PERILS OF MULTICULTURALISM:

POLlCY AND THEORY RECONSIDERED

BY Harjinder Kaur Deol

A thesis submitted to the Oepartment of Philosophy in confonnity with the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Queen's University

Kingston, Ontario, Canada

September 2001

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This thesis will argue that, contrary to Kyrnlicka's claim that

rnulticulturalism promotes liberal values through the integration of immigrants into

mainstream society, the philosophy of multiculturalism actually undermines

those very values. Kymlicka's liberal justification for polyethnic rights hinges on

the claim that they promote the integration of immigrants into mainstream

institutions. However, 1 will demonstrate that if integration were a reality in

Canada. multiculturalism could not be said to have caused it. Further, integration

is not a reality in Canada and may not occur in the future due to new trends in

immigration.

Given that integration is not occurring, we will find that though the

intentions of an ideology of multiculturalism are laudable. it has the unintended

negative side effect of endorsing cultural preservation in attempting to preserve

diversity. When the cultures of sorne immigrants who come to Canada from

"non-traditional" sources are severely oppressive towards women in non-overt

ways, the preservation of such cultures preserves gender-bias as well. This

shouM concern the likes of Kymlicka since it undemines the project of furthering

the liberal values of autonomy and equality. Multiculturalism is supposed to be a

normative notion motivated by concern for the dignity of ail human beings. That

is, the ideology of diversity is about respecting the backgrounds and decisions of others. But 1 will suggest that concem for the dignity, autonomy and equality of al1 human beings may require an alternative approach to deal with cultural diversity. My gratitude goes to Christine Sypnowich for providing invaluable comments and support during this project. She has been an excellent mentor and friend. I thank Will Kymlicka for taking up the position of supervisor so quickly and for providing me with subject matter for my thesis through his own work. Alastair Macleod's copy editing advice was invaluable in the late stages of the project as well; and his support over the last three years has meant a great deal to me. Further, I thank the Department of Philosophy at Queen's and the

Graduate School for their patience and understanding during this lengthy process. The guidance of Sergio Sismondo is why I've finally managed to complete this project.

Don Carmichael has proven yet again to be an excellent friend and mentor and I believe that much of the inspiration for this project has come from what he has taught me. I would be truly honored to be half the academic and human being that he is.

My friends and family have been very patient with my temperament during the last stages in the project, so t would like to thank them for putting up wtth me.

In particular, I would like to thank Guillemo Barron. Leslie Elliot, Michael Kocsis,

Zameer Hakimali, Mark Smith, Thornas Tobias, Ali Owaisi, and Matthew

Harnaga. Without Jane Forsey, I would not have been able to continue my studies. I ask for forgiveness if I have failed to mention anyone who has helped me in this process-my sincerest gratitude to you nonetheless. Table of Contents

Chapter 1-Introduction Page I

1. The Origins of Cultural Diversity in Canada Page 2

II. Multicultural Canada Page 5

III. The Origins of Multiculturalism Page 7

IV Multiculturalism and the lntegration of Immigrants Page 10

V. The Project Page 13

Chapter 2-Kymlicka's Theory of Polyethnic Right Page 16

1. t ntroduction Page 16

II. National vs. Ethnic Groups Page 16

II1. Societal Cultures and Legitîmate Expectations Page 19

IV. Polyethnic Rights Page 23

V. Autonomy Through Polyethnic Measures Page 25

VI. Equality and Polyethnic Measures Page 28

VI 1. Conclusion Page 31

Chapter 3-Empirical Evidence for lntegration Page 32

1. Introduction Page 32

II. Measuring Successful lntegration Page 33

III. Kymlicka's Empirical Case for Multiculturalism Page 39

A. Political lntegration Page 40

1. Naturalization Page 40

2. Political Participation Page 44 B. Social lntegration Page 48

C. Cross Country Cornparison Page 52

IV. Conclusion Page 54

Chapter &The Success and Future of lntegration Page 55

1. Introduction Page 56

II. The Generational Fact of lntegration Page 57

Ill. New ImmigrationTrends Page 60

III. The Reality of lntegration Page 64

IV. The Future of lntegration Page 67

A. Residential Segregation Page 67

B. Commercial Segregation Page 70

C. Social and Other Types of Segregation Page 72

D. Institutional Completeness and New Immigrants Page 74

VI. Conclusion Page 77

Chapter &Illiberal Minority Rights Page 79

1. lntroduction Page 79

II. The Feminist Cornplaint Page 80

III. Group Rights and the lnternallExternal Distinction Page 84

IV. The Difficulty in Detecting Women's Oppression Page 87

A. The Covert Nature of Gender Practices Page 87

B. Dangers of the Private Sphere Page 90

V. Kymlicka's Solution: Success and Failure Page 92

VI. Interrelation of Culture and Gender Page 94 VIL Wtthe~Multiculturalism Page 95

VIII. Conclusion Page 97

Conclusion Page 99

References Page 101

Appendix A Page Il5

Appendix B Page 117

Appendix C Page 118

Vita Page Harj inder Deoi

Chapter l

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is a cry on behalf of many immigrant and first-generation

Canadian women who are negatively affected by the preservation of their

traditional cultures. What do we do when the sacred cow of our political culture

formally endorses the subordination of women in illiberal ethnic communities?

Can Canadians sanction a policy that endorses the preservation such cultures?

Multiculturalism is Canada's ofkial policy for dealing with cultural diversity

arising from immigration policies. I am interested in the policy in practice and in

the theoretical justification behind such a policy. Will Kyrnlicka builds a liberal

theory of minority rights that takes Canadian multiculturalism policy as an

example of how "A comprehensive theory of justice in a multicultural state will

include both universal rights. assigned to individuals regardless of group

membership. and certain group-differentiated rights or 'special status' for

minority cultures" (Kymlicka 1995: 6). Kymlicka presents both autonomy-based

and equality-based arguments to show how multiculturalism and special rights for cultural groups can promote the liberal values of freedom and justice in

liberal democratic states.' I argue that multiculturalism not only fails to fully

promote the liberal values of autonomy and equality, but also that

multiculturalism cannot be justified on liberal grounds due to the way it helps

preserve traditional cultures and their gender inequality. I suggest that either we find an alternative means of dealing with cultural diverçity with a view to

preserving our liberal values more effectively, or justify multiculturalism on

grounds that do not appeal tu liberalism.

1. The Oriains of Cultural Diversitv in Canada

Canada's cultural and racial diversity has greatly increased as a result of

immigration polices in the latter half of the twentieth century. On an international

level. migration has been one of the most important factors in global change: it

has grown in both volume and significance since the 1900's. Currently, Canada.

the United States and Australia are the world's leading recipients of immigrants

and account for over half of the world's legal immigration (Kymlicka 1995: 14).

The twentieth century has been a period of large-scale immigration to Canada

from the verj start. For example, in the 43 year period from 2860 to 1900

Canada admitted less than 2 million immigrants2 This situation began to change dramatically in the pre-World War I years-so much so that total

immigration between 1901 and 1931 exceeded 4.4 million. These immigration rates were later matched only by the post-World War il influx (Simmons

1990: 142). During World War II, less than 200,000 were admitted. From 1945 to 1999, well over 9 million people were welcomed to Canada under the

' I refer to "liberal valuesn in a broad sense to denote freedom and equality. I comment fully on these values in the next chapter. * See Appendix A for a list of annual immigration rates from 1860 to 1999. Ha jinder Dm1

immigration policy3 In the 1990's, annuat arrivais in Canada have generaHy

remained over 220, 000 (Frideres 1992: 501.~

Yet, large-scale immigration in itself is not the sole cause of diversity in

the Canadian population. High rates of immigration were accompanied by

another important factor: "The increase in immigration [came] in the wake of a

significant shift in the source of migrants to Canada. More than 95 percent of

immigrants to Canada in the post-World War II decade came from Europe.

Australia, and the United States" (Straford 1992: 74). This had been the trend

since the beginning of large-scale immigration to Canada at the tum of the

hventieth century. Until the 1960's, people of nonIuropean cultural or racial

backgrounds, described in the literature as immigrants from "non-traditional

sources", were admitted only for the purpose of employment as rnenial

labourers. However, by the 198Ots, immigrants from non-traditional sources

made up 70 percent of immigration to Canada. These "non-traditional sources"

include places such as Asia, Africa, the Middle East. South and Central America.

and the Caribbean (Thompson and Weinfeld 1995: 189).' In 1989, 48.5 percent

of all immigrants to Canada came from Asian counties aione (Thompson and

Weinfeld 1995:189). Another fifth originated in Africa. the Caribbean, and

Central and South America (Mercer 1995: 172).6 By 1999 the proportion of

1 am unsure as to whether this figure includes refugees. But the exact nurnber. which is not included in Appendix A, ir 9, 710,276. This is about 1.3 times the annual total for the United States during this period (Mercer 1995: 171).

"ee Appendix B. See also Indra 198: 165, 170. In the mid-1960's immigrants to Canada came mostly from Europe. Great Britain and the United States. These countnes provided 85 percent of al1 Ha jinder Dcol

immigrants corning to Canada from non-traditional sources had increased to

over 75 percent (Straford 1992: 74).7

Yet, what is often called the "new wave" of immigration. immigration from

countries other than Europe. began only in the late 1960's after the requisite

changes to Canadian immigration policy were made.' Until 1947, Canadian

immigration policy gave preferential treatment to British sub~ects.~By 1951.

however, this treatment was expanded to include immigrants from France and

Northwestern Europe. The Immigration Act of 1952 extended the policy of

preferential treatment to immigrants of European Nationalities. In the 1960's.

demand for further change to Canadian immigration policy arose. According to

Freda Hawkins, Canada's role in the United Nations was crucial here: "Canada

sould not present a good image or function well in the UN or the multiracia!

Commonwealth with the burden of a racist immigration policy around her neck"

(Hawkins 1988: 13). In 1962, a new immigration policy was put into effect and was formalised by the lmmigration act of 1967. A "points system" was

established, making Canada the first in the world to put an end to fonal criteria for preferring immigrants of a certain race, nationality, or ethnicity (Gwyn 1996:

187; Indra 1980: 167). This system allocated a fixed number of "points" based on immigrants to Canada. Only 7 percent of immigrant were from Asia. By 1973, the European and American contingents in Canadian immigration decreased to only 47 percent. 60th the number of countries providing immigrants and the number of non-European immigrants was on the rise during this period but Asia, the West lndies and South America seem to be best represented. ' The math on the Statistics Canada information in Appendix B shows that 144, 999 immigrants out of a total of 189, 81 6 were from non-traditional sources. a There is some disagreement as to whether the shift in immigration patterns took place before or after 1970. Contrary to Frideres and others. who clairn that such shifts began in the early 1960's. the applicant's eduwtion, training, langlrage, occupation, and age.

Consequently, changes in immigration policy made room for change in the source countries providing immigrants to canada. 'O

Given the changes in source countries for immigrants over the last 30 years. we can see why Canada exhibits a greater cultural and racialized diversity than ever before. David Ley argues that the high level of immigration since the post-1945 period and the transformation in the composition of immigrant cohorts have caused an ethno-cultural remaking of major cities and the face of the nation as a whole (Ley 1999: 3). This is why Canada is often described as being a "multicultural" society

II. Multicultural Canada

"Muiticullurai" is a term that is used in a variety of ways. The term can be used to describe an ideology, government policies that promote cultural pluralism, or the dernographic reality of cultural diversity that generally tends to precede these policies (Thornpson and Weinfeld 1995: 195). There is added confusion precisely because the term "culture" is rather vague and mutable.

Using the tenvery broadly, we can Say that a "culture1'is a way of life." Thus, we could Say that East Coast fishing villages. gays and lesbians. the working class, Communists, nudists, hippies, punks, skaters etc. al1 have different

Roy claims that the patterns changed significantly beginning only in 1971. after the inception of Canadian multiculturalism policy. See Roy 1995: 199. ' For a complete list of changes to Canadian immigration policy. see Frideres 1992: 48-50. 10 Although one might argue that the previous era's trends were artificially skewed by racist immigration policy, my point is sirnply that the immigrant cohort changed due to changes in official Immigration policy. " See Brotz 1980: 42. cultures and that a society containing these groups is "rnulticultural". For ouf

purposes, the term "multicultural" when applied to Canadian society will not

include lifestyle subcultures and enclaves. The term "culture" will be used in a

very specific sociological sense. It will refer to the system of beliefs, traditions,

rituals, customs, language, food, dress, and history of a group of people in a

given territory (Kymlicka l995:18). This definition of culture is synonymous with

the idea of "ethnos". Still, to Say that a society is mutticulturat because it

contains members from a variety of such communities is still not specific enough

to explain cultural diversity.

In his influential book entitled Multicultural Citizenship Will Kymlicka

develops a more nuanced understanding of cultural diversity. He notes that the

term "multicultural" can refer to two very different types of cultural diversity

(Kymlicka 1995: 15). One source of cultural diversity is the coexistence of different "nationsn in a polity. Kymlicka takes "a nation" to be synonymous with

"a culture" of a certain kind (as defined above): "a peoplen-a historical

"intergenerational community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and history" (Kymiicka

1995: 18). He uses the term "multinational" to describe polities that include nations of this sort. Canada is a multinational state in that it is the federation of three coexisting nations: Quebec, the First Nations, and English Canada.

Multinational states are generally created when one nation is colonised by settlers (as was the case with Canada's Aboriginal population), or invaded and conquered (as French-Canadians were conquered by the English). Harjinder Dcoi

Even though multinational cutturat divenity presents intense chat tenges,

a different kind of cultural diversity results when the members of a polity have

emigrated from different nations and are allowed and encouraged to preserve

some of their ethnic particularity while participating in the rnainstream institutions

of the host society. Immigrants will often coalesce into loose associations, which

Kymlicka calls "ethnic" groups or "immigrant" groups (Kymlicka 1995:10).

According to Kymlicka. states that contain various ethnic or immigrant groups

exhibit a cultural diversity that is best described as being "polyethnic* (Kymlicka

1995: 15). Immigrants who come from various countries and cultural

backgrounds make Canada a "polyethnic" society. The term "multicultural" is

vague enough to be used to refer to either kind or (as in the Canadian case) to

both kinds of cultural diversity. Here, the term will be used only to refer to

polyethnic diversity that has been brought about by immigrants and their

descendants in English canada.'*

III. The Origins of Multiculturalism

Liberal societies containing polyethnic diversity inevitably face the

question of how to include immigrants in their new society. Lack of integration

into mainstream institutions spells marginalization and disadvantage for new

immigrants. Moreover, integration promotes solidarity amongst citizens of a state by providing "a strong sense of common identity and common membership. so that they will make sacrifices for each othef (Kymlicka 1998: 29).

lZ In referring to today's immigrants and their descendants. I will use the following ternis interchangeably: "ethnic groups", "immigrantgroupsn, "ethnic minotities", "ethnic minonty groups", and "new source immigrants". I will specify when speaking only of recent immigrants. The past policies of liberal democratic countries for dealing with

immigrants and their inclusion were very different from current Canadian

policy. l3 Until the 19601s, the "AnglotonforrnityJ'mode1 of assimilation was used

to deal with immigrants. This was the case in each of the three countries

(Australia. Canada and the United States) with the highest levels of immigration.

Immigrants were expected to shed their cultural heritage and assimilate

completely to the culture of the host society. Language, food, dress, and any

other ethnic peculiarities became the fuel for disparagement. In general.

immigrants were regarded with a "You will become like us and you are obliged to

become like usJ'mentality.14 Beginning in the 1970's. however, this mentality

began to change. and so did policy. It became widely accepted that "immigrants

should be free to maintain some of their old customs regarding food, dress,

religion. and to associate with each other to maintain these practices" (Kymlicka

1998:14). Not only were immigrants now allowed to maintain their traditional ways, they were even encouraged by the state to do so. Policy in the three prime receiving countries reflected the shift in integration models-from "Anglo- confomrty" to potyethnicity. In Canada, this shft carne in the forrn of multiculturalism policy in 1971.

It is difficult to Say just how these changes came about. According to

Kymlicka, movements like the "ethnic revival" or "ethnic fevei' in the US. set the stage for such policy changes (Kymlicka 1995: 61 ). He clairns that immigrants

l3 This historical review is devised pnmarily from Kymlicka 1995: 14. 14 Joseph Steinberg says this about immigrants in the US, but I think we could Say that it was tnie of how immigrants were regarded in English Canada. See Steinberg 1981: 42. were repudiating the idea of Angloconforrnity, and that in the end. they were successful in demanding that their ethnic identities be recognised and valued.

Yet it is not clear that the shift away from Anglo-conformity and towards a policy of multiculturalism was the result of demands made by ethnic groups."

Sorne writers on the subject claim that the adoption of multtculturalism policy was the upshot of a top-down process-that it was imposed by the

Federal Government for political purposes-independent of any demands for recognition that ethnic groups may have been making. These critics see electoral competition as a critical force in the development of multiculturalism policy in that the policy could be perceived as being "a Liberal Party ploy to gain the ethnic vote" (Breton 1988: 29). It happens that Liberal Prime Minister Pierre

Trudeau was up for re-election in October of 1972.16

In any case, it is clear that ethnic groups in Canada were far from unanimous in dernanding recognition. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism was created in 1963 to find ways to improve French-English relations in Canada. Many writen claim that after the Official Languages Act was announced in 1969,various ethnic groups protested and wanted to claim their part in history (Pizanias 1992: 91). Although some groups of non-Anglo-

'' There is disagreement as to how immigrants were adapting to Canadian society even before the 1970's. For example, Frieda Hawkins claims that the 1950's to 1970's period was not a period of complete assimilation and 'Anglo-confomity*. Rather, Hawkins's personal experience in the federal bureaucracy suggests that attempts to accommodate the cultural differences of immigrants were being made despite multiculturalism. See Hawkins 1988: 15. 7 6 In addition, many commentators claim that the govemment did not foresee what impact the policy would have on ethnic groups or the shape that the policy would take after it was instituted. These points suggest that the Trudeau govemment initially had only a vague idea as to how the policy would genuinely integrate immigrants of non-Anglo-saxon and non-French backgrounds into mainstream Canadian society. Harj inder De01

Saxon and non-french backgrounds did protest the commission's position on

language and culture as presented in the B & 8's official report, others

supported the vision of a bilingual, bicultural. binational Canada (Breton 1988:

37). When given the chance to participate in the B&B1sdeliberations, few ethnic

groups actually submitted briefs. According to Breton, although various ethnic

groups submitted a total of fifty-five briefs, between thirty-two and thirty-seven of

them were from Ukrainian groups alone (Breton 1988: 37). " According to

Breton, "this does not suggest a widespread mobilisation across groups ... .

There was little or no coordination among the various groups in the preparation

and presentation of their briefs" (Breton 1988: 37).

Although it is difficult to explain the reasons for the relevant changes in

policy regarding the integration of immigrant groups, the result of these changes

is clear. On October 8, 1971, Prime Minster Trudeau first unveiled a policy of

Multiculturalism within a Bilingual framework.

IV. Multiculturalism and the lntearation of lmmiarants in Canada

In Trudeau's words, multiculturalism policy was intended to "support and encourage the various cultures and ethnic groups that give structure and vitality to our society" (House of Comrnons Debate, October 8, 1971: 8545).

Multiculturalisrn policy allows for and even encourages cultural differences. It provides members of culturaliy different groups with recognition of the diversity they contribute to the Canadian mainstream. Further, multiculturalism makes

- -- - t 7 It is difficult to tell what the exact number of briefs from the Ukrainian community was. This is due to having identified the ethnic affiliations of groups who submitted briefs by their names. See Breton 1988: 37. Hajinder Dm1 provisions for the rethinking and reconstructing various aspects of rnainstream institutions in ways that accommodate the cultural differences of immigrants without affecting their political and economic success. Yet multiculturalism also includes policies that allow immigrants to become fully participating members of the mainstream society. Consequently. the ramifications of the policies that fa11 under the rubric of multiculturalism in Canada are vast.18

In both Multicultural Citizenship and Finding Our Way. Will Kymlicka refers to Canada's policy of Multiculturalism as a good example of the promotion of what he calls "polyethnic rights". Not only does multiculturalism policy contain measures such as language training, anti-discrimination laws, changing the education curricula to include the contribution of minorities, etc. to "ensure the effective exercise of the cornmon rights of citizenship" (Kymlicka 1995: 31 ), but it also contains some "group-specific meas~res".'~Such group-specific measures include: flexible work schedules and holidays to accommodate the cultural holidays of ethnic minorities; exemptions from existing legislation that rnay require members of ethnic groups to relinquish their cultural codes for purposes of economic and political success; and, government funding for cultural festivals and studies. These measures recognise, according to Kymlicka, rights that individuals may exercise in virtue of their membership in a particular ethnic minority-group. Polyethnic rights are group-differentiated recognition rights or accommodations that help immigrants express their identity in mainstream institutions without hampering their success. That is, Canadian multiculturalism

-- - '' See Appendk C and Kymlicka 1998: 42. Ha jinder De01

policy helps immigrants bernefully participating members of their new society

without giving up their cultural codes. For Kymlicka, this marks an important

change in policy towards the integration of immigrants.

Canada's adoption of multiculturalism signified a shift from policies of

"assimilation" to policies of "polyethnicity." The terms "assimilation" and

"integration" are often used synonymously, but they are different in a critical

respect. Both have to do with the idea of making immigrants full participants in

their new societies. Yet while "assimilationnrefers to a particular process or

means through which the full membership of immigrants is achieved,

"integration" refers to the end-namely the inclusion of immigrants into

mainstream society. lntegration can consequently be achieved though various

processes, of which assimilation is only one.

The term "assimilation" is generally viewed as having negative

connotations due to its association with oppressive policies, discrimination, and

hostility towards immigrants who have not managed to shed their cultural

distinctiveness. Of course, there are degrees in assimilationist policies and

these negative aspects need not be present. ln the externe case, assimilation

refers to the process of eradicating any and al1 cultural differences, including their manifestation in private affiliations and home life. In the more moderate case. it can mean non-recognition of cultural differences in mainstream society although they are allowed to flourish in the private realm and private

*' See Appendix C. Hqincier Dcol

açsociati~ns.~~Further, both of these sorts of assimilation policy cm be purçued

in more or less coercive and non-coercive ways (Mason 1999: 268). The

general thrust of assimilationist policies, however, lies in the fact that the

inclusion of immigrants in the mainstream is achieved through the eradication of

cultural differences, at least in the public sphere. "Assimilation implies almost

total absorption into another linguistic and cultural group. An assirnilated

individual gives up his cultural identity.. . " (Report of the B&B Royal Commission

1969: 5). Assimilationist policies do not encourage the maintenance of cultural

differences in public institutions and they certainly do not provide public

recognition of such differences.

On the other hand, multiculturalism or polyethnicity, as ideology or policy,

can be viewed as another means of integrating immigrants into mainstrearn

institutions. It attempts to integrate immigrant groups through recognition and

accommodation of cultural difference in the mainstream political and economic

institutions so that the full participation of immigrants is not hindered by their

cultural differences. Furtherrnore, multiculturalism can be viewed as an

integrative poiicy that allows and even encourages the preservation of cultural

differences. Canada has chosen to follow this route since 1971 .

V. The Proiect

By using Canada as the reference point, I will examine Kymlicka's arguments for the integrative force of polyethnic rights on ethic minorities. This

'O This would be similar to the Amencan "melting potn idea. That is, the USA does not recognize cultural difference (although it does indeed exist). But this does not mean that the US is any les diverse than Canada. Ha jinder Deol

thesis will be concemed wtth recognition rights and accommodations in

particular. It is not about whether the mainstream society should adjust itself to

accommodate the particularpractices (such as wearing a turban or hijab) listed

above in its mainstream institutions. Rather, I would like to consider the general

policy of making such accommodations and providing cultural recognition. I will

therefore not be referring to the practices listed above through the thesis. The

reason for this is that Kymlicka never lists any cultural practices that are

particularly deserving of polyethnic rights. It is difficult to see how in the cases

he considers polyethnic rights are required because they seem to be cases of religious freedom; the rights to be recoçniszd might easily be justified on grounds of freedom of religion as welL2' Consequently, I will only be dealing with the general policy and ideology of making accommodations for cultural practices and for the preservation of those cultural practices. This issue will be explored in the context of Kymlicka's theory of polyethnic rights and their bearing on rnulticulturalism policy in

I will provide a summary of Kymlicka's theory of multiculturalism in the first part of the next chapter. This summary will describe the connection between rnulticulturalism policy and the liberal values of autonorny and equality. This connection is one that hinges on the project of absorbing immigrants into

'' Making accommodations for religious practices cari easily be justified on grounds of the fundamental freedoms of al1 Canadians as expressed by Section 2 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Once we consider religious freedoms, however, I can think of no purely cultural practices that would warrant polyethnic rights.

&* Moreover, the similarity between Kymlickals theory of polyethnic rights and Canadian multiculturalism policy is strong enough so that the ternis will be used interchangeably. For more on this similarity, compare Appendix C with Kymlicka 1998: 42. Hajindcr Dcol

mainstream Canadian socMy as full participants a project that Kymticka

claims is a very successful one. The third chapter shows that this project is not

as successful Kymlicka believes it to be. 1 will argue that the evidence as to

whether multiculturalism is promoting integration is inconclusive. Canadian

demographics suggest. as the fourth chapter argues, that we have good reason

to think that integration is not occurring today in the way that Kymlicka suggests

and may not occur in the future the way that it has in the past. Nevertheless.

multiculturalism does endorse the preservation of culture. If we take for granted

that multiculturalism does indeed promote the preservation of culture (whatever

the purpose of this may be), liberals face a significant challenge in overcoming

the potential conflict between multiculturalism and feminism. It will be argued

that Kymlicka's theory endorses an ideology of cultural preservation and that this

ideology does not adequately extend the liberal values of autonorny and equality

to women who belong to non-traditional immigrant groups. This threatens to

undenine the project of building a uniquely liberal theory of minority rights.

In short. I will argue that despite the laudable intentions of the group-

specific rights that are contained in Canada's officiai policy of multiculturalism, they either fail or are questionable with respect to their effects on the avowed aim of multicultura! integration. While the policy certainly does promote a

philosophy of cultural retention and preservation, in doing so it fails to enhance and protect the equality and autonomy of women in many ethnic minority groups. especially those from non-liberal "sourcencountries. Consequently, polyethnic Harjinder Dcol rightç for immigrant groups and multicutturatisrn policy cannot be justtfied on liberal grounds. Harjinder Deol

Kymlicka's Theory of Polyethnic Rights

1. Introduction

Multicultural policies and polyethnic rights are supposed to enable

immigrants to becorne full-fledged members of their new society; they allow

immigrants to integrate into the mainstream institutions without abandoning their cultural codes. Will Kymlicka claims that the philosophy underlying multicultural policies is an integrationist one (Kymlicka 1995: 178). Although immigrants are allowed and even encouraged to maintain their cultural heritage, the public recognition and affirmation of ethnic identity occurs within the common institutions of the mainstrearn society (Kymlicka 1998: 44). Kymlicka further argues that polyethnic rights are not only consistent with liberal principles of liberty and equality, but can also promote those principles. In essence, he claims that multiculturalism policy cmbe justified as a requirement of justice through appeal to liberal values. In this chapter, 1 will provide an exposition of

Kymlicka's theory of polyethnic rights, and show how rights of this ktnd are thought to promote the liberal values of autonomy and equality.

II. National vs. Ethnic Grou~s

According to Kymlicka, the term "multiculturalism" often confuses two senses of the term "rnulticultural". He notes "the term can be confusing, precisely because it is ambiguous between multinational and polyethnicn

(Kymlicka 1995: 17). As mentioned earlier, the term "multicultural" refers to the form of ethnocuitural diversity that ~esultsfrom distinct and self-governing

nations existing alongside the larger society, as in the case of Quebec. In

another sense, however, the term refers to the ethnic diversity that results from

individual and familial immigration. The former type of diversity refers to national

minority groups; the latter refers to ethnic minority groups. Accordingly.

Kymlicka divides the group-rights to which he thinks ethnic and national groups

are entitled.

Group rights corne in three forms for Kymlicka: self-government rights. special

representation rights and polyethnic rights.' Gerald Doppelt characterizes

Kymlicka's group-differentiated rights as rights that "scme persons possess in

virtue of their membership in some cultural group with valid daims to self-

protection" (Doppelt 1998: 224).

Self-government rights usually belong to national groups. They are

intended to provide some form of territorial jurisdiction or political autonomy, in

order to ensure the free development of a national culture (Kymlicka 1995: 27).

Self-government rights may provide the national minority with control over

education, immigration, resource devetopment, language and famity law

(Kymlicka 1995: 38). Take for example the culture of the Quebecois in Canada.

They have an institutionally complete society in which French is the common

language. French is the language used in government. the majority of schools, the media, and in most businesses as well. To ensure that their culture

continues to develop along these Iines and that the French language fiourishes. Ha jinder ûeol

the Quebecois need certain setf-govemment rtghts! such as territorial

jurisdiction. political autonomy and special language provisions.

Special representation rights can be claimed by national or ethnic groups

if they do not receive fair representation of their views and interests in decisions

that affect them. As such, special representation rights are seen as a way to

remedy systematic exclusion of minorities from the political process until this

oppression or disadvantage is removed. Kyml icka views special representation

rights as temporary measures to remedy the effects of inequality inducing

pressures on minority groups until these pressures are removed [Kymlicka

32).

Finally. polyethnic rights provide immigrants with recognition and

accommodation for their cultural differences These accommodations allow

immigrants to participate fully in mainstrearn institutions without fear of

discrimination and without pressure to abandon their cultural codes. Kyml icka

lists exemptions from Sunday closing legislation and certain dress codes as

measures that fall under the rubric of polyethnic rights. For him, such rights are not temporary measures because the cultural differences they protect are not differences we seek to eliminate (Kymlicka 1995: 31 ). "They [polyethnic rights] are intended to help ethnic minorities express their cultural particularity and pride without it hampering their success in the economic and political institutions of the dominant society." (Kymlicka 1995: 31)

' I take 'gmuptightsn and 'group-differentiated measures" to be the same for purposes of this project. Harji nder Deol

Self-government rights and polyethnic rights are ascribed to minority groups in virtue of two different characteristics One of these characteristics has to do with the presence or absence of what Kymlicka calls a "societal cultureJ'.

He defines a "societal culturen as a culture that "provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social. educational. religious. recreational and economic life" (Kymlicka 1995: 76).

Groups of people who share a societal culture are generally territorially concentrated and have a common language. The other characteristic by virtue of which rights are ascribed to minority groups has to do with the different legitimate expectations of members of ethnic and national groups.

III. Societal Cultures and Leaitirnate Expectations

Kyrnlicka argues that national minorities (such as the Quebecois in

Canada) tend to exhibit societal cultures, the characteristic required for entitlement to self-government rights. National groups tend to be territorially concentrated and have cultures based on a shared language that is used in schools, media, law etc. (Kymlicka 1998: 27). Immigrant groups, on the other hand, tend not to possess the type of societal culture that would warrant protection through self-government rights. Ethnic groups are created by individual and familial emigration. Immigrants leave behind the territories ernbodying the societal cultures that provide meaningful ways of life and institutionalized practices conducted in their mother tongue (Kymlicka 1995: 77).

These groups therefore come to lack the territorial concentration and institutional embodiment required for developing distinct societal cultures, as they fragment and disperse throughout the hast counhy. Thus, Kymficka argues that

immigrants do not generally daim rights to self-government. Instead, immigrants

integrate into the larger society and enrich the existing societal culture instead of

creating their own institutionally complete societies (Kymlicka 1995: 94).

Thus, the presence or absence of a "societal" culture with a certain

degree of institutional completeness constitutes part of the difference between

ethnic and national groups, and consequently, the rights to which they are

entitled. Kymlicka's justification of who gets what rights also depends on the

legitimate expectations that members of each of these minority groups can have.

More specifically, whether a demand for rights to self-government is justified will

depend on whether the members of such groups choose to live within or

alongside the dominant culture.

National rninorities are those that have been involuntarily incorporated, or

have voluntarily formed a federation with other nations.* The Canadian federation is one that began with the involuntary incorporation of Aboriginal

groups by the French settlers, and then the conquering of the French by the

British colonists (Kymlicka 1995:12). Kymlicka points out that many recent constitutional debates. such as those concerning the Meech Lake and

Charlottetown Accords, re-negotiated the terms of federation so that what was initially an involuntary incorporation could be viewed as voluntary by members of al1 three national groups.

Again, Kymlicka takes 'nation' to rnean 'a historical community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and culture." (Kyrnlicka 1995: Il) Ha jinder Deol

Immigrant groups in Canada are the result of a very drfferent historicat phenomenon, namely, the decision of individuals and families to leave their homelands to find a new life (Kymlicka 1998: 7). Kymlicka argues that, "The fact that these groups were formed initialty through immigration is pivotal in understanding their status in Canada, and in understanding how they differ from

our 'nations within' " (Kymlicka 1998: 7).

Such historical factors, according to Kymlicka, affect the expectations that the members of groups of different kinds have. Mernbers of national groups did not expect to have to integrate into another culture. Aboriginal groups had institutionally complete societies occupying an historic homeland; they did not leave their homeland for a new life. French and British colonists came to the

New World with the expectation that that they could create a new society. "lt is an essential feature of colonkation," Kymlicka explains, "as distinct from individual emigration that it aims to create an institutionally complete society"

(Kymlicka 1995: 15). Self-government is a legitimate expectation of both the colonizing and pre-existing ~ationalgroups in Canada.

Immigrant groups, however, have a very different set of legitimate expectations. Immigrants voluntarily leave their own societal cultures to join a pre-existing one in another land.3 Kymlicka notes:

This choice was more or less voluntary, at least in the sense that they chose to come while rnany of their friends and family chose to stay, and it

3 For purposes of simplicity, 1 will view ail immigrant groups ta be the result voluntary immigration from their homelands. 1 understand that in the case of refugees, this is not the case and even with respect to immigrants, it may be difficult to determine whether a decision ta immigrant is voluntary. This is the case with ewnomic immigrants as well as children. was made by people who knew that they were entering a new society with its own established laws and institutions. (Kymlicka l998:7)

lmmigrants wish to integrate into their new societies; "They have uprooted

thernselves, and they know when they come that their success and that of their

children, depends on integrating into the institutions of English speaking society''

(Kymlicka 1995: 95-96). In the past. immigrants have integrated into mainstream

society from inside small enclaves of cultural distinctiveness-these are

characteristic of Canadian culture, and in line with a policy of multiculturalisrn.

Immigrants have not had the expectation of creating institutionally complete

societies when they come to Canada. Moreover, argues Kymlicka, immigrants

do not legitimately have the right to demand the kinds of provisions required to

create an institutionally complete society. lmmigrants voluntarily give up the

right to live and work in their own culture that they once had in virtue of their

national membership in their homelands. As such, the voluntary decision to

leave one's culture in the historical creation of ethnic minorities generally rules

out the rights of immigrant groups to self-government rights. As such, the

legitimate expectations of members of immigrant groups and members of

national rninorities are thus profoundly different in nature.

Nevertheless! Kymlicka argues that voluntary immigrants are entitled to polyethnic rights for purposes of expressing their cultural identity while being full members of their new societal culture. While accepting that they must integrate into their new societies, immigrants have typically sought greater recognition of their ethnic identity and aimed to modify the institutions and laws of the mainstream to make them mare accommodating of ethnic difference. This is

what multiculturalism in Canada, which Kymlicka thinks is a good example of a

policy that enshrines polyethnic rights, is meant to provide.

IV. Polvethnic Riahts

The range of polyethnic rights considered by Kymlicka includes measures

designed to ensure the effective exercise of the common rights of citizenship.

Such measures include funding for cultural and religious practices and

exemptions from laws and regulations that hinder the expression of ethnic

identity in common institutions. Policies that aim to eliminate prejudice and discrimination against visible minorities, ethnic practices and ethnic identities are also designed to promote the common rights of citizenship (Kymlicka 1995: 30,

94). Recognition in the educationa! curriculum of immigrants' contributions !O society and history, and changes to the way they are portrayed in school textbooks, govemment documents, and the media can also serve this end

(Kymlicka 1995: 30, 94). Most of these rights protect al1 members of immigrant groups regardless of their cultural background or place of origin; they are common rights of citizenship and are not group-differentiated.

However, polyethnic rights that meet the demands of ethnic groups for public funding of cultural and religious practices are group-differentiated. These rights may involve the funding of ethnic magazines, associations and festivals

(Kymlicka 1995: 32).4 ~xemptionsfrom existing laws and regulations that

4 I will not be considering this type of group-differentiated measure in rny discussion. Further, the budget for such groupdifferentiated measures is so comparatively srnall in terms of federal expenditures, it rnay be considered negligible. prevent immigrants from expressing their identity in political and ecunomic

institutions, are also group-differentiated measures. For Kymlicka these

measures include exemptions for Sikhs from the RCMP's uniform requirements,

the right of Orthodox Jews to Wear the yarmulke during military service, and the

right of Muslim girls to Wear the chador contrary to school dress-codes (Kymlicka

1995: 32).' Muslims and Jews have also sought exemptions from Sunday

closing legislation. These measures, according to Kymlicka, "are intended to

help ethnic groups and religious minorities express their cultural particularity and

pride without hampering their success in the economic and political institutions

of the dominant society" (Kymlicka 1995: 31 ).

Kymlicka argues that none of the above listed measures are intended to

allow immigrants to view themselves as separate from the mainstream society or

as self-governing nations. In Finding Our Way, he specifically deals with the

sorts of policies that fall under the rubric of Canadian multiculturalism to show

how they do not provide the means for immigrants to recreate their societal cultures and promote separatism (Kymlicka 1998: 42). Rather, Kymlicka points to how they are meant to promote the integration of immigrants into mainstrearn society.

For example, Canadian multiculturalism includes affirmative action pol icies and guarantees of representation in government institutions for visible minorîties. These types of policies are "intended to increase the numbers of

As mentioned in the introduction, I am not concemed with particular pracüces but the general thrust of the philosophy behind such policies. Ha jinder Deol immigrants who participate in mainstrearn institutions" (Kyrnlicka 1998: 43).

Flexible work schedules to accommodate the religious holidays of immigrant groups. exemptions from Sunday closing regulations, and flexible dress-codes to accommodate the religious differences of immigrants "are intended to make immigrants feel more cornfortable in mainstream institutions" (Kymlicka 1998:

43). Indeed, Kymlicka argues that none of the policies that fall under the rubric of Canadian multiculturalism actually encourages immigrants to view themselves as separate from the mainstream society. Rather, they encourage and provide ways for immigrants to integrate successfully into the already existing mainstream societal culture while allowing thern to preserve some aspects of their cultural heritage.

V. Autonomv throuoh Polvethnic Measures

Liberalism is based on the principle of individual autonomy. 1 am using the term autonomy here to refer to the human capacity to choose a plan for leading a good life, and revise that plan for purposes of adopting a better one.

That is. autonomy is the freedom to make life-affecting decisions by considering and adopting some life options over others.

KymlickaJsargument for how group-differentiated rights promote autonomy rests on the idea of how culture provides a context of choice within which life decisions are made. Societal cultures in particular provide the sort of options that are necessary for individual autonomy: "Deciding how to lead our lives is. in the first instance, a matter of exploring the possibilities made avai lable by our culturen ( Kymlicka 1995: 126). Kymlicka recognizes that what matters for individual autonomy ts more than stmply the fact that there is some

set of options; these options must be meaningful to the individual as well.

Societal cultures provide genuine choice because they embody a "shared

vocabulary" of meaning and tradition (Kymlicka 1995: 80-81 ). "Participation in

such a culture provides meaningful ways of life across the full range of human

activities-social. educational, religious, recreational, econornic-encompassing

both the public and private spheres." (Kyrnlicka 1998: 27, emphasis added)

As rnentioned earlier, members of immigrant minorities voluntarily

relinquish their right to live and work in their own societal culture. According to

Kymlicka. they do not have a right to state support and funding to recreate their

cultures (Kymlicka 1995: 96)! Yet, although immigrants do not have the right to

their own societal culture. Kyrnlicka argues that they still have rights for access

to a societal culture. He claims that "what matters, from a liberal point of view. is

that people have access fo a societal culture which provides them with

meaningful options encompassing the range of human activities" (Kymlicka

1995: 101, emphasis added). Since access to a societal culture makes the

development of self-reftective capacities possib te, autonomy requires a societal

culture that provides a rneaningful context of choice, even for immigrants who

have voluntarily relinquished their original rights of cultural rnembership.

Since the question of access to a societal culture for immigrants is not

about recreating the societal cultures they left behind, it is, according to

6 Although Kyrnlicka does not feel that immigrants have rights to self-government, he does not categoflcally nile them out on grounds of justice (Kymlicka 1995: 96). Kymlicka believes that Ha jinder De01

Kymlicka, about successfutty integrating into the societat culture of their new

land. The range of options provided by the dominant society's societal culture

becomes the range of options available to immigrants with successful

integration.' Kymlicka defines integration as "the extent to which immigrants

view their life-chances as tied up with participation in the range of societal

institutions. based on a common language, which define a societal culture"

(Kymlicka 1998: 28). He adrnits that he uses the term in a very specific

sociocultural sense and that such a definition of integration does not preclude

differences in religion, personal values, family relationships, or lifestyle choices

( Kym l icka 1998: 28). Consequently, the distinciiveness of immigrant groups

which "is manifested primarily in family life and voluntary associations" is entirely

consistent with the institutional integration of immigrants into the mainstream

society (Kymlicka 1995: 14).

The successful integration of immigrants will require, according to

Kymlicka, fighting patterns of prejudice and discrimination. Prejudice and

discrimination raise concerns about the possible marginalization of immigrant

groups; they impede the ability of immigrants to have full access to their new

societal culture. Ensuring this good for immigrants "involves not only the

rigorous enforcement of anti-discrimination laws, but also changes to the way

immigrants are portrayed in school textbooks, govemment documents, and the

immigrant groups cm, under the right conditions, becorne national minonties with societal cultures. ' Although it is clear that immigrants have access to the cultural options that the mainstream societal culture provides, their range of options are actually quite different than mernbers of the dominant culture. This is because immigrants possess hybrid cultural identities with which cornes quite a different range of cultural options. See Carens 1997. Harjinder Deol

media" (Kymlicka 1995:97). Immigrants will also requtre Engtish language

training so that they can find employment and take on the tasks of daily life with

comparative ease. For Kymlicka, such rights are only meant to ensure the

effective exercise of the common rights of citizenship. They are not group

differentiated measures since they are rights that immigrants have by virtue of

being members of their new political comrnunity, and not by virtue of belonging

to any particular ethnic group.

However, Kymlicka argues that group-specific polyethnic rights can also

help aid integration through modifying the institutions of the dominant culture.

Such modifications would include exemptims from Sunday closing legislation for

Jews and Muslims, and uniform exemptions for Sikhs (Kymlicka 1995: 97).

These policies allow immigrants to maintain some of their heritage without being

disadvantaged in mainstream institutions; without such policies, immigrants "may

effectively be denied access to society's central institutions unless they forsake

their cultural code" (Levey 1997: 220-2 1).

It is important to note that integration secures access to a societal culture

and thereby the autonomy that is developed in a cultural context of choice.

Integration, according to Kymlicka, is a Wo-way process (Kymlicka 1995: 96).

Just as immigrants must adjust to the customs and ways of the mainstream. so

must the mainstream society adapt itself to immigrants. Polyethnic rights are tools to help this process of integration into a cultural context of choice that supports ind ividual autonomy. Vt. Eauality and Potvethnic Measures

Kymlicka believes that polyethnic rights also promote the liberal value of equality; at issue is equality of access to a societal culture. This too, depends on the successful integration of immigrants. Equality of access can for the most part be created by the cornmon rights of citizenship, and equality with respect to cultural membership is achieved if immigrants can integrate successfully into the mainstream culture (Kymlicka 1995: 1 14). Thus, Kymlicka argues that the good of cultural membership for immigrants is generally a matter of "providing language training and fighting patterns of discrimination and prejudice"

(Kymlicka 1995: 114).

Yet. Kyml icka daims that equal ity justifies some group-specific rights as

~veli. This argument rests primarily on the irnpossibility of separating state and ethnicity, or the "benign neglect" mode1 of the liberal state being impossible.

Kymlicka argues that many decisions made by the state unintentionally reflect the needs of Christians and members of the dominant cultural group (Kyrnlicka

1995: 114). For example, the government workweek accommodates Christian beliefs about days of rest and religious celebration. Hence, government offices are closed on Sundays, Christmas and Easter. Govemment unifons do the same. They do not prohibit, for instance, the Christian tradition of wearing wedding rings (Kymlicka 1995: 1 15). State symbols such as flags, anthems. and mottoes reflect a particular ethnic or religious background. The idea of the separation of state and ethnicity is consequently a myth. The state cannot help but privilege the ways of the dominant cultural community. Harjinder De01

Kyrniicka daims that the irnpossibifity of separating state and ethnicity in

the ways described above poses a disadvantage for ethnic and religious

rninorities and may hinder their equality of access to the mainstream societal

culture. He argues that although support for the ways of a particular cultural

comrnunity is unavoidable, the disadvantage that that accrues to ethnic

rninorities from this factor should be remedied. Kymlicka states:

The only question is how to ensure that unavoidable forms of government support for particular ethnic and national groups are provided fairly-that is, how to ensure that they do not privilege some groups and disadvantage others. In so far as existing policies support the language. culture, and identity of the dominant nations and ethnic groups, there is an argument of equality for ensuring that somc attempts are made to provide similar support for minority groups. (Kymlicka 1995: 115)

Group-specific rights are justified on grounds of equality. because the

'benign neglect' view faces significant embarrassrnent with respect to

government decisions. Kymlicka argues that accommodations should be made

for Jews and Muslims who have different conceptions of the standard work- week: "having established a work week that favors Christians. one can hardly

object to exemptions for Muslims or Jews on grounds that they violate the separation of state and ethnicity" (Kymlicka 7995: 774). He also argues that dress-codes should accommodate the cultural requirements in terms of headgear for members of some cultural groups: "having adopted dress codes that meet Christian needs, one can hardly object to exemptions for Sikhs and

Orthodox Jews on grounds that they violate 'benign neglect"' (Kymlicka 1995: Harjinder Deol

Consequently, polyethnic rights cmprornote equality and pfevent immigrants from facing disadvantage in accessing a societal culture due to their group membership. But again. the equality argument rests on successful integration into the mainstream culture-allowing immigrants to be part of mainstrearn institutions without the disadvantages that result from their cultural heritage.

VII. Conclusion

Kymlicka argues that integration promotes the liberal values of autonomy and equality. Specific polyethnic rneasures and group-rights are merely a means of bringing about this integration and thus, polyethnic rights can be justified on liberal principles of justice. In the end, what matters for Kymlicka is that immigrants have a meaningful context of choice and that they be equal to rnembers of other cultural groups when trying to access a societal culture. A policy of polyethnicity, such as Multiculturalism, "helps to ensure that those people who do wish to express their ethnic identity are respected and accommodated, while simultaneously increasing the ability of immigrants to integrate into the larger societyn (Kymlicka 1998: 22). We will find, however, that in practice multiculturalism does not aid the process of integration in the way that

Kymlicka suggests. Chapter 3

Empirical Evidence for lntegration

1. Introduction

Kymlicka's defense and justification of multiculturalism on liberaI grounds

depends in large part on its empirical success in promoting integration . As

noted in the previous chapter, integration allows members of immigrant groups

to becorne fully participating members of their new society. Kymlicka daims that

by facilitating integration the good of cultural mernbership promotes the

autonomy and equality of immigrants. Consequently, Kymlicka's liberal

justification for multiculturalism depends upon its success in promoting

integration.

If we cannot Say that rnulticulturalism promotes integration in reality, then

we also cannot Say that it helps further liberalism's goals of autonomy and

equality. In this chapter, I will consider the ernpirical evidence as to whether

multiculturalism is effective in promoting integration.' I will argue that Kymlicka's

arguments about. and interpretations of, the ernpiricat evidence. attrt bute too

much causal power to multiculturalism in promoting integration. At best. we can conclude that the empirical evidence concerning the success of multiculturalism

in promoting integration is inconclusive. Consequently, those justifications for a policy of multiculturalism that hinge on its empirical success are shaky at best.

A number of commentaton argue that multiculturalism has been successful in pmmoting integration. Indeed, the general view seems to be that this is the case. Harjinder Deol

II. Measurino Successfut Intemation

For a number of reasons, the empirical evidence for the integration of immigrants in Canada is difficult to represent as a causal consequence of the official policy of rnulticulturalism. The most striking of these reasons rnay be that there seems to be no agreed upon definition of "integration". We begin an account of the success of multiculturalism without a clear sense of what

"integration" involves and without a list of specific criteria for rneasuring the lack or presence. rate, or intensity (depth) of integration for immigrant groups.

If we were to use Kymlicka's own definition of integration as a basis for choosing the factors that promote or hinder the process, we would have too little to work with to provide an account of what integration involves. Kymlicka points out that he uses "integration" in a very sociological sense: 3he extent to which immigrants and their descendants integrate into an existing societal culture and come to view their life-chances as tied up with participation in the range of social institutions. based on a common language, which define societal culture"

(Kyrnlicka 1998: 28, 53). Not only does this definition remain vague conceming the rneasures that determine successful integration, but the potential factors that might be cited are endless. By Kymlicka's definition a societal culture is ubiquitous; as stated earlier, a societal culture encompasses the full range of meaningful human activity (Kymlicka 1995: 76). It would seem that the institutions based on a common language that compose a societal culture range frorn government institutions al1 the way down to religious groups and other Ha jinder Deot social clubs, famtly networks etc.. As such, Kymlicka's definition of integration leaves us in the dark about the empirical measures that might bring it about.

Indeed, it is not clear what the litmus test for integration is. Geographical and sociological commentators use a number of factors. in various combinations. to ascertain whether successful integration is a reality in Canada. For example, sociologist Morton Weinfeld believes the following factors to be relevant: language retention, ethnic in-marriage, social networks, regional and urban concentrations, ethnic organizations, institutional completeness. ethnic self- identity and economic segregation (Weinfeld 1994: 239). Geographer David Ley takes residential, occupational and social life segregation to be important factors in determining social integration as well as language acquisition. intermarriage and linguistic comfort with official languages (Ley 1999: 3-51,AH of the above listed factors are potential criteria for measuring successful integration.

Even once we do have an account of what integration involves and what general factors to look for. there is the question of how to test for the presence or absence of these factors. Daniel Heibert points out, for example, that even if we had established that lack of residential concentration is a good indicator of integration, we would still have trouble determining whether residential integration was a fact. He rightly asks, "What does residential integration in a multicultural society look like? Do we even know what we are looking for?"

(Heibert 2000) Similarly, how can we judge that ethnic groups are linguistically

See Kymlicka 1998: 27 and 1995: 76. Harjindcr Dcol tntegrated wtthout criteria for what cwnts as linguistic "knowledge"of one of the official languages?

The problem of not having an account of what successful integration entails exacerbates the already existing problems of the rough and ready methodology that must be used in the social sciences. Heibert discusses some of the measuring techniques used by sociologists and geographers. These techniques involve a "diverse set of methodologies that include participant observation. structured and unstructured interviews. focus groups. landscape evaluation. media studies, questionnaires, descriptive data analysis, and statistical hypothesis testingn (Heibert 2030). That is, the methodologies of the social sciences are greatly affected by the humans involved in the experiments; this is the "human factor"

The human factor makes it both necessary and problematic to use interviewing and self-reporting as means of gathering evidence for integration in terms of self-identity, language fluency. social integration and a number of other characteristics. In its most basic form, this manifests itself as a definitional problem with the term "ethnicity" itself. Ethnicity can be defined and conceived in different ways. Because the term is broadly construed as referring to a culture or "ethnos", researchers and subjects can divide a population differently depending on whether language, cultural origin, ethnic ancestry. religion or cultural identity is used as the criterion for determining ethnicity (White 1992:

164). For example, if we take the Indo-Canadian community, we can partition its members according to national origin (there are some who corne from Africa), Hajinder De01 language (Punjabi. Urdu. and Hindi are commun languages), or religion (the community could be divided into Sikhs, Muslims, Hindus. and ~hristians).~

Therefore, depending on what characteristics we take to define the ethnicity in question. the sample population will change. According to Pamela White. "Any review of the literature brings the conclusion that there is no consensus on what criteria determine ethnicity" (White 1992: 163-164). Monica Boyd notes that a researcher's conception of ethnicity will influence the characteristics employed in de termining ethnicity. For example. "The social constructionist perspective of ethnicity eschews the conceptualization of ethnicity as primordial or 'natural' traits and behaviors, unalterable over timr" (Boyd 1999). In addition to the researcher's assignments of ethnicity. an individual's ethnic identification makes the situation even more diffïcult According to Boyd, "Ethnic self-assignments are not always based on objective 'facts' or on rational choices.. .they are influenced by the advantages and disadvantages associated with select ethntcities" (Boyd 1999). This can include symbolic and personal meanings attached to a particular ethnicity by the identifying individual. The problems. however, do not end there.

In addition to the complications caused by the human factor in deriving accurate responses and research results, there is the factor of question design.

Certain questions evoke certain answers. For example. both Boyd and White note how the census questionnaire protocol at Statistics Canada can affect the

This emphasizes the point made in chapter 2 about the lack of correlation between ethnic groups, national boundaries, and the general lack of territorial concentration and common identity amongst people of the same nationality. See White 1992. Ha jinder Deol

ethnic classtfications of respondents (Boyd 1999: White 1992:163-1 66).4 In the

1986 census. the ethnicity question ernphasized ethnic roots, ancestry and

ethnic origin. That is, it emphasized the primordial nature of ethnicity (White

1992: 166). By 1991, the protocol for designing census questions had changed

to include "Canadian" as an ethnic classification. The definition of ethnicity

being used at this time was thus more of a social constructionalist one. The

response rate for being of Canadian ethnic origin was high enough to ensure

that "Canadian" became a category of ethntc classif cation in the 1996 census

questionnaire (Boyd 1999). The whole category of "visible minority" also

became recognized in 1996 . This means that before the Ernployment Equity

Act's definition of visible minorities as persons who are of neither Aboriginal,

Caucasian in race or white in color, members of eleven major groups were

miscategorized in the census data: Chinese, Blacks. South Asians, Latin

Americans, Southeast Asians, Japanese, Koreans, and Pacific Islanders (Boyd

1999). Before 1996,no measure of visible minority existed in the Canadian

censuses (Boyd 1999). Thus, the human factor and subjectivity involved in

question design for ethnic classifications can yield significantly inaccurate

evaluations when dealing with questions of ethnicity and integration.

Once the human factor is taken into account in a margin of error, however, there is a new problem concerning the generalizabiliity of results.

First, persona1 histories and beliefs of individuals involved make it difficult to draw accurate and generalizable conclusions about any particular ethnic group

Boyd finds census evaluations inaccurate due to the nature of the questions.

38 Harjinder Deoi

(Ray 1994: 263). There are simply tao many variations amongst members in

any given group. Second, each ethnic group in each geographical area in

Canada has different factors affecting its integration process. This fact leads

John Mercer to claim that measurements of any factors and the conclusions

drawn from those measurements are not generalizable from one metropolitan

area to another (Mercer 1995: 183)? He notes how immigrant cornmunities Vary

across. and within. metropolitan areas due to differences in origin or variations in

cultural contexts from city to city (Mercer 1995: 175). This hazard in

generalizing from one metropolis to another makes any study about the

integration of immigrants dificu~t.~

Once facts have been gathered and numbers have been tallied. many

social scientists and geographers find it difficult to Say anything about one

integration index without relating it to another.' This type of inter-relatedness

can be found in studies of different criteria used to show the success or failure of

integration. For example, John Harles finds that the readiness to take on civil

duties is only a partial indicator of political integration and that that conceptions

of personal identity are also important in determining whether immigrants are well-integrated poiitically (Harles 1997: 717). Ceri Peach finds that rates of

intermarriage between various ethnic groups can be predicted from patterns of

residential segregation: "the spatial allocation of housing may be one of the most

Mercer studies this difficulty of generalization in the five different metropolises that are the top destinations of new immigrants: Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Edmonton, and Calgary. Heibert argues that the characteristics of immigrants should not be naturalized. He daims that portraying immigrants groups as homogenous takes ethnocultural characteristics in isolation from other social factors (Heibeft 1994: 258). See Heibert 1994: 258, for example. fundamenta l variables in detemining the outcome of ethnic assimilation [or

integration]" (Peach 1980: 381 ). Ley finds that residential segregation is related

to social isolation, language acquisition and occupational segregation (Ley

1999: 8). lndeed this interrelation makes it difficult to Say anything about one

factor without mentioning another.

Far from exhausting the list of complications in measuring levels of

integration. it is worth mentioning some of the ethical concerns with using

various indices such as residential segregation and social isolation. Heibert

claims that the use of any sort of segregation index to measure integration only

tells part of the story about the immigrant experience (Heibert 1994: 258). Such

indices are dangerous due to the possibility that they may inadvertently

contribute to prejudice. For example, portraying an ethnic group as

homogenous, as many of these indices do, can perpetuate racist bias and

stereotypes of immigrants as "naturally" different. Moreover. there is the issue of

results being used and skewed for the purposes of policy makers and interest

groups. "The use of ethnic origin data for policy purposes and the existence of

groups keenly interested in numbers means that the measurement of ethnic

origins is not determined solely by the principles of sound social science

research." (Boyd 1999)

III. Kvmlicka's Emoirical Case for Multiculturalism

In the first chapter of Finding Our Way, Kymlicka presents a "review of the empirical evidence concerning the impact of 'multiculturalism' on the integration of ethnic groups" (Kymlicka 1998: 8). This review is intended primarily to refute the daim that official rnulticutturaRsrn is undenining the historicat tendency of

ethnic groups to integrate into mainstream society. Yet it also argues that

multiculturalism is a causal force in the successful integration of immigrants. In

order to make his case for the success of multiculturalism in promoting

integration. Kymlicka acknowledges that his argument requires at least some

account of what integration involves (Kymlicka 1998: 17). While acknowledging

the earlier mentioned difficulty about the lack of standardized criteria for

measuring successful integration, Kymlicka proceeds by using the fol lowing

indices: 1) adopting a Canadian identity, 2) participating in broader social

institutions and not just ethnic ones. 3) learning an official language, 4) having

interethnic friendships and mixed marriages rather than socializing only with

rnembers of one's ethnic group (Kymlicka 1998- 17) Kymlicka readily admits

that the above items in no way form a comprehensive list of what is involved in

integration (Kymlicka 1998: 18), but then proceeds to present empirical evidence

in support of the view that rnulticulturalism is having a positive effect on the

integration of immigrants in certain respects. The relevant factors can be divided into those that demonstrate political or legai integration and those that demonstrate social integration.

A. Political lntenration

1. Naturalization

According to Kymlicka, the decision to bewme a Canadian citizen is the most basic form of political integration and naturalization rates have increased since 1971 (Kyml icka 1998: 18). One might be tempted to attribute this statistic Ha jinder Deol

to the economic benefits of becarning a Cariadian citizen; however, Kyrnficka

points out that such economic incentives have actually decreased since the

inception of official multiculturalism. In terms of civil rights and legal benefits, a

permanent resident and a citizen enjoy virtually the same status with the

exception that the citizen can vote (Kymlicka 1998: 18). Kymlicka therefore

interprets the increase in naturalization rates to suggest that identification with

Canada, the desire to formalize membership in Canadian society, and participate in Canadian political life is increasing as well. He assumes that identification is the primary reason for immigrants to take out citizenship

(Kymlicka 1998: 18). Further, Kymlicka claims that immigrants from non- traditional sources "have shown the greatest desire to become Canadian, while

!hose that fa!! outside the multiculturalisrn rubric [frorn traditional sources of immigration] have shown the least desire to become Canadian" (Kymlicka 1998:

18). Kymlicka suggests consequently that multiculturalisrn is a cause of immigrants wanting to become Canadian citizens and that it thus has a politically integrative impact on immigrant groups.

Yet in order to show the truth of the above claim, Kymlicka must first show that the act of naturalizing is indeed undertaken to express identification with

Canadian institutions. Unfortunately it is not clear that the act of taking out citizenship papers represents identification with Canada. Some acadernics suggest that the primary reason for naturaiizing may be purely instrumental- that is, to gain a Canadian passport. Kymlicka's failure to consider the securing of a Canadian passport as a major reason for "non-traditional" immigrants taking Canadian citizenship arouses suspicion as to the accuracy of tirs conclusions

with respect to the increase in political integration since 1971. The recent arriva1

of such immigrants means that many have left their extended families and

sometimes homes behind in their old country. The lengthy process of family

reunion, and the desire of some to stay in the home country. may make frequent

travel to the homeland necessary in order to keep family bonds intact. A

Canadian passport not only provides safety while traveling, but it also allows for

easy access to visas for traveling to other places. As Bissoondath correctly

notes:

Few passports are safer than a Canadian one: it opens borders and doors that [even] and American one will not. It carries no legacy of political or colonial resentment. For many people, as a result, Canadian Citizenship merely rneans access to the (dis) cornforts of the former or ancestral homeland with the assurance of safe haven should things go awry, or should political instability necessitate flight. (Bissoondath 1994: 132)

In a series of 30 random interviews conducted on Lao immigrants, Harles finds that the ability to travel on a Canadian passport is a major reason for taking out citizenship. "[It] was mentioned by almost al1 of the interviewees as a primary motivation to take out citizenship-a benefit not to be gainsaid as Lao families are commonly separated by country of residence." (Harles 1997: 721 )

In addition to showing that there has been an increase in naturalization amongst non-traditional immigrants since 1971, Kyrnlicka must show that there is a causal link between multiculturalism and this increase. For starters, it is not clear whether there really is a high level of identification amongst immigrants.

This not to Say that it is out of the question for some immigrants to naturalize Harji nder Deol because of identification with Canada and a desire to participate in its democratic process. I would like to suggest, however. that if increase in naturalization rates means increase in identification with Canadian institutions and thus, the success of political integration, simply pointing to numbers is not enough. Kymlicka must show how naturalization is motivated by the increased identification. and he fails to provide this connection. Instead, we find that the increase in naturatization rates may be due to factors other than those that

Kymlicka cites. In addition to their interest in securing a Canadian passport. immigrants may feel a sense of allegiance to Canada because of having uprooted and transplanted themselves. Tha! is, "their allegiance to Canada may be a function of the process of immigration itself' (Harles 1997: 727) or time may be a factor On the other hand Harles suggests that the failure of identification rnay be the result of the process of immigration, because it makes newcomers feel like guests in the host society (Harles 1997: 722). As Harles notes in the case of Lao immigrants in Canada, although "immigrants can be disposed to high levels of political commitment,. . . not enough time has passed since the introduction of official multiculturaiisrn to be completely confident of its consequences" (Harles 1997: 716). Because the Lao refer to their place in

Canada by using "us and them" terminology, Harles claims that the political transformation of immigrants is not always complete; ties to the homeland die hard (Harles 1997: 721 ).' Thus the difficulty of deterrnining the motivational and a Kymlicka acknowledges the possibility of incomplete political identification. He writes, "te fact that immigrants have accepted .... Institutional integration does not mean that they have integrated in a more purely psychological sense" (Kymlicka 1998: 52). Ha jinder Dcol causai factors in the taking out of citizenship by mernbers of non-traditional ethnic groups makes Kymlicka's conclusion about the integrative impact of multiculturalism suspect.

Finally, given that immigration policy eliminated entrance barriers for non- traditional immigrants only in the late 1960's. it is understandable that naturalization rates for non-traditional immigrants should have increased since

1971. The proportions of such immigrants gaining access to Canada increased under the points system, and so, no doubt, their proportion in naturalization rates increased as well. In other words, the increase seems to be due simply to the changing proportions of non-traditional immigrants to those from Europe and the United States since 1971. The arriva1 of non-traditional immigrants in

Canada happens to have coincided with the irnplementation of multiculturalism.

This, however, does not mean that the desire of immigrants to become naturalized citizens of Canada is a consequence of the success of multiculturalism in promoting political integration. To establish this, Kymlicka must not only present naturalization-rate figures for before and after 1971 but also eliminate several other possible explanations for the discernible trends.

Otherwise, multiculturalism cannot reasonably be regarded as the sole (or even the major) causal factor in the increase there has been in the naturalization rates of non-traditional immigrants.

2. Political Participation

In addition to naturalization rates, Kymlicka sees political participation as a symbolic affirmation of citizenship; it "reflects an interest in the political life of Hajinder Deot the targer society" (Kyrnticka ?998:t 8). Kyrnticka consequently takes certain facts about political participation to suggest that multiculturalisrn is a politically integrative force. First, political participation has not decreased since 1971

(Kymlicka 1998: 18). Second, since 1971 ethnic groups have become increasingly well represented in parliament: "today, they have nearly as many

MP's as one would expect given their percentage of the population" (Kymlicka

1998: 18). They have not shown any inclination to sponsor ethnic-based political parties. Kymlicka takes these indicators to suggest that "immigrants are supportive of and committed to proiecting the country's basic political structure"

(Kynilicka 1998: 19). Moreover, he takes the evidence to be suggestive of the integrative force of multicultural policy:

If we look at al! the indicators of legal and political integration, then, we see that since the adoption of multiculturalism in 1971 immigrants have been more likely to become Canadians, and more likely to participate politically. And when they participate, they do so through pan-ethnic parties that uphold Canada's basic liberal-democratic principles. (Kymlicka 1998:19)

Here too. Kymlicka seems to be guilty of the same sort of fallacy as in the case of naturalization rates. He takes the lack of decrease in participation since the inception of multiculturalisrn to represent its integrative impact. First, in order to truly demonstrate the causal impact of multiculturalisrn policy, Kymlicka would have to show not only that there was an overall increase in political participation amongst immigrant groups, but also a causal link between this increase and various policy initiatives that fall under the nibric of officia1 multiculturalism.

Second, Kymlicka needs to establish a definitive link between voting and Ha jinder De01 political integration. He fatls, however, to do either and consequently his daims about the integrative impact of multiculturalism in terms of political participation seem suspect.

As with naturalization rates, the motivational and causal factors behind political participation rates seem to be of many kinds. This makes it difficult to

Say exactly what the act of voting expresses. A concern for the political society rnay or rnay not be a reason to vote and the act of voting need not represent successful integration. Voting cmbe an act of voicing purely personal and instrumental concems with respect tç oneself and one's ethnic group: it rnay be an attempt to ensure that one's interests are not overlooked. Similarly, voting can be considered an expression of gratitude for the safety and security a tolerant society provides for immigrants There is therefore no clear-cut case for the view that immigrant voting signifies successful political integration.

Moreover, even if we allow such a correlation, Kymlicka provides no case for how multiculturalism is responsible for the increase (or lack of decrease as he puts it) in the political participation of immigrants. Other factors rnay be responsibie for this increase. In a study of various ethnic groups in Montreal,

Miriam Lapp finds that voter tumout is greatly affected by the amount of rnobilization initiated by the communities' elite leaders. Interviews with these leaders revealed that members of some groups with their origins in countries where voting is mandatory, are inclined to vote out of habit (Lapp 1999). Other immigrants rnay vote because they corne from cultures that value political activity and participation. Past experience of non-democratic countries rnay also Harj inder De01 dispose immigrants to vote (Lapp 1999). Indeed, Lapp finds that voter turnout can also Vary according to the strength of a community's intemal news network. knowledge of Canadian politics, family pressure, socialization and a whole gamut of other factors.

As far as the representation of immigrants in parliament is concerned,

Kymlicka overlooks a crucial distinction that would hinder him from concluding that the representation of ethnic groups in parliament is consistent with their percentage of the population. Although proportionality with respect to ethnic groups in general may be achieved in the House of Cornmons, visible minorities are significantly underrepresented. It seems obvious that in general, "the diversity of Canadian society-in terrns of ethnicity ... is not reflected in our governing bodies" (Young 1998). In the 35thparliament of Canada after the

1993 election "the level of minority presence correspond[ed] to the incidence of minorities in the population at large, but visible minorities clearly rernain[ed] underrepresented" (Black and Lakhani 1997: 1 ). At the time 24.7 percent of the members of the house had backgrounds that were neither French nor English

(Black and Lakhant 1997: 7).' Predictably, the non-french, non-English population level was at 27 percent at the time. Yet only 4.4 percent of MP's were visible minorities, whereas census data reported their population level at

7.5 percent (Black and Lakhani 1997: 7). The 3.1 percent difference in proportion for visible minorities seems as insignificant as the 2.3 percent

-- These results are taken from Black and Lakhani 1997: 7. 1 find it interesting that Kymlicka has used the same source as I have and has neglected to mention the representational differences between visible minonties and ethnic groups in general. Xarjinder Deol difierence for ethnic groups in general. Yet this discrepancy becornes more troubling when we consider that Statistics Canada reported that visible minorities more accurately composed 9.4 percent of the population. leaving their representation at below the halfway mark (Black and Lakhani 1997: 7). Although the proportional representation in the House of Commons has since increased. there are still significant differences. In 1996,the visible minorities composed

11.2 percent of the population requiring at 34 visible minority MP's to be proportionally represented (Library of Parliament 2001 ). There were, however, only 16-barely reaching the halfway mark. In the 2000 election, 14 visible minority MP's out of 301 MPJs(4.7percent) were elected while their population level was at 12 percent (Cheung 2001). Since visible minorities would be what

Kymlicka describes as the "multiculturalJ'groups. the groups that are "most directly affected by the multiculturalism policy" (Kymlicka 1998: 18). it seems that the policy has had less of an integrative impact on political representation than

Kymlicka claims. 'O

In the end, none of the facts that Kymlicka provides is a sure indicator of successful political integration. First, due to the complexity of the motivational factors involved in naturalization and political participation. the task of showing

'O Black and Lakhani believe this discrepancy to be a matter of the recent amval of visible rninorities: Translated into the present context, they irnply a requisite passage of time for minority communities to be sufficiently integrated before econornically secure and politically interested individuals emerge, able and eager to assume high-level political responsibilities. If visible minorities are underrepresented, this logic would suggest, it is because of their status of having amved relatively recently. (Black and Lakhani 1997: 11) Ha jinder Ilml

how these indicators represent potitiwt integration is arduous, if even possible.

More difficult still is the task of showing how multiculturalism is responsible for

successful integration. We see above that Kymlicka fails to show the point he

wants to make about the causal efficacy oi multiculturalism policy in promoting

political integration.

B. Social lntearation

Despite his case for the successful political integration of immigrant

groups, Kymlicka notes that individual Canadians probably do not take political

integration to be as important as social integration (Kyrnlicka 1998: 19). He

perceptively points out that even if immigrants are good deinocratic citizens, if

they are socially isolated and cannot speak one of the two official languages,

Canadians will perceive a failure of integration (Kymlicka 1998: ? 9).

Consequently, Kymlicka presents empirical evidence on three indicators-

language acquisition, intermarriage rates, and residential concentrations-to demonstrate how multiculturalisrn has been successful in promoting the social

integration of immigrant groups.

According to Kymlicka, an increase in demand for official language acquisition amongst immigrants since 1971 points to an aspect of social integration that has been achieved by multiculturalism policy. He points to the fact that the demand for ES1 and FSL classes exceeds supply in many

It is not clear that an official policy of multiculturalisrn is required to increase the representation of ethnic groups. Ha rjinder Deol

rnetropolitan areas and has never been higher (Kyrnlicka 1998: 19)."

Furthermore, the 1997 census showed that 98.6 percent of Canadians reported

that they had knowledge of at least one official language. Kymlicka finds that

this is especially impressive given that the number of immigrants who arrive with

knowledge of an official language has declined since 1971" (Kyrnlicka 1998:Ig).

Thus, Kymlicka implies that even in terms of social integration, multiculturalism

policy is effective for immigrants given language-acquisition success rates.

Yet an increase in demand for ESL and FSL is dependent on a variety of

causes and motivations and cannot be said to be the result of an official policy of

multiculturalisrn. It is important to keep in mind how important a role economic

mobility and necessity play in language acquisition. "There exist clear economic

benefits which are associated with knowledge of English andlor French in

Canada" (Economic Council of Canada qtd. in Weinfeld 1994: 241).12 It is thus

not clear what role multiculturalism plays in the increased desire to know an

official language. Desire aside, language acquisition seems to be a necessity in rnany respects. Second, demand for English and French classes rnay be higher today than it ever bas been before, but this rnay be the result of increased

immigration levels. As Kymlicka notes, this increased immigration is frorn non- traditional sources and many immigrants arrive without knowledge of an official language (Kymlicka 1998: 19-20). This may point to why the demand for French and English has exceeded the supply of language classes. The supply of such

11 'ESLn and "FSLnstand for English as a Second Language and French as second language respective1y. Harji ndcr Dcol classes may have decreased propurtionally with the nurnber of immigrants who arrive without knowledge of an official language.

Kymlicka takes intermarriage rates to be another indicator of successful integration-societal integration in particular. . Here he points to the fact that intermarriage rates have consistently increased since 1971 (Kymlicka 1998: 20).

He implies that multicultural policy is responsible for this despite the fact that "it is not the business of governments either to encourage or discourage intermarriage" (Kymlicka 1998: 20). Kymlicka takes both the increase in intermarriage and the increase in social acceptance of such mariages to be indicative of how well immigrants are mixing with the mainstream culture.

Furthermore, he suggests that this is the result of multicultural policy, albeit an unintended one: "Canadians today are much more willing to accept members of other ethnic groups as coworkers, neighbors, or friends than they were before

1971" (Kymlicka 1998: 20).

Indeed, according to sociologists, "Marriage may be taken as the one of the most sensitive indicators of ethnic assimilation" (Peach 1980: 372).13 Yet muiticu[turaiism seems to have liffle to do even indirectly with rates of intermarriage according to sociologists. The sociological studies find that time has the greatest impact on higher rates of intermarriage:

The duration of residence in Canada was very strongly associated with intermarriage, suggesting that one of the reasons why the propensity to

'2~conornicCouncil of Canada (1 991). New Faces in the Crowd: Economic and Social Aspects of Immigration. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada. l3Peach uses the terni assimilation to refer to what we are calling 'integration". As stated earlier however, even assimilation is a means to integrating immigrants. Her use of the terminoiogy can be properiy said to be the result of having done her studies in the 1970's. See also Ram 21 3. tntermerry is lower among persons ortginating from Asia, the Caribbean and Southern Europe than fcom the US., Australia, and Western and Northern Europe, is the fact that immigrants from the former group of countries are more recent arrivals and are therefore less exposed to inter- group relations. (Ram 1990: 225)

Residential segregation and spatial separation also seern to play large roles in determining intermarriage rates. Peach conducts a study in which she proves that the degree of intermarriage between any two different ethnic groups is correlated with the degree of their spatial separation (Peach 1980: 371 ). Ley too finds a robust relationship between intermarriage and residential segregation: he attributes the high level of out-marriage in European groups to be the result of low levels of residential segregation (Lcy 1999: 9). This conclusion is wholly accurate according to Peach. She points out that as the spatial distribution of various ethnic groups begins to overlap, chances of contact between members are maximized and intermarriage is an inevitable result of such contact (Peach 1980: 372).

In general, the dynamic behind intermarriage highlights the fact that integration indices are interrelated and that numbers cannot be explained without reference to other factors that contribute to increased or decreased integration. The population size of an ethnic group, its length of residence in

Canada. the sex ratio within the group, occupational and sex segregation in the labor force al1 influence the levels of intermarriage in ethnic groups (Ram 1990:

21 3).14

C. Cross Countw Cornparison and Factors that Affect lntearation Harjindcr Deol

Finally, Kyrnlicka makes a crosscountry cornpartson of immigrant group

integration. He compares the different dimensions of integration in Canada and

the U. S. to show how multiculturalism policy is aiding in the process of

integration in Canada. Concerning each of the above listed indicators of

integration, Kymlicka daims that "Canada, with its multiculturalism policy. fares

better than the United States, with its repudiation of multiculturalism" (Kyrnlicka

1998: 21 ). In fact, according to Kymlicka, Canada does better than any other

country in the world when it comas to integrating its immigrants (Kymlicka 1998:

21 ). The Australian situation is comparable, but they too have their own version

of multiculturalisrn. Thus, Kymlicka concludes, "The two coun!:ies that lead the

world in the integration of immigrants are countries with official multiculturalism

policies. They are much more successful than any country that has rejected

rnulticulturalism." (Kymlicka 1998: 21 )

In order to show that multiculturalism does have causal power in promoting integration. Kymlicka must provide comparative evidence from countries that do have officia1 policies of multiculturalism and those that do not.

The differences might turn out to be due to multiculturalisrn policy; however, they might also be the result of a number of other factors such as the absence of residential concentration, the absence of new infiuxes of immigrants, the need for economic mobility, etc.. These possible explanations make it difficult to attribute causal power to multiculturalisrn in matters of integration.

14 See Ram for more on occupational heterogeneity and rates of out-mamage (Rarn 1990: 221). Indeed, cornparisons between countries that do and do not endorse multiculturalism are difficult to make because integration is influenced by a number of interrelated factors. Various characteristics of ethnic groups themselves will affect their success rate in regard to integration. Frideres suggests that the dernographics within various ethnic groups may be important components in determining patterns and rates and degrees of integration

(Frideres 1992: 57). Rates and degrees of integration are influenced by the demographic factors of group cohesion, language maintenance, age-sex composition, intermarriage, where immigrants corne from, where they settle, how large a group they form, education. occupational status, incorne, and time of arriva1 (Frideres 1992: 57; Ray 1994: 254).

Despite al1 of these factors, however: integration may still be difkult for the individual due to cultural factors. Kymlicka himself allows for the possibility of integration not occurring: "In some cases, where the differences in social organization and technological development are vast. successful integration may be alrnost impossible" (Kymlicka 1995: 85). According to Kymlicka, the cost integration varies for individuals depending on the speed of the process, the age of the person, and the sirnilarity between the source and the host cultures, language, and history (Kymlicka 1995: 85). Although Kymlicka does not acknowledge those factors in his cornparison of the immigration countries, he does recognize that integration is affected by a variety of factors.

Characteristics of the host society will also affect the rate and extent of immigrant integration. One such characteristic is the area in which immigrants Haginder De01 - choase to settle. In metmpolitan areas, the social and cultural characteristics of the population already there will influence their adaptation to the new society

(Balakrishnan and Selvanathan 1990: 399). The social benefits and the level of material well being a country provides can also have an integrative function

(Harles 1997: 730). lntegration is affected by the level of prejudice in the host society and the extent to which anti-discrimination laws are enforced. In addition. the cultural practices, social structures, and ideologies of receiving socteties clearly affect integration leve~s.'~Finally, a time factor ensures makes that integration will take place by the second or third generation, as we will discuss in the following chapter. Neverthelers, because of the rnultiplicity of factors that affect integration, an inter-country cornparison really cannot tell us much about the effectiveness of multiculturalism or its causal impact on integration.

IV. Conclusion

In studying Kyrnlicka's empirical arguments for the success of multiculturaiism in promoting social and political integration, we find his interpretations suspect for a number of reasons. First, integration is difficult to study due to lack of criteria for the measurement of successful integration, shortcomings in methodology, and the human factor involved in question design and answers. Yet even after we have developed an account of what criteria to use and how to apply them, successful integration still cannot be shown in any

'' For more on how racism and the structure of the host society affect the integration of immigrants see Castles and Miller 1998: 232 and Weinfeld 1994: 261. Ha rjinder Deoi conclusive way to be the resuft of rnufticulturatisrn poticy. We find this to be the case based on the evidence provided above on both the political and social aspects of successful integration; we canot Say that multiculturalism policy is responsible for either the failure or the success of integration. Consequently. multiculturalism policy cannot be said to promote the liberal values of equality and autonomy through aiding the process of integration for immigrants. Ha jinder De01

Chapter 4

The Success and Future of Integration

1. Introduction

Successful integration is an essential factor in Kymlicka's argument for how polyethnic rights promote liberal values of freedom and equality. However.

Kymlicka's position on multiculturalism's success in promoting integration is complicated by his recognition of the generational fact of integration-that integration is an inevitable consequence of time over succeeding generations.

Kymlicka's acknowledgment of the impact of time on the integration of ethnic groups makes his argument for the empirical successes of multiculturalism seem superfluous. If integration is an inevitable reality, then why do we need multiculturalism to aid the process? As demonstrated, whether multiculturalism can facilitate the process of integration is inconclusive. Nevertheless, we might still wonder whether the successful integration of immigrants is a reality at ail.

In this chapter, I will point to ways in which Canada's social reality suggests that integration is not as successfut a project as Kyrnticka makes it out to be. Furthermore, since the truth of the generational thesis depends on certain conditions that no longer hold for Canadian immigrants. there is reason to believe that integration will not occur in the future in the way that it has in the past. Indeed, the changing patterns of diversity in Canadian society will usher in the need for a different understanding of cultural integration and pluralism. The purpose of this discussion is to show that even though multiculturalism cannot Ha jinder Dcol

be said to facilitate or hindef the pfocess of integration, the fact that integration

is not occurring suggests that either we are failing in promoting liberal values of

equality and autonomy, or that Canada's multiculturalism cannot be justified on

liberal grounds that appeal to the effectiveness of integration.

II.The Generational Fact of Integration

Many writers on the subject of multiculturalism recognize the impact that

time has on the integration of successive generations within ethnic groups.

Even Kymlicka makes much of this point, arguing that although cultural

attachments may be strong for first generation immigrants, they will wane by the

third generation as has been the case in the past (Kymlicka 1995: 78-79). Jeff

Spinner also argues that by the third or fourth generation. descendants of

immigrants have weak cültural attachments. They hold on to symbols of their

ethnicity by attending cultural events and retaining some cultural rituals. but

these symbols do not instrumentally affect the way that people live their lives.

Both Kymlicka and Spinner use Herbert Gans's terminology with respect to

waning ethnicity; they cal1 it "symbolic ethnicity"-ethnicity of the last resort

(Kymlicka 1995: 98; Spinner 1994: 67).'According to Gans, "For the third

generation. the secular cultures which the immigrants brought with them are now

only an ancestral memory, or an exotic tradition to be savored once in a while in a museum or an ethnic festival" (Gans 1979: 6). Gans catls this "voluntary ethni~ity".~

See also Herbert Gans 1979. ' This points to a pmblem with providing groupdifferentiated rights to immigrant groups. If ethnicity is sornething that inevitably becomes voluntary, how does it differ from the lifestyle Hqinder De01

Indeed, many characteristics of ethnic groups are affect& by tirne as

syrnbolic ethnicity becomes a noticeable reality by the third generation. The

differences between those who grew up in the old country and those who have

grown up in the host country suggest this sort of change (Spinner 1994: 66). In

a study of South Asian families in Canada, Aycan and Kanungo find that the

memories of life in the old country and attachments to their cultural roots makes

parents' attitudes towards change different from those of their children, who are

raised in the host country and are more flexible and tolerant towards change

(Aycan and Kanungo 1998: 453). Soma d the children's' beliefs will be

influenced by the ways of their parents; for example. parents find pragmatic

values, "such as those related to education and career decisions, easier to

change than core values about dating, mariage patterns, and religious

practices" (Aycan and Kanungo 1998: 453). But the school system can be seen

as a competitor with parents in the socialization of immigrant children; often

parents do not win (S. Abu-Laban 1998: 3). Even though parents bring the

language, historical narratives, tradition and convention with them, they are

bound to wither away in the absence of the institutional structure necessary for

the survival of any culture's language, traditions, and conventions (Kymlicka

1995: 79). Kymlicka describes this transition as follows:

While there are many aspects of heritage that immigrants will maintain and cherish ... For the third generation, if not sooner, learning the original choices of members of other cultural subgroups and minonties who do not coalesce according to ethnicity? Bnan Walker defines this phenomenon of privileging ethnicity over other foms of identification as "culturalismn(Walker 1997: 21 1). He argues, "culturalists start with a general concern about maintaining the cultural backgrounds on which people rely, but their focus soon narrows to a more exclusive concentration on ... ethnic groups" (Walker 1997: 21 3). rnother tongue is not untike teaming a foreign tanguage. Leamiftg the old language may be rewarding as a hobby or business skill, but for children of immigrants, it is the anglophone culture which defines their options, not the culture frorn which their parents uprooted themselves. (Kymlicka 1995: 78-79)

This is particularly troublesome as language seems to be the most important and recognizable locus of drift amongst succeeding generations of immigrants.

Weinfeld notes that although elements of language knowledge do persist beyond the immigrant generation, the generational loss of language is a fact

( Weinfeld 1994: 240).

Yet language loss seems to lead to increased integration in other respects. According to Harles, political identification becomes easier for the children of immigrants because they face fewer language impediments (Harles

1997: 722). There is also a generational increase in intermarriaçe. As ethnicity becornes increasingly symbolic, intermarriage increases: Spinner finds that intermarriage "by the third generation is so common that.. .[he] doubt[s] it can be called intermarriage anymore" (Spinner 1994: 67)

This generational loss of culture, however, is not to be lamented if it means increased integration. lntegration does indeed allow for greater upward mobility and fewer disadvantages for immigrants. Were integration a doubtlessly successful project, we ought not to worry about any disadvantage to immigrants at present because it will not be systemic or generationally reproduced; "time will take care of things" (Beaujot and Rappak 1990: 11 1 ; Ley: 13). Nevertheless,

3 For more on the generational loss of language see Castles and Miller 1998: 13. Hqindcr Dcol there ts reason to doubt whether new immigrants have the same patterns of overcoming disadvantage as post-war (1946-1960) immigrants had.

III. New Immigration Trends

The generational thesis of integration only 3olds true with respect to today's immigrants if we assume the truth of what sociologists cal1 "straight-line theory". This theory concerns the process of immigrant integration and asserts that integration is cumulative: "with each passing generation since immigration, the measurable differences between the descendants of immigrants and the

Canadian-born are reduced until they are virtually indistinguishable" (Boyd and

Vickers 2000b). Yet, straight-line theory and models of assimilation and pluralism were derived from the experiences of European groups; they were

"baseci primarily on the experiences of immigrants who were largeiy white and

European, and whose children grew up during a period of unprecedented economic growth'' (Boyd and Vicken 20006). Nevertheless, the integration patterns exhibited by European immigrants have been assumed to be fundamentally similar to those of more recent immigrants of non-European backgrounds, who are mostly visible minorities (Waters 1990: 6).'

The truth of straight-line theory is taken for granted by Black and Lakhani when they assume that patterns of political integration for visible minorities will be similar to those experienced by European groups. Black and Lakhani claim that visible minorities will become better represented with each passing election

Black and Lakhani define 'visible minority" as effecüvely those who do not belong !O groups with European ethnic backgrounds (Black and Lakhani 1997: f). [Black and Lakhani 1997:3). They find that since longer periods of settlement

and advanced stages in the immigrant adaptation process correlate with

increased representation for ethnic groups in general, this is likely to be the case

for visible minorities as well. Kymlicka too feels that visible minority groups are

relevantly similar to older immigrant groups: "the obstacles facing many visible

minorities in Canada today are comparable to those faced by immigrant groups

in the past" (Kymlicka 1998: 79).

Although Kymlicka rightly leaves room for the possibility that visible

minorities will follow different patterns of integration, he does believe that there

is no reason to assume that immigrants will not integrate in the future as they

have in the past (Kymlicka 1998: 80). Yet since we cannot be sure that they will

not integrate. as Kymlicka points out. we cannot be sure that they will integrate

as other groups have in the past either. For one thing, most visible minorities

have arrived in Canada only in the last thirty years and it may be that not enough

time has passed for us to either draw or preclude the cornparison between

European and Non-European ethnic groups. According to Simmons, the effect

of new wave immigration was minor untit 1990 for a nurnber of reasons:

immigration from non-traditional sources is a relatively new phenornenon; the

total number of arrivals is 40 percent greater than the number who actually stay

here;' and the proportion of immigrants to the overall size of the Canadian

' Many who corne here return home or migrate somewhere else. See Simmons 154. See also Beaujot and Rappak, and Thompson and Weinfeld. population has been relatively smali [Simmons 1990: 154).' Because the effect

has been minor until recently, it "remains unclear as to whether the visible

minority experience will parallel [that] of white ethnic groups" (Weinfeld 1994:

261 ).

Other writers on the subject of integration find that the distinction between

visible and non-visible minorities is essential to the conclusions they draw. For

exarnple, Steinberg makes clear that he is mostly dealing with white ethnics and

that these ethnic groups need to be distinguished from racial minorities

(Steinberg 1981: 49). "They are not varianis of the sarne phenornenon."

(Steinberg 1981: 50)' One reason for the need to disiiiiguish visible and non-

visible minorities has to do with the differences in the demographics of these two

groups. Frideres finds that "European and North American immigrants show

demographic characteristics that are substantially different than the new visible

immigrants frorn Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean" (Frideres 1992:

58). EuropeanlNorth American cohorts are characterized by balanced sex ratios

(equal numbers of men and women immigrants), most members have university

education. and corne to Canada on independent immigrant status; however. the new visible immigrant cohort is not characterized by the same thingse8Another reason for distinguishing visible and non-visible minorities has to do with cultural differences. Castles and Miller note: "If culture is defined in terms of language,

Frideres makes the same assessrnent with respect to the recent effects of new wave !mmigration (Frideres 1992: 56-57). ' Beaujot and Rappak also find the incomparability of traditional and non-traditional immigrants to be a fact, See Beaujot and Rappak 1990: 112. See Frideres 1992: 58, for data. religion. values. then some non-European migrants are cleafly dtffefent from the receiving populations" and European immigrants as well (Castles and Miller

1998: 233). Thus, old theories of assimilation, integration and straight-line theory neglect the cultural and demographic differences between newer and older immigrants.

However, these theories also overlook the barriers to successful integration faced by visible minorities (Boyd and Vickers, 2000a). This is a significant oversight on Kymlicka's part. He assumes that because discrimination has only deferred and not hindered integration in the past, the pattern will be the same for new visible immigrants (Kymlicka 1998: 79). He

States:

The obstacles facing visible minorities in Canada today are comparable to those faced by immigrant groups in the past. Visible minorities today face enormous prejudice and discrimination, but so did earlier immigrants... .There is reason to believe that visible minorities today can overcome these barriers to integration, just as earlier groups have done. (Kymlicka 1998: 79)

Yet Kymlicka seems to neglect an essential feature of newer immigrants that may make their integration an obstacle-namely, that they are predominantly raciallvisible minorities and as such are visibly "different". Steinberg explains how in the middle of the 2othcentury in the United States. European immigrants had it better than racial minorities (namely, blacks) because they were generally employed in industries where they could rise to more skilled positions. They also faced less prejudice although they were disparaged for cultural pecul iarities. Yet racial minorities were always kept separate (Steinberg 1981 : 42). In the same vein, Castles and Miller explain how racisrn against white immigrants disappears over time but persists over generations against non- whites (Castles and Miller 1998: 232). Hence, there are good reasons to be skeptical about whether or not new wave immigrants will integrate as previous

European groups have done because racism may hinder the process of integration. This suggests that the fate of visible minorities rnay be considerably different from that of European immigrants.

Consequently, straight-line theory, theories of assimilation and integration. and policies based on these theories may not apply to new immigrants. As Simmons notes, the racial, ethnic and cultural characteristics of new immigrants are distinctive (Simmons 1090: 141). Frideres takes the variations in social and cultural patterns to suggest that policies established for traditional immigrants rnay not be appropriate for newer, visible minorities

(Frideres 1992: 58). According to Frideres, although to date Canadians have not needed to assess the impact of existing programs and policies, the differences between todayJs immigrants and those of 30 years ago may mean that old policies wi t t not work (Frideres t 992:61). Weinfeld agrees with this assessment; he argues that white European groups cast little light on what cultural policy should now be and that ethnicity in Canada hinges on the fate of visible minority groups (Weinfeld 1994: 250).

IV. The Realitv of Inteeration

Some criteria for determining the success of integration suggests that social integration rnay be a failure in Canada. Kymlicka's neglect of such factors skews hts impression of integration in Canada. This impression wnbe corrected with adequate attention to how various indicators of integration are interrelated-residential segregation, commercial segregation, institutional completeness, intermarriage, language acquisition, occupational segregation etc.. These factors when viewed together suggest that social integration is not occurring in Canada. Indeed, we can even see how these factors might interact to prevent integration in coming years.

Kyrnlicka claims that the fact that "permanent ethnic enclaves do not exist in Canada" is an indicator of successful social integration (Kymlicka 1998: 20).

He claims that the least amount of residential concentration is exhibited by Asian and Afro-Caribbean groups-groups arriving primarily after 1971 and the inception of an otficial policy of rnulticulturalism in Canada. However. the facts suggest that enclaves do in fact exist in Canada, although they change in location and character. According to Castles and Miller, a certain degree of residential segregation is to be expected in al1 of the immigration countries; it simply is not the case that Canada is without such segregation (Castles and

Miller 7998: 220). It thus seems that if the presence or absence of enclaves demonstrates the success or failure of social integration, we should perhaps be led to conclude that social integration is not in fact occurring.

Residential segregation is one of the oldest indicators of lack of integration; it is "a manifestation of the extent to which the ethnic groups are assimilated in Canadian society" (Ley 1999: 6; Balakrishnan and Selvanathan

1990: 399). Many sociologists and geographers therefore consider residential HarJinder Dcol

segregation to be an important indicato~in integration tests. Spatial isolation

and segregation from the host society are inversely related to integrati~n.~

Kymlicka should not assume that there is no residential segregation in

Canada today because there are in fact a number of pockets of ethnic

concentration that corne to mind when we think about Canadian geography. The

Little Indias. China Towns and other segregated areas in central metropolitan

areas are demographically typical of our multicultural society. Kymlicka may be

led to think that there is an increasing amount of integration by the fact that

ethnic communities have recently begun to move into the suburbs. For example.

Heibert finds that immigrants of European origin in Vancouver have become less

concentrated over time (Immigration). Yet, Heibert also notes that this may not

be the pattern for al1 groups:

Visible minorities... have likewise become suburbanized but this has not been associated with a lessening of their degree of residential concentration.. . European groups tend to conforrn to traditional theories of immigrant residential behavior which non-European groups do not. (Heibert 2000)

Even with respect to soma European immigrant groups, voluntary segregation is a reality. For example, in studying Portuguese settlement patterns. Teixeira finds that continuous and gradua1 movement of the "core" community to the suburbs has not affected the vitality of ethnic institutions (Teixeira 1996: 189).

' See Peach 1980: 380. and Teixeira 1996: 188. Rather, he finds that resegregatkn ocwrs in the sub~rbs.'~Another example of

this is found by Wang who finds that while their population has been increasing

in Toronto. the Chinese have been moving towards suburban areas such as

Markham.and Scarborough and reproducing an enclave residential pattern

(Wang 1999: 19). Consequently, although ethnic communities move within

metropolitan areas. this does not mean that they are dispersing or becoming

better integrated residentialty.

Empirical research therefore suggests a significant degree of residential

segregation. Ley pays significant attention to the "separatenessJ'of ethnic

groups and therefore emphasizes immigrant concentrations in central city and

suburban areas (Ley 1999: 6). Distinct patterns of residential segregation by

ethnic groups cmbe noticed in various metropolitan areas for a number of

reasons. Population size as a whole, ratio of immigrant groups to the

mainstrearn population and the size of the individual groups affect patterns of

residential segregation (Balakrishnan and Selvanathan 1990: 400). Indeed. the

size of immigrant groups has increased significantly over the last twenty years.

This is due in part to the increased levels of immigration in this period and the concentration of 77 percent of new immigrants in just four cities (Toronto,

Montreal, Calgary, and Vancouver)-with 40 percent settling in Toronto alone."

These patterns of immigration and settlement provide the critical mass and

'O Teixeira attributes this resegregation to cultural forces shaping the cornmunity rather than economics or discrimination. He finds that culture is one of the most important factors in Portuguese housing decisions (Teixeira 1996: 190). tt See Ley, Mercer 1995, Heibert 2000, Balakrishnan and Selvanathan 1990, for figures on Metropolitan concentrations of ethnic groups. Ha jinder Deol

geographical concentration necessary for the foundation of enclaves and distinct

ethnic communities (Heibert 2000).

V. The Future of Inteeration

A. Residential Seareqation

Many social scientists and geographers see the amount of residential

segregation increasing in the future for a number of reasons. The sheer number

of immigrants that Canada receives is one reason to think that residential

concentration will increase in the future. While Canada continues to use

immigration as a way to compensate for low hirth rates and an aging population,

"it is likely that the number and site of ethnic groups will also increase and

produce the "critical mass" necessary for the formation of ethnic neighborhoods

and institutions" (Balakrishnan and Selvanalhan 1990. 400).

A second factor in increasing residential concentration is that many of

these immigrants will settle in rnetropolitan areas. In 1996, 93.5 percent of

immigrants who arrived from 1991 to 1996 were located in central metropolitan

areas (CMA's), particularly Toronto, Vancouver and to a lesser extent Montreal

(Heibert 2000). As these cities experience population increases frorn immigrant

influxes, intemal migration rates are uneven or decreasing (Ley 1999: 4; Heibert

2000). That is, inflows of immigrants to metropolitan areas are not matched by

inflows of those who are already settled in Canada; the nurnber of Canadian residents who move to the above CMA's each year. is small or negligible in comparison. This means that the proportion of immigrants in major cities will rise in the corning years. As ethnic groups increase in size due to immigrant

reception, and as new immigrants demonstrate a preference for "ethnic areas".

these residential areas will become larger and more segregated (Teixeira 1996:

185-1 86). Indeed, Kobayashi and Peake observe that the level of ethnic

concentration and segregation in Canadian cities is already rising (qtd. in

Heibert 2000). l2

Third, we find that the ethnic diversity can polarize various ethnic groups

and increase residential segregation. Here. I am speaking not only of the

cultural diversity that immigration creates but also of the socio-economic

diversity that is created by the settlement patterns of immigrants. Bourne notes:

As people confront growing socio-econornic polarization, in the context of increasing ethnic diversity, they become more prone to congregate in enclaves where they share as much in cornmon with their neighborç as possible (Le. both class and ethno-cultural characteristics). Thus, .. .we should find more extreme levels of segregation in large cities experiencing active immigrant reception. (Ctd. in Heibert 2000)'~

Fourth, the fact that many of today's immigrants are visible minorities will

also affect their settlement patterns and increase levels of residential

segregation. Heibert finds that immigrants from non-European backgrounds are

more spatially concentrated than those who have come from more traditional

sources (Heibert 2000).l4 Straford concurs: "Immigrants from Third-World countries are concentrated in the larger cities, even more than traditional

immigrants from Europe and the United States. In 1981, 82 percent of these

'' Kobayashi. A. and Peake L. (1997) Immigration and Canadian Cities: A Critical Review of Literature and Annotated Bibliography from the Perspective of Urban Studies (Ottawa: Citizenship and Immigration Canada). Harjinder De01

non-traditionat immigrants fived in the nine largest Mes in Canada." (Beatrjot

and Rappak qtd. in Straford 1992: 74) This difference in residential

concentration between Europeans and non-Europeans suggests that the level of

segregation is lower for established groups and might increase for visible

minorities who are generally the more recent arrivals (Ley 1999: 6).

Despite al1 of the above causes of segregation, we still need to look at the

effects of racism; racism may also be a cause of residential segregation with

newer immigrants and may continue to be a factor in the future. As mentioned

earlier. the problem of racism in Canada is a real one and it is important not to

complacently assume that it does not exist. Visible minorities will form an

increasing proportion of the population as those immigrants from traditional

sources who came in waves More them age without replacement (Frideres

1992: 61 ). Balakrishnan and Selvanathan daim that this will lead to greater

visibility and thereby heighten the risk of even more discrimination in certain

cities (Balakrishnan and Selvanathan 1990: 402-403). And even if racisrn does

not increase. existing levels of racism may still be a hurdle for visible minorities

in terms of residential and economic mobility. In general. racism hinders the

integration of minorities into mainstream society (Castles and Miller 1998: 221 :

Roy 1995: 200). At the same time, when dealing with the causes and effects of residential concentration, it is important not to make hasty assumptions.

According to Heibert, we cannot assume that social deprivation or exclusion

l3 Boume, L.S. (1996) "Normative Urban Geogfaphies: Recent Trends, Competing Visions and New Cultures of Regufation," Canadian Geographer 40: 2-16. l4 See Driedger 1999. Ha rjinder De01 produces residential concentration or segregatron. Nor should we think those problems of discrimination and exclusion would be lessened if the degree of residential concentration were reduced (Heibert 2000).

B. Commercial Seareqation

An increase in population site and residential concentration spurs the development of an enclave econorny that serves the particular social and econornic needs of the ethnic community. For example, for the Chinese in

Richmond, B. C., residential concentration supports an array of commercial enterprises, such as Chinese strip malls and varkets (Mercer 1995: 182).

Ethnic commercial activity can be defined as ethnic businesses or enterprises that are owned andior operated by members of minority groups and are oriented towards consumers of the szme ethnicity (Wang 1999: 22). Ethnic commercial activities occur when ethnic households reach a threshold concentration and there is sufficient demand (Wang 1999: 20). Thus, ethnic neighborhoods allow for the establishment of small businesses and agencies that cater to the needs and associations of immigrants (Castles and Miller 1998: 221 ).

In Toronto, for exarnple, Wang finds that as the Chinese population has been increasing and concentrations have been moving more towards suburban areas such as Markham and Scarbourough, commercial activity has become multinuclear (Wang 1999: 19). Because of this, new Chinese retail establishments no longer limited to small scale and family operated business in

China town but is transfoming into branch operations (Wang 1999: 30). Since the 1980's. the commercial activity has also diversified from retail to more Harjinder De01

service oriented activity such as banking. "Thisbusiness diversification

indicates clearly that the Chinese community has been steadily building a more

self-sufficient and self-contained economy." (Wang 1999: 25)

Nevertheless, commercial and residential segregation does not tell the whole story about the separateness of ethnic groups; we may therefore conclude that such enclaves or pockets of ethnicity are simply indicative of a multicultural society like ours. The fact that Chinese immigrants are providing goods and services to other Chinese immigrants does not imply any normative conclusions about residential and commercial segregation. Yet, because so many other criteria for integration are dependent upon residential and commercial activity, in part or in whole. the existence of segregation in these sectors suggests that other sorts of social integration are not occurring either. This is what makes enclaves troubling; the separation of residence and commercial activity from mainstream society points to the likelihood that there are also other forms of separateness simply because the various forms of social isolation are interrelated.l5

C. Sociat and Other Tmes of Seqrecration

An offshoot of economic and residential segregation, and perhaps even a cause of it, is the fact that immigrants may also cluster for cultural maintenance and support. There is no doubt that without the cultural and social support that cornes from a community of one's own, pressures to conform to mainstream trends are diffÎcult to resist (Spinner 1994: 82-83). Clusters of same group

lS See David Ley 1999. Heibert 2000. immigrants provide support so rnernbers can maintain their cultural practices and institutions (Spinner 1994: 84).16 It is clear that ethnic communities need some critical mass in order to meet the needs of the community and pursue certain collective endeavors (Weinfeld 1994: 247). Yet, it is not clear whether concentration is a result of, or precondition for, the creation of the sorts of communities that are typical of ethnic enclaves:

Immigrants may cluster together for economic and social reasons arising from the migratory process. .. But they also frequently want to be together. in order to provide mutual support, to develop family and neighborhood networks and to maintain their languages and their cultures. (Castles and Miller 1998: 221 )

Castles and Miller are correct in noting the interrelation of various demographic factors: they show how residential segregation is both a precondition and an effect of community building. Ley too explains how residential segregation, labor market segregation, use of a non-official language in the home. and the prevalence of in-group marriages are interconnected proportionaliy. Further,

"residentially isolated groups are also likely to be isolated in distinctive economic nichesJ'(Ley 1999: 8). For example, Ley points out that some Vancouver ethnic groups have well-defined economic niches. South Asian men and Italian men are localized in the construction industry, women of Chinese origin converge in the textile industry, Filipinas in domestic service, while Jews are also concentrated in certain professions as we11.17 Ley finds that there is an 81 percent correlation between residentiai and labor market concentration for 21 of

- l6 Such concentrations in cities such as Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal can be used as leverage with politicai authorities to gain certain services. "Residential concentrations may clearly play a role in key ridings." (Weinfeld 1994: 247) Ha jindcr Dcol

the targest rninorities (tey 1999: 8). l8 Fwther, ethnic economies can mean that

people are able to work in their own isolated enclaves and environments without

venturing into mainstream society a great deal.

Ley finds that social interaction is related to residential proximity and that

"highly segregated minorities are more likely to draw friends and support

networks from within their own group" (Ley l999:8). Therefore, we can see the truth of Peach's theory that residential segregation is inversely related to

intermarriage rates. According to Peach, segregation reduces the sort of contact that leads to romantic relationships and consequently intermarriage rates are likely to be low (Peach 1980: 372).

Yet social interaction within one's own ethnic group would also suggest that the use of an official language is not required to build social relationships, and of course it is not needed in the home either. Because most of today's immigrants who socialize with members of their own group probably do so in a non-official language, they are also more likely to be socially isolated because of a reliance on their language (Ley 1999: 9). ln addition, ethnic economies can ensure that iack of proficiency in an official language is not a disadvantage in finding an occupation (Ley 1999: 11) "To the extent that immigrants rnay be employed or live in ethnic enclaves, the language is reinforced." (Weinfeld

1994: 240) In itself, there is no problem with the retention of the mother tongue.

Wang, however, notes that the level of institutional completeness of these ethnic

17 See Ley 1999: 17, ft-nt. 8. '' Measures of the lack of integration correlateci negatively with personal income. Less integration means les economic success (Ley 1999: 10). Ha jinder Deol neighborhoods can help immigrants to bypass altogether the language barriers of the dominant culture (Wang 1999: 21 ). Such residential and economic segregation becomes proble~.latic for social integration. however, when the full range of human activity can be conducted in the ethnic tongue.

D. Institutional Comoleteness and New lmmiarants

The commercial. residential and social "apartness" of immigrant groups indicates how various ethnic groups are attaining higher levels of institutional completeness. For example, "As more and more goods and services required by the Chinese are provided by their co-ethnics, the Chinese community has been moving towards higher levels of institutional completeness" (Wang 1999: 33).

This becomes a significant barrier to integration. According to Wang, the

"Theory of Institutional Completenessnexplains that an ethnic community's higher level of institutional completeness weakens the needs of its members to integrate and the forces of attraction to the mainstream society (Wang 1999: 21).

The degree of institutionai completeness in immigrant communities may be high enough to make integration into mainstrearn society a significant obstacle. As mentioned eartier, Kymlicka defines a societal culture as

"institutionally completenwhen it contains social, economic, and political institutions and practices that encompass both public and private life (Kymlicka

1995: 78); it is "the shared vocabulary of everyday lifen (Kymlicka 1995: 76).

When we refine our definition of "institution", we find that integration may be a greater hurdle than it seems at first sight. An "institutionnis a "form of social activity structured by rules that define such things as roles, moves, positions, Harjinder De01

powers and opportunities" fCard 1996: 100). According to John Rawls, we can

"think of games and rituals, trials and parliaments, markets and systems of

propertyJ'as being social practices or institutions (Rawls 1999: 48). Once we

have redefined institutions in this way, we find that evidence of economic and

social segregation suggests that the degree of institutional completeness is so

high that successful integration into the mainstream society may sirnply not be

occurring .

First, it seems that immigrant groups are beginning to possess. if they do

not posses them already, the characteristics of societal cultures. For example,

Milton Gordon daims that ethnic groups have the sorts of institutions that

preclude the need to integrate into mainstream institutions: ethnic groups are not

just cultural entities with a distinctive cultural heritage, but also "sub-societies"

(Ctd. in Steinberg 1981: 65).

[Ethnic groups are the product of] a proliferation of voluntary organizations and friendship networks which allow their members to live out their lives within an ethnic milieu... . In al1 of [the] activities and relationships which are close to the core of penonality and self-hood-the mernber of the ethnic groups may, if he wishes.. .follow a path which never takes him across the boundaries of his sub-societal network (Gordon. qtd. in Steinberg 7 987 : 65-66).''

Second, it seems that newer immigrants are in fact showing apartness from mainstrearn Canadian society and that this pattern will continue in the future. Ley notes:

There is a consistent lack of integration among ethnic groups on a series of measures-an apartness that is more marked the greater the share of

19 Ley also finds that immigrant communities are locations of dense social bonds and networks that are embedded in voluntary organizations (Ley 1999: 1O). immigrants in a group, and more pfoncunced also for groups whose members are visible minorities. (Ley 1999: 9)

As immigration continues and Canada receives more visible minorities. we have

good reason to expect that the sort of integration that Kymlicka desires on

political, social, linguistic, economic and residential levels will not occur in the

future.

Current immigration patterns suggest that European ethnic and cultural

communities will wcaken soon and the focus of multiculturalism and integration

policies will switch to Third World Immigrants who will be larger in number and in

concentration (Straford 1992:154).This is supported by Frideres observation

that,

Prior settlements in urban centres have produced ethnic concentrations. However. today's visible minority ethriics have developed their own distinct institutional structures to support their unique value systems and, for the first time, some evidence exists that institutionally complete ethnic ghettos are being formed in major metropolitan areas. (Frideres 1992: 64)

Third, ihis pattern of settlement and segregation suggests that new

immigration will inhibit the effect of time on increased integration into

mainstrearn society. This is because indicators of isolation rise as the

proportion of new immigrants in an ethnic group increases (Ley 1999: 21 ).

Spinner suggests that this is because new influxes of immigrants prevent generational integration (Spinner 1994: 59). This is not to Say that new

immigrants do not bring anything of value to the Canadian multicultural situation.

Weinfeld notes for example that, "immigration serves as a systemic process of for keeping ethnic languages ative, as do enhanced means of international travel and communication." (Weinfeld 1994: 243). Steinberg observes that new immigrants are purveyors of authentic cultures and replenish the ranks of ethnic groups with people who personify the culture in its purest form: they can represent a cultural point of reference even for assimilated mem bers (Steinberg

1981: 45). Consequently, increasing immigration will ensure the presewation of cultural diversity within Canada.

VI. Conc~usion

Although the idea of generational integration undermines the position that multiculturalism prornotes integration, we find that generational integration may no longer be a fact for immigrants in Canadian society. Characteristics of new immigrants are considerably different from previous cohorts and highlight the passibility that previous trends wi!!no longer occur. Furthermore. we find that with respect to these new immigrants, integration is not a reality and may be even less successful in the future.

The promotion of successful integration seems to be multiculturalisrn's raison d'être. But once it is accepted that multiculturalism policy cannot be said to promote the integration of immigrants and that integration is not occurring, we mîght ask about the effectiveness of using polyethnic rights as means to promote the liberal values of autonomy and equality. That is, integration is supposed to make multiculturalism a liberal project; without successful integration, the project of multiculturalism cannot be justified as a liberal one. Harjinder Dm1

Iliiberal Minority Rights

1. Introduction

Kymlicka's justification of polyethnic rights on liberal grounds suggests that without successful integration, immigrants lack the range of meaningful options that a societal culture provides. Since integration is not occurring and whatever evidence of integration there is cannot be attributed to multiculturalism policy. it is difficult to see just how multiculturalism promotes liberal values of equality and freedom. Indeed, we might ask just what mul:iculturalism policy does promote. On a purely theoretical view, we can attribute the endorsement of cultural preservation and diversity to the philosophy or ideology behind multiculturalism policy. Regardless of the possible liberal justifications for polyethnic rights therefore, we can still Say that the encouragement of diversity and cultural maintenance are the upshots of an ideology of multiculturalism.'

Some multiculturalists may consider the maintenance of cultural diversity a laudable goal in itself. As an ideology it allows Canadians in general to express their "enlightened self-interest" by allowing various lifestyles to flourish

' I do not mean to suggest that multiculturalism policy causes cultural divenity or that it helps presewe culture. 1 want to emphasize that the policy rests on an ideology of cultural presewation being a good thing. Regardless of whether multiculturalism does or does not presewe diversity is not the issue here. The issue is about whether an ideology of cultural presewation is a Iiberal one, once we have dismissed the policy's effectiveness in promoting integration. Hereon, I wiIl only be speaking of multiculturalism as an ideology, attitude or a state sanctioned mentality of endorsing the preservation of culture as a good thing. and contribute to the overall nchness of people's lives. However. Kymlicka

makes clear that diversity is not a substitute for justice, and diversity arguments

should be used only to supplement, not replace, justice based arguments. such

as the ones he uses, to justify polyethnic rights (Kymlicka 1995: 123).

Herein lies the problem for promoting liberal values through polyethnic

rights. What happens when the ideology of promoting cultural maintenance

sanctions the preservation of illiberal cultures? In particular, can we endorse an

ideology of multiculturalism when some cultural groups foster gender inequality

of a much more extreme sort than is to be found in Canadian society? In the

following chapter. I will examine how the preservation of some immigrant

cultures perpetuates the oppression and subordination of their women

rnernber~.~This fact suggests that we should be weary not only of justifying a

multiculturalist mentality on liberal grounds but also of endorsing the

preservation of culture if we are concerned with liberal values of autonomy and equality. That is, in the face current and future trends in immigration from societies that practice gender inequality, a policy that encourages the maintenance of culture cannot be a tiberat one.

II. The Feminist Comdaint

The social reality in Canada makes clear that cultural diversity is a fact.

But just as we cannot establish that polyethnic rights and OffÏcial Multiculturalism

Schwartz. Bria n (1 986) First Pn'ncip/es, Second Thoughtsr Aboriginal Peoples, Constitutionai Reform and Canadian Statecraff (tnstitute for Research on Public Policy, Montreal). Qtd. in Kymlicka 1995: 121. Haj inder Deo 1

policies promote or hinder the process of integration, so we cannot say that they

promote or hinder cultural diversity. However it is clear that such policies do

express an attitude of encouraging the preservation of cultures by members of

ethnic groups. And we might consider whether we can endorse this

multiculturalist attitude and the preservation of culture on liberal grounds.

Diversity is only achieved through the preservation of what immigrants bring with

thern to their new societies, narnely a different culture and way of iife.

Unsurprisingly, cultural diversity results when we abandon the project of trying to

eradicate immigrant cultures and endorse instead the preservation of such

cultures.

Admirable as the notion of enhancing cultural diversity may seem, some

feminists have argued that the preservation of immigrant cultures in the liberal

state can serve to oppress women who belong to ethnic rninorities that practice

gender discrimination. Susan Moller Okin argues that the preservation of the

cultures of ethnic groups is likely to have negative effects on the lives of women

and girls (Okin 1997; 1998: 661 -664). Kymlicka argues that we should still

endorse the multiculturaf ist attitude because hts theofy of polyethnic rights can

accommodate feminist concerns about the oppression of women because it does

not permit ethnic group rights to control their individual members. As such,

where the freedom and equality of women is at issue. polyethnic rights do not

Although I am speaking only of women in the following chapter, children of immigrants. first generation Canadians, also face considerable obstacles conceming choice and equality. even if they are bom in Canada. endorse an ethnic group's prese~ationof such practices. He claims that this is why his theory of minority rights is a liberal one.

As a feminist, Okin believes that "women should not be disadvantaged by their sex, and that they should be recognized as having human dignity equally with men. and the opportunity to live as freely chosen lives as men canJ'(Okin

1994: 2). Okin understands the defense of cultural practices in liberal dernocracies to be the multiculturalist's position. According to O kin, those who hold this position argue that minority cultures and ways of life are not suficiently protected through the individual rights cf their group members and thus require group rights (Okin -1 994: 2; 1998: 661 ). There is a considerable tension between multiculturalism and feminism, argues Okin, because culture and gender are intimately interrelated-cultures are for the most part illiberal because they practice sex discrimination. Nat only are most cultures patriarchal. but many cultural rules are concerned with personal, sexual and reproductive life. Many culturally based customs aim at controlling women (Okin 1997).

Since multiculturalism promotes the protection of cultures-even cultures within which women are oppressed-there is inevitably considerabte tension between multiculturalisrn and feminism.

What if multiculturalism means supporting clearly sexist cultures? Many gender- biased customs regarding women's sexuality-clitoridectomy, polygamy. the marriage of children and coerced marriage-are practiced in the home cultures immigrants left behind. Okin draws attention to the fact that clitoridectomy is not uncommon in Cote d'Ivoire and Togo, that polygamy is not uncornmon in former French-African colonies, that forced marriags between rape

victims and their assailants is practiced in much of Latin America, Southeast

Asia and parts of West Africa (Okin 1999: 14). In Pakistan and the Arab Middle

East, women who dare to bring forth rape charges are themselves charged with

sexual offenses of adul tery or sex outside marriage, and this practice is justified

under the guise of Islam (Okin 1999: 15). In these parts of the world, women's

sexuality is viewed as something that needs to be harnessed and controlled, and

many cultural customs and rituals are based on that view. As Okin states:

Many of the world's traditions and cultures, including those practiced within formerly conquered and colonized nation-states-which certainly encompasses most of the peoples of Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia-are quite distinctly patriarchal. They.. .have elaborate patterns of socialization, rituals, matrimonial customs and other cultural practices (including systems of property ownership and control of resources) aimed at bringing women's sexuality and reproductive capabilities under men's control. Many such practices make it virtually impossible for women to choose to live independently of men, to be celibate or lesbian, or to decide not to have children. (Okin 1999: 14)

Although immigrants cannot legally perpetuate these traditions once they arrive in Canada, such practices do reflect the place of wornen in many of the cultures that exist in the countries from which recent immigrants have been coming.

I realize that it rnay seem controversial-and some may Say that it is even racist-to single out the societies mentioned above for institutionalizing the subordination of women when the truth is that gender bias is a reality

Okin seems to hint at the fact that much of the patriarchy in these cultures is due to Western colonization and that patriarchy is something that demonstrates the impact of colonialism on these cultures. This is, however, well beyond the scope of this paper. everywhere.' I am not suggesting that ethnic rninoritieç should be held to higher

standards of gender equality than our society has achieved. But it is not

farfetched for one to believe that despite the need for improved gender equality

in Canadian society, it is still considerably more "gender forward" than the

countries that have had the greatest number of emigrants to Canada in the last

30 years. This does not mean that I believe the gender situation in Canada is

satisfactory. Nevertheless, tt is still reasonable to assume that in general

Western liberal cultures have moved away, to a considerable degree. from their

distinctly patriarchal roots (Okin 1999: 16). Not only do we legally guarantee

women many of the same freedoms and opportunities as men. but in general.

"rnost families in these cultures ... do noi communicate to their daughters that

their lives are of less value than boys. that their lives are to be confined to

domesticity and service to men" (Okin 1999: 17).

Consequently, when our multicultural ideology entails sanction for

members of patriarchal cultures to protect and enhance their culture. we are

indeed faced with a considerable challenge with respect to our liberal values.

This, cornbined with the fact that members and families of these cuttures are arriving in Canada at a very fast pace, should make us examine our rnulticultural sensibilities to see whether they work for or against our liberal aspirations of autonomy and equaltty.

Kymlicka argues that the extent to which a given culture is liberal is simply a matter of degree. See Kymlicka 1995: 171. III. gr ou^ Riehts and the EnternaV Externat Distinction

The idea that there is a conflict between endorsing an ethnic group's right to enhance and express its own culture, and endorsing the rights of women in those groups to freely chosen and autonomous lives brings to mind the traditional debate between group and individual rights. This situation seems to be an exarnple of what Leslie Green notes: "Some of the ways in which we try to ensure that minorities are not oppressed by majorities make it more likely that thpse minorities are able to oppress their own interna1 minorities" (Green 1996:

257). An ethnic group may daim a right that allows it to suppress intermarriage by members of its group, punish for apostasy, enforce traditions. customs. or patriarchy on its individual members. Even Kymlicka acknowledges that individual rights cm be violated when erhnic groups impose patriarchal and oppressive cultural traditions on women members, or require other members to follow traditional gender roles (Kymlicka 1995: 36). The idea that a group's collective rights can violate the individual rights of its members is often the reason why such rights are assumed to be inimical to a liberalisrn that prizes the freedom and equality of individuals.

The kind of freedom that matters to liberals is the freedom to live our Iives how we choose and to be able to question and revise that way of life when we determine it to be necessary or more desirable, without fear of discrimination or punishment (Kymlicka 1995: 81 ). This is the freedom that Kymlicka believes liberals ought to endorse for individuals. But a policy that encourages cultural maintenance seerns to get in the way of women being able to exercise this fundamental freedom. So how can liber& endorse polyethnic rights for immigrant groups if "Liberals can only endorse minority rights in so far as they are consistent with respect for the freedom or autonorny of individuals" (Kymlicka

1995: 75),and if the immigrant groups in question involve the sorts of groups that concern ferninists Iike Okin?

Kymlicka argues that his theory of polyethnic rights does not fall prey to the criticism that it promotes the oppression of wornen, or indeed of any other members of ethnic minorities because it distinguishes between rights that function as "internal restrictions" and those rights that function as "external protections".

The first kind [are] intended to protect the group from the destabilizing impact of internal dissent (e.g. the decision of individual members not to follow traditional practices or customs). whereas the second [are] intended to protect the group from the impact of external decisions (e.g. the economic or political decisions of the larger society). (Kymlicka 1995: 35)

For example, a group right that allowed it to stop members from marrying outside their ethnic group would impose an internal restriction. An example of an external protection for a member of a minority would be the exemption he or she might enjoy from a work-place dress code, an exemption which would enable him or her to Wear a culturally distinctive attire. Kymlicka daims that, although liberals can accept external protections for the sake of equality with respect to access to the mainstream societal culture, they cannot accept internal restrictions that limit the rights of the members within an ethnic group.

Consequently, Kymlicka holds that his liberal theory of minority rights can support group-difierentiated rneaswes or rights because it will not allow for polyethnic "rights" that restrict the civil and political liberties of the individual members of a group. This is what makes Kymlicka's theory of minority rights a distinctly liberal one. According to Kymlicka, no polyethnic "rights" that limit the autonomy and equality of women in any ethnic group can be endorsed by liberals. This fundamental liberal requirement is satisfied by his theory of minority rights because of the way in which the theory exploits the distinction between interna1 restrictions and external protections.

IV. The Difficulty in Detecting Women's O~pression

Most cultures of the world are genderea and do not accord women social status and value equal to that of men. Consequently, along with language. cultural dress, food, and religion, ethnic groups afso bring traditional conceptions of gender roles with them to Canada. Okin suggests that if we allow ethnic cultures to flourish we also endorse the gender roles that they bring with them. This is because "the sphere of personal, sexual, and reproductive life functions as a central focus of most cultures, a dominant theme in cultural practices and rules" (Okin 1999: 12-13). Consequently, the preservation of culture can also mean the preservation of gender roles and herein lies the problem for proponents of multiculturalism. According to feminists, the preservation of culture can 'substantially limit the capacities of women and girls of that culture to live with hurnan dignity equal to that of men and boys, and to live as freely chosen lives as they can (Okin 1999: 12).

A. The Covert Nature of Gender Practices Ha jinder Dcol

Okin notes the many ways in which women in ethnie groups can be

oppressed or have their individual liberty curtailed. Some illiberal cultural

practices impose a psychological or physical harm on wornen in very overt ways.

Such practices would include female genital mutilation. sex selective abortion,

female infanticide. child marriage, forced marriage between rape victims and

their assailants, polygarny, forcefully preventing a woman from exiting her

marriage, forced arranged marriage, wife beating, denying females an

education. suttee6,purdah7, and talaq divorces. Kymlicka notes that "some

minority cultures discriminate against girls in the provision of education and deny

women the rights to vote or hold office" (Kymlicka 1995: 153) Overtly gendered

practices. such as those listed, place clear restrictions on the civil and political

rights of women. They are thus easily identified as internal restrictions (Poulter

ctd. in Okin 1997; 1998: 670).1° "They limit the freedorn of individual members

within the group to revise traditional practices. As such. they are internal

restrictions that are inconsistent with any system of minority rights that appeals

to individual freedorn or personal autonomy" (Kymlicka 1995: 153).

6 Suttee is the ancient Hindu practice of a widow sacrificing herself on her husband's funeral pyre. Hindu's in Bali practiced Suttee until the early 1900's (Geertz 1983: 37). And, it is still practiced today in some parts of lndia (Kymlicka 1995: 203. ft nt. 8) ' Some Hindus and Muslims practice this custorn to shield women from the wandering eyes of men by rneans of a veil or a curtain. 8 In the Muslim talaq systern, a husband can unilaterally divorce his wife by repeating the words "1 divorce you" three times, but wornen cannot unilaterally do the same to their husbands 6Kyrnlicka 1995: 204. R nt. 10). For brevity, I will herein cal1 these types of psychological and physical harm posing cultural ractices 'overtly gendered* practices. Po Sebastian Poulter lists non-gender related and gender-related daims for culture based special legal treatment. Poulter, Sebastian (1987) 'Ethnic Minonty Customs, English Law, and Human Rights." International and Comparative Law Quarteriy 36 (1 987): 589-61 5. The trouble is, most gender-biased practices are much more insidious, and are dificult to pinpoint as violations of the basic rights of women. These cultural practices curtail women's freedorn covertly, and rarely corne out into the open to show how they constrain the freedom of women in minority groups. In these cases, the internallexternal distinction does not suffice for the identification-and a fortiori-for the elimination of illiberal practices to prevent them from being preserved. Most gender-based oppression evades Kymlicka's internallexternal distinction because the distinction ignores the fact that inegalitarian practices need not be overt in a culture.

The covert nature of inegalitarian practices is demonstrated in the interactions of members of minority groups and members of the mainstream culture. For example, Spinner notes how formal criteria are often not enough to prevent the pressure to conform to existing norms. He recognizes the subtle ways in which people can be manipulated, made to do things and behave in ways that they do not wish. With respect to the Arnish. he notes that gossip among the community is a way to regulate the behavior of its members (Spinner

1994: 90). Spinner also sees this phenornenon at work between members of ethnic minority and dominant groups: even "even if there are no laws forbidding unconventional ways of life, there is pressure on those who act and look differently to conform to the prevailing conventions and norrnsn (Spinner 1994:

78). Okin notes precisely the same problem with respect to women in ethnic groups: Hri jinder De01

Though they may appear to respect the basic civil and political liberties of women and girls, many cultures do not. especially in the private sphere. treat them with anything like the same concern and respect as men and boys, or allow them to enjoy the same freedoms. (Okin 1999: 21 ) "Power and pressure" to corrform to inegalitarian practices therefore, "are

manifested.. . in subtle ways" (Spinner 1994: 78). The internallexternal

distinction fails to capture this subtle facet of the power involved in gender-

oppression.

The subtle forms of power and pressure used to enforce gender roles make

detecting gender-bias more than simply a matter of looking more closely;

"covert" gender bias is nebulous and invisible under the gaze of the law and the

public. In many cases, no formal criteria of rights violations can capture the coercion involved in the enforcement of gender roles. For example, Chandran

Kukathas points to how women in the British lndian community have arranged marriages unwillingly due to these subtle forms of power. In extrerne cases. "the threat of social ostracism could place the individual under duress to determine that marriage was not entered into voluntarilyn (Kukathas 1996: 251 ). The threats posed by social ostracism, ruining the family honor, loss of affection from one's toved ones or being the subject of gossip are significant deterrents to the questioning of gender roles. The internallexternal distinction thus fails to capture the subtle forces of power and coercion at work behind the enforcement of gender roles.

B. Danaers of the Private S~here

The internallextemal distinction also overlooks gender oppression because, as Okin notes. gender inequality is mostly practiced in the private realm and is reinforced &y subtle forms of power-relations of the kinds mentioned above. She notes that because minority cultures are gendered and there are substantial power differences between women and men (Okin 1997).

"in many cultures. strict control of women is enforced in the private sphere by the authority of either actual or symbolic fathers, often acting through or with the complicity of, the older women of the culture." (Okin 1997: 9; 1994: 679)

Patriarchy in domestic life, differentiat treatment based on sex differences. differential distribution of resources and power between boys and girls. differences in the freedom and respect given, zre examples of how gender inequality can manifest itself in private sphere.

Furtherrnore, the internallexternal distinction overlooks the point that the more successful the socialization process is. the less likely it is that gender oppression will be obvious." Since the private sphere is where socialization occurs. the root of gender bias does not fall into those sorts of practices that can be identified by the internallexternal distinction. Family is the first school of moral development, and as such it is the first environment in which both boys and girls ieam to treat each other (Okin 1994: 12)." When there are gender inequalities, Papanek notes, "well socialized women internalize oppression as f 1 This seems to suggest that the more viable a culture is, the stronger its ability to enforce the oppression. In this case, it seems obvious to me that cultural rights are not the answer to the inequality of ethnic groups. " Given that many immigrants today corne from third worid countries. it is important to note Okin's daim that such immigrant families 'are even worse schools of justice and more successful inculcators of the inequality of the sexes as natural and appropriate than their developed wodd equivalents" (Okin 1994: 13). Hajinder hl

necessary for successkft deveiapment" (Qtd. in Okin 1994: 19).l3 These women

can rationalite the cruelties and the men who perceive them are unlikely to

object and point out the injustice. Not only may women not recognize their

oppression, but also they rnay not have the means to do anything about it once

they do recognize that their communities are oppressive and treat them unjustly.

Okin is correct in noting that "the privacy of home can be a dangerous place,

especially for wornen ..."(Okin 1988: 129).

These factors escape Kymlicka's internallexternal distinction and thus Kymlicka

fails to respond adequately to the feminist critique. Since the distinction is

supposed to prevent us from recognizing the cultures of illiberal groups, we find

that Kyml ickaJstheory of polyethnic rights fails to preserve liberal values.

Rather, cultural rights undermine the attempt to promote liberal values because of their conflict with women's autonomy in gender-biased immigrant cultures.

V. Kvmlicka's Solution: Success and Faiiure

In theory, Kymlicka's internallexternal distinction may provide good formal protections of individual rights. Laws about things such as informed consent. security of person, or the right to life would prohibit cultural practices such as clitoridectomy, child mariages and polygamy. In these situations, it is obvious that state intervention is justifiable if not requîred. Kymlicka's internallexternal distinction can thus scrutinize for overtly gendered cultural practices that violate

'3 Cultural noms can restrict autonomy lot he extent that one is psychologicaliy unable to act against its imperatives. Papanek. Hanna (1990) "To each less she needs, from each more that she can do: Allocations, Entitlements, and Value." Women and World Development. Ed. lrene Tinker. New York: Oxford UP. Harjinder De01 the basic rights of women. In practice, hovuever, haw Kymlicka would choose to deal with illiberal ethnic groups that do not violate any formal laws is unclear.

Kymlicka's solution to Okin's criticisms is to modify the idea of internal restrictions to include the "covert" gender-biased practices that, for example, prevent females from getting a higher education or becoming professionals. He states:

Okin argues, in effect, that my account of "interna1 restrictions" is too narrow. I defined internal restrictions as those claims by a group which involve limiting the civil and political liberties of individual members. but Okin insists that the ability of women to question and revise their traditional gender roles can be drastically curtailed even when their civil rights are formally protected... . The domestic oppressions that Okin discusses are paradigrnatic examples of the sorts of "internal restrictions" which liberals must oppose. .. Okin is suggesting a constructive elaboration of this distinction, but I see no reason to reject the underlying principle. (Okin 1999: 32)

In essence, Kymlicka suggests that we should texture our understanding of intemal restrictions to include not only the violations of basic formal rights, but also less obvious forms of oppression within immigrant groups. He implies that the conflict gender oppression poses for his liberal theory of minority rights can be deatt with in this way.

At times Okin implies that Kyrnlicka is right to suggest that we allocate polyethnic rights more carefully, taking gender inequality into account at the bargaining table. Okin suggests that the elirnination of such "coveK practices should be a condition for giving a particular group polyethnic rights: 'the degree to which each culture is pattiarchiil and its willingness to change, in this respect, must be seen as relevant factors in the consideration of justification of group rights from a liberat standpoint" (Okin t 998: 678). Consequently. Okin seerns to

imply that the more textured notion of internal restrictions would prohibit us from

protecting illiberal cultures, and thus inhibit their patriarchal practices.

However, Okin's arguments undermine any general policy of recognizing

the culture of groups more illiberal than our own either through the conferment of

polyethnic rights. or through a general state policy that encourages the maintenance of traditional cultures. The kinds of gender oppression that Okin is referring to with respect to covert illiberal practices are not the sorts of practices that can be proven in a court of law. Many times they cannot even be recognized, or pointed at when they occur. They do not nccur in the form of groundbreaking events. riots, wars or colonization. Gender oppression is not the sort of violation for which the state can acquire a warrant to investigate. make illegal. or pay reparations. It is perhaps the most insidious form of subordination and as such the hardest to eradicate. Consequently, we find that the problem that Okin is actually referring to does not have to do with a more

"textured" understanding of internal restrictions. It is a problem that is endemic to the entire project of preserving gendered biased cultures for the purpose of furthering liberal values.

VI. Interrelation of Culture and Gender

In order for Kymlicka's theory of polyethnic rights to be truly liberal one, it must be compatible with a certain conception of freedom.

The defining feature of liberalism is that.. . . it grants people a very wide freedom of choice in terms of how they lead their lives. It allows people to choose a conception of the good life, and then allows them to reconsider thet decision, and adopt a new and hopefulty better plan of Me. (Kymlicka 1995: 80)

Kymlicka argues that Our culture provides the possibilities that we first encounter

when deciding how to live our lives (Kymlicka 1995: 126). In the case of many

women. however, roks are assigned to them. and they are prevented from

questioning or revising these roles because of subtle forms of coercion and

socialization. Consequently, the opportunity for immigrant women to develop

certain self-reflective capacities and thereby enjoy the freedom to choose their

own life plans is curtailed by the project of cultural preservation as promoted by

the ideology behind polyethnic rights. Where cultures are illiberal, "noargument

can be made on the basis of enhancement of self-respect or the greater capacity

for choice that the female members of the culture have any clear nterest in its

preservation" (Okin 1998: 680).

Kymlicka himself suggests that illiberal cultures should not be presewed.

In Liberalism, Community and Culture, Kymlicka notes that gender inequality and

culture are interhvined:

The assumptions about the role of women's inferiority are deeply embedded in many of sociefy's insfitufions... Removing them will require changes not only in the access women have to social positions but also in their ability to shape and define those positions. (Kymlicka 1989: 92)

Kyrnlicka's preferred liberalism seems to suggest that unless cultural

background conditions are changed to provide women with self-reflective capacities and roorn for choice, women's social positions cmnot be improved.

Consequently, Kymlicka himself seems to think that the elimination of gender Ha jinder Deol

oppression requires the alirninatiw, of the cultural backgrounds that perpetuate

it.

If culture and gender inequalities are so deeply intertwined. it seems that

the preservation of illiberal cultures is at odds with the liberal value of freedorn.

No amount of "texturing" in our conception of interna1 restrictions is going to be

effective in eliminating the sort of gender oppression that is created and

perpetuated through the preservation of deeply illiberal cultures. Consequently.

polyethnic rights for such illiberal groups stand in stark conflict with the liberal

value of freedom.

VII. Wither Multiculturalism

At the end of the project of creating a liberal theory of minority rights,

Kyrnlicka is confronted with the problem of endorsing the preservation of cultures

that deny the very values that justiw, and make desirable, their preservation in

the first place.

In Chapter 8 of Multicultural Cifizenship, Kymlicka tries to reconcile his

liberal theory of rninority rights with the facts surrounding illiberal minority

groups. He suggests that third party intervention to prornote liberal values of

freedom and equality in groups that appear to be illiberal is often unjustified with

respect to national minorities and other states (Kymlicka 1995: 166). However.

he says very little about what we ought to do with illiberal ethnic groups that do

not respect li beral principles conceming their own mernben. Kymlicka argues that it is "more legitimate ta compel respect for liberal principlesn and that liberal states can "insisf that immigration entails accepting the legitimacy of state enforcement of liberal principles, so long as immigrants know thts in advance,

and none the less voluntarily choose to corne" (Kymlicka 1998: 170). Yet, it is

unclear what sort of intervention or scrutiny this "insistence" on respect for

liberal values would entail.

Kyrnlicka suggests that third party intervention is inappropriate for

compelling illiberal ethnic minorities to liberalize. He reflects on the lessons of

colonialism to note that liberal institutions only really work if they have been

internalized by rnembers of the group in question (Kymlicka 1995: 167). It is

thus reasonable to assume that Kymlicka is "against coercive intervention in

illiberal cultures. and in favor of rational persuasion aimed at their voluntary

liberal izationJ' (Doppelt 1998: 234).

However. the fact of gender-based oppression implies much more about

our cornmitment to the multicultural ethos. As liberals, we cannot endorse the

preservation of culture through an official policy of multiculturalism when such

preservation subordinates and oppresses wornen in immigrant groups. We cannot justiw this ideology as a liberal one since clearly its implementation means the curtaiting of the individual rights of immigrant women. Kymticka's neglect of gender-based oppression that is not captured by law makes it dificult to believe that his theory of minority rights could be "impeccably liberal."

If a liberal theory of minority rights "requires freedom within the minority groupJ'(Kymlicka 1995: 152, Kymlicka's emphasis), Kymlicka needs to do more than just insist that minority rights or even a philosophy of multiculturalism is compatible with the protection of individual rights. If he recognizes that the above forrns of gender oppression do occur, he must be prepared to intewene in

ethnic groups where women's rights are being violated in covert and subtle

ways. Further, he must be prepared to do away with the general policy of

promoting cultural diversity and encouraging immigrants to preserve their

illiberal cultures. "Without this cornmitment, the central claim of his work and his

'liberalismY-namely, that group rights are fully compatible with the protection of

individual rights-seems empty and hollow." (Doppelt 1998: 235)

VIII. Conclusion

Kymlicka tries to hold ont0 his theory of minority rights while recognizing

that cultures are illiberal and do curtail the freedom and equality of women

members. It has been shown that although Kymlicka's distinction between

intemal restrictions and external protections can protect wornen from obvious

and formal violations of their basic rights, it is too crude to capture the subtle and

covert aspects of gender inequality and how it is enforced by members of a

given ethnic cornmunity. Kymlicka suggests that we refine his notion of interna1

restrictions to include the more subtle aspects of immigrant women's oppression,

but he fails to note that the interrelation of culture and gender inequality renders

his distinction impotent and irrelevant. Consequently, many aspects of gender-

inequality sieve through his internaVexternal distinction (even once it is refined)

and prevent his theory of polyethnic rights from being a truly liberal one. We find in the end that the very project of cultural preservation, when it cornes to groups that are illiberal with respect to gender is at odds with liberal freedom. Conct usion

This thesis has argued that contrary to Kymlicka's daims that multiculturalism promotes liberal values through the integration of immigrants into rnainstream society, the philosophy of multiculturalism actually undermines those very values. Kymlicka's liberal justification for polyethnic rights hinges on the claim that they promote the integration of immigrants into mainstream institutions. This goal of integration is rneant to ensure that immigrants have access to the type of societal culture that allows for the development of autonomy and provides meaningful options in the choosing of life plans. lntegration is also supposed to promote equality with respect ta cultural rnembership by providing immigrants with the same opportunities for cultural expression as members of the dommant culture have. However, i have demonstrated that if integration were a reality in Canada. multiculturalism could not be said to have caused it. Further, integration is not a reality in Canada and rnay not occur in the future due to new trends in immigration.

Given that integration is not occurring, we find that though the intentions of a multiculturalism policy are laudable, it unintentionally expresses a philosophy of cultural preservation in attempting to prornote diversity. When the cultures of some immigrants who come to Canada from non-traditional sources are severely oppressive towards women in non-overt ways, the preservation of such cultures actually preserves gender-btas as well. This should concern the likes of Kymlicka since it undermines the project of furthering the liberal values of autonomy and equality. The rates of immigration from traditional societies and the extent of gender bias they bring with them highlight the urgency with

which the problem needs to be addressed. Moreover, since integration is not

occurring and may not occur in the future, our current reality suggests that we

reconsider our approach to cultural diversity. As liberals we cannot endorse a

project that has the unintended side effect of oppressing women. An ideology of

cultural preservation is not a liberal one since sexism is so deeply entrenched in

culture as demonstrated above. Without paying attention to the individual rights

of women. Kymlicka cannot create a liberal theory of minority rights that rests on

the idea of preserving culture.

Multiculturalism is supposed to be a normative precept motivated by

concern for the dignity of al1 human beings. But the demographic situation in

Canada has changed so significantly in the last thirty years that concern for the

dignity of al1 human beings may require a different sort of ideology in our current

context. That is, concern for the dignity, autonomy and equality of al1 human

beings. a truly liberal approach, may require an altemate means of dealing with

cultural diversity. In the words of Neil Bissoondath, "Reality has a way of

battering phitosophy: it is reality's way of saying a new phitosophy must be found. It may be time for the cow of multiculturalism to be stripped of its

holiness" (Bissoondath 1994: 44). Ha jinder Deol

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Immigration-Historical Perspectives: Number of Immigrants to Canada per annum, from 1860-1999. Sum 1,746.03 Sum 4,472.47 Sum 169.24 ' Sum ' 4,950,07 i Sum j 4,760.20 or for 3 for 2 for 2 1 for 4 . Col.' 0 Col. Col. Col. 1 Col.

Source: Strategic Planning and Policy Research, Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Facts and Figures1999: Immigration Overview Catalogue Number MP43-333/2000E (Ottawa: Communications Branch, 2000) 2.

This row of sums correlates with my review of the origins of cultural diversity in Chapter 1. Harjinder Dcol

Table 1 Immigration Summary by Source Area (1999) Principle Appiicants and Dependents

Region 1 Number i Percentage

1 Africa and the Middle East 33,441 1 17.62 t 1 Asia and Pacific 96,370 / 50.77 1 / South and Central America 1 15,188 1 8.00 1 United States 5, 514 1 2.90 I 1 Europe and the United Kingdom : 38, 912 I 20.50 - 1 a Not Stated i 391 ! 0.21 Total 189. 816 IO0

Table 2 immigration by Top Ten Source Countries Principal Applicants and Dependents

1 1997 / 1998 1 1999 1 1 COUNTRY ' # I China, 18,520 ]18.57 % 7" 1:9,764 ;".,,Yank 29,095[ # ' 75.33 1 rank'1 1 People's 1 I I 1 Republic of ' I I lndia 19,610 9.08 2 15,352 8.81 2 117.415 9.17 2 Pa kistan 11,233 5.20 5 8,089 4.64 4 1 9,285 4.89 3 j Philippines ! 10,869 5.03 6 8,176 4.69 3 9,160 4.83 4 1 Korea, / 4,000 1.85 11 4,909 2.82 8 7,212 3.80 ( 5 I Republic of 1 1

; Iran 6,771 -- 3.89 / 7 1 5,903 3.1 1 1 6 j . -3.46 - 7- 1 United States - ::48?-- -- 2.33 9 ) 5,514 1 2.90 1 7 1 41768 2-74 1 1 l I of America l 1 1 Taiwan 1 13,320 6.17 4 7,181 , 4.12 ! 6 1 5.461 1 2.88 1 8 ; Sri Lanka 1 5,070 2.35 8 3.328 1.91 1 14 1 4,719 1 2.49 1 9 1 United 1 4,657 2.16 , 10 , 3,896 2.24 1 11 1 4,476 j 2.36 1 10 Kingdom 1

Russia 3,734 1.73 . 14 4,303 ,- 2.47 10 3,771 1.99 12 Hong Kong 22,250 10.30 1 8.086 4.64 5 3,664 1.93 , 13 j Total for Top 1 118,037 54.64 87,399 50.18 / 1 98,240 / 51.76 / ! l I l ten only 1 1 I Total Other 1 97,977 45.36 / 86,760 49.82 91,576 j 48.24 1 I Countnes 1 I 1 I / 1 Total 1 216,014 100 174.159 , 100 1 ! 189,816 1100 1 Source: Strategic Planning and Policy Research, Citizenship and lmmigration Canada, Facts and Figures1999: Immigration Overview Catalogue Number MP43-33312000E (Ottawa: Communications Branch, 2000) 7. Harjinder Deoi

MULTICULTURALISM POLICY OF CANADA (Section 3)

Multiculturalism policy

3. (1 ) It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government of Canada to (a) recognize and promote the understanding that multiculturalism reflects the cultural and racial diversity of Canadian society and acknowledges the freedom of al1 members of Canadian society to preserve, enhance and share their cultural heritage; (b) recognize and promote the understanding that multiculturalism is a fundamental characteristic of the Canadian heritage and identity and that it provides an invaluable resource in the shaping of Canada's future; (c)promote the full and equitable participation of individuals and communities of al1 origins in the continuing evolution and shaping of al1 aspects of Canadian society and assist them in the elimination of any bairier to that participation; (d)recognize the existence of communities whose members share a common origin and their historic contribution to Canadian :ocie?y, and enhance their development; (e) ensure that al1 individuals receive equal treatment and equal protection under the law, while respecting and valuing their diversity; (9 encourage and assist the social, cultural, economic and political institutions of Canada to be both respecfful and inclusive of Canada's multicultural character; (g) promote the understanding and creativity that arise from the interaction between individuals and communities of different origins; (h) foster the recognition and appreciation of the diverse cultures of Canadian society and promote the reflection and the evolving expressions of those cultures; (1) preserve and enhance the use of languages other than English and French. while strengthening the status and use of the officiai languages of Canada; and 0) advance rnuiticulturalisrn throughout Canada in harmony with the national cornmitment to the official languages of Canada.

Federai institutions

(2) It is further declared to be the policy of the Government of Canada that al1 federal institutions shall (a) ensure that Canadians of al1 origins have an equal opportunity to obtain employrnent and advancement in those institutions; (b) promote policies, prograrns and practices that enhance the ability of individuals and cornmunities of al1 origins to contribute to the continuing evolution of Canada; (c) promote policies, programs and practices that enhance the understanding of and respect for the diversity of the members of Canadian society; (d} collect statisticaf data in order to enable the development of palcies, programs and practices that are sensitive and responsive to the rnulticultural reality of Canada; (e) rnake use, as appropriate, of the language skills and cultural understanding of individuals of al1 origins; and (f)generally, carry on their activities in a manner that is sensitive and responsive to the multicultural reality of Canada.

Source: Canadian Multiculturalism Act. R.S.,1985, c. 24 (4th Supp.). http:/lwww.cic.gc.ca/english/publindex. hm(1 3 Aug. 2001 ) Canadian Multiculturalism Act~files\Multiculturalism- Canadian Multiculturalism Act.htm (20 Aug. 2001).