Corporate Power, the Mining Industry, and Public Policy in Ontario
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MINING ONTARIO: CORPORATE POWER, THE MINING INDUSTRY, AND PUBLIC POLICY IN ONTARIO MATTHEW CORBEIL A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY GRADUATE PROGRAM IN POLITICS, YORK UNIVERSITY TORONTO, ONTARIO JUNE 2020 © MATTHEW CORBEIL, 2020 Abstract This dissertation critically examines the history of the government of Ontario’s policies towards the mining industry to analyze the impact of concentrated economic power on political processes in liberal democracies. It is the first comprehensive study of the political power of one of the province’s largest and most influential industries. Drawing on critical theories of business power, this dissertation examines policy developments across four contentious issue areas, namely fiscal policy, air pollution control, occupational health and safety, and access to mineral lands. Employing a qualitative historical narrative, the study draws on data collected from the Public Archives of Ontario, newspapers, published reports and secondary academic literature. Challenging those theoretical perspectives that downplay the direct influence of large business enterprises over public policy, this dissertation argues that the mining industry has exercised a predominant influence over the government of Ontario’s public policies. While the industry disposes of several political resources that privilege it in relation to its opponents, two in particular deserve special attention: First, mining’s commanding economic presence in the provincial North where alternative investment opportunities are generally absent, and second, the industry’s deep-seated linkages with the provincial mining ministry in terms of personnel and ideology. In sum, the mining industry’s structural power over the Northern economy together with its close working relations with the provincial ministry of mines have rendered provincial policymakers particularly vulnerable to the industry’s lobbying, allowing the industry to play a predominant, though not monolithic, role in shaping provincial public policy. ii Acknowledgements I owe many thanks to many people for helping me see this project through to completion. First, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to the members of my supervisory committee, Stephanie Ross, Dennis Pilon, and Mark Winfield. Stephanie dedicated an incredible amount of time and effort to my work, reading and commenting on many hundreds of pages of early and ugly drafts. I am grateful not only for her keen editorial insight, but just as much for her kindness and collegiality. I would not have been able to finish this project were it not for Stephanie's unwavering support and her profound belief in my skills as a researcher and writer. Dennis's perceptive comments drew my attention to several insights that I had missed in my own writing, and his constructive advice helped me to develop a better understanding of what my project was really about. Mark came on board relatively late in the game, but it meant a great deal to me to have my work taken so seriously by the leading expert on Ontario's environmental policies. I benefited very much from his advice, and his insightful questions forced me to think more deeply about the mining industry's lasting structural power. I am also grateful to my examining committee, Stephen McBride, Anna Zalik, and Rodney Loeppky. Many thanks to the staff in the Department of Politics – especially Margo Barreto, Jlenya Sara- De Meo, Marlene Quesenberry, and Carolyn Cross – without whom I am sure I would remain lost somewhere in the Byzantine bureaucracy that is FGS. Thanks also to the staff at the Archives of Ontario, especially Allison Hazlett, Deborah Holder, Garin Kirwan, Erin McGouran, and Lindsey Winstone. Many friends helped me along the way, each in their own way. Thank you especially to the old Dovercourt crew: Kitty Gosen, Brendan Jowett, Ellen Tang, Caroline Howes, and the many, many wanderers who made our little hippie house such a vibrant community. Thank you also to my friends and colleagues in academe, especially Greg Albo, Bryan Evans, Sam Gindin, Paul Gray, Jordan House, Umair Muhammad, Sadia Muhammad, Rawan Abdelbaki, Lacey Croft, Adam King, and Mark Thomas. And to my friends holding the mining industry accountable, especially Joan Kuyek, Jamie Kneen, Judith Marshall, and Janice Martell. I want to thank my family: My parents-in-law: Kathy and Richard Cox; my sisters, brothers-in- law, niece, and nephews: Alysha, Jon, Madeleine, Stellan, Aiden, Jessica, Albert, Atticus, and Baby-on-the-Way; and my grandfather: Poppa Joe. A very big thank you to my parents – Mike and Loretta – who've given me so much material and emotional support over the years. I owe you guys – a lot. Last – but certainly not least – I am deeply grateful to my wife, Caitlin. Thank you for your love and friendship, for your companionship on journeys near and far, and – very sincerely – for your patience. I can't wait to start our new adventure together in our little cottage on Geneva Street. iii Table of Contents Abstract ii Acknowledgements iii Table of Contents iv List of Acronyms vii Chapter 1: Introduction and Theory 1 Introduction 1 Theorizing Business Power in Liberal Democracy 8 Open-Ended Competition: The Pluralist Approach 10 Policymaking in a Market Prison: Structural Marxism, Neo-pluralism and Structural Dependency 22 Neo-Institutionalism and State Autonomy Theory: “Bringing The State Back In” 30 Class-Based Power Structure Research 34 Chapter 2: The Structure of the Ontario Mining Industry 47 Introduction 47 Nickel 48 Uranium 62 Gold 68 Iron Ore 75 Capturing the Ministry of Mines: Industry-Government Linkages 78 Conclusions 96 Chapter 3: The Mining Fiscal Regime 98 Introduction 98 The Structure of Mining Taxation in Ontario 100 Industry Dominance (1943-1965) 105 Tax Reform: The Carter and Smith Reports (1967-1972) 117 The Royal Commission on Taxation (The Carter Report) 118 The Ontario Committee on Taxation (The Smith Report) 128 The “Manufacturing Condition” Revisited (1973-1979) 142 Reimbursing Foreign Processing Costs and Fighting over “Social Assets” 155 The Return to Normalcy (1985-2015) 163 The Liberal Government (1985-1990) 165 The NDP: A Fair Tax Plan for Ontario? (1990-1995) 168 The Progressive Conservatives: “Common Sense Revolution” (1996-2002) 170 iv Conclusions 172 Chapter 4: Air Pollution 175 Introduction 175 Early Legislative Hegemony (1880s-1968) 178 Amending the Damage by Fumes Arbitration Act 186 The Select Committee on Air Pollution and Smoke Control 189 Protest after the Select Committee 197 The Rise of the Environmental Movement and the First Control Orders (1968-1978) 201 Ending Inco’s “Acid Reign” (1978-1985) 213 “Countdown Acid Rain” (1985-1994) 229 Conclusions 232 Chapter 5: Occupational Health and Safety 236 Introduction 236 Industry Dominance and Self-Regulation (1938-1965) 238 Revising the Mining Act, 1938-39 240 Corporate Safety on the Job 245 The Special Committee on Mining Practices at Elliot Lake 248 Occupational Health 259 The Rise of the OHS Movement and the Making of the Occupational Health and Safety Act (1965-1978) 266 The Rise of the OHS Movement 267 The Royal Commission on Health and Safety of Workers in Mines: Hearings, Final Report and Bill 139 272 Bill 70: The Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1978 280 Regulating Toxic Substances 288 Consolidating the Internal Responsibility System (1979-) 296 Conclusions 304 Chapter 6: The Mining Act 306 Introduction 306 A Political Economy of Mineral Exploration 308 Mineral Development and the Environment: An Overview 311 The Mining Act and the Free Entry System 315 Revisions to the Mining Act (1906-1989) 320 Greening the Mining Act? (1989-1995) 324 The Savings and Restructuring Act (1996-2000) 338 “Modernizing” the Mining Act (2002-2015) 344 v Aboriginal and Treaty Rights: The Duty to Consult and Accommodate 345 Free Entry under Fire 349 Public Consultations 353 The Amendments 359 Conclusions 364 Chapter 7: Conclusions 369 Introduction 369 Implications for Competing Theories of Business Power 374 Avenues for Future Research 386 Proposals to Improve Public Policy 387 Bibliography 393 vi List of Acronyms ACGIH – American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists AMD – Acid Mine Drainage AMMNO – Association of Mining Municipalities of Northern Ontario CGBA – Central Bank Gold Agreement CCAMU – Community Coalition Against Mining Uranium CCAR – Canadian Coalition on Acid Rain CCF – Cooperative Commonwealth Federation CIMM – Canadian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy FPIC – Free, prior and informed consent FUME – Fight Unwanted Mining and Exploration GDP – Gross Domestic Product GSA – General Services Administration JHSC – Joint Health and Safety Committee ICRP – International Commission on Radiological Protection IRS – Internal Responsibility System KI - Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug MAPAO – Mines Accident Prevention Association of Ontario MEB – Mines Engineering Branch MNDM – Ministry of Northern Development and Mines MNR – Ministry of Natural Resources MPP – Member of Provincial Parliament NDP – New Democratic Party vii OHS – Occupational health and safety OHSA – Occupational Health and Safety Act OMA – Ontario Mining Association OMEF – Ontario Mineral Exploration Federation PDAC – Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada QE – Quantitative easing TEIGA – Treasury, Economics and Intergovernmental Affairs TLV – Threshold Limit Value TWA – Time-Weighted Average USAEC – United States Atomic