CANADA RETURNS to AFGHANISTAN Introduction

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

CANADA RETURNS to AFGHANISTAN Introduction CANADA RETURNS TO AFGHANISTAN Introduction It had been two months since Canadian The decision to return to Afghanistan Focus troops landed in Kabul for the first was not without controversy. When This News in Re- rotation in Operation Athena— Minister of Defence John McCallum view story focuses on the return of Canada’s latest contribution to the war announced the decision on February 12, Canadian troops to on terrorism in Afghanistan. Canadians 2003, the world community was en- Afghanistan. In were assigned to the NATO-led Interna- gaged in a heated debate regarding early February tional Security Assistance Force (ISAF) whether or not to wage war on Saddam 2003, Defence and were growing increasingly accus- Hussein’s Iraq. While U.S. and British Minister John tomed to life in Kabul. Five Canadians politicians were vigorously promoting McCallum an- nounced that in two open-aired vehicles were on a an attack on Iraq, countries like France Canada would send routine patrol about three and a half and Germany were voicing their reser- troops to the war- kilometres from Camp Julien, Canada’s vations. In the middle of the debate was torn nation, effec- home in Afghanistan’s capital. In an Canada, expressing concerns about tively eliminating instant, a road that had been deemed engaging in a war that the United the Canadian army from action in Iraq. safe by engineers less than 24 hours Nations was refusing to sanction while While some criti- earlier turned into an explosive death fearful of the repercussions of not cized Canada’s trap. One of the vehicles struck a supporting their closest ally, the United choice to return to landmine, killing two men, Sergeant States. Sending troops to Iraq became a Afghanistan in- Robert Short and Corporal Robbie non-issue in February because Canada stead of joining the United States in the Beerenfenger, and injuring three others, could not simultaneously participate in war on Iraq, Master Corporal Jason Cory Hamilton, the Iraqi and Afghan military theatres. McCallum, among Corporal Thomas Stirling, and Corporal By the time U.S. and British forces others, pointed to Cameron Lee Laidlaw. All five soldiers landed in Iraq in March 2003, Canadi- the legitimacy of were members of the Royal Canadian ans had confirmed what the commit- an ongoing Cana- Regiment, 3rd Battalion, based in ment to Afghanistan a month earlier dian presence in Afghanistan. Petawawa, Ontario. Investigators had indicated: Canada would not be concluded that one of the Canadian taking part in the war on Iraq. vehicles ran over a landmine that had Military critics claim that Canada YV Sections probably been combined with two other opted for Afghanistan as an excuse not marked with this mines. The explosion of the one mine to take part in the U.S.-led invasion of symbol indicate set off a chain reaction, sending the Iraq. The government responded to the content suitable for younger viewers. vehicle flying and leaving a giant crater accusations with a firm claim to na- in its wake. The tragedy marked the tional sovereignty, stating that an first combat deaths in Canada’s second independent nation did not need an foray into Afghanistan. Canada’s initial excuse not to go to war. Meanwhile, mission to Afghanistan, part of Opera- Defence Minister John McCallum tion Apollo, saw 800 members of the repeatedly cited U.S. Defense Secretary Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Donald Rumsfeld’s sincere appreciation Infantry serve in Kandahar. This time, for Canada’s decision to continue to Operation Athena would see two rota- participate in the war on terror in Af- tions of 1950 troops work with other ghanistan. Criticism was also levied at ISAF forces to secure the capital city of the government regarding the state of Kabul. the Canadian military. Political pundits CBC News in Review • November 2003 • Page 32 pointed to the antiquated equipment of had as many as 10 million landmines Definition the military and the limited number of littered across the country. In short, NATO is the North soldiers available for service. Accord- Afghanistan was not a safe place. In Atlantic Treaty Organization, an ing to the critics, the government had fact, Afghanistan was so volatile that alliance that neglected the military to such an extent some National Defence officials had Canada helped that soldiers were now being put in privately referred to the Afghan venture found in 1949. harm’s way. Once again, the Canadian as “mission impossible,” claiming the Originally focused government struck back, claiming that decision to return to the region on European active Canadian troops would be pro- prompted the resignation of top-level defence, it has recently become vided with the best equipment avail- officer Major-General Cameron Ross more active in able. It would be irresponsible for the (Scott Taylor, The Globe and Mail, global crises. government to put troops in the line of June 10, 2003). fire without providing them with the Is the Canadian landmine tragedy in means to protect themselves. Finally, Kabul an indicator of more violence to Quote some critics wondered about the safety come? Months earlier, in June 2003, “The mission in of a mission to Afghanistan. The new four German soldiers were killed and Afghanistan is fundamental to Afghan government, led by President 29 others were wounded when a suicide Canada’s security. Hamid Karzai, held sway over the area bomber drove his taxi into an armored Even though it is in and around Kabul, but outside the convoy. The Germans were on their not immediately capital the story was quite different. way to the airport, set to head home evident, when our Warlords were teaming up with a after a tour of duty in Kabul. It appears soldiers patrol the resurgent Taliban to control large that more attacks will follow, and streets of Kabul, they are also pockets of southern Afghanistan, par- Canadians, with close to 2000 of the keeping the streets ticularly in areas that border Pakistan. NATO-led 5500 troops in Kabul, may of Canada safe.” Also, it was estimated that Afghanistan become the next targets. — Defence Minister John McCallum, Toronto Star, Questions October 3, 2003 1. What is Operation Athena? 2. What happened early in the operation to put Canadians in Kabul on high alert? 3. Make a point-form list of the concerns and criticisms regarding Canada’s decision to return to Afghanistan. CBC News in Review • November 2003 • Page 33 CANADA RETURNS TO AFGHANISTAN YV Video Review 1. What tragedy demonstrated the dangers that Canadian soldiers face in Please view the Afghanistan? video and answer the questions. 2. What event does the video suggest represents the roots of the current conflict in Afghanistan? 3. Which Afghanis were the hardest-hit once the Taliban came to power? Why? 4. What event prompted the U.S. government to shift its focus to Afghanistan? 5. Who has taken over security patrols in Kabul? 6. What is Canada’s mission in Afghanistan? 7. What theories have investigators uncovered regarding the landmine deaths of Sergeant Robert Short and Corporal Robbie Beerenfenger? 8. What criticisms have been made against the Iltis vehicles? 9. Describe the landscape of Kabul as outlined in Tara Sutton’s report. 10. Have things improved for Afghan women? 11. The video refers to women being “hidden behind the veil.” What does this mean? CBC News in Review • November 2003 • Page 34 CANADA RETURNS TO AFGHANISTAN Two Tours, and Six Fallen Soldiers Operation Apollo Kandahar. Tragically, the bomb killed After the terrorist attacks on the United four Canadians and injured eight others. States on September 11, 2001, Canada The pilots of the F-16 thought they rallied behind the Americans in the were being attacked by the troops on hopes of aiding them in their battle the ground and, despite receiving orders against terrorism. Canada’s main mili- not to fire, did so anyway, claiming tary contribution came in what has self-defence. Minutes later they learned come to be known as Operation that they had bombed their own allies. Apollo—a loosely knit combination of The pilots eventually avoided man- all branches of the Canadian Forces. slaughter charges from the U.S. mili- Operation Apollo provided immediate tary. One received a reprimand while air and naval support for the U.S.-led the other faces a court martial. war on terror. Eventually, Canadian land forces were deployed and fought Operation Athena alongside U.S. troops in battles against Operation Athena was the subject of Taliban and Al Qaeda forces. While controversy from the start. Days after reports of the ability and training of the announcement that Canada would Canada’s soldiers were positive, mili- be sending troops back to Afghanistan tary experts pointed to the signs of in August 2003, Major-General neglect emerging in the ability of the Cameron Ross, a top-level Canadian Canadian Forces to do their job. To officer, resigned from his post. While begin with Canadian soldiers had to be Ross cited “personal reasons” for his airlifted to the Persian Gulf by the U.S. resignation, sources claim that he quit Once they arrived, Canadians baked in because of the dangers inherent in the the desert heat in their dark green Afghanistan mission (The National camouflage uniforms. The Americans Post, February 15, 2003). Despite also provided transportation for Canadi- Ross’s resignation, training began and, ans once they arrived and artillery in August 2003, a force of 1950 Cana- support—including helicopter gun- dian soldiers gathered in Kabul to take ships—for Canadians involved in part in the NATO-led International combat missions. Lt.-Col Pat Stogran, Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
Recommended publications
  • A Small Arms
    CANADIAN TODAY SPRING 2019 | VOL. 3 | ISSUE 1 THIS ISSUE • Uniting the Army’s X-Men • A paratrooper’s first jump • De la protection des forces aux médecins volants • Life extension plans for the Leos • Taking aim at new sniper systems • A better way to buy C4ISR? • LAVs: Mobile, lethal and better protected Close Combat, Close Engagement Refining the capstone operating concept GENERAL DYNAMICS CANSEC 2019 PRESENTATIONS Enabling your TacCIS to Support Cyberspace Mission Objectives Vertex: Reliable Network, Survivable Architecture Join us in booth #1601 To register for the presentations, contact [email protected] www.gdmissionsystems.ca CANADIAN TODAY IN THIS ISSUE SPRING 2019 | VOL. 3 | ISSUE 1 THEME 8 CLOSE ENGAGEMENT by Chris Thatcher Facing future conflict across the full spectrum of warfare, the Army has evolved its capstone operating concept to better reflect the emerging reality. 14 X-MEN ORIGINS by Allan Joyner and Chris Thatcher It may still be testing its powers, but the transfer of the Canadian Combat Support Brigade to the field force has created a unit with skillsets, especially in the 4th Artillery Regiment (General Support), not found anywhere else. 20 CHANGING (SOME) OF THE LEOPARD’S SPOTS by Allan Joyner Once considered an anachronism to Canadian operations, the tank has repeatedly proven its worth. Now the 2A4M Leopard is in the early phases of a life extension. 32 COMBAT ARMS LEADERSHIP by Chris Thatcher Few exercises test the combat skills of a young leader like Exercise Common Ground. Here’s a sample of what it’s like to spend 24 hours in the hot seat.
    [Show full text]
  • Department of National Defence Report on Plans
    DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE REPORT ON PLANS AND PRIORITIES 2009-2010 DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE: 2009-2010 REPORT ON PLANS AND PRIORITIES TABLE OF CONTENTS MINISTER’S MESSAGE.............................................................................................................................I SECTION I: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 1 RAISON D’ÊTRE .......................................................................................................................................... 1 PLANNING CONTEXT .................................................................................................................................. 2 PLANNING SUMMARY................................................................................................................................. 8 SECTION II: ANALYSIS OF PROGRAM ACTIVITIES BY STRATEGIC OUTCOME............... 20 SECTION II A – PROGRAM ACTIVITY: GENERATE AND SUSTAIN RELEVANT, RESPONSIVE AND EFFECTIVE COMBAT-CAPABLE INTEGRATED FORCES ................................................................................................ 20 SECTION IIB – PROGRAM ACTIVITY: CONDUCT OPERATIONS ................................................................. 27 SECTION IIC – PROGRAM ACTIVITY: CONTRIBUTE TO CANADIAN GOVERNMENT, SOCIETY AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH CANADIAN INTERESTS AND VALUES ...................... 31 SECTION IID – PROGRAM ACTIVITY: INTERNAL SERVICES.....................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • National Defence and the Canadian Forces
    Skip to content | Skip to institutional links National Defence and the Canadian Forces www.forces.gc.ca Français Home Contact Us Help Search canada.gc.ca CEFCOM Home > Current Operations > Fact Sheets > Joint Task Force Afghanistan Operations Joint Task Force Afghanistan: Current Operations Current Operations Composition during Rotation 7 of Operation ATHENA Map Fact Sheets Joint Task Force Afghanistan comprises all Canadian Forces assets deployed in southwest Past Operations Asia on Operation ACCIUS , Operation ARCHER and Operation ATHENA . Its established CEFCOM strength is 2,830 personnel, of whom all but about 15 are deployed on Operation ATHENA. About Us Joint Task Force Afghanistan is made up of the following units: Newsroom Operations l At Kandahar Airfield: Media Embedding ¡ Joint Task Force Afghanistan Headquarters, which is also the headquarters of Program Task Force Kandahar ¡ the Canadian contingent at COMKAF (Commander, Kandahar Airfield) Feature Story ¡ the Canadian contingent at ISAF Regional Command (South) Headquarters Archive ¡ Task Force Kandahar, part of ISAF RC(South) Tell Us Your Stories ¡ the Joint Task Force Afghanistan Air Wing ¡ the National Support Element (NSE) l In Kabul: ¡ the Canadian contingent at ISAF Headquarters ¡ the Canadian members of the Military Advisory Unit of the United Nations Advisory Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA, see Operation ACCIUS ) ¡ the Canadian contingent of Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC­A, see Operation ARCHER) ¡ the military liaison staff at the Canadian Embassy
    [Show full text]
  • The Perception Versus the Iraq War Military Involvement in Sean M. Maloney, Ph.D
    Are We Really Just: Peacekeepers? The Perception Versus the Reality of Canadian Military Involvement in the Iraq War Sean M. Maloney, Ph.D. IRPP Working Paper Series no. 2003-02 1470 Peel Suite 200 Montréal Québec H3A 1T1 514.985.2461 514.985.2559 fax www.irpp.org 1 Are We Really Just Peacekeepers? The Perception Versus the Reality of Canadian Military Involvement in the Iraq War Sean M. Maloney, Ph.D. Part of the IRPP research program on National Security and Military Interoperability Dr. Sean M. Maloney is the Strategic Studies Advisor to the Canadian Defence Academy and teaches in the War Studies Program at the Royal Military College. He served in Germany as the historian for the Canadian Army’s NATO forces and is the author of several books, including War Without Battles: Canada’s NATO Brigade in Germany 1951-1993; the controversial Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means 1945-1970; and the forthcoming Operation KINETIC: The Canadians in Kosovo 1999-2000. Dr. Maloney has conducted extensive field research on Canadian and coalition military operations throughout the Balkans, the Middle East and Southwest Asia. Abstract The Chrétien government decided that Canada would not participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom, despite the fac ts that Canada had substantial national security interests in the removal of the Saddam Hussein regime and Canadian military resources had been deployed throughout the 1990s to contain it. Several arguments have been raised to justify that decision. First, Canada is a peacekeeping nation and doesn’t fight wars. Second, Canada was about to commit military forces to what the government called a “UN peacekeeping mission” in Kabul, Afghanistan, implying there were not enough military forces to do both, so a choice had to be made between “warfighting” and “peacekeeping.” Third, the Canadian Forces is not equipped to fight a war.
    [Show full text]
  • National Defence
    ARCHIVED - Archiving Content ARCHIVÉE - Contenu archivé Archived Content Contenu archivé Information identified as archived is provided for L’information dont il est indiqué qu’elle est archivée reference, research or recordkeeping purposes. It est fournie à des fins de référence, de recherche is not subject to the Government of Canada Web ou de tenue de documents. Elle n’est pas Standards and has not been altered or updated assujettie aux normes Web du gouvernement du since it was archived. Please contact us to request Canada et elle n’a pas été modifiée ou mise à jour a format other than those available. depuis son archivage. Pour obtenir cette information dans un autre format, veuillez communiquer avec nous. This document is archival in nature and is intended Le présent document a une valeur archivistique et for those who wish to consult archival documents fait partie des documents d’archives rendus made available from the collection of Public Safety disponibles par Sécurité publique Canada à ceux Canada. qui souhaitent consulter ces documents issus de sa collection. Some of these documents are available in only one official language. Translation, to be provided Certains de ces documents ne sont disponibles by Public Safety Canada, is available upon que dans une langue officielle. Sécurité publique request. Canada fournira une traduction sur demande. National Defence Performance Report For the period ending March 31, 2003 The Honourable John McCallum, P.C., M.P. Minister of National Defence Minister's Message PART I: THE BENEFITS OF
    [Show full text]
  • TABLE of CONTENTS Introduction
    TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction....................................................................................................................... 3 Investigation and Methodology ....................................................................................... 5 The Concept of Decompression ....................................................................................... 7 Current DND/CF Policy on Decompression and Redeployment.................................. 9 CF Experience with Third-location Decompression: Operation Apollo and Decompression in Guam................................................................................................. 13 Feedback and Evaluation of the Guam Decompression Period.................................... 13 Operation Athena.......................................................................................................... 16 Practices of Other Militaries & Non Government Organizations.............................. 19 Royal Netherlands Armed Forces................................................................................. 19 Australian Defence Force ............................................................................................. 20 Analysis: A Principled Approach to Decompression................................................... 23 Recommended Guiding Principles:............................................................................... 25 Factors to Consider in Determining Whether Decompression at a Third Location is Warranted After an Operational Deployment............................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Canadian Forces in Afghanistan
    OONN TRACKT R A C K SPRING / PRINTEMPS 2009 VOLUME 14, NUMBER 1 Canada-US Defence Relations After the Obama Visit It Didn’t Have to Be This Way Canadian Forces in Afghanistan - Then, Now and Beyond The Impact of Missile Defence on China’s “Minimum Deterrence” Nuclear Posture Origins of the Strategic Advisory Team - Afghanistan Canadian Forces photo by / Photo Forces canadienne par Vic Johnson DONOR PATRONS of the CDA INSTITUTE DONATEUR PATRONS de l’INSTITUT de la CAD Mr. Keith P. Ambachtsheer Colonel (Ret’d) John Catto Dr. John Scott Cowan Colonel The Hon. John Fraser Rear-Admiral (Ret’d) Roger Girouard Dr. J.L. Granatstein Jackman Foundation (1964) Senator Colin Kenny Brigadier-General (Ret’d) Don W. Macnamara Lieutenant-Colonel W. Morrison Mr. David Scott Senator Hugh D. Segal COMPANIONS of the CDA INSTITUTE COMPAGNONS de l’INSTITUT de la CAD Admiral (Ret’d) John Anderson Mr. Paul Chapin Mr. M. Corbett Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) L.W.F. Cuppens Brigadier-General (Ret’d) James S. Cox Mr. John A. Eckersley Colonel (Ret’d) Douglas A. Fraser Major-General (Ret’d) Reginald W. Lewis General (Ret’d) Paul D. Manson Colonel (Ret’d) Gary Rice Royal Military College Club of Canada Foundation Colonel (Ret’d) Ben Shapiro Brigadier-General (Ret’d) T.H.M. Silva Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret’d) Ernest Skutezky Mr. Robert G.Tucker Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) Jack Vance OFFICER LEVEL DONORS to the CDA INSTITUTE DONATEURS de l’INSTITUT de la CAD - NIVEAU d’OFFICIER Major-général (Ret) Clive Addy Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret’d) J.A.
    [Show full text]
  • Canadians in Afghanistan Canadians in Afghanistan
    ‘We‘We areare FightingFighting Evil’:Evil’: Canadians in Afghanistan Canada has been America’s ally in Afghanistan from the very beginning. During 2006, Canadian troops engaged in the country’s most intense combat since the KoreanKorean WarWar (1950-53). BY RICHARD K. KOLB 22 • VFW • March 2007 DOD PHOTO Canada had ample reason for sending troops to al Qaeda’s haven in Central Asia. On Sept. 11, 2001, 24 Canadians were among those murdered in the World Trade Center terrorist attack. As Maclean’s, Canada’s top news- magazine, proclaimed in a 2006 editorial: “We are now in the front line in a global struggle against radical Islamic terror- ism. We are, for all intents and purposes, at war. … Any relaxation of Canada’s position in this conflict would be a victo- ry for violent jihadis everywhere.” On those same pages, Royal Military College instructor Sean M. Maloney fur- ther cemented the case for Canada’s involvement in this conflict. “The global Above: Canadian soldiers of the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry al Qaeda movement is at war with (PPCLI), search the hills for al Qaeda and Taliban fighters near Qualat, Afghanistan on July 1, Canada,”he wrote. 2002, during Operation Cherokee Sky. “We are mentioned by their prime Below: A member of the PPCLI applies cammo before boarding a CH-47 Chinook for the Tora leader as an enemy; our people were mur- Bora region to search for Taliban fighters during Operation Tor II on May 4, 2002. dered by al Qaeda in the 9/11 attacks; al Qaeda cells plot the murder of our demo- army regiment created since 1968.
    [Show full text]
  • Canada in Afghanistan: 2001-2010 a Military Chronology
    Canada in Afghanistan: 2001-2010 A Military Chronology Nancy Teeple Royal Military College of Canada DRDC CORA CR 2010-282 December 2010 Defence R&D Canada Centre for Operational Research & Analysis Strategic Analysis Section Canada in Afghanistan: 2001 to 2010 A Military Chronology Prepared By: Nancy Teeple Royal Military College of Canada P.O. Box 17000 Stn Forces Kingston Ontario K7K 7B4 Royal Military College of Canada Contract Project Manager: Mr. Neil Chuka, (613) 998-2332 PWGSC Contract Number: Service-Level Agreement with RMC CSA: Mr. Neil Chuka, Defence Scientist, (613) 998-2332 The scientific or technical validity of this Contract Report is entirely the responsibility of the Contractor and the contents do not necessarily have the approval or endorsement of Defence R&D Canada. Defence R&D Canada – CORA Contract Report DRDC CORA CR 2010-282 December 2010 Principal Author Original signed by Nancy Teeple Nancy Teeple Approved by Original signed by Stephane Lefebvre Stephane Lefebvre Section Head Strategic Analysis Approved for release by Original signed by Paul Comeau Paul Comeau Chief Scientist This work was conducted as part of Applied Research Project 12qr "Influence Activities Capability Assessment". Defence R&D Canada – Centre for Operational Research and Analysis (CORA) © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2010 © Sa Majesté la Reine (en droit du Canada), telle que représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2010 Abstract …….. The following is a chronology of political and military events relating to Canada’s military involvement in Afghanistan between September 2001 and March 2010.
    [Show full text]
  • (Military) (MSM) CITATIONS 2003 to 2007 UPDATED
    MERITORIOUS SERVICE MEDAL (Military) (MSM) CITATIONS 2003 to 2007 UPDATED: 12 July 2018 PAGES: 43 CORRECT TO: 26 April 2003 (CG) 18 October 2003 (CG) 08 November 2003 (CG) 20 March 2004 (CG) 17 July 2004 (CG) 13 November 2004 (CG) 13 August 2005 (CG) 08 Aril 2006 (CG) 14 September 2006 (GH) 24 October 2006 (GH) 27 October 2006 (GH) 07 April 2007 (CG) For most of 27 October 2006 23 June 2007 (CG) 31 March 2010 (CG) 03 July 2010 (CG) 28 July 2010 (CG) 18 December 2010 (CG) Prepared by John Blatherwick, CM, CStJ, OBC, CD, MD, FRCP(C), LLD(Hon) Mr. & Mrs., Brigadier-Generals Christopher Thurrott and Jaeger, each OMM, MSM, CD 1 Citations in this Folder PAGE NAME RANK UNIT DECORATIONS / 31 ANDERSON, David James LCol Chief of Staff Task Force Afghanistan MSM CD 26 ATHERLEY-BLIGHT, Julia May Major Dep Cdr Task Force Pakistan Op Plateau OMM MSM CD 41 BAKER, Cary Arthur Major RCR - NATO Exercise Steadfast Jaguar MSM CD 23 BATA, Sonja Ingrid HCaptain(N) Honorary Captain Canadian Navy OC MSM CD 22 BEARE, Stuart A. MGen Cdr NATO Stabilization Force Bosnia CMM MSC MSM CD 43 BEAUDETTE, Michael (‘Mike’) J. LCol CO JTF-2 (No Gazette for Security Reasons) MSM CD 18 BENTLEY, Lorne William (‘Bill’) LCol CF Professional Develop Cdn Defence Academy MSM CD 33 BISHOP, Timothy James Major J33 Current Operations OP Archer Afghanistan MSM CD 10 BRADLEY, Daniel Rodney CWO RSM 3RCR in Kabul Afghanistan MMM MSM CD 38 BROWN, Ward Desmond CWO RSM Prov Reconstruction Team Afghanistan MMM MSM CD 30 CAPSTICK, Michael Derek Colonel Commander Strategic Advisory Team Afghan OMM MSM CD 11 COYLE, William J.
    [Show full text]
  • Archived Content Information Archivée Dans Le
    Archived Content Information identified as archived on the Web is for reference, research or record-keeping purposes. It has not been altered or updated after the date of archiving. Web pages that are archived on the Web are not subject to the Government of Canada Web Standards. As per the Communications Policy of the Government of Canada, you can request alternate formats on the "Contact Us" page. Information archivée dans le Web Information archivée dans le Web à des fins de consultation, de recherche ou de tenue de documents. Cette dernière n’a aucunement été modifiée ni mise à jour depuis sa date de mise en archive. Les pages archivées dans le Web ne sont pas assujetties aux normes qui s’appliquent aux sites Web du gouvernement du Canada. Conformément à la Politique de communication du gouvernement du Canada, vous pouvez demander de recevoir cette information dans tout autre format de rechange à la page « Contactez-nous ». CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE - COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES JCSP 33 – PCEMI 33 Master of Defence Studies Breaking Trail – Towards Relevant Canadian Parachute Forces by/par Maj G.R. Smith 23 April 2007 This paper was written by a student La présente étude a été rédigée par un attending the Canadian Forces College in stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes fulfilment of one of the requirements of the pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic cours. L'étude est un document qui se document, and thus contains facts and rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits opinions, which the author alone considered et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriate and correct for the subject.
    [Show full text]
  • Committee Ppoossiittiioonn Ppaappeerrss
    DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE PPOOSSIITTIIOONN PPAAPPEERRSS Committee: Disarmament and International Security Country: Afghanistan Delegate: Kevin Tamerler The Taliban Ladies and Gentlemen of the Disarmament and International Security, I am honored to be asked to speak on a topic so closely linked to my own country, and would like to thank the council for recognizing this grave threat to my nation's very existence. And I would like to begin by singling out two among your number for special recognition: two permanent members of the Security Council: Russia and the United States. Many of your governments and your people would like to say that the Taliban are an Afghani problem that necessitates an Afghani solution. Perhaps they are right in some respects, but first I would like to give you a history lesson. Two decades ago, Afghanistan was a puppet state of the USSR, of Russia. A handful of Afghani patriots, many of them ardent Muslims, tried to fight off the might of the atheistic superpower. The CIA, ever opportunistic to be one up on the Russians, chose to support these zealots, sending millions of dollars of equipment and training aid, much of it filtered through Pakistan. The free nations of the world applauded as this scrappy band of freedom fighters defeated the military juggernaut that was Russia, leading to the end of the Cold War, bringing freedom to Eastern Europe. Indeed, one could even say that my people's blood was shed for the sake of your democracies. After the victory, the CIA lost interest in us. We were no longer any use to them, so they simply let us be.
    [Show full text]