi ned private fi rms and NGOs were categories with pre- the economic development model applied in Ko- sumably the highest number of unfair benefi ciar- sovo today, whose founda ons were designed ies. It was emphasized that some are perceived by UNMIK, to serve rela vely more interests of to exist even today, advoca ng certain agendas traders instead of domes c producers. In other in favor of the interest of their clans. words, Kosovo joined the interna onal markets such as CEFTA under very unfavorable terms “... frequent declara ons over the (while every CEFTA member enjoys some quota misuse of funds have debased the overall on certain products, Kosovo has none) and a role of such organiza ons, it is not clear very liberal trade policy (the same low tariff on whether investment being made on such imported goods that Kosovo does not have the clubs (business associa ons included) are capacity to produce as well as on those vital for serious ones, which would enhance the its (infant) economy) (GAP, 2011). Another major state welfare, or the investments are made force that contributed to this situa on was the for the interests of individuals...” infl uence of big trading companies, which were (Respondent, poli cal elite) typically (co)owned, or closely linked, with dis n- guished poli cians. Those companies were also The most dis nguishing feature regarding the main partners of interna onal corpora ons this type of actors was their abrupt downsizing in or producers, whose interests were advocated by me. Yet, the support from EU countries and the their respec ve home-countries’ diploma c of- USA (USAID) remained rela vely the same, with fi ces in Kosovo. a change of the focus to the area of legisla on, rule of law (Acquis Communitarian) and private “... in the majority of those business- sector development. es or those in the oil market, poli cians take part in the decision making scheme and ownership, own shares of those fi rms, Economic actors however, as I told you, it is rather diffi cult A dominant part of the economic elite was to document that because if you take a composed of rela vely large fi rms mainly (co) look at the list of owners at the Business owned by 1) strong infl uen al poli cal fi gures/ Registra on Agency, their names do not par es, 2) their family rela ves, 3) informal clan show up.” members. They were mainly engaged in econom- (Respondent, poli cal elite ic ac vi es that are most frequently contracted

94 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* by public sector, as well as in trading (impor ng). nors; and 3) the quality of products/services was We were told that in most of the cases owners or rela vely be er and poten ally cheaper. shareholders of the biggest companies in those A dis nct feature was the increasing pres- sectors were either in poli cs or closely related ence of interna onal investors. Although they to the poli cal elite. Poli cal-business cycles were perceived as being less involved into in- were put forward as outcomes proving that type formal clans and channels, most of them either or rela onship. Indeed, it was indicated by one paid a higher cost or had to nego ate with rep- of our interlocutors from the economic elite that resenta ves of such informal clans. To illustrate there were “stars” rising overnight as market that, we were told by one of our economic elite leaders whenever certain poli cal fi gures gained interlocutors about a common prac ce where power, and vice versa. Those were the fi rms for a par cular investor, not linked with certain that were ordained to win the majority of rela- segments of poli cs, it would be almost impos- vely big public contracts, turning into ar fi cial 19 sible to priva ze a public company at fi rst hand; monopsony. instead, they ought to buy it from another en ty, “... there are some companies which which might have owned no more than EUR 100 have a monopoly and access to almost eve- prior to priva zing a par cular public asset for ry large income for consump on, whether millions of euros. in terms of public tenders or other catego- “Behind every priva za on of big ries ... medium and small businesses do not public companies there is someone pow- have adequate access in procurement... erful from poli cs. Upon priva zing such There are cases when companies that are companies, they sold them out to second more compe ve for execu ng a certain and third hand. If somebody from abroad contract get eliminated from compe on wanted to come and invest in Kosovo, he/ because they lack poli cal support.” she always had to buy from a second hand, (Respondent, economic elite) as the fi rst one was taken by poli cians who had risen the price at which it was Subsequently, the second layer of econom- sold to that par cular foreign investor” ic elite was established, largely consis ng of subcontrac ng fi rms of those belonging to the fi rst (Respondent, poli cal elite) layer. Indeed, having near– zero chance of winning a public contract on their own, they decided “It was impossible to priva ze if you to cooperate with the fi rms that did win con- did not provide certain bribes” tracts. Similar trends con nued along the value (Respondent, economic elite) chains, crea ng some sort of a pyramid, where everybody was dependent on the public sector. Interlocking actors The two most o en cited causes for that were fi rst, compe on for capturing the same public Evolvement and exercise of poli cal pa- resources evolving between powerful informal tronage was heavily dependent on the third type clans, where other private fi rms (compe tors) of actors – interlocutors. Namely, they repre- and poli cal infl uen al fi gures co-habituated; sented persons who habituated in the elite cir- and second, prevalence of poli cal patronage in cles of poli cs and economics, serving as bridges almost every public ins tu on/company. between them, and extrac ng certain personal Regardless of that, some of our respond- benefi ts as well. ents from the economic elite argued that being In addi on to owning leading private fi rms, connected to poli cs was not a prerequisite for or certain shares of them, interlocking actors a private fi rm to become a market leader in cer- were also highly ranked within the main poli cal tain economic sectors if: 1) spending of the pub- par es and public en es. In many cases, certain lic sector did not make the bulk of the aggregate well-known business owners also held posi ons demand; 2) the main targeted market was other of MPs, Ministers, and other lower hierarchical businesses and/or interna onal companies/do- posi ons. What is more, some of our respondents men oned the “revolving door” phenome- 19 “A market situa on in which there is only one buy- non – where certain infl uen al individuals moved er” (Oxford, 2015)

95 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* from business to poli cs and vice versa. They Non-governmental organiza ons and also emphasized that those par cular fi rms tend- clubs ed to benefi t most from the public contracts at both levels of governance, regardless of whether Minority communi es’ businesses in Kos- they actually met all the respec ve requirements ovo lack representa on in business chambers, or or not. Thus, monopolies were created, where have it in a small number; while also lacking the certain ins tu ons became recognized for being capaci es for forming their own business cham- “friendlier” to certain businesses. bers, or other forms of joint pla orms/unions. Non-governmental organiza ons (NGOs) took “... it is very diffi cult to draw the their role in this sphere, as since the armed con- line between business and poli cs links, fl ict, they have held most of the unoffi cial com- between business and poli cs... This is muni es’ resources – from foreign dona ons to another problem, as many poli cians are poli cal representa on. In that context, the cri - business owners at the same me...If there cism made toward poli cal par es, business, or is a revolving door, here we have no door clubs and chambers, holds valid also for some at all, where business and poli cs have be- NGOs. More specifi cally, they have been rather come as one person, o en unifi ed.” successful in misusing public funds from Kosovan (Respondent, poli cal elite) and Serbian governments, along with the funds from interna onal donors. The only me when there was no “revolv- Being aware of that, many persons, including door” at all was during the days or weeks being poli cians, became highly interested in par- fore the elec ons, when poli cians were “on the cipa ng in NGOs projects, mainly for personal hunt” for infl uen al persons who could “secure” benefi ts. More specifi cally, some local poli cians more votes for them. Poli cians knew that big from Serb community, who held and/or con nue businesses employed thousands of workers, and to hold key posi ons at public ins tu ons, advo- together with their family members only, these cated for alloca on of funds for par cular objec- represented a signifi cant vo ng power. Thus, ves that were closely linked to the objec ves of they tended to use both “carrots” (various favors certain NGOs. Hence, although those public (fi - and contracts were promised, out of which only a nancial) resources were distributed through reg- small por on were fulfi lled) and “s cks” (threats ular compe on (public calls), those NGOs were about taking their licenses away, avoidance of placed in an advantageous posi on before the taxes, etc.) to convince as many of those owners compe on even started. In return, poli cians as possible to vote for them. On the other hand, ensured benefi ts for themselves through informal learning from experience, some businesspersons channels, whereas many projects were not im- approached poli cal fi gures/par es themselves, plemented at all, or were implemented only “on and off ered their resources such as vote of cam- paper”. Implementa on “on paper” means pre- paign dona on, in exchange for something.20 In sen ng receipts of respec ve expenses, which in most of the cases, businesspersons were eager reality were never realized; usually those receipts to run for MPs or mayors.21 were issued by other organiza ons/businesses owned by friends and family members of those who were employees of NGOs.22 No exemp on was made concerning the funds off ered by interna onal donors, as it was argued that segments 20 In the case of minority-dominated municipali es, of the la er, too, were interested in extrac ng where there is no ac ve private fi rm opera ng, such extra profi ts for themselves. a lesson might have not been learned, yet; s ll, poli- cians and their middlemen are the ones who ap- Another rela vely new trend relates to proach poten al voters. the establishment of various business-advoca ng 21 Concrete examples were pointed out, such as Mar- clubs e.g. Rotary club, which in one way or an- garita Kadriu and Ramiz Kelmendi, who besides being MPs, each own one of the biggest trading malls 22 Another way of abusing dona ons was through the in Kosovo. In fact, it was diffi cult to diff eren ate implementa on of projects, but with costs of their when they were speaking as business owners and implementa on presented much higher than they when as poli cians/policymakers. really are.

96 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* other, are expected to improve the policy-mak- cians have a tendency to turn to various informal ing in Kosovo. Yet, we obtained diff erent opin- or alterna ve methods for mi ga ng their fears. ions regarding the contribu on of and to those A rather frequent method is entering in clientelist clubs. From one perspec ve, they were defi ned clans, through which they obtain the possibil- as posi ve, but rather weak and/or limited at ity to capture certain public resources; and later scope. Others stated that their real inten ons they use these resources to expand their poli - were assumingly oriented toward gaining control cal support. More specifi cally, poli cians, voters, over the ins tu ons that their leaders were in- and other poten al relevant stakeholders create terested in taking over in the (near) future. Simi- a certain pla orm of coopera on, which could lar perspec ves were put forth when trying to best be explained as ‘vote-trading”. 25 This plat- evaluate the roles of other “clubs” such as cham- form represents a “place” where poli cians seek bers of commerce,23 NGOs, research ins tutes or as many votes, as cheap as possible, whereas the think tanks, except that their primary concern voters request long or short-term26 benefi ts from was infl uence rather than leadership over spe- the poli cal groups or individuals as payback for cifi c ins tu ons. Regardless of their diff erences, their support. These pla orms improved with they share their heavy dependency on fi nancial me, becoming more complex and sophis cated. resources in order to (objec vely) perform their What is more, this is where the addi onal layers expected roles.24 of stakeholders (middlemen) were developed, usually consis ng of infl uen al persons within the respec ve communi es. Similar to the poli - RESOURCES cal fi gures, those middlemen are expected to go out in the fi eld, and ask for votes among their The exchange of resources among the in- family rela ves, friends, and other community terested par es was men oned as one of the members for a certain poli cal fi gure. Addi on- most common aspects of poli cal patronage. It ally, they are usually “authorized” by those poli - can occur between diff erent actors, such as ci - cal fi gures to provide, in most cases, two types of zens (who have vo ng power; hence they “hold” “carrots” for poten al voters: immediate (cash, the votes) and poli cians/poli cal par es (who in-kind support of daily food or u lity bills), and have poli cal power; hence they “hold” job posi- future benefi ts (promises about employment, ons in public ins tu ons). In addi on, there are public contracts, con nua on of poli cal support other various stakeholders with certain resources of those already employed in certain public in- (such as funds and dona ons), which give them s tu ons), and a “s ck” (in mida on of persons the leverage for par cipa ng in informal ex- already employed in public services – for exam- change of resources. Some of the resources most ple, by threatening that they will get fi red if they o en referred to are votes, jobs and means of fi - or their family members do not vote for certain nancing poli cal par es. par es/individuals). Votes We iden fi ed two main phases through which the poli cal patronage intertwines with One of the main factors for developing the poli cian-voter rela onships: fi rst, before the poli cal patronage and for maintaining poli cal elec ons, and second, a er the poli cal fi gures power is the votes, that is, obtaining as many 25 For the purpose of this paper, we use the term votes as possible. Having in mind that poli cians “vote-trading” for describing an informal trading do not have exact informa on on the overall vot- system where the main stakeholders are poli cians ers’ poli cal preferences, they are at constant un- on the one side (buyer) and poten al voters on the ease about their poli cal perspec ve, especially other side (seller). 26 Voters seem to learn from experience in par cipat- in the pre-elec on year. For that reason poli - ing in vote-trading pla orm, due to the previous numerous betrayals by their poli cal representa ves. 23 The most infl uen al ones were reported to have In other word, once the elec ons are done, they been Economic Chamber of the US, Kosovo and Ger- have a rather hard me accessing their poli cal rep- many. resenta ves, who tend to forget the promises made 24 Typically, chambers of commerce are funded by to them prior to elec ons. This is why voters pre- membership fees, whereas the rest of “clubs” exclu- fer short-term benefi ts in exchange for their votes: sively by interna onal donors. cash, in-kind support, concrete vacancy, etc.

97 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* that are part of those informal rela onships gain very low poli cal support; 2) it was an obliga on power. Within the fi rst phase, the majority of to be fulfi lled towards those who had contribut- poli cians establish informal clans, mainly based ed to collec ng votes; 3) by hiring persons (party on promises of their contribu ons to the clan members) already known to him, he avoided un- members, once they come into power. Together professional individuals taking certain posi ons with those clans, they seek out as many votes as at public administra on. possible among poten al individuals and groups (business) of voters. To the former, they promise “There are some employed based on posi ons within the public ins tu ons, organi- preferences... because we had to support a za ons and par es, whereas to the la er they party branch...In fact, there are cases when promise specifi c public contracts or other favors I requested that the best be hired. Yet, even they believe best fi t that par cular fi rm/mar- those that were hired without any connec- ket. As far as the second phase is concerned, it ons were no be er than the former ones. is characterized by great uncertain es, betrayals Now that diff erence is eroded, though.” and disappointments; but also by great benefi ts (Respondent, poli cal elite) for those few lucky ones. In order to maintain their integrity among their cons tuents, those This pa ern of poli cal patronage proved poli cal fi gures are careful in fulfi lling their ob- to be rather successful mainly because poli cal liga ons to at least a few of those whom they par es could appoint their desired persons in made promises during the elec on campaigns. certain posi ons, and they were loyal as well as Various forms of poli cal patronage are exten- servile to them. The majority of our interlocutors sively u lized to do so, since they have to over- emphasized the importance of friendships and pass certain legal and technical requirements in other informal rela ons with poli cians or poli - order to reward their poli cal supporters. cal par es in power, as a determining factor for one’s career within the public sector. Further, it Jobs was men oned that poli cal rela ons tended to dominate even the family-based ones. “I would A er the armed confl ict, the public sector support you a lot, were you in my party”, was remained the single largest employer in Kosovo. said to one of our economic elite respondents As such, it was a very a rac ve target for govern- by a family rela ve, who belonged to the higher ing par es, as it provided the possibility to use it ranks of a diff erent party. as a resource for ensuring more votes. Control- ling certain aspects of the public sector meant Money controlling the work posts in that sector as well. This provided poli cal par es with a resource One of the resources, o en men oned by for nego a on with voters, either by promising the respondents as a power tool used for vari- them a work post, or by threatening to fi re them. ous poli cal “games”, was money. This resource In this period, public companies were the most can be used in many ways, ranging from legal to profi table ones, which explains the great interest illegal. Benefi ciaries can be both individuals and of the majority of poli cians for obtaining con- the poli cal par es. Individuals use their party trol over those companies. It became common, membership, while poli cal pari es use their especially a er a poli cal party gains power, to power, to capture this resource. As previously experience a large infl ux of that party’s members noted, individuals in most cases use the party joining either public administra on, or public membership and the hierarchical posi on within companies, at various levels of hierarchy – from the party to obtain jobs or board membership, management posi ons to the cleaning person- which than provides them with regular salaries nel. One of our poli cal elite respondents agreed or per diems. The higher the individual is within that during his mandate as minister, around 80 the party, the be er posi on he or she can ac- persons were employed at the ministry that he quire. Along with that, there are other, more di- was in charge of. Three arguments were put for- rect methods of capturing this resource, that is, ward in order to jus fy such a decision: 1) some money, such as bribes (varies from small to large of those who got employed were party members amounts, depending on the favor acquired) or who kept party branches ac ve in loca ons with percentages (e.g. if a company wins a public ten-

98 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* der using informal networks, they are expected by central level poli cians. All these mechanisms to provide a percentage of the overall amount to are put in place for two main reasons: obtaining those who helped them to win the tender in the resources (from fi nances to allies), and maintain- fi rst place). ing poli cal power (primarily absorbing votes). Money is also an important resource for Major mechanisms used for these purposes are poli cal par es, which will be explored later in explored in the following text. the subchapter on fi nancing poli cal par es as a mechanism; but here we wanted to focus on Within the party the interplay of a party and an individual when it comes to capturing this important resource. One The electoral system in Kosovo enables of the respondents from the economic elite ex- voters to vote for a poli cal party, but also for up plained that in most cases dona ons are made to fi ve specifi c candidates as representa ves of both toward the poli cal par es, and toward in- that par cular party. In other words, voters have dividuals in those par es, in order to ensure the the power to choose not just the party, but also support, no ma er what the overall outcome of specifi c party members that will represent them the elec ons is. For example, a party which re- in the Parliament. ceives dona ons can pass the census during the Correspondingly, it can be inferred that elec on period and enter the Parliament, but poli cal representa ves do not compete just remains in opposi on. In that case, that par cu- against members of other par es, but also those lar party may not have the capacity to provide of their own. Under those circumstances, it be- certain “favors” to its donors, as it is not part of comes rather necessary for any party member to the government; but the individuals from the establish, or join, informal clans in order to win party holding MP posi ons may s ll have certain over the compe on, both at the intra and in- power. This is why businesses which give dona- ter party level. Such a struggle was reported to ons to the party also give “dona ons” to the in- be almost impossible to overcome for any party dividuals – those who are most likely to obtain a member who had not received the support of seat in the Parliament, and placements in certain his/her respec ve par es’ elites. Further, a com- boards such as those for public tenders. A similar mon feature of most poli cal par es is that they method is applied for local elec ons, when “sup- have a powerful leader who knows everything, port” for the party candidate for mayor is as im- and whose decisions should not be objected to. portant as “support” for the party itself. Thus, the party leaders are the ones who make “There was money in cash that decisions on who will get which posi ons within was not transferred via banks; there were the party, as well as within the public ins tu- cases when the value of that money sur- ons, whenever their party gains poli cal power. passed the limit allowed by the respec ve Upgrading party members to higher posi ons law. Much of what is shown at the Central within the party is usually decided based on two Commission of Elec ons is not even close factors: 1) direct or indirect family rela ons, 2) to what is given informally.” economic interest-based rela ons. Party rela- ons were found to dominate the family ones. (Respondent, poli cal elite) Although paradoxical at fi rst, there were cases of rela ons based on the men oned factors/inter- MECHANISMS ests, emerging among par es’ elites coming from diff erent par es, as long as there were economic The above actors use diff erent mecha- interests that were benefi cial for all involved. nisms for the exchange or resources listed, but for other informal prac ces as well. Such prac- Between par es and ins tu ons ces can occur within the poli cal party, between the party and ins tu ons, and between Poli cal par es, or individuals, as previ- the economic and poli cal systems. The last op- ously described, have a tendency of delega ng on can take place in three diff erent scenarios: their party members to various power posi ons through abusing contracts, abusing priva za on at the central level: within the legisla ve (MPs) process, and with illegal construc on supported as well execu ve ins tu ons (ministers, poli -

99 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* cal advisors to the ministers); followed by power other persons. The RTK has around 1,000 posi ons at the local level (mayors, municipal workers, out of whom 200 were recently execu ves, directors of public ins tu ons). An hired without any criteria whatsoever, argument in favor of these prac ces was the es- but all are linked with poli cs either as a tablished “tradi on” for the changes within pub- nephew, uncle, brother in law, sister in law, lic administra on, beginning with posi ons at etc.” managerial level; and within units that deal with (Respondent, poli cal elite) public procurement and human resource management. Certainly, by providing power posi ons A dis nc ve scenario was no ced in those on both local and central levels, poli cal par es public companies that were near bankruptcy, or acted strategically in two main dimensions: fi rst, had already declared it. A Board member of one they rewarded some of their most loyal support- of those companies told us that there was near– ers; and second, ensured themselves extended zero infl uence from poli cs in his or other board arms in other public resources available at those members selec on process. Also, they were giv- respec ve public en es. en more freedom in terms of decision-making on Numerous family rela ves of infl uen al strategic policies; however, they had no suffi cient poli cians from the governing party in the mu- resources to implement them. nicipality of Pris na were employed in public companies at various power posi ons, including “We have heard sayings that we are those at board and top management level (Gaze- the most professional Board in the respec- taexpress, 2015). ve municipality. Maybe it’s only been a short me, but so far, there has been no Similarly, the board and management of 27 nega ve infl uence whatsoever. In fact, Radio and Television of Kosovo – RTK was re- there has been only posi ve infl uence, in- ported to have been cri cally infl uenced by the cluding professional contribu on of the governing party (PDK). Both of those cases dem- municipality’s management for improving onstrated that boards of public companies have the condi on the public company is in at two roles: 1) neutraliza on of boards as moni- the moment.” toring mechanisms for the work of management which works under direc ons of par cular clans (Respondent, economic elite) of governing par es; and 2) replacement of “un- professional” (poli cally undesired) manage- Between economic and poli cal systems ment, from the governing par es’ point of view. Bearing in mind the weak judiciary system, “I have a personal experience re- poli cal par es are, among others, perceived by garding the issue of RTK, as I have been businesses and by party members, as a way of dealing with it a lot. The Assembly appoints gaining protec on from legal consequences of the Board of RTK. As a monitoring mecha- their illegal ac ons. These types of favors are nism, the Board is completely ignored by provided mainly thanks to the neutraliza on of the Management, because the la er is the judiciary system by informal clans. directly linked with the party on power... They (par es in power) have sent their “I am not quite sure, however it is persons on Board, just to reward them and o en referred that there are 350,000 up to give a salary of 1,000 euro. These persons 400,000 families in Kosovo... what I want were assigned to hire a par cular person to say is that there are 400,000 unresolved as Director, who in return would hire some cases wai ng for trial at the Courts of Ko- sovo, resul ng with one case per family. 27 This example was brought up by one of our respond- That level of ineff ec veness of the judiciary ents from the poli cal elite who was personally involved; the Board could not do its job of monitoring makes it compulsory for you to search for the work of the respec ve Management, because informal alterna ves that might give you a the la er for the most part neglected it. Manage- faster and easier solu on, without wai ng ment was able to behave that way because it had too long, etc.” strong direct es with poli cal fi gures from the governing party (/ies), who in return had appointed the (Respondent, poli cal elite) majority of board members too.

100 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

Admi edly, when a governing party need- di onal incen ves for the development of poli - ed the court to give them, or the business closely cal patronage. In this regard, we have iden fi ed related to the party, a (favorable) verdict, vari- a number of main sources poli cal par es or in- ous formal instruments were ac vated through dividuals turn to when in need of fi nancial sup- informal rela ons to expedite the procedures, port: and vice versa. A concrete example on pressur- ing the juridical system was men oned by one of – Public budget: Each poli cal party holding MP the interlocutors: a mayor of a rela vely big mu- posi on within the Parliament receives an- nicipality in Kosovo, who was found guilty by the nual funds for the party. The amount received Basic Court and was sentenced to two years in depends on the number of MPs, but some jail. That decision was never enforced as his de- es ma ons are that for each MP the party fense con nuously found certain legal excep ons receives around 33.000 euro. These funds are to prolong the process, giving him more me to provided for u lizing opera onal expenses fi nish his mandate, and hoping for an expira on of poli cal par es, while MPs are allowed of the Court’s decision. to keep up to 10% for personal expenses. Some interlocutors consider this regula on “...because the Basic Court s ll has not reached a decisive ruling, its ini al de- as discriminatory toward smaller poli cal par- cision may be appealed. However, it has es, such as minority par es holding limited not re-evaluated that par cular decision number of posi ons, and ever worse toward for more than a year now, enabling him poli cal par es not represented in Parlia- (the mayor) to con nue the mandate” ment. In any case, these funds are rela vely small when compared to the overall costs of (Respondent, poli cal elite) management of a poli cal party. Subsequent- In order to ensure the legal protec on, ly, poli cal par es are in need for addi onal and to restrain from crea ng poli cal enemies, funds for management, and even more for big businesses tend to support all major poli cal the campaigns. par es, as previously described. What is more, – Party members: One of the ways for obtain- those businesses are the ones that have iden - ing addi onal funds is through charging party fi ed even more lucra ve ways for obtaining ben- membership fee. This technique was greatly efi ts from governing par es. In par cular, thanks applied by one of the fastest growing opposi- to the rela ons they have with strong poli cal on par es – Self-determina on Movement – fi gures, who are also leaders of certain informal LVV.28 They have set rules such as “no organi- clans, and the rela ons with persons at high level za on member is allowed to earn more than posi ons at state agencies/structures, they (busi- three mes the average income in Kosovo”, nesses) have addi onal benefi ts from public pro- while anything above that ceiling goes to the curement (e.g. avoiding tax and tariff payments, party’s account. Also, they decided to u lize and applying unfair (illegal) business prac ces to such funds for paying per diems to party ac- beat their compe tors). Correspondingly, it was vists who provide help to the organiza on, emphasized that some of the top debtors to Tax or to the MPs. Administra on of Kosovo (TAK) are fi rms that are at the same me the biggest donors to the gov- – Private business: Some interlocutors indicated erning par es. This outcome derives from poli - that certain poli cal par es use their infor- cal patronage used for gran ng protec on from mal clans to ensure the necessary fi nances, certain legal consequences for those individu- through forceful collec on of regular tributes als (fi rms). At the same me, certain poli cians from businesses. They are mainly collected in were described to have put pressure on those cash, with a rela vely small por on received businesses, signalling for the possibility of termi- through the banking system too. In recent na ng the respec ve informal networks. years, this serves as the main source of funding for all the main par es, at both central Financing poli cal par es and local levels of government.

A empts to iden fy poten al sources for 28 LVV is oﬃ cially registered as an organiza on/move- ﬁ nancing the poli cal par es, or the elec on ment instead of party. On na onal elec ons in 2014, campaigns, turned out to ul mately generate ad- LVV won 13.59% of the total votes.

101 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

Correspondingly, it represents a rather ons. The funds coming from private businesses conducive mechanism for the development of are in most cases u lized for funding campaigns clientelist informal rela ons, out of which seri- of local elec ons. Ini ally, candidates for mayors ous implica ons (corrup on) erupted. Moreover, establish special commissions, which contact al- it was reported that many (big) fi rms support most every private business opera ng in a specif- more than one poli cal fi gure/party, as they do ic local area, asking for their support; while the not want to create enemies in poli cs, and at the value of contribu ons vary, one thing remains same me, they behave strategically by building constant – avoidance of repor ng them to the alliances with all poten al winners, mi ga ng the Central Commission of Elec ons (KQZ). poten al risk associated with poli cal changes. These strategic choices were defi ned as “Strat- – Interna onal donors: Another alterna ve op- egy of octopod”, where private fi rms, unsure of on for fi nancing poli cal par es is by obtain- who would actually win the elec ons, built close ing funds from various interna onal donors. es and contributed to campaigns of more than This can be done in two ways: by direct dona- one poli cal party. ons to poli cal par es or by fi nancing certain programs such as raising the capaci es “There are some fi rms which have of poli cians.29 In addi on to that, there were cooperated with the system of an octopod, cases of misusing dona ons for NGO projects, as we call it; they have kept a balanced re- were the funds for project ac vi es were al- la onship with all poli cal par es, no mat- located for fi nancing poli cal par es of cam- ter which party was at power they had cer- paigns. tain rela ons and arrangements in place” “In addi on to formal mechanisms of (Respondent, economic elite) fi nancing poli cal par es, such as through MPs in the Parliament, there are informal Typically, it was the big trading companies ways of fi nancing as well. One of the most (trading centers, oil companies, etc.) which were common ways for fi nancing (minority) reported to be (co)owned by infl uen al poli cal par es is by “money laundering” through fi gures, that provided the majority of such funds; NGO projects, which are implemented only however, as already stated, it was very diffi cult to “on paper”. Some mes those projects are document that. Further, it was emphasized that valued at half a million euro.” businesses which planned to compete for big public contracts were especially keen to use this (Respondent, economic elite) tac c. An interes ng case was revealed when one of the biggest private fi rms approached an Contracts infl uen al poli cal fi gure shortly before the results of the elec ons were published, for volun- The phenomenon of certain private fi rms, tarily providing fi nancial support. which sponsor poli cal par es, winning public contracts from public ins tu ons governed by “Once we were off ered certain fi - those par es, was referred to as a “public se- nancial support by a very big company, cret”. Thus, public procurement to a large extent which we turned down, mainly because we fails to accomplish its main role of enhancing ef- knew that a similar off er was made to an- fi ciency of public spending. Public contracts are other party, and he waited up to the last u lized as another type of public economic re- moment to see who was closer to winning source of poli cal patronage in order to ensure the elec ons, and only then made that of- personal benefi ts and/or poli cal support. As a fer to us.” tool, it becomes available once poli cal par es (Respondent, poli cal elite) penetrate par cular units of public en es, dealing with public procurement. According to our This was perceived as a strategic choice by interlocutors – of which some were directly in- the private fi rm, as he might have believed that volved in the below described ac ons – there are a diff erent party was certainly going to win, or a three main methods in which a par cular con- simple way for establishing good rela ons with all par es that were expected to win the elec- 29 This was the case with some poli cal par es of minori es.

102 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* tract is “locked-in” for a par cular private fi rm. completely deliver the expected output as It is also important to no ce that bribes were defi ned in the terms of reference in the re- reported as a rule in almost every publicly pro- spec ve ini al contracts. As a result, those cured contract.30 Those methods are: businesses u lize their legal right to ask for as much more funds as possible, or they 1. Designa on of terms of references: the com- offi cially declare that they will not be able mi ee that is specifi cally established for dra - to fi nish their job as expected; and/or ing the terms of references of a par cular b. Fearing that they will not be able to meet contract misuses their given role. In par cu- the required deliverables, even with the lar, since they are required to defi ne, as much addi onal funds granted, those private as possible, the technical and fi nancial im- fi rms look for other alterna ves i.e. sacrifi c- plica ons of a par cular contract, they have ing the quality and corrup ng the respec- the possibility to deliberately include specifi c ve monitoring authori es (if they had not small precondi ons that could be fulfi lled by done so already during the bidding phase). only few, or in some cases only one, private By the me that such low quality of servic- fi rms. This is how compe on fades away es/goods provided is no ced, the me for even before it appears. appeal has passed already. As such, those 2. Unrealis c off ers: part of the job of the above- fi rms manage to fi nalize the project with- men oned commi ee is to research market out acquiring for more funds or delays. prices of relevant goods and services that 3. Abolishment of tenders: whenever an out- are to be acquired through a public contract. sider private fi rm “surprises” all the involved Based on their fi ndings, an early request for actors with a rela vely lower price, insiders at alloca on of a certain amount of funds for a public ins tu ons fi nd various intriguing ways par cular contract is to be submi ed. Thanks for the abolishment of the whole process. In to the informal rela ons they have, private some cases, such mistakes are too obvious, fi rms learn about the decision, even though it making it hard to believe that they were not is not public, and usually submit a bid close to included as a preven ve measure. There was that value. a case that one of our interlocutors from the Another way of winning the compe on is economic elite reported during the interview, bidding with a much lower bid, assuming that when a public tender for opening a well was other private fi rms (also poten ally informed abolished; the jus fi ca on of the relevant con- about the amount of funds allocated for the trac ng authority consisted of an error in the contract they are compe ng for) will submit terms of reference, where instead of opening a bid near to that allocated value. This type a well, construc ng a road was required. of behavior is rather temp ng for businesses, 4. In some cases, such businesses complain to bearing in mind that public contrac ng au- the relevant public ins tu on(s). Even though thori es generally prefer and reward contracts such businesses possess evidence in their fa- to the lowest bids. By rewarding contracts to vor, the reviewing body, most likely comosed lowest bidders the ammount of (public) mon- of persons informally linked with the same ey is intended to increase; however, in cases informal clans, rejects their complaints as un- when those bids are “unrealis cally” or sig- warranted. nifi cantly below the respec ve prices in the “Once I have par cipated in a ten- market, respec ve economic operators typi- der which I hoped I was going to win, be- cally act in one the following manners, which cause the main criterion was the price, and tend to generate the opposite eff ects from I had bid with the most favorable (lowest) those intended in the fi rst place: one. Their explana on was that there was a. Firms that have won a certain contract something wrong with my applica on doc- under such low bids will not be able to uments, even though they never checked them. I did complain and paid 500 euro 30 10% – 15% of the value of contracts was the usual for that, and I was told that I had no right percentage that the winners of those contracts had to informally pay as bribes to the representa ves of to make such an appeal. When I went to contrac ng authori es. withdraw the sample documents, they lit-

103 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

erally told me this: ‘This is the fi rst me In addi on to these, other cases of dis- that you’ve par cipated in a tender, right?’ crimina on of minori es have been noted as I responded: yes, but you do not care about well. In 2005, the LVV lead a campaign32 against the diff erence in price of around 300,000 buying products imported from Serbia, and prod- euro rela ve to the winning price of that ucts made by local businesses owned by Serbs.33 tender, and that the budget of Kosovo is Similar ac ons and unresolved poli cal issues being misused.” between Kosovo and Serbia were defi ned as having signifi cant detrimental impact on trade rela- (Respondent, economic elite) ons between the two. What is more, Serbian 5. Discrimina on of minori es: As for the mat- government imposed certain barriers and block- ters related to abusing public procurement ades to Kosovan products. Indeed, while Serbia processes, a rela vely worse situa on has refuses to recognize Kosovo as an independent been reported from interlocutors represent- state, it does not recognize the relevant offi cial ing minority groups. Certain rules in public documents with state symbols, required for ex- calls are wri en in that manner that usually porters in Serbia. As such, even Serb minori es none of the businesses owned by minori es were greatly aff ected, resul ng with loss of mar- 34 is eligible to apply for the tenders; in other kets and compe veness. Namely, doing busi- cases, even when they are, they are asked ness with producers from Kosovo meant doing to fulfi l extra criteria, designed especially for business locally, as far as Serbia was concerned or alterna vely businesses had to pay double them. A concrete example was pointed out to taxes (Nosov, 2013). That was par cularly the be the case of dona ons/subsidies off ered for case a er the Kosovan ins tu ons declared their s mula ng private sector growth; typically, it independence from Serbia in 2008. However, in is required for private fi rms to have specifi c 2011 in Brussels nego a ons, Serbia and Kosovo capaci es of produc on, which are unrealis - signed an agreement on Custom Stamp, which cally high for the respec ve businesses, oper- was expected to solve these issues and improve a ng in areas where minori es make the ma- their trade.35 jority of popula on. “Terms of references are such that ly smaller than that of other TV sta ons targe ng businesses run by minori es are not able majority groups. to fulfi l them. For example, they are off er- 32 For objec ve reasons, it must be noted that we could not fi nd evidence, besides the respec ve opinion of ing support for building refrigerators of our respondent, in support of the idea that such a 500 tones, while I need a refrigerator of campaign was also against Kosovan products, made 150–200 tones, as in the area where we by (Serb) minori es. As such, one might argue that live that is the maximum that can be pro- it could have been an indirect impact of that cam- duced. We, as a minority community have paign. to have a special treatment so we could 33 “We were producing juices for a couple of years, but our business failed for a number of reasons: closed par cipate in society as we are asked to.” market, inability to export to the Albanian market (Respondent, economic elite) 31 (areas with Albanian majority within Kosovo), block- ade, issues with bar code, and the whole campaign against buying goods produced in Serbia or by lo- 31 Another business owner from the minority group cal producers from Serb community in Kosovo. This complained that his company may receive its work- situa on started changing in 2005/2006, and the ing license valid only for a year, whereas other com- markets opened up.” Interview with a business rep- panies (owned by majority group representa ves), resenta ve, May 2015. compe ng in the same sector, usually receive a license for three years. That automa cally results in 34 Indeed, Kosovan businesses had to export their tripling the costs for him, as each applica on for products in Serbia through other neighboring coun- licensing is associated with par cular fees; and dur- tries, i.e. Macedonia and Montenegro. By default, ing the renewal period, his business cannot legally their prices were not so compe ve/lucra ve any- operate. Further, par cular state taxes/charges were more, as transporta on costs increased, along with defi ned to be unequal for minori es – for example, other losses due to longer routes that had to be un- every local TV sta on pays the same taxes as those dertaken in order to reach their customers in Ser- at the na onal level. TV sta ons owned by minori- bia. es primarily serve minori es, who are by default 35 More on Custom Stamp, and other agreements less in terms of quan ty, but are also geographically reached during the Brussels nego a ons can be more disperse, which makes reaching each viewer found here: h p://www.kim.gov.rs/eng/p09.php costlier; and s ll leaves the number of viewers vast- (accessed 23 November 2015)

104 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

Priva za on Head of the Board – Dino Hasanaj, was told to have commi ed suicide36. Almost four years have Almost all of our respondents stated that passed without a new Head of the Board. On the this process had been a big failure. They explic- other hand, some of its staff in higher levels of itly stated that the process of priva za on was management were delegated by the Government conducted on the basis of poli cal patronage. to distant countries as ambassadors, in order to draw away the a en on from these ma ers. “These priva za ons of public companies have been done not only through “There are so many irregulari es, as poli cal patronage, out of which the poli- the majority of people from poli cs have cians have also benefi ted a lot, indeed. entered the KPA, so that they could favor ...one of their ways to hide their traces certain businesses from inside by disquali- was avoiding the declara on of ownership fying other businesses... There have been on their names” cases when government offi cials had engaged into priva zing certain companies (Respondent, poli cal elite) at symbolic prices, and company staff were sent as ambassadors to some distant posts, Moreover, a lack of transparency and op- to silence such issues” portuni es for ci zens to gain ownership of previously socially owned enterprises, followed by (Respondent, poli cal elite) a failure to create sustainable and new jobs, to The KPA was described as one of the most revitalize industrial manufacturing and to en- corrupt state agencies. Despite the fact that it hance compe veness of the private sector, was designed to serve as an independent agency, were pointed out as some of the main failures of its Board members were appointed by poli cal priva za on. Further, informal rela ons, bribing, par es. Actually, prior to, or a er joining the KPA, and even physical a acks or coercions were the some of them held high-level posi ons at public dominant and decisive factors in almost every ins tu ons, such as the minister of fi nance or case of priva za on. vice ministers. As such, the KPA was portrayed as the p of the iceberg, part of a much bigger cor- “Such interferences have been made rupt system, heavily infl uenced and controlled by public already through media. Similar phe- certain informal clans. Those clans consisted of nomena have been so brutally and clearly highly ranked (domes c and interna onal) poli - displayed so that this is no longer our so- cal fi gures, who applied illegal ac ons in order to ciety. Someone shows on TV and declares generate certain profi ts for themselves. To illus- that he had won a tender, but somebody trate, there were many cases when inadequate told him to quit it in return for 200,000 persons were (purposefully) hired at very im- euro, and it was never executed in reality.” portant posi ons in public enterprises, resul ng (Respondent, poli cal elite) with bankruptcy of many of the public companies prior to their priva za on. Our interlocutors A dis nguishing feature of this category of defi ned this as a clear inten on of poten al buy- resource being exchanged/mechanisms used is ers who, through informal rela ons with relevant the direct involvement of interna onal actors. In stakeholders, managed to reduce the market val- fact, interna onal actors had a decisive role, es- ue of such companies prior to priva zing them.37 pecially during the period right a er the armed Besides, having access to vital informa on in ad- confl ict. The main ins tu on in charge of manag- vance enabled them to create certain advantages ing the processes was UNMIK, followed by Kos- over other compe tors.38 ovo Priva za on Agency (KPA). In fact, the KPA was established by UNMIK under its fourth pillar. 36 For more on this case, please see (Aliu, 2012) The infl uence of domes c ins tu ons was rather 37 It was members of the above-men oned informal clans who made the fi rst purchases, to later sell the limited during the phase of designing their struc- very same companies at a much higher price. Priva- ture and opera onal system. Yet, they were very za ons of the Grand Hotel and the Iliria (now the intensively involved with specifi c processes of Swiss Diamond Hotel) were men oned as relevant priva za on, e.g. public companies with rela ve- examples. ly large areas of land and metal stocks. The KPA 38 Those individuals/clans, who had access to informa- on at earlier phases about the loca on where a

105 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

“...when a business owner makes an In the case of municipality of Gracanica, most of off er to a poli cal party, he/she expects (illegal) construc on is done alongside the road something back, be it tenders, or execu on Pris na – Lipljan, also known as the “industrial of certain projects, dra ing urban plans zone”. Illegally built objects are a couple hundred where varying interests exist. For example, square meters in size, designed to serve as busi- the loca on of Vermic-Merdare highway ness centers or warehouses. In most cases, those was changed a couple of mes, because objects are built without construc on permits or certain persons owned lands and proper- mee ng the physical infrastructure prerequisites, es in par cular areas and this was not i.e. those related to waste, water or electricity. done unconsciously...” Further, construc ons are usually completed in a (Respondent, poli cal elite) rela vely short period, where contractors work even nights and weekends, all in order to fi nish Consequently, various detrimental out- as fast as they can. The two most important rea- comes emerged, including but not limited to dis- sons for this approach to work are: 1) fi nishing incen vizing and/or excluding foreign investors, construc on before the offi cial ban,42 and 2) le- criminal clans gaining more (economic) power, galiza on of the construc on43 – municipali es many public companies being sold at rela vely are in stalemate trapped with already (illegally) low prices when the price criterion was the only built objects which are more reasonable to legal- evalua on factor of bids, transforma on of previ- ize than bring down. ous manufacturing companies39 and arable land40 into restaurants and construc on land, respec- A er the legaliza on of certain, above all, vely, and concentra on of a public ownership illegally constructed buildings, the municipality into the hands of very few. is responsible for providing basic needs for their func oning such as the sewarage system, elec- On the other hand, there were respondents, especially from governing poli cal par es, tricity, building of roads, etc. A common problem who argued that although priva za on was a here is the price that municipali es have to pay rather complex process, characterized by many in order to provide the above-men oned public irregulari es, there was a tendency to exagger- services, whereas the revenue collected from the ate things. legaliza on process as a whole is o en not suffi cient to cover the relevant expenses of trea ng Illegal construc on those buildings as the ones constructed legally in the fi rst place. Probably the most challenging issue, at least for the local level poli cs, is preven ng The Municipality is in process of le- the illegal construc on on municipal peripher- galizing those objects, from which we hope ies, which has been happening for years now.41 to fund the budget in order to cover for at least some of the things needed for func- new highway was going to be built, were quick to oning of those objects. (...) All the money buy out or even priva ze the relevant land of public we receive from the legaliza on we invest companies, to later sell them to the Government at a much higher price. for pu ng an end to it, is a close rela on between 39 There were two relevant cases reported to have oc- the owners of construc on companies and poli cal curred in Gjilan: two public companies that used to par es in power on the central level. For that rea- produce tex le and parts for diff erent vehicles, were son, the issue of illegal construc on falls to the local turned into restaurants a er their got priva zed. level poli cians, who are either also in close rela on Another example of a failed priva za on was the with the owners of construc on companies, or lack case of the biggest hotel in Pris na, the Grand Ho- the capacity for stopping the illegal construc on in tel. It was contracted to the highest bidders, but general, and work on a case-by-case basis. with zero experience in the hotel industry. As such, 42 The process of banning construc on comprises six it was said that the company went bankrupt. steps; in some cases, those steps take somewhat 40 There were cases reported in the municipality of longer than expected, genera ng a “loophole” for Vushtrria and Prizren, where hundreds of hectares investors and contractors to fi nish their work before of arable land were transformed into construc on any banning decision is made. land, where many hotels, motels and pools were 43 It is important to no ce that legaliza on of objects built. costs ten mes less than obtaining the construc on 41 One of the main reasons for the con nua on of il- permits, which gives a rela vely strong incen ve to legal construc on, or rather the lack of mechanisms avoid going through the la er (legal) process.

106 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

in the development of infrastructure, but These prac ces are usually based on ad- the problem is that legaliza on costs about hoc and sudden44 decisions made by government a tenth of the price of the building permit. or regulatory bodies (energy prices), mainly in a (Respondent, poli cal elite) form of increase in the Value Added Tax (VAT) on certain products. Within this context, it was very Another constraint for the Municipality of diffi cult to avoid the impact of lobbyists asking Gracanica in its a empt to control and stop ille- for changes of regula ons that would generate gal construc on is the lack of staff at the Depart- higher prices of products and services, at the ex- ment of Inspec on (DI). pense of others. The assump on is that only few fi rms closely related to policy makers had mely We tried to be in the fi eld all the inside informa on on the planned changes. The me, but the problem is that some mes fi rms which suff ered the most damage from we stay at one place un l 8pm, and as this were the ones that could not an cipate the soon as we change the loca on, they (con- changes of respec ve regula on/policies that structors and workers) come, light up the tended to have direct eff ects on their products/ refl ectors and start building. services’ fi nal prices. (Respondent, poli cal elite) An example of that was the case of increasing the VAT on alcoholic drinks, which In addi on, investors have diff erent ways quickly translated into higher fi nal prices. Since of nego a ng with those in poli cal power on producers of alcoholic drinks failed to an cipate local level, either by using connec on with cen- such a (sudden) change of VAT, they had agreed tral level poli cal par es, or other, more direct, upon fulfi lling orders from their business clients means. at a rela vely lower price than they would do in the opposite scenario. This turned to be rather First, they engage into bribing, by problema c, as it was stated in those contracts sending their middlemen, and if that is that prices might change a er a two-week no- denied, then they make threats to family ce, whereas the respec ve governmental deci- members and other rela ves of those in sion was ordered to be executed on the next day power. It puts a lot of pressure, but it is more of a psychological game, as no physi- from the approval. cal a ack was recorded. (Respondent, poli cal elite) Changing laws in favor of interests of certain lobbies, interest groups Currently (in spring 2015), that Munici- pality has 30 open cases at the Municipal Court The most powerful actors in this context in Pris na, regarding illegal construc on taken were the persons defi ned as interlocutors, and place within its territory. Interes ngly, in those big private fi rms that funded more than one po- cases both investors and contractors have ac- li cal party. Bearing in mind that top businesses cused each other, although they are diff erently in Kosovo mostly belong to trading sector, and impacted by doing so. Indeed, for investors it is much less to manufacturing, some of our inter- an opportunity to expedite the process of poten- locutors pointed out to this phenomenon as one ally obtaining a construc on permit, whereas of the main reasons why Kosovo does not have contractors have no benefi ts, since they are not a more suppor ve domes c manufacturing pol- allowed to u lize their opera ng license (their icy. This statement was also supported by argu- company is shut down) during the process pe- ing that there are no strong lobbying groups of riod. industrialists that would lobby for their interest, which would possibly generate a more balanced treatment of those sectors at the policy level. In Regula on of prices of certain products addi on, the majority of laws were sponsored by outside government en es i.e. embassies and Although this type of public resource was corpora ons. men oned to be used rela vely rarely, its eff ects were direct and rather detrimental to private fi rms as well as the general welfare. 44 Assuming only a few fi rms that are closely related to policymakers had that kind of informa on on me.

107 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

Apart from that, our respondents from the and pubs.46 What is more, places as those in the poli cal elite men oned the case when Kosovan countries in the region, were said to be preferred lawmakers lacked clear understanding of certain rela vely more, especially when rather important laws that they themselves were presen ng and decisions were nego ated i.e. rela vely bigger asking for MPs votes. That was described as a value contracts.47 Many signifi cant implica ons poten al threat to the eminency of ins tu ons, were pointed out to derive out of such informal as even the highest state apparatus (Assembly) prac ces. To begin with, they are diffi cult to be proved to be controlled by external forces. fought from a legal point of view, as such informal, or in some cases even illegal, prac ces are diffi cult to prove, and having in mind that the CULTURE OF INFORMALITY agreements were reached without any trace (e.g. documents and signed papers) that could Q: Apart from offi ces, what are the be used in the court of law. Only the persons other places where poli cians meet with who actually paid par cular bribes may be con- interested par es and what are the rea- sidered as a valid source, however, based on the sons for doing so? experiences in the past, those persons feel that such undertakings are unworthy. For the reasons A: Primi vism. Frivolity of poli cal stated above, informal mee ngs, or informal representa ves and dishonest pursuit for places for mee ngs, became almost a regular making changes. During the elec on peri- prac ce of both central and local level poli cal od, everyone is talking about changes, and representa ves. then they con nue with the same prac ces for years. Taverns off er anonymity – when Another interviewee, who men oned that you make deals in the offi ce you are obliged everything is done verbally, but that at the same to submit an offi cial report, and it is sort of me, “those are not things that one would dis- pu ng a stamp on it, while the things you cuss at a coff ee shop”, made a diff erent obser- agree on in a tavern “may be, or may not va on. Another point of view includes the idea be”. Along with that, proving corrup on is that places of mee ng do not ma er at all. “Even much harder, and it lays with the one who when such decisions are made through debates was paying for it – and qui ng never pays at offi cial ins tu ons and publically transmit- back. It is absurd and rude, and it goes ted...” e.g. in parliamentary sessions, “...all they that far that even when you send the of- do is legi mize informally agreed decisions well fi cial invita on for a mee ng you get a call ahead,” he said. back asking for the mee ng to take place Notably, in addi on to fully extrac ng pub- in a tavern. In a tavern there is no record, lic resources for their private/personal exclusive hence, a er the mee ng, you cannot send the offi cial notes from the mee ng and Party leaders bring those decisions to their party there are no offi cial, signed and stamped councils, subsequently”. agreements. It is all in the air, it becomes 46 “Restaurants (the Tiff any, Ron, Puro, and Gorenje were men oned as the most frequented ones) are a ma er of interpreta on, and the success the main policy-making ins tu ons in Kosovo, and of the agreement depends on the poli cal I say this with competence” was the answer of one will of the moment. of our respondents from poli cal elite from central level to our ques on pertaining to the main actors (Respondent, economic elite) in the poli cal scene in Kosovo. 47 One of our respondents presented a rather illumi- During the last decade in par cular, a new na ng fi rst-hand experience regarding this phenom- norm has evolved, regarding the loca ons where enon (from poli cal elite from local level). While on informal prac ces are developed, including but her campaign for the city mayor, she was approached not limited to restaurants, coff ee shops, offi ces by a certain group from the respec ve local business 45 community asking this ques on: “How are we going of foreign diploma c missions, private houses, to meet you in case you are elected as the Mayor, while we know that most of the deals are made at 45 Many of our respondents described the process of restaurants late at night?!” Surprised by their ques- policymaking as heavily impacted by interna onal on, she presented her willingness to open a special ins tu ons. One of our poli cal interlocutors stated: offi ce dealing exclusively with issues that they and “O en, party leaders are invited to foreign (diplo- others like them might have. Apparently, she gave ma c) offi ces when important topics come into play. the “wrong” answer, as she was quick to learn that Those are the places where decisions are made. they were suppor ng her opponent.

108 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* benefi ts, informal prac ces were helpful also for 17, 2015, from h ps://kallxo.com/page/ gradual “harves ng” of the former. Moreover, index/2?l=en_US. individuals holding par cular (managerial) public Keeley, Brian. 2007: Human Capital. Human posi ons take advantage of public resources they Capital: How what you know shapes have in control, as they seek to further accommo- your life. OECD Publishing. h p://doi. date themselves. Examples of that include using org/10.1787/9789264029095-en public vehicles for private tasks, and/or lending them to their family members; increasing oper- Montanara, Lucia. 2009: The Kosovo statebuilding a ng costs e.g. phone bills, lunches, conferences conundrum: Addressing fragility in a contest- or prin ng; and/or invi ng their companions or ed state. FRIDE. Retrieved from h p://fride. spouses to domes c or interna onal business org/download/WP91_Lucia_Montanaro_Ko- trips. sovo_Statebuilding_Conundrum_3dic.pdf. Nosov, Andrej. 2013: Trgovina poljoprivrednim proizvodima između Srbije i Kosova. Be- LITERATURE ograd: Hartefakt Fond. Retrieved from http://www.heartefact.org/wp-content/ Aliu, Fatmir. June 12, 2012: Kosovo Priva za on uploads/2013/03/SRB-KOS_SRP_web.pdf. Agency Chief Killed in Offi ce. Balkan Insight. Retrieved from h p://www.balkaninsight. Oxford. (2015). Oxford Dic onary. Retrieved from com/en/ar cle/kosovo-priva za on-agendy- h p://www.oxforddic onaries.com/us/defi - director-dino-asanaj-killed. ni on/american_english/clan. Anten, Louise, Ivan Briscoe & Marco Mezzera. 2012: Sadiku, Lejla. 2010: A Diagnosis of Corrup on in The Poli cal Economy of State-building in Sit- Kosovo, No. 8. European Research Centre ua ons of Fragility and Confl ict: from Analy- for An -Corrup on and State-Building. Re- sis to Strategy. Retrieved July 5, 2015, from trieved from h p://www.againstcorrup on. http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/ eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/WP-8-Di- fi les/20120100_cru_poli cal_economy.pdf. agnosis-of-Corrup on-in-Kosovo-new.pdf. Ballkan Insight. 2010: Key Poli cal Par es in Kos- Smajljaj, Avdi. 2011: Ailing the Process: Poli cal ovo. Retrieved from h p://www.balkanin- Par es and Consolida on of Democracy in sight.com/en/article/who-is-who-political- Kosovo. Universität Duisburg-Essen, Fakultät par es-in-kosovo Für Gesellscha swissenscha en” Ins tut Für European Commision. 2012: Kosovo Progress Re- Poli kwissenscha . Retrieved from h p://d- port 2012. Retrieved from h p://ec.europa. nb.info/1015268293/34. eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/ package/ks_analy cal_2012_en.pdf. Spector, Bertram, Svetlana Winbourne & Laurence D. Beck. 2003: Corrup on in Kosovo: Obser- European Commision. 2013: Kosovo Progress Re- va ons and Implica ons for USAID. Pris na. port 2013. Retrieved from h p://ec.europa. Retrieved from h p://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_ eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/ docs/Pnacu939.pdf. package/ks_rapport_2013.pdf. European Commision. 2014: Kosovo Progress Tota, Elton. August 8, 2014: Increase in the price of Report 2014. Retrieved from h p:// power supply in Kosovo may trigger social ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_ unrest. Independent Balkan News Agency. documents/2014/20141008-kosovo- Retrieved from h p://www.balkaneu.com/ progress-report_en.pdf. increase-price-power-supply-kosovo-trigger- social-unrest/. GAP. 2011: Kosovo in CEFTA: In or Out? Pris na. Retrieved from h p://www.ins tu gap.org/ UNMIK. 2003: Parallel Structures in Kosovo. Pris- documents/72590_CEFTAEng.pdf. na. Gazetaexpress. 2015: The employment scheme of Williams, Nick & Tim Vorley. 2014: Ins tu onal the LDK in Prish na. Retrieved July 14, 2015, asymmetry: how formal and informal ins tu- from h p://www.gazetaexpress.com/lajme/ ons aff ect entrepreneurship in Bulgaria. In- skema-e-punesimeve-familjare-te-ldkse- terna onal Small Business Journal. Retrieved 78543/?archive=1. from h p://isb.sagepub.com/content/ea KACA, BIRN, Internews, & LENS. 2014: Kallxo. rly/2014/05/30/0266242614534280.full. com – Corrup on Repor ng. Retrieved July pdf+html.

109 ä Adnan Hoxha ä Dina Milovanović ä Yllka Buzhala

INFORMALITY AND CLIENTELISM IN KOSOVO EXPLAINED

oli cal patronage is refl ected in a mix of s tu ons. Nee describes them as ways how to formal and informal prac ces, whose inter- occasionally build social capital, as they facilitate Pac ons take various forms, mainly depend- collec ve ac on and coordina on. On the other ing on factors such as the strength of the formal hand, formal ins tu ons are the ones monitored ins tu ons and the level of their accessibility per- by the state (Danielson, 2010). ceived by rela vely large masses. Certainly, those There was general consent of our respond- two factors were indicated as the main determi- ents that informality (informal prac ces) is a nants of the actual rela onships between formal rather complex outcome of mul ple origins. The and informal prac ces of exchanging resources, available literature strongly dictates that such which typically evolved as subs tu ng, compet- phenomenon is rather common in all post-social- ing, complemen ng and/or accommoda ng re- ist countries. Par cularly, scholars such as Aliyev la ons. Our expecta ons were that the informal (2015) argue that such outcome is strongly corre- rela ons evolving between the actors of the eco- lated with communist legacies. Similarly, Mistzal nomic and poli cal elites, in par cular, heavily af- (2000) argues that economic shortages (some- fect general social reproduc on. Indeed, informal thing commonly found in underdeveloped post- ins tu ons are expected to hinder the proper communist countries like Kosovo) signifi cantly func oning of the state and society in general, push the society in general to rely more heavily risking the sustainability of the system of repro- on informal (personalized) networks for accom- duc on as a whole. That par cular rela onship plishing what they need/want. Yet, although in- is argued to derive, at least in the end, in cases formality is mainly associated with those seeking when informal ins tu ons tend to subs tute the to survive, most of our respondents argued that formal ones, and especially in socie es with rela- a signifi cant por on of the overall economic ac- vely greater social and economic inequali es vi es from formal actors is conducted informal- and mistrust. Yet, we acknowledge the fact that ly seeking to gain certain compe ve advantages in the socialist period in the USSR, informal ins - or simply enhancing their profi ts, contradic ng tu ons had an opposite role, as they helped the Smith and Stenning (2006), who described infor- func oning of the state (although they were not mality more as a surviving strategy. intended to) by supplemen ng the missing parts of the state administra on. Being signifi cantly infl uenced by foreign conquerors that extended their control during Contrary to formal rules, informal ones the past centuries throughout the region and are derived and communicated through infor- beyond, Kosovan society is no excep on when mal channels. Indeed, rules comprising norms, it comes to its culture. What makes it special, customs, and conven ons that ought to deter- however, relates to the immense aversion accu- mine behavioral expecta ons and which get mulated through centuries against formal rules monitored by acquaintances, friends and family and ins tu ons (Pula, 2004). Obviously, that or close-knit group or community, while social does not hold true per se, but in terms of having approval/disapproval is perceived as main form foreign (not necessarily interna onal) constella- of sanc ons, Nee (1998) defi ned as informal in- ons governing their local ma ers. Subsequent-

110 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* ly, all that aversion transformed into an extensive that outcome were indicated to be: the complete resistance to formal rules and ins tu ons, and absence of or very weak formal ins tu ons, pri- support for informal ones instead. That was par- mary orienta on of a signifi cant por on of Kos- cularly emphasized during the establishment of ovan leadership on personal economic benefi ts, the parallel system during the 90s as part of the and a rela vely high aversion of local people to- peaceful resistance, and later on the armed one, ward formal ins tu ons largely controlled by the led by the KLA. Indeed, Kosovars were almost interna onal community (UNMIK). Subsequently, en rely deprived of having their formal ins tu- while formal rules and ins tu ons were exten- ons throughout their history. Even those exist- sively violated and ignored, informal ones were ing ins tu ons were rather defi cient and limited widely perceived by the society as a more eff ec- formal ins tu ons and under the Serb, Croat ve alterna ve of “ge ng things done”. Another and Slovene Kingdom, where Albanians were signifi cant factor contribu ng to the weakness of not cons tu onally equal to those other na ons formal ins tu ons was claimed to be the lack of (Malcolm, 1998; David, Fenwick, Bayes, & Mar n, a clear vision about the future of Kosovo among 2010). Thus, not un l recently, Albanians had the the interna onal community. Indeed, “UNMIK chance to run their ma ers on their discre on. was itself a vic m of an interna onal policy that That was described as cri cal for understanding lacked vision” (Eide, 2005, par. 1). Dependency why the informal prac ces are s ll powerful and theory of social change projects that previous widely accepted by general masses, although the ins tu onal arrangement take me to mutate, trend has been described to be somewhat dimin- independent of the a empts and investments ishing during the recent years. put in. Similarly, Nee and Cao (1999) empirical- From a general perspec ve, we iden fi ed ly backed it up by showing that abrupt changes an indirect rela onship between the existence in the process of ins tu onal development are and the level of effi ciency of formal ins tu ons rather rare to fi nd. One of the main reasons be- with that of the informal ones; on the other hind that is argued to be the interest of power- hand, a mixed rela onship was proclaimed to ful networks or individuals to maintain the status exist between the level of effi ciency of informal quo. That was also refl ected into dysfunc onal ins tu ons and the degree of freedom for local formal ins tu ons, whereas informal clans and people to (freely) lead them. Rose (1997) and prac ces were being established throughout Grodeland (2007) found similar results, where in- them. That was par cularly the case with regard formal networks serve as far more reliable sourc- to the judiciary and public administra on state es than the formal ones in post-socialist rather branches. Ensuring their control was described than developed countries. as cri cal for poli cal patronage to further develop, mainly because the la er was endowed with Regardless of where one stands on those rela vely large public resources to be maneu- conclusions, one thing was generally shared by vered with, whereas the former provided shelter almost all of our respondents: historical events for such maneuvers. Possible explana on of such have had tremendous implica ons on crea ng behavior could be that of Chavance (2008) who certain norms, or seeking ways out of formal for- stated that unexpected and/or undesired results eign rules and ins tu ons’ authority, and percep- might occur due to the imposi on of new formal ons, which means formal ins tu ons and rules rules; the incongruence with the exis ng ins - hindering their na onal and personal interests, tu ons and lack of legi macy represent his two regarding the interac ons between formal and main arguments behind that explana on. Stark informal prac ces. To be er understand these (1995) supported the idea that the post-commu- rela onships, we have divided the respec ve nist socie es rebuild their ins tu ons with the period studied in this research into three parts, le overs of communism, too. based on the key respec ve transforma ons that took place. On the other hand, the complemen ng type of interac ons between formal and informal The fi rst period relates to subs tu ng and prac ces was found to be dominant during the compe ng types of interac ons between formal second period pertaining to the last few years and informal prac ces. These were par cularly prior to Kosovan ins tu ons declaring independ- present during the immediate years of the post– ence from Serbia. This was the me when most 2000 period. Some of the main reasons behind of the Kosovan leadership and interna onal com-

111 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* munity made great eff orts in strengthening the to public resources, mainly for enhancing their exis ng formal ins tu ons and crea ng the nec- personal interests. That had tremendous implica- essary condi ons for the establishment of the ons in almost every social aspect, as greater en- new ones. Doing so, Kosovan leadership had the ergies/resources were being spent on extending opportunity to be part of the ins tu onal estab- informal infl uence over formal ins tu ons, trans- lishment process right from the beginning. This forming them and their rules more as norma ve was argued to have had two main eff ects on the rather than descrip ve points of reference. That way interac ons evolved through poli cal pa- statement is argued to hold even today, regarding tronage: fi rst, Kosovan leadership had the chance public administra on and judiciary state branch- to (try to) infl uence their designa on and/or ex- es, where “special” interpreta ons of terms of tend its infl uence on them, and second, instead references of public contracts and legal acts are of con nuing in one way or another to endorse made in order to favor and protect, respec vely, informal ins tu ons, which un l then were con- par cular segments of informal clans, composed sidered as (direct) subs tutes and/or compe - of members belonging to poli cal and economic tors to the formal ones, they began considering elites. Addi onally, this was the me when poli - them as complements of the la er. cal patronage experienced its boom, as informal The third transforma on of the interac- clans related to governing poli cal par es made ons between formal and informal prac ces was sure to extend their tentacles throughout the defi ned as being dominated by the accommodat- previous and newly created ins tu ons, major ing type of interac ons between formal and in- and profi table public organiza ons, regulatory 1 formal prac ces. However, it must be noted that, bodies or independent agencies. especially during its fi rst years, the compe ng Another dis nguishing and relevant factor type of transac ons was also very much spread that contributes to exploring the prevailing inter- and, in some cases, dominant, as formal ins tu- ac ons men oned above, refers to the defi cien- ons were only beginning to emerge. Nonethe- cies of most of Kosovan leadership which have less, following the declara on of independence, evolved in the past, in terms of representa on, many responsibili es that were concentrated on accountability, transfer of power, and perceiv- UNMIK were transferred to then recently estab- ing themselves as part, rather than the begin- lished Kosovan ins tu ons. Subsequently, the at- ning or ending, of social organiza on process tude of masses toward formal ins tu ons hit an (Riza, 1985). Such defi ciencies were argued by all- me high level of acceptance, and had it not the majority of our respondents to have prima- been for the la er being rather weak and formal rily derived out of the lack of (well-established) rules not well designed, the spread of informal mechanisms of elec on, checking accountability, prac ces of exchange would have been rather and protec on of social organiza on structures, limited. respec vely. The majority of that leadership was defi ned as largely reac onary and surviving cor- ollaries, heavily dependent on the respec ve cir- AMBIGUOUS INTERACTIONS cumstances, instead of strategic rudiments for BETWEEN FORMAL AND reaching a greater level of social organiza on INFORMAL RULES and development. Most of the above-men oned features of In a rela vely short period of me, it be- leadership seem to be applicable also to the cur- came unclear which type of interac ons between rent leadership and general masses. In the past, formal and informal prac ces was the dominant the powerhouses of informal prac ces were rela- one, mainly due to the development trend of the vely larger and more infl uen al families (Kras- two determining factors (eff ec veness of formal niqi & Topxhiu, 2012). They were endowed with ins tu ons and by that people’s trust in them), rela vely more fi nancial and social capital where which experienced some oscilla ons. The prima- personal contacts were the most infl uen al ones. ry reason for that was indicated to be the fact Typically, their norms and prac ces became that a signifi cant por on of Kosovan leadership, mo vated by personal gains, returned to informal 1 For more on this issue, please refer to Sec on 4, prac ces as alterna ves for more eff ec ve access Subsec on Types of public resources and ways how they are “exchanged” for votes.

112 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* standards for the rest of their communi es, re- been able to develop relevant ins tu ons, as well gions and beyond. That culture was dominant as elements of the legal framework (EC, 2012). even during the last resistance of Albanians in A number of relevant laws and provisions have Kosovo against foreign controlled formal ins tu- been passed, aligned with the Na onal An -cor- ons (by the regime of Milosevic, in par cular). rup on Strategy and the Criminal Code of Kos- Likewise, social structures con nue to serve as ovo (EC, 2014). Specifi c laws have been passed powerhouses of informality, but they have been in the areas of declara on of assets, preven ng organized now into diff erent format, that is, po- confl icts of interest in exercising public func- li cal par es. This is refl ected in party leadership ons, whistle-blowers, public procurement and that mainly consists of family rela ves and clien- fi nancing of poli cal par es (EC, 2012). The most telist clans, whose poli cal support largely origi- relevant is the Law on An -corrup on, followed nates from regions where their party leaders and by the Law on Poli cal Party Financing, Law on his/her close people come from. Preven on of the Confl ict of Interest, and Law Moreover, in the post-armed confl ict pe- on declara on and origin of the property and riod, economic elite ini ally comprised busi- gi s of senior public offi cials. Further, the Central nesspersons who survived the pre-armed confl ict Elec on Commission Offi ce is in charge of moni- as well as the armed confl ict era. Simultaneously, toring the implementa on of the Law on Poli cal dozens of informal “systems” were formed, which Party Financing. However, implementa on of le- to one extent or another incorporated these fi ve gal framework lacks capacity and resources; and main components: military, poli cal, criminal, leg- as a result, poli cal par es generally do not com- isla ve and social component. Many of the new ply with the set requirements under this par cu- economic elite members generated their power lar law (EC, 2014). Despite the public funds that through criminal groups, which mainly engaged poli cal par es receive based on the number of into smuggling, traffi cking, money laundering, seats they have in the Parliament, the Law on Fi- and extor on. The most infl uen al systems were nancing Poli cal Par es allows them to receive 2 linked to some of the dominant poli cal elites. contribu ons from other sources (ARK, 2010). Those informal rela ons were rather determin- These alterna ve sources of fi nance are o en is c on establishing social order and ensuring cri cized for not being properly conducted and monitored by the respec ve ins tu ons. As such stability. They enabled military, economic and we assume that they turned into real sources of poli cal components to receive their rents and establishing various informal rela ons and buy- privilege. Faced with the vulnerability of the in- ing poli cal infl uence (TI, 2013). On the other terna onal community, a part of such elites had hand, when the Law on declara on and origin the means and incen ves to refuse enforcing the of the property and gi s of senior public offi cials law over their poli cal-criminal structures, paving was linked with the Criminal Code of Kosovo, its their way to gradual entrance (1999–2008) into implementa on was rather sa sfactory. Around the governance system of the UN protectorate 99.25 % of those who were obliged by this law (UNMIK). Such power structures capitalized their made their declara ons. Another contribu ng informal rela ons by ge ng top managerial posi- factor to this has been the fact that the KACA has ons at the largest public enterprises and public built enough capaci es to verify the truthfulness administra on, winning public contracts, acquir- of such declara ons (EC, 2014). ing monopolies and infl uencing market regula- on and priva za on (Capussela, 2015). Admit- The current legisla ve infrastructure was tedly, these closed poli cal-economic cycles ever built mainly thanks to the support received from since con nue to minimize the space for new the interna onal community, which allocated a economic and poli cal elites to be formed, while rela vely large volume of resources for that ob- only those “conformist” to the clans’ interests jec ve. Yet, many of our respondents were rather may be successful in entering the elites. reserved when asked to assess the eff ec veness

In contrast to the past, during the respec- 2 Poli cal Subjects are allowed to receive contribu- ve period studied here, at least from a literal on from 1.1. natural persons in the amount not point of view, legal and ins tu onal fundamen- exceeding two thousand (2.000) euro per calendar tals of society had been put in place to a great year; 1.2. legal en es in the amount not exceeding ten thousand (10.000) euro per calendar year (ARK, extent. In the area of an -corrup on Kosovo has 2010).

113 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* of that support. On the other hand, while in the son behind that dates back to the origin of past respec ve leadership used to fi ght the infl u- the establishment of Kosovo as a state itself, ence of (foreign) formal bureaucra c ins tu ons and is based on the idea that interna onal as a whole, it was argued that a great majority of community was more concerned about the the recent ones have either tolerated or deliber- stabiliza on of the region (the Western Bal- ately designed ins tu onal and legal loopholes, kans) rather than its development.5 Under to be fi lled with various bureaucracies, later on. such “mood” among the very infl uen al interna onal actors, the necessary legal prosecu- ons against infl uen al poli cal fi gures that MAIN DETERMINANTS OF would create par cular uncertain es were POLITICAL PATRONAGE greatly avoided, incen vizing them to con- nue their work causing similar issues as the Having in mind the context described one addressed in this research. above, we can state that poli cal patronage is – Failure of law-enforcing ins tu ons perceived as a rather eff ec ve alterna ve for ac- was argued to be the case especially cessing almost any kind of public resource and/ in the context of minori es, for whom or favor. Subsequently, the level of a rac ve- interna onal organiza ons were seen ness for joining informal clans was described as as guardians of the rule of law, in- rather high, resul ng with the la er spreading in stead of the local ins tu ons. Indeed, almost every segment of society. The following fi rst UNMIK, and then EULEX, had the were claimed to have enhanced the evolvement exclusive right to deal with rela ve- of such outcomes: ly complex cases of corrup on and crimes. On the other hand, other in- – Lack of rule of law and mechanisms of ac- s tu ons the Serb community had to countability – most of our respondents point- turn to when in need of legal or po- ed out to the failure of the judiciary system in li cal protec on were the Belgrade- fulfi lling its mandate. Also, the level of ins tu- run Provisional Councils, as the only onal and individual accountability rela ve to local ins tu ons ac ve in this fi eld. their respec ve mandates was defi ned as be- However, their mandate was rather ing very low. A key factor used to explain the restricted and they mainly dealt with rela vely low level of law implementa on, rela vely low-profi le cases (EC, 2014; was argued to have resulted also because of Freedom-House, 2004; Muharremi, the incompa bility of the legal framework 2010). adopted in Kosovo, largely “copied and past- ed” from foreign countries of diff erent con- – Tolerance of the interna onal community texts. A shared belief among the majority of toward clientelist networks – throughout the our respondents regarding the harmfulness post-armed confl ict period, interna onal com- of the previously described fact, is that the munity had full capaci es for more fi ercely judicial system in Kosovo does not have the fi gh ng the corrup ve prac ces undertaken capaci es (or will) to deal with the issues re- by some of its segments together with those garding poli cal patronage and abuse of polit- of Kosovan leadership. Despite some success ical power.3 Further, they claim that (domes- stories, it has failed to do so. What is more, c and interna onal) ins tu ons, which were almost all of our respondents emphasized the legally obligated to stop such mal-prac ces, idea that such failure mainly derived from failed and con nue to do so.4 A primary rea- negligence, rather than lack of capaci es and/ or relevant informa on. Many cri cs of this 3 Kosovo might be the only country, in Europe at argue that EULEX, contrary to general expec- least, where the average years of work experience ta ons about the eff ec veness of its mission, of prosecutors was lower than that of advocates, implying an exclusive approach being applied to- eu-facing-questions-dismissal-prosecutor-alleged- ward the experienced and rela vely harder to con- corrup on trol professionals. 5 During the immediate years of the post-armed con- 4 A former EULEX judge is now accusing EULEX of fl ict period especially, it was unimaginable to arrest mal-prac ce. Please see more about this case here: strong poli cal fi gures, such as KLA commanders, h p://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/05/ although they were involved in corrup ve prac ces.

114 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

has been rather reluctant to inves gate mas- respec vely. Also, the leadership style of ex- sive rule of law viola ons and corrup on, clusion and isola on of those who act or even mainly because of its interest to maintain loy- declare in a diff erent way from party leaders al partners in power and avoid possible desta- or those closely related to them (clans), has biliza ons in the region; this has become a resulted in mainly bandwagon fallacy-based7 rather serious issue, a er certain allega ons type of support from their respec ve cons t- among its members were made, undermin- uencies (Färnsveden, Qosaj-Mustafa, & Frans- ing the faith in such ins tu ons (Borger, 2014; worth, 2014). Further, it is common for the Shehu, 2014). majority of poli cal par es to be called upon – Concentra on of power to a rela vely small the names of their leaders, all of whom are group of people – opera ng in a rather con- men, as if they were their private proper es. ducive environment as the one depicted here, Along with the precondi ons men oned it became rela vely easy for informal clans to above, the majority of our respondents also in- extend their infl uence in many ins tu ons/ dicated that poli cal patronage manifests itself organiza on. In an a empt to be er explain in diverse forms of clientelist networks, which this process, some of our respondents men- could be categorized into two broad categories: oned the domino eff ect, which implies that personal and power networks. for every addi onal public ins tu on to be put under control, less resources were re- As far as the personal networks are con- quired rela ve to the previous ins tu ons. cerned, numerous factors were indicated to have Two reasons were suggested for this: fi rst, led to their establishment. The most o en report- poten al opponents were easier to manipu- ed one relates to having their members engaged late as more resources were available, and into the (peaceful and armed) resistance against second, most of the opponents did not even the Regime of Milosevic during 90s, especially, try to counteract, as they were aware that in- and in social-intensive professions, followed by formal clans might be related with ins tu ons belonging to rela vely famous and large families, that might provide legal “shelter” to them. and owning a rela vely big business (businesses). Indeed, rela ons established during the above- – Rela vely large por on of popula on living men oned resistance have been proven to have in (extreme) poverty6 – a strong posi ve re- tremendous and las ng impact on personal net- la onship between the level of poverty and works and poli cal leadership, too. More specifi - that of poli cal patronage was found to have cally, although the LDK was established before the prevailed. There are twofold reasons for that: armed confl ict, such rela ons s ll proved handy 1) faced with rather limited opportuni es for for sustaining its party membership, whereas the survival, many individuals are condi oned to newly created par es (the PDK and AAK8) were cooperate with or join clientelist clans, and 2) heavily dependent on them, at least in their ear- those at the top levels within informal clans ly stages. Alterna vely, looking at them from an are fans of status quo, as it is rela vely cheap- ideological point of view, it s ll is very diffi cult to er to maintain their networks. The prevalence make a dis nc on between them. of such phenomena was refl ected in the latest UNDP Report, intended to measure the public Likewise, being engaged into social-in- pulse on the related issues, where corrup on tensive professions like health-services and and poverty were declared as two most im- academia, especially in the context of Kosovo, portant issues a er unemployment (Hetemi, cons tu ng a rela vely small society, signifi - Duri, O’Dea, & Çunaj, 2015). cantly contributed to expanding one’s personal networks. Educa on and health services were – Prevailing patriarchal mentality – this phe- the two main components of the Parallel System nomenon is depicted to be present especially of 90s; despite those being rather challenging among the leadership that has been educated and par cipated in the communist/socialist 7 The belief that an argument is valid because the ma- educa on and public administra on system, jority of people accept it. 8 Here it is primarily being referred to the PDK and 6 The poverty rate (is the percentage of the popula- AAK, as they were two main poli cal par es estab- on living on less than $1.25 a day at 2005 interna- lished by the key poli cal and military KLA leader- onal prices) in 2011 was 29.7% (UNDP, 2015) ship.

115 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

mes, they also contributed to the establishment our respondents who claimed that founders of long las ng personal networks. Similar sectors of par es were included in this category, too, represent the backbone of the Serb-dominated we may prove the earlier men oned quality parallel structures throughout the post-armed of clientelist rela ons regarding their self-en- confl ict period. Another signifi cant factor which forcement.11 contributes to the establishment of personal – Comprising members who received a rela ve- networks is being an entrepreneur. As expected, ly high number of votes in the past elec ons they are the ones who have rela vely greater – usually the individuals with higher number contacts and network with people of diff erent of votes are included in top posi ons within backgrounds. That is par cularly the case with their hierarchical par es, which exposes them the owners of rela vely big businesses, who are to rela vely more frequent and lucra ve off ers o en described as closely related to infl uen al to join informal clans. However, one has to poli cal leaders. Apart from providing jobs, these take cau on when evalua ng a poli cal can- people were o en considered by masses as for- didate simply based on the number of votes mal ins tu ons of lending, and trading of stocks. he/she might have received. On the one hand, On the other hand, power networks were there is vote trading, whereas on the other described as mainly composed of internal core hand, there is poli cal dictate. The la er phe- group9 and peripheral contacts.10 Below are nomenon was illustrated by cases when party combined the main features of each of those leaders or their close teams (clans) would in- two segments, respec vely. However, doing so vite a few individuals from outside, un l that might be misleading, if the following caveats are moment typically unknown fi gures12,to join not considered: their par es. It is typical for them to receive enough votes during the following elec ons, 1. Features men oned below are dominant but for becoming an MP or a minister. From one not exclusive to members of those par cular perspec ve, such prac ces were perceived as sub-types of power networks; posi ve, whenever a rela vely well-qualifi ed 2. There is a signifi cant and posi ve link between individual joined poli cal and ins tu onal dominant respec ve features in each type of life; however, others claimed that regardless networks and resources (economic ones, fol- of their professional background and skills, lowed by personal contacts, poli cal power, such candidates would most of me act as insecurity structures, and media support) that debted (servile) to their party leaders. the la er are established upon; and – Comprising members who control specifi c 3. Although characterized by diff erent quali es, sec ons (economics) within their respec ve those two sub-types of power networks are par es and public ins tu ons – usually when not mutually exclusive. their respec ve par es gain power, those who are responsible for par cular sec ons within As far as the core internal groups are con- their par es (economic issues) take lead of cerned, one or more of the following were men- the respec ve public ins tu on mandate to oned to be their main characteris cs: regulate/develop the same segments at the – Comprising party leaders and/or very few na onal level.13 individuals closely related to them: conse- 11 More than a decade has passed since the main po- quently, it is typical for this type of actors to li cal par es were established. hold key posi ons within their respec ve par- 12 Concrete examples of this phenomenon were re- es. In this regard, it is relevant to emphasize ported to be the owners of rather powerful busi- the fact that, if we are to agree with some of nesses, or strong cri cizers from civil society. That was interpreted as another tac c applied by party 9 This group was claimed to comprise infl uen al polit- leaders to buy out their (poten al) poli cal oppo- ical fi gures holding top posi ons within par es and/ nents. or public ins tu ons. 13 This was reported to hold especially in the areas 10 O en serving as subordinates, who have usually related to ins tu ons involved into private sector benefi ted from poli cal patronage in the sense of growth, where owners of some of the biggest com- becoming integrated at certain hierarchical ranks panies are proposed and/or appointed as ministers in various public ins tu on/organiza ons, and/or and execu ve chiefs of relevant ministries and inde- other sectors, e.g. business and academia. pendent agencies, respec vely.

116 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

- Comprising members who serve as nego a- son why such individuals were presumed to tors on behalf of their respec ve par es – it be part of such informal networks was the was described that they are the ones who be- skep cism about their rela vely fast poli cal gin nego a ons regarding par cular issues or progress and regress. It was argued that own- even governing coali ons. ers of the exis ng rather infl uen al and cri - – Comprising members who usually benefi t the cal media outlets were mainly “bought out” most from poli cal patronage (clientelist rela- in order to (temporarily) silence them. On ons) – posi oned or linked to the top hier- the other hand, cases when such individuals archical posi on or individuals, which enables dropped out of their par es to later on es- them to have earlier access to informa on tablish such enterprises were interpreted in and various (public) assets/resources. That two relevant ways: fi rst, they wanted to cam- oufl age their support to a par cular poli cal privilege is further advanced when we consid- party, or second, they saw it as their best al- er their previous feature, as they may be able terna ve to take revenge. The situa on with to arrange agreements that fi t rela vely bet- the public media is no diff erent, if not worse. ter to their interests, fi rst and foremost. Nev- One of the main problems with public enter- ertheless, it was argued that they are the fi rst prises since 2008 has been the selec on of “to go out” of managerial posi ons within the Boards of Directors. A er Kosovo An -Corrup- public ins tu ons once their respec ve par- on Agency found evidence of poli cal infl u- es are no longer at power; yet, their infl u- ence for the selec on of the board members ence was described to be further con nued within some of the enterprises, those people within those par cular ins tu ons, mainly were forced to resign. For example, when through their informal rela ons with the ma- some board members of the PTK were dis- jority of respec ve staff whom they support- 14 missed, the government posted two vacancy ed for being hired in the fi rst place. announcements for the admission of new di- – Comprising members who used to lead and/ rectors. Since those were unsuccessful, a new or be part of security structures – undeniably, Board of Directors in the PTK was appointed this feature was par cularly emphasized as directly by the government with con nuing applicable for the PDK, whose second most extensions. In addi on to that, in a number powerful fi gure served as the Head of previ- of cases some criteria such as gender struc- ously Intelligence Service of Kosovo (SHIK). ture, community representa on or adequate Moreover, currently he holds the posi on of educa on were not met. All this makes pub- the Head of Parliament.15 lic enterprises subject to corrup on, poli cal – Comprising members who (will) own a rather maneuver and other types of misusing public infl uen al media instrument – the main rea- resources (Hyseni, Bregasi, & Beqiraj, 2014).

14 One of our respondents was informally told by an On the other hand, the following quali es ex-Minister that his Ministry is being run by outside were defi ned as pertaining rela vely more to the clans, and this is an extreme example on this phe- peripheral contacts: nomenon. In addi on to this, there was a lack of mechanisms – Great infl uencing poten al – although mem- for evalua ng the work of party members based on bers of this category typical do not hold the professional contribu on to the party and/or ins - tu on where they belonged. Instead, to a great ex- same (top) posi ons as those of the previous tent, if not fully, such evalua ons were described as one, their proximity with the la er enhances based on the level of contribu on one has made for their poten al to infl uence specifi c processes/ his/her party and clan members. decisions of their interest.16 15 Most of our respondents belonging to poli cal elite of other par es stated that like him, many other – Ac ng as informal representa ves of certain members of that security structure have been in- poli cal fi gures (par es) – members of this tegrated into the poli cal and ins tu onal se ng. Thus, despite the fact that they had offi cially de- 16 That was argued to be the case, especially when clared their mission completed in 2004, a signifi cant members of this layer owned rela vely big trading part of that structure is presumed to be ac ve and companies, whose infl uence on decision makers has rather infl uen al in the process of policy making in turned Kosovo into one of the most open economies Kosovo. More specifi cally, o en they are associated/ in Europe, at least, much to the expense of domes- iden fi ed with the issue of poli cal patronage itself. c manufacturers.

117 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

layer were defi ned more or less as execu- for economic gain as well as for consolida ng tors of decisions made by the former ones. poli cal power” (Duli-Sefaj, 2014:26), as one of Subsequently, they are in direct contact with the most frequent forms of corrup on. Indeed, the relevant stakeholders, including poten- it is es mated that one of 21 ci zens of Kosovo al voters. In fact, that seems to be common works as a public offi cial, whereas 30% of them to the extent where some even misuse that are considered as excess workforce, mainly hired “privilege”.17 through clientelist rela ons (Duli-Sefaj, 2014). In – Holding managerial posi ons at the public addi on to that, “smuggling with impunity, nepo- sector – as already men oned, while a par- sm, and bribes at all levels are believed to occur cular party is in power, besides its core in- regularly”. (Perri , 2006:6) ternal group, individual holders of lower ranks within the ins tu ons benefi t as well. In fact, they serve as their “satellites”18 even when CONCLUDING REMARKS such par es are no longer in power. Thus, Through this research, we tried to shed they represent a key component for sustain- more light on our understanding whether the ing such networks (poli cal patronage), but Weber’s defi ni on of poli cal capitalism fi ts in at the same me loyal partners in the imple- the Kosovan post-socialist society. We did so by menta on of par cular projects and/or agree- tes ng a relevant thesis regarding the developments while in power.19 ment and reproduc on of poli cal capitalism. Our fi ndings suggest on the one hand, the prev- Similarly, Jackson (2014) found that clien- alence of poli cal capitalism as defi ned in the telism has served for sa sfying needs of certain Weberian concept, where profi ts are achieved people (without excluding those at the bo om); through exercising poli cal power, whereas on however, it has downgraded the rela onship be- the other hand, the rather essen al cri cal role tween the state and society in general. That is of the economic sphere, as argued by Holcombe contrary to what Holcombe’s (2015) model of (2013) . In par cular, while in the fi rst case, cor- poli cal capitalism stands for, where masses and rup on and monopolies were proclaimed to be elites are strictly divided from one another, while the main means for achieving profi ts, in the lat- rent-seeking provides benefi ts only to the lat- ter one, mutually dependent rela onships be- ter group. However, our fi ndings are in line with tween economic and poli cal arenas were des- other relevant studies which point out that “the ignated as the way not only to accumulate, but employment of friends and rela ves, decisions also maintain capital. Indeed, “clientelism has and skimming of procurement awards, etc., ap- turned out to be of great concern for ci zens’ ac- pear to be systemic and used as an instrument cess to ins tu ons, services, employment, and even their access to decision-making and demo- 17 There was a case men oned by one of our poli cal cra c infl uence” (Jackson, 2014, p. 2). respondents, which shows how presumably a mem- The key players of that poli cal capital- ber of this category asked on behalf of a par cular ist system were the poli cal elite, who derived poli cal fi gure to use a car during the poli cal campaign for private purposes. A er the elec ons were their authority in the socialist transi on period over, the owner of that par cular car called that and peaceful and armed resistance in par cular. par cular fi gure asking for payback. However, all he Those belonging to the la er were rather power- received was a sincere request never to bother him ful, enjoying almost exclusive power in the fi rst with such a call again. years in the post-armed confl ict period. Further, 18 This term was used to describe people who were (unaccountable as well as unverifi able) having ac- appointed at (managerial) posi ons as civil servants within the public administra on and/or organiza- cess to public goods, such elites soon gave birth ons, through poli cal patronage. Typically, they are to new economic elites as well. Special treat- rather servile to certain poli cal par es (fi gures), ments, favors and protec ons from (postpone- who supported their candidacy. The leading segment of) legal prosecu ons were some of the ments of clientelist rela ons use them to gain par- main ways through which economic elites swi ly cular informa on in advance and par cular favors with regard to accessing public resources. accumulated abundant capital. 19 Staff employed at the Procurement and Human Re- Despite the transforma on into a plural- source units within public ins tu ons/organiza ons ist society, where rather strong compe on be- is the usual target of “reforms” once new poli cal tween par es has been evolving, the control par es gain governing power.

118 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* over public resources is rather perceived to have European Commission. 2012: Kosovo Progress Re- been done through clientelist networks, mostly port 2012. Retrieved from h p://ec.europa. established on economic interests. Throughout eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/ this me, a rela vely small group of people, gen- package/ks_analy cal_2012_en.pdf. era ng too much ineffi ciency that s ll con nues European Commission. 2014: Kosovo Progress to hinder the quality of life, controlled the power Report 2014. Retrieved from h p:// and resources. They established other networks, ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_ through which stability was maintained (Capus- documents/2014/20141008-kosovo- sela, 2015). As such, poli cal instability repre- progress-report_en.pdf. sents a constant risk, comprising instable coali- Eide, Kai. 2005: Kosovo: the way forward. Re- ons, frequent governments, and lately social trieved from h p://www.nato.int/docu/ unrest (BBC, 2015). In addi on to this, living in review/2004/historic-changes-balkans/Kos- poor condi ons with limited opportuni es repre- ovo-way-forward/EN/index.htm. sents a scenario far from the one where people Färnsveden, Ulf, Ariana Qosaj-Mustafa & Nicole can use their poten al to the greatest possible Fransworth. 2014: Country Geneder Profi le. extent. Retrieved from h p://www.swedenabroad. com/ImageVaultFiles/id_20757/cf_347/ Orgut_Kosovo_Gender_Profi le_FINAL_2014- LITERATURE 05-08.PDF. Freedom-House. 2004: Na ons in Transit 2004: Assembly of Republic of Kosovo. 2010: Law on fi - Democra za on in East Central Europe nancing poli cal par es. Retrieved July 17, and Eurasia. Rowman and Li lefi eld. Re- 2015, from h p://www.kuvendikosoves.org/ trieved from h ps://books.google.com/ common/docs/ligjet/2010-174-eng.pdf. books?id=AsJlnVU4ipoC&pgis=1. BBC. 2015: Kosovo police arrest dozens of opposi- Hetemi, Atdhe, Iris Duri, Michelle O’Dea & Bardha on members in crackdown. Çunaj. 2015: PUBLIC PULSE REPORT –IX. Re- Borger, Julian. 2014: EU accused over its Kosovo trieved from h p://www.undp.org/content/ mission: “Corrup on has grown exponen- dam/kosovo/docs/PublicPulse/PPR9_An- ally.” The Guardian. Retrieved from h p:// glisht.pdf. www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/06/ Hyseni, Bahri, Magdalena Bregasi, & Metë Beqiraj. eu-accused-over-kosovo-mission-failings. 2014: Public enterprises in Kosovo and their Capussela, Andrea Lorenzo. 2015: State-Building challenges in the future. Retrieved from in Kosovo: Democracy, Corrup on and the h p://www.academia.edu/14264298/Bahri_ EU in the Balkans. London: I.B.Tauris. Re- Hyseni_Magdalena_Bregasi_Metë_Be- trieved from h ps://books.google.com/ qiraj_-_Public_enterprises_in_Kosovo_and_ books?id=b_68BwAAQBAJ&pgis=1. their_challenges_in_the_future. Danielson, Anna. 2010: Exploring the processes Jackson, David. 2014: Clientelism: The alterna ve underpinning informality A research project dimension to Kosovo’s governance. Pris na. about the grey economy in Kosovo*. London. Krasniqi, Floren na & Rahmije Mustafa Topxhiu. Retrieved from h p://www.lse.ac.uk/euro- 2012: The Informal Economy in Kosovo: Char- peanIns tute/research/LSEE/PDFs/PhD Sym- acteris cs, Current Trends and Challenges. posium/Papers 2010/Danielson.pdf Journal of Knowledge Management, Econom- David, Sara, Jennifer Fenwick, Sara Bayes & Tracy ics and Informa on Technology, II(2), 1–25. Mar n. 2010: A qualita ve analysis of the Retrieved from h p://www.scien fi cpapers. content of telephone calls made by women org/wp-content/fi les/1260_Floren na_Xhe- to a dedicated “Next Birth A er Caesar- lili_Krasniqi_The_informal_economy_in_Ko- ean” antenatal clinic. Women and Birth, sovo-characteristics_current_trends_and_ 23(4), 166–171. h p://doi.org/10.1016/j. challenges.pdf. wombi.2010.07.002 Malcolm, Noel. 1998: Kosovo: A Short History. New Duli-Sefaj, Florina. 2014: Ethnography of corrup- York: University Press. on: the case of Kosovo. Retrieved July 4, Muharremi, Robert. 2010: The European Union 2015, from h p://an corrp.eu/wp-content/ Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) from uploads/2014/11/Kosovo.pdf.

119 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

the Perspec ve of Kosovo Cons tu onal Shehu, Bekim. November 4, 2014: Allega ons of Law. Max-Planck-Ins tut Für Ausländisches corrupt prac ces undermine faith in EULEX öff entliches Recht Und Völkerrecht, 357– Kosovo jus ce authori es. Deutsche welle. 379. Retrieved from h p://www.zaoerv. Retrieved from h p://www.dw.com/sq/ de/70_2010/70_2010_2_a_357_380.pdf dyshimet-p%C3%ABr-afera-korruptive- Perri , Henry (eds.). 2006: Comba ng Corrup on n%C3%AB-eulex-zbehin-besimin-te-organ- in Kosovo. Opera on Kosovo. et-e-drejt%C3%ABsis%C3%AB-n%C3%AB- kosov%C3%AB/a-18038448. Pula, Besnik. 2004: The emergence of the Kosovo “parallel state,” 1988-1992. Na onali es Pa- Transparency Interna onal. 2013: Buying infl uence: pers. h p://doi.org/10.1080/009059904200 Money and elec ons in the Balkans. Re- 0296131. trieved from h p://www.transparency.org/ news/feature/buying_infl uence_balkans. Riza, Skeder. 1985: General Hisotory – New Time (1453 – 1789). Koha e Re. Pris na: ETMM- UNDP. 2015: About Kosovo | UNDP in Kosovo*. KSAK. Retrieved May 8, 2015, from h p://www. ks.undp.org/content/kosovo/en/home/ countryinfo.html.

120

ä Slobodan Cvejić ä Dragan Stanojević

VARYING CONTEXTS OF POLITICAL CLIENTELISM – COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SERBIA AND KOSOVO*

he research into the informali es and po- HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT OF li cal clientelism in Serbia and in Kosovo* Tprovides the possibility for a compara ve INSTITUTIONS IN SERBIA AND analysis of the development, structure and forms KOSOVO* of these occurrences in two socie es sharing the same history, but also being diff eren ated by a A wider descrip on of the historical devel- number of characteris cs. Of course, we do not opment of informality and clientelist prac ces in pretend to ascertain the universality of impor- Serbia and Kosovo* has been provided in earlier tant features of poli cal clientelism by compar- chapters. Here we want to stress the most im- ing only two socie es, rather than discovering portant factors of informality that characterized the specifi c infl uence of certain factors of the the ins tu ons and people living in this area said clientelism, which means fi nding the diff er- a er the withdrawal of O oman rule. In this re- ences between the two forms of informality and gard, it is important to stress that ethnic confl ict clientelism that could be explained with the spe- between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo* has cifi c nature of the historical development, along- been an important tool for roo ng informal inside with the varie es between the contempo- s tu ons and clientelis c prac ces throughout rary structural and cultural characteris cs of said the modern history, especially in Kosovo*. The socie es. The aim of such a compara ve analysis founda on for ethnic cleavage was set during is to provide a more comprehensive explana on O oman rule, but the historians agree (Vickers, regarding the forming and func oning of informal 1998; Madrugearu and Gordon, 2008) that eth- networks of power and clientelis c hierarchy. nic confl ict between Serbs and Albanians actually Since the development, structure and forms began a er 1912, when Turks withdrew from the of poli cal clientelism have been thoroughly de- region. Let us recall that through the second half th scribed in the previous chapters, we will not deal of the 19 century Serbia has slowly modernized with a detailed outline of these occurrences, but its state apparatus and introduced formal nor- rather set their elements in a diff erent, compara- ma ve-ins tu onal structures, professionaliza- ve interpreta ve frame, in order to see which on of the state administra on and instruments of them are especially important for explaining of legal-ra onal power (limited cons tu onal clientelism. In the fi rst part we will focus on the constrains of the sovereign’s rule). Thus, a er ins tu onal development of Serbia and Kosovo*, the Balkan Wars, with the territorial expansion of and in the second on contemporary diff erences the Kingdom of Serbia, the moderniza on, em- regarding the rela onships between formal and bodied above all in the transforma on of the for- informal ins tu ons. mal ins tu onal system, was for Albanians in Ko- sovo* represented through a shi of rulers and a repressive establishment of new administra on from another ethnic group, which at this turn addi onally had a diff erent religious affi lia on to that of its per nent majority of popula on, the fact that addi onally stressed the ethnic dis nc- on between the two groups.

123 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

From the moment of incorpora on into the other side of the extrac on ins tu ons es- the new Kingdom of Yugoslavia, following the tablished by the Serbian poli cal elite: for them end of World War I, un l 1981 Kosovo* was pass- almost the en re 20th century represented an ing through its ‘Yugoslav’ phase of history. As instrument of oppression and abuse. Because of Amanda Vickers (1998) states, close to the end this reason the Albanians from Kosovo* have de- of the Yugoslav period, rela vely stable rela ons veloped their resistance towards the formal ins - between the two ethnic groups were achieved, tu ons in the early stages, and preferred to rely with Kosovo* gaining autonomy and Kosovo Al- on the informal (tribal and family) rela ons as an banians playing an increasing role in administra- instrument for survival. During the largest part of on and the economy. However, tremendous the socialist moderniza on Kosovo* con nued to Serbian-Albanian tension and localized violence lag behind when compared to the rest of the re- remained throughout most of this phase. A er gions of Yugoslavia in that period. Only a er the the period of harsh oppression of Yugoslav King- Cons tu on of SFRY from 1974 had been adopt- dom against Kosovo Albanians between the two ed, Kosovo* received a degree of autonomy that world wars, Kosovo Albanians’ par cipa on in was favorable for the development of inclusive Great Albania project and oppression against Ko- ins tu ons, which further contributed to Albani- sovo Serbs during the WWII and a revanche of ans taking larger par cipa on in the formal fl ows the communist rule a er the war, from the late of the poli cal and economy life.1 At the same 1960s the Yugoslav federal government saw Ko- me, and in the sphere of informal ins tu ons sovo* as a “bridge” for improved rela ons with in Kosovo*, the transforma on of the forms of neighboring Albania. This was an introduc on inclusion into poli cal life towards more modern to much more favorable posi on of Kosovo Al- forms of interest loyalty took place. However, banians ensured by the new Federal Cons tu on this progress did not last for more than 15 years, of 1974 and their entry into formal ins tu ons. it was halted shortly a er Tito’s death and as During this en re period the posi on of Serbs early as by the end of the 80’s, when Milosevic’s in Kosovo* was also (although more rarely than regime signifi cantly reduced the autonomies of those of Albanians) swinging between holding al- the provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo*), by mak- most all administra ve and power posi ons and ing changes to the Cons tu on and transferring being oppressed by Albanian majority, which in- the control of the police, judiciary system, econ- evitably led to a general abuse of and mistrust in omy, educa onal system and use of minority lan- formal ins tu ons. guages, the profi ciency of informal organiza on The history of the 20th Century was sig- again gained its signifi cance.2 A small number of nifi cant for the subject of this chapter because Albanians that entered the structures of social diff erent regional models were being established authori es was perceived as clients of the Ser- in Serbia and in Kosovo*: In Serbia it was ex- bian poli cal network of power. pansionis c, while in Kosovo* a rebellious one. As a consequence, the prevailing pa ern The regional expansion had enabled the Serbian of informality grew to the level of a system. Alba- poli cal elite to establish extrac ve ins tu ons nians claimed independence of Kosovo* and or- that enabled drainage of the gains, both from ganized a parallel state system and a parallel sys- indeb ng of all the subsequent governments tem of educa on and healthcare, among other with foreign creditors and by the redirec on of things.3 Through years the ‘Parallel System’ was profi ts from all the controlled geographical areas to the central cashbox. The development of the 1 Albanian gained parity with Serbo-Croa an as an clientelis c networks in Serbia, described earlier, offi cial language, and four fi hs of available public which during the 20th century, regardless of the posts were reserved for Albanians (Vickers: 179– 180). social order, included clientelis c instrumentali- 2 Miloševic did not remove Kosovo’s seat from the za on of the public authori es and domina on Federal Yugoslav Presidency, but he installed his of poli cal par es over the economy subsystem, own supporters in that seat, so he could gain power had received an even more emphasized ethnical in the Federal government. A er Slovenia’s seces- dimension in Kosovo*, which for the majority of sion from Yugoslavia in 1991, Milosevic used the Albanians meant exclusion from the Serbia-led seat to obtain dominance over the Federal govern- clientelis c networks and directed them towards ment, outvo ng his opponents. the strengthening of patrimonial informal ins - 3 The ‘Parallel System’ came into existence at the end of 1980s, represen ng the non-violent movement tu ons. In Kosovo*, Albanians were situated on lead by Ibrahim Rugova. Its main goal was independ-

124 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* gaining in strength and later on Albanians also second half of 1990s. This also brought change to organized and trained, with substan al foreign informal structures and values (like authoritarian support, the army of the self-declared Kosovo Re- organiza on with strict subordina on, cleavages public called the Kosovo Libera on Army (KLA). between clans based in tribal heritage, war merits Under the circumstances of informality the new as legi miza on principle, etc.), a phenomenon poli cal structure was established, as well as to signifi cantly infl uence further development of new elements of social structure. Namely, in ins tu ons in Kosovo* a er 2000. In Serbia, at 1989 Democra c League of Kosovo (LDK) was es- the same me, the informal ins tu ons domi- tablished that gave birth to the new Albanian po- nated by Milosevic’s clique were challenged by li cal elite in Kosovo*. The strength of the infor- increased poli cal compe on and strengthened mal structure became apparent at the moment economic elite, which led to a change in the re- when the Albanian members of just dismissed la on between formality and informality, where Assembly of the Autonomous Province, gathered formal ins tu ons were slowly ge ng stronger. nd informally on 2 July 1990 and declared status of At the beginning of 2000s Serbia and Ko- Federal Republic, equal to other republics of so- sovo* were both facing the transforma on of cialist Yugoslavia. From that moment on, the dis- the rela on between formal and informal ins - nc on between formal and informal ins tu ons tu ons. On account of interna onal pressure af- for Kosovo Albanians became Janusian: there ter the termina on of the armed confl icts, both were oppressive formal ins tu ons controlled en es were directed towards strengthening the by Milosevic’s regime and informal Albanian in- capaci es of formal ins tu ons, which for Ser- s tu ons providing survival for most of Kosovo* bia meant the transforma on and strengthening inhabitants. It should be noted, though, that es- of the exis ng ins tu ons, while virtually a new tablishment of informal systems of educa onal formal ins tu onal order was established in Ko- or health care services was just an organiza onal sovo*. There was a form of “ins tu onal memo- profi ling of more profound informal ins tu ons ry” and a heritage from the previous period built like patriarchal norms and increasing poli cal ho- into the formal ins tu ons in Serbia, while that mogeniza on, so favorable for the maintenance “memory” had to be transferred from informal of patrimonial culture. ins tu ons into formal ones when talking about During the fi rst half of 1990s in Serbia, in- Kosovo*. On the road of strengthening formal informal poli cal structures and power networks s tu ons in Serbia the obstacles were their own established at the end of the na onalis c stage weak capaci es, poli cal instability and wide- of socialist Yugoslavia (see the chapter on histori- spread mistrust, while the situa on in Kosovo* cal context in Serbia) were used to dismantle the was even more complicated on account of lack of socialist ins tu ons and establish a clientelis c poli cal and other ins tu ons and the protector- system that slowly absorbed most of the poli cal ate status by the UN. The transi on period was and economic elite, while in Kosovo* informality envisaged in such way to enable the representa- was centered around Rugova’s peaceful resist- ves of European ins tu ons to supervise, sup- ance poli cs. Nonetheless, the failure to intro- port and assist in the establishment of Kosovo duce signifi cant changes into people’s everyday ins tu ons. Nevertheless, the transforma on of lives seriously shook the unifi ca on of all Albani- informal to formal ins tu ons is a diffi cult task an societal segments under Rugova’s leadership. las ng for centuries in some countries. The proc- Soon the rivaling poli cal op ons appeared that ess of moderniza on is indeed accelerated in Ko- demanded more radical ac ons against Serbian sovo*, but the success of establishing a formal dominance and led to strengthening of milita- ins tu onal order in Kosovo* is confronted by ris c stream in Kosovo Albanians’ poli cs in the the already customary norms and conducts that ence of Kosovo through specifi cally chosen meth- include “bypassing” of formal ins tu ons, pro- ods that would earn the support of interna onal tec ng interests of informal local centers of pow- community (Maliqi, 2011). Its fi rst concrete ac on er, but also by poli cal instrumentaliza on of the appeared on an incident between Serbian authori- es and schools in Kosovo, when Albanian teachers transi on ins tu ons under the supervision of refused to adopt the new curriculum designed by the EU. This is a historic framework where new Belgrade, and instead decided to con nue using the rela ons between formal and informal spheres old one set by already dissolved provincial (Kosovo) in Serbia and Kosovo* are established. authori es (Pula, 2004).

125 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

INFORMAL NETWORKS AND Milosevic and the establishment of a new social RELATIONS, SCANNING OF order, which included the strengthening of the func ons of democra c poli cal ins tu ons and CONTEMPORARY DIFFERENCES market economy. This turning point was for Ko- sovo* marked by gaining autonomy, but also by The key diff erences between the contem- entering of military leaders into the poli cal and porary frameworks of poli cal clientelism in Ser- economic playing fi elds. bia and Kosovo* are presented in Table No 1. Although the resources and mechanisms of ex- The changes from 2000 for Serbia meant that during the fi rst few years of deblocked trans- change within the poli cal and economic spheres forma on a signifi cant number of actors from the are very similar in those two social contexts, poli cal scene would disappear, which led to new there are certain dissimilari es and they can be reconfi gura ons in poli cs. Apart from Milosevic, explained by historical and cultural poli cal her- his generals in the military and police departed itage, the a tudes towards ins tu ons and the from posi ons of power (which considerably re- methods of forming poli cal and economic ac- duced the repressive func on in the network) tors. while a noteworthy part of the economic actors The fi rst and the most important diff er- succeeded in maintaining their wealth. Taking ence between the two social contexts can be into considera on that poli cal changes even led seen in the structure and composi on of the in- to confronta ons (some mes with great distur- formal networks. Poli cal events of 1999/2000 bances, as is the case of the assassina on of the have set the characters of these networks. The Prime Minister Djindjic) with the inherited net- most important consequences in Serbia are the works that remained from the mes of war con- breaking of the power networks of Slobodan fl icts on the Western Balkans during the 1990s

Table 1: Dis nc ve features of poli cal clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

Diff erences Serbia Kosovo* Actors The key actors are poli cal par es, in- Very large infl uence of individuals and dividuals have less infl uence family Heritage of the Heritage of the war and parallel struc- Very large infl uence of the armed confl ict crises and wars tures and actors exists, but is far less and structures that were fi rmly established important considering the fact that at that period. Especially regarding the a signifi cant number of people from connec ons between poli cs and econo- that network had disappeared (soon- my during that period, which was mostly er or later) with the fall of Milosevic based on black and gray economy. Interna onal Very signifi cant, included from me Always present during the nego a ons factor to me both on formal and informal level Kinship Kinship es are far less signifi cant Large signifi cant families (tradi onalism) (except as a form of loyalty in some are s ll important poli cal actors, notwith- cases) standing the raising importance of the poli cal par es. Ins tu onal Ins tu onal heritage of socialism and Parallel ins tu ons during post-socialism heritage post-socialism A tude The norma ve of signifi cance of the The norma ve of resistance to ins tu onal towards ins tu ons among the poli cal elite solu ons on all levels ins tu ons and the popula on Ethnic By most part an internal ma er of A part of ethnical nego a ons, interna- clientelism Serbia onal arbitra on and local networks

126 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

(criminal organiza ons that were connected with ing independence. The second reason for the sig- the security agencies), a large por on of these nifi cance of individuals is in the type of networks actors has sooner or later been removed from that support them within the par es themselves. the clientelis c networks and from formal ins tu- While these networks in Serbia are mostly com- onal posi ons. Thus, poli cal changes in Serbia posed of the party members, in Kosovo* they a er 2000 have led to a greater instability in the are used to spread family and hometown con- rela ons between the key actors, which in turn nec ons, which in turn include the existence of resulted in rela vely fast fl uctua ons within this the forms of loyalty. The outcome of such struc- fi eld. The poli cal par es in their fi ght for power turing of the power networks for Serbia means had only the possibility to establish a temporary that informal groups rely more on the developed balance, but without the opportuni es to force party organiza ons for the protec on of their long term solu ons. interests, while in Kosovo* the informal groups War structures in Kosovo* had a signifi - are largely gathered around powerful individu- cantly larger infl uence on the func oning of the als. Considering the fact that in Serbia poli cal poli cal life. A considerable part of poli cal fi g- par es themselves are fi elds of confl ict between ures have started their careers in uniform, and compe ve informal groups over organiza onal a part of the economic elite had also been cre- resources, this makes the intra-party confl icts in ated during the war period or immediately af- Serbia more stripped down. The intra-party com- ter it. Having in mind the character of the war pe ons are done in Kosovo* as well, but they economy that resides on informal economy and are far less visible there. illegal ac vi es, with this poli cal stabiliza on The last fi nding opens up ques ons with started a process of introducing its bearers into regard to the diff erences and importance that legal fl ows of the economy. Because of the pre- kinship es play on all levels of formal and in- served strength of informal networks and the re- formal func oning of the poli cal and economic pressive power of their core the result of these subsystems. Families are rarely an important processes is that the economic and poli cal elite factor in cons tu ng informal networks in Ser- in Kosovo* are by and large more stable than is bia, and if they are it is mostly the case of the the case in Serbia. closest family members. On the other hand, po- The second no ced diff erence between Ko- li cal par es, ‘ekipe’ within them and interests sovo* and Serbia is a somewhat larger infl uence regarding economic actors are a dominant form of individuals in poli cal life in Kosovo*. The re- of informal networks. Kinship is thus established search results unques onably show that the in- as one of the forms of trust and loyalty, none- fl uence of the leaders and the top leadership of theless a form which is largely sporadic and pe- poli cal par es is high in Serbia, but also that the ripheral. Alterna vely, the signifi cance of large personaliza on of the poli cal life is more promi- families and kinship es, although declining, is nent in Kosovo*. Although poli cal pluralism and s ll a very signifi cant source of solidarity and the democra za on processes provide for a po- loyalty in Kosovo* on all levels of func oning of li cal life led through poli cal par es, in Serbia the poli cal life: from organizing a poli cal party, the par es themselves are as organiza ons more gathering votes during an elec on campaign, us- signifi cant than the leading individuals. A large ing public resources (employment) to build eco- number of replacements and departures from nomic connec ons between private companies. the poli cal life by party leaders in the last twen- A long period without integra ng the majority of ty or so years tes fi es to this fact. The pluralism the Albanian popula on in Kosovo* within the within the poli cal par es, which is more o en frameworks of formal ins tu ons and the de- than not expressed with the existence of parallel velopment of parallel ins tu ons has led to the ‘ekipa’ within the organiza on, implies interests existence of a rooted tradi onal system of poli - that overcome individuals. This pluralism o en cal representa on – through principal fi gures of leads to intra-party turmoil and replacements. kinship groups (families, fraterni es and tribes), On the other hand, this form of informal poli - villages and similar. The process of deconstruc- cal party struggle is less emphasized in Kosovo*, on of the tradi onal forms of inclusion in the due to the forces that poli cal leaders have as poli cal life has started much earlier in Serbia, a heritage established in the process of increas- and these forms almost vanished during the

127 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

20th century. Although the informal structures given by the interna onal actors (which will be remained very important, they developed new dealt with later in the text), which exerts a slow forms and reached the modern forms of interest change on the established informal structures based loyalty. and prac ces. One of the most signifi cant diff erences is The gap between the norma ve and fac- the ins tu onal heritage of Kosovo* and Ser- tual role of ins tu ons in Serbia and Kosovo* is bia. Serbian elite has built its ins tu ons fi rstly diff erent. The accounts of all the actors in Serbia through the periods of early independence and emphasize the role and signifi cance of ins tu- through the periods of Kingdom of Yugoslavia ons in poli cal and social life. Informal prac ces and socialist Yugoslavia it considered those in- are most commonly understood either as a form s tu ons as its own. Although the ins tu on- of deviant behavior, behavior that to a lesser or aliza on of poli cal life had a gradual pace and greater extent deviates from the norma ve (in- included a signifi cant part of informal prac ces, s tu ons), or as complementary to ins tu onal ins tu onal and informal arrangements have solu ons (acquaintances, arrangements made collec vely represented a legi mate expression in informal se ngs that guarantee sincerity in of the “rules of conduct” for all par cipants in agreements). However, the same narra ves have the poli cal (and economic) fi eld. Poli cal and a plethora of paradoxes, because of the fact economic actors had the possibility to develop that, although the clientelism and patronage are forms of control over the ins tu ons and usage seen as deviant, they are also considered to be of public resources for their own gain, all the way inherent to the poli cal fi eld and are jus fi ed up to the level of extrac ve formal ins tu ons by similar or same prac ces in the region, and (both poli cal and economic alike), thus avoiding even economically and poli cally “developed so- the radical confronta on of the formal and infor- cie es”. Consequently, on a norma ve level the mal spheres. Conversely, since the annexa on of signifi cance of formal ins tu ons as regulators of Kosovo* territory to Serbia and through almost poli cal life is not ques oned, however, the level the en re period un l the year of 2000, the of prac cal solu ons places a challenge before greater part of the elite in Kosovo* had viewed those norms and demands ad hoc explana ons. the formal ins tu ons as foreign, forced and fac- In Kosovo*, on the other hand, even on the nor- tors that do not represent the will and interests ma ve level we experience a lower level of trust of the popula on. This is precisely the reason in the exis ng ins tu ons, which in the accounts why tradi onal forms of organizing the public life of our examinees causes discordance between and ethnical solidarity were existent as a form of the norma ve and the factual. resistance against the formal ins tu ons. Over the course of me new, subs tu ve structures The signifi cance of the interna onal factor of informality, parallel ethnical ins tu ons that within the post-confl ict area of the European pe- infl uenced the addi onal founda on of poli cal riphery is felt directly and indirectly. The direct prac ces outside formal frameworks, were estab- eff ect is over the offi cial poli cal channels of lished as well. These informal ins tu ons have, communica on, and indirectly through control- through reproduc on of everyday life, combined ling or tolera ng informal rela ons. Having in the standards reached during the moderniza on mind that Kosovo* is s ll under EU/interna onal (for example in educa on and health care) with supervision, both as a territory and poli cally the tradi onal forms of informal prac ces (kin- speaking, the signifi cance of interna onal ins - ship es). The importance of formal ins tu ons tu ons and actors is far greater than in Serbia, was thus reduced to symbio c representa on, which has more freedom when it comes to ne- but was also present as a prac cal expression go a ons and arrangements in the interna onal of (lack of) power. The formal ins tu ons were fi eld. The impression from the statements of re- perceived as oppressive and as a show of power spondents form Kosovo* is that due to their ef- and domina on of the Serbian ethnical element, forts to establish ins tu onal arrangements, the while the informal ins tu ons were seen as interna onal actors have accepted the reality represen ng ethnical solidarity and a symbol of of the poli cal moment in Kosovo* and made a resistance. The situa on did not change signifi - considerable compromise with the exis ng infor- cantly a er the declara on of the independence. mal networks that have established themselves The direc on and character of the ins tu ons is as complementary to formal ins tu ons. In that

128 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* way the informal mechanisms that were present of foreign countries regarding the treatment of before the declara on of independence, have po- ethnic minori es (infl uence of Hungary on the si oned themselves in ins tu onal arrangements posi on of Hungarians in Vojvodina and infl u- to a great extent crea ng func onal ins tu onal ence of Turkey on the posi on of Bosnjak popula- mechanisms. The second signifi cance of the inter- on in Sandzak), the issues of na onal minori es na onal actors in further strengthening of infor- are to a large extent ma ers of Serbia’s internal mal arrangements can be seen in the percep on policies, that is to say internal nego a ons with of the interna onal actors as the key factors that the representa ves of the ethnic groups, with to the greatest extent keep the hands of the do- which informal channels for exchanging services mes c elite ed. In that way an aversion is being and public goods are most commonly formed. created among the poli cians toward them and On the other hand, having in mind the s ll pend- moves a be er part of the poli cal ac vi es to ing resolu on for the interna onal status of Ko- the sphere of the informal. The third signifi cance sovo* that an cipates interna onal arbitra on, of the interna onal actors can be seen in a much unregulated poli cal and territorial organiza on larger role of the foreign (suspicious) capital dur- (which includes the ethnical element), as well as ing the process of priva za on, which managed the ethnically s ll very divided popula on, the to obtain domes c resources through networks ques on of interethnic rela ons in Kosovo* has of war economy. The signifi cance of interna on- been raised to the highest interna onal level. al actors in Serbia is present in a diff erent way When this fact is placed in the context of strong and with a less direct approach. According to informal ins tu ons, presented earlier, it is not the tes monies of prominent Serbian poli cians, surprising to fi nd that clientelis c es in Kosovo* several foreign ambassadors have both formal are more strongly based on ethnical solidarity. and informal infl uence on domes c aff airs and With a high level of separa on, in Kosovo*, the actors: both regarding the poli cal elite and the informal es are more an internal ethnical issue big business. Having in mind that to a signifi cant than a form of nego a on and communica on extent this infl uence goes outside the framework among ethnic groups, which is addi onally dem- of the defi ned roles of the ambassadors, but also onstrated with the research on informali es of that, within the poli cal realism, a need for this the Serbs ethnic minority in Kosovo*. These rela- is implied, there is s ll a need to inves gate fur- ons are further complicated by the presence of ther the infl uence of the interna onal factors. interna onal factors that apart from arbitra ng Among the most noteworthy diff erences in the rela ons, at the same me tolerate eth- that set the form and structure of clientelis- nic clientelis c connec ons, which is addi onally c networks and patronage in the nego a ons viewed by both sides as unfair (in the case of the about public resources is the ethnic confl ict and other ethnic group). ethnic compe on. This manifesta on is important for the poli cal life in both Serbia and Ko- sovo*, however, in Kosovo* it has far greater * * * consequences then in Serbia. Ethnic minori es and par es that represent them in Serbia play a What have we learned from the compara- signifi cant role in nego a ons regarding the dis- ve analysis of the poli cal clientelism in Serbia tribu on of public resources (budget funds and and Kosovo*? The common factors of the com- employment opportuni es, fi rst of all), but these para ve framework are a long history of peasant, arrangements are mostly local (for example in patriarchal socie es, geographical locality of the Sandzak) and regional (in the autonomous prov- Western Balkans, centuries-old domina on of the ince of Vojvodina), rather than na onal in their O oman Empire, delays in moderniza on when character. Obtaining public compe ons or bids, compared to Europe and suscep bility to the in- employment and similar, can be part of ethnic solidarity, but also a part of the exchange be- fl uences of foreign governments and companies. tween ethnic groups (for example, when employ- The diff erences are numerous and each one of ment opportuni es are delivered according to them has a specifi c consequence to cons tu ng ethnic quotas in the public sector, a er the elec- rela ons of formal and informal ins tu ons. ons in ethnically mixed municipali es). Howev- Cultural (language and prevailing religion) er, although even in Serbia there is an infl uence and social diff erences (Albanian nobility as op-

129 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* posed to Serbian and Albanian peasantry) in outside factors can be suitable for the stabiliza- Kosovo* during the rule of the O oman Empire on of inclusive ins tu ons, as is largely the case have led to deep segrega ons and confl icts be- of Kosovo* today, if the func on of interna onal tween Serbs and Albanians. Delayed independ- poli cal actors is en rely transparent and moni- ence of Albanian state from the O oman Empire tored in such a way to ensure that the local polit- and slower rise of a modern, more ra onal ad- ical system and community are not instrumental- ministra on has led to the dominance of Serbian ized for the purposes and interests of those who military and administra on in Kosovo*, but from are managing the formal ins tu ons. Apart from the very start it appeared as repressive towards that, it is important that the gap between formal local Albanians. Formal ins tu ons in Kosovo* and informal ins tu ons be planned and reduced were not mul ethnic and inclusive for local pop- under managerial control so that the local po- ula on. They were a part of the system of clien- li cal structures gradually, but rela vely swi ly, telism established in various states dominated take over control of the formal ins tu ons, and by Serbs during the 20th century, and in a seg- the local popula on is strengthened to monitor regated mul ethnic community they gave way and cri que the work of these ins tu ons. The to local Serbs to include themselves in the clien- la er includes the transforma on of the poli cal telis c networks, while the Albanians very rarely culture from patrimonial to civic. It is required to had that opportunity. In other words, while this transfer the key actors from informal ins tu ons clientelis c system represented an obstacle to to formal ins tu ons, but with diff eren a on, so a faster development of Serbia during the 20th that the promoted ones are those who develop century, for Serbs in Kosovo* (and in one short suppor ve informal mechanisms (educa on, period during socialism for Albanians from Kos- health care, poli cal democra za on, economic ovo*) it represented a compara ve advantage coopera on and similar). compared with the other ethnic group. Up to this A er the armed confl icts during the 1990s day the ethnic clientelism has remained the most Serbia was faster to deal with war-profi teering important instrument of poli cal and economic clientelis c networks from Milosevic Era, than domina on of a single ethnic group in Kosovo*. Kosovo* was with freeing itself from the infl u- Informal ins tu ons are more compe ve ences of war commandants on establishing the towards the formal ones in Kosovo* than in Ser- new ins tu onal order and economic subsystem. Democra za on is poten ally suitable for weak- bia. The establishment of mul ethnic formal in- ening the poli cal clientelism because it leads to s tu ons infl uences the transforma on of infor- pluraliza on of the centers of power and a more mal ins tu ons. The more these ins tu ons are ra onal usage of the resources. However, in or- authen c and representa ve of the local popula- der for that to happen, poli cal security and a on and the prevailing poli cal culture, the lesser change of the poli cal culture need to be estab- is the infl uence of the informal ins tu ons. The lished. That culture would include the increase lack of authen c formal ins tu ons, as the ones of trust in the poli cal par es and especially the that already existed in Serbia in the 19th century, trust in state ins tu ons. If this condi on is not and which would be accepted as a result of the fulfi lled, increased poli cal compe on exerts compromise of interests of all ethnic groups in augmented pressure and control within the cli- Kosovo*, led to the situa on where the informal entlis c networks, in order for the mechanisms ins tu ons of Albanians from Kosovo* were un- of clientelis c exchange to be embedded more challenged and thus slow to change. In that way fi rmly and interests for the extrac on of public the Albanians in Kosovo* had an even slower resources protected. This pressure and control transi on from the tradi onal patrimonial mod- are stronger and more direct if the clientelis c el to a more contemporary, instrumental one, networks include groups of war veterans and which is more tolerant of pluralism and compe - comrades or organized criminal groups. Apart on of various interest groups. That process has from that, if the ethnic segrega on overlaps with been ini ated in the late socialism, and we are the poli cal, the empowerment of inclusive for- witnessing it even today. mal ins tu ons becomes even harder, because, The infl uence of foreign countries and in- as a rule, ethniciza on of poli cal divisions forces terna onal organiza ons is far greater and more the informal ins tu ons into a patrimonial mod- direct in Kosovo* than in Serbia. The presence of el. For these reasons, the democra za on has

130 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* to encompass the poli cal par es themselves, Madrugearu, Alexandru and Mar n Gordon. 2008: so that compe on is developed within them, The wars of the Balkan Peninsula: Their Me- alongside with poli cal compe on and merito- dieval Origin. Scarecrow Press. cra c selec on. Malcolm, Noel. 1998: Kosovo: A Short History. New York: New York University Press. Maliqi, Shkelzen. 2011: Why nonviolent resistence LITERATURE in Kosovo failed. (A. Idrizi, Ed.). Prish na: Center for Social studies – Gani Bobi. Banac, Ivo. 1984: Nacionalno pitanje u Jugoslaviji. Zagreb: Globus. Pula, Besnik. 2004: The emergence of the Kosovo “parallel state,” 1988–1992. Na onali es Pa- Crampton, Richard J. 2014: The Balkans Since the pers. h p://doi.org/10.1080/009059904200 Second World War. London: Routledge. 0296131. Čalić, Mari-Žanin. 2013: Istorija Jugoslavije u 20. Vickers, Miranda. 1998: Between Serb and Albani- veku. Beograd: Clio. an: A History of Kosovo. New York: Columbia University Press.

131 SUMMARY

nformality represents an important feature of a) trends in rela ons between eco- post-socialist socie es. Informal and personal nomic and poli cal elite over the Inetworks that predate from the socialist pe- last 20 years; riod are an important legacy for development b) current state-of-art research and of democra c systems and market economy in analysis; former socialist countries. Par cularly in the context of weak and blurred ins tu onal and nor- The research relied heavily on social sci- ma ve framework, individuals tend to rely more ence journals and books in order to grasp a bet- on informal ins tu ons and prac ces. Because of ter understanding on the historical legacies and that, pa erns of clientelism and ques on of the changes in the social context of the two socie- ‘culture of informality’ are important for underes. standing of contemporary trajectories in poli cal and economic subsystems of former socialist so- 2. Semi-structured face-to-face interviews with cie es. three groups of respondents: The general aim of the research was to a) In poli cs –people occupying high iden fy main forms, determinants and social ef- posi ons in public administra on, fects of informal norms, rela ons and prac ces infl uen al people in poli cal par es through which poli cal elite captured economic (on the na onal and local level); resources in Serbia and Kosovo*. The research b) In economy –execu ves/managers was realized within the project ‘Informal Prac c- in private companies (small, middle es of Capturing Economic Resources by Poli cal and big enterprises). Elite: Exploring Party Patronage in Kosovo and Serbia.’ The project was made possible through c) In the area of exper se –specialists the support of the Regional Research and Pro- and experts; mo on Program (RRPP) which is operated by the In order to ensure historical relevance of Interfaculty Ins tute for Central and Eastern Eu- the collected data the interviews were conduct- rope (IICEE) at the University of Fribourg (Swit- ed with both current and former power holders. zerland) and has been fully funded by the Swiss Also, we took considera on of representa on of Agency for Development and Coopera on (SDC), women and ethnic minori es. the Federal Department of Foreign Aff airs. The research was implemented by SeConS – Develop- ment Ini a ve Group from Belgrade and Center MAJOR FINDINGS – SERBIA for Research, Documenta on and Publica on (CRDP) from Prish ne. Due to development path of Serbian so- In order to iden fy, describe and explore ciety the rela on between formal and informal the informal prac ces of capturing economic re- ins tu ons today is most o en compe ng, al- sources by poli cal elite, we have chosen qualita- though historically it also used to be subs tu ve ve research design. The research goal was thus and some mes complementary. accomplished in two steps: Based on the respondents’ statements, it is possible to dis nguish following actors which 1. Analy cal reviewing of relevant literature and are relevant for the situa on inside the poli cal data sources with the aim of recognizing: and economic fi eld:

133 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

1. formal organiza ons / poli cal par es The respondents pointed out three criteria 2. Networks of trust consis ng of individuals for taking key posi ons and climbing the leader- who form more or less stable power networks ship ladder of their poli cal party: and they are divided on those consis ng of: a) 1) the ability to raise funds/money for the par- poli cians b) interlockers and c) private busi- ty, ness people, 2) organiza onal/communica on skills and 3. Interna onal factor (embassies and foreign mul na onal companies). 3) personal loyalty.

There are three areas of exercising poli - Several mechanisms were detected be- cal power: intra-party, governance posi ons and tween poli cal and economic systems, too. The brokerage between poli cal and economic sys- most frequent are: party ‘conquest’ of manage- tem. Within poli cal par es the power is used to ment structures of public enterprises, fi nancing arrange, structure, build and reconstruct power poli cal par es by public enterprises, party di- networks in line with confi gura ons based on rected employment, lobbying for legisla ve and certain interests. Within governance poli cal ac- administra ve ‘favours’, public tenders, the use on, power generated in the poli cal par es is of control mechanisms. transferred to ins tu ons, governance structures. Our analysis of informal rela ons, party Finally, third power area/func on is related to patronage and poli cal clientelism in post-social- the establishment of linkages between poli cal ist Serbia has showed that although ins tu onal and economic system. Very rarely one poli cal and personal elements in the poli cal and eco- actor can perform all three func ons, and usu- nomic system had been altered a er 2000, the ally there is certain func onal division between structure of power did not change. Although the poli cal actors. complementary processes of blocking transfor- On the other side, primary fi eld of private ma on and conversion of poli cal into economic entrepreneurs is the economy. They are relying resources has led to gradual reconstruc on, di- on the public resources to a great extent. vision and even confl ict among elite fac ons, Interna onal actors are recognized as im- which has implied a shi of power from the polit- portant on two levels. At one level they infl u- ical to the economic arena, it was ul mately the ence, guide and control the ins tu onal and pol- economic system that remained under poli cal icy reforms. At other level, they are donors and domina on and all the power and privileges, in investors and their economic role is perceived as turn, concentrated in the hands of a small group important. of people. Majority of respondents perceive money A complex informal system of power con- and fi nancial benefi ts as key resource that is be- centra on and resource distribu on had been ing exchanged between actors. However there set and maintained based on informal, yet quite are other resources of importance as well, such strict, rules and on hidden, but very func onal, as jobs, contracts, informa on, acquaintances on roles. Through several mechanisms, these roles the right posi ons as well as various in kind ben- have been reproduced and both puni ve and efi ts. rewarding rules have been applied as a way of Diff erent mechanisms are used for the ex- favoring the extrac ve mode of formal ins tu- change within a poli cal party, between party on func oning. The ongoing economic crisis and ins tu ons and between poli cal actors and has sharpened the edge of poli cal clientelism: economic actors in public and private sector of scarce resources and ght compe on between, the economy. The key mo ve underlying these and inside informal networks and poli cal par es mechanisms is to provide long-term posi oning will either put addi onal pressure on disciplining of poli cal par es in the power for what they the informal system and preven ng defec on, or need: will lead to the fragmenta on and weakening of poli cal power. The la er scenario might either 1. enough people to vote for them and result in the strengthening of inclusive formal 2. suffi cient fi nancial resources to secure poli - poli cal ins tu ons or to switching to yet an- cal infl uence. other stage of dominance of the economic elite

134 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* inside Serbian poli cal capitalism. It is worth em- for other informal prac ces as well. Such prac c- phasizing that the outcome will, at least par ally, es can occur within the poli cal party, between depend on the prevailing values and ac vism of the party and ins tu ons, and between the eco- the ci zens. nomic and poli cal systems. The last op on can take place in three diff erent scenarios: through abusing contracts, abusing priva za on process, MAJOR FINDINGS – KOSOVO* and with illegal construc on supported by central level poli cians. Two more recognized mech- The development path of Kosovan soci- anisms of clientelis c exchange of resources ety also led to most o en compe ng rela on are regula on of prices of certain products and between formal and informal ins tu ons today. changing of laws in favor of interests of certain However, during the modern history this rela on lobbies (interest groups). used to be much more o en complementary and All these mechanisms are put in place for subs tu ve than in Serbia. two main reasons: obtaining resources (from fi - Percep on on relevant poli cal actors in nances to allies), and maintaining poli cal power Kosovo* goes beyond poli cal representa on in (primarily absorbing votes). governing ins tu ons. The respondents listed six Our analysis showed that rela onships be- diff erent actors. Under the category of poli cal tween economic and poli cal arenas were mu- actors fall poli cal par es as the “most obvious” tually dependent and were designated as the ones, along with interna onal actors, whose way not only to accumulate, but also maintain power and role has decreased in me. The third capital. Indeed, “clientelism has turned out to important group of poli cal actors are “parallel” be of great concern for ci zens’ access to ins - ins tu ons run by the Republic of Serbia, which tu ons, services, employment, and even their con nue to exist in Kosovo* upon the end of the access to decision-making and democra c infl u- armed confl ict. Economic actors are marked as ence” (Jackson, 2014, p. 2). The key players of important ones, especially those “abusing” pub- that poli cal capitalist system were the poli cal lic resources and crea ng informal clan-based elite, who derived their authority in the socialist networks with poli cal par es/individuals. For transi on period and peaceful and armed resist- the establishment and maintenance of those ance in par cular. Those belonging to the la er networks, intermediaries are needed, here de- were rather powerful, enjoying almost exclusive scribed as interlocking actors. Finally, the last power in the fi rst years in the post-armed con- on the list of relevant poli cal actors men oned fl ict period. Further, (unaccountable as well as were also nongovernmental organiza ons and unverifi able) having access to public goods, such clubs, holding leverage for policy making and for elites soon gave birth to new economic elites as obtaining funds. well. Special treatments, favors and protec ons from (postponement of) legal prosecu ons were Concerning the resources exchanged some of the main ways through which economic among the interested par es they were men- elites swi ly accumulated abundant capital. oned as one of the most common aspects of Despite the transforma on into a plural- poli cal patronage. Such exchange can occur ist society, where rather strong compe on be- between diff erent actors, such as ci zens (who tween par es has been evolving, the control have vo ng power; hence they “hold” the votes) over public resources is rather perceived to have and poli cians/poli cal par es (who have po- been done through clientelist networks, mostly li cal power; hence they “hold” job posi ons in established on economic interests. Throughout public ins tu ons). In addi on, there are other this me, a rela vely small group of people, gen- various stakeholders with certain resources (such era ng too much ineffi ciency that s ll con nues as funds and dona ons), which give them the to hinder the quality of life, controlled the power leverage for par cipa ng in informal exchange of and resources. On the other hand, living in poor resources. Some of the resources most o en re- condi ons with limited opportuni es, which is ferred to are votes, jobs and means of fi nancing the case with majority of ci zens of Kosovo*, poli cal par es. represents a scenario far from the one where The above actors use diff erent mecha- people can use their poten al to the greatest nisms for the exchange or resources listed, but possible extent.

135 REZIME

eformalnost predstavlja važnu funkciju b) trenutnog stanja na polju istraživanja post-socijalis èkih društava. Neformalne i i analize ovog problema; Nliène mreže koje da raju iz socijalis èkog perioda su važno nasleðe za razvoj demokratskih U cilju boljeg razumevanja istorijskog sistema i tržišne ekonomije u bivšim socijalis- nasleđa i promena u društvenim konteks ma èkim zemljama. Posebno u kontekstu slabog i posmatranih društava (kosovskog i srpskog), nejasnog ins tucionalnog i norma vnog okvira istraživanje se u velikoj meri oslanjalo na knjige i pojedinci imaju tendenciju da se više oslanjaju na časopise iz oblas društvenih nauka. neformalne ins tucije i prakse. Zbog toga, obrasci klijentelizma i pitanje o “kulturi neformalnog” su 2. Polu-strukturisanim intervjuima, licem u lice, važni za razumevanje savremenih putanja razvoja sa tri grupe ispitanika: poli èkih i ekonomskih podsistema bivših socijal- a) U poli čkom polju – osobe koje za- is èkih društava. uzimaju visoke pozicije u državnoj Opš cilj istraživanja bio je da se iden - upravi, kao i u cajni pojedinci u fi kuju glavni oblici, determinante i socijalni efek poli čkim par jama (na nacional- neformalnih normi, odnosa i praksi kroz koje nom i lokalnom nivou) poli čka elita zarobljava ekonomske resurse u b) U ekonomskom polju – rukovodioci/ Srbiji i na Kosovu*. Istraživanje je organizovano direktori u privatnim preduzećima u okviru projekta: “Neformalne prakse zarob- (mala, srednja i velika preduzeća) ljavanja ekonomskih resursa od strane poli čke c) U ekspertskom polju – stručnjaci. elite: istraživanje par jske patronaže na Kosovu i u Srbiji”. Projekat je sproveden kroz Region- U cilju pos zanja istorijske relevantnos alni program promocije istraživanja (RRPP) ko- prikupljenih podataka, intervjui su sprovedeni i jim upravlja Međufakultetski ins tut za Cen- sa trenutnim i sa doskorašnjim nosiocima moći. tralnu i Istočnu Evropu (IICEE) na Univerzitetu u Friburgu (Švajcarska) i u potpunos fi nansiran od strane Švajcarske agencije za razvoj i saradnju GLAVNI NALAZI – SRBIJA (SDC), Saveznog ministarstva inostranih poslova. Istraživanje su sproveli SeConS – grupa za razvo- S obzirom na razvojni put srpskog društva jnu inicija vu iz Beograda i Centar za istraživanje, danas je odnos između formalnih I neformalnih dokumentovanje i objavljivanje (CRDP) iz ins tucija u najvećoj meri takmičarski (compe - Priš ne. ve), iako je kroz istoriju neretko bio zamenjujući U cilju iden fi kovanja, opisa i analize nefor- (subs tu ve), a ponekad i dopunjujući (comple- malnih praksi zarobljavanja ekonomskih resursa mentary). od strane poli čke elite, izabrali smo kvalita vni Na osnovu izjava ispitanika moguće je ra- istraživački pristup. Istraživački cilj je pos gnut zlikova sledeć e aktere koji su relevantni za sit- kroz sledeća dva koraka: uaciju unutar oblas poli ke i ekonomije:

1. Analizom relevantne literature i izvora poda- 1. formalne organizacije/poli čke par je taka sa ciljem prepoznavanja: 2. mreže poverenja koje se sastoje od pojedinaca a) trendova u relacijama između eko- koji čine više ili manje stabilne mreže moći, nomske i poli čke elite u poslednjih koje su podeljene na one koje se sastoje od: 20 godina; a) poli čara b) interlokera (onih koji istovre-

136 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

meno imaju pozicije i u poli ci i u privredi) i c) 1) sposobnost za prikupljanje sredstava/novca za poslovnih ljudi iz privatnog sektora, stranku, 3. međunarodni faktor (ambasade i strane mul- 2) organizacione i komunikacijske sposobnos i nacionalne kompanije). 3) lična lojalnost.

Postoje tri oblas ostvarivanja poli čke Osim toga, prepoznato je i nekoliko me- moć i: unutarpar jska, upravljačke pozicije i posre- hanizama koji funkcionišu između poli čkog dovanje između poli čkog i ekonomskog sistema. i ekonomskog podsistema. Najčešći su: par- U okviru poli čkih stranaka snaga se koris da jsko ‘osvajanje’ upravljačkih struktura javnih se organizuje, strukturira, izgradi i rekonstruiše preduzeć a, fi nansiranje poli čkih par ja od mreža moći u skladu sa određenim interesima. strane javnih preduzeća, par jsko zapošljavanje, U okviru upravljanja poli čkom akcijom moć lobiranje za zakonodavne i administra vne ‘us- generisana u poli čkim par jama se prebacuje u luge’, javni tenderi, korišć enje kontrolnih meha- ins tucije i upravljačke strukture. Konačno, treć a oblast/funkcija moći se odnosi na uspostavljanje nizama (inspekcija i sl.). veza između poli čkog i ekonomskog sistema. Iako je došlo do ins tucionalnih i personal- Vrlo retko jedan poli čki akter može da obavlja nih promena u poli čkom i ekonomskom sistemu sve tri funkcije, a obično postoji izvesna funk- nakon 2000. godine, naša analiza neformalnih cionalna podela između poli čkih aktera. odnosa, par jske patronaže i poli čkog klijen- S druge strane, osnovna oblast delovanja telizma u Srbiji je pokazala da je struktura moći privatnih preduzetnika je ekonomija. Oni se u ostala nepromenjena. Iako je proces “blokirane” zarobljavanju resursa u velikoj meri oslanjaju na post-socijalis čke transformacije, praćen konver- javna sredstva. zijom poli čkih resursa u ekonomske, doveo do postepene rekonstrukcije, podele, pa čak i konf- Međunarodni akteri su prepozna kao likta između različi h elita, uz pomeranje moći iz važni na dva nivoa. Na jednom nivou u ču, vode poli čke u ekonomsku sferu, istraživanje je poka- i kontrolišu ins tucionalne i poli čke reforme. Na zalo da je poli čka dominacija nad ekonomskim drugom nivou, oni su donatori i inves tori i nji- hova ekonomska uloga se smatra važnom. sistemom sveprisutna, tj. da su moć i privilegije koncentrisani u okviru male grupe ljudi. Već ina ispitanika smatra da su novac i fi - nansijska korist ključni resurs koji se razmenjuje Složen neformalni sistem moći i distribuc- između aktera. Među m, postoje i drugi značajni ije resursa je postavljen i održava se na bazi ne- resursi, kao što su: radna mesta, ugovori, infor- formalnih, ali krajnje strogih pravila, kao i na bazi macije, poznanici na važnim pozicijama, kao i skrivenih, ali izrazito funkcionalnih uloga. Ove razne koris u naturi. uloge se reprodukuju putem nekoliko mehaniza- ma, dok se procedure kažnjavanja i nagrađivanja Različi mehanizmi se koriste za razmenu primenjuju u cilju favorizovanja ekstrak vnog u okviru jedne poli čke stranke, između par je i modela funkcionisanja formalnih ins tucija. ins tucija i između poli čkih aktera i ekonomskih aktera u javnom i privatnom sektoru ekonomije. Tekuća ekonomska kriza pojačava poli čki kli- Ključni mo v koji se nalazi u osnovi ovih mehani- jentelizam: sve oskudniji resursi i pojačano zama je da se obezbedi dugoročno pozicioniranje takmičenje između i unutar neformalnih mreža poli čkih stranaka u vlas kako bi pribavile ono i poli čkih par ja će rezultova ili dodatnim pri- što im je potrebno: skom u cilju disciplinovanja neformalnog sistema ili fragmentacijom i slabljenjem poli čke 1. dovoljno ljudi da glasaju za njih i moći. Ovaj drugi ishod bi mogao vodi ili ka 2. dovoljna fi nansijska sredstva da se obezbedi jačanju inkluzivnih formalnih poli čkih ins tuc- poli čki u caj. ija ili ka još jednoj fazi dominacije ekonomske elite u okviru poli čkog kapitalizma u Srbiji. Ne Ispitanici su istakli tri kriterijuma za zauzi- bi trebalo smetnu sa uma da potencijalni ishod manje ključnih pozicija prilikom uspona na lider- bar delimično zavisi od preovlađujućih vrednos skoj lestvici njihove poli čke par je: u društvu i stepena građanskog ak vizma.

137 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

GLAVNI NALAZI – KOSOVO* sistema. Poslednja opcija može se odigra putem tri različita scenarija: putem zloupotrebe ugov- ora, putem zloupotrebe procesa priva zacije i Razvojni put kosovskog društva takođe je putem nelegalne izgradnje podržane od strane doveo do toga da je danas odnos između formal- poli čara na centralnom nivou. Još dva prepoz- nih I neformalnih ins tucija najčešće takmičarski. nata mehanizma klijentelis čke razmene resursa Ipak, tokom moderne istorije ovaj odnos je mno- su kontrola cena određenih proizvoda i promena go više bio dopunjujući ili zamenjujući nego u Sr- zakona u korist određenih interesnih grupa. biji. Svi ovi mehanizmi su uspostavljeni usled Percepcija relevantnih poli čkih aktera dva ključna razloga: pribavljanja resursa (od fi nan- na Kosovu* prevazilazi poli čke predstavnike u sijskih sredstava do uspostavljanja savezništava) ins tucijama vlas . Ispitanici su prepoznali šest i održavanja poli čke moći (primarno kroz dobi- različi h grupa aktera. Kategoriji poli čkih aktera janje glasova). pripadaju poli čke par je kao najočiglednije, za- jedno sa međunarodnim akterima čija se moć i Naša analiza je pokazala da su odnosi uloga vremenom smanjila. Treća važna grupa između ekonomske I poli čke arene međuzavisni poli čkih aktera su “paralelne” ins tucije ko- i postavljeni na način koji omogućava da se kapi- jim upravlja Republika Srbija i koje su nastavile tal ne samo akumulira već i održava. Zaista, “kli- da funkcionišu na Kosovu* i nakon završetka jentelizam je postao velika prepreka građanskom oružanog sukoba. pristupu ins tucijama, uslugama, zapošljavanju, pa čak i samom procesu donošenja odluka i Ekonomski akteri su označeni kao važni, demokratskom u canju” (Jackson, 2014, p. 2). i to pre svega oni koji zloupotrebljavaju javne Ključni akteri poli čkog kapitalizma su poli čke resurse i stvaraju neformalne mreže (klanove) sa elite, čija je moć izvedena iz perioda socijalis čke poli čkim par jama/pojedincima. Za postojanje i tranzicije, a posebno iz perioda miroljubivog i održavanje ovih mreža neophodni su posrednici, kasnijeg oružanog otpora. Ključni akteri iz perioda koji su prepozna kao interlokeri. Konačno, pos- oružanog otpora su uživali skoro apsolutnu moć lednji na lis spomenu h relevantnih poli čkih u prvim godinama nakon završetka oružanog su- aktera su nevladine organizacije koje imaju moć u koba. Imajući neograničeni pristup javnim resur- kreiranju poli ka i dobijanju novčanih sredstava. sima oni su “odgovorni” i za nastajanje novih Što se če resursa koji se razmenjuju ekonomskih elita. Privilegovani tretman, činjenje između zainteresovanih strana, oni su spomen- raznih usluga, kao i zaš ta (ili odlaganje) od u kao jedan od najčešćih aspekata poli čke krivičnog gonjenja samo su neki od načina putem patronaže. Takva razmena se može pojavi kojih su ekonomske elite brzo akumulirale obilje između različi h aktera, kao što su: građani (koji kapitala. poseduju “glasačku” moć i mogu da uskrate svoj Uprkos transformaciji u pluralis čko društvo glas na izborima) i poli čari/ poli čke par je (koji u kome je razvijeno takmičenje između poli čkih poseduju poli čku moć, s obzirom da drže pozici- stranaka, kontrola nad javnim resursima se odvija je u javnoj upravi). Dodatno, postoje i razni drugi putem uspostavljanja klijentelis čkih mreža, pre zainteresovani akteri sa određenim resursima svega zasnovanim na ekonomskim interesima. (kao što su fondovi i donacije), koji im daju moć Tokom ovog perioda, rela vno mala grupa ljudi, da učestvuju u neformalnoj razmeni resursa. Neki generišući neefi kasnost koja neprestano uman- od najčešće istaknu h resursa su glasovi, poslovi juje kvalitet života, kontroliše moć i resurse. Sa kao i novac za fi nansiranje poli čkih par ja. druge strane, velika većina stanovnika Kosova* Pomenu akteri koriste različite meha- živi u lošim životnim uslovima sa ograničenim pri- nizme za razmenu resursa, kao i za druge nefor- likama i mogućnos ma, što predstavlja scenario malne prakse. Takve prakse se mogu pojavi u daleko od onog u kome oni mogu u najvećoj meri okviru poli čke stranke, između poli čke stranke da ostvare svoj potencijal. i ins tucija, kao i između ekonomskog i poli čkog

138 PËRMBLEDHJE

nformalite paraqet një par të rëndësishëm a) tendencave në marrëdhëniet mes të shoqërive post-socialiste. Rrjetet joformale elitës ekonomike dhe poli ke gjatë Idhe personale që datojnë nga periudha social- 20 viteve të fundit; iste janë trashëgimi e rëndësishme për zhvillimin b) hulum meve dhe analizave aktuale e sistemeve demokra ke dhe të ekonomisë së më të avancuara; tregut në vendet ish-socialiste. Veçmas në konteks n e kornizës së dobët dhe të paqartë ins tu- Hulum mi u mbështet kryesisht në revista cionale e norma ve, individët priren të mbësh- dhe libra të shkencave sociale në mënyrë që të teten më fort në ins tucionet dhe prak kat kuptohen më mirë trashëgimitë historike dhe joformale. Për shkak të kësaj, janë me rëndësi ndryshimet në konteks n social të të dy sho- modelet e klientelizmit dhe çështja e “kulturës së qërive. informalite t” në mënyrë që të kuptohen trajek- 2. Intervista të gjysmëstrukturuara sy më sy me toret bashkëkohore në nënsistemet poli ke dhe tri grupe të respondentëve: ekonomike të shoqërive ish-socialiste. a) Në poli kë – njerëz që zënë poste Qëllimi i përgjithshëm i hulum mit ishte të larta në administratën publike, që t’i iden fi konte format kryesore, përcaktuesit njerëz me ndikim në par të poli ke dhe efektet sociale të normave joformale, mar- (në nivel shtetëror dhe lokal); rëdhëniet dhe prak kat me anë të të cilave el- b) Në ekonomi – drejtuesit/menax- ita poli ke i ka kapur resurset ekonomike në herët në kompanitë private (ndër- Serbi dhe në Kosovë*. Hulum mi është kryer në marrjet e vogla, të mesme dhe të kuadër të projek t “Prak kat joformale të ka- mëdha); pjes së burimeve ekonomike nga elita poli ke: shqyr mi i patronazhit par ak në Kosovë dhe c) Në fushën e eksper zës – specialistë Serbi”. Ky projekt u mundësua nga mbështetja e dhe ekspertë; Programin Rajonal për Hulum m dhe Promovim Për të siguruar rëndësinë historike të të (PRHP), që operohet nga Interfaculty Ins tute dhënave të mbledhura, intervistat u kryen me for Central and Eastern Europe (IICEE) në Univer- mbajtësit aktualë dhe të mëparshëm të push- site n e Friburgut (Zvicër) dhe është i fi nancuar te t. Po ashtu, kemi marrë në konsideratë për- plotësisht nga Agjencia Zvicerane për Zhvillim faqësimin e grave dhe të pakicave etnike. dhe Bashkëpunim (SDC), Departamen Federal i Punëve të Jashtme. Hulum mi është kryer nga SeConS – Grup Inicia vash për Zhvillimin nga Be- GJETJET KRYESORE – SERBI ogradi dhe Qendra për Hulum m, Dokumen m dhe Publikim (QHDP) nga Prish na. Për shkak të rrugës së zhvillimit të sho- Me qëllim të iden fi kimit, përshkrimit dhe qërisë serbe, marrëdhënia ndërmjet ins tu- eksplorimit të prak kave joformale të kapjes cioneve formale dhe joformale sot është më së burimeve ekonomike nga elita poli ke, kemi së shpesh konkurruese, edhe pse historikisht zgjedhur dizajnin e hulum mit cilësor. Kështu, ka qenë edhe zëvendësuese dhe ndonjëherë qëllimi i hulum mit u realizua në dy hapa: plotësuese. Bazuar në pohimet e të respodentëve, 1. Shqyr mi anali k i literaturës përkatëse dhe i është e mundshme të bëhet dallimi i aktorëve të burimeve të të dhënave me qëllim të njohjes mëposhtëm që janë relevantë për situatën bren- së: da fushës poli ke dhe ekonomike:

139 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo*

1. Organizatat formale/par të poli ke 2. burime të mja ueshme fi nanciare për të sigu- 2. Rrjetet e besimit të përbëra nga individë që ruar ndikim poli k. formojnë rrjete pak a shumë të qëndrueshme Respdentët kanë vu në pah tri kritere për të pushte t dhe ndahen në ata që përbëhen marrjen e pozitave kyçe dhe ngjitjen e shkallëve nga: a) poli kanët b) ndërmjetësit dhe c) të lidershipit prej par së së tyre poli ke: njerëzit e biznesit privat, 3. Faktori ndërkombëtar (ambasadat dhe kom- 1) mundësinë për të mbledhë fonde /para për panitë e huaja shumëkombëshe). par në, 2) a ësitë organiza ve/komunikuese dhe Ka tri fusha të ushtrimit të pushte t poli- k: brenda par së, në pozicionet e qeverisjes 3) besnikërinë personale. dhe në ndërmjetësimin mes sistemit poli k dhe a j ekonomik. Brenda par ve poli ke pushte Janë zbuluar edhe një varg mekanizmash përdoret për të rregulluar, strukturuar, ndërtuar ndërmjet sistemeve poli ke dhe ekonomike. Më dhe rindërtuar rrjetet e pushte t në përputhje të shpeshtat janë: “push mi” par ak i struk- me konfi gurimin e bazuar në interesa të caktu- turave drejtuese të ndërmarrjeve publike, fi nan- ara. Brenda qeverisjes, veprimi poli k, pushte cimi i par ve poli ke nga ndërmarrjet publike, i gjeneruar në par të poli ke u transferohet in- punësimi i drejtuar nga par a, lobimi për ‘favore’ s tucioneve, strukturave qeverisëse. Në fund, fu- legjisla ve dhe administra ve, tenderët publikë, sha/funksioni i tretë i pushte t ka të bëjë me kri- përdorimi i mekanizmave të kontrollit. jimin e lidhjeve ndërmjet sistemit poli k dhe a j Analiza jonë e marrëdhënieve joformale, ekonomik. Shumë rrallë një aktor poli k mund t’i patronazhit par ak dhe klientelizmit poli k në kryejë të tria funksionet dhe zakonisht ka njëfarë Serbinë post-socialiste tregoi se ndonëse elemen- ndarjeje funksionale mes aktorëve poli kë. tet ins tucionale dhe personale në sistemin poli- Nga ana tjetër, fusha kryesore e sipërmar- k dhe ekonomik kishin ndryshuar pas vi t 2000, rësve privatë është ekonomia. Ata në masë të struktura e pushte t nuk ka ndryshuar. Edhe pse madhe bazohen në burimet publike. proceset komplementare të bllokimit të transformimit dhe shndërrimit të burimeve poli ke në Aktorët ndërkombëtarë njihen si të rëndë- aso ekonomike kanë çuar në rindër min gradual, sishëm në dy nivele. Në një nivel ata ndikojnë, ndarje dhe madje edhe konfl ikt ndërmjet frak- udhëzojnë dhe kontrollojnë reformat ins tucion- sioneve elitare, çka ka nënkuptuar një zhvendosje ale dhe të poli kave. Në nivel tjetër, janë dona- të pushte t nga arena poli ke në atë ekonomike, torë e inves torë dhe roli i tyre ekonomik per- në fund të fundit ishte sistemi ekonomik ai që ceptohet si i rëndësishëm. mbe nën dominimin poli k dhe i gjithë pushte Shumica e respodentëve i perceptojnë e privilegjet, për më tej, u përqendruan në duart paratë dhe përfi met fi nanciare si burime krye- e një grupi të vogël njerëzish. sore që shkëmbehen ndërmjet aktorëve. Megjit- Një sistem kompleks joformal i përqen- hatë, ka burime të tjera po aq me rëndësi, si ven- drimit të pushte t dhe i shpërndarjes së burimeve det e punës, kontratat, informatat, të njohurit në është vendosur dhe ruajtur në bazë të rregullave pozitat e duhura, si dhe përfi me të ndryshme të joformale, por mja të rrepta, si dhe të roleve brendshme. të fshehta, por shumë funksionale. Nëpërmjet Mekanizma të ndryshëm përdoren për një vargu mekanizmash, këto role janë riprod- shkëmbim brenda një par e poli ke, ndërmjet huar dhe janë aplikuar rregulla ndëshkuese por par së dhe ins tucioneve, si dhe ndërmjet ak- edhe shpërblyese, si mënyrë për të favorizuar torëve poli kë dhe atyre ekonomikë në sektorin mënyrën ekstraktuese të funksionimit formal të publik dhe privat të ekonomisë. Mo vi kryesor ins tucioneve. Kriza e vazhdueshme ekonomike e në thelbin e këtyre mekanizmave është që të sig- ka mprehur tehun e klientelizmit poli k: burimet urohet pozicionim afatgjatë i par ve poli ke në e pakta dhe konkurrenca e ngushtë ndërmjet pushtet, për çka u nevojiten: dhe brenda rrjeteve joformale dhe par ve poli- ke ose do të ushtrojë presion shtesë mbi disi- 1. njerëz të mja ueshëm që të votojnë për ta, plinimin e sistemit joformal dhe parandalimin e dhe shmangieve, ose do të çojë në fragmentarizimin

140 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* dhe dobësimin e pushte t poli k. Skenari i fundit burimeve. Disa nga burimet e përmendura më së mund të rezultojë me forcimin e ins tucioneve shpesh janë vota, vendet e punës dhe mjetet e përfshirëse poli ke formale ose me kalimin në fi nancimit të par ve poli ke. një tjetër fazë të dominimit të elitës ekonomike Aktorët e mësipërm përdorin mekanizma brenda kapitalizmit poli k serb. Vlen të theksohet të ndryshëm për t’i shkëmbyer burimet e për- se rezulta , të paktën pjesërisht, do të varet nga mendura, por edhe prak ka të tjera joformale. vlerat mbizotëruese dhe ak vizmi i qytetarëve. Prak kat e lla mund të shfaqen brenda par së poli ke, ndërmjet par së dhe ins tucioneve, si GJETJET KRYESORE – KOSOVË dhe ndërmjet sistemeve ekonomike dhe poli- ke. Mundësia e fundit mund të ndodhë në tre skenarë të ndryshëm: duke abuzuar kontratat, Rruga e zhvillimit të shoqërisë kosovare duke abuzuar procesin e priva zimit, si dhe me po ashtu ka çuar në marrëdhënie më së shpesh ndër m të paligjshëm të mbështetur nga poli- konkurruese mes ins tucioneve formale dhe kanët e nivelit qendror. Dy mekanizmat më të joformale sot. Megjithatë, gjatë historisë mod- njohur të shkëmbimit klientelist të burimeve janë erne kjo marrëdhënie ka ditur të jetë shumë më rregullimi i çmimeve të produkteve të caktuara shpesh komplementare dhe zëvendësuese sesa dhe ndryshimi i ligjeve në të mirë të interesave në Serbi. të lobeve të caktuara (grupeve të interesit). Percep mi mbi aktorët relevantë poli kë Të gjithë këto mekanizma janë vënë në në Kosovë* shkon përtej përfaqësimit poli k vend për dy arsye kryesore: marrjen e burimeve në ins tucionet qeverisëse. Respodentët kanë (nga fi nancat e deri te aleatët), dhe ruajtjen e radhitur gjashtë aktorë të ndryshëm. Nën kate- pushte t poli k (kryesisht thithjen e votave). gorinë e aktorëve poli kë bien par të poli ke si ato të “më të dukshmet”, së bashku me aktorët Analiza jonë ka treguar se marrëdhëniet ndërkombëtarë, pushte dhe roli i të cilëve ka ndërmjet arenave poli ke dhe ekonomike ishin rënë me kohë. Grupi i tretë i rëndësishëm i ak- reciprokisht të ndërvarura dhe të përcaktuara si torëve poli kë janë ins tucionet “paralele” të rrugë jo vetëm për ta akumuluar, por edhe për ta drejtuara nga Republika e Serbisë, të cilat vazh- ruajtur kapitalin. Vërtet, “klientelizmi doli të jetë dojnë të ekzistojnë në Kosovë* pas përfundimit një shqetësim i madh për qasjen e qytetarëve në të konfl ik t të armatosur. Aktorët ekonomikë janë ins tucione, shërbime, punësim, e madje edhe shënuar si të rëndësishëm, sidomos ata që “abu- qasjen në vendimmarrje dhe ndikim demokra- zojnë” me burimet publike dhe krijojnë rrjete k” (Jackson, 2014, f. 2). Lojtarët kryesorë të joformale mbi baza klanore me par të dhe indi- kë j sistemi poli k kapitalist ishin elita poli ke, vidët e jetës poli ke. Për vendosjen dhe mirëm- autorite i të cilave rridhte nga periudha social- bajtjen e këtyre rrjeteve, kërkohen ndërmjetësit, iste e tranzicionit, si dhe rezistenca paqësore dhe të përshkruar këtu si aktorë bashkues. Së fundi, ajo e armatosura në veçan . Këta që i përkasin të fundit në listën e aktorëve relevantë poli kë kësaj të fundit ishin goxha të fuqishëm, duke gë- të përmendur ishin edhe organizatat dhe klubet zuar pushtet pothuajse ekskluziv në vitet e para joqeveritare, që mbajnë mundësitë për bërjen e të periudhës pas konfl ik t të armatosur. Më tej, poli kave dhe për marrjen e fondeve. elitat e lla (të pashpjegueshme dhe të paveri- fi kueshme) duke pasur qasje në të mirat publike, Lidhur me burimet e shkëmbyera ndërmjet shpejt i pollën edhe elitat e reja ekonomike. Tra- palëve të interesuara, këto janë përmendur si j met e veçanta, favorizimet dhe mbrojtjet nga një nga aspektet më të zakonshme të patron- ndjekjet ligjore (si dhe shtyrjet e tyre) ishin disa azhit poli k. Shkëmbimi i llë mund të ndodhë nga mënyrat kryesore me të cilat elitat ekonomike mes aktorëve të ndryshëm, siç janë qytetarët (që shpejt akumuluan kapital të bollshëm. kanë pushte n e votës, prandaj “mbajnë” votat) dhe poli kanët/par të poli ke (që kanë pushtet Përkundër transformimit në shoqëri plu- poli k, prandaj “mbajnë” vende të punës në in- raliste, ku konkurrenca tejet e fortë ndërmjet s tucionet publike). Përveç kësaj, ka edhe shumë par ve po evoluon, kontrolli mbi burimet publike aktorë të tjerë me burime të caktuara (të lla si perceptohet sikur është bërë më fort nëpërmjet fondet dhe donacionet), që u japin atyre shansin rrjeteve klienteliste, kryesisht të themeluara mbi për të marrë pjesë në shkëmbim joformal të interesa ekonomikë. Gjatë gjithë kësaj kohe, një

141 Informal Power Networks, Poli cal Patronage and Clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo* grup rela visht i vogël i njerëzve, duke gjeneru- shumicën e qytetarëve të Kosovës*, paraqet një ar shumë paa ësi që ende vazhdon ta pengojë skenar larg a j ku njerëzit mund të përdorin po- cilësinë e jetës, kontrollon pushte n dhe bur- tencialin e tyre sa më shumë që të jetë e mund- imet. Nga ana tjetër, jetesa në kushte të vësh- shme. ra me mundësi të kuﬁ zuara, që është ras me

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Edited by Slobodan Cvejić

INFORMAL POWER NETWORKS, POLITICAL PATRONAGE AND CLIENTELISM IN SERBIA AND KOSOVO

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