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CANADA's BLOODY WAR in AFGHANISTAN Introduction

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CANADA's BLOODY WAR in AFGHANISTAN Introduction CANADA’S BLOODY WAR IN AFGHANISTAN Introduction The Killing Fields of Kandahar Dreams of Peacekeeping Focus Canadian soldiers were on foot patrol When the preliminary stages of Opera- As the combat through Pashmul, a cluster of villages in tion Archer (the new, more aggressive death toll rose to the former Taliban stronghold of Canadian role) were implemented in 43, including 10 deaths in Septem- Panjwai, just west of Kandahar, Af- fall 2005, Canada’s top soldier, General ber alone, Canadi- ghanistan. They were on a new make- Rick Hillier, warned Canadians that the ans once again shift road designed to keep the troops era of the blue-helmeted peacekeeper questioned the off the mine-infested main roads. They was over and that the Canadian Forces mission in Afghani- were reasonably certain that Operation were now on a war footing in Afghani- stan. This News in Review story exam- Medusa, a massive Canadian-led stan. Canadians needed to expect casu- ines the Canadian NATO attack to rid the district of alties because Canada’s move from the battle to win the Taliban insurgents had been effective. security of Kabul to the birthplace of hearts and minds of In fact, their superiors had claimed that the Taliban in Kandahar would entail a the people of as many as 1 000 Taliban had been great deal more direct contact with the Kandahar province as well as the killed by NATO troops in the first two enemy. It took some time but, by the intense debate at weeks of the campaign. Nonetheless, beginning of the summer of 2006, the home regarding the Canadians weren’t sure what booby- Canadian public was very much aware Canada’s military traps the insurgents had left behind. of the dangers in Kandahar. The flag- involvement in They weaved their way carefully along draped coffins of nine soldiers—includ- Afghanistan. the road, looking for landmines and ing four killed in one incident—as well improvised explosive devices (IEDs). as the death of diplomat Glyn Berry YV Sections Corporal Mike Blois was at the tail end shook Canadians out of their peace- marked with this of the patrol when a huge IED explo- keeping dreams and let the nation know symbol indicate sion went off in front of him. that it was at war. content suitable for As the dust began to settle he shouted younger viewers. out the names of the men in his patrol. Summer in Panjwai All but one either answered or stumbled Summer tends to be fighting season in toward him. Private Josh Klukie was Afghanistan, and the summer of 2006 missing. The soldiers fanned out proved to be no exception. A resurgent through the thick foliage, eventually Taliban took the fight to Canadian finding Klukie 50 metres away from the troops who were working to bring blast scene. He was lying on his back, security to Kandahar province. July saw conscious but unable to speak. Blois three Canadians fall: two at the hands of and a medic from a nearby U.S. patrol a suicide bomber and one in a firefight. started working on him, reassuring him, In August eight Canadians died, with and urging him to hang on. Blois said, four killed in an ambush by the Taliban “This is nothing Josh, this is nothing.” that saw Canadian troops pounded by Klukie just looked at Blois, forced a rocket propelled grenades (RPGs). This smile—perhaps a final gift of comfort happened in Pashmul, the most danger- for a friend—and died. He was the 38th ous area in the Panjwai district and the Canadian to die in the conflict in Afghani- reputed spiritual centre of the Taliban stan since hostilities began in 2001. during its rule. Source: Globe and Mail, “The sad smile Canadian and NATO commanders of a dying soldier,” October 2, 2006 knew that something needed to be done CBC News in Review • November 2006 • Page 6 in Panjwai and, on September 2, tion to the mission began to grow, Definition Canada led an international force in culminating in NDP leader Jack Taliban in Arabic Operation Medusa: a 15-day battle to Layton’s announcement in early Sep- means “seeker of truth” or “stu- rid the district of Taliban insurgents. tember that, if elected, his government dent.” It usually According to NATO, Panjwai was would pull Canadian troops out of refers to the reli- under coalition control by the middle of Afghanistan. This set off a wave of gious zealots who the month, with as many as 1 000 condemnation from the governing governed Afghani- Taliban killed in the fighting and the Conservatives and the opposition stan until late 2001. In the current rest retreating into the countryside. Liberals. Prime Minister Stephen fighting it is not Most civilians heeded the warnings Harper’s Conservatives rallied behind always clear issued by Canadian forces and left the their leader and pointed out that Parlia- whether Canadians area before the fighting began. Life ment agreed (albeit by a very narrow are fighting the appeared to be returning to normal margin) to extend the mission to Febru- original Taliban, mercenaries, or when troops saw local farmers come ary 2009. Liberal leadership candidates even local criminals back to their homes shortly after the expressed views ranging from the need or warlords. The heavy fighting had ended. Operation to honour our commitments in Afghani- name has come to Medusa was arguably the most success- stan to regular reviews of the mission. represent a broader ful campaign against insurgents since The Bloc Québécois put their support in range of insurgents the Anglo-American ousting of the the mission but called for safeguards to than the original force that gov- Taliban in 2001. However, Canada paid ensure the security of the Royal 22nd erned Afghanistan a heavy price for its leadership role in Regiment (also called the Vandoos) of before 2001. the battle. During the two weeks of the Valcartier, slated to replace troops in main battle, Canada lost five soldiers, Kandahar in 2007. Government advo- and in the aftermath stretching into cates for military involvement con- Did you know . mid-October, another 10 soldiers were tended that too much attention was An EKOS killed. That brought the casualty count being spent on the casualty count and (www.ekos.com) in the Afghan conflict to 43, with 42 not enough on the good that Canada’s poll conducted in soldiers and one diplomat dying at the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) September showed hands of Taliban, Al Qaeda, and other was bringing to the people of Afghani- that 49 per cent of Canadians opposed insurgent groups. stan. In the end, only the NDP came out the war, 38 per staunchly against the deployment in cent supported the Should we stay or should we go? Afghanistan. war, and 12 per As the combat death count rose during cent held no opin- the summer of 2006, Canadian opposi- ion. The EKOS poll was indicative of previous polls that To Consider showed that Cana- 1. What happened to Josh Klukie in Pashmul? dians were split when it came to 2. How did the mission in Kandahar bring dreams of peacekeeping to an end the mission in for most Canadians? Afghanistan. 3. Describe what happened in Panjwai in the summer of 2006. 4. How did politicians react to the war in Afghanistan near the end of the summer of 2006? CBC News in Review • November 2006 • Page 7 CANADA’S BLOODY WAR IN AFGHANISTAN YV Video Review 1. a) What happened to the Canadian convoy mentioned at the beginning of Respond carefully Chris Brown’s report? to the questions, which should guide your viewing of the b) How common are the types of attacks the Canadians encountered that day? video. 2. What sobering lessons did Canadians learn early in Operation Medusa? Did you know . Canada has pledged to up- grade the equip- ment of 2 000 3. How are the Taliban attracting new recruits to fight in the insurgency? Afghan policeman so that they can better carry out 4. What groups make up the Neo-Taliban? their duties. Update As of November 5. What is delaying the Canadian reconstruction efforts in Kandahar province? 2006, leadership of the NATO military campaign in south- 6. What does Prime Minister Harper mean when he says that Canada will not ern Afghanistan leave Afghanistan until success has been achieved? passed from Canada to Holland. 7. How did the Canadian Forces wind up getting dispatched to Afghanistan? 8. Were the top brass in the army prepared for a large deployment? 9. How did Major-General Cameron Ross react to the announcement of the Afghanistan mission? 10. What is General Rick Hillier’s perspective on serving in Afghanistan? 11. What is your personal opinion of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan? How do you think it will turn out? Explain clearly. CBC News in Review • November 2006 • Page 8 CANADA’S BLOODY WAR IN AFGHANISTAN Operation Medusa The Panjwai Problem firefights with the Taliban. Then, on the Did you know . When NATO agreed to form the Inter- second day, as troops prepared to The A-10 Thunder- national Security Assistance Force continue their advance into Panjwai, a bolt—also called the “Warthog”— (ISAF – www.jfcbs.nato.int/ISAF/ U.S. A-10 Thunderbolt aircraft, called specializes in index.htm) and join the U.S.-led mis- in for a strafing attack on insurgents, strafing, which sion in Afghanistan, they had to come mistakenly fired on Canadian soldiers involves rapidly up with a strategy to fight the Taliban, instead, killing one and wounding 30 firing bullets the Al Qaeda, and other insurgents who others.
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