Secretary of Defense , left, and President . Laird was a zealous advocate of By John T. Correll A South Vietnamese UH-1H helicopter in flight over Southeast Asia in August 1971. . to extricate the United States from Viet- Van Thieu took exception to the term Over the next four years, Laird would out in cooperation with the South Viet- US MILITARY PERSONNEL If the Vietnamese nam. Nixon had no desire to continue because, he said, it implied that up to be the strongest advocate for Vietnam- namese for the complete withdrawal took over the war, the war. The question was how to get then, the US had done all of the fight- ization. In May 1969, he informed the of all US combat ground forces, and IN out of it with what he called “peace ing alone. kept using that Vietnamizing their replacement by South Vietnamese 600,000 the Americans with honor.” the word anyway on the basis that it the war was the highest priority of the forces.” As Nixon’s national security advisor, referred only to “the assumption by Department of Defense. The first US troop withdrawal—800 could go home. Henry A. Kissinger, explained later, the Vietnamese of that portion of the In August, Laird rewrote the mission men from the 9th Infantry Division— 536,134 “America, the bulwark of free people war effort carried on previously by the statement for US forces in Southeast was on July 8, 1969. t was a strange war that Richard M. everywhere, could not, because it was United States.” Asia. Previously, the objective had been Nixon’s intention was for the mutual 500,000 Nixon inherited when he began his weary, simply walk away from a small to defeat the enemy. The new mission, withdrawal of US and North Vietnamese 475,219 Ipresidency in 1969. His predeces- ally, the commitments of a decade, THE BIG SWITCH as Kissinger explained it, “focused on forces, but refused to cooperate. sor, Lyndon B. Johnson, had given up 45,000 casualties, and the anguish of The Vietnamization policy was decid- providing ‘maximum assistance’ to the “The demand for mutual withdrawal on winning, called off the air campaign their families whose sacrifices would ed upon at a National Security Council South Vietnamese to strengthen their grew hollow as unilateral withdrawal 400,000 against , and opened be retroactively rendered meaningless.” meeting in March 1969. The timetable forces, supporting pacification efforts, accelerated,” Kissinger said. negotiations with the enemy. The solution was seen to be “Viet- set by the called for the and reducing the flow of supplies to “Withdrawals would become like North Vietnam, encouraged and em- namization.” If South Vietnam could program to start in July with a comple- the enemy.” salted peanuts to the American public,” 334,591 boldened, was not interested in a peace be enabled to take over the war and tion date sometime between December In a speech in November, Nixon de- Kissinger added. “The more troops we settlement unless all of its war aims persuaded to do so, US forces could pull 1970 and . clared, “In the previous administration, withdrew, the more would be expected. 300,000 were met—in effect, the unconditional out and go home. In the first phase, South Vietnam we Americanized the war in Vietnam; withdrawal of US forces and surrender Credit for the “Vietnamization” term would take over responsibility for the in this administration, we are Vietnam- THE US DRAWDOWN of the South Vietnamese government is usually given to Secretary of Defense ground war. Phase two would include izing the search for peace. ... Under US troop strength in Vietnam peaked in Saigon. Melvin R. Laird, who proposed it as an a buildup of the South Vietnamese air the plan, I ordered first a substantial at 543,000 in April 1969. By the end of 200,000 To make matters worse, former mem- improvement on “de-Americanization,” force. In the final phase, US presence increase in the training and equipment the year, a net reduction of about 7,000 184,314 bers of the Johnson administration suggested previously. would be reduced to a military advisory of South Vietnamese forces. ... We have had been achieved. Units not yet with- 156,776 demanded that Nixon move promptly South Vietnamese President Nguyen mission. adopted a plan which we have worked drawn continued to receive new arrivals

100,000

24,172 49 0 ’65 ’68 ’69 ’70 ’71 ’72 ’73 (June)

Except for 1973, numbers are as of Dec. 31 for each year. Photos: USAF/National Archives; Oliver F. Atkins White House via National Archives National via House White Atkins Archives;Photos: Oliver F. USAF/National Vietnam60 AUGUST 2017 H WWW.AIRFORCEMAG.COM IZATION AUGUST 2017 H WWW.AIRFORCEMAG.COM 61 Buildup of the Vietnamese Air Force ARVN AND THE RUFF PUFFS April 1971, reported that USAF generals (VNAF) was more complicated. Prior 1968 1972 1975 regarded South Vietnamese pilots as to 1965, the VNAF was an all-propeller Number of Personnel 606,100 1,061,400 662,600 “the elite of their nation’s armed forces” force, mainly flying T-28 and A-1 fight- Main Force ARVN 302,000 535,500 180,600 and “among the most professional fly- er-bombers and attack aircraft and Regional Forces 152,200 282,100 289,000 ers in the world.” Their experience was C-47 transports. VNAF was a limited Popular Forces 151,900 243,800 193,000 measured in years rather than months capability force, configured to deliver Tanks — 550 350 and some of them had logged as many APCs — 900 880 limited firepower in support of ground as 4,000 combat missions. The “Ruff Puffs”—Regional Forces and Popular Forces territorial militia—fought the Viet Cong in the countryside. The troops against a lightly armed enemy. Army of Vietnam (ARVN) took over when significant numbers of the enemy were concentrated against district and province The assessment was considerably The South Vietnamese obtained centers. more negative from junior officers and jets—A-37 attack aircraft and F-5 fight- NCOs engaged in training the ground ers, both modifications of US Air Force forces. Some ARVN units and leaders trainers—between 1966 and 1968 but Vietnamese population and economy the M-48 tank’s ‘ballistic computer,’ were good, but too many soldiers were did not possess them in significant could support. for example, than to render it as an deficient in everything from marksman- numbers until Vietnamization began. The US dumped resources and ‘adding machine.’ As late as May 1971, ship to tactics and taking care of their UH-1 Huey helicopters replaced the responsibilities on the South Viet- almost 6,000 pages of helicopter main- equipment. “Vietnamization is a word older H-34s. AC-47 and AC-119 gun- namese faster than they could ab- tenance and repair manuals had yet to for the politicians,” one major told The ships were added as well. sorb them. With the possibility of a be translated.” New York Times. VNAF was built strictly to defend peace agreement suddenly looming Poor maintenance was a continuing There were also reservations about South Vietnam. It did not have the capa- in 1972, almost 700 additional air- deficiency, especially on the Huey heli- the combat effectiveness of Vietnam- bility to strike North Vietnam on its own planes—including improved model copters, which were the most numerous ese airmen. As shoulder-fired SAM- or to conduct interdiction missions in F-5E fighters—were delivered within aircraft in the VNAF fleet and which re- 7 anti-aircraft missiles became more high-threat areas like Laos. “In the time a few months, anticipating that a quired extensive service. At times in the prevalent, VNAF pilots were reluctant remaining, we’re not going to create cease-fire would impose restrictions 1970s, half of the Hueys were grounded to go below 10,000 feet to launch close a force that will take the place of the on military assistance and the further with mechanical failures. air support strikes. Accuracy was not A US instructor teaches South Vietnamese pilots about a Cessna A-37 light force that’s here now,” Air Force Gen. provision of equipment. Yet another kind of problem was possible from such altitudes. attack aircraft. In the process of Vietnamization, the final phase would see the US George S. Brown, who was the deputy “This force, although stretched by military role reduced to that of an advisory position. commander for air ops at Military As- the expansion, was considered to be “THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE WERE sistance Command Vietnam (MACV), capable of providing close air support as replacements for troops rotating USAF historian Elizabeth H. Hartsook. said in 1970. in an effective manner,” said USAF Gen. NOT IMPROVING AS FAST AS THE home at the end of their one-year tours. “But Air Force commitments continued Thieu asked for high-performance William W. Momyer in a postwar anal- Nearly all of the early reductions were to increase.” F-4 fighters but he did not get them. ysis. “It was not considered, however, US FORCES WERE WITHDRAWING.” ground forces. Airpower was drawn The Army had a different problem Among other considerations, F-4s were that VNAF would be able to provide ­—USAF historian Elizabeth H. Hartsook down more slowly and assumed a great- in the drawdown: the breakdown of “grossly beyond current VNAF mainte- the highly sophisticated support that ... er share of the American involvement morale and discipline among troops nance capabilities,” historian Hartsook USAF repeatedly did when there was a created by service politics. Thieu was On balance, Hartsook said, “The in the war. The level of US Air Force who were reluctant to engage in combat said. major engagement.” an army general and the army was his South Vietnamese were not improving presence in country did not change to buy time for the South Vietnamese VNAF coped reasonably well with power base. He effectively sidelined as fast as the US forces were withdraw- much. In fact, the aggregate number of in a war the US was no longer trying to the changes and in 1971, flew 63 per- TRAINING AND OTHER ISSUES and isolated others, such as his rival, ing.” US aircraft in South Vietnam increased win. The most extreme manifestation cent of the combat air sorties in South The rapid expansion of the South Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, and by 40 in 1969. of this was “fragging” attacks on those Vietnam. Vietnamese forces created a huge new put his own people in positions of DECLARING SUCCESS Ever since the Rolling Thunder air perceived as overzealous to fight. In Airfields and base facilities were training requirement, of which instruc- authority. Further evaluation of Vietnamiza- campaign against North Vietnam end- 1970, there were 209 instances of “frag- transferred as well. By November 1972, tion for aircrews and technicians was “What counted for Mr. Thieu was per- tion was based on South Vietnamese ed in 1968, aircraft from USAF units ging” with 45 killed, mostly officers USAF had turned over to the South the most difficult part. sonal loyalty, so generals in the South participation in three broader military in South Vietnam and Thailand and and NCOs. Vietnamese all installations except for Through 1975, VNAF continued to Vietnamese army and provincial chiefs operations during the transition peri- from Navy carriers offshore had been Laird reminded commanders that Tan Son Nhut in Saigon, where 7th Air send several hundred officers a year in the South Vietnamese government od: the incursions into Cambodia in available for operations in the South “the chief mission of our forces in South Force and MACV were headquartered. to the United States for undergraduate tended to be promoted on the basis of 1970 and Laos in 1971, and the “Easter and for interdiction of the Ho Chi Minh Vietnam continues to be to [ensure] the The strength of the South Vietnamese pilot training. At the same time, South their allegiance to Mr. Thieu rather than invasion” from North Vietnam in 1972. Trail in Laos. success of Vietnamization.” forces peaked in 1972 at just over a mil- Vietnam began to develop an aircrew merit,” said Fox Butterfield of The New In Cambodia, ARVN performed ef- Some of the older USAF aircraft were lion, close to the 1.1 million calculated training program of its own. After pri- York Times. “It was an old-fashioned, fectively alongside US ground forces in pulled out or transferred to the Viet- THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE by US planners as the limit the South mary training in the T-41D Mescalero Confucian system, often greased by the destruction of enemy sanctuaries namese but the principal fighter and at- BUILDUP at Nha Trang, fledgling airmen went corruption.” and supply bases. In Laos, the search- tack platforms in South Vietnam—F-4s, Between 1968 and 1972, the per- GROWTH OF THE VNAF to Phan Rang and the T-37 trainer for and-destroy ground operation against F-100Ds, and A-37s—took on a stronger sonnel strength of the Army of the AIRCRAFT SQUADRONS PERSONNEL transition to F-5s and A-37s. ESTIMATES OF PROGRESS the was conducted role than before. B-52 bombers flying Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and the 1962 70 8 4,000 Training for mechanics and other Opinions were divided about the by the South Vietnamese army—the from bases in , Thailand, and “Ruff Puffs”—the Regional Forces and 1966 393 16 15,000 technical specialists was conducted progress of Vietnamization. Gen. use of US ground forces in Laos having Okinawa provided an exceptionally Popular Forces territorial militia—in- 1968 362 17 16,200 in English. This left instruction open Creighton W. Abrams of MACV and been specifically forbidden by an act lethal form of close air support. creased by about 75 percent. 1970 746 37 29,000 only to those who were proficient in Adm. John S. McCain, commander of of Congress—supported by American The nature of the drawdown creat- The United States transferred large 1972 2,075 47 47,000 English, but the practice was kept for US Pacific Command, said the program airpower and logistics. Some units did ed a unique resource problem for the numbers of weapons, 44,000 radio sets, 1973 1,769 64 61,700 several reasons. was working. Laird, returning from a well; others did not. 1975 1,673 65 63,000 Air Force. “The other services were and 1,800 tanks to the South Vietnam- “The Vietnamese language, reflect- visit to Saigon in 1971, said Vietnam- The more critical test came in March The “Enhance Plus” surge in 1972 dumped aircraft and cutting back on their SEA [Southeast ese ground forces. The Ruff Puffs were equipment on the South Vietnamese Air Force faster than ing its society, had not developed ization was “on schedule or ahead of 1972 with a three-pronged invasion Asia] commitments drastically and able to replace their World War II vin- they could be absorbed. Between June and December, words for sophisticated technology,” schedule in all respects.” by the North Vietnamese across the VNAF gained 678 additional airplanes. Thereafter, some could devote their money and efforts to tage M-1 Garands and Thompson sub- aircraft were lost to attrition and others were redistributed said journalist David Fulghum. “The historian Kenneth Demilitarized Zone and eastward out neglected future force planning,” said machine guns with M-16 assault rifles. in a realignment of assets and squadrons. language could come no closer to Sams, writing in Air Force Magazine in of Laos and Cambodia. Air Force of US the Museum National Photo:

62 AUGUST 2017 H WWW.AIRFORCEMAG.COM AUGUST 2017 H WWW.AIRFORCEMAG.COM 63 Most of the US ground forces were already gone, so it was up to the South Vietnamese and US airpower to repel the attack. They succeeded in doing so but the key factor was clearly airpower. “From the Easter offensive of 1972, it was apparent that the ARVN couldn’t stand up to the North Vietnamese with- out continuous and massive air sup- port,” Momyer said. “ARVN was most dependent upon airpower and gen- erally would not initiate major attacks unless airpower was assured.” The last US Army combat troops left Vietnam in August 1972 and most of the remaining US Air Force contingent in Southeast Asia was in Thailand. In November, seeking to persuade Thieu to support a peace agreement, Nixon gave him “absolute assurance” that “if Hanoi fails to abide by the terms of the agreement, it is my intention to take swift and severe retaliatory action.” In his memoirs, Nixon faulted Con- In 1972, anticipating a peace Operation Linebacker II, the massive gress for withholding “the means to agreement, the US gave South Vietnam air strikes on Hanoi and in enforce the Paris agreement at a time some 700 aircraft, including F-5Cs and December, helped persuade the North when the North Vietnamese were open- Es, plus modified trainer airplanes. Vietnamese to negotiate in earnest. ly violating it” and “cutting back on In congressional testimony Jan. 8, military aid for South Vietnam at a time was accompanied by so many ra- Laird said that “the Vietnamization when the Soviets were increasing their dar-controlled anti-aircraft guns and program has been completed” and that aid to North Vietnam.” SAM-7 missiles that VNAF’s slow-mov- the South Vietnamese armed forces South Vietnam had a large army ing helicopters and attack aircraft were “fully capable” of providing se- and air force but the logistics system were seldom able to operate in the curity against North Vietnam within was dismally inadequate. Aircraft and battle areas. the borders of South Vietnam, making helicopters often stood idle for lack ARVN, spread thin and poorly led, possible “the complete termination of of maintenance or spare parts. After could not hold, so Thieu decided to American involvement in the war,” even the cease-fire, there were no more re- abandon the highlands region and if the peace talks failed. placements for aircraft lost to combat two northern provinces and make a The peace accords were signed Jan. or accidents. stand farther south. The situation soon 27, 1973, and the cease-fire went into The effectiveness of VNAF was further deteriorated into a disorganized rout. effect Jan. 28. By June, the American diminished by the South Vietnamese Hundreds of aircraft and huge stores military presence in South Vietnam style of command and control, which of supplies were left behind and fell had dwindled to a few dozen. divided the air force up into smaller into enemy hands. segments that were assigned to corps In some places, the South Viet- SOUTH VIETNAM ALONE commanders, who were always soldiers. namese soldiers did well; elsewhere In a March 29 speech, Nixon said, These army officers exercised control they broke and ran. “VNAF as a whole “We have prevented the imposition of over all of the air and ground forces fought better than any other element a Communist government on South within their territory and employed of the RVNAF [Republic of Vietnam Vietnam.” It was a bold claim, but Nixon them with a limited, local perspective. Armed Forces],” Momyer said. was no longer in a position to influence Without US aid, South Vietnam could Thieu resigned April 23 and flew events in Vietnam. not sustain or support a force of the pre- into exile. Most of the remaining VNAF He was already engulfed by the Wa- vious size. ARVN numbers fell sharply, aircraft fled to Thailand on April 29 to tergate scandal that would eventually with high casualty and desertion rates avoid capture. drive him from the presidency in August contributing further to the decline. VNAF’s last combat sortie was by 1974, and now that the United States A-37s against North Vietnam columns was out of Vietnam, Congress was de- THE FALL OF THE SOUTH moving toward the capital on April 30. termined to make sure it stayed out. The North Vietnamese began the fi- Saigon fell later that day, bringing the In July, Congress denied funding to nal campaign of the war March 10, 1975, long war in Vietnam to an end. J finance “directly or indirectly” combat attacking with a force that included 18 operations by US forces “in or over or army divisions—more than twice as John T. Correll was editor in chief of Air from the shores” of Vietnam or any- many as they employed in the Easter Force Magazine for 18 years and is now a where else in Southeast Asia. Congress invasion of 1972—as well as armor and contributor. His most recent articles, “Air- also reduced assistance for South Viet- artillery in large numbers. power at the Bay of Pigs” and “Eisenhower nam from $2.1 billion in 1973 to $700 North Vietnam made no effort to and the Eight Warlords” appeared in the million in 1975. establish air superiority but the army July issue. Air Force of US the Museum National Photo:

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