Professor Edelgard Mahant holds a PHD in International Relations with specialization in international relations and comparative politics from the London School of Economics and Political Science. Her interest in international relations stems from the fact that she was born into the European maelstrom during World War II. Her books include Number 19 Birthmarks of Europe, a study of the origins of the European Union (2004) and Invisible and Inaudible in Washington (co-authored with SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY: Graeme Mount in 1999) which is a study of American policies towards NATIONAL INTEREST VERSUS Canada. Her current research interests include a general book on foreign policy, a project she has dreamt of for years. NATIONAL IDENTITY

Professor Edelgard Mahant has taught at the following institutions: Laurentian University in Northern Ontario (1969-1990), where she progressed through the INAUGURAL LECTURE ranks to become Full Professor; York University in Toronto, Canada (1990-2007); Baptist University in Hong Kong; and the Institut d’Etudes Politiques in Rennes, France which has an exchange agreement with the University of Botswana. She has been with the University of Botswana since BY 2008. Edelgard Mahant

21 March 2012

Centre for Continuing Education Centre for Continuing Education, University of Botswana ISBN: 978 99912 485 8 5

SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY: NATIONAL INTEREST VERSUS NATIONAL IDENTITY

INAUGURAL LECTURE

BY EDELGARD MAHANT WITH SARA COSTA

University of Botswana

21st March 2012

Mahant, Edelgard with Costa, Sara. South Africa’s Foreign Policy: National Interest Versus National Identity, 21st March 2012, Gaborone, Centre for Continuing Education

Keywords: South Africa/foreign policy/democratic/constructivism/Mandela/Mbeki/African

Production Team:

M. E. Masendu Editor T. Motswetla Desktop Publisher N. Matome-Harun Graphic Designer

Copyright © Centre for Continuing Education, University of Botswana

ISBN: 978 99912 485 8 5

ii Preface to the Professorial Inaugural Lecture Series

Professorial inaugural lectures are part of our engagement strategy and outreach service as they afford the University through its professors an opportunity to share the knowledge and experience cultivated over time with the general public. They also serve as an inspiration to our younger colleagues who are still working their way up the academic ladder.

It is my conviction that the inaugural lectures series will continue to cater for our multiple needs and purposes as an institution and a nation. They act as a resource for students, lecturers and other practitioners. They also provide critical information for planning the institutional operations and the shape and scope that the academic discourse must take across the institution.

The University of Botswana is proud that its Centre for Continuing Education (CCE) has taken over the initiative started in 1985 by the then National Institute for Research and continues to organise the lectures with untiring zeal. The purpose of this general introduction, therefore, is to attempt to invigorate this vibrant initiative and help to spur it to greater heights in an academic setting that is changing in line with the changing demands of the present day Botswana society which is making various demands on the University of Botswana. The professorial inaugural lecture series is therefore a unique response to the cry of our society whose members desire to be effective stakeholders and partners with the University of Botswana going forward.

Professor Isaac Ncube Mazonde Director, Office of Research and Development

iii Abstract

When Nelson Mandela became President of South Africa, he announced that human rights would become the light which would guide South Africa’s foreign policy but, when he tried to implement such a policy, the newly democratic country found itself isolated among African states. When Mandela sought to impose sanctions on Nigeria after the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and nine other opposition leaders, no other African government would support him.

Thabo Mbeki, who replaced Mandela in 1999, proudly proclaimed, “I am an African”. He sought to work with other African governments, no matter how unsavoury their democratic credentials. His government tried to mediate the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo and maintained good relations with Zimbabwe as that country slid into chaos. Most recently, the South African government has helped to prevent Sudan’s President Omar El-Bashir from being brought before the International Criminal Court.

What caused such a rapid change in the foreign policy of a newly democratic country? Using the theoretical framework of constructivism, I argue that it was the desire of the Mbeki regime to make South Africa a leader among African states rather than the pursuit of strategic or economic interests that led to the change in policy. This is a good example of identity politics and the search for prestige!

Key words South Africa/foreign policy/democratic/constructivism/Mandela/Mbeki/African

iv

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTIONThis paper explores the inconsistencies that have characterized South African foreign policy since the end of apartheid in 1994 and tries to Thisexplain paper these explores inconsistencies the inconsistencies in terms that of have some characterized of the theories South of Africaninternational foreign relations. policy since the end of apartheid in 1994 and tries to explain these inconsistencies in terms of some of the theories of internationalSouth Africa’s relations. constitution is one of the world’s most progressive in terms of human rights. Yet the country continues to perplex the SouthWestern Afr worldica’s constitution and its democratic is one of neighbour the world’s Botswana most progressive by a foreign in termspolicy that of human all but ignores rights. human Yet the rights country and continuessupports members to perplex of the internationalWestern world community and its democratic whose human neighbour rights record Botswana is, at bya minimum, a foreign questionable.policy that all but On ignores the occasion human ofrights the and Archbishop supports Desmondmembers Tutu’sof the international80th birthday community celebrations, whose South human Africa rights delayed record the processingis, at a minimum, of the questionable.Dalai Lama’s visa, On theultimately occasion forcing of the the Archbishopexiled spiritual Desmond leader Tutu’sof the 80thTibetan birthday people celebrations, to cancel his South trip to Africa attend delayed the ceremony the processing (BBC, 2011).of the DalaiAt the Lama’sCommonwealth visa, ultimately Heads forcingof Government the exiled Meeting spiritual (2011) leader in Perth,of the TibetanAustralia, people South to cancel Africa his opposed trip to attend the publication the ceremony of (BBC, the Eminent 2011). AtPersons’ the Commonwealth Group Report, Head whichs of would Government have made Meeting the (2011)Commonwealth in Perth, Australia,more effective South at Africa preventing opposed human the publicationrights abuses of the amongst Eminent its Persons’members. Group Moreover, Report, as awhich member would of thehave UN made Security the CouncilCommonwealth (UNSC) morefrom 2007 effective-2008, at South preventing Africa voted human against rights imposing abuses sanctions amongst on its members.both Myanmar’s Moreover, military as a juntamember after of itthes violentUN Security response Council to peaceful(UNSC) fromdemonstrations, 2007-2008, and South on Africa Iran, which voted has against repeatedly imposing violated sanctions nuclear on bothsafeguards Myanmar’s (Gruzd military 2009). junta South after Africa its violent also blocked response a tosubstantive peaceful demonstrations,debate on Zimbabwe, and on and Iran, is leading which hasefforts repeatedly to have the violated International nuclear safeguardsCriminal Court (Gruzd suspend 2009). the South prosecution Africa also of blocked Omar Al a -Bashir, substantive the debatepresident on ofZimbabwe, Sudan. Itand maintains is leading close efforts ties to with have a numberthe International of states Criminalwhose human Court rights suspend record the is questionable prosecution and of Omar where Aldemocracy-Bashir, the is president of Sudan. It maintains close ties with a number of states 1 whose human rights record is questionable and where democracy is

1 remarkable for its absence: Cuba, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and remarkable for its absence: Cuba, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Morocco. How can we explain this apparently blatant disregard for the Morocco. How can we explain this apparently blatant disregard for the basic principles which supposedly guide the country’s foreign policy? basic principles which supposedly guide the country’s foreign policy?

South Africa has come a long way in a short time. After the abolition of South Africa has come a long way in a short time. After the abolition of apartheid, which constituted one of the most egregious apartheid, which constituted one of the most egregious institutionalized system of human rights abuse since the Holocaust, institutionalized system of human rights abuse since the Holocaust, Nelson Mandela, proclaimed that “human rights will be the light that Nelson Mandela, proclaimed that “human rights will be the light that guides [South African] foreign policy” (Mandela, 1993). His guides [South African] foreign policy” (Mandela, 1993). His successors, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, have adopted an successors, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, have adopted an ambitious foreign policy agenda with a decidedly pan-Africanist ambitious foreign policy agenda with a decidedly pan-Africanist approach, and they sometimes seem to have all but forgotten approach, and they sometimes seem to have all but forgotten Mandela’s idealism and initial commitment to human rights, in favour Mandela’s idealism and initial commitment to human rights, in favour of an apparently more realist approach with an emphasis on the of an apparently more realist approach with an emphasis on the promotion of economic interests and a rhetoric of anti-western promotion of economic interests and a rhetoric of anti-western imperialism. imperialism.

Some authors have described South Africa’s foreign policy as Some authors have described South Africa’s foreign policy as incoherent and ambiguous (Bischoff 2003) while others have incoherent and ambiguous (Bischoff 2003) while others have characterized it as an “eclectic synthesis of neo-realist and neo-liberal characterized it as an “eclectic synthesis of neo-realist and neo-liberal principles” (Williams, 2000) or have written of “an identity crisis in its principles” (Williams, 2000) or have written of “an identity crisis in its external role” (Ventner 2001). So what are the motivating factors that external role” (Ventner 2001). So what are the motivating factors that inform South African foreign policy? Are these inconsistencies a inform South African foreign policy? Are these inconsistencies a reflection of an ambiguous conception of national interest, of a search reflection of an ambiguous conception of national interest, of a search for a new African national identity, or do they reflect the adoption of a for a new African national identity, or do they reflect the adoption of a realist, pragmatic, less liberal approach to foreign affairs, as the realist, pragmatic, less liberal approach to foreign affairs, as the memory of apartheid fades? This paper attempts to answer to these memory of apartheid fades? This paper attempts to answer to these questions by identifying the theoretical underpinnings of South Africa’s questions by identifying the theoretical underpinnings of South Africa’s post-Mandela foreign policy. To that end, we examine South African post-Mandela foreign policy. To that end, we examine South African policy towards Zimbabwe, South African decisions and actions during policy towards Zimbabwe, South African decisions and actions during 2 2

its first term on the United Nations Security Council and South African policy on Sudan. its first term on the United Nations Security Council and South African Foreignpolicy on Policy Sudan. in the Post-Apartheid Era

WithForeign the Policyend of inapartheid the Post and-Apartheid the coming Era of democracy, South Africa put an end to its status as the pariah of the world and re-entered the internationalWith the end systemof apartheid as an and emblematic the coming su ccessfulof democracy, case of South democratic Africa transition.put an end Itsto its new status-found as status the pariah as the of the “darling world ofand the re - internationalentered the community”international (Molotosystem 2010)as an conferredemblematic significant successful political case legitimacyof democratic and diplomatictransition. clout, Its new advantages-found status which as could the “darlinghave helped of the the international country to pursuecommunity” an ambitiou(Moloto 2010)s foreign conferred policy significant agenda. political Indeed, legitimacy South Africa and experienceddiplomatic clout, a metamorphosis, advantages which from could an have isolated, helped militaristic the country pariah to statepursue to a an champion ambitiou ofs multilateralism foreign policy and agenda. global Indeed,engagement. South Africa experienced a metamorphosis, from an isolated, militaristic pariah stateSouth to Africa a champion had the of opportunity multilateralism to redefine and global its engagement.foreign policy, all the while defining itself as a nation. Like its constitution, South African foreignSouth Africa policy hadseemed the opportunity at first to be to based redefine on itshigh foreign moral policy,values alland the a sensewhile definingof identity itself that as stemmed a nation. both Like from its its constitution, historical legacy South and African the visionforeign ofpolicy its charismatic seemed at first leader, to be Nelson based Mandela. on high moral In fact, values the and same a foreignsense of policy identity principles that stemmed first established both from byits historical the ANC legacy in its “Foreignand the Policyvision of Perspective its charismatic in a Democratic leader, Nelson South Mandela. Africa” In in fact, 1996 the continue same today,foreign more policy than principles a decade first later,established virtually by unchanged the ANC in as its the “Foreign latest StrategicPolicy Perspective Plan 2009 - in2012 a Democraticissued by the South Department Africa” inof Foreign 1996 continue Affairs (sincetoday, more renamed than a Department decade later, of virtually International unchanged Relations as the latest and CooperationStrategic Plan or2009 DIRCO)-2012 issued demonstrates. by the Department These of two Foreign documents Affairs advocate(since renamed commitment Department to the promotion of International of human Relations rights and democracy,Cooperation to orjustice DIRCO) and international demonstrates. law, to These international two documentspeace and toadvocate internationally commitment agreed to upon the mechanisms promotion of for human the resolution rights and of democracy, to justice and international law, to international peace and 3 to internationally agreed upon mechanisms for the resolution of

3 conflicts, a commitment to Africa in world affairs and economic conflicts, a commitment to Africa in world affairs and economic development through regional and international cooperation. development through regional and international cooperation.

Mandela’s leadership was characterized by his idealism, his life Mandela’s leadership was characterized by his idealism, his life experience in prison and his central role in the national liberation experience in prison and his central role in the national liberation movement. A truly charismatic leader, Mandela set out to implement movement. A truly charismatic leader, Mandela set out to implement an ambitious foreign policy based on the beliefs that: a) issues of an ambitious foreign policy based on the beliefs that: a) issues of human rights are central to international relations (...) b) just and human rights are central to international relations (...) b) just and lasting solutions to the problems of humankind can only come through lasting solutions to the problems of humankind can only come through the promotion of democracy worldwide; c) (...) justice and respect for the promotion of democracy worldwide; c) (...) justice and respect for international law should guide the relations between nations; d) peace international law should guide the relations between nations; d) peace is the goal for which all nations should strive and where this breaks is the goal for which all nations should strive and where this breaks down, internationally agreed and nonviolent mechanisms, including down, internationally agreed and nonviolent mechanisms, including effective arms control regimes, must be employed; e) the concerns effective arms control regimes, must be employed; e) the concerns and interests of the continent of Africa should be reflected in [its] and interests of the continent of Africa should be reflected in [its] foreign policy; f) economic development depends on growing regional foreign policy; f) economic development depends on growing regional and international economic cooperation in an interdependent world and international economic cooperation in an interdependent world (Mandela 1993). (Mandela 1993).

In the 1990s South Africa took a number of initiatives that reflected its In the 1990s South Africa took a number of initiatives that reflected its commitment to an ethical foreign policy and greatly contributed to its commitment to an ethical foreign policy and greatly contributed to its international reputation. South Africa destroyed its nuclear arsenal, international reputation. South Africa destroyed its nuclear arsenal, becoming the first denuclearized state and initiated an international becoming the first denuclearized state and initiated an international campaign to promote non-proliferation and disarmament. It played a campaign to promote non-proliferation and disarmament. It played a prominent role in the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and prominent role in the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and became a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the became a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime. The following year, South Africa Missile Technology Control Regime. The following year, South Africa signed the Pelindaba Treaty on a nuclear free weapons zone in Africa. signed the Pelindaba Treaty on a nuclear free weapons zone in Africa. It also took part in the Ottawa Process (1997) against land mines and It also took part in the Ottawa Process (1997) against land mines and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) (Brysk, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) (Brysk, 4 4

2009: 173). In 2000 South Africa played a leading role in the fight against the illegal trade in diamonds in the context of the Kimberly Process2009: 173). (Flemes, In 2000 2009). South All Africaof these played initiatives a leading reinforced role inthe the ethical fight natureagainst of the South illegal African trade in foreign diamonds policy in as the well context as the of the vision Kimberly of its leader.Process (Flemes, 2009). All of these initiatives reinforced the ethical nature of South African foreign policy as well as the vision of its Inleader. 1996, following the Abacha regime’s execution of opposition leader, Ken Saro Wiwa, Mandela denounced Nigeria’s blatant disregard of Indemocratic 1996, following principles the Abachaand human regime’s rights execution and called of oppositionfor the imposition leader, Kenof sanctions Saro Wiwa, and Mandelathe expulsion denounced of Nigeria Nigeria’s from the blatant Commonwealth. disregard of Whiledemocratic Mandela’s principles stand and for humanhuman rightsrights andwas calledwidely forapplauded the imposition in the ofNorth sanctions and the and West, the other expulsion leaders of refrained Nigeria fromfrom such the Commonwealth. an approach in Whileorder toMandela’s preserve stand their for national human interests. rights was As widely Adelmann applauded (2004:264) in the explains,North and the West, other leaders refrained from such an approach in order to preserve their national interests. As Adelmann (2004:264) explains,while Britain, France, the USA, Germany and others verbally applauded his actions, not one of these countries followedwhile Britain, South France,Africa’s example. the USA, British Germany oil multinationals and others continuedverbally applauded business hisas usual;actions, the not USA one kept of these up a counvigoroustries dialoguefollowed South with AbachaAfrica’s whileexample. US British corporations oil multinationals expanded businesscontinued contacts;business Franceas usual; sought the USA to exploitkept up thea vigorous tension betweendialogue London with Abacha and Abudja while to US its corporationsown advantage. expanded South Africabusiness held contacts; the moral France high ground, sought but to in exploit isolation. the tension between London and Abudja to its own advantage. South The failureAfrica of held his policythe moral on Nigeriahigh ground, was the but biggest in isolation. challenge to South African foreign policy under Mandela, and one that would have a profoundThe failure effect of his for policy future on foreignNigeria powaslicy the decisions. biggest challenge South Africa to South was heavilyAfrican foreigncriticized policy in Africa, under accused Mandela, of and betrayal one thatfor turning would againsthave a anotherprofound African effect for country future and foreign of being policy the decisions. lackey of South the West.Africa wasThe heavily criticized in Africa, accused of betrayal for turning against 5 another African country and of being the lackey of the West. The

5 Nigerian incident was a harsh wakeup call as to the pitfalls of an Nigerian incident was a harsh wakeup call as to the pitfalls of an ethical foreign policy in an international order often still ruled by ethical foreign policy in an international order often still ruled by Realpolitik. It contributed to the realization that a foreign policy based Realpolitik. It contributed to the realization that a foreign policy based on idealism and ethics can be hard to sustain. on idealism and ethics can be hard to sustain.

When Thabo Mbeki replaced Mandela as President in 1999, he When Thabo Mbeki replaced Mandela as President in 1999, he wanted to show that he was truly African, not an advocate of Northern wanted to show that he was truly African, not an advocate of Northern and Western values (Landsberg, 2000). While in exile, Mbeki adopted and Western values (Landsberg, 2000). While in exile, Mbeki adopted Black Consciousness as his “foundation ideology”; in his own words, Black Consciousness as his “foundation ideology”; in his own words, “the beginning of our rebirth as a continent must be our own “the beginning of our rebirth as a continent must be our own rediscovery of our soul….” (Gevisser, 2009: 221) In 1996, Mbeki in a rediscovery of our soul….” (Gevisser, 2009: 221) In 1996, Mbeki in a speech to South Africa’s constituent assembly repeated the refrain, “I speech to South Africa’s constituent assembly repeated the refrain, “I am an African,” many times. Mbeki’s declaration of his Africaness am an African,” many times. Mbeki’s declaration of his Africaness included “the dignity of the individual”, a “law-governed society”, included “the dignity of the individual”, a “law-governed society”, government by the people and the resolution of conflicts by peaceful government by the people and the resolution of conflicts by peaceful means (www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/zuma20.18786.html, means (www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/zuma20.18786.html, Accessed 8/11/2010; Vale, 2010). Whereas the apartheid government Accessed 8/11/2010; Vale, 2010). Whereas the apartheid government had seen South Africa as a kind of European outpost, Mbeki set out had seen South Africa as a kind of European outpost, Mbeki set out to show that his country was “in Africa, with Africa and a part of to show that his country was “in Africa, with Africa and a part of Africa”, to improve Africa’s image in the rest of the world) and South Africa”, to improve Africa’s image in the rest of the world) and South Africa’s image in Africa (Landsberg, 2010). Africa’s image in Africa (Landsberg, 2010).

Mbeki took a personal interest in foreign policy, even before he Mbeki took a personal interest in foreign policy, even before he became President, and when he did concentrated “foreign policy in became President, and when he did concentrated “foreign policy in the presidency” (Qobo, 2010; Vale, 2010). He adopted an aggressive the presidency” (Qobo, 2010; Vale, 2010). He adopted an aggressive policy of putting Africa first. At the regional level, the South African policy of putting Africa first. At the regional level, the South African government continued to mobilize political, financial and military government continued to mobilize political, financial and military resources to stabilize the African continent, generally pushing for resources to stabilize the African continent, generally pushing for negotiated solutions and inclusive governments, consistent with its negotiated solutions and inclusive governments, consistent with its own democratic transition. Since the end of apartheid, South Africa own democratic transition. Since the end of apartheid, South Africa 6 6

has participated in numerous peacekeeping missions and assumed important mediator and facilitator roles in places such as Burundi, hasAngola, participated the Democratic in numerous Republic peacekeeping of Congo (DRC), missions the Comoros, and assumed Ivory importantCoast, Sudan mediator Liberia, and Les facilitatorotho and roles Zimbabwe in places (Landsberg, such as Burundi, 2010; Angola,Gevisser, the 2007, Democratic p.682; Habib Republic and ofSe Congolinyane, (DRC), 2006, the148). Comoros, Ivory Coast, Sudan Liberia, Lesotho and Zimbabwe (Landsberg, 2010; Gevisser,Mbeki assumed 2007, p.682;an important Habib andleadership Selinyane, role 2006, in the 148). reconstruction of Africa’s institutional architecture, becoming the main defender of the Mbekiideal ofassumed an African an important Renaissance, leadership and role the in architect the reconstruction of the New of Africa’sEconomic institutional Partnership architecture, for African becomingDevelopment the (NEPAD)main defender and its of Peer the idealReview of Program. an African NEPAD’s Renaissance, main tenet and isthe that architect African of renewal the New is Economicpossible throughPartnership a commitment for African Development to institutional (NEPAD) accountability and its Peer and Reviewdemocratic Program. governance NEPAD’s coupled main with tenet a is neo that-liberal African emphasis renewal on is possibleeconomic through growth (Alden a commitment & LePere, to 2004). institutional Through accountability NEPAD South and democraticAfrica became governance an interlocutor coupled between with the a neoAfrican-liberal continent emphasis and the on economicWest, promoting growth democracy (Alden & LePere,and good 2004). governance Through within NEPAD Africa Southwhile Africasecuring became western an interlocutor support and between investment. the African South continent Africa has and been the West,instrumental promoting in democracy setting up and the good African governance Peer Review within Africa Mechanism while securing(APRM), anwestern instrument suppor fort and mutual investment. learning South and socialization Africa has which been instrumentalabout half of Africanin setting states up have the acceptedAfrican Peer (Landsberg Review and Mechanism Monyae, (APRM),2010). The an APRM, instrument like for N EPAD, mutual promotes learning and democracy socialization and which good governance,about half of Africanpeace andstates security have accepted and development. (Landsberg andSouth Monyae, Africa contributed2010). The to APRM, Africa’s like institutional NEPAD, integration promotes whendemocracy it participated and good in creatinggovernance, the African peace Union and security(AU), the andsuccessor development. of the Organization South Africa of Africancontributed Union to (OA Africa’sU). South institutional Africa was integration the first whenstate to it chair participated the AU in 2002.creating SA the hasAfrican also Union defended (AU), the a successor policy that of promotesthe Organization Regional of EconomicAfrican Union Communities (OAU). South (REC) Africa as thewas implementing the first state agentsto chair of the the AU AU. in South2002. SA Africa has is also one defended of the main a policy contributors that promotes to the Regional African RenaissanceEconomic Communities Fund, which (REC) since as 2000the implementing has formalized agents technical of the andAU. South Africa is one of the main contributors to the African 7 Renaissance Fund, which since 2000 has formalized technical and

7 financial assistance to Africa (Sidiropoulos 2008). Mbeki’s government financial assistance to Africa (Sidiropoulos 2008). Mbeki’s government also sought the revitalization of the South African Development also sought the revitalization of the South African Development Community (SADC), of which South Africa is the wealthiest and most Community (SADC), of which South Africa is the wealthiest and most developed member. developed member.

Yet Mbeki was sensitive to criticisms suggesting that South Africa was Yet Mbeki was sensitive to criticisms suggesting that South Africa was acting as a regional hegemon. Sidiropoulos (2008) adds that “South acting as a regional hegemon. Sidiropoulos (2008) adds that “South African officials stressed that they are partners in the continent, not a African officials stressed that they are partners in the continent, not a regional power or a hegemon”. This determination to express African regional power or a hegemon”. This determination to express African solidarity and be a partner to other African countries is visible in South solidarity and be a partner to other African countries is visible in South Africa’s quiet diplomacy toward Zimbabwe (on which see below). Africa’s quiet diplomacy toward Zimbabwe (on which see below).

Beyond Africa, Mbeki has sought to bring the African agenda to the Beyond Africa, Mbeki has sought to bring the African agenda to the forefront, particularly in the G20, UN, IMF, WB, and the WTO. As the forefront, particularly in the G20, UN, IMF, WB, and the WTO. As the chair of the UNSC in March 2007, South Africa pushed for a new chair of the UNSC in March 2007, South Africa pushed for a new relationship between the UN and the African Union with the goal of relationship between the UN and the African Union with the goal of better coordinating efforts of conflict resolution on the African better coordinating efforts of conflict resolution on the African continent. South Africa has also advocated the reform of global continent. South Africa has also advocated the reform of global institutions to provide better representation for the South. In the UN it institutions to provide better representation for the South. In the UN it has positioned itself as the voice of the African continent, pushing for has positioned itself as the voice of the African continent, pushing for a permanent seat in the UNSC. South Africa has used its political a permanent seat in the UNSC. South Africa has used its political clout to promote unconditional debt relief of Heavily Indebted Poor clout to promote unconditional debt relief of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). It sought to extend its leadership role vis-à-vis the Countries (HIPC). It sought to extend its leadership role vis-à-vis the developing world through an active engagement in the battle against developing world through an active engagement in the battle against poverty, underdevelopment, unfair trade and political and socio- poverty, underdevelopment, unfair trade and political and socio- economic marginalization (Flemes, 2009; Ventner, 2001). economic marginalization (Flemes, 2009; Ventner, 2001).

Mbeki’s African identity and Africa first policy led to greater South- Mbeki’s African identity and Africa first policy led to greater South- South solidarity, an emphasis on the fight against poverty, which in South solidarity, an emphasis on the fight against poverty, which in turn has seen South Africa support national liberation struggles as well turn has seen South Africa support national liberation struggles as well 8 8

as a number of so-called rogue states. It has openly professed its support for the Palestinian struggle, and maintained close ties with undemocraticas a number countries of so-called such rogue as Cuba, states. Libya It has and openly Iran. More professed recently, its supportSouth Africa for thehas Palestiniandeveloped strong struggle, ties and with maintained China; hence close the tiesdelay with in undemocraticgranting the Dalai countries Lama sucha visa, as as Cuba, mentioned Libya above.and Iran. More recently, So uth Africa has developed strong ties with China; hence the delay in grantingThese characteristics the Dalai Lama stem a visa, directly as mentioned from a conception above. of South African national identity as a result of its socio-historical legacy, as the Thesefollowing characteristics 2003 speech stem by Dr.directly Dlamini from-Zuma, a conception then Minister of South of Africanforeign affairs,national illustrates: identity as a result of its socio-historical legacy, as the following 2003 speech by Dr. Dlamini-Zuma, then Minister of foreign affairs,...our illustrates: collective experiences as South Africans have placed us in a unique position to understand the ...ourchallenges collective facing experiences humanity... Firstly, as South ours Africans is a reality have of placedtwo nations, us in one a unique developed position and towealthy, understand the other the challengesmarginalized facing and poor... humanity... Hence Firstly, we have ours committed is a reality ourof twoforeign nations, policy one to developed the eradication and wealthy, of poverty the other and marginalizedunderdevelopment and poor... and forHence the we transformation have committed of ourthe foreigncontinent policy and tothe the global eradication environment’ of poverty (quoted and in Nunderdevelopmentieuwkerk, 2004). and for the transformation of the continent and the global environment’ (quoted in So underNieuwkerk, the leadership 2004). of Mbeki there was a shift away from the emphasis on human rights and a greater focus on South-South Sosolidarity, under the the leadership promotion of Mbeki of multilateralism there was a shift and away anti - fromWestern the imperialism.emphasis on Mbeki human often rights expressed and a hisgreater opposition focus onto Western South-South and Northernsolidarity, imperialism, the promotion which has of revolved multilateralism around five and key anti themes:-Western a) imperialism.the political and Mbeki economic often expressed power imbalance his opposition between to the Western North and Northernthe South; imperialism, b) the need which to transform has revolved the UNaround and five other key international themes: a) thebodies political to address and economic global inequities; power imbalance c) opposition between to the the domineering, North and the South; b) the need to transform the UN and other international 9 bodies to address global inequities; c) opposition to the domineering,

9 hypocritical and self-serving approach of Western countries that chide hypocritical and self-serving approach of Western countries that chide and bully developing states; d) South-South cooperation and and bully developing states; d) South-South cooperation and solidarity; and finally e) multilateralism and respect for international solidarity; and finally e) multilateralism and respect for international law in the conduct of international affairs (Nathan, 2008: 5-7). In law in the conduct of international affairs (Nathan, 2008: 5-7). In 2007, Mbeki raised many of these issues at the UN General 2007, Mbeki raised many of these issues at the UN General Assembly: Assembly:

Because the nations of the world are defined by the dominant and the Because the nations of the world are defined by the dominant and the dominated, the dominant have also become the decision makers in dominated, the dominant have also become the decision makers in the important global forums, including at this seat of global the important global forums, including at this seat of global governance [i.e. the UN]. Accordingly, the skewed distribution of governance [i.e. the UN]. Accordingly, the skewed distribution of power in the world (political, economic, military, technological and power in the world (political, economic, military, technological and social) replicates itself in multilateral institutions, much to the social) replicates itself in multilateral institutions, much to the disadvantage of the majority of the poor people of the world. Indeed, disadvantage of the majority of the poor people of the world. Indeed, even as we agree on the important programmes that should bring a even as we agree on the important programmes that should bring a better life to billions of the poor, the rich and the powerful have better life to billions of the poor, the rich and the powerful have consistently sought to ensure that whatever happens, the existing consistently sought to ensure that whatever happens, the existing power relations are not altered and therefore the status quo remains power relations are not altered and therefore the status quo remains (Mbeki, 2007). (Mbeki, 2007).

In short, the Mbeki government’s foreign policy had schizophrenic In short, the Mbeki government’s foreign policy had schizophrenic aspects, democracy and accountability on one hand, African and aspects, democracy and accountability on one hand, African and Third World solidarity on the other. Third World solidarity on the other.

In terms of the dichotomy between realism and liberalism, or the more In terms of the dichotomy between realism and liberalism, or the more recent theoretical frameworks of neo-liberalism and constructivism, a recent theoretical frameworks of neo-liberalism and constructivism, a first intuitive approach would suspect that South Africa’s revolutionary first intuitive approach would suspect that South Africa’s revolutionary idealism has given way to realism and the pursuit of material national idealism has given way to realism and the pursuit of material national interests. Inconsistencies in South African foreign policy would thus interests. Inconsistencies in South African foreign policy would thus reflect pervasive tensions between self-interest and universal reflect pervasive tensions between self-interest and universal 10 10

idealism, African solidarity and partnership with a liberal and democratic North and competing perceptions of national identity and nationalidealism, interest. African A solidaritysecond look, and however, partnership reveals with a different, a liberal though and notdemocratic necessarily North mutually and competing exclusive perceptions image, one of national of a country identity whose and nationalleaders haveinterest. consciously A second pursued look, however, an African reveals identity a different,in an Africa though now nothappily necessarily free from mutually apartheid, exclusive yet still image,haunted one by many of a countryother forms whose of leadersviolence, have repression consciously and human pursued rights an Africanabuse. identity in an Africa now happily free from apartheid, yet still haunted by many other forms of violence,Mbeki repression possessed and human and acted rights on abuse. a world -view that joined realism to a politics of Third Worldism and racial redress… MbekiIf human possessed rights came and secon actedd in on Mbeki’s a world foreign-view thatpolicy joined this wasrealism probably to a politics due of as Third much Worldism to the and former racial president’s redress… ‘idealistic’If human rights notions came of racial secon andd in South Mbeki’s-South foreign solidarity policy asthis it was to probably calculations due ofas South much Africa’s to the interests….(Glaser, former president’s 2010)‘idealistic’ notions of racial and South-South solidarity as it was to calculations of South Africa’s interests….(Glaser, We now2010) take a closer look at three of the major issues that dominated South African foreign policy under Mbeki: Zimbabwe and its descent Weinto nowauthoritarianism take a closer and look economic at three ofdecline, the major the issuesdecisions that and dominated actions South AfricaAfrican took foreign during policy its firstunder term Mbeki on :the Zimbabwe United Nations and its Securitydescent intoCouncil authoritarianism (2007-2008) and and economic the policy decline, toward the Sudan,decisions which, and actions if we Southconsider Africa the took number during of its people first term affected, on the has United suffered Nations from Security human Councilrights abuses (2007 even-2008) more and severe the than policy those toward seen Sudan, in Zimbabwe. which, if we consider the number of people affected, has suffered from human Zimbabwerights abuses even more severe than those seen in Zimbabwe. Mbeki’s policy toward Zimbabwe is the most puzzling of all of Mbeki’s Zimbabweforeign policies. It is not, as Adelmann, quoting Manzini (2004:253) wouldMbeki’s have policy us towardbelieve Zimbabwe that there wereis the bondsmost puzzlingdating back of all to of apartheid Mbeki’s days.foreign While policies. in exile, It is the not, African as Adelmann, National Congressquoting Manzini (ANC) maintained(2004:253) would have us believe that there were bonds dating back to apartheid 11 days. While in exile, the African National Congress (ANC) maintained

11 close relations with Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU, and when Mugabe won close relations with Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU, and when Mugabe won the internationally supervised 1980 elections, the ANC leaders the internationally supervised 1980 elections, the ANC leaders perceived this loss as one for them as well as Nkomo (Gevisser, perceived this loss as one for them as well as Nkomo (Gevisser, 2007:431). Mbeki was given the task of establishing good relations 2007:431). Mbeki was given the task of establishing good relations with the leadership of South Africa’s newly liberated neighbour, a task with the leadership of South Africa’s newly liberated neighbour, a task in which he had only limited success; it took five years after in which he had only limited success; it took five years after Zimbabwean independence before the ANC was allowed to open an Zimbabwean independence before the ANC was allowed to open an office in Harare (Gevisser, 2009, 301; Gevisser, 2007, 437; Vale, office in Harare (Gevisser, 2009, 301; Gevisser, 2007, 437; Vale, 2010). Mbeki frequently mentioned that in 1990 Mugabe postponed 2010). Mbeki frequently mentioned that in 1990 Mugabe postponed land reform in Zimbabwe, so as not upset the beginnings of the end- land reform in Zimbabwe, so as not upset the beginnings of the end- of-apartheid negotiations in South Africa but, that is only one example of-apartheid negotiations in South Africa but, that is only one example of assistance from Mugabe and one that was also in Zimbabwe’s of assistance from Mugabe and one that was also in Zimbabwe’s interest (Gevisser, 2009:302). Mugabe’s autocratic and ruthless interest (Gevisser, 2009:302). Mugabe’s autocratic and ruthless tendencies became evident long before he started to evict white tendencies became evident long before he started to evict white farmers. In the 1980s, he had 20000 Ndebele supporters of Nkomo, farmers. In the 1980s, he had 20000 Ndebele supporters of Nkomo, slaughtered in the notorious Matabeland massacres (Gevisser, slaughtered in the notorious Matabeland massacres (Gevisser, 2009:301). 2009:301).

A renewed crisis in Zimbabwe occurred shortly after Mbeki took office. A renewed crisis in Zimbabwe occurred shortly after Mbeki took office. By 2000 the Zimbabwean economy was in a freefall as a result of By 2000 the Zimbabwean economy was in a freefall as a result of macroeconomic mismanagement and a corrupt clientelistic ruling elite macroeconomic mismanagement and a corrupt clientelistic ruling elite (Ventner 2001). Zimbabwe’s new opposition party, the Movement for (Ventner 2001). Zimbabwe’s new opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was gaining popularity and a defeat of Democratic Change (MDC) was gaining popularity and a defeat of ZANU-PF seemed imminent. Mugabe turned to illegal and ZANU-PF seemed imminent. Mugabe turned to illegal and increasingly violent means to maintain his leadership, engaging in increasingly violent means to maintain his leadership, engaging in political repression and racial politics. He announced a land reform political repression and racial politics. He announced a land reform program that would reallocate land owned by white farmers to black program that would reallocate land owned by white farmers to black peasants (Adelmann, 2004). While the western media have focused peasants (Adelmann, 2004). While the western media have focused largely on this expulsion and the consequent food shortages, largely on this expulsion and the consequent food shortages, Zimbabwe suffered from many other problems: rigged elections, Zimbabwe suffered from many other problems: rigged elections, 12 12

imprisonment and other abuse of the government’s opponents, the decline of a once outstanding infrastructure, including hospitals and schools,imprisonment a decline and in other public abuse health of and the hyperinflation government’s (Gevisser, opponents, 2009: the decline297-304). of a once outstanding infrastructure, including hospitals and schools, a decline in public health and hyperinflation (Gevisser, 2009: Mbeki’s297-304). South Africa responded to the Zimbabwean crisis by implementing what has been termed ‘Quiet Diplomacy’ or ‘ConstructiveMbeki’s South Engagement’ Africa responded (Gevisser, to the 2009, Zimbabwean pp.298 -299). crisis As by Howarthimplementing suggests, what ‘Mbeki’s has been strategy… termed toward ‘Quiet Zimbabwe Diplomacy’ may be or reconstituting‘Constructive state Engagement’ identity’ (2008: (Gevisser, 295) but 2009, it has pp.298 also-299). created As Howarth‘cognitive suggests, dissonance’. ‘Mbeki’s In May strategy… 2000, Mbeki toward embraced Zimbabwe Mugabe may at be a reconstitutingtrade show, an state action identity’ which (2008:led to a 295) rebuke but from it has Nelson also Mandela created ‘cogniti(Gervisser,ve dissonance’. 2009:272). Later In May that 2000, year, Mbeki met embraced Mugabe Mugabe at a summit at a tradenear Victoria show, anFalls, action where which he thought led to a he rebuke had persuaded from Nelson the Mandelalatter to (Gervisser,modify his policies.2009:272). Mbeki Later promisedthat year, toMbeki try andmet Mugabepersuade at the a summit UK to nearprovide Victoria more Falls, funds where for land he reformthought (Gevisser, he had persuaded 2009:303). the Inlatter 2002, to modifySouth his African policies. observers Mbeki promisedrubber-stamped to try and an persuade obviously the riggedUK to Zimbabweanprovide more election funds for (Prys, land 2009). reform When (Gevisser, Mugabe 2009:303). did not change In 2002, his policies,South African Mbeki refused observers to turnrubber or - evenstamped to threaten an obviously to turn off rigged the Zimbabweanelectricity on whichelection Zimbabwe (Prys, 2009). depends When to Mugabethis day, dida tactic not changethat South his policies,Africa’s had Mbeki successfully refused to usedturn or against even to former threaten Rhodesian to turn off Prime the electricityMinister, on Ian which Smith Zimbabwe (Gevisser, depends 2009: to 299). this day, The a tactic South that African South Africa’sgovernment had remained successfully committed used to against its strategy former of quiet Rhodesian diplomacy Prime by Miniscallingter, on Ian the Smithinternational (Gevisser, community 2009: to 299). drop the The ‘smart South sanctions’ African governmentagainst Zimbabwe. remained Some committed have also to itssuggested strategy ofthat quiet South diplomacy Africa h byas callingagreed onto remain the international silent on the community Zimbabwean to dropmatter the in ‘smartreturn for sanctions’ its vote againstin various Zimbabwe. international Some organizations have also suggested with regional that votingSouth blocs.Africa Ith as is agreedalleged tothat remain this wassilent the on case the Zimbabwean with the reformulation matter in return of the for OAU its voteinto in various international organizations with regional voting blocs. It is alleged that this was the case with the reformulation of the OAU into 13

13 the AU and later as South Africa sought votes to get a non-permanent the AU and later as South Africa sought votes to get a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council (Brysk, 2009, 178). seat in the UN Security Council (Brysk, 2009, 178).

In 2000, the Mbeki government announced an economic rescue In 2000, the Mbeki government announced an economic rescue package for Zimbabwe amounting to approximately R1 billion package for Zimbabwe amounting to approximately R1 billion (McKinley, 2004). This could have been a pre-emptive move to avert (McKinley, 2004). This could have been a pre-emptive move to avert the continuing decline of the Zimbabwean economy, in which South the continuing decline of the Zimbabwean economy, in which South Africa had a vested interest. However, upon closer examination it Africa had a vested interest. However, upon closer examination it becomes evident that the real beneficiaries of Mbeki’s rescue package becomes evident that the real beneficiaries of Mbeki’s rescue package were South African government parastatals and government- were South African government parastatals and government- controlled financial institutions (Lipton, 2009). As McKinley explains: controlled financial institutions (Lipton, 2009). As McKinley explains:

By early 2000 one of the targets, the Zimbabwean Electricity By early 2000 one of the targets, the Zimbabwean Electricity Parastatals Association (ZESA), was estimated to owe its Parastatals Association (ZESA), was estimated to owe its South African counterpart (ESKOM) in the region of R300 South African counterpart (ESKOM) in the region of R300 million. Similarly, the government-owned National Oil million. Similarly, the government-owned National Oil Company of Zimbabwe, the country’s sole oil procurement Company of Zimbabwe, the country’s sole oil procurement agency, was estimated to owe over R250 million to its agency, was estimated to owe over R250 million to its suppliers, with one of the key suppliers at that stage being suppliers, with one of the key suppliers at that stage being the South African oil/coal parastatal, SASOL. Part of the the South African oil/coal parastatal, SASOL. Part of the ‘rescue package’ also included more than twenty joint ‘rescue package’ also included more than twenty joint investment projects in Zimbabwe, in the areas of investment projects in Zimbabwe, in the areas of infrastructure, tourism and natural gas exploration involving infrastructure, tourism and natural gas exploration involving South Africa’s state-owned corporations such as the South Africa’s state-owned corporations such as the Development Bank of Southern Africa and the Industrial Development Bank of Southern Africa and the Industrial Development Corporation (McKinley, 2004: 359). Development Corporation (McKinley, 2004: 359).

Thus Mbeki’s rescue package was intimately tied to the South African Thus Mbeki’s rescue package was intimately tied to the South African domestic goal of black economic empowerment and represented an domestic goal of black economic empowerment and represented an initiative to secure the interests of the South African economic elite. initiative to secure the interests of the South African economic elite. 14 14

The package thus had two main goals; a) fostering the South African economic elite’s goals of increasing indebtedness and as a Theconsequence package thusownership had two of mainsectors goals of ;the a) fosteringZimbabwean the Southeconomy; African b) economicpreventing the elite’s rise goalsto power of of increasingthe opposition indebtedness party, which andat the as time a consequencewas relatively unknownownership and of possiblysectors ofaverse the Zimbabwean to South Africa’s economy; interests b) preventing(McKinley, 2004).the rise to power of the opposition party, which at the time was relatively unknown and possibly averse to South Africa’s interests (McKinley,In 2008, the2004). economic situation descended down another spiral. Zimbabwe’s currency became worthless, and shortage of water led to anIn 2008, outbreak the of economic cholera situation and famine descended (Gevisser, down 2009:304). another spiral. This collapseZimbabwe’s had currency economic became costs worthless, for South and Africa, short inage terms of water of reduced led to anconsumer outbreak spending of cholera on South and African famine goods (Gevisser, and services 2009:304). and a Thisloss collapsein international had economic confidence costs in the for stabilitySouth Africa, of the in region. terms of There reduced was consumeralso a security spending challenge on South stemming African from goods the large and servicesinflux of refugees.and a loss It inis estimatedinternational that confidence as early asin the 2003, stability that is of before the region. the Zimbabwean There was alsoeconomic a security crisis challenge reached itsstemming nadir, 25,000 from the to large30,000 influx refugees of refugees. crossed It isinto estimated South Africa that eve as ry early month, as and 2003, that that by is2007 before the total the Zimbabweanhad reached economic2M (Adelmann, crisis 2004;reached Prys. its 2009;nadir, Hamil25,000 and to Hoffman,30,000 refugees 2009). crossed into South Africa every month, and that by 2007 the total had reached 2MThere (Adelmann, is by now 2004; a substantial Prys. 2009; body Hamil of evidence and Hoffman, to show 2009). that Mbeki’s government was protecting Mugabe’s from international criticism and Theresanctions: is by thenow endorsementa substantial body of the of 2002evidence election, to show its that support Mbeki’s of governmentZimbabwe during was protecting the 2002 Mugabe’s Commonwealth from international meeting, the criticism less thanand sanctions:neutral role the the endorsement South Africans of the played 2002 in election, 2007 when its support a SADC of Zimbabwedelegation was during supposed the 2002 to help Commonwealth negotiate a deal meeting, with the the opposition less than neutralMDC role(Geldenhuy the Souths 2006; Africans Lipton, played in 2009; 2007 www.mg.za/print when a SADC delegationFormat/single/2010 was supposed-11-29 -toreport help-cats negotiate-doubt -aon deal-mebekis with the-neutrality…. opposition accessedMDC (Geldenhuy Dec. 1, 2010).s 2006; Lipton, 2009; www.mg.za/print Format/single/2010-11-29-report-cats-doubt-on-mebekis-neutrality…. accessed Dec. 1, 2010). 15

15 Yet South Africa’s leaders have not accepted Mugabe’s policies Yet South Africa’s leaders have not accepted Mugabe’s policies without question. In 2000, a joint Nigerian/South African mission tried without question. In 2000, a joint Nigerian/South African mission tried to persuade Mugabe to abandon the policy of seizing white owned to persuade Mugabe to abandon the policy of seizing white owned farms, in 2002 South Africa was one of three Commonwealth farms, in 2002 South Africa was one of three Commonwealth governments that tried to persuade Mugabe to moderate some of his governments that tried to persuade Mugabe to moderate some of his policies, and in October 2010, a South African delegation travelled to policies, and in October 2010, a South African delegation travelled to Harare to try and shore up a power sharing agreement with the Harare to try and shore up a power sharing agreement with the opposition (Ventner, 2001; Prys, 2009); Global Post, Oct. 1, 2010). opposition (Ventner, 2001; Prys, 2009); Global Post, Oct. 1, 2010).

Mbeki’s policy on Zimbabwe is puzzling. Did he have his ego tied to Mbeki’s policy on Zimbabwe is puzzling. Did he have his ego tied to the reconciliation with Mugabe that he had been asked to bring about, the reconciliation with Mugabe that he had been asked to bring about, as Gevisser hints (2007: 435-6 and 2009: 300)? Was it realism based as Gevisser hints (2007: 435-6 and 2009: 300)? Was it realism based on the fact that Mugabe’s majority Shona people were likely to on the fact that Mugabe’s majority Shona people were likely to continue to rule the country (Gevisser, 2009), or South Africa’s continue to rule the country (Gevisser, 2009), or South Africa’s economic self-interest and interest in stability of the region? Was it a economic self-interest and interest in stability of the region? Was it a ploy not only for Zimbabwean support at the UN and elsewhere, but ploy not only for Zimbabwean support at the UN and elsewhere, but also that of other African governments who might feel threatened by also that of other African governments who might feel threatened by an effective South African human rights policy or perhaps a sense of an effective South African human rights policy or perhaps a sense of African solidarity, tout court (Gevisser, 2009, pp.264 and 300)? We African solidarity, tout court (Gevisser, 2009, pp.264 and 300)? We shall attempt answers to some of these questions as we examine shall attempt answers to some of these questions as we examine Mbeki’s Zimbabwean policy in the context of his foreign policy overall. Mbeki’s Zimbabwean policy in the context of his foreign policy overall.

South Africa in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC): South Africa in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC): 2007-2008 2007-2008

In October of 2006, South Africa was for the first time in its history In October of 2006, South Africa was for the first time in its history elected to serve as a non-permanent member of the UN Security elected to serve as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (Nieuwkerk 2007). Here too South Africa followed a policy of Council (Nieuwkerk 2007). Here too South Africa followed a policy of Africa first, choosing to focus its presidency in March of 2007 and then Africa first, choosing to focus its presidency in March of 2007 and then again in April 2008 on the issue of strengthening the relationship again in April 2008 on the issue of strengthening the relationship 16 16

between the UN and regional organizations, in particular the AU, an initiative that highlighted the need for greater coordination of efforts in betweenpeacemaking the UNand and peacekeeping regional organizations, on African issues in particular (Nieuwkerk the AU, 2007). an initiativeWhile many that anticipatedhighlighted SAthe wouldneed forplay great a positiveer coordination role in support of efforts of ina humanpeacemaking rights and agenda, peacekeeping South Africa’s on African first tenureissues (Nieuwkerk in the UNSC 2007). has beenWhile variouslymany anticipated described SA as would controversial play a positive and disappointingrole in support for of itsa seeminghuman rights disregard agenda, for human South rights Africa’s issues first tenureand consistent in the UNSCsupport has of illiberalbeen variously states. Criticism described of South as controversial Africa’s tenure and in disappointing the UNSC is mainly for its basedseeming on disregard its position for human on four rights controversial issues and decisions: consistent South support Africa of workilliberaled states.with China Criticism and Russiaof South among Africa’s others tenure to in prevent the UNSC the isadoption mainly ofbased Western on its- sponsored position on resolutions four controversial condemning decisions: and South imposing Africa sanctionsworked with on China Myanmar’s and Russia military among junta, others Zimbabwe, to prevent Iran the and adoption Sudan. Theseof Western decisions-sponsored are discussed resolutions in more condemningdetail below. Furthermore, and imposing in Aprisanctionsl of 2007, on Myanmar’sSouth Africa, military along junta,with China, Zimbabwe, Russia, Iran Indonesia and Sudan. and Quatar,These decisions opposed area discussion discussed on in climatemore detail change below. on the Furthermore, grounds that in theApri Securityl of 2007, Council South (SC)Africa, was along not withthe appropriateChina, Russia, forum Indonesia for this kindand ofQuatar, discussion, opposed even a discussion though South on climate Africa change had previously on the grounds supported that fightingthe Security climate Council change (SC) atwas the not G8 the Summit appropriate held forum in Heiligendamm for this kind (Bischoffof discussion, 2003). even though South Africa had previously supported fighting climate change at the G8 Summit held in Heiligendamm Myanmar(Bischoff 2003). On January 12, 2007, the UK and the US introduced a draft resolution thatMyanmar called on Myanmar to release all political prisoners, begin political dialogueOn January and 12, put 2007, an the end UK toand the the humanUS introduced rights abusea draft resolution of ethnic minoritiesthat called (Bischoffon Myanmar 2003). to release South Africaall political voted prisoners, against thisbegin resolution political whichdialogue China and and put Russia an end later to vetoed. the human South rightsAfrica abusehas defended of ethnic its decisionminorities by (Bischoff arguing 2003).that a) Souththe resolution Africa voted was not against consistent this resolution with the mandatewhich China of the and SC Russia as it dealtlater withvetoed. alleged South human Africa rights has defendedabuses in its a sovereigndecision by country arguing and that therefore a) the resolution did not constitute was not aconsistent threat to regionalwith the mandate of the SC as it dealt with alleged human rights abuses in a 17 sovereign country and therefore did not constitute a threat to regional

17 or international peace and security (which ironically is the argument or international peace and security (which ironically is the argument the apartheid regime had used), b) the appropriate forum for the the apartheid regime had used), b) the appropriate forum for the discussion of the issue was the Human Rights Council and c) the text discussion of the issue was the Human Rights Council and c) the text would compromise the good offices mission of the Secretary General would compromise the good offices mission of the Secretary General to Myanmar (Nieuwkerk 2007; Ploch 2011). South Africa further to Myanmar (Nieuwkerk 2007; Ploch 2011). South Africa further reminded the SC that such issues are better handled by regional reminded the SC that such issues are better handled by regional bodies and that Myanmar’s neighbours in the Association of South bodies and that Myanmar’s neighbours in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) did not see the situation in Myanmar as East Asian Nations (ASEAN) did not see the situation in Myanmar as a threat to regional or international peace and security (DFA). The a threat to regional or international peace and security (DFA). The ASEAN is known to defend ‘constructive engagement’ as the most ASEAN is known to defend ‘constructive engagement’ as the most effective means to promote political change in Myanmar (Geldenhuys effective means to promote political change in Myanmar (Geldenhuys 2006). 2006).

South Africa’s decision would have been tenable had South Africa South Africa’s decision would have been tenable had South Africa brought up the issue in the Human Rights Council (HRC), which it did brought up the issue in the Human Rights Council (HRC), which it did not, once again, sacrificing human rights in favour of sovereignty and not, once again, sacrificing human rights in favour of sovereignty and non-western interference. In fact, the issue was not brought up in the non-western interference. In fact, the issue was not brought up in the HRC until after Myanmar’s military junta’s violent response to peaceful HRC until after Myanmar’s military junta’s violent response to peaceful protests in September 2007, when 53 countries called for a special protests in September 2007, when 53 countries called for a special session on the issue. South Africa was not among them (Human session on the issue. South Africa was not among them (Human Rights Watch 2008). Rights Watch 2008).

Iran Iran On 24 March 2007, Britain, France, Germany and the US, introduced On 24 March 2007, Britain, France, Germany and the US, introduced resolution 1747 to address Iran’s nuclear programme. The resolution resolution 1747 to address Iran’s nuclear programme. The resolution called on Iran to respect the obligations stipulated by the International called on Iran to respect the obligations stipulated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and imposes sanctions aimed at persuading Iran to Nuclear Weapons and imposes sanctions aimed at persuading Iran to comply with earlier resolutions and to constrain the further comply with earlier resolutions and to constrain the further development of its nuclear program (Nieuwkerk 2007). development of its nuclear program (Nieuwkerk 2007). 18 18

South Africa initially threatened to abstain but reluctantly voted in favour of the resolution after securing a number of amendments to the text, which included the recognition of the role of the IAEA and an emphasisSouth Africa on negotiations initially threatened (South Africa to abstain 2009). but Nonetheless, reluctantly votedEbrahim in Ebrahim,favour of theDeputy resolution Minister after of securingInternational a number Relations of amendments and Co-operation to the hastext, stated which includedthat South the Africa recognition was ultimately of the role forced of the to IAE voteA and for the an resolutionemphasis onbecause negotiations it did not (South understand Africa 2009). UN Protocol, Nonetheless, which Ebrahimdictates thatEbrahim, if a country Deputy becomesMinister ofinvolved International in the Relationsdrafting of and the Coresolution,-operation it cannothas stated then thatvote Southagainst Africa it or even was abstain. ultimately Ebrahim forced stated, to vote ‘we for voted the forresolution it in the because end, but it wedid wanted not understand to vote against UN Protocol, it. We hadwhich to dictatesexplain thisthat toif athe country Iranians’ becomes (Rossouw involved 2010). in1 the drafting of the resolution, it cannot then vote against it or even abstain. Ebrahim stated, ‘we voted for it in the end, but we wanted to vote against it. We had to explain 1 thisSouth to theAfrican Iranians’ Policies (Rossouw toward 2010). Sudan

South Africa’s foreign policy toward Sudan has been another disappointmentSouth African Policiesfor international toward observersSudan who expected South Africa to make greater efforts to address what could be considered one of Souththe world’s Africa’s worst foreign humanitarian policy crises toward in Sudan recent times. has been South another Africa- disappointment for international observers who expected South Africa to make greater efforts to address what could be considered one of 1 The South African paper the Mail & Guardian claims to have found theevidence world’s that worstthe government’s humanitarian policy crises on Iran in m recentay have times. been influenced South Africa by - the South African based multinational MTN, which in its attempts to muscle a Turkish firm out of the Iranian cell phone market promised the Iranian 1government The South that African it coul paperd persuade the Mail the & government Guardian claims of South to have Africa found to sell it evidenceweapons whichthat the UN government’s sanctions did policy not allow on Iran Iran m ayto have andbeen even influenced to get SA by theto change South Africanits vote atbased the IAEAmultinational and the MTN,UN (Naidoo, which in2012). its attempts The relevant to muscle document,a Turkish firm filed out with of athe court Iranian in the cell District phone of market Columbia promised (USA) the also Iranian claims thatgovernment MTN gave that the it coulSA dambassador persuade the to governmentIran $200 000 of toSouth facilitate Africa the to deal sell andit thatweapons in 2005 which MTN UN arranged sanctions a privatedid not offallow-the Iran-record to have meeting and betweeneven to get the SA Iranianto change ambassador its vote at tothe SA IAEA and Presidentand the UN Mbeki (Naidoo, (Iran: 2012). Turkcell The 2005). relevant document, filed with a court in the District19 of Columbia (USA) also claims that MTN gave the SA ambassador to Iran $200 000 to facilitate the deal and that in 2005 MTN arranged a private off-the-record meeting between the Iranian ambassador to SA and President Mbeki (Iran: Turkcell 2005). 19 Sudan relations date back to the apartheid regime when, in the early Sudan relations date back to the apartheid regime when, in the early 1990s, the Sudanese National Congress Party (NCP) sought to 1990s, the Sudanese National Congress Party (NCP) sought to acquire military technology to be used in a military campaign against acquire military technology to be used in a military campaign against the Sudan People’s Liberation Army or SPLA (Yoh n.d.). The SPLA the Sudan People’s Liberation Army or SPLA (Yoh n.d.). The SPLA had in turn forged a relationship with the ANC that dated back to the had in turn forged a relationship with the ANC that dated back to the 1980s, when both parties signed a memorandum of political 1980s, when both parties signed a memorandum of political understanding and coordinated political activities in exile. In 1991 the understanding and coordinated political activities in exile. In 1991 the SPLA split into two factions and relations between the two parties SPLA split into two factions and relations between the two parties were limited until the movement reunited in 2003, at which point the were limited until the movement reunited in 2003, at which point the SPLA and the ANC, now South Africa’s ruling party, signed a new SPLA and the ANC, now South Africa’s ruling party, signed a new memorandum of political understanding. memorandum of political understanding.

Under the leadership of former President Mandela, South African Under the leadership of former President Mandela, South African policy towards Sudan was characterized by solidarity with the people policy towards Sudan was characterized by solidarity with the people of Sudan and a promotion of a peaceful and inclusive solution to the of Sudan and a promotion of a peaceful and inclusive solution to the conflict. More recently under Mbeki’s leadership, policy towards Sudan conflict. More recently under Mbeki’s leadership, policy towards Sudan has been very much informed by Mbeki’s African agenda (Yoh n.d.). has been very much informed by Mbeki’s African agenda (Yoh n.d.). Accordingly, priority was given to supporting the implementation of a Accordingly, priority was given to supporting the implementation of a peace agreement between Khartoum and the SPLA and contributing peace agreement between Khartoum and the SPLA and contributing to the stabilization of the region. While Mbeki declined to become to the stabilization of the region. While Mbeki declined to become directly involved as a mediator to the conflict in 2003, South Africa has directly involved as a mediator to the conflict in 2003, South Africa has remained a champion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) remained a champion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and continues to play an important role as chair of the AU Committee and continues to play an important role as chair of the AU Committee on Post Conflict Reconstruction Process in Sudan and as a contributor on Post Conflict Reconstruction Process in Sudan and as a contributor to the AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur (Adebajo 2007). Moreover, to the AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur (Adebajo 2007). Moreover, since 2005, the (DFA) Department of Foreign Affairs (since renamed) since 2005, the (DFA) Department of Foreign Affairs (since renamed) has sponsored a joint initiative between the (DFA) and the University has sponsored a joint initiative between the (DFA) and the University of South Africa (UNISA) aimed at increasing the capacity of SPLM of South Africa (UNISA) aimed at increasing the capacity of SPLM cadres to participate equitably at all levels of governance (Yoh n.d.). cadres to participate equitably at all levels of governance (Yoh n.d.).

20 20

South Africa has remained engaged in the peace process in Sudan at the regional level, while seemingly attempting to block discussions of SouthSudan’s Africa human has remained rights violations engaged in in global the peace fora. process In fact, in in Sudan the UNat theHuman regional Rights level, Council, while seemi Southngly Africa attempting has to consistently block discussions sought of to Sudan’sweaken efforts human to rights address violations the human in global rights fora. crisis In in fact, Darfur in the(Human UN HumanRights Watch Rights, 2008). Council, In 2006, South South Africa Africa has opposed consistently a resolution sought that to weakendenounced efforts Khartoum’s to address conduct the human in Darfur rights and crisis supported in Darfur instead (Human a Rightsweaker Watch resolution, 2008). that In made2006, noSouth reference Africa opposedto follow -aup resolution action by that the denouncedCouncil or Khartoum’s the Sudanese conduct government’s in Darfur and duty supported to protect instead civilians a weaker(Nathan resolution 2008). As that a nonmade-permanent no reference member to follow of the-up UNSC action in by 2007, the CouncilSouth Africa or the opposed Sudanese a resolution government’s that proposed duty to sanctions protect civilians against (Nathancombatants 2008) who. As attack a non - civilianspermanent and member obstruct of the peace UNSC efforts in 2007, and Southagainst Africa parties opposed to the conflict a resolution that refuse that proposedto co-operate sanctions with UNAMID against, combatantsthe joint UN who-AU attackpeacekeeping civilians force and in obstruct Darfur peace (Nathan efforts 2008). and In againstNovember parties of thatto the year, conflict South that Africa refuse also to co opposed-operate a with US- sponsoredUNAMID, theresolution joint UN introduced-AU peacekeeping in the UN General force in Assembly, Darfur (Nathan condemning 2008). rape In Novemberas a weapon of thatof war, year, even South though Africa it had also supported opposed aUNSC US-sponsored resolution resolution1325 of March introduced of the in samethe UN year General on the Assembly, elimination condemning of grave sexual rape asviolence a weapon during of war, armed even conflict though (Nathan it had 2008).supported South UNSC Africa resolution argued 132that5 a of narrow March interpretation of the same of year rape on could the potentially elimination make of grave other sexual forms violenceof rape during seem armedmore acceptable conflict (Nathan (Bischoff 2008). 2008). South Deputy Africa Foarguedreign thatMinister a narrow Aziz interpretation Pahad later of stated rape could that potentially the US was make attempting other forms to ofpoliticize rape seemrape in more the context acceptable of Sudan, (Bischoff while 2008).it had not Deputy done so Fo inreign the MinisterBalkans Aziz (Bischoff Pahad 2008; later Nathan stated 2008). that the In addition, US was in attempting 2008 South to politicizeAfrica sided rape with in the the context AU and of the Sudan, Arab whiLeaguele it had in s notupport done of sodeferring in the Balkansthe possible (Bischoff indictment 2008; of Nathan Sudan’s 2008). President In addition, Al-Bashir, in arguing 2008 Souththat it Africacould sided impact with negatively the AU and on thethe politicalArab League process in s (Southupport Africaof deferring 2009; theBischoff possible 2009). indictment of Sudan’s President Al-Bashir, arguing that it could impact negatively on the political process (South Africa 2009; Bischoff 2009). 21

21 Recent years have seen a strengthening of diplomatic relations Recent years have seen a strengthening of diplomatic relations between South Africa and Sudan. During President Al Bashir’s visit to between South Africa and Sudan. During President Al Bashir’s visit to South Africa in 2007, Mbeki and Al Bashir signed agreements on South Africa in 2007, Mbeki and Al Bashir signed agreements on defence, economic and trade co-operation and strengthened the defence, economic and trade co-operation and strengthened the existing Joint Bilateral Commission formed in 2006. In addition, the existing Joint Bilateral Commission formed in 2006. In addition, the two leaders agreed that firm action by the international community two leaders agreed that firm action by the international community should be taken against the rebels who boycotted the peace talks. should be taken against the rebels who boycotted the peace talks. While Mbeki had been critical of the rebels, he did not publicly criticize While Mbeki had been critical of the rebels, he did not publicly criticize Khartoum’s excessive and systematic use of force against civilians, Khartoum’s excessive and systematic use of force against civilians, which some governments denounced as genocide. South Africa’s which some governments denounced as genocide. South Africa’s stance in Sudan has led many to accuse the country of appeasing stance in Sudan has led many to accuse the country of appeasing Khartoum and allowing the oppression of the Sudanese people to Khartoum and allowing the oppression of the Sudanese people to continue. This is especially troubling given South Africa’s historical continue. This is especially troubling given South Africa’s historical struggle against apartheid and its professed commitment to human struggle against apartheid and its professed commitment to human rights and democracy in its foreign policy. rights and democracy in its foreign policy.

In all three instances, South Africa sided with illiberal and authoritarian In all three instances, South Africa sided with illiberal and authoritarian regimes, justifying this on the basis that internal conflict was not a regimes, justifying this on the basis that internal conflict was not a threat to international peace and security and that, therefore, such threat to international peace and security and that, therefore, such issues fell outside the mandate of the UNSC. SA's position is issues fell outside the mandate of the UNSC. SA's position is consistent with the themes that underlay Mbeki's leadership: an consistent with the themes that underlay Mbeki's leadership: an overarching concern for state sovereignty, a stated preference for overarching concern for state sovereignty, a stated preference for conflict to be handled at the regional level, and an expressed conflict to be handled at the regional level, and an expressed suspicion of western interference through the offices of the UN. Mbeki suspicion of western interference through the offices of the UN. Mbeki often expressed his distrust of the UN as a representative body and often expressed his distrust of the UN as a representative body and the need for South - South collaboration to prevent a new form of the need for South - South collaboration to prevent a new form of western imperialism. This has resulted in the subordination of human western imperialism. This has resulted in the subordination of human rights concerns to other factors. rights concerns to other factors.

22 22

Overview of Relevant Theories

OverviewTo what extent of Relevant can some Theories of the traditional theories of international 2 relations explain the changes in South Africa’s foreign policy? To what extent can some of the traditional theories of international 1.relations Classical expl orain Offensive the changes Realism in South – According Africa’s foreign to Morgenthau, policy?2 states must and should seek to increase their national capability, that is, their 1.“interest Classical defined or Offensive in terms Realism of power” – According albeit in moderationto Morgenthau, or pay states the mustprice and in terms should of seek loss to of increase the same their (Morgenthau, national capability, 1993:5; that Williams, is, their “interest2005; Tsygankov defined in and terms Tarver of power”-Wahlquist, albeit 2009; in moderation Barkin, 2009; or pay Rose, the price1998). in Whereas terms of Morgenthau’s loss of the same successors (Morgenthau, have emphasized 1993:5; Williams, military 2005;over other Tsygankov types ofand capabilities, Tarver-Wahlquist, Morgenthau 2009; himself Barkin, s 2009;tressed Rose, that 1998).capabilities Whereas could Morgenthau’s include tangible successors and have intangible emphasized factors, military from overgeography other types to “national of capabilities, morale” Morgenthau and the quality himself of stressed government that capabilities(Morgenthau, could 1993: include 124-164; tangible Williams, and 2005; intangible Mastanduno, factors, 1997; from Waltz,geography 2000). to The “national pursuit morale”of economic and objectives the quality and of a governmentgood name (Morgenthau,are capabilities, 1993: which 124Morgenthau-164; Williams, would have 2005; recognized Mastanduno, as relevant 1997; Waltz,elements 2000). of power. The pursuitKeohane of explainseconomic that objectives according and to athe good rationality name assumptionare capabilities, in realist which theory, Morgenthau world politicswould havecan be recognized analyzed asby relevantviewing elementsstates as ofunitary power. rational Keohane actors explains that seek that toaccording maximize to theirthe rationalityexpected assumptionutility (Keohane in realist 1986 theory,: 164-165). world National politics caninterest be analyzed is not, however, by viewing an stateseasy concept as unitary to define.rational Toactors minimize that seek the potentialto maximize for ambiguity,their expected this utility (Keohane 1986: 164-165). National interest is not, however, an easy concept to define. To minimize the potential for ambiguity, this Mandela. This is not to say that other theories, such as liberalism, neo- liberalism and neo-liberal institutionalism are of no relevance with respect to South African foreign policy. They may indeed be of some utility when it Mandela.comes to explaining This is not aspects to say of thatthe country’s other theories, foreign such policy. as liberalism,But in terms neo of- explainingliberalism and the neo paradox-liberal ofinstitutionalism the rapid turnaround are of no relevance in post-apartheid with respect South to AfricanSouth African foreign foreignpolicy, policy.the theories They which may offer indeed the be most of somepromise utility are realism, when it constructivismcomes to explaining and their aspects variants of the country’s foreign policy. But in terms of explaining the paradox of the rapid turnaround in post-apartheid South African foreign policy, the theories which offer the most promise are realism, constructivism and their variants 23

23 paper limits national interest to material, that is economic and security paper limits national interest to material, that is economic and security interests. So in terms of classical realism, what if any evidence is interests. So in terms of classical realism, what if any evidence is there that South Africa’s post-apartheid South African governments there that South Africa’s post-apartheid South African governments pursued power as an objective that would enhance the state’s pursued power as an objective that would enhance the state’s economic development and capability? economic development and capability?

2. Defensive and/or Structural Realism - emphasizes systemic over 2. Defensive and/or Structural Realism - emphasizes systemic over other causal factors in the making of foreign policy (Mastanduno, other causal factors in the making of foreign policy (Mastanduno, 1997; Rose, 1998; Waltz, 1979). Though other factors, notably 1997; Rose, 1998; Waltz, 1979). Though other factors, notably domestic politics are not ruled out, structural realists favour the state’s domestic politics are not ruled out, structural realists favour the state’s relative position within the relevant international system as the factor relative position within the relevant international system as the factor that is most likely to shape its foreign policy. Some realists add that that is most likely to shape its foreign policy. Some realists add that the state’s position within its international system in turn leads to the the state’s position within its international system in turn leads to the almost natural evolution of a balance of power (Morgenthau, 1993: almost natural evolution of a balance of power (Morgenthau, 1993: 181-202; Waltz, 2000). Zakaria, as summarized by Rose (1998), adds 181-202; Waltz, 2000). Zakaria, as summarized by Rose (1998), adds one caution; he points out the need to take into account not just a one caution; he points out the need to take into account not just a state’s raw capabilities in relation to that of other states but the extent state’s raw capabilities in relation to that of other states but the extent to which the government is willing and able to mobilize those to which the government is willing and able to mobilize those capabilities for foreign policy purposes. This caution may be of special capabilities for foreign policy purposes. This caution may be of special relevance for South Africa, a country which faced and continues to relevance for South Africa, a country which faced and continues to face serious reconstruction and social problems after the damage face serious reconstruction and social problems after the damage caused by years of apartheid which wasted the country’s human caused by years of apartheid which wasted the country’s human potential, not to mention the physical and psychological damage potential, not to mention the physical and psychological damage caused by sanctions. In terms of structural realism and given the fact caused by sanctions. In terms of structural realism and given the fact that South Africa is militarily and economically the most capable state that South Africa is militarily and economically the most capable state in Southern Africa, and that by a considerable margin, what evidence in Southern Africa, and that by a considerable margin, what evidence is there that the governments of post-apartheid South Africa sought to is there that the governments of post-apartheid South Africa sought to attain and retain the position of a regional hegemony? attain and retain the position of a regional hegemony?

24 24

3. Neo-classical realism occupies a halfway house between classical realism and constructivism. It is based on the assumption that the 3.influence Neo-classical of structural realism factors occupies such a halfway as relative house power between is not classical always realismobvious andeven constructivism.to political actors It isthemselves based on (Rose, the assumption 1998). The that extent the influenceto which ofth e structural central decision factors - suchmaking as authorities relative power of states is not seek always to obviousacquire powereven to or political react to actors the relevant themselves international (Rose, 1998). system The can extent thus tonot whichbe taken the for central granted; decision it needs-making to be authorities demonstrated. of states Neo- classical seek to acquirerealists arepower realist or react enough to the to relevant suspect international that the international system can system thus notplays be ataken prime for rolegranted; in theit needs shaping to be of demonstrated. the foreign policyNeo-classical of the realistsconstituent are units, realist and enough ”neo” enough to suspect to realize that the that international other factors, system such playsas misperceptions a prime role and in domestic the shaping politics, of may the intervene foreign policyand derail of the constituentrealist logic units, (Lobell, and Ripsman ”neo” enough and Taliaferr to realizeo, 2007).that other So factors, in terms such of asneo misperceptions-classical realism, and whatdomestic evidence politics, do maywe have intervene that Southand derail Africa’s the foreignrealist logicpolicy (Lobell,-making Ripsman elite has andconsciously Taliaferr triedo, 2007). to a) follow So in a termspolicy of regionalneo-classical dominance realism, and what b) evidence used that do position we have of that dominance South Africa’s to the foreignadvantage policy of- making South Afreliteica has, in consciously terms of both tried security to a) follow and a economic policy of regionalgain? dominance and b) used that position of dominance to the advantageWhat all three of South types Afr of ica realism, in terms have of in both common security is a and foundation economic of gain?materialism and an assumption of rationality of the instrumental kind Whaton the allpart three of policy types makers of realism (Wendt, have 1994). in common This is is not a foundationthe case with of materialismanother group and an of assumption theories thatof rationality have variously of the instrumental been labeled kind onstructuralism the part of and policy (social) makers constructivism. (Wendt, 1994). This is not the case with another group of theories that have variously been labeled structuralism4. Constructivism and (social)(identity constructivism. based): Howarth (2008) argues that ‘state identities and foreign policy can be mutually constitutive or 4.destructive, Constructivism that (identity constructions based): of Howarth identity (2008) form theargues basis that of ‘state the identitiesprinciples and and paradigms foreign policyunderpinning can beforeign mutually-policy framework, constitutive and or thatdestructive, operationalization that constructions or application of identityof these formto actual the situations basis of can the reconstituteprinciples and state paradigms identities. underpinning Even a structural foreign- policy realist framework, such as Waltz and that operationalization or application of these to actual situations can 25 reconstitute state identities. Even a structural realist such as Waltz

25 admits that, “the impulse to protect one’s identity-cultural and political admits that, “the impulse to protect one’s identity-cultural and political as well as economic…is strong” (Waltz, 2000). Constructivism as well as economic…is strong” (Waltz, 2000). Constructivism sometimes seems to merge into the liberalism of the post-World War I sometimes seems to merge into the liberalism of the post-World War I era, the one that assumed that good intentions, good rules and era, the one that assumed that good intentions, good rules and international institutions to enforce them can build a better world. The international institutions to enforce them can build a better world. The constructivism that deals with the adoption of common norms is of this constructivism that deals with the adoption of common norms is of this variety (Finnemore, 1996; Sikkink,1991). Wendt (1992) links the variety (Finnemore, 1996; Sikkink,1991). Wendt (1992) links the adoption of common norms to the creation of a common identity; adoption of common norms to the creation of a common identity; surely governments will not seek to enslave or abuse the peoples of a surely governments will not seek to enslave or abuse the peoples of a country with which they identify. This idea opens up promising country with which they identify. This idea opens up promising avenues of enquiry, for example, Nazi propaganda that deliberately avenues of enquiry, for example, Nazi propaganda that deliberately created a distance between the Nazi and the peoples whom they created a distance between the Nazi and the peoples whom they oppressed and abused. But this is not a path that we can follow here. oppressed and abused. But this is not a path that we can follow here.

It is another kind of constructivism that may be useful in It is another kind of constructivism that may be useful in understanding South African foreign policy. This, which could be understanding South African foreign policy. This, which could be labeled pure constructivism, deals with the construction of identities labeled pure constructivism, deals with the construction of identities and sees states as anthropomorphic beings that, like individuals, seek and sees states as anthropomorphic beings that, like individuals, seek to achieve a sense of identity and belonging (Wendt 1992). And it is to achieve a sense of identity and belonging (Wendt 1992). And it is this search for identity which leads governments to formulate foreign this search for identity which leads governments to formulate foreign policies that confirm and deepen that identity (Wendt, 1992; Gaskarth, policies that confirm and deepen that identity (Wendt, 1992; Gaskarth, 2006). Identity is communal by definition. One cannot identify with 2006). Identity is communal by definition. One cannot identify with oneself alone. So where do states find their sense of identity? Is the oneself alone. So where do states find their sense of identity? Is the international identity of a state built on its domestic political culture international identity of a state built on its domestic political culture (Wendt, 1994; Stairs 1982)? Or is it the international environment, a (Wendt, 1994; Stairs 1982)? Or is it the international environment, a regional or world-wide climate of opinion or a regional political culture regional or world-wide climate of opinion or a regional political culture which shapes a country’s foreign policy? Jepperson, Wendt and which shapes a country’s foreign policy? Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein (1996) see states’ interests and identities “as partly Katzenstein (1996) see states’ interests and identities “as partly constructed by their environment”. Wendt (1992) identifies various constructed by their environment”. Wendt (1992) identifies various degrees of identity building on the part of international institutions, degrees of identity building on the part of international institutions, 26 26

from the looseness of the Concert of Europe to the tightness of the European Union. We label this constructivism environmental. from the looseness of the Concert of Europe to the tightness of the EuropeanCultural or Union. institutional We label elements this constructivism of states’ environmental. environments shape national interests; identity becomes the link between the international Culturalor regional or environment institutional and elements the state’s of interes states’ts, environmentsand the preservation shape nationalof that identityinterests; can identity in turnbecomes become the anlink interestbetween inthe its international own right or(Jepperson, regional environment Wendt and and Katzenstein, the state’s interes 1996).ts, and Constructivism the preservation can ofexplain that the identity reshaping can inof turnnational become foreign an policies interest as inthe its environment own right (Jepperson,of beliefs and Wendt opinions and in a Katzenstein, region changes; 1996). for example, Constructivism in western can explainEurope the when reshaping West of Germany national becameforeign policies an anti as-militaristic the environment model democracy,of beliefs and in easternopinions Europe in a region when changes; former Soviet for example, satellites in sought western to becomeEurope whengood NATO West allies,Germany and became in Asia where an anti Japan-militaristic turned model from democracy,militarism to in antieastern-militarism Europe (Ru whenggie, former 1998). Soviet If identities satellites do sought indeed to becomeshape interests, good NATO or to use allies, the andstronger in Asia language where favoured Japan turnedby Wendt, from if militarism“interests are to anti dependent-militarism on (Ru identities”ggie, 1998). (Wendt, If identities 1994), then do indeed South shapeAfrica’s interests, identity asor ato member use the strongerof the African language community favoured rather by Wendt, than an if “interestsoutcast from are that dependent community on identities” should shape (Wendt, and 1994), inform then its foreign South Africa’spolicy. What identity evidence as a member is there of that the theAfrican foreign community-policy makers rather ofthan post an- apartheidoutcast from South that Africa community sought to should express shape an African and informidentity itsby foreignmeans ofpolicy. a foreign What policy evidence which is identified there that their the countryforeign -withpolicy others makers in Africa? of post - apartheid South Africa sought to express an African identity by means 5.of aConstructivism foreign policy (basedwhich identified on national their political country culture) with others - Conversely, in Africa? or perhaps also, a state’s identity could be built upon its domestic political5. Constructivism culture (Jepperson, (based on national Wendt andpolitical Katzenstein, culture) - Conversely, 1996; Wendt, or perhaps1992; Tsygankov also, a and state’s Tarver identity-Wahlquist, could 2 be009; built Nel uponTaylor itsand domestic van der Westhuizen,political culture 2001). (Jepperson, Thus Canada’s Wendt and foreign Katzenstein, policy was 1996; for decades Wendt, based1992; Tsygankovon a domestic and traditionTarver-Wahlquist, of compromise 2009; andNel Taylornegotiations and van within der Westhuizen,that country’s 2001). federal Thus system Canada’s (Stairs,1982) foreign policy and the was Scandinavian for decades based on a domestic tradition of compromise and negotiations within 27 that country’s federal system (Stairs,1982) and the Scandinavian

27 countries’ contribution to international development can be ascribed to countries’ contribution to international development can be ascribed to a domestic tradition of egalitarianism (Jepperson, Wendt and a domestic tradition of egalitarianism (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996). Howarth (2008) contends that in a democratic Katzenstein 1996). Howarth (2008) contends that in a democratic setting, this process of construction and reconstruction needs to be setting, this process of construction and reconstruction needs to be legitimated, and the media plays an important role in that process. In a legitimated, and the media plays an important role in that process. In a similar vein, one strand of constructivist theory sees identity as a role similar vein, one strand of constructivist theory sees identity as a role which emerges out of strategic interactions and is rooted in broader which emerges out of strategic interactions and is rooted in broader philosophical discourses (Klotz 2004). Klotz explains that “leaders philosophical discourses (Klotz 2004). Klotz explains that “leaders debate in this broader language, assuaging domestic divisions; the debate in this broader language, assuaging domestic divisions; the discourse of identity shapes domestic interests into a ‘national discourse of identity shapes domestic interests into a ‘national interest”. Over time, they articulate collective principles, even if they interest”. Over time, they articulate collective principles, even if they disagree over specific policies. Theories of state identity in particular disagree over specific policies. Theories of state identity in particular predict that if state identity is coherent, then policy will be consistent, predict that if state identity is coherent, then policy will be consistent, but if identity is ambiguous, policy will be contested (Klotz, 2004: 5). but if identity is ambiguous, policy will be contested (Klotz, 2004: 5). So can we find evidence to show that South Africa’s foreign policy is So can we find evidence to show that South Africa’s foreign policy is based on an amalgam of domestic identities that have combined to based on an amalgam of domestic identities that have combined to form a national identity that, inter alia, legitimizes itself by the making form a national identity that, inter alia, legitimizes itself by the making of a relevant foreign policy? of a relevant foreign policy?

In this context, applying constructive identity theory to the South In this context, applying constructive identity theory to the South African case reveals that since the end of apartheid there have been African case reveals that since the end of apartheid there have been competing perceptions of national identity. These have been competing perceptions of national identity. These have been influenced by personal leadership, firstly Mandela’s, who initiated a influenced by personal leadership, firstly Mandela’s, who initiated a markedly idealistic era with an emphasis on Africa, democracy, human markedly idealistic era with an emphasis on Africa, democracy, human rights and non-violent mechanisms for conflict resolution, and then rights and non-violent mechanisms for conflict resolution, and then Mbeki’s, who maintained the focus on democracy and Africa, but who Mbeki’s, who maintained the focus on democracy and Africa, but who demonstrated more realist leanings, as well as internationalist and demonstrated more realist leanings, as well as internationalist and anti-imperialist tendencies. Perceptions of national identity that anti-imperialist tendencies. Perceptions of national identity that constrained South African foreign policy decisions can thus be constrained South African foreign policy decisions can thus be analyzed with recourse to leaders’ discourse. analyzed with recourse to leaders’ discourse. 28 28

6. Path dependency (also known as historical institutionalism) generally refers to the causal relevance of preceding stages in a temporal sequence, in other words, what happens at an earlier point 6.in time Path will dependency have an effect (also on later known events as (Pierson historical 2000). institutionalism) The effect generallyearlier events refers have to the in relation causal to relevance later events of preceding follows an stages increasing in a temporalreturns process, sequence, whereby in other ‘the words, probability what happens of further at stepsan earlier along point the insame time path will increaseshave an effect with eachon later move events down (Pierson that path 2000). ... and The the effectcosts earlierof exit events of switching have into relationsome previously to later events plausible follows alternative an increasing – rise” (Piersonreturns process, 2000: whereby252). In ‘the fact, probability Levi (1997) of further suggests steps that along path the dependencysame path increases means that with “once each a move country down or regiothat pathn has ... started and the down costs a track,of exit the of costs switching of reversal to some are previously very high. plausible There will alternative be other –choice rise” (Piersonpoints, but 2000: the entrenchments 252). In fact, of Levi certain (1997) institutional suggests arrangements that path dependencyobstruct an means easy reversalthat “once of a thecountry initial or regio choice”.n has started Applying down path a track,dependency the costs to of the reversal South are African very case,high. There where will there be hasother been choice a points,dramatic but regime the entrenchmentschange, raises ofthe certain question institutional as to the point arrangements of origin obstructof the path. an Is easy it the reversal foreign policy of the of initialthe apartheid choice”. regime Applying or does path it dependencyconsist of the toforeign the Southpolicy Africanadvocated case, by the where ANC there while hasit was been still a dramaticgovernment regime in waiting? change, raises the question as to the point of origin of the path. Is it the foreign policy of the apartheid regime or does it Applicationconsist of the of foreign Above policy Theories advocated by the ANC while it was still a government in waiting? Mbeki took office at a time when the pitfalls of a foreign policy based Applicationon ethics were of Above painfully Theories evident and domestic political and social instability had become policy priorities. It is, therefore, no surprise that heMbeki sought took office to reap at a the time rewards when the of pitfalls South of Africa's a foreign newly policy acquired based internationalon ethics were profile painfully for tangible evident material and domestic gains. In political general and terms, social an analysisinstability of had Mbeki's become foreign policy policy priorities. reveals It is, a therefore,foreign policy no surpr withise visible that herealist sought leanings; to reap Mbeki's the African rewards Renai of Southssance, Africa's NEPAD newly as well acquired as his international profile for tangible material gains. In general terms, an 29 analysis of Mbeki's foreign policy reveals a foreign policy with visible realist leanings; Mbeki's African Renaissance, NEPAD as well as his

29 policy of security and wealth creation' all fall neatly within the realist policy of security and wealth creation' all fall neatly within the realist paradigm and were motivated by economic interests and political paradigm and were motivated by economic interests and political influence. A stable democratic continent would attract foreign influence. A stable democratic continent would attract foreign investment and SA, as the biggest economy in the continent, had investment and SA, as the biggest economy in the continent, had much to benefit from such a scenario. much to benefit from such a scenario.

In classical realist terms, it can be said that both in Zimbabwe and In classical realist terms, it can be said that both in Zimbabwe and Sudan, South Africa pursued a foreign policy that was, at least partly, Sudan, South Africa pursued a foreign policy that was, at least partly, driven by economic and security interests. South Africa's pursuit of driven by economic and security interests. South Africa's pursuit of economic interests in Zimbabwe and Sudan is evidenced by its economic interests in Zimbabwe and Sudan is evidenced by its attempts to expand trade with both countries. Zimbabwe is an attempts to expand trade with both countries. Zimbabwe is an important trading partner. The crisis in Zimbabwe is harmful to South important trading partner. The crisis in Zimbabwe is harmful to South African companies and its economic downturn has had negative African companies and its economic downturn has had negative effects on the South African economy, directly in terms of reduced effects on the South African economy, directly in terms of reduced spending on South African goods and services, and indirectly as the spending on South African goods and services, and indirectly as the instability in the region results in a loss of international confidence and instability in the region results in a loss of international confidence and foreign investment (Adelmann 2004). However, as Adelmann (2004: foreign investment (Adelmann 2004). However, as Adelmann (2004: 267) argues: 267) argues:

the policy of quiet diplomacy also offers opportunities. the policy of quiet diplomacy also offers opportunities. Trade figures suggest that while some sectors suffer from Trade figures suggest that while some sectors suffer from the crisis, others directly profit from the crisis as their the crisis, others directly profit from the crisis as their products substitute Zimbabwean products on the local and products substitute Zimbabwean products on the local and to a lesser extent also on the world market (...) the main to a lesser extent also on the world market (...) the main economic interest of South Africa is to prevent a complete economic interest of South Africa is to prevent a complete collapse of Zimbabwe (...) quiet diplomacy paves the way collapse of Zimbabwe (...) quiet diplomacy paves the way for further profits in the future. for further profits in the future.

South Africa has an additional security challenge stemming from the South Africa has an additional security challenge stemming from the large influx of Zimbabwean refugees, which could worsen if Zimbabwe large influx of Zimbabwean refugees, which could worsen if Zimbabwe 30 30

turns into a failed state. Therefore, from a realist perspective, quiet diplomacy towards Zimbabwe makes sense, at least in the short term. turnsSouth intoAfrica's a failed 'constructive state. Therefore, engagement' from toward a realist both perspective, Zimbabwe quiet and diplomacySudan was towards also predicated Zimbabwe onmakes the sense fact that,, at least African in the solidarity, short term as. Southopposed Africa's to public 'constructive criticism, wouldengagement' amount toward to a better both nameZimbabwe for South and SudanAfrica within was also the Africanpredicated continent, on the w facthich that, in classical African solidarity,realist terms as opposedtranslates to to public power. criticism, Mbeki's would SA amount sought to a become better name an ally for ofSouth the AfricaAfrican within continent the African and become continent, a w regionalhich in classical hegemon, realist but terms in a translatesbenevolent tofashion. power. Mbeki's SA sought to become an ally of the African continent and become a regional hegemon, but in a benevolentSouth Africa's fashion. rationale for decisions in the UNSC can also be explained in realist terms, specifically with reference to defensive/ Southstructural Africa's realism. rationale While at for the decisions regional level in the SA UNSCenjoys cana hegemonic also be explainedposition, at inthe rea internationallist terms, specificallylevel it is still with an emerging reference middle to defensive/ power. structuralAs Bischoff realism. (2009) While suggests, at the Southregional Africa level voted SA enjoys on “polit a hegemonicical rather thanposition, ethical at thegrounds”, international which levelmakes it isrealist still an sense emerging if one middleconsiders power. the emergingAs Bischoff multi (2009)-polar suggests, international South system. Africa Ideologically, voted on “polit Southical ratherAfrica thanaligned ethical with grounds”,the emerging which centers makes of realistpower, sense mainly if Chinaone considers and Russia. the emergingSouth Africa multi sought-polar to international become a me system.mber Ideologically,of the BRIC (Brazil, South AfricaIndia, alignedChina, Russia),with the emerging an effort centers in which of itpower, succeeded mainly inChina December and Russia. 2011 Southwhen theAfrica BRIC sought became to become the BRICS, a me whilember the of Indiathe BRIC-Brazil (Brazil,-South AfricaIndia, (IBSA)China, grouping Russia), continues an effort into mature which it(Bischoff succeeded 2009: in 105). December 2011 when the BRIC became the BRICS, while the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA)So while grouping at the continues international to mature level (Bischoff South Africa 2009: remains 105). a middle power, it used its seat at the UNSC not only to align itself more closely Sowith whileother atemerging the international middle powers, level South but also Africa to remainsretain its aregional middle hegemonypower, it used position its seat when at the it UNSC comes not to only African to align affairs itself by more consist closelyently sidingwith other with emerging African states middle regardless powers, but of their also human to retain rights its regional record. hegemonyMoreover, South position Africa's when attempt it comes to refer to African matters affairs before by the consist UNSCently to siding with African states regardless of their human rights record. 31 Moreover, South Africa's attempt to refer matters before the UNSC to

31 other bodies such as the HRC, the General Assembly or regional other bodies such as the HRC, the General Assembly or regional organizations, was an attempt to democratise decisions, which would organizations, was an attempt to democratise decisions, which would otherwise be decided solely by the five permanent members. When it otherwise be decided solely by the five permanent members. When it comes to African affairs, South Africa would then be in a much better comes to African affairs, South Africa would then be in a much better position to exercise its hegemonic power in the African continent position to exercise its hegemonic power in the African continent through the African Union and the SADC, and thus maintain its role on through the African Union and the SADC, and thus maintain its role on the continent. the continent.

There is an almost equally strong case for a constructivist There is an almost equally strong case for a constructivist interpretation of Mbeki’s foreign policy. President Mbeki, who had for interpretation of Mbeki’s foreign policy. President Mbeki, who had for so long lived in other African countries believed in South Africa’s so long lived in other African countries believed in South Africa’s destiny as an African country, as is evident from his passionate “I am destiny as an African country, as is evident from his passionate “I am an African” speech. an African” speech.

Mbeki possessed and acted on a world-view that joined realism Mbeki possessed and acted on a world-view that joined realism to a politics of Third Worldism and racial redress… If human to a politics of Third Worldism and racial redress… If human rights came second in Mbeki's foreign policy this was probably rights came second in Mbeki's foreign policy this was probably due as much to the former president’s ‘idealistic’ notions of due as much to the former president’s ‘idealistic’ notions of racial and South-South solidarity as it was to calculations of racial and South-South solidarity as it was to calculations of South Africa’s interests….(Glaser 2010) South Africa’s interests….(Glaser 2010)

For Mbeki being African did not mean being just like other African For Mbeki being African did not mean being just like other African countries, but rather to show that Africans could adopt and practise countries, but rather to show that Africans could adopt and practise the values of democracy, humanism and transparency that the ANC the values of democracy, humanism and transparency that the ANC had sought for South Africa during the long years in exile and had sought for South Africa during the long years in exile and opposition. Hence his government took the initiative in creating opposition. Hence his government took the initiative in creating NEPAD, provided peacekeepers to other African countries and spoke NEPAD, provided peacekeepers to other African countries and spoke on behalf of Africa in international fora. on behalf of Africa in international fora.

32 32

When the governments of Africa were almost unanimous in taking a position, such as in the case of Omar Al Bashir and the ICC, Mbeki Whenchose notthe togovernments isolate his country,of Africa as were Mandela almost had unanimous done over in Nigeria taking ina position,1996, and such instead as in showed the case his ofAfricanness Omar Al Bashir by supporting and the theICC, position Mbeki choseof the not other to governmentsisolate his country, (Nathan as 2005).Mandela The had case done of over Zimbabwe Nigeria in is 1996,more complex.and instead Mbeki’s showed government his Africanness supported by supportingMugabe’s notthe justposition with ofwords the otherbut also governments with economic (Nathan assistance, 2005). The and case South of Africa Zimbabwe has an is moreeconomic complex. as well Mbeki’s as a security government interest supported in the stability Mugabe’s of its not neighbour. just with wordsYet that but support also with was economic not unconditional; assistance, and there South were Africa times has when an economicMbeki’s Southas well as Africa a security tried interest to mo inderate the stability Mugabe’s of its neighbour. policies. YetNevertheless, that support the was wish not to adhere unconditional; to the African there were principle times of when non- Mbeki’sinterference South in others’ Africa affairs tried undoubtedly to moderate played Mugabe’s a role in policies. Mbeki’s Nevertheless,policy toward Zimbabwe. the wish toOn adhereZimbabwe to theas well African as on principle the UN Security of non- interferenceCouncil, Mbeki in was others’ sensitive affairs to undoubtedly criticism that played his government a role in was Mbeki’s pro- policyWestern toward or un Zimbabwe.-African (Geldenhuys On Zimbabwe 2008). as well as on the UN Security Council, Mbeki was sensitive to criticism that his government was pro- WesternMbeki's or anti un--imperialistAfrican (Geldenhuys ideology, 2008). which expresses itself in a preference for the handling of conflict at the regional level ('African Mbeki'ssolutions to anti African-imperialist problems') ideology, is als o whichan expression expresses of an identity, itself in that a preferenceof the Third for World the handling as against of conflict the wealthy at the North regional and level West ('African (Bjorn solutions2009). It tohas African caused problems') South Africa is als noto an only expression to take up of the an caseidentity, of poor that ofcountries the Third in the World UN asbut againstalso to theattempt wealthy to play North a role and in West the all (Bjorn but 2009).moribund It hasNon caused-Aligned South Movement. Africa notThis only was to yet take another up the expression case of poor of identitycountries politics in the on UN the but part also of the to Mbekiattempt government. to play a role in the all but moribund Non-Aligned Movement. This was yet another expression of identityWhile there politics is on considerable the part of the evidence Mbeki thatgovernment. the search for an African identity informed the Mbeki government’s foreign policy, the case for a Whilelink be tween there isthe considerable political culture evidence of post that-apartheid the search South for Africa an Africanand its foreignidentity informedpolicy is allthe but Mbeki impossible government’s to determine. foreign policy, For one the thing,case forthat a link between the political culture of post-apartheid South Africa and its 33 foreign policy is all but impossible to determine. For one thing, that

33 political culture is still in the making. For another, the political culture political culture is still in the making. For another, the political culture has only been studied to a limited extent. And lastly, there is little has only been studied to a limited extent. And lastly, there is little evidence that South Africa’s foreign policy has been shaped by either evidence that South Africa’s foreign policy has been shaped by either the diffuse nature of its domestic ethos nor by specific domestic the diffuse nature of its domestic ethos nor by specific domestic interests – with one significant exception. Large partly government interests – with one significant exception. Large partly government controlled parastatals as well as some large mining firms have controlled parastatals as well as some large mining firms have influenced the policy toward Zimbabwe and Sudan. influenced the policy toward Zimbabwe and Sudan.

Turning next to historical institutionalism, South Africa’s history of Turning next to historical institutionalism, South Africa’s history of regional destabilization during the apartheid regime had constrained regional destabilization during the apartheid regime had constrained the acceptance of its continental leadership by neighboring countries, the acceptance of its continental leadership by neighboring countries, who had been the victims of that destabilization. Applying path who had been the victims of that destabilization. Applying path dependency to the South African case must allow for the fact that a dependency to the South African case must allow for the fact that a critical juncture took place in 1994 when South Africa decided to end a critical juncture took place in 1994 when South Africa decided to end a historical chapter in which it played the role of a regional hegemony. historical chapter in which it played the role of a regional hegemony. After 1994, South Africa adopted a co-operative role and has made After 1994, South Africa adopted a co-operative role and has made efforts to maintain it that way since. Or did it? Did South Africa end efforts to maintain it that way since. Or did it? Did South Africa end the interventionist attitude it had adopted during apartheid especially the interventionist attitude it had adopted during apartheid especially toward Southern Africa in particular, which it viewed as its own sphere toward Southern Africa in particular, which it viewed as its own sphere of interest, an exploitable source of energy resources, cheap labor of interest, an exploitable source of energy resources, cheap labor and an easily accessible market for its products (Flemes, 2009)? and an easily accessible market for its products (Flemes, 2009)?

As South Africa sought to abandon its historical hegemon role and As South Africa sought to abandon its historical hegemon role and adopted a more democratic and cooperative stance in its foreign adopted a more democratic and cooperative stance in its foreign policy, it was forced to strike a delicate balance between becoming a policy, it was forced to strike a delicate balance between becoming a leader in liberal-style development and democracy, and in this way leader in liberal-style development and democracy, and in this way risk being perceived as the lackey of the West, or on the other hand, risk being perceived as the lackey of the West, or on the other hand, expressing solidarity with other African nations. In this context, South expressing solidarity with other African nations. In this context, South Africa has had to carefully couch its leadership in what some scholars Africa has had to carefully couch its leadership in what some scholars have termed ‘soft, soft diplomacy’ so as to avoid being labeled a have termed ‘soft, soft diplomacy’ so as to avoid being labeled a 34 34

hegemon (Hau, Scott and Hulme 2012). Therefore, it is in South Africa’s interest not to act unilaterally to impose democracy in the hegemonAfrican continent. (Hau, Scott and Hulme 2012). Therefore, it is in South Africa’s interest not to act unilaterally to impose democracy in the SouthAfrican Africa’scontinent. historical legacy also helps us understand South Africa’s ties with a number of states whose democratic and human Southrights records Africa’s are historical at minimum legacy questionable, also helps suchus understand as Libya, Cuba,South Africa’sSaudi Arabia, ties with Algeria a number and Morocco. of states These whose friendship democratic ties were and humanforged betweenrights records the ANC are and at minimum the respective questionable, governments such asduring Libya, apartheid Cuba, asSaudi they Arabia, shared Algeria a common and Morocco. struggle Thesefor national friendship liberation. ties were Iran, forged Libya andbetween Cuba the in ANC particular, and the were respective important governments supporters during of theapartheid ANC liberationas they shared movement. a common Thus, struggle the friendly for national relations liberation. with theIran, aboveLibya mentionedand Cuba countries in particular, are not were meant important to demonstrate supporters a disregardof the ANC for democratiliberation c movement. principles on Thus, the part the of friendly South Africa. relations They with are theinstead above an expressionmentioned countries of the bonds are not forged meant as to a demonstrate result of a a common disregard past for characterizeddemocratic principles by the struggle on the partfor national of South liberation. Africa. They are instead an expression of the bonds forged as a result of a common past Therecharacterized were some by the such struggle bonds for also national in the liberation. case of Zimbabwe, but that story is more complex. Historically, the ANC had been closer to JoshuaThere were Nkomo’s some ZAPUsuch bonds than Robertalso in Mugabe’sthe case of ZANU, Zimbabwe, but President but that Mbekistory is personally more complex. supported Historically, ZANU because the ANC he had realized been closer that the to majorityJoshua Nkomo’s Shona people ZAPU ledthan by Robert Mugabe Mugabe’s were likely ZANU, to but dominate President an independentMbeki personally Zimba supportedbwe (Gevisser ZANU 2007:431). because So he there realized were personal that the historicalmajority Shona ties. And people there led was by the Mugabe fact that were both likely the ANC to dominate and ZANU an andindependent ZAPU faced Zimba a bwesimilar (Gevisser situation 2007:431). from 1965 -So1980: there they were were personal forced historicalinto a bloody ties. guerrilla And there war was against the facta racist that regime. both the But ANC SA andalso ZANUhas a andstrong ZAPU economic faced aand similar security situation interest from in 1965a stable-1980: Zimbabwe, they were and forced this factorinto a mustbloody be guerrilla taken into war account against along a racist with regime. the historical But SA ties. also has a s trong economic and security interest in a stable Zimbabwe, and this factor must be taken into account along with the historical ties. 35

35 Analysis, Conclusions, Outlook for the Future Analysis, Conclusions, Outlook for the Future

We have demonstrated that the foreign policy of the new democratic We have demonstrated that the foreign policy of the new democratic South Africa is not wholly informed by a Realpolitik that set in after the South Africa is not wholly informed by a Realpolitik that set in after the initial humanitarian and idealistic impulse of the Mandela years had initial humanitarian and idealistic impulse of the Mandela years had begun to fade. Instead that realism is tempered by the search for a begun to fade. Instead that realism is tempered by the search for a new identity of South Africa as an African state. And yet this new identity of South Africa as an African state. And yet this conclusion can only be tentative. Much remains to be done, conclusion can only be tentative. Much remains to be done, particularly with respect to a possible link between the political culture particularly with respect to a possible link between the political culture of the new South Africa and its foreign policy as that political culture is of the new South Africa and its foreign policy as that political culture is itself still in the making and not yet studied. itself still in the making and not yet studied. South African foreign policy under the leadership of President Jacob South African foreign policy under the leadership of President Jacob Zuma will show both continuity and a break with the recent past. Zuma will show both continuity and a break with the recent past. Foreign policy priorities under Zuma are likely to remain the Foreign policy priorities under Zuma are likely to remain the development of the African continent, a promotion of multilateral development of the African continent, a promotion of multilateral cooperation and the pursuit of global governance reform. cooperation and the pursuit of global governance reform. Nonetheless, these priorities will be pursued in a reality different from Nonetheless, these priorities will be pursued in a reality different from that of recent years. South Africa is no longer the favorite returnee of that of recent years. South Africa is no longer the favorite returnee of the international community, especially after its first contentious tenure the international community, especially after its first contentious tenure as a non-permanent member of the Security Council. And Zuma as a non-permanent member of the Security Council. And Zuma faces rising domestic challenges that have led to fractures within the faces rising domestic challenges that have led to fractures within the ANC. South Africa has in the last decade registered 6% annual ANC. South Africa has in the last decade registered 6% annual growth, strong job creation and high foreign investment (Johnson, growth, strong job creation and high foreign investment (Johnson, 2008). However, poverty, unemployment and crime remain high. 2008). However, poverty, unemployment and crime remain high. Maintaining macro-stability at home will be key to Zuma’s success, Maintaining macro-stability at home will be key to Zuma’s success, who pledged to address domestic challenges during his term. In terms who pledged to address domestic challenges during his term. In terms of foreign policy this emphasis on domestic issues has already begun of foreign policy this emphasis on domestic issues has already begun to show a renewed emphasis on development and poverty reduction, to show a renewed emphasis on development and poverty reduction, which will require foreign investment, regardless of the state of which will require foreign investment, regardless of the state of democracy in the countries from which that investment comes (SA democracy in the countries from which that investment comes (SA 36 36

DIRCO 2009 and 2012c); thus, the kow-towing to China and the good relations with Saudi Arabia. DIRCO 2009 and 2012c); thus, the kow-towing to China and the good Therelations specific with Saudi issues Arabia. addressed in this paper are continuing to preoccupy the Zuma government. Zimbabwe is still an issue, and ThePresident specific Zuma issues is personally addressed invo lved in this in the paper SADC are effort continuing to try and to preoccupyimprove the the state Zuma of governance government. in that Zimbabwe country is (Sasman, still an issue, 2012; andSA PresidentDIRCO 2012b). Zuma is Sudan,personally or invo ratherlved the in the two SADC Sudans, effort still to presenttry and improveproblems the of state peace of andgovernance good governance, in that country and (Sasman, the government 2012; SA of DIRCOSouth Africa 2012b). has continued Sudan, orto tr rathereat both the Sudanese two Sudans, governments still present with problemsrespect and of deference. peace and In goodMarch governance, 2012, Zuma andreferred the governmentto President Al of SouthBashir Africaof Sudan has andcontinued President to trSalvaeat both Kiir Sudaneseof South Sudan governments as his “dear with respectbrothers” and (SA deference. DIRCO 2012a) In March 2012, Zuma referred to President Al Bashir of Sudan and President Salva Kiir of South Sudan as his “dear brothers”For the years (SA DIRCO2011-201 2012a)2 South Africa has once again been elected to the Security Council, and two of the issues it has had to face there are thoseFor the of years the turmoil2011-201 in 2 Libya South and Africa in Syria.has once On again Libya, be Southen elected Africa’s to theposition Security has Council,been that and the two problem of the issuesshould it be has settled had to by face the there Libyans are thosethemselves of the (SA turmoil DIRCO in Libya2012b.) and On in Syria.Syria, OnSouth Libya, Africa South would Africa’s have positionpreferred has to been leave that the the matter problem to the should League be settled of Arab by States, the Libyans but it themselveseventually supported(SA DIRCO the 2012b.) appointment On Syria, of SpecialSouth Africa UN would Envoy have Kofi preferredAnnan, calling to leave for the the observance matter to theof human League rights of Araband socio States,-ecnomic but it eventuallydevelopment supported (SA DIRCO the 2012c appointment and e) of Special UN Envoy Kofi Annan, calling for the observance of human rights and socio-ecnomic developmentIt is safe to say (SA thatDIRCO Zuma’s 2012c South and e)Africa is not likely to attempt an ambitious foreign policy agenda, though it will undoubtedly seek to Itmaintain is safe ato position say that of Zuma’sfirst among South equals Africa on is thenot African likely to continent, attempt anas ambitiousis suggested foreign by the policy persistent agenda, atte thoughmpt in it March will undoubtedly and April 2012seek to maintainhave a Southa position African of first elected among as equals Secretary on the General African of continent, the African as is suggested by the persistent attempt in March and April 2012 to 37 have a South African elected as Secretary General of the African

37 Union. If South Africa can help to achieve for the rest of African Union. If South Africa can help to achieve for the rest of African continent what it has achieved for itself in terms of human rights and continent what it has achieved for itself in terms of human rights and democracy, that will be a boon to the people of Africa who, over the democracy, that will be a boon to the people of Africa who, over the last two hundred years, have suffered from almost every imaginable last two hundred years, have suffered from almost every imaginable human rights abuse. human rights abuse.

38 38

References

ReferencesAdebayo, Adekeye. (2007) South Africa and Nigeria in Africa: An Axis of Virtue South Africa in Africa. The Post- Adebayo, Apartheid Adekeye. Era, (2007) edited South by Africa Adebajo and Adekeye, Nigeria in Adebayo Africa: AnAdedeji Axis and of VirtueChris Landsberg.South Africa Cape in Town: Africa. University The Post of- ApartheidKwaZulu- Natal Era, Press.edited by Adebajo Adekeye, Adebayo Adedeji and Chris Landsberg. Cape Town: University of Adelmann,KwaZulu M. - 2004.Natal Press. ‘Quiet diplomacy: The reasons behind Mbeki’s Zimbabwe Policy’. Africa Spectrum 39, no. Adelmann, 2: 249 M.- 276. 2004. ‘Quiet diplomacy: The reasons behind Mbeki’s Zimbabwe Policy’. Africa Spectrum 39, no. African2: National 249-276. Congress. 1994. Foreign policy perspective in a democratic South Africa.” African Nationalhttp://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/policy/foreign Congress. 1994. Foreign policy perspective in a democratic South Africa.” Alden, C.http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/policy/foreign and Le Pere G. 2004. South Africa’s post-apart heid foreign policy: from reconciliation to ambiguity. In full flight: South Alden, C.African and Le foreign Pere G.policy 2004. after South apartheid, Africa’s posted.- apart W. Carlnaesheid foreign and policy:P. Nel, from 50-66. Southreconciliation Africa: Midrand. to ambiguity. In full flight: South African foreign policy after apartheid, ed. W. Carlnaes and Barkin, P. Samuel Nel, 50 - .66. (2009) South Realism,Africa: Midrand. Prediction and Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy Analysis. 5:233-246. Barkin, Samuel . (2009) Realism, Prediction and Foreign Policy. BBC NewsForeign "Dalai Policy Lama Analysis cancels. 5:233 South-246. Africa Tutu Trip over Visa", October 4, 2011 BBC Newswww.bbc.co.uk/news/world "Dalai Lama cancels South-africa Africa-15164383 Tutu Trip over Visa", October(accessed 4, 2011 Oct. 5, 2011) www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15164383 (accessed Oct. 5, 2011) 39

39 Bischoff , P. 2003. External and domestic sources of foreign policy Bischoff , P. 2003. External and domestic sources of foreign policy ambiguity: South African foreign policy and the projection of ambiguity: South African foreign policy and the projection of pluralist middle power. Politikon 30 no. 2: 183-201. pluralist middle power. Politikon 30 no. 2: 183-201.

(2009) Reform in Defence of Sovereignty: South Africa in the UN (2009) Reform in Defence of Sovereignty: South Africa in the UN Security council, 2007-2008. African Spectrum 44 (2): 95-110. Security council, 2007-2008. African Spectrum 44 (2): 95-110.

Bjourn, MǾller. 2009. The African Union as a Security Actor. African Bjourn, MǾller. 2009. The African Union as a Security Actor. African Solutions to African Problems? London School of Economics, Solutions to African Problems? London School of Economics, Crisis States Research Centre, Working Paper 2:57 Crisis States Research Centre, Working Paper 2:57 http://eprints.lse.ac/uk/28485/ (accessed April 29, 2012) http://eprints.lse.ac/uk/28485/ (accessed April 29, 2012)

Brysk, Alison. 2009. Global Good Samaritans: Human rights as Brysk, Alison. 2009. Global Good Samaritans: Human rights as foreign policy. New York: Oxford University Press. foreign policy. New York: Oxford University Press.

Finnemore, Martha. 1996 National Interests in International Society. Finnemore, Martha. 1996 National Interests in International Society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Flemes, D. 2009. ‘Regional power South Africa: Co-operative Flemes, D. 2009. ‘Regional power South Africa: Co-operative hegemony constrained by historical legacy’. Journal of hegemony constrained by historical legacy’. Journal of Contemporary African Studies 27, no. 2: 135-157. Contemporary African Studies 27, no. 2: 135-157.

Gaskarth, J. 2006 Discourses and Ethics: The Social Gaskarth, J. 2006 Discourses and Ethics: The Social Construction of British Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy Construction of British Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy Analysis 2:325-341. Analysis 2:325-341.

Geldenhuys, D. 2006. South Africa and Myanmar. Beware the Geldenhuys, D. 2006. South Africa and Myanmar. Beware the Politics of Perfidy. South African Journal of International Politics of Perfidy. South African Journal of International Affairs 13:2, 161-173. Affairs 13:2, 161-173.

40 40

Geldenhuys, D. 2008. The Idea-driven Foreign Policy of a Regional Power: the Case of South Africa. Paper Geldenhuys, presented D. 2008. to the The Regional Idea-driven Powers Foreign Network Policy at of the a RegionalGerman Institute Power: of t heGlobal Case and of Area South Studies, Africa. Hamburg, Paper presentedGermany, Sept. to the 15 -16, Regional 2008. Powers Network at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, Gevisser,Germany, M. 2007. Sept. Thabo 15-16, Mbeki.2008. The Dream Deferred. J ohannesburg: Jonathan Ball. Gevisser, M. 2007. Thabo Mbeki. The Dream Deferred. J Gevisseohannesburg:r, Mark. 2009. Jonathan A Legacy Ball. of l iberation. Thabo Mbeki and the Future of the South African Dream. New York: Gevisse Palgraver, Mark. 2009.Macmillan. A Legacy of liberation. Thabo Mbeki and the Future of the South African Dream. New York: Glaser, PalgraveD. 2010. Macmillan.“Mbeki and his Legacy. A Critical Introduction.” In Mbeki and After. Reflections on the Legacy of Thabo Glaser, MbekiD. 2010., ed. “Mbeki Daryl Glasaer.and his Legacy. Johannesberg: A Critical Wits Introduction.” University InPress, Mbeki pp.3 and-40. After. Reflections on the Legacy of Thabo Mbeki, ed. Daryl Glasaer. Johannesberg: Wits University Gruzd , Press,S. 2009. pp.3 ‘South-40. Africa: is Zuma’s foreign policy a change of style or substance?’AllAfrica. Com Gruzd, S. 2009. ‘South Africa: is Zuma’s foreign policy a change Habib, A.of style and Selinyaneor substance?’ N. 2006.AllAfrica. ‘Constraining Com the unconstrained: civil society and South Africa’s hegemonic obligations in Habib, A.Africa’. and SelinyaneIn full flight: N. 2006. South ‘Constraining African foreign the unconstrained: policy after apartheidcivil society, ed. and W. South Carlnaes Africa’s and hegemonicP. Nel, 175 obligations-94. Midrand, in Africa’.South Africa: In full Institute flight: for South Global AfricanDialogue. foreign policy after apartheid, ed. W. Carlnaes and P. Nel, 175-94. Midrand, South Africa: Institute for Global Dialogue.

41

41 Hamil, J. and John H. 2009 ‘Quiet Diplomacy’ or Appeasement? Hamil, J. and John H. 2009 ‘Quiet Diplomacy’ or Appeasement? South African Policy towards Zimbabwe, The Round Table, South African Policy towards Zimbabwe, The Round Table, 98:402, 373-384 98:402, 373-384

Howarth, A. 2008. ‘Foreign policy, identity and the media: Howarth, A. 2008. ‘Foreign policy, identity and the media: Contestation over Zimbabwe’ in Power, politics and Identity in Contestation over Zimbabwe’ in Power, politics and Identity in South African Media, eds. Hadland et al, Cape Town: HSRC South African Media, eds. Hadland et al, Cape Town: HSRC Press. Press.

Iran: Turkcell's case against MTN. 2012. Text of complaint filed in US Iran: Turkcell's case against MTN. 2012. Text of complaint filed in US District Court of Columbia, Washington DC, March 28 [2012] District Court of Columbia, Washington DC, March 28 [2012] www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page7 www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page7 1619?oid=290033&sn=Detail&pid=71616 (accessed May 7, 1619?oid=290033&sn=Detail&pid=71616 (accessed May 7, 2012) 2012)

Human rights Watch 2008. Letter to Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Human rights Watch 2008. Letter to Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa, Feb. 13. of South Africa, Feb. 13.

Jepperson, R. L., Alexander W. and Peter J. K. 1996. Norms, identity Jepperson, R. L., Alexander W. and Peter J. K. 1996. Norms, identity and culture in national security. In The Culture of national and culture in national security. In The Culture of national security. Norms and identity in world politics, edited by Peter security. Norms and identity in world politics, edited by Peter Katzentein. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 33-75. Katzentein. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 33-75.

Johnson, S. 2008. ‘Transforming Jacob Zuma; Once touted as the Johnson, S. 2008. ‘Transforming Jacob Zuma; Once touted as the man who’d ruin South Africa, Zuma has remade himself as man who’d ruin South Africa, Zuma has remade himself as mainstream moderate’. Newsweek 152, 12. mainstream moderate’. Newsweek 152, 12.

Keohane, R. 1986. Neorealism and its critics. New York: Columbia Keohane, R. 1986. Neorealism and its critics. New York: Columbia University Press. University Press.

42 42

Klotz, A. 2004. ‘State identity in South African foreign policy’. In South African foreign and security policies in the post-apartheid era, Klotz, A.ed. 2004. W. Carlsnaes‘State identity et al. in South African foreign policy’. In South African foreign and security policies in the post-apartheid era, Landsberg, ed. W. C. Carlsnaes 2000 Promoting et al. Democracy: The Mandela-Mbeki Doctrine. Journal of Democracy 11 (3): 213-39. Landsberg, C. 2000 Promoting Democracy: The Mandela-Mbeki (2010) ThaboDoctrine. M Journalbeki’s Legacyof Democracy of Transformational 11 (3): 213-39. Diplomacy. In (2010) Mbeki and After. Reflections on the Legacy of Thabo (2010) ThaboMbeki, M editedbeki’s Legacy by Daryl of Transformational Glasaer. Johannesberg: Diplomacy. Wits In University(2010) Mbeki Press, and pp. After. 209 -Reflections241. on the Legacy of Thabo Mbeki, edited by Daryl Glasaer. Johannesberg: Wits South University Africa's 'AfricanPress, pp. Agenda: 209-241. Challenges of Policy and Implementation. Paper Prepared for the Presidency Fifteen South Year Africa's 'African Review Agenda: Project, Challenges available of Policy online: and Implementation.http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/docume Paper Prepared for the Presidency Fifteen Yearnts/d -za/dv/3 Review_african_agen/3_african_agenda.pdf Project, available (accessed online: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/docume21 December 2011). nts/d-za/dv/3_african_agen/3_african_agenda.pdf (accessed Levi, M.21 1997. December A model, 2011). a method, and a map: rational choice in comparative and historical analysis. In Comparative politics: Levi, M.r ationality, 1997. A culture, model, aand method, structure. and ed. a M. map: Lichbach rational choiceand in comparativeA. Zuckerman. and Cambridge: historical analysis. Cambridge In Comparative University p Press,olitics: rpp.19ationality,-41. culture, and structure. ed. M. Lichbach and A. Zuckerman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Lipton, Merle.pp.19- 41. 2009. Understanding South Africa's foreign policy: the perplexing case of Zimbabwe, South African Journal of Lipton, Merle.International 2009. AffairsUnderstanding, 16:3, 331 South-346 Africa's foreign policy: the perplexing case of Zimbabwe, South African Journal of International Affairs, 16:3, 331-346 43

43 Lobell, S. E., Norris M. RIPSMAN AND JEFFREY W. TALIAFERRO. Lobell, S. E., Norris M. RIPSMAN AND JEFFREY W. TALIAFERRO. (2007) The statesman, the state and the balance of power: (2007) The statesman, the state and the balance of power: Neoclassical realism and the politics of grand strategic Neoclassical realism and the politics of grand strategic adjustment. Paper Delivered to the International security and adjustment. Paper Delivered to the International security and arms control annual conference, Montreal, Canada, Oct. 19- arms control annual conference, Montreal, Canada, Oct. 19- 20, 2007. 20, 2007.

Mandela, N. (1993) South African foreign policy. Foreign Affairs Mandela, N. (1993) South African foreign policy. Foreign Affairs November/December (1999) Opening sessions of Parliament, November/December (1999) Opening sessions of Parliament, Cape Town 5 February. Cape Town 5 February.

Mastanduno, M. (1997) Preserving the Unipolar Moment. Realist Mastanduno, M. (1997) Preserving the Unipolar Moment. Realist theories and U.S. grand strategy after the cold war. theories and U.S. grand strategy after the cold war. International security. 21(4):49-88. International security. 21(4):49-88.

Mbeki, M. & Sidiropoulos E. 2008. An alternative foreign policy. South Mbeki, M. & Sidiropoulos E. 2008. An alternative foreign policy. South African Institute of International Affairs: 1-4. African Institute of International Affairs: 1-4.

McKinley, D. (2004).South African Foreign Policy towards Zimbabwe McKinley, D. (2004).South African Foreign Policy towards Zimbabwe under Mbeki. Review of African Political Economy 31, under Mbeki. Review of African Political Economy 31, No.100:357-364. No.100:357-364.

Moloto, J. 2010. The South African miracle sixteen years later: A case Moloto, J. 2010. The South African miracle sixteen years later: A case study in leadership. [Lecture delivered at Duke University, study in leadership. [Lecture delivered at Duke University, April 20] hyperlink "http://saembassy.ogt11.com/?p=675" April 20] hyperlink "http://saembassy.ogt11.com/?p=675" http://saembassy.ogt11.com/?p=675 (accessed Nov.8, 2010) http://saembassy.ogt11.com/?p=675 (accessed Nov.8, 2010)

Morgenthau, Hans Joachim. 1993. Politics among nations: the Morgenthau, Hans Joachim. 1993. Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace. New York: McGraw Hill. struggle for power and peace. New York: McGraw Hill. Revised by Kenneth W. Thompson. Brief edition. Revised by Kenneth W. Thompson. Brief edition. 44 44

Naidoo, S. 2012. Whistle-blower played an ace. Mail & Guardian, April 5-12:2.

Nathan,Naidoo, S. L. 2012. 2005. Whistle Consistency-blower andplayed inconsistencies an ace. Mail & in Guardian South African, April foreign5-12:2. policy. International Affairs 81, no. 2: 361-372.

Nathan,2008. ‘Anti L.- i 2005.mperialism Consistency trumps human and inconsistencies rights: South Africa’s in South approach African foreignto the Darfur policy. Intconflict’.ernational Working Affairs Paper81, no. 31.2: 361 Crisis-372. States Research Centre. Development Studies Institute. 2008. ‘Anti-imperialism trumps human rights: South Africa’s approach Philip N.,to Taylorthe Darfur I. and Vanconflict’. Der W Workingesthuizen Paper J. (2001) 31. Crisis States ReformistResearch Centre.Initiatives Development and South Africa’s Studies Multilateral Institute. Diplomacy: A Framework for Understanding. In South Africa's Multilateral Philip N.,Diplomacy Taylor I. and and Van Global Der W Change:esthuizen The J. (2001) Limit of Reformism, Reformistedited by NelInitiatives Philip, andIan TaylorSouth andAfrica’s Janis Multilateral van der W Diplomacy:esthuizen. AAldershot: Framework Ashgate. for Understanding. In South Africa's Multilateral Diplomacy and Global Change: The Limit of Reformism, Nieuwkerk, edited Anthoni by Nel Van.Philip, (2004)Ian Taylor South and Africa'sJanis van National der Westhuizen. Interest. Aldershot:African Security Ashgate. Review 13 (2): 80-101.

(2007)Nieuwkerk, A Critique Anthoni of South Van. Africa's (2004) SouthRole on Africa's the UN NationalSecurity Council. Interest. SouthAfrican African Security Journal Review of International13 (2): 80-101. Affai rs 14 (1): 61-77.

Ploch,(2007) L.A (2011)Critique South of South Africa: Africa's Current Role Issues on theand UN U.S. Security Relations. Council. SouthCongressional African Journal Research of International Service. Affairs 14 (1): 61-77.

Ploch, L. (2011) South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations. Congressional Research Service.

45

45 Olivier, G., and Geldenhuys D. 1997. South Africa’s foreign policy: Olivier, G., and Geldenhuys D. 1997. South Africa’s foreign policy: From idealism to pragmatism. Business and the From idealism to pragmatism. Business and the Contemporary World 9: 107-17. Contemporary World 9: 107-17.

Pierson, P. 2000. Increasing returns, path dependencies and the Pierson, P. 2000. Increasing returns, path dependencies and the study of politics. American Political Science Review study of politics. American Political Science Review 94(2):251-267. 94(2):251-267.

Prys, M. 2009. Regional hegemon or regional bystander: South Prys, M. 2009. Regional hegemon or regional bystander: South Africa’s Zimbabwe. Policy 2000–2005. Politikon 36 (2): 193- Africa’s Zimbabwe. Policy 2000–2005. Politikon 36 (2): 193- 218. 218.

Rose, G. 1998, Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy. Rose, G. 1998, Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy. World Politics 51:144-172. World Politics 51:144-172.

Rossouw, M. 2010. SA 'Bungled' Iranian Sanctions. Mail & Guardian. Rossouw, M. 2010. SA 'Bungled' Iranian Sanctions. Mail & Guardian. October 15 to 21. October 15 to 21.

Ruggie, J G. 1998. What makes the world hang together? Neo- Ruggie, J G. 1998. What makes the world hang together? Neo- utilitarianism and the social constructivist challenge. utilitarianism and the social constructivist challenge. International Organization 52 (4):855-885. International Organization 52 (4):855-885.

Sasman, C. 2012. Zuma solicits regional support on Zimbabwe. The Sasman, C. 2012. Zuma solicits regional support on Zimbabwe. The Namibian, Feb. 24, 2012. www.namibian.comm.na.news/full- Namibian, Feb. 24, 2012. www.namibian.comm.na.news/full- story/archive/2012/february/article/ zuma-solicits…. (accessed story/archive/2012/february/article/ zuma-solicits…. (accessed Feb. 25, 2012) Feb. 25, 2012)

Sidiropoulos, E. 2008. ‘South African foreign policy in the post-Mbeki Sidiropoulos, E. 2008. ‘South African foreign policy in the post-Mbeki period’. South African-Journal of International Affairs 15 (2): period’. South African-Journal of International Affairs 15 (2): 107-120. 107-120. 46 46

Sikkink, K. 1991 Ideas and institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Sikkink, K. 1991 Ideas and institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil South Africa.and Argentina. Department Ithaca: of InternationalCornell University Relations. Press. 2009. Strategic Plan 2009-2012. [Pretoria] South Africa. Department of International Relations. 2009. Strategic South Africa.Plan 2009 Department-2012. [Pretoria] of International Relations. 2012a South African Government’s Response to the Recent Military South Africa.Confrontation Department between of International the Republic Relations. of Sudan 2012a and South AfricanSudan. www.dfa.gov.z Government’sa/docs/2012/suda0402.html Response to the Recent (accessed Military ConfrontationApril 29, 2012) between the Republic of Sudan and South Sudan. www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2012/suda0402.html (accessed South Africa.April 29,Department 2012) of International Relations. 2012b Speech by Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Ms Maite South Africa.Nkoana Department-Mashabane, of International on South Relations. Africa’s Foreign 2012b Speech Policy by at MinisterAtlantic Clubof International in Sofia, Republic Relations of Bulgariaand Cooperation, on 2nd September Ms Maite Nkoana2011. -Mashabane,www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2011/mash0902.html on South Africa’s Foreign Policy at Atlantic(accessed Club April in Sofia,29, 2012) Republic of Bulgaria on 2nd September 2011.South Africa.www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2011/mash0902.html Department of International Relations. 2012c) (accessedStatement Aprilby International 29, 2012) Relations and Cooperation Deputy SouthMinister Africa. Marius Department Fransman ofat the International High Level Relations. Segment 20of12c) the Statement19th Session by International of the United Relations Nations and Human Cooperation Rights Council, Deputy MinisterGeneva, Marius Switzerland Fransman, Wednesday, at the High Level 29 FebruarySegment of 2012. the 19th/www.dfa.gov.za/doc Session of the s/speeches/2012/frans0229.html United Nations Human Rights Council, Geneva,(accessed SwitzerlandApril 29, 2012), Wednesday, 29 February 2012. South/www.dfa.gov.za/doc Africa. Departments/speeches/2012/frans0229.html of International Relations. 2012d. (accessedDeputy Minister April 29,Ebrahim 2012) Ebrahim concludes his working visit toSouth Africa. Saudi Department Arabia. of International May Relations. 2, 2012d. 2012. Deputy Minister Ebrahim Ebrahim concludes his working visit to Saudi Arabia. May 2, 2012. 47

47 www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2012/saud0502.html (accessed April 29, www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2012/saud0502.html (accessed April 29, 2012) 2012)

South Africa. Department of International Relations. 2012e. Briefing South Africa. Department of International Relations. 2012e. Briefing on International Relations Matters. March 22, 2012. on International Relations Matters. March 22, 2012. www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2012/ebra0322.html www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2012/ebra0322.html (accessed Apri; 29, 2012) (accessed Apri; 29, 2012) Spencer, J. 2004. South Africa’s foreign policy: vision and Spencer, J. 2004. South Africa’s foreign policy: vision and reality. In Sidiropoulos, E. ed., Apartheid past, renaissance reality. In Sidiropoulos, E. ed., Apartheid past, renaissance future: South Africa’s foreign policy 1994 - 2004. future: South Africa’s foreign policy 1994 - 2004. Johannesburg: South African Institute for International Johannesburg: South African Institute for International Relations. Relations.

Stairs, D. 1982 The political culture of Canadian foreign policy. Stairs, D. 1982 The political culture of Canadian foreign policy. Canadian Journal of Political Science 15 (4): 667-690. Canadian Journal of Political Science 15 (4): 667-690.

Tsygankov, A. P. and Matthew Tarver-Wahlquist. (2009) Duelling Tsygankov, A. P. and Matthew Tarver-Wahlquist. (2009) Duelling honors power, identity and the Russia-Georgia Divide. honors power, identity and the Russia-Georgia Divide. Foreign policy analysis. 5:307-326. Foreign policy analysis. 5:307-326.

Vale, P. 2010. Thabo Mbeki and the great foreign policy riddle. In Vale, P. 2010. Thabo Mbeki and the great foreign policy riddle. In Mbeki and After. Reflections on the Legacy of Thabo Mbeki, Mbeki and After. Reflections on the Legacy of Thabo Mbeki, ed. Daryl Glaser. Johannesberg: Wits University Press, ed. Daryl Glaser. Johannesberg: Wits University Press, pp.242-262. pp.242-262.

Venter, D. 2001. South African foreign Policy: Decision making in the Venter, D. 2001. South African foreign Policy: Decision making in the African context. In African foreign Policies: Power and African context. In African foreign Policies: Power and process, ed. Gilbert Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons. Boulder: process, ed. Gilbert Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Lynne Rienner.

48 48

Von Hau, M., James S. and David H. 2012. Beyond the BRICs: Alternative strategies of influence in the global politics of Von Hau,development. M., James European S. and David Journal H. of 2012. Development Beyond the Research. BRICs: 24:187Alternative-204. strategies of influence in the global politics of development. European Journal of Development Research. Waltz, Kenneth24:187-204. N. 1979 Theory of international politics. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Publishing. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979 Theory of international politics. Toronto: Waltz, KMcGraw. N. 2000-Hill Structural Publishing. realism after the cold war. International Security 25(1):5-41. Waltz, K. N. 2000 Structural realism after the cold war. International Security 25(1):5-41. Wendt, A. 1992 Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics. International Organization Wendt, 46(2): A. 1992391 -425 Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics. International Organization Wendt, 46(2): Alexander.391-425 1994 . Collective identity formation and the international state. American Political Science Review Wendt, 88(2):384 Alexander.-396. 1994 . Collective identity formation and the international state. American Political Science Review Williams,88(2):384 M. C. 2005-396. The realist tradition and the limits of international relations. Cambridge; Cambridge University Press. Williams, M. C. 2005 The realist tradition and the limits of international rWilliams,elations. Cambridge; P. 2000. SouthCambridge Africa’s Univ foreignersity Press. policy: getting critical? Politikon 27: 1. Williams, P. 2000. South Africa’s foreign policy: getting critical? Yoh, J. Politikon G. Nyuot. 27: n.d. 1. South Africa’s foreign Policy towards Sudan. www.johngaiyoh.com.pdf/South%20Africa’s%20foreign%20po Yoh, J. G. Nyuot. n.d. South Africa’s foreign Policy towards Sudan. www.johngaiyoh.com.pdf/South%20Africa’s%20foreign%20po 49

49 licy%20towards?Sudan.pdf?PHPSESSID+putki848kn70foiqbs licy%20towards?Sudan.pdf?PHPSESSID+putki848kn70foiqbs 8po9op (accessed Dec. 10, 2011) 8po9op (accessed Dec. 10, 2011)

50 50

OTHER PUBLICATIONS IN THE SERIES

OTHER1. Brown,PUBLICATIONS M. J. (1989). IN THE Social SERIES Work and Society with Some Implications for Botswana. 1.2. Brown,Datta, A. M. (1989). J. (1989). Research Social for Development Work and Society for Research with Some and Implicationsthe Development for Botswana. of Research. 2.3. Datta,Takirambudde, A. (1989). P Research N. (1991). for The Development Legal Order for inResearch Africa: Theand theCurrent Development Crisis and of Future Research. Prospects. 4.3. PerringsTakirambudde,, C. (1992). P N. Which(1991). way The Botswana? Legal Order The in Africa:Role of Thethe RuralCurrent Economy Crisis and in theFuture Post Prospects.-Diamond Era. 5.4. Rempe,Perrings , H.C. (1993).(1992). BankruptingWhich way Botswana? the Poor: International The Role of Debt the andRural the Economy Lower Income in the Post Classes.-Diamond Era. 5.6. Rempe,Hutton, M. H. (1994). (1993). Social Bankrupting Work: An the Extension Poor: International of Community. Debt 7. Fubura,and the Lower B A Income (1994) Classes. Organisations as Reflections of 6. Management?Hutton, M. (1994). Social Work: An Extension of Community. 7.8. Fubura,Taiwo, A. BA. (1994). A (1994) Beyond Organisations Cognition in Science as Reflections Education. of 9. Management?Sinha, S. K. (1994). Probability, Statistics and Inference 10.8. Taiwo,Monu, EA. D A. (1994). (1994). The Beyond Technology Cognition Gap in in Science Agriculture: Education. Who is 9. Sinha,to Blame? S. K. (1994). Probability, Statistics and Inference 10.11. Monu,Devan, E K.D (1994). R. S. The (1996) Technology. On the Gap Quest in Agriculture: for a Theory Who ofis toEverything. Blame? 11.12. Devan,Batibo, H. K. M. R. (1997). S. (1996) The. Role On of the Language Quest for in the a TheoryDiscovery of Everything.of Cultural History: Reconstructing Setswana Speakers’ 12. Batibo,Cultural H. Past. M. (1997). The Role of Language in the Discovery 13. ofEyeson, Cultural K. N. History: (1998). ReconstructingAn Exploration of Setswana Life – For Better Speakers’ For Culturalworse Past. 13.14. Eyeson,Akinpelu, K. A.N. J.(1998). (1998). An EquityExploration and of Quality Life – For in Better University For worseContinuing Education. 14. Akinpelu, A. J. (1998). Equity and Quality in University Continuing Education. 51

51 15. Youngman F (1998) Old dogs and new tricks? Life-long education for all – The challenge facing Adult Education in Botswana 16. Adeyemi, M. D. (2010). Social Studies as Pedagogy for Effective Citizenship 17. Quansah E.K. (2010). Rethinking Matrimonial Property Rights on Divorce in Botswana 18. Morton R. F. (2011). The Future of History

52 Professor Edelgard Mahant holds a PHD in International Relations with specialization in international relations and comparative politics from the London School of Economics and Political Science. Her interest in international relations stems from the fact that she was born into the European maelstrom during World War II. Her books include Number 19 Birthmarks of Europe, a study of the origins of the European Union (2004) and Invisible and Inaudible in Washington (co-authored with SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY: Graeme Mount in 1999) which is a study of American policies towards NATIONAL INTEREST VERSUS Canada. Her current research interests include a general book on foreign policy, a project she has dreamt of for years. NATIONAL IDENTITY

Professor Edelgard Mahant has taught at the following institutions: Laurentian University in Northern Ontario (1969-1990), where she progressed through the INAUGURAL LECTURE ranks to become Full Professor; York University in Toronto, Canada (1990-2007); Baptist University in Hong Kong; and the Institut d’Etudes Politiques in Rennes, France which has an exchange agreement with the University of Botswana. She has been with the University of Botswana since BY 2008. Edelgard Mahant

21 March 2012

Centre for Continuing Education Centre for Continuing Education, University of Botswana ISBN: 978 99912 485 8 5