FORGE the FUTURE Porto Alegre, V.2, 2014 Dados Internacionais De Catalogação Na Publicação (CIP)

QUESTION OLD STRUCTURES FORGE THE FUTURE Porto Alegre, v.2, 2014 Dados internacionais de catalogação na publicação (CIP)

UFRGSMUN : UFRGS Model United Nations Journal : Question old structures ; forge the future / Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Faculdade de Ciências Econômicas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais. – Vol. 2 (2014). – Porto Alegre : UFRGS/FCE/PPGEEI, 2014 -

Anual. ISSN 2318-3195.

1. Relações exteriores : Política. 2. Relações internacionais. 3. Política internacional. 4. Conflito internacional. CDU 327

Responsável: Biblioteca Gládis W. do Amaral, Faculdade de Ciências Econômicas da UFRGS Capa por Débora Olivaes Pereira Projeto gráfico e editoração por Matheus M. Hoscheidt ABOUT UFRGSMUN JOURNAL

UFRGSMUN: UFRGS Model United Nations Journal is an academic vehicle linked to UFRGSMUN, an Extension Program of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul. It aims at contribuiting to the fields of International Relations and International Law through the study of pressing topics in the international scenario. The journal publishes articles in English about issues related to peace and security, environment, human rights, world economy, international law and integration. All of the contributions to the journal must be subjected to a careful scientific revision by graduate students. The journal seeks to promote the diffusion of knowledge and reflection and the debate on important current international questions. Editor André Luiz Reis da Silva (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil) Editorial Board Analúcia Danilevicz Pereira (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil) André Moreira Cunha (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil) Eduardo Ernesto Filippi (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil) Fábio Costa Morosini (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil) Hélio Henkin (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil) Henrique Carlos de Castro (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil) Jacqueline Angélica Haffner (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil) José Miguel Quedi Martins (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil) Luiz Augusto Estrella Faria (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil) Marco Aurélio Chaves Cepik (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil) Paulo Fagundes Visentini (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil) Sonia Renincheski (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil) Editorial Committee Bruno Gomes Guimarães (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany) Diego Rafael Canabarro (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil) Erik Ribeiro (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil) Fernanda Graeff Machry (Tilburg University, Netherlands) Guilherme Ziebell de Oliveira (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil) Isadora Loreto da Silveira (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil) Luiza Leão Soares Pereira (Cambridge University, United Kingdom) Mamadou Alpha Diallo (Universidade Federal da Integração Latino-Americana, Brazil) Thiago Borne Pereira (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil) Walter Lorenzo Motta de Souza (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil) Executive Committee Bruna Leão Lopes Contieri João Arthur da Silva Reis Júlia Oliveira Rosa Matheus Machado Hoscheidt Willian Moraes Roberto Contact Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul - Faculdade de Ciências Econômicas Programa de Pós-Graduação em Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais Av. João Pessoa, 52, sala 33A - 3o andar - CEP 90040-000 - Centro Porto Alegre/RS - Brasil | Telefone: +55 51 3308.3963 | Fax: +55 51 3308.3963 CONTENTS

Presentation 9

Maritime Connectivity in the Asia Pacific Region Júlia Tocchetto, Letícia Tancredi, Régis Zucheto Araújo, Renata Schmitt Noronha 13

The Establishment of Foreign Military Bases and the International Distribution of Power Bruna dos Santos Lersch, Josiane Simão Sarti 83

The Utilization of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) for Military Action in Foreign Airspace Giordano Bruno Ronconi, Thaís Jessinski Batista,Victor Merola 137

Application of the Genocide Convention (Croatia v. Serbia) Diego Bortoli, Vitória Maturana de Britto 183

Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile) Cristieli Carvalho dos Santos, Inaê Oliveira 213

The Situation regarding Non-State Military Actors in the Middle East Willian Moraes Roberto, Ana Carolina Melos 247

The Situation in Iraq Guilherme Henrique Simionato, Natália Regina Colvero Maraschin 295

Energy Transition and Challenges for the 21st Century Bruna Jaeger, Patrícia Machry 337 Shale Gas - Revolution? André França, Katiele Menger 337

Government and Corporative Internet Surveillance Gabriela Jahn Verri, Luiza Bender, Eduardo Dondonis 411

Legal and Political Measures to Address Cybercrime Matheus M. Hoscheidt, Elisa Felber Eichner 445

A presença de potências extrarregionais como ameaça à manutenção da Zona de Paz e Cooperação Jéssica da Silva Höring, Leonardo Weber, Marília Bernardes Closs 479

Pirataria no Golfo da Guiné Giovana Esther Zucatto, Michele Baptista 531

Guidelines for IPC Journalists Aline de Ávila Rocha, Carolina Carvalho Trindade, Marcel Hartmann 567

PRESENTATION

UFRGS Model United Nations 2014 is the twelfth edition of a project that is taking place since 2003. In this sense, as part of a tradition that exists since the beginning of this project, UFRGSMUNers have been guiding themselves by some principles. It can be said that UFRGSMUN carries a realistic view of the world. It means that we bear in mind the notion that the international system’s power structure – framed by the use of force, of economic resources and international structures - imposes constrains on the actions of states, regions and individuals. Concomitantly, we agree that such structural ties are constitutive of a world order which has many flaws. Social injustice, wealth and rights inequality, military conflicts, imperial or unilateral practices are some of the evidences of this. Despite personal judgments, the assumption of such thesis constitutes the core of any International Relations theoretical and intellectual effort. Our realism, however, shall never be mistaken with resignation, pes- simism or even cynicism. It is essentially an assumption of the world how it looks today, rather than an acceptance of it. For the world order to be changed, and for a new future to be forged, we must understand its reality, and therefore its possibilities, and be pragmatic and determined enough in order to be capable of changing it. Every UFRGSMUN edition has tried to mirror the international reality by reflecting its changes. Nonetheless, since we reject determinist visions of the future and recognize human action as the main determinant of our fate, we must position ourselves amidst the struggle on the way future is being forged. Hence, in UFRGSMUN twelfth edition, the eight committees and thirteen topics being discussed are permeated by the certainty that the world is facing a historical crossroads. The unipolar momentum that prevailed during the last decade is over, but there is nothing to replace it for now. International crises and conflicts, associated with the emergence of new powers, live alongside the maintenance of old practices and rigid establishments. A deep transition of power and economic resources is on its course; but such is not enough. The situation demands not only the shedding of new perspectives and the 9 hearing of new voices, but a deep and profound questioning of the structures themselves. An institutional reconstruction must be pursued at the national, regional and international levels if we intend to complete the transition to a multipolar order peacefully, by not repeating the same errors of the past. This year’s motto, “Question old structures, forge the future”, which framed this journal and all the 2014 staff’s work, tries to encompass the UFRGSMUN spirit such as characterized above. We tried to propose alternative solutions and innovative actions while debating some of the most urgent and fundamental questions of the international agenda, in order to make our humble contribution at the struggle for taking part of the historical window of opportunity we have upon us. As we hope you will notice, we have also put some efforts in this direction by questioning some structures inside of UFRGSMUN itself. We invite you all to debate on how to deal with some of the most challenging issues the international system faces nowadays, and encourage you to engage with us in a transformative praxis. This journal was elaborated with the purpose of providing our delegates the best possible material for preparation, according to high academic standards. We hope it helps you to have the best UFRGSMUN experience as possible. From now on, it is up to you to question old structures, and to forge the future.

João Arthur Reis Secretary-General UFRGSMUN 2014

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UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations ISSN: 2318-3195 | v.2, 2014| p. 13-80

MARITIME CONNECTIVITY IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION

Júlia Simões Toccheto1 Letícia Tancredi2 Régis Zucheto Araújo3 Renata Schmitt Noronha4 ABSTRACT

This guideline has as its main objective to embrace almost every issue that matters for understanding the situation regarding maritime infrastructure in the Asia Pacific area and, more specifically, the region encompassing Southeast and Northeast Asia. Moreover, aspects of history, politics and economy are considered vital to better comprehend this area’s maritime connectivity needs. The historical background of each of these regions helps to explain the existing bottlenecks regarding not only infrastructure, but also political cooperation. In this regard, the political realm is extremely important for these countries to cooperate. It is necessary to build sustainable connectivity infrastructure; furthermore, historical distrust and conflicts have been in the pace of these regions’ development and sometimes hamper better dialogue. Moreover, the economic ties are of most relevance, once they even strongly connect countries with bad political relations, as China and Taiwan, and also reveal which area is poorly connected or must have its infrastructure expanded. The maritime infrastructure is crucial for the development of every region in the world, and it gains significance in the regions here studied, where water plays a crucial role in trade and transportation. Therefore, bearing all these issues in mind is imperative for inferring which is the best combination of infrastructure investment for each country and for the region’s better development.

1 Júlia Simões Tocchetto is a 8th semester International Relations undergraduation student at UFRGS and director of the ADB. 2 Letícia Di Maio Tancredi is a 6th semester International Relations undergraduation student at UFRGS and assistant director of the ADB 3 Régis Zucheto Araujo is a 6th semester International Relations undergraduation student at UFRGS and assistant director of the ADB 4 Renata is a 7th semester International Relations undergraduation student at UFRGS and director of the ADB. Asia Development Bank’s Board of Governors

INTRODUCTION

The Asia-Pacific region can be divided by the Southeast Asia and the Northeast Asia region. This study guide will be structured based on that division. Therefore, it is important to broadly introduce these two distinct regions. Southeast Asia is situated on the east of the Indian subcontinent and on the south of China. It consists of two portions: the mainland Southeast Asia, a continental proportion, and a variety of archipelagoes to the south and east of this portion, the insular Southeast Asia (Eb 2000).Due to this, the sea is geographically predominant: more than 80% of the region’s surface is covered by the ocean, being home to more than 31.000 island economies. The region has the busiest international sea lines of communications, one of the richest biodiversity areas and a huge amount of oil reserves (Son 2013). Southeast Asia is also considered the geographical center of gravity for the wider Indo-Pacific region, where significant transport chokepoints1 between the Indian and Pacific oceans are settled. Southeast Asia also fringes the South China Sea and, thus, is economically and strategically vital to the emerging economies of Asia. In this context, it urges to explore the maritime potential of the region in parallel with the goals envisioned by the process of integration of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), turning the region into a globally competitive maritime and economic region. ASEAN envisions a Southeast Asia where goods, investment, capital, trade and people can flow across the region without obstacles, enhancing trade, investment and socio-economic growth among its members, as well as enlarging markets. Therefore, maritime connectivity is essential to reach all of these goals. Being an area surrounded by waters, it is essential that it puts in place adequate infrastructures and resources related to maritime transport and cargo handling and an efficient, safe, secure and environmentally friendly atmosphere for seaborne trade and shipping (Khalid 2006). According to Cheong (Cheong, 2013) The Northeast Asian region is divided into conventional Northeast Asia and Northeast Asia in a broader sense. The conventional Northeast Asia region comprises of China, Japan and South Korea (CJK). In a broader sense, Northeast Asia includes North Korea, Mongolia and Far East Russia, Taiwan and Hong Kong, in addition to CJK. For the purposes of this article, the latter will be used to describe the region, but not as a whole: only China, Japan, Republic of Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Russian Federation are embraced in the study. The importance of the region lies within it: China, as one of the most important international actor and owner of an economy which grows since the 1980’s, is the major player to mention in the region, not only because of its influence over the other countries of the region, mainly with Japan, 1 Chokepoints are “narrow sea lanes that are often highly vulnerable to disruption” (Ballout 2014). They are often used to transportation of oil all over the world. 14 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

South Korea and Russia, and its relations, but also because of its role in the possibility of a shift in the polarization of the world (IPEA, 2010). Likewise, a few of the most important seas that compose the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) are located in the region, such as the Sea of Japan, Yellow Sea, Okhotsk Sea and the East China Sea, and their importance to maintain goods supply must not be undervalued, since the lack of inland infrastructure poses a barrier to the possibility of transport by land (Feddersen, 2012). Therefore, maritime connectivity is essential to reach all of these goals and maintain trade flows. Being an area surrounded by waters, it is essential that it puts in place adequate infrastructures and resources related to maritime transport and cargo handling and an efficient, safe, secure and environmentally friendly atmosphere for seaborne trade and shipping (Khalid 2006).

1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1.1 THE SOUTHEAST ASIA REGION

1.1.1 Maritime Connections in Southeast Asia

Strategically positioned at the crossing of the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, Southeast Asia has its history, trade, politics and culture defined by maritime connections across the Indian Ocean field rather than the Asia-Pacific, which is rather a recent route (Bateman and Chan 2011). In ancient times, Southeast Asia served as a passageway for the diffusion of trade and culture. Two millennia ago, the region was linked to the Indian Ocean trading system by a sea route that flowed from the mouth of the Red River (nowadays Hanoi) through the Malacca Strait to Sri Lanka and India, the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, and Roman ports in the Mediterranean. This sea route was replaced by another maritime route starting from the Pearl River, Guangdong, which enabled long-distance transportation of goods, manly luxuries (Chew 2011). Early historical linkage between the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia was characterized by collaboration, based on exchange of commodities and culture, with occasional naval conflict related to the domination of maritime trade (Bateman and Chan 2011). Many of these relate to the Malacca Strait2, as Chinese naval expeditions during the fifteenth century to guarantee its influence through the strait

2 Located between the east coast of the Indonesian island of Sumatra and the west coast of Malaysia, The Strait of Malacca is the main corridor between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. It supports the bulk of the maritime trade between Europe and Pacific Asia. As the main passage between the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the second biggest chokepoint of the world, its importance is of global relevance. 15 Asia Development Bank’s Board of Governors across the Indian Ocean. For centuries, Malacca has been part of the Arab trade routes linking the Middle East, Southeast Asia and China. In the 7th century, the maritime empire of Srivijaya, based on Palembang, Sumatra, rose to power, and its influence was expanded to the Malay Peninsula and Java. The empire controlled two major chokepoints in Southeast Asia: the Strait of Malacca and the Sunda Strait. Srivijaya profited from spice trade, from the tributary trade system with China and from trade with Indian and Arab merchants. The Strait of Malacca became the most important maritime trade route between India and China (Chew 2011). The importance of the Strait of Malacca in global trade continued with the rise of a Malacca Sultanate in the 15th century, the Johor Sultanate, and the rise of the modern city-state of Singapore. In the colonial era, the strait has been target of disputes among great powers. From the sixteenth until the nineteenth centuries, Portugal, Netherlands, Great Britain and France entered the Indian Ocean, envisioning an opportunity to access China. These incursions transformed long- established maritime connections between Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean (Chew 2011). In 1511, the Portuguese dominated Malacca, a political and cultural center which has given name to the strait. In 1641, the region was conquered by the Netherlands. In 1867, this jurisdiction was taken by England. Singapore became the main harbor, and other important centers, such as Malacca and Penang, comprised the Strait Settlements3, lasting until World War II. After the war, trade in Pacific gained huge importance, and so did the strait. Another strait of great importance in the region is the Singapore Strait, a route of 105 kilometers sited between Singapore and Indonesia, connecting the South China Sea with the Strait of Malacca. The strait is an important shipping route since ancient times, used by migrants to Sumatra, Borneo and other islands of Indo-Pacific region and by Chinese traders to commerce with India and Arabia (Eof 2013). However, it was only in the sixteenth century that the strait emerged as a well-defined trade route, when the Portuguese travelled between India and Macau (Si 2001). In 1819, with the foundation of Singapore and its strategic geographic position, the strait gained even more relevance, since the island emerged as shipping and trading center in the region (Sien 1998). Nowadays, the Strait of Singapore is one of the world’s busiest commercial routes, being considered the second biggest port in the world and receiving an average of 140,000 vessels annually (Ship Technology 2013).The port of Singapore became even more well-known in the 1990s. It was established in 1819 and, since then, has been responsible for a huge expansion of Singaporean exports, becoming a mart for the trade from Indo-China,

3 The Straits Settlements was a former British colony on the Strait of Malacca, comprising four trade centers: Penang, Singapore, Malacca and Labuan. It was established or taken over by the British East India Company. “The Straits colony, occupied by Japanese during World War II, was broken up in 1946, when Singapore became a separate crown colony” (Britannica 2014). 16 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

China, Thailand, Malay Peninsula, Indonesia and Europe. (Psa 2014). On top of that, ports are also of utmost relevance to maritime trade and connectivity. The major international ports in the Malacca Strait are Singapore; Johore, in Johor, Malaysia; Belawan, located in Medan, the main town of Sumatra; Penang, located in Georgetown, capital of the state of Penang in Malaysia; and Klang, the foremost trade outlet for Peninsular Malaysia. There are also smaller ports that support other elements of integration, such as local trade and labor migration (Evers and Gerke 2006; Leifer 1978). The attempts of promoting regional integration in Asia have commonly been seen as a method of defense against colonialism in the region. Southeast Asia was divided among Netherlands, who had sovereignty over Indonesia; France, dominating Indochina (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia); Great Britain, whose possessions were Malaysia, Burma, Singapore and part of Borneo; and United States, present in Philippines and Guam. These powers usually tried to maintain its Asian possessions isolated from each other, following the patterns of Great Britain’s “divide and rule” policy (Magno and Reis 2012). In the context of the Second World War, geopolitics in the region had a drastic change. Japan engaged in a series of victories over great powers. The Asian country invaded China and, in 1941,it attacked Southeast Asia and the North-American Pacific Fleet (Magno and Reis 2012). In these invasions, Japan undermined colonial rule by granting a minimum of autonomy or independence to the territories invaded. After Japanese surrender in 1945, in the advent of the American attacks in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, colonial powers engaged in a last attempt to recover domination over the region. They did not have the same strength as in the past, though. Colonial powers could not defend their territories from Japanese offensive, so that claims to control it again did not have a solid basis. Furthermore, it was too late: colonial ties had been cut by the Japanese, giving space to anti-colonial nationalist movements. The region needed to improve its attempts of cooperation, once colonial powers withdrawal led to a power vacuum that could attract new foreign powers. Also, Southeast Asia nations had to join forces in order to be effectively heard and to acquire a strong position in the regional and international system (Khoman1992). Notwithstanding, starting a policy of integration was still not easy. The world was divided by the Cold War context, and rivalries were rising in many areas of the world, including in Southeast Asia. In that time, almost all countries in the region were facing internal issues, dealing with rebellions and civil wars. Furthermore, the region was still under great influence of the Great Britain and the United States, which led to many conflicts between nations in the region (Magno and Reis 2012). In 1949, communist victory in China inspired many other communist movements in the Southeast Asia region. The fear of the embodiment of the

17 Asia Development Bank’s Board of Governors

“Domino Theory”4 made United States turn further into the region. Therefore, the American government started to take part of and to promote regional initiatives. The first example is the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), in 1954, signed by Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, Britain and United States, the last two being responsible for guiding the organization. However, both had different visions for the institution, which led to its failure5. In 1961, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) was founded by the governments of Malaysia, Thailand and Philippines. This initiative had focused on cultural and economic fields. Soon after its establishment, though, the organization collapsed due to a territorial dispute. The conflict emerged between Philippines against Indonesia and Malaysia, being considered a colonial heritage: Great Britain, upon withdrawal from North Borneo (Sabah), had attributed to Malaysia sovereignty over the territory. Nevertheless, Indonesia also had claims for Sabah, launching its “Konfrontasi” policy6 and engaging in confrontation with Malaysia. Hence, ASA collapsed. Finally, in 1967, a promising initiative is proposed. Thailand, which had remained neutral in the dispute for Sabah, decided to assume a conciliatory role, creating the right moment for regional cooperation - otherwise, the future of the region would remain uncertain. Foreign minister of Thailand, Thanat Khoman invited two former members of ASA and Indonesia – a key member – to a meeting in Bangkok. Singapore also requested to join the meeting, being accepted. On August 8, 1967, the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand signed the Bangkok Declaration. This document gave birth to the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN). It was the foundation of probably the most successful regional initiative in Asia, after many fail attempts in the past. The document proposed “cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, technical, educational and other fields and in the promotion of regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter” (Asean official website 2014). It was the first time that the Southeast Asian nations would successfully path its way toward integration. Actually, the foundation of ASEAN represents the culmination of the decolonization process that had started after the second Great War (Khoman 1992).

4 The domino theory was a foreign policy theory during the 1950s to 1980s, promoted at times by the government of the United States, that speculated that if one land in a region came under the influence of communism, then the surrounding countries would follow in a domino effect” (Princeton 2014). 5 The projects of United States and of Britain for SEATO were extremely different: while the first had the goal of establishing a military alliance, the second a broad organization that could follow have the concept of non-agression as one of its pillars (Turnbull 2008; Magno and Reis 2012). 6 Konfrontasi was a policy of confrontation by Indonesia from 1963 to 1966, in opposition to the formation of Malaysia from the Federation of Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore (Mackie 1974). 18 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

Integration process grew on a gradual basis, broadening its scope in the region. Brunei Darussalam joined on 7 January 1984, Vietnam on 28 July 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar on 23 July 1997 and Cambodia on 30 April 1999, reaching its current membership (Asean 2014). The economic integration of the block started only in 1992, with the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), which liberalized trade in goods through reduction of tariffs. (Andrews 2012). However, the economic integration of the block has slowness as a feature. Coupled with the stalemate on agricultural issues and the failed attempt by OECD to include investment issues in the Doha round, many developed countries concluded bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs) with ASEAN members, as New Zealand, Australia, US, Japan, China, India and South Korea (Kraichitti 2006). The main objective of these FTAs is to expand market for products with export potential, as fisheries, electronics, textile, leatherwear and computer parts. In comparison to Northeast Asia, the group is more open to international trade, and the strategic position of the Malacca Strait has influence over this fact (Andrews 2012). Nonetheless, the need for enhancing trade between members of the group cannot be underestimated. In the case of AFTA, internal trade in ASEAN has increased, but not sufficiently. In 2011, intra-ASEAN trade was 598 billion dollars while extra-ASEAN trade was 1,790 billion dollars (Asean Ec ChartBook 2012). This difficulty in enhancing intra-block trade comes from a weak regulatory capacity and protectionism. Economic relations between ASEAN and Northeast Asia are more significant, accounting for a level of trade of 55% in 2005 (Andrews 2012). Apart from ASEAN, there are other Asian countries that are significant for the discussion presented. The emergence of India as one of the biggest economies in the world and as a global player may change the flows of trade and migration in its region, for example, having global impacts that may be felt mainly by nations that constitute the Indian Ocean littoral and region (Berlin 2006). It may be considered that since the 1990s, with the adoption of the “Look East”7 policy by India, the country has been trying to enhance closer relations with nations located in the Bay of Bengal and Southeast Asia. India build a particularly strong partnership with Sri Lanka, including a FTA signed in 2000 that doubled the bilateral trade (Berlin 2006). It is an important partnership since Sri Lanka has a central location for all of South Asia. On the other hand, relations with Bangladesh don’t follow the same pattern, finding obstacles as Bangladeshi illegal migration, trade and water use. However, in accord to Berlin (2006), some improvement may be under way.

7 The “Look East” Policy consists in an effort to reach closer relations with the Southeast Asian nations, in an attempt to compete with China (Berlin 2006). 19 Asia Development Bank’s Board of Governors

Image 1 - Indian Ocean littoral

Source: Berlin, 2006: 61.

There is also an approach of India towards the members of ASEAN. The country became a sectoral partner in 1991, a full dialogue partner in 1995 and a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996. Among those countries, India has focused on enhancing relations manly with Burma, Singapore and Thailand (Berlin 2006). The littoral states in the Indian Ocean have already attempted to reach a regional economic cooperation process in the past. The Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation was founded in 1997 in Mauritius, envisioning easier trade and investment among its members. Notwithstanding, the block stagnated, since national interests and political economies were significantly divergent (Chew, 2011).

20 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

1.2 THE NORTHEAST ASIA REGION

To understand the recent process of integration within Northeast Asia, attention must be paid to the historical role of the interaction among the nations of the region. In the second half of the nineteenth century the relations and conflicts between the countries, and its subsequent consequences and ramifications in the twentieth century, led to and served as the basis of the current processes of integration in Asia as a whole. Focusing in Northeast Asia, the interactions with the western powers are the main pillar that has been shaping the relations amid Asian countries. When China was still the Chinese Empire, since the Opium Wars (1839- 1842 and 1856-1860), it was being dismembered and exploited by European Empires and Japan, which held possessions in Chinese territory. This process of fragmentation assured the commercial interests of these powers and crushed China both economic and politically (Filho 1982). After years rebuilding itself internally, China involved in a conflict with Japan, known as the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1985), for the control of the Korean peninsula. Being defeated, China had to cede to Japanese jurisdiction the disputed region (Roberts 2012). The Russian Empire saw the Japanese Empire as a compromising factor to its geopolitical interests in the region; incapable of facing Russia, Japan had to cede to the pressure and resigned of a few possessions gained in the First Sino- Japanese War to the Russian Empire. Aiming to retrieve its losses, Japan got into war with Russia, a few years later, in 1904, in the Russian-Japanese War, fighting for control over the Korean peninsula and Manchuria. The Japanese Empire, enjoying heavier power over the outdated Russian navy, imposed great defeat to the Russian Empire, which vanished in 1917’s Revolution, inside the context of World War I (Roberts 2012). China, for its turn, from 1912 to 1949, experienced a long period of Civil War. Since 1914, an already modernized Japan took the place of Western powers in China, once they were involved in World War I. Then, Japan launched its expansionism plan in Asia, especially in China, starting by the occupation of Manchuria. China had, by that time, several factions of power: the warlords who were leaders of the various Chinese provinces; the Nationalist Party, founded by Sun Yat-Sen and the Communist Party, founded in 1921. All these forces begin to fight for power in China. Notably, the warlords and the Nationalist Party, led by General Chiang Kai-Shek, decided to ally with the Japanese against the Communists. The Communist Party fought the Japanese and also had to secure itself from the Nationalist Party (EERRI 2012, 25). With the Great Depression, most of the Northeast Asia countries suffered from a huge dependence to exports of agricultural goods to Europe and North America. This led to growth of unemployment and poverty taxes, in addition to shrinkage of

21 Asia Development Bank’s Board of Governors international trade flows. Japan, which had a growing industrial base, was also affected, but it recovered in 1932, with the rise of Japanese nationalism (Filho 1982). With the advent of World War II (1939-1945), Western powers and the Soviet Union (the Allies) fought against Germany, Italy and Japan (the Axis). Japan aimed at taking down China and at occupying the Korean peninsula. After Axis’ defeat, the United States of America occupied Japan, China resumed and finished the Civil War, and the Korean peninsula was split in two: the northern part became a possession of the Soviet Union and southern of the United States. Both territories claimed to be the rightful government of the Korean peninsula. This antagonism led to the Korean War (1950), in which China successfully defended North Korea from South Korea’s attacks supported by the United States; after three years of intense attacks from both sides, more than one million deaths – including civilians and military – and little strategic gains, the armistice was signed in 1953, with the Northern allies claiming victory (Brites 2011). After the World War II, Soviet aid to China consisted of technical advice, economic assistance on a large scale and the introduction of Soviet methods, for example, in industrial management (Roberts 2012). However, due to tensions between the Soviet Union and China, both detached in the episode known as the Sino-Soviet Split, which started in the 1960s – in the context of the Cold War (1945-1991) – as a result of ideological differences and lack of support of the Soviet Union to China. Visentini (2013) states that such breakup happened when the Soviet Union supported India, with which China always had unsolved matters, leading China to ally with Albania, whose relations with the soviets were just broken (Visentini, et al. 2013). Furthermore, after almost one century under direct foreign influence, with the conclusion of the Chinese Revolution and the rise of Deng Xiaoping in 1976, China started its economic reforms, which would lead to economic openness and greater insertion in the international markets, becoming the second biggest economy in the world. This fact shows China’s will to develop better ways to integrate the region, not only in the search for markets to buy its products, but also to find sources for its growing internal economic demand. The reform and opening up of the Chinese economy since the 1990s have increased Northeast Asian economic ties, mainly between China, Japan and the Republic of Korea. In addition, China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 provided a new momentum to the Northeast Asian countries, boosting trade relations (Thorstensen 2012). It is clear that Northeast Asia has a history full of wars, invasions and occupations, which culminated in the great distrust atmosphere of resentments and unresolved matters that is established in the region. Beyond the aforementioned matters, maritime disputes and political rivalry, results of historic conflicts, are roadblocks that keep multilateral cooperation difficult. One of the ways in which

22 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations all countries of Northeast Asia managed to get together as a group focusing on integration is the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which includes not only countries of Northeast Asia, but the ones from Southeast Asia and the ones within the Pacific Ocean. However, the most important here is to discuss the recent trilateral and bilateral attempts of integration between the countries in Northeast Asia (Szczudlik-Tatar 2013). After the Asian crisis in the end of the 1990’s, the urgency to deepen economic, financial and trade cooperation in order to have stronger bonds among Asian countries became clear in China’s policies. Although, in the beginning, Japan and South Korea seemed reluctant to adhere to Chinese attempts of uniting the three countries, the governments of Tokyo and Seoul showed will towards the project of creating a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), in which both would obtain access to the Chinese market. As a result of these first moves, in 2012, China, Japan and South Korea signed a trilateral investment agreement and announced the decision to start negotiations on a FTA; talks on this FTA begun in 2013 (Szczudlik-Tatar 2013). Despite the fact that FTAs are of major importance to intensify interdependence in Asia, they are just one of the few tools being used to strength cooperation in the region and, still, is not enough. The reason why is the lack of institutionalization and the fear between the countries to cede sovereignty; this turns the attempts of cooperation superficial and leads them to lay emphasis on economic-oriented projects. Moreover, security cooperation and political integration are goals which will not be accomplished considering previous actions taken by the countries of Northeast Asia when in harsh situations: maintaining peace in the region along with institutionalized and regular dialogue may lead to decreasing of tensions and increasing of confidence, although it seems difficult to see this happening after the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands episode8 (Szczudlik-Tatar 2013). Alongside the trilateral agreements, bilateral cooperation is as important as the former: in Northeast Asia, bilateral trade rates find themselves in fast development and it rises economic dependence among Asian countries; it is not surprising that the highest rates of trade flows are between China, Japan and South Korea, but Russia and Mongolia also have intense interchange of products with all the members of the region. Four factors explain why bilateral exchange has such positive influence over the region: (1) there is strong internal complementarity in terms of resources – as so natural and human ones, but also funds and technology – which finds reinforcement in (2) the large differences in economic and political conditions and in (3) strong common market systems; finally, (4) infrastructure network conditions within the whole region plays vital role in fortifying this

8 In 2012, the Japanese government bought this archipelago from private Japanese owners; the Chinese government saw this act as violation of Chinese sovereignty, given the disputes between the countries over the islands’ ownership. 23 Asia Development Bank’s Board of Governors kind of trade. The issue of the question is located in the latter, when maritime infrastructure is taken in consideration (Li & Zhong, 2010). Concerning the existent lack of infrastructure on maritime connectivity, it is of main importance to keep and increase rates of investments in infrastructure in higher grounds and to work for the maintenance of multilateral cooperation, not only, but mainly, in economic and financial matters which focus on infrastructure; exploring other areas of cooperation, such as political ones, will serve as strengthening tools. Different levels of labor productivity, lack of trust – as a result of the already mentioned historical background of the region – and influence by the outside, mainly by the United States of America and the European Union, are the main problems which hinder the continuity of integration in Northeast Asia. The goal now is to pursue integration and cooperation in all possible ways by trying to find solutions to the above-mentioned issues (Li & Zhong, 2010).

2 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

This section will explain current issues involving maritime infrastructure of the Asia Pacific region, dividing it, as in the historical background, in a geographical approach: first the Southeast Asia region will be analyzed followed by the Northeast Asia region. Each subsection will introduce the political relations among countries of the region and the ones from outside that have some level of influence; after that, there will be an explanation of their economic links, mainly commercial and investments links, in order to clarify the ongoing infrastructure needs; and, finally, there will be a description of the maritime infrastructure that already exists and the main bottlenecks of each region’s maritime infrastructure. Before starting the subject, it is also important to stress that both regions have relevant intersections and relations that cannot be ignored, e.g. the Chinese interests in the South China Sea. In order to address these kinds of issues, sometimes one subsection will treat of subjects (or countries) that may not belong exclusively to the region at issue.

2.1 THE SOUTHEAST ASIA REGION

2.1.1 Political relations and the dynamic of the region

The Southeast Asia is mainly archipelagic, there are more than 31,000 island economies, scattered and isolated from the rest of the continent (The Asia Foundation 2010). The implementation of maritime connectivity projects is imperative for the development of the region and for its functioning as one of the most important paths for

24 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations the international trade. The consideration of the political issues of Southeast Asia consists of a very important part for the analysis of infrastructure projects. Territorial disputes, regional integration organizations and the influence of several countries which are not part of the region may raise risks for the success of such projects, or even facilitate their achievement. The South China Sea has been place for many disputes over territorial issues, mainly claims of sovereignty in small islands made by six states of the region. The two biggest problems relate to the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands. Both are strategic points for trade circulation and represent the importance of controlling the Sea Lines of Communication9 for the countries. Besides, all this area is very rich in natural resources, such as oil and natural gas, which brings another reason for dispute over the islands. The claims for the Paracel Islands are made by China and by Vietnam. They constitute a chokepoint for better relations between both countries. The claims for the Spratly islands are shared by China, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. These countries maintain military presence over their claimed islands, sometimes even building ports or airports to support its sovereignty (Poling 2013). China expects to increase its control over Taiwan by owing sovereignty over more islands in the area, which explains why the country tries to implement military exercises in the region (Dolven, Kan and Manyin 2013). Many of such claims are usually overlapping, increasing the potential for conflicts and making the region very unstable. This would definitely compromise the flows of trade and, thus, compromise the interest of several countries that depend on this region for their economy. Furthermore, these disputes also affect the regional integration process, since there is always a small conflict preventing it from getting deepened. All countries of ASEAN have been keen on implementing the Code of Conduct10, which would emphasize the will of the group of overcoming this problem (Council on Foreign Relations 2013). Good relations between the countries are of utmost importance for the development of the regional integration process and, consequently, for structural integration and connectivity. Moreover, the implementation of infrastructure projects could increase the utilization of natural resources and mitigate some of these conflicts. The implementation of a regional integration processes contributes to the connectivity of the region. It is important to bear in mind that, with the conclusion of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), countries have had a space to discuss the best ways for development of the region and to implement the measures deemed necessary. ASEAN was established in 1967 and, since then, it has been promoting several plans for its economic growth. As stated in the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (ASEAN 2010):

9 Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC’s) is a term to describe the main maritime routes for trade, logistics and naval forces (Peele 1997). 10 The ASEAN Code of Conduct (COC) is a document comprising guidelines for the relations between the nations in the South China Sea. The COC is an attempt to stop actions that could destabilize the situation in the region (Thayer 2012). 25 Asia Development Bank’s Board of Governors

The vision of ASEAN Leaders to build an ASEAN Community by 2015 calls for a well-connected ASEAN that will contribute towards a more competitive and resilient ASEAN, as it will bring peoples, goods, services and capital closer together. An enhanced ASEAN Connectivity is essential to achieve the ASEAN Community […] (ASEAN 2010, 6).

Once the objectives of the association show the will to achieve connectivity, it becomes easier to put it in practice. This Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity is an important step to deploy the projects for the creation of a more effective infrastructure, mainly in the maritime connectivity area, which is vital for the countries’ economies. Without ASEAN, the cooperation in these areas would be very difficult, since its creation gave birth to the so called “ASEAN way”. This concept expresses the notion of cooperation through dialogue and flexibility, besides forming an identity for the group. The ASEAN way has an ethical content that contributes to the cooperation in the area and to better relations among ASEAN countries (Reis 2012). Moreover, ASEAN provides a lot of intelligence and qualified studies that contribute to the monitoring of the integration. The key strategies created by the specialists of ASEAN are essential for the effectiveness of these projects (ASEAN 2010). It is vital to consider the influence of other countries in the region. Since it is one of the central lines for trade flows and it is rich in natural resources, there are various interests involved in the area that have been playing key roles in the political relations. Countries like India, China, Japan and US have improved their relations with the Southeast Asian countries in order to consolidate their influence in the area. India has been trying to counterbalance China’s influence in the region by promoting several investments and military assistance to the ASEAN countries, especially to Singapore and to Vietnam. The Strait of Malacca is central for the passage of any trade between India and the Pacific Ocean, besides being crucial for its national security, since it is near Indian Special Economic Zones (Khurana 2009). China, on the other hand, is focusing on the infrastructure investments and on economic partnerships. The country has several agreements with members of ASEAN and also with ASEAN itself, including the China-ASEAN Connectivity Cooperation Committee, which will embrace all measures for connectivity with China in the region. China’s main destiny for investments is Myanmar, because the country represents an alternative path for Chinese trade and resources, once China is seeking for diversification in its trade and energy supply routes (Khurana 2005). The country still relies heavily on the Malacca Strait, since approximately 60 percent of the vessels passing through the strait per year are heading to China (Zhang 2008). The United States of America have been worrying about Southeast Asia for its importance for the international trade. The Straits located in the region, such as Malacca, Lombok and Sunda, are special chokepoints in the system of sea lines of communication and any event occurred there can compromise international trade. 26 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

US claim that “all trading nations have a vested interest in preserving stability on the Southeast Asian SLOCs” (Noer 1996, 3), which confers it a right to be active and present in the region. The country has been trying to heighten its presence in Southeast Asia after the 9/11 events, transforming the region into a “second front” for the war on terror. Events such as the bombing in Bali, Indonesia, on October 2002 that left 200 killed also encourage the presence of US in the region (Vaughn et al 2009). Through regional maritime security initiatives, US has improved its relations with ASEAN countries, though Indonesia and Malaysia still present restraints concerning sovereignty in the requests from US (Morada 2006). Japan is one of the most present nations from outside the area. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) is very active in Southeast Asia, being the investor of many of the most important projects of infrastructure. The interests of Japan are basically because of the energy provision from the area, which is vital for its economy. Japan looks for economic relations and investment with ASEAN countries through JICA’s Regional Cooperation in ASEAN, providing port development and new strategies for maritime connectivity (Khurana 2005). The image below shows the various ports funded with JICA’s investments in the region.

Image 2 - JICA’s Cooperation on Port Development in Southeast Asia

Source: Japan International Cooperation Agency 2012.

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2.1.2 Economic Relations

Economic relations inside ASEAN have improved significantly after the creation of the association. Understanding this dynamics is essential to implement projects that may improve relations where they are not very strong and to achieve better logistics. In 1997, ASEAN countries agreed on a Common Effective Preferential Tariff that gave preference for products originated in ASEAN to increase its competitiveness in the world market. With the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), in 2007, and the goals of AEC 2015, the path for economic integration became more concrete. The countries sought to eliminate tariffs and non-tariff barriers and to facilitate investments from ASEAN to ASEAN. The AEC can be summed up by its motto “One Vision, One Identity, One Community” (Price Waterhouse Coopers 2012). ASEAN has hitherto established several Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with other countries, which represents the association’s will to become more competitive in the global trade flows. Such FTAs were made with China, Japan, Korea, India, Australia, New Zealand and Russia. FTAs were also made with other regional economic groups, like Mercosur and the European Union. There is also the Trans- Pacific Partnership Agreement11, which now includes only Singapore and Brunei Darussalam from the ASEAN region, but it is still in negotiation (Price Waterhouse Coopers 2012). This partnership is gaining security aspects as the negotiation of US’s entrance goes further, and may represent another source of North American influence in the region. Close to 20% of ASEAN trade comes from intra-ASEAN exchanges. Brunei has a big production on mineral fuels and oil, since it has access to important sources of petroleum offshore. The country’s main exports for ASEAN countries are precisely from oil production. Interestingly, the country’s main imports from ASEAN are also from oil extraction and mineral fuels, besides machinery and articles of iron and steel – especially for the industries located there. Vietnam also imports oil and electrical equipment from ASEAN, but its main exports are of oil too. Here, it is important to bear in mind that these countries have access to oil reserves, but do not have the technology to refine it. This is a very important fact on the region, which explains why they export and import oil and mineral fuels. Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand main exports and imports are on oil production. But in this case, these countries have the capacity to refine it, indicating more development in industry and technology (International Trade Center 2014). Cambodia and Lao PDR do not have such abundant oil resources, and,

11 TPPA or Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement is a trade agreement between 11 countries namely Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei Darussalam, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, America, Peru, Mexico, Chile (Kong 2014). 28 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations therefore, need to import it from the rest of the world. Mineral fuels and oil rank as their main imports, along with vehicles. Both countries export simpler goods, such as rubber and copper articles for ASEAN countries. The Philippines, on the other hand, show superiority in industrialization, importing and exporting mainly electrical equipment. Myanmar exports are highly topped by oil production, in a much higher level than other countries. But its imports are also mainly of mineral fuels, only one third of what they export, showing how the country has difficulty in supplying itself (International Trade Center 2014). Concerning relations among ASEAN countries, it is clear that Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore have the best trade within the block. These three countries have very close relations, appearing as their biggest exporters and importers. Indonesia also has good relations with Singapore and Malaysia, but ranks only as the biggest importer from Lao PDR. Brunei main relations are with Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam, which has also good relations with Cambodia (International Trade Center 2014). Lao PDR does not have close trade ties with Vietnam and Cambodia, although they have been trying to improve connectivity inside the Indochina Peninsula. It seems that all trade relations inside ASEAN are very dynamic and that all countries cultivate commercial ties with each other. Some of them, such as Myanmar and Lao PDR, do not have close ties with neighbors, because these countries do not have a much opened economy and are still trying to develop their commercial ties. Philippines is not a big exporter or importer for any of the countries of ASEAN, since the country has better trade relations with extra regional countries, such as Japan and United States (International Trade Center 2014). It is also important to notice that archipelagic countries have more trade relations with other archipelagic countries, so that it is important to improve maritime connectivity in order to increase this trade’s effectiveness.

2.3 THE SITUATION OF THE MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE

The Southeast Asia is an archipelagic region, consisting of thousands of islands poorly connected that have strategic value for many countries outside the region. ASEAN also deals with problems of heterogeneity, presenting different levels of development, infrastructure and connectivity. Many areas of Southeast Asia have insignificant road or railway infrastructure, giving maritime connectivity huge importance for the development of these regions. As stated in a report on maritime connectivity of the ADB:

Improved connectivity, especially through transport links, is an essential

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condition for economic growth. Transport links not only provide physical access to resources, but also enable producers to take advantage of opportunities in domestic and foreign markets, leading to economies of scale and specialization. (Trace, Frielink and Hew 2009, 7)

Therefore, improving physical maritime connectivity in ASEAN is essential for countries to achieve greater competitiveness, to consolidate ASEAN integration and ASEAN Community. It would also reinforce ASEAN as a central point in East Asia, for trade and for economic integration (ASEAN 2010). Moreover, as seen above, ASEAN countries have been improving their commercial and investment relations among themselves and with other partners from Asia and the Pacific, which demands more maritime connectivity, since the greatest part of the trade is made through the sea. This shows how important it is to maintain the effectiveness of shipping services and the appropriate conditions of ports in the region (Trace, Frielink and Hew 2009). According to the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (ASEAN 2010), ASEAN has selected 47 ports as the main destiny for port development investment. Each one of these ports has different conditions, and one of the objectives of the plan is to create equality among them. Singapore and Malaysia are the countries with the best port infrastructure of the region, but, even so, they need investments in order to achieve greater capacity, as they are big hubs. Ports in Bintulu and Sandakan, in Malaysia, aspire to become regional hubs as well, urging for higher flows of investment in the region. It is important to provide less developed countries with access to these hubs by improving their connection and integration with the economic centers of the region. While Malaysia and Thailand have improved their port infrastructure in the latest years, the rest of the region has remained stable and in need of support and development (Shepherd and Wilson 2008). If a port infrastructure is inefficient or inadequate for the port’s demand, the costs would be higher for the shipping lines, increasing charges and compromising the flows of trade and provoking obstacles for the free trade in the area. The ports of Singapore, Port Klang (Malaysia) and Port of Tanjung Telepas (Malaysia) are the ones with the best conditions for trade, being references worldwide. On the other hand, Bangkok (Thailand), Laem Chebang (Thailand), Jakarta (Indonesia) and Manila (Philippines) have poor management and lack of investment on the right sectors (Trace, Frielink and Hew 2009). One of the main issues of the region is the depth of the ports and straits. The straits of Malacca and Sunda are the ones with the biggest flows of trade in the region, but they are not that safe. Their depth can prevent bigger ships from passing or causing vessels to run aground, besides the presence of an active volcano (Krakatoa) in the Sunda Strait, which provides a natural risk for any trade flow (Noer and Gregory 1996). The Straits of Lombok and Makassar would be preferable alternatives for ships, since they

30 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations are the only ones without draft limitations. The problem is that Singapore still depends on the Malacca Strait for its incomes and any diversion of trade from it would harm its interests. Indonesia has problems with the depth of its ports, preventing bigger ships from passing, and it still suffers from poor management and infrastructure, lacking land connectivity for trade (Trace, Frielink and Hew 2009).

Image 3 - Straits of Lombok and Makassar

Source: Indo-Pacific Images 201212

Another chokepoint is the fact that private investments usually go for the most developed ports, focusing on the higher flows of trade. The minor ports have been left aside and with poor conditions to actually be an alternative for ships to address. This reflects the need, posed by the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity, to create more equal conditions of trade and connectivity, improving the ports on the less developed areas and generating their economic growth and development. Considering that ship-owners would only use the ports where there is a cargo base with sufficient size for their containers and products, it is important for countries to focus on the construction of bigger cargo bases in their ports, to attract more ships. Another point for improving maritime connectivity is to invest on projects of connection between ports and inland transport, as roads, railways and even waterways (Trace, Frielink and Hew 2009).

12 Available at: http://www.indopacificimages.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Throughflow_ annotated_750.jpg. (accessed 26 sept 2014). 31 Asia Development Bank’s Board of Governors

An interesting aspect of the trade in Southeast Asia is that, because of the huge amount of islands, the usual strategy of “load-on, load-off”13 becomes too expensive and, thus, not worthwhile. The Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity chose to experiment a new special strategy for the region, created in the Philippines, which is the “roll-on, roll-off” (RO-RO) strategy. This strategy has been showing great results and may highly increase trade flows between ASEAN countries. With the RO-RO, there is a connection between the land and sea transport, because trucks go inside the vessels, mitigating the costs for the unloading and preventing time- losses. The plan anticipates investments in RO-RO vessels for the region, in order to improve this form of cargo transportation that seems much more efficient for the local geography (The Asia Foundation 2010). Improving maritime connectivity does not depend solely on ports or strategies for trade; creating maritime economic corridors, pre-determined routes that should path the way for infrastructure development, can increase the relations among neighbors and improve the flows of trade.

The development of maritime economic corridors (MECs) can address the issue of poor connectivity on “thin” regional routes. The corridor development concept hinges on an evolution from transport corridors, to trade corridors, to corridors where many dimensions of economic development are taken into account. In a maritime setting, such corridors can integrate highly scattered island economies with multiple economic, social and even environmental benefits. In archipelagic nations such as Indonesia and the Philippines, MECs can be domestic but most likely will have a bigger impact when crossing borders. (Trace, Frielink and Hew 2009, 15)

The JICA has a project for a Maritime Economic Corridor in Southeast Asia, comprising Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines. This corridor would support the desire of Indonesia of creating an economic development corridor in the region. This initiative is part of the partnership between ASEAN and Japan for connectivity in Southeast Asia, for which Japan is contributing with ideas of connectivity infrastructure projects (JICA 2012). The following image shows the Maritime ASEAN Economic Corridor.

13 In this system, goods are delivered by trucks to the point of origin, unloaded, then loaded onto ships, carried to the next port, unloaded once more, then loaded onto other trucks for the next leg of their journey. Each step, which may be repeated many times in an inter-island distribution chain, imposes another layer of costs and bureaucracy (The Asia Foundation 2010). 32 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

Image 4 – The Maritime ASEAN Economic Corridor

Source: JICA 2012

Other projects can also improve maritime connectivity and diminish the dependency on the abovementioned straits as the main paths for trade flows in the region. China has a long-term concern on securing its supply of energy through the Southeast Asia region; hence, it is trying to create alternative routes for trade. China is now investing in the Sittwe Port in Myanmar, in order to supply support for the pipeline that would connect the port to Kunming, in the Yunnan Province. This pipeline would provide the energy and the physical integration needed for China, and reduce the Malacca voyage in 750 miles (Zhang 2008). China has also studied the possibility of building a canal in the Kra Isthmus that would be like a Chinese version of the Panama Canal. This construction would take place in the south of Thailand and may change completely the dynamics of energy flows in the region, creating a new passage for countries to use and diminishing their dependency on the Malacca Strait (Zhang 2008). Although it seems very good for the ASEAN countries, Singapore hugely depends on the flows of the Strait of Malacca, defending its utilization despite its risks. If some of its flows were to be diverged from it, the country would face several losses. Another important proposal from China is the project of the New Maritime Silk Road. The name comes from the trade flows of Chinese silk and other commodities that used to exist in ancient times. The Chinese President has announced in 2013 the will to join efforts with the countries from Southeast Asia in order to enhance maritime connectivity. This project can bring opportunities for cooperation and 33 Asia Development Bank’s Board of Governors also challenges, considering the several territorial disputes in the area. Furthermore, it should raise economic development and diplomatic ties in the region. This idea is supported by many of ASEAN members and is part of the new foreign policy of Xi Jinping (Jiao 2013). With all this stated, it is clear that the Southeast Asia region is in need of investments in maritime connectivity infrastructure. It is important to establish projects that can address different areas of the region, as much as different sectors of infrastructure. New strategies for trade, construction of ports and canals are all valuable and different ways of improving the connectivity in the area. The best way to achieve development goals of the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity and to reach a seamless Southeast Asia is through integration. In terms of investment, the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity identifies public-private partnerships (PPPs) as a way to coordinate government and private sector actions in order to fill the gaps on infrastructure and infrastructure services. Furthermore, a study from ADB shows that international institutions, such as the ADB itself and the World Bank, should provide the necessary financial and technical assistance for the implementation of regional integration projects, especially in the maritime connectivity area. This study also supports the idea of an Asian Forum for Infrastructure, where countries could discuss projects for subregional integration in a regional scope. Along with this forum, the study proposes an Asian Infrastructure Fund, created with the domestic savings of the region to finance the projects of infrastructure. One important fact is that the projects should be organized by priority levels, encouraging countries to improve their planning on national projects as well (Asian Development Bank 2009). The same study places connectivity infrastructure projects, such as building roads, railways, bridges, canals, ports and pipelines, as the main priorities of policymakers to connect and improve integration in Southeast Asia. According to ADB (2009, 10), “from 2010 to 2020, Asia will need to invest around U$8 trillion in overall national infrastructure and, in addition, about U$290 billion in specific regional infrastructure projects”. This would create an average of U$750 billion per year. With the latest economic crisis, countries are still trying to recover from the losses that caused infrastructure projects to be the first to be cut off from the government costs. It created a very large infrastructure deficit in the South East countries, such as Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. The multilateral financing institutions should, thus, support the development of these economies through the rough periods and promote more investments in the region (Asian Development Bank 2009).

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2.2 THE NORTHEAST ASIA REGION

The Northeast Asia Region is composed by Northeastern China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Russia Far East and Mongolia (Kawai 2013). The latter will not be fully treated here, once it is landlocked.

2.1.1 Political relations and the dynamic of the region

The Northeast Asia is a region of great economic and political importance for the world, and it is far from stable. Its relatively recent history, which remains in the hearts and minds of the people of the region, embraces Japan’s invasion of China, Japanese control of Korea and the Korean War. The Korean War divided the peninsula and had China fighting for North Korea and Japan, for South Korea. All of this led to an environment of distrust and unresolved problems (Cook 2014). The recent rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has created concerns of all kinds in the region. On one hand, Asian countries have become more dependent on China’s trade. On the other, its growing military capabilities raise questions about how and against whom it can use it. PRC’s recurrent disagreements with United States – despite their huge trade and investment relations – alarms US allies in Asia, especially the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan, geographically near China and deeply economically involved with this country (Cook 2014). In the level of bilateral relations, China and South Korea established diplomatic ties only in 1992, and, since then, relations have largely improved, exemplified by the increasing number of leaders’ visits. The current administration of Park Geun-hye in ROK has a more cooperative and trust-based approach to China. Both countries have shared goals of economic development and policies for North Korea, while signing agreements in many areas, including high-tech industry and energy (Snyder and Byun 2013). It is clear that better relations with China are in consonance with a more amicable approach to North Korea. Park has approached its northern neighbor with a trust-building policy, whereas she has demonstrated her will to collaborate with China in this issue, recognizing its potential role in exercising “leverage over Pyongyang’s aggressive policies” (Snyder and Byun 2013, 1). Chinese President Xi Jinping and Park share important positions on the Korean Peninsula, as the goal of denuclearization, an important step towards peace and stability. In addition, they have reached agreements on their sovereignty problems in the Yellow Sea, though not eliminating them (Snyder and Byun 2013). Finally, these positive relations between China and South Korea are a relevant constraint for

35 Asia Development Bank’s Board of Governors the relations of the latter with Japan and US (Cook 2014)14. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) remains under UN Security Council sanctions and isolated from the international community, hampering better relations with countries in the region15. China has been North Korea’s greater political and economic ally, and their cooperation exists since the Korean War. Nowadays, China strives to reallocate North Korea in the international community. In this pursuit, it defends the need of stability, dialogue and denuclearization in the Peninsula. Despite recently demonstrating some disapproval on North Korea’s dismiss of the denuclearization – as showed by its latest nuclear tests – and economic reform demands, PRC prioritizes stability over denuclearization, and that may continue to guide its relations with DPRK. On the other hand, North Korea recent provocative acts have approximated the Japan-ROK-U.S. axes in terms of North Korean issues, prioritizing denuclearization pressure (Snyder and Byun 2013; Nanto and Manyin 2010). Japan-South Korea relationship has gotten worse over the last decade, while they intensified their disputes. While ROK’s President Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) highlighted territorial disputes with Japan, President Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013) tried to improve their relationship. The current President Park Geun-hye, however, has resumed the trend of negative trajectory (Cook 2014). Notably, analyzing these three presidents, the periods when ROK advanced in cooperation with China coincided with those when the relations with Japan worsened. This fact is important when considering the possibility of a trilateral cooperation. Contrary to the above bilateral relationship, the China-Japan one has not changed due to alterations in leaderships; it is much more influenced by domestic factors, their problematic history and their opposite trajectories. Then, their relations have been marked by instability. In this case, territorial disputes are central to diplomatic relations, even leading to concerns of a possible conflict. Public opinion of both countries has shown opposition against each other (Cook 2014). Moreover, in Japan’s 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines, the Chinese rise is identified

as the greatest threat to Japanese security and position in Asia and the consequent need for Japan to respond firmly to this challenge unilaterally, through the US-Japan alliance and through fostering closer security ties with like-minded regional countries (Cook 2014, 9).

14 In this sense, it is important to mention that “South Korea’s hesitancy in fully committing to support the United States’ regional ballistic missile defense system opposed by China and backed by Japan (and Australia) is one sign of this constraint” (Cook 2014, 3). 15 Accordingly, it is important to stress that the US pressures on East Asian multinationals not to do businesses with North Korea are a powerful constraint to the integration of this country properly in the international community and, particularly, in the East Asia as a whole (Petrov 2012). 36 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

Besides all that, Japan is the leading US’s ally in Asia and China has tried to limit US role in the region. Despite bilateral divergences, there is a trilateral cooperation among Japan, China and ROK that dates back to 1999, in a meeting on the sidelines of “ASEAN plus Three Summit”. Since 2008, the three countries started to meet every year in a separate summit. The main areas of cooperation, involves economy and trade, culture, finance, science and technology and logistics, among others. Furthermore, they have already supported eighteen ministerial meetings in some areas, like foreign policy and economy and trade (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China 2012). Therefore, although it is known that their history and relations are marked by a myriad of quarrels and distrust, these achievements show a stronger cooperation is, at least, pursued. Better relations among these three countries – and, more difficult but also necessary, North Korea – can contribute to enhance region stability. Russian relations with the region also involve territorial disputes with historical implications, but nowadays it is guided mainly by economic issues. Its potential to export gas for Northeast Asian countries is the main axis of Russian insertion in the area. Russia and China have been trying for a long time to achieve an agreement on this issue, but negotiations have always been stalled. At the moment, with Russian annexation of Crimea and the western claims about it, Russia has more reasons to turn east. This fact came to foster Russian long-standing goal of diversifying its energy markets from slow-growing Europe (Johnson 2014).

The crisis in Ukraine, which has stoked fears in Europe that Moscow will again use its energy weapon to bludgeon recalcitrant neighbors, is only accelerating Europe’s urge to find alternatives to Russian gas - and accelerating Russia’s desire to find new buyers. Many of them could come from Asia (Johnson 2014, 1).

Then, China, Republic of Korea and Japan could solve its energy supply issue, now heavily dependent in coal (China) and expensive Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) sources (Japan and ROK). Japan, in particular, has had its first trade deficit in 30 years, due to expensive LNG imports. This energy situation explains why Asian countries’ reaction to the Ukraine crisis has been much softer than western ones. Even Japan and South Korea, US allies, have hesitated to condemn Russia (Johnson 2014). Finally, the last aspect to be covered is the maritime sovereignty disputes in Northeast Asia. This rivalry is mainly justified by overlapping sovereignty rights - in conformity with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea16 -, the transformation of territorial disputes in matters of national pride and, due to the region’s countries

16 This UN Convention stipulates 12 nautical miles of territorial water, 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) – regarding natural resources and certain economic activities - and 350 nautical miles of continental shelf. 37 Asia Development Bank’s Board of Governors economic growth, the intensification of the pursuit of national maritime interests. Besides the Russia-Japanese dispute over the Northern Territories/Kuril islands, the disputes are situated in the South China Sea (treated in the Southeast Asia section), the East China Sea, the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea (Lee 2013). In the East China Sea, most relevant disputes take place between Japan and China over 1) Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, also claimed by Taiwan; and 2) continental shelves extension over shared waters, which involves oil and gas fields. In the Sea of Japan, the dispute involves the Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo/Takeshima). In the Yellow Sea, the disputes are a minor disagreement between China and South Korea: both claim for Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) rights. The main problem of this dispute is the Chinese fisherman illegal activities in the South Korean EEZ, once Chinese waters suffer from overfishing. Also in the Yellow Sea, there is the Ieodo/ Suyan reef dispute between China and ROK (Lee 2013; Roehrig 2012; Dolven, Shirley and Mark 2013). In addition, US interests are also involved in the disputes, once it considers “presence in the ‘East Asian littoral’ vital to its primacy and global strategic influence” and believes that involving itself in the region is a response to “China’s growing maritime assertiveness” (Baviera 2010, 1). Chinese maritime interests are growing fast, as well as its efforts to become a maritime power. Regional countries’ willingness to develop better relations can be hampered if these maritime disputes are not appropriately solved (Mingjiang 2012).

2.1.2 Economic Relations

The analysis of economic links among countries shows which ones have the closest relationships, how this has evolved and what might be the future prospects of the countries’ economic cooperation and, perhaps, regional integration. Most of all, the assessment of the economic links gives us powerful tools to judge the bottlenecks of maritime infrastructure connectivity. First of all, these countries are very different from each other. While China is a big country, with the biggest world’s population and astounding growth rates (despite the little recent slowdown), Russia is also a big emerging country, with lots of resources but with less impressive growth rates. The others are much less populated and also have divergences: South Korea is a growing developed country, Japan is an almost stagnated developed country and North Korea is practically isolated from the international community (Kawai 2013). In terms of trade, Northeast Asia has had an increased integration in last decades. Intra-Northeast Asian trade accounted for 22.8% of the total region’s trade in 2011, from 15.2% in 1992. China is the only country that has its dependence on the region reduced. Besides that, Russian Far East dependence stands out (Kawai 2013):

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Table 1 - Trade Dependence of Individual Countries on Northeast Asia (%) Country 1992 2000 2010 2011 PRC 22.2 26,7 19.0 18.6 Japan 10.9 16.6 28.5 28.7 DPRK 54.1 34.0 57.4 75.4 Republic of Korea 23.5 26.0 33.3 32.2 Mongolia 78.2 67.6 82.0 81.7 Russian Federation 12.5 8.1 17.0 15.4 Russian far East -- 53.8 65.0 75.0 DPRK = Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, PRC = People’s Republic of China Source: FMI apud Kaway (2013) The PRC is the main exporter to Japan since 2002, exporting mainly coal, coke and oil (not crude) -, followed by the United States. ROK, in its turn, was the third major exporter to Japan in 2002, but, in 2013, it ranked as the 7th biggest supplier, notably losing room to fuels (as natural gas, oil and coal) exporters, like Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Australia. In 2013, the United States was the main destiny of Japan’s exports, but China followed it closely – as it had been the major destiny from 2009 to 2012. ROK has been the third major destiny for more than ten years (International Trade Center 2014). China’s main supplier in 2013 was the Republic of Korea, followed by Japan. It imports from ROK and Japan mostly electronic equipment (e.g. electric integrated circuits), optical products and machinery. In terms of exports, ROK and Japan were, in 2013, the 5th and the 6th main destinies, respectively17. China’s foremost exports to Japan and ROK are of manufactured products, as electronic equipment and machinery, but remarkably they are goods of other parts of the production chain, when compared to Chinese imports. North Korea was the 12th destiny in 2013, and imported mainly oil, machinery and electronic equipment (International Trade Center 2014). South Korean imports come, firstly, from fuel exporters, as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and, in the 7th position as exporter, Russia. Japan and China were only the 12th and the 21st exporters in 2013, respectively. Chinese position is now much lower than in previous years. On the other hand, China was the main destiny of ROK’s exports in 2013, while Japan was the third (International Trade Center 2014). Therefore, China, ROK and Japan have a great share in each other’s trade,

17 Chinese trade was considered counting Hong Kong off. 39 Asia Development Bank’s Board of Governors notably because of its investment ties, with the reallocation of ROK’s and Japan’s corporations’ production bases to China18. Trade among them “has increased by more than four times from US$130 billion in 1999 to US$ 690 billion in 2011” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China 2012, 1), and has summed up 91.7% of total intra-region trade in 2011. Russia and North Korea, by their turn, have relatively little participation in the region’s commerce (International Trade Center 2014; Kawai 2013). Besides these bilateral relations, one important aspect of the commercial links is the dependence on fuels. “While China, Japan and South Korea were the world’s second, third and eleventh largest oil consumers, they are 50, 99 and 97% dependent on oil imports respectively” (Australian Strategic Policy Institute 2013, 10). Russia is abundant on oil and natural gas; however, 80% of its energy resources go to Europe (Australian Strategic Policy Institute 2013).Although these three countries trade relations with Russia have not been very significant yet, the potential for a higher level of economic integration is huge. Finally, Northeast Asia institutionalized integration has been intensifying slowly compared to other regional projects, as the European Union or the MERCOSUR. Particularly, there is one initiative that stands out: The China-Korea- Japan Free Trade Area, known as CKJ. The potential of integration is great, given the relevant and evolving economies embraced in this region19 (Cheong 2003) and the already established trade and investment ties. As for economic implications, the CKJ is likely to enlarge markets and investment opportunities, fostering economic growth. Besides that, certainly it would have security and political consequences: as history has shown, economic agreements can contribute to reduce security tensions and to create an environment of peace and trust, what would be helpful to the stability of Northeast Asia20 (Cheong 2003; Petrov 2012). Nevertheless, Petrov (2012) is more pessimistic regarding CKJ, believing that “political mistrust and economic protectionism” prevail in these countries’ sense of regionalism. The possibility of integration is severely harmed by “[t]he legacies of colonialism, international wars and civil conflicts […], thwarting any attempts to

18 Japan and ROK have increased significantly its Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on China. In 2011, “direct investment from Japan and the ROK to China had amounted US$ 80 billion and US$ 50 billion respectively” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China 2012, 1). Chinese FDI to Japan and ROK is much smaller, comparatively (The Heritage Foundation and American Enterprise Institution 2014). 19 These three major Asian powers represent 75% and 22% of the East Asian and world populations, 90% and 20% of East Asian and the world economies and 70% and 20% of East Asian the world trade, respectively. Their population is around 1.5 billion people and its aggregate GDP is around US$15 trillion (Petrov 2012); (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China 2012). 20 The possibility of the CKJ certainly brings implications to the infrastructure needs in the region: a FTA imply the need of an adequate net of maritime infrastructure connectivity. 40 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations rebuild trust and achieve multilateral cooperation”. Although the countries’ leaders have recognized economic benefits of a FTA, they have advanced little in resolving mutual problems. On top of that, to develop the entire region, an agreement would have to include North Korea, allowing its products to reach new markets, in order to boost its “flagging economy”, and consumer goods to enter in North Korea, alleviating its supply problems (Petrov 2012, 1). The inclusion of DPRK is crucial to avoid instability trends in the region; an peace building path must involve dealing with the economic issues.

2.3 THE SITUATION OF THE MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE

The Asia Pacific region, particularly Northeast Asia, is a region whose increasing trade is notable and prominent. Given the its geography, maritime trade is unavoidable. Besides, most of the world trade is being carried by sea (Ng 2012). Intergovernmental cooperation is needed in the intent of improving maritime connectivity. As Kaway (2013) affirms:

governments tend to be reluctant to finance cross-border infrastructure projects using their own resources. The reason is that these projects are often viewed as unduly benefiting the neighboring countries when the latter do not adequately invest in the shared projects. The consequence is that governments tend to under-invest in cross-border infrastructure and, as a result, limit cross-border connectivity (Kawai 2013, 3).

Northeast Asian countries share a great economic complementarity among each other: “The Russian Far East and Mongolia are resource-rich economies, while Japan and the Republic of Korea are strong in high-tech manufacturing industries. The PRC has abundant labor and provides a large, expanding market” (Kawai 2013, 7). However, compared to other Asian regions, they have done little to cooperate. Better integration would have to occur and, especially, better maritime connectivity is necessary. Alongside trade, the countries’ ports were also transformed. Asian ports are “early adopters of containerization and private participation in port operations. These factors collectively enabled the region to master container handling and become home to some of the world largest global terminal operators” (UNCTAD Secretariat 2011, 97). China’s rising demand and manufactures exports, mainly in the last decade, have expanded the need to invest in port infrastructure. The Chinese 11th Five-Year Development Plan focused on maritime infrastructure development (Ng 2012). The great amount of investment led to oversupply of port facilities. Hence, a competition

41 Asia Development Bank’s Board of Governors dynamic started and has intensified as enterprises reallocated to more inland locations in China, like Sichuan, Hunan and Chongquing, and ports near these regions started to gain importance and to grow. Then, established hub ports, like Hong Kong (China), Busan (Korea) and Kaohsiung (Taiwan), started to compete with formerly peripheral Chinese ports (Ducruet, Lee and Ng 2010; Ng 2012). China, whose trade is 90% made by sea, has more than 500 ports in activity. In addition, it has the world’s busiest port – in terms of TEU’s (Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit) (Khalid 2006)21 -, once Shangai surpassed Singapore in 2010. Moreover, in the list of the 50 busiest container ports of the world, China appears with 12 ports, while 7 of them are among the top ten. Therefore, constant investment is needed to meet this demand. South Korea, by its turn, has a total of 28 international ports and 22 coastal ports, but has only one port in this same list, the Port of Busan, which ranks in the 5th position. Busan is part of South Korea strategy to become the logistical hub of Northeast Asia, which involves investing in another port (Gwangyang) to avoid congestion in Busan. Japan has a network of near 1.100 ports (given its own geography), being 21 specific trade ports. Moreover, Japan has 3 ports among the 50 busiest of the world. North Korea has increased its ports capabilities in the last decades, but its potential is still underused due to international isolation. Finally, Russia has 22 large ports and 100 small ports. Russia Far East suffers from poor railroads and roads, which is why its waterways are essential in this area (World Shipping Council 2014; Ng 2012; The Korea Transport Institute 2005). Besides considering the TEU of ports, other way to analyze their importance is evaluating its role in a region’s transport network, that is, its centrality and intermediacy in shipping liner routes. If we adopt this view, “the growth of traffic at Chinese ports does not necessarily imply that they have gained equivalent position within the structure of shipping networks.”22 (Ducruet, Lee and Ng 2010, 4). Ports that have the majority of its throughput channeled by few connections are much more vulnerable and dependent, while “[s]trong ports are those that diversify the distribution of their traffic”, as Busan and Shangai23 (Ducruet, Lee and Ng 2010, 9). In terms of volume of container traffic, Chinese ports have increased their participation on Northeast Asia, South Korea has maintained its position, and Taiwan, Hong Kong and Japan have their shares. However, the Northeast Asia

21 TEU can be defined as the “[s]tandard unit for counting containers of various capacities and for describing the capacities of container ships or terminals. One 20 Foot ISO container equals 1 TEU” (OECD 2002). 22 However, some ports may have big throughputs and be connected with few lines of trade, while others may be much more connected but have as main function the channeling of small volumes, for example (Ducruet, Lee and Ng 2010). 23 From 1996 to 2006, Shangai has amplified its connections from 20 to 36, reducing significantly its vulnerability and dependence (Ducruet, Lee and Ng 2010). 42 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations network remains concentrated in Hong Kong and in Busan, while only Shangai has achieved a central position. For Japan, there is a slow port growth and a limited centrality, because ports have a trade function rather than a transit function i.e. being a logistical hub, as South Korean ports (Ducruet, Lee and Ng 2010). Although plenty of investment was directed to port infrastructure and even a dynamic of competition emerged, the question remains open on whether all this investment and the prospects of future investments are enough to the region’s growing trade and utilization of port facilities. A study made by the Ocean Shipping Consultants (OSC) concluded - based on known port investment plans and forecasted container port demand - that the latter will increase more than the capacity of Northeast Asia ports. Therefore, their perception is that the situation will not be sustainable without additional port investments. The prospects are that the demand will represent from 104 to 108% of the total port capacity in 2020 (Ocean Shipping Consultants 2013). Another relevant aspect of the maritime connectivity in Northeast Asia is the ferry lines connecting the countries’ ports. International ferry transportation is more intense in the Bohai Sea, the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea than in the Japan Sea. Domestic ferries in Japan, China, Russia and the ROK have as their main purpose the movement of vehicles (including railroad wagons). The Northeast Asian international ferries, however, basically transport only cargo and passengers. The only exception is the Shimonoseki-Busan ferry, connecting Japan and the Republic of Korea, which can deal with the movement of automobiles and trucks. However, Japanese vehicles can only enter into ROK under strict conditions, and vice versa (Mitsuhashi, et al. 2005).

Image 5 - Northeast Asia International Ferry Network (2002)

Source: Erina apud Mitsuhashi et al (2005), adapted by the authors.

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In terms of sea transport corridors, the northern and the southern sides of the Tsushima Strait are very different. The southern side has an intense international transportation and needs constant investment in both soft and hard or physical infrastructure, once trade tends to increase (Mitsuhashi, et al. 2005). The former is defined as “a sound and predictable legal system, advanced research and development, and the provision of a comprehensive suite of maritime services including baking, insurance and maritime financing”. And the latter as “well-developed port systems, both domestic and offshore, an efficient, quality international shipping fleet, and modern shipbuilding and ship repair facilities, bunkering and logistics support” (Mak 2006, 138). On the other hand, the northern side of the Tsushima Strait has few shipping lines. This region is a gateway to the Russian Far East, to DPRK and to Northeast China, that is, a great market yet to be fully explored. To develop shipping routes in the northern side of Tsushima Strait, some changes must occur, as 1) the improvement of inland connection between Northeastern China and the Sea of Japan; 2) the advance of transport efficiency in Siberia (through the Siberian Land Bridge); and 3) the upgrading of DPRK’ international relations, in order to achieve freedom of transit through its territory and better use of its ports (Mitsuhashi, et al. 2005). The Korea Transport Institute (2005) exposed 6 important transport corridors in the Northeast Asia region24. The first one connects Russia, Mongolia and China, being essential to Mongolia, once it provides access to sea through the Chinese Tianjin Port. The connection is made by road and railroads, and can be extended to Japan via container vessel from Tianjin to Kobe port. The second one is the Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo (BESETO) corridor, “perhaps the most important economic growth axis in North-East Asia” (The Korea Transport Institute 2005, 34). It is supposed to connect Beijing to Seoul, via railway and roads, and Seoul to Tokyo via maritime connectivity, connecting Busan and Gwangyang ports to Shimonoseki port in Japan via sea ferry, and then reaching Tokyo via railway or roads. Nonetheless, it is not in operation yet once there are not links between the ROK and DPRK and sections of the corridor in China and ROK have yet to be improved. This route would provide an alternative for direct sea route from Chinese Dalian Port to Busan or to Japan.

24 For further knowledge of these corridors, access: http://www.internationaltransportforum.org/ Proceedings/Border2009/09Lee1.pdf 44 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

Image 6 - BESETO Corridor

Source: Korea Transport Institute (2005).

The third corridor goes from Busan in South Korea through North Korea and reaches Russia in the Siberian Land Bridge. It can get to Japan via container vessel connecting Yokohama port and Busan. This corridor is also not functioning due to lack of connection between ROK and North Korea. The fourth corridor connects Mongolia, China, DPRK (Rajin Port, a free trade seaport) and, via maritime connectivity, Japan. It is a great potential route to reduce costs, mostly for the trade between Chinese northeastern three provinces (CNETP) and Japan, and to integrate North Korea with the region. Railway and related transshipment facilities would need to be modernized and improved, while Rajin port would need new investment to operate properly and more efficiently. The fifth corridor connects Russian ports to Northeastern China, then passes through Russia and reaches Mongolia. It is an important way for Chinese products to achieve the East Sea and the Pacific. However, Russian ports would have to be improved, mainly its transshipment facilities and its administrative procedures (The Korea Transport Institute 2005).

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Image 7 - Potential East Trade Corridor utilizing Corridor 4 and Corridor 5

Source: Korea Transport Institute (2005) apud MOT of Japan (2000).

The sixth corridor would connect Russia Far East, the CNETP ROK and Japan. Linking the entire CNETP25 region, this corridor would be essential to support transport demands of this area. The corridor would connect CNETP to ROK and Japan via the Dalian Port, which is the 17th busiest port of the world. Its capacity would have to be augmented. In general, to improve infrastructure connectivity in this region, investments must be made to meet the increasing demand of sea transportation. According to ESCAP (2005), for China, new terminals and expanded capacity can be a target; for DPRK, major challenges relate to the slow economic growth, the lack of funds, the inadequate capacity of its ports and maritime fleet and the lack of container handling capacity. Japan needs to diminish its ports cost, increase the efficiency of its services and of its own coastal shipping. ROK, mostly, needs to invest in new seaports; finally. Russia needs to improve its cargo handling equipment and control system, as well as improve its inland connectivity to its ports in the Russia Far East 25 The CNETP compose the Bohai economic circle with the Greater Beijing region (Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei Provinces). The Bohai region is one of the three major economic areas in China with the Zhu River Delta (Shenzhen, Guangzhou, and Hongkong) and the Chiang River Delta (Shanghai)” (The Korea Transport Institute 2005, 78) 46 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations via railway and roads (Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 2005, 25-26). Northeast Asia growth also implies increasing energy demand. This question is particularly relevant when considering the abundance of hydrocarbons in some Northeast Asian countries and the shortage of other ones. Moreover, China plans to increase its natural gas use so as to reduce its dependence on coal, in order to diminish its greenhouse gas emissions. Although it had plans of pipelines networks, they had been delayed on price and route issues, mostly26. However, after ten years of negotiations, in 2014 China and Russia – represented by CNPC and Gazprom, respectively - have finally reached a deal on the natural gas supply to the former. Both will invest in pipelines in their respective territories to enable the transportation of the gas (Russia Today 2014). Although of the most importance, the deal does not closes other types of energy trade agreements. For instance, energy sea lines of communication could foster the region’s integration, even in military affairs, and meet the rising demand for energy, even though it could also amplify mistrust if the governments do not cooperate properly (Australian Strategic Policy Institute 2013; Paik, Lahn and Hein 2012). Moreover, other routes and projects can still be in place, once Russia can still develop other deals (even with China)27 and its gas fields in East Siberia. As Paik (2012) states:

Russia aims to send 19-20% of its gas exports to the Asia Pacific market by 2030. To achieve this, it must start developing its super giant gas fields in East Siberia. […] But the economic justification can only come from a more assured stake in the Asian market, namely by securing long-term pipeline delivery contracts (Paik 2012, 1).

This pipeline for China can help to revitalize the CNETP area as well as to develop the Russia Far East and bolster Northeast Asia integration. Moreover, it could be extended to Japan and South Korea. Undoubtedly this kind of dynamics would enhance cooperation in the region. (Paik, Lahn and Hein 2012).

26 China has negotiated for getting gas to supply its CNETP, while Russia would benefit from supplying gas for the western part of China, once it would be possible to direct surpluses from Europe to this country (Paik, Lahn and Hein 2012). Moreover, “[f]or Russia, China’s three northeastern provinces offer only a 20 bcm/y gas market, whereas at least 30 bcm/y would be needed to justify the development of an eastern pipeline.” (Paik, Lahn and Hein 2012, 7). These were some of the issues that hampered de negotiations. Also, for gaining share in the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) market, starting by Asian markets, “Putin signaled the urgency of building a pipeline from the Sakha Republic to the Port of Vladivostok” (Paik 2012, 1). 27 For instance, “A separate route that could deliver gas to China’s western provinces and provide diversification is also in the works, according to Putin.” (Russia Today 2014). 47 Asia Development Bank’s Board of Governors

3 PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS

It is important to notice that some measures to achieve further maritime connectivity have already been taken in the Asian region as a whole, as well as many others are in progress. Following the patterns of division of this work, in this section some examples of previous actions concerning the topic are presented, firstly, concerning Southeast Asia and, secondly, Northeast Asia.

3.1 SOUTHEAST ASIA

In a general analysis, ASEAN has been slow to implement measures of cooperation on maritime questions. This slowness can be explained by the overlapping claims existent - among member nations and between some members and China, for example –, by the difficulty to engage in resource mobilization, financing requirements for modernized port infrastructure and by the lack of capacity of the countries in the region as a whole (Pushpanathan2010). Only in the latest years questions such as maritime connectivity started to gain the attention they deserve. In this sense, the primary means of cooperation towards the cited question in the present is the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity. For this reason, we will first present a brief analysis of this measure, including some of the other measures related to maritime cooperation in the following sub-sections.

3.1.1 Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity

Launched in 2010, the Plan was created as an element of the main goal that is to build an ASEAN Community by 2015, serving as a plan of action for the period from 2011 until 2015. The ASEAN Community calls for a well-connected region, not only among its members but also between these members and the rest of the world. The connection proposed by the plan would be achieved by a three-pronged strategy: physical connectivity, institutional connectivity and people-to-people connectivity, being maritime connectivity located in the first scope, so that this sub- area will be better explored in this work. The Key Strategies of ASEAN to enhance physical connectivity consist on: a) complete the ASEAN Highway Network; b) complete the implementation of the Singapore Kunming Rail Link (SKRL) Project; c) establish an efficient and integrated inland waterways network; d) accomplish an integrated, efficient and competitive maritime transport system; e) establish integrated and seamless multimodal transport systems to make ASEAN the transport hub in the East Asia

48 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations region; f) accelerate the development of ICT infrastructure and services in each of the ASEAN Member States and g) prioritize the processes to resolve institutional issues in ASEAN energy infrastructure projects (Asean 2010). The following list shows the projects considered as priority by the plan, being the items iv, v and vi directly related to maritime connectivity (Asean 2010):

i) Completion of the ASEAN Highway Network (AHN) missing links and upgrade of Transit Transport Routes (TTRs); ii) Completion of the Singapore Kunming Rail Link (SKRL) missing links; iii) Establish an ASEAN Broadband Corridor (ABC); iv) Melaka-Pekan Baru Interconnection (IMT-GT: Indonesia); v) West Kalimantan-Sarawak Interconnection (BIMP-EAGA: Indonesia); vi) Study on the Roll-on/roll-off (RoRo) network and short-sea shipping; vii) Developing and operationalising mutual recognition arrangements (MRAs) for prioritized and selected industries; viii) Establishing common rules for standards and conformity assessment procedures. ix) Operationalise all National Single Windows (NSWs) by 2012; x) Options for a framework/modality towards the phased reduction and elimination of scheduled investment restrictions/investments; xi) Operationalisation of the ASEAN Agreements on transport facilitation; xii) Easing visa requirements for ASEAN nationals; xiii) Development of ASEAN Virtual Learning Resources Centres (AVLRC); xiv) Develop ICT skill standards; and; xv) ASEAN Community building programme.

In relation to maritime transport, the Plan addresses port infrastructures, maritime services and port performances as the key challenges to achieve connectivity in this area. In order to achieve integration in the seas, especially to achieve efficient shipping routes, the Plan tries to implement the example of the Philippines Nautical Highway (Roll-on/roll-off (RO-RO) System), which deserves a special attention.

3.1.1.1 The RO-RO System

The RO-RO system is essential to achieve the goal of building efficient and reliable shipping routes in order to enhance connectivity. To fully understand how the system works and how it can improve trade and connectivity, we must first understand the system that is traditionally used by the countries in Southeast Asia: the load-on/load-off system. Accordingly to the Asia Foundation (2010):

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In conventional containerized or ‘load-on, load-off’ shipping, goods are delivered by trucks to the point of origin, unloaded, then loaded onto ships, carried to the next port, unloaded once more, then loaded onto other trucks for the next leg of their journey. Each step, which may be repeated many times in an inter-island distribution chain, imposes another layer of costs and bureaucracy. As a result, the economics of load-on, load-off tend to favor centralized shipping hubs that may poorly serve smaller, regional markets. (Asia Foundation 2010, p. 1)

The RO-RO policy simplifies the process, since it allows trucks, buses and cars to roll on and off the vessel without unloading. In this sense, it saves time, costs, equipments and also makes some bureaucratic procedures unnecessary. In Philippines, the amount of benefits purchased since the implementation of the policy was huge: according to ADB (2010), the results consisted on reduction in transport costs, creation of new regional links and expansion of regional markets, more efficient shipment of goods and people that have particularly benefited the poorer provinces in the maritime routes, acceleration of local area development, realignment of logistical practices with more frequent deliveries, and greater competitive pressure on the domestic shipping industry. Following the great example from that country, a regional RO-RO policy was adopted as one of the 15 flagship projects approved in the ASEAN Leaders Summit of 2010, as well as included on the Master Plan for Connectivity, as previously stated. Also according to the Asia Foundation, the main challenges for the implementation of the policy are the maintenance of focus to establish the process and “regulatory environments for commercially viable regional RO-RO routes to emerge” (Asian Foundation 2010, 2). In the following table, there are some of the potential Ro-Ro routes, considered by studies of 2011 and related to the perspectives of the Plan:

Table 2 - Potential Ro-Ro Routes in the perspective of MPAC Sumatera Economic Corridor 1. Dumai – malaka (Malaysia) – Songkhla (Thailan) 2. Belawan – Penang 3. Tj. Balai Asahan – Port Klang (Malaysia) – Songkhla (Thailand) Java Economic Corridor 4. Malaka – Java - Sumatera Kalimantan Economic Corridor 5. Singkawang – Kuching (Sarawak) – Brunei via land transportation

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6. Singkawang / Pontianak - Johor Sulawesi Economic Corridor 7. Bitung Manado – P. Mindanao (Phillipines) Bali-Nusa Tenggara Economic Corridor 8. Kalabahi (NTI) – Timor Leste 9. Kupang (NTI) – Timor Leste via land transportation Maluku-Papua Economic Corridor 10. Sorong – Bitung – P. Mindanao Source: Centre for Policy Analysis and Development on Asia-Pacific and African Regions

3.1.1.2 Roadmap Towards an Integrated and Competitive Maritime Transport (RICMT)

Stressed by the MPAC, the Roadmap consists of an action plan to achieve a “more open, efficient and competitive ASEAN maritime transport system” (Bridel, 2012 p. 6), covering elements as movement of freight and passengers and liberalizing maritime transport services in ASEAN, connecting with the objective of establishing ASEAN as a single market. Related to the Roadmap is the implementation of an ASEAN Single Shipping Market (ASSM), in order to enhance competitiveness and efficiency of the shipping market in the region. According to the document of creation of the Roadmap, the countries subscribe to a policy agenda which states: (a) Foster competition in all shipping markets; (b) Adhere to the principle of free competition on a commercial basis for cargo movements to, from or between ASEAN Member Countries; (c) Promote a set of guidelines for the regulation of liner shipping markets; (d) Prevent or minimize the imposition of unjustifiable fees, surcharges or imposts by shipping lines or associations of shipping lines with a dominant position in any trade to, from or within ASEAN; (e) Ensure that any international shipping operations retained under Government-ownership are corporatized and operated in accordance with commercial principles; (f) Refrain from providing preferential access to routes, cargoes or contracts to Government-owned lines, and to adopt a timetable for the removal of such preferences where they currently exist; (g) Work collectively and progressively towards the development of a single integrated ASEAN shipping market; and (h) Develop guiding-principles for the pricing of port services based on the cost of service and infrastructure provision. (“Roadmap towards an integrated and competitive maritime transport in Asean” 2010, p. 2) The implementation of the Roadmap is coordinated by the ASEAN Maritime

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Transport Working Group (MTWG), a platform created so that the countries can update each other about the progress towards the implementation of measures related to maritime cooperation, as MPAC, for instance.

3.1.2. Asian Development Bank (ADB)

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) is one of the main sources for connectivity financing. The bank provides an average of more than USD 1 billion per year in infrastructure lending and capacity building (APEC, 2013). The initiative that matters the most for the subject discussed in this work is the attempt to develop Regional Corridors. These are crucial for the development of transport connectivity, since it links urban areas with important economic activity, amplifying the opportunities and benefits to other areas of the region. In relation to maritime connectivity specifically, the main initiatives are the Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT) and the Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia- Philippines-East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA).

3.1.2.1 The Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT)

Crucial to the development of this initiative is the establishment of connectivity through economic corridors. The first to be considered is the Songkhla-Penang- Medan Corridor, important due to its great seaports. The second one is the Strait of Malacca Corridor, the most advanced in terms of transport connectivity. Another transport route in potential is Banda Aceh- Medan- Pekanbaru-Palembang (North- South Sumatera) Corridor, although this route is currently insufficient because of the increasing volume of traffic. The last corridor to be considered is Malacca-Dumai. ADB has initiated a study on the development of IMT-GT economic corridors as a first step in implementing the following policies, also created after a study made by the institution:

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Table 3 - Proposed policy framework and strategies for the maritime sector of IMT-GT Issue Policy Strategy Draught restrictions: IMT‐GT supports - IMT‐GT support The lack of periodic undertaking of periodic regularization of periodical maintenance causes maintenance dredging maintenance dredging of availability of inadequate at Sumatra ports and ports water depths at Dumai, development of new - IMT‐GT supports Belawan and Teluk Bayur. ports in Southern development of Nakula Songkhla and Kantang Thailand container terminal jetty on suffer from the same the Trang River and the problem. proposed 2nd Songkhla port subject to feasibility and approvals of Thailand Government Operational Efficiency: IMT‐GT supports - IMT‐GT supports port The operational implementation of efficiency improvement of performance of some of best practices and Dumai, Belawan, Teluk the key ports of IMT‐GT modernization of Bayur and Penang through is well below international portoperation in order appropriate studies. Whilst standard, particularly to achieve comparable the Dumai study could focus in domestic container performance level. on bulk cargoes, the study for handling at Belawan and Belawan and Penang ports Teluk Bayur. Penang is no could focus on container exception. handling. The study for Teluk Bayur could encompass both efficiency improvement for bulk cargoes and a feasibility study for setting up a container terminal. Port Interfaces: IMT‐GT supports - IMT‐GT supports Dumai, Belawan and Teluk development of adequate development of port access Bayur are the ports that port interfaces in order Road for Belawan and Teluk suffer from inadequate to facilitate seamless Bayur and hinterland Road hinterland connectivity. hinterland traffic connectivity between Dumai movement as well as to and Pekanbaru. increase the cargo potential of IMT‐GT ports

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Issue Policy Strategy New Port Development: IMT‐GT supports - IMT‐GT recognizes The proposed development of a the strategic advantage of transshipment harbor transshipment harbor locating a transshipment at Sabang Bay suffers in Sumatra with private harbor in Bande Ache from many lacunas. The sector participation to Province that will benefit proposed new ports at cater to the growing the IMT‐GT subregion. Pakbara in Southern transshipment traffic in In order to minimize the Thailand and Kyaukphyu the Malacca strait. lacunas identified and and Dawei in Myanmar the threats posed by new that also aims at ports developments in transshipment traffic of Thailand and Myanmar the Bay of Bengal ports is a as well as to strategies the great threat to the project. threats of new capacity New capacity additions that additions, reevaluation of the are underway at Colombo, feasibility study should be Chennai, Kelang and Johor commissioned. ports are another threat to the Sabang Transshipment Harbor proposal. Passenger Terminal: IMT‐GT supports - IMT‐GT recognizing the The missing connectivity development of exclusive role of tourism prospects between Tammalng and passenger and cruise encourages setting up of JV Medan could Foster terminals to encourage companies among IMTGT tourism growth in the tourism and cater to countries for the operation IMT‐GT subregion. The passenger traffic. of ferry services between existing passenger terminal Tammalang and Belawan. at Belawan is located within - IMT‐GT further supports the cargo handling area separation of passenger and is inadequate to handle terminal from the cargo future cruise vessel. Malacca operational area of Belawan passenger terminal suffers port and development of an from tidal variation causing exclusive passenger terminal. disruptions to the services. In addition cruise liner terminal similar to Kelang may be considered if viable or integrated with the proposed passenger terminal. - The new terminal development at Malacca may be reevaluated to develop the terminal with the state-of‐art passenger amenities including CIQ facilities.

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Issue Policy Strategy Automated Customs All IMT‐GT countries - IMT‐GT encourages the Clearance: should have fully member countries to adopt IMT countries are not automated customs ASYCUDA World compliant with the clearance system standardized formats that is uniform in its recommended by the application, process WCO as the adoption and procedure in order of ASYCUDA differed. to enable seamless Hence the software to trading among IMT process the customs countries. clearance is developed on a standalone basis. This results in substantial delays. Source: Maritime Sector Study of the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT), 2008. p. 3-4.

3.1.2.2. Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines- East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA)

BIMP-EAGA is a sub-area currently in a situation of under-developed connectivity, and one of the great reasons to it is the poor maritime infrastructure (CPADAPAR, 2011). This fact calls the attention since the sub-area accounts for the two largest archipelagos of the region (Indonesia and Philippines). RO-RO network already exists between Brunei and Malaysia, even though the situation is still incipient. There is a need to find ways to expand this system in the area designated. Indonesia and Philippines already recognized the importance of building a RO-RO system between both countries and engaged in dialogues to implement joint studies.

3.1.3 Maritime Security

It is important to stress that maritime cooperation in the region is happening not only in economic terms but also in relation to other areas, such as maritime security, for instance. A good example is the Cooperative Mechanism for the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The Mechanism was launched in 2007, envisioning the

55 Asia Development Bank’s Board of Governors encouragement of user states and shippers to cooperate and help seaside states in their responsibilities to guarantee safety and environmental protection in the Straits (NBAR, 2010). The littorals (Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines) have primary responsibility over the Straits because they possess sovereign rights. They also are responsible for maintaining maritime security, but this element does not enter in the scope of the Cooperative Mechanism because it was refused by Indonesia and Malaysia. Another measure to guarantee maritime security is the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia (ReCAAP), addressing the huge problem that piracy constitutes in the region, even threatening the development of trade by maritime routes. The Agreement was established in 2006 and it has fifteen Asian members (Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, Republic of Korea, Laos, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Vietnam), as well as two European countries (Denmark and Norway). The initiatives previously presented constitute only some of the measures adopted to enhance maritime connectivity and cooperation in Southeast Asia. ASEAN, for example, has been promoting maritime cooperation under various other frameworks, mainly through ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Transport Ministers Meeting (ATM), ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) and East Asia Summit (EAS) (Son, 2013). According to Khalid (2013):

In undertaking these measures, ASEAN member nations fully acknowledge the importance of maritime sector as a key facilitator of trade and socio-economic development in the region. Despite their disparities in the levels of socio- economic development and maritime infrastructures, member nations are committed to the cause of developing an integrated and competitive maritime transport sector (Khalid 2013 – online).

A Southeast Asia region greatly connected by water is not only essential to explore geographical conditions (a region surrounded by seas, as previously stated in this work), but also to successfully achieve the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) envisioned by the regional institution - being this fact recognized by the member nations, since an efficient maritime transport sector is considered one of the pillars of then AEC (Khalid, 2013 - online). 3.2 NORTHEAST ASIA

From the beginning of the 1990’s to the first five years of the 2000’s, one of the main tasks of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) was to work together with private investors and the governments of the major countries of Northeast Asia to enhance the

56 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations capabilities and facilities of a few ports in the region. Concerning the People’s Republic of China, five of the main ports, namely, the ports of Dandong, Yingkou, Yantai I, Fangcheng and Yantai II, had projects built up to these ends; it is known that all of the projects created for this purpose are fully operational. In the same period, ADB participated in the seminar on Port Investment and Competition, in Tianjin, and in the 1995’s ESCAP study Privatization in Ports, Waterways, and Dredging, including preparation of Guidelines for Private Sector Investiments in Ports and Dredging. Finally, ADB has been supporting projects which facilitate port operations, as the implementation and maintenance of highways, railways and expressways (UNESCAP 2005). Similarly as in Southeast Asia’s section, in the next sub-sections some projects concerning infrastructure development to Northeast Asia will be discussed as well.

3.2.1 The Greater Tumen Initiative (GTI)

A prominent ADB’s project relative to development of infrastructure aiming the improvement of connections of sea ports, developed in the mid-1990’s, is the Nine Transportation Corridors in North-East Asia, which relies on the connection of areas with the greatest concentration of population in the region within the Pacific Ocean, using already built network and the ones to be built. The corridors are: the BAM Trade Corridor, the Siberian Land Bridge (SLB) Trade Corridor, the Suifenhe Trade Corridor, the Tumen River Area Trade Corridor, the Dalian Trade Corridor, the Mongolia Trade Corridor, China Land Bridge (CLB) Trade Corridor, the Korean Peninsula West Trade Corridor and the Korean Peninsula East Trade Corridor. It is important to express that there are differences between the maturity and development of each corridor: some are just concepts and other are already being sufficiently used (UNESCAP 2005). From all these corridors, there is one which has often been discussed: the Tumen River area. The PRC as the first country to show interest in developing the region and to guarantee access to an important port in the Sea of Japan, leading to the creation of the Tumen River Area Development Programme (TRADP), which was supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), aiming environmental management, economic development and regional cooperation, with participation of China, Russia, North Korea, South Korea and Mongolia. Under this programme, the Rajin-Sonbong Economic Special Zone (Rason) was created in leased land from the Russian Federation, the RPC and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. By 2005, the Changchun Agreement changed the name of the programme to the Greater Tumen Initiative (GTI), because of the involvement of private sectors, extension of territorial boundaries in which the initiative would act and exclusion of North Korea as a member – due to rivalry with South Korea (White 2010).

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The GTI has benefits for every country participant in the initiative, that is to say: the northeast of China is not economically developed as its eastern coastal region and an easier access to ports, trade routes and inland regions of Russia would give the region a chance to a joint development with this country. As a result of this partnership, the Primorsky territory, which has a lack of infrastructure and financing, would have its problems solved by the abundant natural resources in the GTI region. In the same way, South Korea, which has limited natural resources, would have more efficient transportation and shipping connections through the Sea of Japan, and it would approach to abundant natural resources. Finally, Eastern Mongolia, as an underdeveloped region, expects to boost its economy and reduce poverty by using trade mechanisms provided by the Tumen River corridor (White 2010).

Image 8 - Map of the Greater Tumen Region.

Source: GTI Brochure (2013). Available at: http://www.dniimf.ru/img/depts/map.jpg

3.2.2 Asian Land Transport Infrastructure Development (ALTID)

Another plan of initiatives for infrastructure relative to the Northeast Asia region in the Asian Land Transport Infrastructure Development (ALTID), which was established in 1992 by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP); it is important to highlight that this initiative was created to cover the whole Asian region, but it has direct and massive impact over Northeast Asia specifically, mainly because of the Northern Corridor, which passes through the PRC and the Koreas. Its three pillars – the Asian Highway (AH), the Trans-Asian Railway (TAR) and the facilitation of land transport projects through intermodal transport terminals (dry and inland ports), according to the ADB Institute

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– seek to improve economic ties by enhancing access to seaports through highways and the establishment of dry ports28 in landlocked countries (ADB & ADBI 2009; ADB 2006). Although they are not maritime infrastructure projects per se, they establish great precedents of infrastructure projects in Asia, besides clarifying the context and current projects and existing infrastructure in the region. Image 9 - The Asian Highway.

Source: United Nations (2007). Available at: http://amur-heilong.net/map/008maps/transport/images/image/2003highway2.JPG

Among the three pillars of the ALTID, the Trans-Asian Railway is one the most important projects to Northeast Asia: the Trans-Asian Railway Network Agreement was signed in 2006 in an effort to bring together not only the ports within Asia by a railway network, but also with the ones in Europe. Given the size of such an important project like this, it is referred, sometimes, as the “Iron Silk Road”

28 UNESCAP defines a “dry port” as an inland location with functions similar to those of a seaport for the consolidation and distribution of goods. It distinguishes three types of modal interchange facilities that process cross-border trade and provide full customs services: dry ports, inland container depots and freight villages. Dry ports can process all forms of cargo, while inland depots can process only containers (ADB, 2009). 59 Asia Development Bank’s Board of Governors

– by the way, the Silk Road concept is recently being brought up and used as an example of possible connection route in matters of infrastructure in Asia. However, there are some structural problems that turn it difficult for the project to become real in its entirety, as, to name one, the different sizes of gauges between the countries in the railways. When TAR is concluded, it will unite regions separated by gigantic distances, providing a huge boost of economic cooperation and enhancement of trade flows (ADB & ADBI 2009; ADB 2006).

Image 10 - The Trans-Asian Railway Network.

Source: Trans-Asian Railway Network: United Nations (2004). Available at: http://eurasianhub. files.wordpress.com/2011/11/tarmap_latest.jpg

3.2.3 The New Silk Road

The Silk Road was an ancient trade route created in the Han dynasty, about AD 200 BC, and it linked China with Central and South Asia, Europe and Middle East. Recently, after the 2008’s crisis, with the current president of the PRC, Xi Jinping, the idea of the Silk Road was revived with a new concept, called “the New

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Silk Road”. With this new identity, it will be used in order to bring together the well-developed coastal areas and the less-developed inland areas, search for new markets and preserve the existing ones, and, finally, maintain constant trade flows within the regions the route covers (Shaanxi 2010; Tatar 2013). Xi Jinping, in his speeches at the 13th Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Bishlek and at the G20 summit in St. Petersburg, both in 2013, presented a proposal with five points to create a New Silk Road Economic Belt to enhance relations with the regions encompassed by the route. These five points discuss, respectively, about (1) joint economic cooperation, (2) strengthening of overland and maritime connections, (3) elimination of trade barriers and reduction of expenses, (4) reinforcement of monetary cooperation and, as said by Xi, (5) strengthening of “people-to- people relations”. Following the proposed ideas, the “New Silk Road” will serve as a tool of communication between the inland parts of China with its coastal areas in the East and South China Seas and with the countries in which the road passes through. That said, the importance of this route to maritime connectivity lies on how it will turn easy the link between far areas inside Asia with ports in the PRC by its maritime branch, the Maritime Silk Road: through this mean, maritime trade not only within Northeast and Southeast Asia, but also outside these regions with trading partners around the world, will get to be fortified (Tatar 2013).

Image 11 - The Silk Road and the Maritime Silk Road

Source: Fact and Details: Silk Road (2010). Available at: http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~vaucher/ Genealogy/Documents/Asia/images/silkroad.gif

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3.2.4 Northeast Asian Development Bank (NEADB)

Finally, a last project regarding the development and improvement of maritime connections in the Northeast Asia region is the establishment of the Northeast Asian Development Bank (NEADB). Since the meeting of the Northeast Asia Economic Forum of 1993, when the idea of the NEADB was put in discussion by South Korea, it has been fostered by a few governments. In 2000, an Ad Hoc Committee was created to emphasize the need for the creation of the NEADB: it would play the role that is not currently performed by the existing institutions, through financial investments directed to infrastructure and economic development. It is said by authorities that praise for the creation of this body that the transfer of capital from the already existent multilateral bodies is not done properly and directly to the needs of Northeast Asia. Besides addressing this problem, the NEADB would also work to disseminate information and technology to all the countries of the region, aiming at strengthening of interdependence and economic stability (Cho & Katz 1996; Kakazu 1994). Two of the main ideas to the creation of the NEADB are (1) to adhere North Korea and Russia to a possible member list, since both countries are not participants in the ADB; and (2) to uplift economic cooperation and integration of different economies with different stages of industrial growth, structure and development, as said by Cho and Katz (1996):

By encouraging economic cooperation and integration and a combination of the maturity of older economies with the potential vitality of the newer ones, we can achieve rejuvenation of the former and stimulation of the latter (Cho & Katz 1996, p. 42).

What is being discussed is that there is a lack of investments in the region and that the NEADB would work to attract the capital from private investors, directing it right to real needs of the region. Other multilateral financial institutions, which, as revealed by recent studies, have their financial support being injected in means that do not meet with the region’s needs for financial infrastructure; therefore, the role of the NEADB here would be to work together with these institutions to improve this matter (Cho and Katz 1996). Beyond that, these investments would have an already decided path and, as a body which would cover not only maritime connectivity issues, but also infrastructural and financial matters (as the improvement of ports and highways/railways that communicate dry ports/trade centers with sea ports), the NEADB concretization would be a greater fact to push Northeast Asia forward. As Cho and Katz (1996) state:

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Successful development will depend on the region’s ability to attract private investment, and this will increase rapidly when investors perceive that their investments will be supported by adequate highway, railway and air transportation systems; ports and harbors […]. Upgrading Northeast Asia’s infrastructure and the importation of engineering and construction services, materials, and plant and equipment, much of it from outside the region, to bring the region’s infrastructure up to standards and permit it to compete successfully with other areas for limited private-sector resources will involve investments in infrastructure far beyond the region’s own capacity (Cho & Katz 1996, p. 44).

4 BLOC POSITIONS

Australia has been trying to improve its maritime connectivity with areas further away, such as India and ASEAN, since they are important commercial partners. Therefore, it is essential to improve the ports in ASEAN, since the South China Sea is a very important region for Australian security and trade (Khurana 2005). The Straits of Lombok and Makassar are very strategic points for the Australian trade flows (Noer and Gregory 1996). Moreover, the Australian government has issues regarding the sovereignty of some reefs with Indonesia, with which it also has problems in establishing the maritime limits (CIA World Factbook 2014). Australia is also negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Exporting mainly to European countries, Bangladesh gives a big importance for the improvement of its own maritime connection. Routes that facilitate the commerce with the west are fundamental for the country (CIA World Factbook 2014). Also, the amount of trade has been growing in its ports and the relations with China have increased, including investments in the port of Chittagong (Krishnan 2010). Besides, the country has boosted its maritime connection with Sri Lanka (Ministry of Defense and Urban Development of Sri Lanka 2013), which counts with Chinese investments in its ports (Ondaatjie 2013). Sri Lanka is a great supporter of the Chinese Maritime Silk Road, believing that the project can improve the connectivity in the region at its highest (Zeenews 2014). Another country enjoying Chinese investments is Myanmar. China has been trying to improve relations with the country and it is its biggest economic partner today. Myanmar is also part of the economic corridor with the countries from the Indochina Peninsula and is a strong supporter of projects in the region. The nation has increased its relations with Thailand and Bangladesh in terms of connectivity and infrastructure (Soe 2014; Ponnudurai 2012). Thailand is one of the most important countries in Southeast Asia in terms of trade flows and it has great relations with Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. It also has strong ties with China and is a great supporter of the Chinese project to build a

63 Asia Development Bank’s Board of Governors canal in the south of the country as an alternative for the Malacca strait flows (Zhang 2008). The maritime trade has become a great part of the total Thai trade, being of utmost relevance for Thailand to improve its maritime connections. Cambodia and Laos are located in the Mekong river region, and their imports and exports depend largely on the development of this region, especially Laos, since it is a landlocked country and needs access to the sea. Cambodia has been working on connectivity projects with Vietnam and it relies on Japanese investments for its development. Also, the country has discovered offshore oil reserves, which may have a great role for its maritime connectivity (ASEAN - German Technical Cooperation s.d.). Vietnam also depends on the Mekong region development and is part of the project of the economic corridor that will connect the three countries to a port in Myanmar. Having as its biggest trade partners Japan, China and South Korea, the country is interested in the development of trade with these countries (CIA Factbook 2014). Besides, Vietnam is part of the negotiations of the TPP. India’s interests in maritime connectivity are highly based on a strategy to balance China and to enhance the “Look East” policy. The South China Sea, for instance, is very important for Indian trade, but not as critical as it is for China. The country engages in several maritime security agreements in the region and looks for an improved relation with countries from ASEAN, such as Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar and Vietnam (Khurana 2009). India can serve as a less intrusive alternative than western partners, such as the United States, which poses high suspicions on ASEAN members with its Regional Maritime Security Initiative (Khurana 2005). Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste are both countries from the Archipelagic Southeast Asia and are two of the poorest countries in the region. Papua New Guinea has a connectivity focused on Australia, which is its biggest importer and exporter and supports the country with security assistance, but, on the other hand, it has poor connectivity with ASEAN, which comprises two of its main importers (Singapore and Malaysia) (Trace, Frielink and Hew 2009). Timor-Leste suffers with the fact that there is only one containerized service linking the country to ASEAN countries, posing a huge obstacle for trade. However, ASEAN countries are still big trade partners. Timor-Leste also has problems with Indonesia regarding the former occupation, even though the Indonesian imports were very significant to Timor- Leste (International Trade Center 2014). The Philippines have been the lead country with regards to maritime connectivity, since it is an archipelagic nation. The country has developed the Ro-Ro strategy to connect its islands and has shown huge progress in connecting to other countries, such as Indonesia, China and Vietnam (Olchondra 2013). This Ro-Ro strategy is the key point for the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity and serves as an example for all the other countries in the region. Having the United States, Japan

64 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations and China as biggest trade partners, the country looks for biggest improvements in connectivity with them (CIA Factbook 2014). Malaysia strongly relies on the Strait of Malacca and has some concerns regarding the regional control of the strait in relation to the United States proposal for the TPP. However, it advocates the use of the Straits of Lombok and Makassar, so that Singapore does not benefit from them as well (Noer and Gregory 1996). One important fact is that there is a possibility of diversion of Malaysian trade from Singapore if the port in Bintulu counts with investments to expand and upgrade its facilities. Besides, the Malaysian ports have a great competition with Singapore in becoming hubs in the region, which explains why Malaysia does not support developments in the port of Singapore so strongly (Trace, Frielink and Hew 2009). Also, the country has very different levels of development and the poorest regions are not well connected to ASEAN. Malaysia is too a supporter of the Maritime Silk Road proposed by China, since it may develop infrastructure that will benefit Malaysian trade. Singapore, on the other hand, has the most important port in the Southeast Asia and counts with a privileged strategic location, right on the Malacca Strait. The country truly defends its control over the Strait and any alternative route may diminish its trade flows and the movements of the port. Its economy depends largely on the hub status of Singapore, since there is no other alternative route (Noer and Gregory 1996). Singapore also concerns about the presence of the United States in the region through the TPP, but it is already part of the partnership. Also part of the strategy to balance India in the region, China has been investing in Pakistan maritime connectivity by developing the port of Gwadar, with strategic location in the Indian Ocean. The country is part of the economic corridor project that will connect it to China (Bhutta 2014). Besides, the nation has good relations with the United States and depends highly on its exports to the country. Pakistan also has problems with India relating to the Kashmir dispute and will not support projects that may increase India’s development. The economic growth of ASEAN countries is very important for Pakistan, since it can use this growth to develop itself through Free Trade Agreements. Furthermore, Pakistan can be a link to the Central Asian countries that are landlocked and need bigger connectivity (Khan 2013). New Zealand has strong trade relations with Australia and China, but has been trying to diversify its partners, especially with countries from Southeast Asia. Therefore it is important to establish a good connection with this region in order to improve even more the commerce. It also believes in expanding its relations to other countries in East Asia (Ministry of Transport of New Zealand 2011). New Zealand is already part of TPP’s negotiations. Brunei Darussalam is part of the TPP original agreement and is in the TPP’s negotiation table. It has a great dependency on oil and gas exports. Its strategic location, near the Malacca Strait, can promote competitive

65 Asia Development Bank’s Board of Governors advantage for the country and increase its trade flows (Prinsen 2004). The country also has good relations with Japan and South Korea; therefore, it is important to develop the regions in the route to facilitate the exports to Northeast Asia ports. Indonesia counts with Japanese investment to develop some of its ports, but it has few locations that provide the depth needed to build a large port. Hence, it is important for it to support projects of development in close countries, which could facilitate Indonesian trade. The importance of the Straits of Lombok and Makassar is very high for Indonesia, once they are the main routes of commerce in the region. Indonesian trade also depends on the Sunda Strait (Noer and Gregory 1996). Afghanistan is still a divided country struggling for stability, where various interests are involved, including those from countries of the Asia Pacific region. Afghanistan, as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, does not have its own interests in stake in the maritime infrastructure of this region, once the projects to future increase in trade routes connected to these three countries – as the so-called “New Silk Road” – focus on upgrading roads and railroads. However, they may follow the interests of their main allies in the region, in order to guarantee good relations and to leverage precedents in investment projects through ADB. Once Afghanistan is striving to get supplies and resources, undoubtedly it may act actively and in conformity with its allies’ interests, as China (already a great investor in Afghanistan and with high potential to increase its economic influence) by one hand, and Japan and South Korea, on the other, as they are both US’ allies and have supported its occupation. Particularly, Japan is the second biggest donor to the country, following USA (Reuters 2011; Ku, Thompsom and Whertz 2011). Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, besides having good relations with Russia (especially the latter), have seen its relations with China fostered in recent years. China is the second biggest Kazakhstan trade partner, only behind Russia. Moreover, China and Kazakhstan have been cooperating in energy and transport cross-border projects, which may boost these two countries relations (International Trade Centre 2014; Idrissov 2014). As the two others, Turkmenistan also has been improving its relations with China, mainly through commercial issues and Chinese investments in a gas pipeline connecting both countries (Miller 2012). Furthermore, recently, both Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have expressed their interest in further cooperation with ASEAN (Turkmenistan 2013; ASEAN 2014). Particularly, the Kazakh are making efforts to direct its grain exports to Southeast Asian markets (through China), besides enlarging its exports to China by building a grain terminal at the Kazakh-Chinese border (Obolenskiy 2014). Although Mongolia is part of the Northeast Asian region, it cannot be subject to investments in the issue in question, once it is landlocked. Its access to the sea is done mainly by Tianjin port in China, but also through Vostochny port in Russia. Bearing this in mind, the country must strive to diversify its gateways to the sea, in

66 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations the intent of securing its trade. Particularly, ports with facilities for containers, coal and iron ore (among other products) are in the core of Mongolia’s interests (Park 2011). Therefore, Mongolia is interested in fostering infrastructure connectivity of Northeastern provinces of China and Russia Far East, as well as railways and other land infrastructure that connect the ports to the rest of these countries’ territory. For example, improving the Vladivostok port, in Russia, would give a greater access to the Pacific Ocean for Mongolia, which is connected to this port via railways connected to Russia (Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 2005). China, as it is located in the Asia-Pacific region, has the general interest of boosting economic integration of the region as a whole. However, it may focus on developing the maritime infrastructure of countries that are strategically important for the sustaining of its trade - the ones located in its main trade routes -, as Myanmar, which is already receiving direct investment from China for the construction of ports. Chinese interests in developing these infrastructures in various countries are mainly commercial, although some say that China has military desires (The Economist 2013). Moreover, a great part of the Chinese trade passes through the Southeast Asia Region, specifically through the Malacca Strait (principally oil imports: 80% of them pass through this strait); therefore, improving alternative trade routes is in China interests (Pant 2009). Besides that, China has great trade and financial ties with ASEAN countries – even a Free-Trade Agreement – which undoubtedly affects its investments interests for the areas. However, its maritime disputes in the South China Sea are a concern and also target areas for investment – preferably unilaterally, though. Moreover, it has deep interests in promoting the maritime “New Silk Road”, connecting the east with the west of Asia. In Northeast Asia, China has great interest in promoting stability in the Korean Peninsula, once it is North Korea’s biggest ally and it has been improving its relations with South Korea. Furthermore, there is interest in the North Korean port of Rajin, located in the Tumen River, which would offer potential access to the northern Pacific (Swielande 2012). Finally, the recent natural gas agreement concluded with Russia puts China in a great place, once it may help to mediate agreements about natural gas supply for other countries, as South Korea or Japan – although one must bear in mind that Chinese relations with the latter are getting worse over the years (Russia Today 2014; Cook 2014). TheRepublic of Korea (ROK) is a key country for the maritime connectivity in East Asia, once it has one of its biggest and busiest ports – Busan – and is striving to improve other facilities. The port of Busan is crucial part of South Korea’s strategy of becoming the central regional trade hub. In this intent, ROK has been investing in the Gwangyang port, in order to avoid congestion in Busan, which is already the fifth busiest port in the world (World Shipping Council 2014). South Korea

67 Asia Development Bank’s Board of Governors has been improving its relations with China in a pragmatically way, once it is still an US ally in the region. However, as ROK is not part of the TPP’s negotiation, it must be concerned about granting its interests in South East Asia. In Northeast Asia although South Korea must try to guarantee great connectivity, it must bear in mind that the astounding Chinese ports’ growth can present competition to its own ports, considering ROK’s intent to become a regional trade hub. Finally, South Korea seeks to reduce the tensions in the Korean peninsula - especially to eliminate the North Korean nuclear threat -, for which the cooperation with China is central (Cook 2014). Taiwan has its core commercial interest in stake when discussing maritime connectivity in the Asia-Pacific, once it is an island and, isolated politically from the international community, the commercial links are its principal method of international insertion. Firstly, it is worth stressing well-developed relationship between Taiwan and US, as Taiwan may strive to defend US interests in the region, like pursuing to guarantee the freedom of navigation and unifying perspectives with US allies in the region. Second of all, Taiwan’s main trade partners are Japan and China; the Northeast Asia (considering Japan, China and the Republic of Korea) represented nearly 40% of its imports and 50% of its exports, demonstrating the importance of maintaining good infrastructure links connecting this region (International Trade Centre 2014). However, Taiwan must endeavor to diversify its investments in the region, once they are currently concentrated on mainland China; therefore, being part of discussed ADB’s projects is extremely relevant, principally in the ones involving Taiwan’s and US’ allies, as Singapore, with which it has signed a free-trade agreement (Wu 2014; Fensom 2013). Moreover, the Taipei port and, mainly, the Kaohsiung port – the 13th busiest container port in the world (World Shipping Council 2014) -, have become ports of great significance, and Taiwan has been pursuing to establish bilateral agreements in order to establish itself as a regional trade hub (Kastner 2013; Taiwan International Ports Corporation 2013). The United States of America has strong interests involved in the whole Asia- Pacific region. Its recent trend of becoming a “Pacific Nation”, manifested in the US pivot to Asia, has bolded them, and having allies in the region has proved to have an increased importance. The United States aims to maintain its ties with traditional allies, but also to further expand them to other countries, not only in the security realm, but in the economic as well. In this sense, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, still in negotiations, is highlighted. The project, as envisioned by the US, excludes China and, if concluded, would help US insertion in the region (Reis 2014; Swielande 2012). TPP is not the only US’s interest, as the country has established ASEAN as a priority, and not all ASEAN’s countries are part of TPP negotiations. Therefore, the US must strive to develop its main Southeast Asian allies’ connectivity, as Singapore, Thailand and Philippines, as well as its emerging allies, alike Vietnam,

68 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations while searching to depart them from Chinese influence, avoiding, if possible, its participation in the main projects for the area. In Northeast Asia, Japan and the Republic of Korea are its main allies. The approximation between China and South Korea represents a concern to US interests and affects directly its objectives when dealing with its support for maritime infrastructure in the area. In broader terms, the US has to defend always the need of freedom of navigation, for which the better connectivity of strategic countries is essential and the expansionist Chinese policy in the region – as considered by the US – is a concern (Swielande 2012; Majid 2013). Canada has been recently driving its attention towards Asia, as it recognizes this century as the “Asian Century” and the Asian markets as great opportunities for its trade interests. Considering itself a Pacific nation and being a big supplier of products, services and expertise, Canada is willing to continue to augment its exports to Asian markets, which has more than tripled from 2002 to 2011. In this intent, Canada has already invested around U$ 3.3 billion in national infrastructure to ease trade in the Asia-Pacific region – being U$ 1.4 billion federal investment - in a unified program named as the Canada’s Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative (Government of Canada 2012). Furthermore, Canada is involved in the negotiations of the TPP agreements, which can bolster its exports and trade relations, besides benefiting its enterprises in the Asia-Pacific markets; hitherto, the only Asian country with which Canada has a free-trade agreement is South Korea (Della-Giacoma 2014). Canada’s most important allies in the region are Australia, Japan, South Korea and the US. However, differentially from the latter, Canada has remained silent on freedom of navigation issues involving the maritime disputes in the South China Sea (Manicom 2012). For accomplishing its objectives, it is essential that Canada increases its influence in the infrastructure projects and the construction of new maritime routes in the area, in order to increase its presence and legitimacy within the region. Japan is directly involved in the issue and particularly interested in investments that ease its commercial links in the region. But further than a potential destination of ADB’s projects, Japan plays an important role as a financing actor in the region and must strive to be involved in projects that serve its objectives, as the improvement of Russian ports or the construction of a maritime gas pipeline connecting Russia and Japan. Cooperation with China and South Korea also may occur, once the negotiations of the China-Korea-Japan free trade agreement are in order; however, as Japanese political relations with these two countries have been getting worse over the recent years, cooperation becomes harder (Cook 2014). Moreover, projects in Southeast Asia also deserve Japan’s attention: it has a free trade agreement with ASEAN and relatively good commercial relations with Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore. By the other hand, Japan has entered in the TPP negotiations, which involves, among others, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore and

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Vietnam (Cooper and Manyin 2013). In this context, it is important to remember the close relationship Japan has with the US, which undoubtedly may affect its position on debating maritime infrastructure in the Asia-Pacific region, a core region in the current US’ foreign policy. TheUnited Kingdom, France and the Netherlands have historical ties with the Asia-Pacific region: they had its presence there either by establishing colonies or by enjoying trade opportunities. Nowadays, although these relationships are not so close as they were, their interests are still present in the region, mainly represented by economic ties. Specifically, UK investment ties with Southeast Asia are pretty relevant (Swire 2013). For Europe as a whole, including Luxembourg, Norway, Germany and Italy, the great volume of trade between Europe and East Asia proves the essentiality of improvements of this region’s infrastructure, being one of the major choke points the Strait of Malacca. Trade ties with the Northeast Asia region (especially China) are the most relevant of the region and, if taken as a whole, the Southeast Asia region is also relevant. Thus, although alternative routes are longer and more expensive, it is useful to have them in mind when discussing this subject, crucial for European trade (European Institute for Asian Studies 2011). A core maritime interest for Europe is securing the freedom of access of the main global Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) being one of them the one that stretches from the East and South China Seas through the Malacca Straits into the Indian Ocean. Moreover, “[m]aintaining open and uninterrupted access to […] SLOCs is vital not only for European trade and commerce, but also for the projection of European power” (Behr, Aaltola and Brattberg 2013, 6). Furthermore, the Europeans, as the United States, consider the maintenance of the freedom of navigation in the region crucial to its interests (European Institute for Asian Studies 2011). Northeast Asia is an important region for Turkey’s growing economic and global influence. In the political realm, relations with South Korea and Japan are historically good. Regarding the former, Turkey has always endorsed South Korean positions in the Korean Peninsula issue (Colakoglu 2013). Its relations with Japan, for its turn, have been improving in the recent years, mainly based on economy – especially investments opportunities – and energy (Miller 2014). Turkish relations with China are basically influenced by their huge commerce – China is Turkey’s third biggest trade partner – and by Chinese investments on mine and rail infrastructure in Turkey. Therefore, Turkey has great incentives to engage itself in the region. However, it usually does not choose sides, as on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, in which it sustains its neutrality (Colakoglu 2013). Turkey does not share significant trade ties with Southeast Asian countries, but it has just signed a free trade agreement with Malaysia, allowing mutual preferential market access, which is important, once bilateral trade has already been increasing. Moreover, “Turkey views at Malaysia as a major entry-point for its commercial interests in ASEAN” (Panda

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2014, 1). Finally, Turkish relations with Asia are constrained by its close relationship with US (Colakoglu 2013).

QUESTIONS TO PONDER

1. Being Northeast Asia more developed than the Southeast Asia, in which instance does the former needs less attention from the ADB? 2. How maritime infrastructure affects the regional - and, perhaps, global - balance of power? 3. What is the role of maritime connectivity in Asia-Pacific’s political issues? 4. Which are the main political and economic conflicts that may hinder better integration and connectivity in the Asia-Pacific region? 5. The energy and security issues may enable a more trustful environment in the region or may just worse their relations?

REFERENCES

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UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations ISSN: 2318-3195 | v.2, 2014| p. 83-135

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FOREIGN MILITARY BASES AND THE INTERNATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWER

Bruna dos Santos Lersch1 Josiane Simão Sarti2 ABSTRACT

The establishment of foreign military bases is a key matter to understand the distribution of power in spheres of influence throughout the world. Oversea bases are the first mechanism of a mass network, which works to maintain the control exercised by great powers, becoming the infrastructure for wars. The use of military power to access another country’s soil is not a modern practice, but it was from the 20th century onwards, with the two Great Wars and the consequently ascension of the USA and the USSR as superpowers, that the establishment of oversea military bases has assumed the configuration we are known to today. Therefore, foreign military bases became the most important apparatus of organizations as NATO and European Union, and the current developments regarding Ukraine, Russia and Crimea reinforce the strategic importance of it.

1 6th semester undergraduate student of International Relations at Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). 2 6th semester undergraduate student of International Relations at Univerisdade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). Disarmament and International Security Committee

1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1.1 ANCIENT GREECE, THE ROMAN EMPIRE, AND MARITIME EMPIRES

To comprehend the current importance of foreign military bases, it is necessary to consider their historical deployment and use throughout history. The presence of foreign troops on the soil of independent nations has traditionally been seen as an unusual and uncomfortable reality. In fact, the use of military bases overseas dates back to Ancient Greece and its city-states (Havarky 1989). The first written sources related to military bases can be found in the writings of Thucydides, which narrated the Peloponnesian War of fifth century BC. He wrote about how the Athenian empire established the Delian League, a military alliance which built Athens’ navy and, therefore, its power and importance throughout territorial issues (Sealey 1974). On the other side, Sparta, which had been the military leader of the Greek world, set a range of alliances through individual treaties, creating the Peloponnesian League. The dispute between these two leagues included basing issues that emerged during the war, such as those related to supply distribution and foreign help from allied city-states. Furthermore, both Persians and Romans prized bases that controlled land- access routes to strategic locations since this was crucial for their imperial power and their conquered territories (Calder 2007). It was during Darius’ Persian Empire (modern day Iran) that the imperial route spread – 2,500km long of roads, containing stone warehouses with food and lodging every 29 km. The logistics that accompanied the creation of roads was revolutionary, including benefits for trade and the transport of cargo and people, even assisting communications - a message that previously took months to circulate now went from one side to another on the gigantic empire. These routes upgraded military capacities, since made it possible to conduct simultaneous attacks on multiple fronts. In modern times, with the 15th century maritime empires’ expansion, expansionist powers managed to set up trading posts, warehouses and oversea bases to consolidate their might and influence, aiming to secure vital interests3. At that time, commercial importance began to walk together with military issues, with basing access turning crucial to defend new lands for exploration. Also, the presence of foreign troops during the Colonial Period is closely related to foreign military bases. The British Empire presence in the Pacific Ocean, especially in Indian Territory, could be explained by its importance – India was an outpost for strategic routes into the Asian continent (Panikkar 1977). In this case, British troops reinforced India’s value

3 As an example of those maritime empires, the Venetian and Genoan republics, the colonial Iberian monarchies, like Portugal and Spain, the Low Countries, France, Italy and, first of all, the British Empire were the leading actors of that time (Lachowski 2007). 84 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations as a colony, also giving support for commerce and military needs of the British crown. The same can be said of the American Presence in the Pacific, when it began to establish its roots to conquer importance in Asia-Pacific. In a further period, during the 19th century, the United States was in a moment of expansion of their industry as well as of their international trade and, therefore, was in need of markets abroad. Based on Alfred Mahan’s thoughts, expressed in his book “The Influence of Sea Power upon History”, Washington believed that the only way to guarantee access into international markets was through the development of a merchant and battleship navy supported by a network of naval bases which would maintain open lines of communication between the United States and its new markets (U.S. Department of State 2013). This is the root of US navy’s power, including the importance of their overseas bases.

1.2 20TH CENTURY

From the 20th century onwards, with the two Great Wars and the consequently ascension of the United States (USA) and the Soviet Union (USSR) as superpowers, the establishment of overseas military bases assumed the configuration we know today. Only from the late 1930s did overseas military bases in other sovereign nations gradually become a more acceptable reality, for both Americans and other states (Calder 2007). The turning point for acceptance was World War II - by 1945, at the end of the war, American policymakers claimed more than 3,000 distinct military installations all over the world - the number approached 20,000 if looser definitions of a military installation are employed, though the actual number matters less than their strategic purpose (Glebov and Rodrigues 2009, 20). After World War II, the United States deployed its forces to large foreign bases abroad in order to contain the Soviet Union. The distribution of bases in Western Europe and Northeast Asia that received US troops and their dependents are a legacy of the Cold War, specifically the unique situation in the early 1950s, when the so-called global threat of the Soviet Union drove many non-Communist states together, uniting them against a shared enemy (Pettyjohn 2013). Moreover, World War II had debilitated many of the nations in Western Europe, which required external assistance to counter the Communist bloc, with the United States being the only nation capable of providing such needed assistance. After the Korean War, the fear of Communism impelled the weakened Asian and European nations not only to align with the USA but also to allow Washington to position American troops and their families on their territories at large bases (Pettyjohn 2013). The Cold War period is characterized by the dispute between two poles, where

85 Disarmament and International Security Committee the use of military bases abroad deepened the importance of alliances, enhancing the balancing of power in a bipolar system. According to Lachowski (2007), the postwar conflict between the USA and the USSR showed that:

The period of East–West confrontation that started in the late 1940s was exceptional. It led to the unprecedented consolidation of two alliances and to rivalry between two superpowers (…) for global supremacy, containment, control of satellite states and access to sources of energy. Attempts were also made to strengthen the strategic communication lines of each alliance while weakening those of the others. The states of both blocs built up global networks of military facilities in friendly and client countries as part of strategies that aimed to confront, encircle or intimidate the other side.(Lachowski 2007, 2)

While the number of American overseas bases dropped precipitously before the end of the Cold War, during the mid-1980s, for example, the Pentagon still controlled more than 800 installations worldwide. More than 300,000 American servicemen and women were deployed to West Germany alone in 1983 (Glebov and Rodrigues 2009, 20). During the Cold War, bases served both to support nuclear deterrence and to improve global communications and intelligence for the emerging space age4 (Calder 2007). In addition to that, a large number of foreign military bases were located in Eurasia. Most of them today are a legacy of the Cold War and are situated at places that were possible points of engagement between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) (Lachowski 2007). It is necessary to ponder that the end of the Cold War brought numerous changes in international security policies, creating the urge to demonstrate cooperation and build confidence across former blocs’ divisions. In spite of the declared political partnership between Russia and the USA and huge cutbacks in Western Europe’s heavy armaments, there was no radical realignment of armed forces in the last decade of the 20th century (Lachowski 2007, 3). Another point of history that is important to consider is related to the French presence in Africa, which had its start in the 19th century. Later, when France’s former colonies in Africa began to gain their independence, between 1960 and 1995, it started to sign bilateral treaties with its former colonies, with a variety of degrees in relation to military cooperation and support. One of the commitments made in these treaties was to allow French military bases in that state’s territory. Therefore, most of the operations involved in protecting French nationals and its allied governments in Africa during the 20th century used such bases (Hansen 2008).

4 Space age began to deepen its importance with the use of space assets in the bipolar dispute between the USSR and the United States, primarily with the launch of Sputnik, in 1957. Across its importance, space technology served, initially, to ensure accurate communications, also seeking approval of public opinion towards the Cold War period. 86 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

1.3 21ST CENTURY

At the 21st century, new directions have been taken by the main states that display military bases overseas in relation to the types of efforts involving military bases. The deepening struggle against terrorism has become central, especially after the September 2001 attacks. The key threats to the USA were redefined as growing religious extremism and other asymmetric threats (e.g. unconventional warfare, crime, and the threat of the proliferation of weapons and technologies of mass destruction) (Lachowski 2007). According to Calder (2007),

(…) since 9/11, the United States has also come to face an increasingly complex political basing problem. As the struggle against terrorism has broadened into a global “arc of instability” within the developing world, and as even America’s industrialized allies have grown skeptical and weary, the pressures on America to retrench have deepened once again, from Saudi Arabia to Turkey, South Korea, and beyond. Something much larger than an “Iraq War syndrome” is at work, although Iraq has proven to be an important catalyst. (Calder 2007)

The shock of the terrorist attacks led to a significant redirection of US attention (and military assets) from Europe to Central Asia and Middle East, including the Caspian–Caucasus area. The broad international anti-terrorist front that was formed after the attacks on the USA enabled Western forces to be deployed close to certain parts of Asia that had been considered Russia’s traditional sphere of influence (Lachowski 2007, 3-4). Therefore, the US political and military involvement in some East European and Asian states - Afghanistan, Iraq and some Central Asian states - and the proximity of US forces to the borders of China and Russia have created a qualitatively new situation (Lachowski 2007). France, by its turn, has reduced the size of its forces in Africa, while the USA is increasing its presence on the other side. Along with the counterterrorism force in Djibouti, Washington has secured agreements with southern and western African nations to provide them with logistical support, while it has also worked to build new drone bases in Niger. The US military also has launched a new joint command, US-Africa Command (AFRICOM) to oversee operations on the continent. The command entered in operations in October 2007 out of the offices of the US European Command in Stuttgart, Germany, and is currently seeking a permanent state to host it in Africa (Hansen 2008). This American command could be taken as a sign that the exclusively French military influence and presence in Africa is effectively over, besides its actual presence and actions.

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2 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

2.1 FOREIGN MILITARY BASES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

By definition, a military base is an installation created to serve as support for military operations and logistics (Glebov 2009). These facilities can play different roles, being related to several types of bases, such as navy, land or air bases. Depending on the role it takes, there are many functions that these settlements can exert: test-ranges for new weaponry, posts of intelligence operations, platforms for military operations, weaponry stock or even as host for military corps. The main controversial issue concerning military bases is its establishment in foreign states’ territory, a common practice related to global distribution of power in spheres of influence. Usually linked with great powers’ foreign policy, military installations abroad have led the international community to many debates associated with the principle of sovereignty. Sovereignty is a concept which has its roots in philosophers from Socrates to Thomas Hobbes. However, the idea formally became a principle in the Westphalian context where the Nation-states were born (Jackson 2003). It represents the highest authority exerted by a legal state within its territory (Calster, n.d.). Thus, state sovereignty is directly linked with the notion of borders and territory.

Territory is simultaneously a condition for a state to exist and a limitation to its rights: in principle, a state is sovereign only in its territory. (…) Sovereignty, in regard to a portion of the globe, has been described as a right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other state, the function of a state (Calster, n.d.).

Therefore, according to this concept of sovereignty, no other state can impose its jurisdiction abroad, only inside its own territory. In other words, the principle of sovereignty of a state clashes with the implementation of military bases belonging to other country inside another one’s territory. In this sense, as the presence of foreign military bases increased since the late of the 20th century, the need to solve this paradox and the importance of regulating this situation based on International Law have become apparent (Manson 2012). The results of this discussion were the Visiting Force Agreement (VFA) and the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA).

2.1.1 The Visiting Force and the Status of Force Agreements

The Visiting Force Agreement (VFA) and the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) have basically the same meanings. The only substantial difference between them is their scope: the VFA covers forces which are temporally present in a foreign 88 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations territory, while the SOFA regulates the situation of military installations effectively established in a host state (Manson 2012). Both agreements are created to formalize the superiority of extraterritorial jurisdiction on civil law. The principle of extraterritoriality refers to the exercise of legal power beyond a state’s territorial borders (Colangelo 2014). It means that countries that maintain military forces abroad have the right to exercise their own exclusive jurisdiction over their installations hosted in foreign states. According to Erik Rosenfeld, researcher at the University of Washington:

It was unclear how customary international law would deal with criminal jurisdiction over visiting forces, especially the problem of concurrent jurisdiction over crimes committed by visiting forces on foreign territory. In order to resolve these problems, SOFAs were developed for the express purpose of defining the legal rights and responsibilities of military forces stationed on foreign soil. SOFAs are international agreements between states that create obligations concerning the jurisdiction over foreign state’s military or civilian citizen.”(Rosenfeld 2014, p.280)

Thus, VFAs and SOFAs are multilateral or bilateral agreements that generally establish the framework under which a state’s military forces can operate in a foreign country (Manson 2012). However, a formal document which specifies the guidelines of these agreements does not exist yet. Then, VFAs and SOFAs are required by states when it is necessary for a specific purpose, but these agreement’s rules are shaped according to the negotiations among countries involved (Manson 2012). Commonly, the main issue concerning SOFAs is related to the jurisdiction which will prevail in that specific area, but other provisions dealing with subjects such as taxes and fees, test-ranges for weaponry and number of troops are also included in the SOFA’s scope (Manson 2012). It is important to notice that VFAs and SOFAs are not security agreements and do not address the rules of war. According to Manson (2012, p.1):“(…) in the event of armed conflict between parties to a SOFA, the terms of the agreement would no longer be applicable”. The most important multilateral SOFA is the NATO SOFA, from 1949, among USA and NATO’s countries. This is the only Status of Force Agreement concluded as part of a treaty. Composed of 20 articles, the NATO SOFA is an example of shared jurisdictions:

Under the shared jurisdiction framework, each of the respective countries is provided exclusive jurisdiction in specific circumstances, generally when an offense is only punishable by one of the country’s laws. In that case, the country whose law has been offended has exclusive jurisdiction over the offender. When the offense violates the laws of both countries, concurrent jurisdiction is present and additional qualifications are used to determine which country will be allowed to assert jurisdiction over the offender (Manson 2012).

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This shared jurisdiction gives a cooperative nature to NATO SOFA, unlike what happens with other bilateral agreement such as the VFA between USA and Mongolia. Based on this document, the USA have exclusive jurisdiction over US personnel, according to US laws.

Any offense against Mongolia’s laws shall be referred to US authorities. There is no requirement for the United States to waive jurisdiction, only to give “sympathetic consideration” of any such request. (Manson 2012)

Finally, the other multilateral SOFA of great importance is the United Nations SOFA. It is based on pacific principles, being the official guidelines to peace-keeping operations. Since 2002, in the context of the peace-keeping mission in Bosnia, the USA and other countries started to request immunity to their troops for fear of being prosecuted for a crime by the International Criminal Court (ICC). As a result, UN has adopted a SOFA for peace-keeping operations that provides broader sending-state criminal jurisdiction than the NATO SOFA (Rosenfeld 2003). In other words, the UN SOFA provides exclusive jurisdiction over any criminal offense that may be committed by peace-keeping forces. With this, states’ forces participating in UN actions receive greater protection from ICC prosecution than in other unilateral military action. According to Rosenfeld (2003, p.290), “(…) this protection increases incentives for countries’ participation in UN missions rather than acting unilaterally or through NATO”. Therefore, with all these agreements, the establishment of foreign military bases has become more regulated in accordance to International Law. With this, great powers can appeal to the principle of extraterritoriality, which is the main base of Visiting Forces and Status of Force Agreements, to extend the protection of their law to their forces installed abroad.

2.2 THE ROLE OF FOREIGN MILITARY BASES

The establishment of military bases is a practice which has increased since the Cold War. For the USA, having access to foreign territories meant conquering spheres of influence which were needed to contain the spread of communism represented by the Soviet Union (Pettyjohn 2013). Since then, the USA has become the state which has more military installations abroad in the world and its presence in many strategic regions of different continents has become part of US foreign policy. Nowadays, according to the Global Research Centre, the USA controls between 700 and 800 bases worldwide. According to Wilbert van der Zeijden (2009), from the Transnational Institute:

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(…) many of the 300 overseas military interventions and invasions of the US in the past century, like Korean War, Vietnam War and Gulf War, were only possible because the US had well-positioned military facilities to launch and support these military operations (Zeijden 2009).

Image 1 - The US Military Footprint on the World

Source: US Department of Defense, Base Structure Report, 2008

Other countries, such as France and the United Kingdom, also operate in a significant number of military installations abroad as a remaining of their colonial empires. The French presence in Africa is still very remarkable and dates from the 17th century. However, it was just in the 19th century that African territories under French influence became colonies. The new imperialism practices established in the 1880’s have resulted in the scramble for Africa, when European powers divided and annexed regions of the African continent, during the Berlin Conference of 1884 (Hansen 2008). With the end of World War II, a multiple process of independences started among African states. However, the formal imperialism that dominated Africa was replaced by foreign military presence and strategic economic partnerships (Hansen 2008).

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Image 2 - The French Military in Africa

Source: http://www.cfr.org/france/french-military-africa/p12578

Today, Africa represents an important French supplier of oil and metals and is a significant market for France’s exports (Hansen 2008). Therefore, in order to secure its national interests, France maintains military bases in countries such as Chad, Djibouti, Gabon, Ivory Coast, and Senegal. There are French troops installed in Mali and Libya too, as result of recent peacekeeping operations (Hansen 2008). The United Kingdom also is an important actor regarding foreign military bases issues. The country has fourteen British Overseas Territories (BOT), which are under UK jurisdiction and sovereignty (Ministry of Defense 2014). According to The Telegraph newspaper (2011), “Britain acquired most of them at the apogee of its national power and prestige, with dates of acquisition ranging from the 17th to the early 20th century”. Bermuda was the first, settled in 1609; Britain claimed the last, the British Antarctic Territory, in 1908. These territories are located in strategic

92 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations region of the Caribbean Sea, North and South Atlantic and in the Indian Ocean. The British National Security Strategy Review (2010) identifies the protection of overseas territories as part of UK security policies. Therefore, the country maintains military facilities in these regions in order to maintain their stability, intervening overseas and using coercive force when it is necessary to guarantee national vital interests (Ministry of Defense 2014). The British Ministry of Defense provides a permanently military presence of around 1,300 personnel in South Atlantic Islands such as the Falklands/Malvinas and South Georgia. The region is strategic to give UK access to Antarctic, where the country develops the British Antarctic Survey and maintain other permanent scientific stations to do researches about Antarctic environment and resources (The Telegraph 2011) The British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) also represents strategic issues regarding UK access, due to its localization near the Middle East and Eastern Asia. The BIOT includes 55 islands in the Chagos Archipelago, being Diego Garcia the largest atoll and the most important island concerning military matters, since the area was leased to US in 1970s and still works as a north-American military base (BBC 2008). The atoll had a vital importance in security purposes, such as the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to the British Ministry of Defense, around 2,500 US personnel are stationed in there, which represents an important part of Anglo-American defense relationship (Ministry of Defense 2014). Others military installations in British Overseas Territories are Gibraltar and Cyprus, both significant too due to its access to the Mediterranean Sea. Cyprus hosts 3,000 British troops in the British Sovereign Areas located in Akrotiri and Dhekelia. These areas are retained for military purpose for the Royal Army and the Royal Air Force mostly. Recently, these bases had been used to support operations in Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq (Ministry of Defense 2014). In the other hand, Gibraltar comprises some 900 personnel and is strategic to dominate the western entrance to the Mediterranean Sea in time of conflicts (BBC 2008). Finally, UK has also military installations deployed across states where NATO operates. Since the Iraq War, in 2003, British troops are in this country under Operation Telic scope, namely to restore infrastructure and services and provide security. About 8,000 UK personnel are still in Afghanistan, in order to help Afghan government in its fight against Taliban groups. The country is involved in United Nations peacekeeping operations too. There are about 300 troops scattered in African countries and in the Balkans region. As the USA, Russia has military bases overseas as consequence of the Cold War. In this period, they both used these installations mainly in Europe to block and deter each other’s presence. The extra-European bases served to provide global mobility and to increase influence in regional conflicts (Lachowski 2007). After the World War II, the USSR tightened its control over its soviet allies,

93 Disarmament and International Security Committee setting up a significant number of military installations in their territories in order to decrease its vulnerability caused by its limited access to the high seas and restrict number of ports (Lachowski 2007). Therefore, the Soviet Union has built a vast military infrastructure in soviets states such as Ukraine, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, but also in allied states from abroad as Angola, the German Democratic Republic, Libya, Syria and Vietnam (Lachowski 2007). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, in 1991, Russia had to abandon most of its bases due to international political pressure and budgetary reasons. However, the country continued to play an important role in the domestic issues of former USSR’ states. Institutional arrangements as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) were created to integrate the region under Russia’s leadership. In this context, after the independence of Eastern European states, Russian attention returned to renew basing agreements with its traditional partners, alleging the need to protect their borders and the need to develop peacekeeping operations in areas of domestic instabilities (Lachowski 2007).

Image 3 - Major British Troop Deployments

Source: BBC, 2008

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Since the September 11 terrorist events, Russia has been reformulating its foreign policy in order to reaffirm its influence in regions that were under US focus, mainly in Central Asia, which were a former USSR territory. According to Russia’s national security doctrine, the deployment of Russia troops in strategically important regions overseas is needed to develop joint security (Lachowski 2007). Nowadays, Russia has about 25 foreign military bases scattered in former Soviet Union’s countries such as Azerbaijan, Georgia and Tajikistan. Recently, in 2012, Russia has reaffirmed its military partnership with Kirgizstan, which began in 2003, by signing an agreement that allows joint defense trainings between the countries, in addition to the military installations which were already there (Reuters 2012). The naval base in Tartus, Syria, is the last Russian foreign military base outside the former USSR and has played an important role since the Syrian civil war began, being the primary mean through which Russia intervenes in the conflict, cooperating with Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad’s forces (Washington Post 2013). Therefore, in general, after the Cold War ended, military installations abroad have remained. Goals such as the War on Terror, control of markets and natural resources and of strategic positions underlie motivations for states to establish bases overseas until today (Dufour 2007). According to Iraklis Tsavdaridis, Secretary of the World Peace Council (WPC):

The establishment of military bases should not of course be seen simply in terms of direct military ends. They are always used to promote states’ economic and political objectives. For example, USA corporations and government have been eager for some time to build a secure corridor for US.-controlled oil and natural gas pipelines from the Caspian Sea in Central Asia through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Arabian Sea. This region -has more than 6 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves and almost 40 percent of its gas reserves. The war in Afghanistan and the creation of U.S. military Bases in Central Asia are viewed as a key opportunity to make such pipelines a reality. (Dufour 2007)

Currently, the establishment of foreign bases by states is directly linked to issues regarding lines of communication, for example. Having lines of communication opened is an essential matter throughout History. They are routes which connect military and commercial units with its supply base, being important to connect markets and being the main issue regarding military logistics abroad (Khalid 2012). Thus, to install air and navy bases overseas, it is fundamental to control sea lines and air lines of communication, since having the capacity to keep these lines open is as important as assuring the possibility of isolating them in strategic situations (Khalid 2012). Another modern use of bases abroad refers to intelligence programs. Echelon is the best example of a signal intelligence system which uses states’ foreign military bases as signals receivers. This network was created in 1946 by a treaty among

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USA, UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand and its objective is to collect and analyze international intelligence data. Through the infrastructure of these countries’ overseas, the system monitors the flow of global communication (Zeijden 2009). Finally, the major and most traditional use for military bases is hosting states’ personnel during an operation, being a platform for military maneuvers, serving as stock or location of test-ranging for weaponry and as transport posts (Zeijden 2009). In cases of peace-keeping operations or of international aid in natural disasters, the infrastructure represented by the military bases is also applied. Thus, the extensive use of overseas bases creates a massive network which is responsible to project power beyond boundaries, increasing the capacity of response and control over other regional security problems (Peterson 2012). This is possible because these installations serve as a military infrastructure that supports states’ operations abroad. That is why foreign military bases became the most important apparatus of organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (Zeijden 2009).

2.3 IMPACTS OF FOREIGN MILITARY BASES IN HOST STATES

Normally, one nation allows another states’ foreign presence in its territory if they are allies or if they share the same perception of a common threat (Pettyjohn 2013). However, the long-term presence of a country in a host state can result in political, environmental and social problems. The establishment of overseas bases can bring political instability to the region in question. If agreements as SOFA’s are negotiated with non-popular local governments, the foreign presence can be seen as an authoritarian policy by the population and by other states as well (Peterson 2012). Moreover, in the course of time, a military infrastructure can represent a threat to the host country, undermining regional security and representing vulnerability to foreign attacks (Zeijden 2009). Finally, being a host nation effectively means losing sovereignty over part of its own territory to another state (Peterson 2012). From the environmental viewpoint, military bases can be aggressions practiced at the local level. The testing of new weaponry, including chemical and nuclear weapons, might represent a risk of contamination and of accidents. Substances based on uranium, for example, can infect the soil and the water, reaching the whole population (Zeijden 2009). Social instabilities are resultants of political and environmental problems associated with crimes that involve foreign personnel as well. According to Zeijden (2009), “(…) communities living around bases often experienced high levels of rapes, violent crimes and loss of lands committed by soldiers”. All these factors

96 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations together cause popular movements of resistance against international military presence overseas (Dufour 2007).

2.4 THE SUSTAINABILITY OF FOREIGN MILITARY BASES

Keeping military bases abroad represents huge costs to great powers: large investments in infrastructure result in heavy burdens to public budgets, even to the USA (Wohlstetter 1951). Bases system depends on relative positions regarding sources of supply, boundaries of enemies’ territories and targets’ localizations. These conditions associated with costs for defense in the area make international projection an expensive undertaking (Pettyjohn 2013). It is expected that costs will rise even higher as a consequence of the new self- governing posture adopted by many host countries. Since large foreign presence can bring internal vulnerabilities, it has become a common practice to charge fees from great powers wanting to establish bases in foreign territories (Pettyjohn 2013). Therefore, sustainability for maintaining overseas bases is decreasing. Agreements that provide temporary presence of foreign troops can substitute the traditional infrastructure developed abroad. It might be a better solution also for the great powers: costs would be lower, there would be fewer causes for retaliation by the local population and states could diversify their international presence easier (Pettyjohn 2013). This framework may represent a change in states’ foreign policies, especially regarding the USA. According to Stace Pettyjohn, a political scientist at the RAND Corporation:

A shrinking defense budget, host-nation opposition to a U.S. military presence, and the increasing vulnerability of many overseas bases are endangering the sustainability of today’s U.S. forward military presence. In the coming years, it is likely that these factors will force the Pentagon to make difficult decisions, which could include divesting some legacy bases or establishing new facilities (Pettyjohn 2013).

Thus, it has become essential to establish international guidelines which regulate the impacts and the sustainability of foreign military bases. The existence of a vast number of situations where military bases abroad are employed makes this an even more complex discussion, which, in the end, aims to create standards by which states and the International Law could control great powers’ presence overseas.

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2.5 CASE STUDIES

2.5.1 Afghanistan

Foreign military presence in Afghanistan has historical roots with consequences that last until today. During the Cold War, the state became a strategic area to the Soviet Union. In order to gain influence in Central Asia and spread the communist ideology, the USSR occupied the country in December 1979, as it had been asked by the leftist government that ruled the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan since 1978 (Barfield 2010). In that period, many insurgent groups named Mujahideen have come to oppose the soviet intervention. This opposition was in accordance with USA’s interests of containing USSR influence. Therefore, the North-American government sent money and weapons to support the rebels, with the support of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. It was also in this period that Taliban emerged as a political and religious movement against the soviet presence in Afghanistan. The conflict lasted almost ten years, ending with the soviet troop’s withdrawal in February 1989 (Barfield 2010). After the USSR’s departure, the communist government established in Afghanistan eventually fell, in 1992. From this moment on, a civil war started between the Mujahideen groups that fought the Soviets and the Taliban for the control of the country. After four years fighting, the Taliban finally broke into the capital Kabul and dominated about 90% of the region, then establishing the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Barfield 2010).

2.5.1.1 The 9/11 attacks and the Afghanistan War

The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was a theocratic government against Western presence in the country. Due to its restrictive and radical policies, the Emirate has been international recognized only by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (Barfield 2010). Even with the lack of international support, the Taliban’s government was able to control the country until 2001, after the 9/11 attacks. Under George W. Bush’s administration, the USA has blamed the Islamic militant organization, Al-Qaeda, for being responsible for terrorism practices and has accused Taliban of protecting and supporting the organization. It was the beginning of the War on Terror (Gall 2014). As retaliation, Washington unleashed the punitive Afghanistan War in October 2001, with US bombings in Afghan cities. The USA entered in the country under the claim that Osama Bin Laden, leader of Al-Qaeda, was hidden under Taliban’s protection (Gall 2014).

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In 2002, after the consolidation of the US presence in the region, Hamid Karzai became president of Afghanistan, under the support of Western powers, anti- Taliban Afghan groups and the United Nations. With the end of the Taliban regime in the country, the USA increased their influence by the establishment of military bases (Gall 2014).

2.5.1.2 Main Foreign Military Bases in Afghanistan

Afghanistan has until today a great number of foreign military bases in its territory. The USA is the country with more installations, but other Western powers, such as the United Kingdom and Germany, have military facilities in the region too. However, nowadays, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has the control of most remaining bases due to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a NATO mission established by the UN Security Council in December 2001.

Image 4 - Bagram Air Base

Source: BBC News The main US air base in Afghan territory is Bagram Airfield. Originally built by the Soviet military during its occupation, this base situated in the north of Kabul can hold up to 10,000 troops and serves as a prison too. In Bagram there is a runway where bomber aircrafts can land as well as huge transport aircrafts (BBC News 2009). According to The State Newspaper, the US have invested about $200 million in Bagram’s infrastructure, with $68 million used only in the runway modernization. 99 Disarmament and International Security Committee

Image 5 - Lead Nations in each Province of Afghanistan

Source: International Security Assistance Force The two main airports in Afghanistan, Kabul International Airport and Kandahar International Airport, serve as air bases as well as Bagram Airfield. Both airports were expanded and modernized by the USA and NATO between 2007 and 2009 and now operate civilian and military flights. Their infrastructure includes operational and maintenance facilities and housing and administrative installations (BBC News 2009). Other bases also have a key role in US and NATO logistics. Camp Joyce, for example, located along the Pakistani border, represents a strategic position since the Taliban is present in Pakistan nowadays (ABC News 2010). Countries such as the UK and Germany still have their bases in Afghanistan as Camp Bastian, the main British installation, and Camp Holland, under German administration (ABC News 2010).

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2.5.1.3 USA-Afghanistan Agreements

Shortly thereafter Operation Enduring Freedom – the official name of the US intervention operation –, the Taliban was ousted by north-American and allied forces and many security agreements were concluded with the new Afghan government (Manson 2012). The first diplomatic contact between the two countries in order to discuss the US presence in Afghan territory occurred in September 2002, through an exchange of notes. The north-American government called upon The Foreign Assistance Act of 19615 to legitimate its intervention (Manson 2012). According to this act, the USA could apply defense measures against internal and external aggression, including military assistance to friendly countries:

The act authorizes the President to furnish military assistance on such terms and conditions as he may determine, to any friendly country or international organization, the assisting of which the President finds will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace and which is otherwise eligible to receive such assistance (Manson 2012, p.7).

Another exchange of notes dated from 2003 was responsible for the accord on foreign personnel status. The US claimed for an agreement equivalent to that accorded under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relation of 1961. According to the Convention, the north-American were immune from criminal prosecution by Afghan authorities as well as were immune from civil jurisdictions (Manson 2012). In 2004, the Afghanistan and the USA signed an Acquisition and Cross- servicing Agreement, responsible for providing logistic support, supplies and services to foreign militaries in the country (Manson 2012). In 2005, President Hamid Karzai and President Bush issued a joint declaration in which they elaborated prospects for a future agreement to help organize, train, equip and sustain Afghan security forces until the country has developed its own capacity. However, efforts to regulate the relationship between the two states have not progressed (Manson 2012). The situation of US presence in Afghanistan have remained the same until December 2010, when the USA, under Barack Obama’s administration, announced that US forces would commence a transfer of security responsibility to the Afghan government in 2011, which would be concluded in the end of 2014. Still in 2011, the official Status of Force Agreement begun to be negotiated to guarantee that the presence of US forces in Afghan territory is temporary and that all troops must withdraw from the country after one year of the agreement (Manson 2012). 5 The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was an act enacted by US Congress. It was responsible for organize the US assistance programs abroad, including military and economic aid. According to this act, the US would intervene, through assistance programs, in countries which were political and economic unstable, in order to help reinforce democratic values and avoid human rights violations (Manson 2012). 101 Disarmament and International Security Committee

Finally, in 2012, the US-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement was signed. It is a legally binding executive agreement that provides a framework for the future relationship between both countries (White House 2012). The document reaffirms the cooperation principle and the shared goal of defeating Al-Qaeda and implements mechanisms to support Afghanistan’s social and economic development. In practice, the agreement is a diplomatic measure to reinforce the commitments made by the two nations. Nonetheless, it has not a security role and does not provide for technical and legal issues concerning the US presence in the country (White House 2012).

2.5.1.4 SOFA’s Negotiations

According to NATO and in relation to its International Security Assistance Force, the organization, “as part of the overall International Community effort is working to create conditions whereby the Afghanistan is able to exercise its authority (…), including the development of professional and capable Afghan National Security Forces” (ISAF 2012, p.1). However, Afghan president Harmid Karzai has decided to leave the signature of the Afghanistan-US SOFA to whoever replaces him in the government in 2014. According to NATO’s Secretary General Anders Rasmussen, without the formalization of a legal framework, there cannot be any deployments in Afghanistan after 2014 (UPI 2014). Since the bilateral SOFA between the two states would provide training and assistance for Afghan forces, the immunity of US personnel in Afghanistan has become a bargaining chip in exchange for benefits such as US military equipment and investments in the country (Clark 2013). Therefore, the regulation of technical issues is essential to provide a legal basis for international troops’ continued presence in the territory beyond 2014 (Clark 2013). The motivation to Hamid Karzai not to sign the SOFA is probably related to domestic policy. Although Afghanistan can obtain benefits from the agreement, is important to Karzai’s reputation that he plays a political role of defending national interests, since his time as president is over (Panda 2013). On the other hand, the USA has many strategic interests in continuing its presence in the country. According to an article published by the London newspaper The Guardian (2001), “a pro-western regime in Kabul should give the US an Afghan route for Caspian oil”. Afghanistan’s northern neighbors contain great reserves of oil which could be critical to future global supply. In 1998, George Bush’s vice-president, Dick Cheney, said: “I cannot think of a time when we have had a region emerge as suddenly to become as strategically significant as the Caspian” (Mombiot 2001). Since it turns necessary the creation of a route for Western powers, Afghanistan appeared as a promising option,

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(…) since transporting the oil through Russia or Azerbaijan would greatly enhance Russia’s political and economic control over the central Asian republics, which is precisely what the West has spent 10 years trying to prevent. Piping it through Iran would enrich a regime which the US has been seeking to isolate. Sending it the long way round through China, quite aside from the strategic considerations, would be prohibitively expensive. But pipelines through Afghanistan would allow the US both to pursue its aim of “diversifying energy supply” and to penetrate the world’s most lucrative markets. Growth in European oil consumption is slow and competition is intense. In south Asia, by contrast, demand is booming and competitors are scarce. Pumping oil south and selling it in Pakistan and India, in other words, is far more profitable than pumping it west and selling it in Europe (Mombiot 2001).

Another key matter concerning Afghanistan is the local opium production. Before US occupation started, the Taliban had successfully eradicated the opium crop in the regions, but since 2001 the production has been increasing (Gareev 2010). According to the 2013 Afghanistan Opium Survey released by United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the cultivation reached a high record in 2013. In 2012, a Mexican spokesman told the newspaper Aljazeera that CIA does not fight drug traffickers. Instead, they try to manage the drug trade (Arsenault 2012). Although there is no effective evidence about US participation in opium trade, there are many multinational corporations interested in it and they play an important role in US foreign policy decisions (Gareev 2010). According to a former commander in the Russian occupation of Afghanistan:

Americans themselves admit that drugs are often transported out of Afghanistan on American planes. Drug trafficking in Afghanistan brings them about 50 billion dollars a year – which fully covers the expenses tied to keeping their troops there (Gareev 2010).

Thus, the US desire to remain in Afghanistan after 2014 has many strategic motivations. In this context, the signature of a Status of Force Agreement between both states can represent access to a region which is key to Western interests in Central Asia. On the other hand, this agreement could also benefit a government that would turn to be a US ally in Afghanistan, increasing its military capabilities through joint trainings and defense cooperation. That is why is important to discuss the guidelines of a possible SOFA between the countries in order to define the terms of this partnership.

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2.5.2 Japan

The most pressing issue concerning foreign military bases established in Japan is its most strategic territory, Okinawa. It is the Japanese southernmost province and is formed by 169 islands which are together known as Ryukyu Archipelago (Sarantakes 2000). During World War II, Okinawa was a key region due to its localization near Taiwan, South Korea, Philippines and China. Therefore, north-America’s access and control of the Pacific Ocean were related with US presence in these islands. In this context, the USA has prepared an offensive action in April 1945, penetrating with its naval forces the Japanese waters (Sarantakes 2000). The Okinawa Battle ended in June 22, 1945 and, as a consequence, the US remained in the region since it.

Image 6 - Korean Peninsula

Source: National Clearinghouse for US-Japan Studies

With the end of the Second Great War, Okinawa has become essential to the north-American post war system. The fear of the return of Japanese aggressive expansionism and the need to contain the soviet influence in Asia has stimulated the USA to create a military infrastructure in the Archipelago to consolidate its presence there (Sarantakes 2000). Episodes such as the Korean War (1950-1953) and the Vietnam War (1956-1975) required a great number of combat and support units

104 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations which were provided through Okinawa (Fuqua 2001). Okinawa was under north-American administration until 1972, when the islands were brought back under Japanese sovereignty. However, even today, about 20% of Okinawa’s main island surface is occupied by US military installations (Fuqua 2001).

2.5.2.1 US-Japan Agreements

The bilateral relationship between the USA and Japan after the World War II officially has begun in 1952, with the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The document was responsible for formalizing the end of the war. Article 3 officially led Okinawa under US administration, applying the concept of residual sovereignty. According to this principle, the USA would take care of this Japanese territory but its inhabitants would retain Japanese citizenship. It was a strategy to deal with possible accusations of colonization practices by the USA (Fuqua 2001).

Image 7 - U.S. Installations in Okinawa

Source: blacktokyo.com

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It was in 1960 that the most important treaty concerning US-Japan relations was accorded. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security guaranteed the use of Japanese territory by US air, naval and land forces in order to contribute to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in Asia (Manson 2010). According to Jacques Fuqua of Indiana University, the document has two key points:

(…) first, Japan and the United States will respond to an attack against either party within Japan’s territory. Second, Japan will provide land for U.S. military installations in its dual mission to provide security for Japan and the “Far East.” The first point results from Article IX of Japan’s “Peace Constitution” (the 1947 constitution) which renounces Japan’s sovereign right to wage war as a means of settling disputes and provides the rationale for a U.S. military presence in Japan. As a result, U.S. forces, along with Japan’s own Self-Defense Forces, satisfy Japan’s security requirements. (Fuqua 2001).

Alongside the Security Treaty, the USA and Japan signed, in 1960, their Status of Force Agreement, providing a separate agreement to govern the status of US armed forces in Japanese territory. This SOFA provides extraterritoriality to US members and requires cooperation between both states in criminal investigations (Manson 2010). Finally, in 2006, the USA, under Bush’s administration, signed an agreement with Japanese government to relocate a US marine air station to a less populated part of Okinawa. The accord has received several critics of the Okinawans who have claimed for the end of US military presence in the region (Fackler 2010).

2.5.2.2 The Future of Okinawa

The foreign military presence in Okinawa has many local impacts. A great number of old installations are now in populated areas since the archipelago were urbanized in the last years. Thus, the population has to live with the extreme noise that comes from air bases and with the pollution coming from the military complexes. The rape of 12 years-old girl by members of US armed forces, in 1995, also has contributed to mobilize people against the crimes committed by US service members (Fuqua 2001). In this sense, the agreement proposed by the USA in 2006, in order to decrease the number of troops in the region and to relocate US bases, was an attempt to reduce hostilities between Okinawans and north-American troops. However, it has resulted in many popular manifestations against military bases (Fackler 2010). In 2009, Yukio Hatoyama was elected as Prime-Minister of Japan, promising in his campaign that he would be against the guidelines provided by the accord proposed by the US. During his administration, Hatoyama was pressured by public

106 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations opinion and, at the same time, by the desire to maintain Japan-USA relations. Thus, in 2010, he announced that he would not fulfill his main election promise and would proceed with the agreement (Fackler 2010). In the last years, popular manifestations have increased, asking for the end of the colonial policy practice by the US in Okinawa (Fackler 2010). The fact that, historically, the islands were integrated lately into the Japanese Empire and, therefore, do not share the same culture identity with the rest of Japan, not being seen as “truly Japanese”, explains one of the reasons why Japan’s government do not try to meet popular claims, not transferring the bases to the mainland (Fuqua 2001). The former US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, claimed that the alliance between USA and Japan is the pillar of Asia-Pacific’s security and that this partnership requires close cooperation and coordinated policies (Foreign Policy Bulletin 2010). Thus, according to Clinton, there will be bilateral negotiations to reduce US military presence’s impacts, but the close relationship has to be reaffirmed:

Let me repeat what American officials have said ever since President Eisenhower signed our treaty 50 years ago: The commitment of the United States to Japan’s security is unwavering. To ensure that our alliance is well positioned to adapt and respond to evolving challenges, we must bolster our diplomatic engagement and security arrangements and ensure that our military posture can continue to provide the security that has been so instrumental in the region’s stability for so long. We must do this while reducing the impact on local communities by American military bases, particularly in Okinawa. Our two governments drew up the realignment roadmap with these dual goals in mind, and we look to our Japanese allies and friends to follow through on their commitments (Foreign Policy Bulletin 2010).

Given US strategic interests of projecting influence in Pacific as well as Okinawa’s dependence on Japanese governmental support, the situation is unlikely to radically change. However, it is essential that US military commanders work actively with the Japanese state to further reduce impacts and crimes against local citizens as well as in working to answer local issues and concerns within the broader framework of Okinawa’s reality (Fuqua 2001).

2.5.3 Ukraine

The discussion about foreign military bases in Ukraine cannot be dissociated from the Cold War period and Russia’s presence and influences in that territory. In 1954, Nikita Khrushchev controversially “gifted” Crimea to Ukraine, in honor of the 300th anniversary of Russian-Ukrainian unity – action that did not have political consequences until the dissolution of the USSR (Weir 2014). An important issue

107 Disarmament and International Security Committee to ponder is that Ukraine has a very clear concern with its territorial integrity, where the function of the state is to maintain its territory (Ukraine 1996). The country is divided in 27 units, where the importance of two specific units, the Crimean Peninsula and Sevastopol, is crucial to understand how relations with Russia are established – those are regions with autonomy. During Cold War, Sevastopol was separated into a special zone by Soviet authorities and governed by Russia. Today, the city of Sevastopol is considered by some countries as a federal city of the Russian Federation and part of the Crimean Federal District, while others consider it as part of Ukraine – this city has a special status, known as a “self-governed” city. Despite that, nearly 60 percent of its population of 2 million identify themselves as Russians (Haaretz 2014).

Image 8 - Sevastopol Location in the Crimean Peninsula

Source: http://www.newinternationaloutlook.com

Crimean Peninsula, on the other hand, organized a referendum in the beginning of 2014 to vote on its independence and consequently integration

108 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations to the Russian Federation, during an instable period of public manifestations6. The referendum was approved with a majority of almost 95,7% of the Crimean population. It is crucial to point that Ukraine’s Constitution – thorough article 134 – considered the Crimean Peninsula as an inseparable part of Ukraine. This leads us to ponder that the constitution was disrespected, representing the fail of Ukraine’s political institutions. Back to the collapse of the Soviet Union, a significant part of Russian military bases abroad was closed. However, today Russia does retain (or has regained) bases throughout much of the former Soviet space. Russian bases or facilities of varying significance exist in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Tajikistan (Lord and Erickson 2014). The largest is the Naval Base at Sevastopol in Crimea. It hosts the main facilities and forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet7, whose strategic purpose in the Cold War period was to constrain NATO’s maneuvering room in the region and keep it ‘within Turkey’s coastal waters’ (Lachowski 2007). According to Varshalomidze and Ali (2014),

The Russian Black Sea Fleet has been based in Crimea since the end of the 18th century. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia and Ukraine argued for years about how to divide the fleet. It was finally resolved on May 28, 1997 with an agreement that limited the size of Russia’s fleet to 388 ships and 161 planes, and the deal was valid until 2017 for $98m annually. After Moscow annexed Crimea in March 2014, the Kremlin annulled all of the agreements, took over all 193 Ukrainian military installations and therefore, remains in Crimea for free.

Presuming a shift in Ukraine’s foreign and security policy, Russian decision makers sought to reformulate the use of Sevastopol after 2017 – Russian Defense Minister Ivanov announced that the Russian fleet did not have plans to leave the base, denying the rumors about moving from Sevastopol to another base facility. He reinforced that ‘the principal base of the [Black Sea] was, is and will [exist] in Sevastopol’, leaving the issue of its duration deliberately vague (Lachowski 2007). According to Lachowski (2007), Russia’s naval bases on its own shores—one being developed in Novorossiysk and another planned at a location between Gelendzhik and Tuapse—are not planned as an alternative, but rather as a supplement, to Sevastopol. Russia and Ukraine almost declared war in the 1990’s due to separatist movements in Crimea and to the disputes under military base of Sevastopol and

6 Those manifestations began in November 2013, when president Yanukovytch renounced to sign an accord to initiate the process of integration of Ukraine. 7 Before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Black Sea Fleet was stationed in Sevastopol, Odessa, Donuzlav and Poti. The Russian fleet is stationed at Feodosya, Sevastopol and, temporarily, Nikolaev. The air force is stationed at 2 main airfields: Gvardeyskoe and Sevastopol (Kacha). 109 Disarmament and International Security Committee nuclear arsenal, both legacies from the USSR. It is known that keeping bases in Crimea will enable Russia to exert a certain influence on this part of Ukraine (Simonsen 2000). Another strategic importance of Crimea and Sevastopol for Russia is the access to the Mediterranean Sea and to Northern Africa. In 2005, Borys Tarasyuk – Ukrainian Foreign Minister – protested against Russian demonstrations of strength, in a case where Russian Special Forces had landed illegally in Crimea during an exercise, also notifying Russia that Ukraine would not extend the 1997 agreement for the deployment of bases in its shores8. Relations between Russia and Ukraine got worse at the end of 2005, considering a context of dispute over gas delivery and its prices. Also, Ukraine threatened to raise the cost for the Russian Navy’s deployment at Sevastopol (Lachowski 2007). By the end of 2006, internal dispute between President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych got turbulent. Shortly after pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych was elected president in 2010, he agreed through the Kharkiv Accords9 to extend the Russian lease until 2042 in exchange for discounts on Russian gas supplies (Haaretz 2014). It is important to consider that Yanukovych tried to outline a policy in two fronts: joining NATO, especially with the creation of a brigade with Lithuania and Poland, considering it as a way to get closer to the European Union (EU), and seeking for conversations with Russia, despite its unstable relations. Other important fact is that the prospects for Ukraine’s accession to NATO had also diminished owing to the public mood, the reluctant stance of the Yanukovich government towards the alliance and NATO’s own ‘Ukraine fatigue’ (Lachowski 2007). Russian presence could represent a threat to Ukraine in case of conflicts: the recent events exemplify these worries as well as the strategic role of maintaining overseas bases. In the context of protests for an independent Ukraine, Russian President, Vladmir Putin, ordered surprise military drills on the border with Ukraine, and at Russia’s Black Sea Fleet base (The Guardian 2014). Russia has the authority to locate troops on its bases in Crimea, and to move them between those bases and Russian territory through the Agreement between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the Status and Conditions of the Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet’s Stay on Ukrainian Territory (Posner 2014). Ukraine and Russia’s relations are dual, where we can see an effort from Ukraine to maintain friendly terms and mutual benefit from the US and Russia, besides its intention to join NATO and EU.

8 This agreement would expire in 2017. 9 The headline grabbing part of the Kharkiv Accords was focused on the extension of the lease on the Black Sea fleet base of Sevastopol, but Russia and Ukraine in fact agreed to cooperate in a number of areas, for example: nuclear industry, help to cover the budget deficit, space cooperation on the GLONASS satellite navigation system, among others (Copsey and Shapovalova 2010). 110 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

2.5.4 Philippines

The Military Bases Agreement of 1947, signed between the Philippine President, Manuel Roxas, and the United States Ambassador, Paul McNutt, on March 14, 1947, ratified and accepted by the US on January 21, 1948, had the purpose of establishing north-American military bases in several areas of the Philippines10, such as the Clark Air Base, in the Luzon Island. The main objective of the agreement was to insure the territorial integrity of the Philippines, through mutual protection of both states, and the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. According to a US military specialist on the Philippine bases,

The final resolution “went a long way” in meeting the U.S. military’s demands. A comparison of the Philippine military bases agreement and the status-of-forces agreements reached with the NATO allies “provides ample evidence that Filipinos were justified in their belief that they received unequal treatment from the United States.” (Shalom 1990, 10)

There were 18 Philippine senators who voted in favor of the treaty and none opposed. However, three senators were recorded as absent for the vote, presumably as a protest. Three other senators had been barred from the legislative body on the grounds of vote fraud, a concocted charge engineered by the Roxas administration. In the United States, the administration decided to consider the bases pact an executive agreement, thus requiring no Senate approval. This could be explained because there was a consensus of Democrats and Republicans favoring the bases, and favoring as well the active foreign policy that the bases would facilitate (Shalom 1990). The agreement grants the United States the right to retain the use of the bases in the Philippines, agreeing “to permit the United States, upon notice to the Philippines, to use such of those bases listed in Appendix B11 as the United States determines to be required by military necessity”. The Philippines further agreed

To enter into negotiations with the United States at the latter’s request, to permit the United States to expand such bases, to exchange such bases for other bases, to acquire additional bases, or relinquish rights to bases, as any of such exigencies may be required by military necessity (The Kahimyang Project 2012).

10 Located at the Luzon Islands, the following regions and provinces were cited in the agreement: Baguio, Bataan, Cavite, Manila (Philippines’ capital), Palawan, Pampanga, Rizal and Zambales. 11 Appendix B lists the following bases: Mactan Island Army and Navy Air Base; Florida Blanca Air Base, Pampanga Aircraft Service Warning Net; Camp Wallace, San Fernando, La Union; Puerto Princesa Army and Navy Air Base, including Navy Section Base and Air Warning Sites, Palawan; Tawi-Tawi Naval Base, Sulu Archipelago; Aparri Naval Air Base. 111 Disarmament and International Security Committee

Philippines and the United States set the agreement for a period of 99 years, subjected to extensions. In addition, it would undergo amendments over the years. Remarkably, in the 1966 Amendment, the agreement was cut down to 25 years of the unexpired portion of the 99-year period, expiring in 1991. Herein, the 1979 Amendments would cover full Philippine sovereignty issues over the bases, but, as seen, the nature of military operations does not permit a host state to ever obtain real, effective and complete control over foreign military facilities on its soil. As Angangco e Lotilla (1978, 491) conclude

At a time of ever increasing complexity in the conduct of military operations, no foreign power can afford to allow another state to achieve control over its forces even if these forces are stationed in a base located in the territory of that host state. If such is the case, then there can be no other conclusion but that the Philippines cannot have territorial sovereignty with the presence of a foreign military facility on its soil.

Nowadays, the US-Philippines relations in defense areas are outlined by the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which is characterized by both governments as an executive agreement and not as a formal treaty, not requiring the consent of the Senate in neither country (Thayer 2014). This agreement is an important reaffirmation of Philippines’ sovereignty, since the use of Philippines’ territory for north-American military facilities can only be used with invitation of the home country.

3 PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS

The deployment of foreign military bases occurs mostly by bilateral and multilateral agreements, forging cooperation between host states and countries that maintain military bases in its territory. The situation over these bases can be analyzed at the regional and global levels. At the regional level, SOFAs and VFAs, as already explained, are the main agreements that forge these commitments. However, the main concern about them is that there is no agreed framework between countries to form those agreements. All SOFAs have different lines, differing from case to case. In this sense, the signed agreement could not limit, for example, criminal and civil jurisdictions, taxes and fees, carrying of weapons, use of radio frequency and regulations about licenses and customs requirements. The US-Philippines relations on this subject, primarily after World War II, shows how states agree and disagree in primordial items, like sovereignty and boundaries to hold the validation of the agreement. On the other hand, at the global level, international efforts for changing this matter, concerning stipulation of guidelines to avoid abuses of power and reinforcing the role of international courts, are noticeable until today. As an 112 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations example, two resolutions taken by the General Assembly addressed the importance of ending foreign military presence in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Also, we have the Oslo Guidelines, where the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs outlines international concerns about how and when using foreign help. In addition, before the 2000s, it became common to see civil arrangements to avoid the deployment of foreign military bases and to remove military forces established in a territory – the No-Bases Network is the main civil effort seen in this matter. The Resolution 2165, from the 21th Session of the General Assembly, named “Elimination of Foreign Military Bases in The Countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America”, from December 5, 1966, was the first resolution to address the intention of the United Nations to search for results about foreign presence in some regions around the world. In that session of the General Assembly, countries ratified that “this question is of paramount importance and therefore necessitates serious discussion because of its implications for international peace and security” (UN General Assembly 1966). Also, this resolution transmitted to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENCD)12 the need for further considerations and reports, what was not achieved, as it can be seen at next year’s resolution. In 1967, the General Assembly recalled for the ENCD to explore this issue, but the ENCD did not reach consensus, nor cleared information because of its non-binding character and the end of the Committee, in 1969. Since the 22th session, the issue concerning military bases abroad has not been in discussion again in the General Assembly. In these matters, another global effort is the Oslo Guidelines - Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief. They were originally prepared over a period of two years, beginning in 1992, resulting from a collaborative effort that culminated in an international conference in Oslo, Norway, in January 1994, and released in May 1994. According to the guidelines “all humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the core principles of humanity, and neutrality with full respect for the sovereignty of the states” (OCHOA 2007). Those guidelines are broad, but they are related to military bases issues in order to prevent abuses from states and to grow an international link to give resources in case of natural disasters and other needs. It would use personnel, equipment, supplies and services installed in military overseas bases, for example, to assist others during difficult times. Finally, another important international action to consider is the No-Bases Network. This civil international joint of non-government organizations and

12 Sponsored by the United Nations in 1962, the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENCD) attempted to establish a dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War. In addition to disarmament, the ENCD considered confidence- building measures and control of nuclear tests (University of Michigan Digital Library 2006). 113 Disarmament and International Security Committee interested scholars became evident since the beginning of the 2000s. By this time, several civil campaigns around the world started to focus on resisting military bases, joining forces to oppose the spread of it, mainly where military presence has brew political opposition and resistance from progressive movements and antiwar activists. In this regard, known as “The International Network for the Abolition of Foreign Military Bases” or No-Bases Network, it claims for all countries to unite local and national campaigns against military presence and militarization. It also works to rehabilitate abandoned military sites, as in the case of Western Europe (Dufour 2007). It is not known if there are official sponsors for this network, but it is through the internet that this effort maintains its strength. Its first global conference was held in 2007, in Quito and Manta, Ecuador, where over 300 activists from 40 countries from around the world aimed to analyze the impact of foreign military bases and local people’s struggles against their existence. During the conference, there were debates to share experiences alongside discussions of joint strategies for action, where panels focused on the impact of military bases on the environment, gender, human rights, peace, democracy, and sovereignty. The conference came to the attention of Rafael Correa – president of Ecuador -, where he ratified the intention to not renew the Agreement with the US for the use of the Manta Base, due in 2009 (Narváez 2014) – in September, the last 15 American troops left the country.

4 BLOC POSITIONS

The Arab Republic of Egypt believes that the Non Aligned Movement represents the most important framework for developing countries regarding political, economic and social issues. To support collective actions instead of unilateral policies is essential, since this constitutes a challenge for third world countries (State Information Service 2014). According to the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the movement is needed to preserve regional and international stability, particularly with respect “to non-interference in the internal affairs of States, respect of their sovereignty, stability and independence of their decision, and the inadequacy of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity to prevent interference in the internal affairs of States” (State Information Service 2014). Besides that, Egypt values its strategic partnership with powers such as the United States and the European Union. Recently, there were some accusations from the international media that US would have established military bases in the country. In this regard, the Egyptian military spokesman, Ahmed Aly, has said that Egypt has no foreign military bases on its soil and this matter is a fixed stance in the national security policy to preserve national sovereignty (Reuters 2012). However, there are 1,600 Multinational Forces and Observer troops from US, Canada, France and other nations in the Sinai, in order

114 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations to monitor the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty. According to Egypt’s government, these forces are often mistaken for foreign military installations (Reuters 2012). TheBolivarian Republic of Venezuela understands that the world is moving towards the consolidation of a multipolar system. Therefore, the country directs its foreign policy in order to strengthen relations at the regional level and face the traditional hegemonic system (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). Under the leftist government of Hugo Chávez, Venezuela has become the closest South American ally of Russia. This partnership still remains and has been strengthened due to many armament agreements signed between the two nations, which are based on equipment’s’ deliveries from Russia to Venezuela. These agreements have become more recurrent since 2009, as a reaction to increased US military presence in Colombia (CNN 2009). Recently, the Russian Defense Minister, Sergei Shoigu, has stated that the country has interests in expanding its military presence in strategic locations, including Venezuela, in order to establish international patrol missions (BBC 2014). In his turn, Venezuela’s president Nicolas Madura welcomes the Russian presence as a way to expand cooperation in many areas, which will help to strengthen the national armed forces (Russia Beyond the Headlines 2013). TheCommonwealth of Australia is a strategic territory due to its location in the Asia-Western Pacific region. As a result of Australia-New Zealand-United States Security Treaty (ANZUS Treaty), the country hosts a great number of US military bases all along its coast. According to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australian Government, the cooperation between Australia and other countries, especially the US, represent access to technology and joint training, what maintains its defense capability and contribute to regional security challenges (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2014). Recently, more than 1,000 US marines have landed in Darwin in northern Australia (ABC News 2014). TheFederal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia understands as its mission the permanently work to tackle all security threats in the Horn of Africa, creating favorable conditions for sustained growth and contributing for peace, security and democracy throughout Africa (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). In this regard, Ethiopia values its partnership with western powers in the War on Terror, providing coordinate actions to combat the fundamentalist groups linked to Al-Qaeda. Recently, Sgt. James Fisher, US spokesman for the 17th Air Force, has declared that a number of US personnel are working at the Ethiopian airfield through Arba Minch airport, in order to “provide operation and technical support for our security programs”. The US has spent million dollars upgrading this civilian airport to make it operational for the use of drones (Washington Post 2011). According to the Ethiopian government, the country do not entertains foreign military bases in its territory, but welcomes international cooperation in security programs (BBC News 2011). Marked by a history of military defeats in the two great wars of the XX

115 Disarmament and International Security Committee century, the Federal Republic of Germany still serves as host for foreign military bases. Once, the international presence in the country was justified by the fear of German expansionism, but today the military facilities in the territory are legitimized through the cooperation in defense issues. Apart from European states such as United Kingdom and France, the United States is the country which has the largest contingent of troops and bases in Germany (German Peace Council 2007). In the last years, Germany has signed agreements to a joint development of defense capabilities with its closest allies, such as the US and France. The country has participated of the War on Terror against the Taliban, establishing German troops in Afghanistan and in Uzbekistan (Ferghana 2013). Nowadays, the Federal Republic of Nigeria is under the People’s Democratic Party’s administration, represented by the president Goodluck Jonathan. The country maintains tie relations with western powers and work together with the United Nations and world leaders to combat terrorism. Due to the repercussion that the United States was interested in establishing a military base in the country, the non-governmental organization Muslims Rights Concern has declared that such would contribute to increase country’s fragile security (Vanguard 2011). In January 2014, Nigeria announced the creation of an Army Special Operations Command (NASOC) at a Counter-terrorism and Counter-Insurgency Lessons Learned Exchange with US, in order to consolidate bilateral cooperation on security matters. Through the US Africa Command (AFRICOM), the United States will be providing NASOC with training and equipment (Foreign Policy Journal 2014). The Federal Republic of Somalia considers security policies as a matter of ensuring national survival. The country reaffirms its democratic values as a way to protect national interests, guaranteeing Somalia’s security. After its independence, in 1960, the country followed the Non-Alignment Movement for a brief period, but during the Siad Barre’s regime, a socialist foreign policy closer to the Soviet Union and China was established. However, since the 1980s, the Somalian state shifted its alignment to the West, reaffirming democratic values (Somali Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation 2014).Somalia integrates the Horn of Africa, a local which is object of US interests in order to combat terrorism in the region. According to US military spokesman, the north-American mission is to enable East African partners to neutralize violent extremists throughout Eastern Africa. Although there are no effective foreign military bases in Somalia, the country receive military aide from US to combat the insurgent groups linked with Al-Qaeda, such as Al-Shaabab (Washington Post 2011). The current strategic localization of French Republic’s military bases is explained through history. Although the country still has small facilities in Germany, originating from the end of the World War II, it is in Africa that the vast majority of French military bases are located. As a result of French colonial policy, which lasted

116 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations until the XX century, the state still maintains troops and installation in nations such as Djibouti, Chad and Gabon. The French government argues that the presence of troops in those countries aims to contribute to the maintenance of security and peace, thorough peacekeeping initiatives, as the turbulent independences of these nations have generated many internal conflicts (Council on Foreign Relations 2008). In 2009, France has opened its first military base in the Gulf, at the United Arab Emirates, as a way to consolidate relations between the countries and to face the Iranian threat in the region (The Guardian 2009). The Federative Republic of Brazil considers the respect for International Law guidelines as essential to discuss international issues. The country believes in a multilateral system and contributes to the empowerment of South America, still maintaining a strong relationship with extra-regional powers (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). In this regard, former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was against the increased US military presence on the region as a result of a US-Colombia agreement. Brazil states that regional issues should be solved through regional cooperation. The country also expressed hostility toward the presence of US Navy patrolling the Brazilian coast through the US IV Fleet (BBC 2009). While it hosts no foreign military bases on its territory, Brazil has signed many cooperation agreements on defense with several powers, such as Russia, China and the United States. Being an important actor in Central Asia, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan hosts a significant number of foreign military facilities in its territory. During the Cold War, the country became essential to guarantee USSR’s influence in the region but, with the decay of the Soviet Union, the communist presence has decreased. Nowadays, Afghanistan is still target of foreign military presence mainly from the US but also from the United Kingdom and Germany, all nations which are there since the 2001 Afghanistan war. The current government, under administration of Hamid Karzai, was established in 2001, after the US Operation Enduring Freedom. The country’s current foreign policy supports Western cooperation and reaffirms the Joint Declaration of the United States-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership as a pivot to Afghanistan’s stability (Afghanistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). According to the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the United Nations presence in the country plays an essential role too, contributing to national development and international peace. Due to international community’s pressure, the US president, Barack Obama, has announced the withdrawal of all US troops in the country until the end of 2014. The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that the network of foreign military bases which is encircling it is a violation of regional peace and security (Press TV 2012). The Iranian government defends that the countries’ defense capability should be developed without military interventions from abroad. In the last decades, hostilities between the Western powers, led by the US, and Iran have increased,

117 Disarmament and International Security Committee encouraged by the fear that Iran was developing nuclear weapons. Therefore, the international military presence around Iran is huge, suggesting a regional balance in order to contain and isolate the country. According to the US Central Command, there are about 125,000 US troops close to Iran (Aljazeera 2013). The Islamic Republic of Pakistan hosts north-American bases, some used for logistical support, others – such as the Shamsi airfield - used by the CIA to launch drone operations. It is said that Shamsi is no longer used by the US, but other airfields may still be used for launching drones (Public Intelligence 2012). The American effort to disrupt terrorist groups led also China to be interested in setting military bases in Pakistan, seeing the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) or the Federally Administered Northern Areas (FANA) as an option for those installations, primarily to contain the growth of terrorist activities of Chinese rebels from al-Qaeda-linked East (Asia Times 2011). In 2012, an effort from the Parliamentary Committee on National Security from Pakistan sought to ban foreign military bases, especially American ones. Their draft addressed that it would be needed a parliamentary approval for any use of Pakistani bases by foreign forces (NDTV 2012). Being a traditional US partner, Japan has hosted many military bases since World War II. Nowadays, the most important US military installations in the country are located in Okinawa. However, due to local impacts, there is a great popular pressure to transfer the bases from Okinawa to Guam, an unincorporated US territory in the Western Pacific Ocean (Fackler 2010). Even with these impacts, the Japanese government recognizes the importance of the US as a strategic ally, contributing to the security and stability of the Pacific Region. On the other hand, Japan also plans to have military installations abroad. In 2011, the country opened its first overseas base since WWII, in Djibouti. The initiative was described by the Djibouti ambassador as an opportunity for Tokyo to play a larger international role in peacekeeping and forge closer relations between the two nations. The objective of this partnership is declared to be to combat piracy in the Horn of Africa’s coast (The Japan Times 2011). According to BBC Asia News, Japan has also begun the construction of a military radar station near Senkaku island group, claimed by China as the Diaoyu islands (BBC News 2014). Being a traditional US partner in the Middle East, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has become a north-American preferential ally during the Cold War, based on oil trade and military assistance. In this period, the United States Military Training Mission was created to coordinate security assistance efforts and to assist the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces to build a defense capacity to promote regional security. In 1991, during the Gulf War, both countries reaffirmed their historical relationship and a great number of US troops were landed in this Arab territory (Council on Foreign Relation 2011). Although the military bases in Saudi Arabia are mostly from US, there is also the presence of British and French troops in the region as a result of the

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Gulf War. The continued presence of foreign non-Muslins personnel in the country causes a reaction from Arab population which has resulted in a withdrawal of US troops from the country and in transference of control of military bases from north- American government to Saudi officials. However, the country reaffirms its strategic partnership with the West and contributes to anti-terrorism initiatives led by US. Recently, the BBC News has reported that US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been operating a secret airbase for drones in Saudi Arabia (BBC News 2013). The government of the Republic of Belarus openly promotes a military alliance with Russia, what means that more Russian military bases may be established there soon (Bohdan 2013). The country proclaimed its neutrality near the 1990s, although its current Constitution states that it strives “to achieve neutrality”. The Belarusian government has little choice concerning its national security, therefore leaning in Russian’s help (Bohdan 2013). Also, Belarus and Russia have plans for a Russian air base with fighter airplanes since the 2000s, along with an intention of Belarus to participate in the construction of Russia’s missile defense system (Belarus Security Blog 2013). The People’s Republic of China believes in peaceful development and a multipolar world as key parts for international stability (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2014). Recently, China has been through a military modernization, declaring that the increase of its capabilities is only intended for defense matters. In this sense, it seems that the country is seeking to open its first military base abroad in the Indian Ocean, probably in Pakistan due to the strong bilateral relationship between them, both with rivalries with India (Asia Times 2012). This initiative could be an alternative to maintain a balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. The Republic of Colombia believes that to achieve progress toward democratic prosperity, a greater diversification of international relations is needed. To do so, new partners and strategic alliances are searched in order to contribute to the strengthening of a multilateral system (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). According to the Colombian government, the state “shall contribute with the national expertise in the struggle against terrorism and the world drug problem; the combat against illicit traffic of small and light arms” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). In this sense, the relationship between Colombia and United States has become closer in recent years. This rapprochement based on the fight against terrorism and drugs resulted in an agreement, signed in 2009, which allowed US personnel to be stationed at seven military bases in the country and also to occupy any installation throughout the entire territory (CNN 2009). Both nations have declared that the US military presence in Colombia is intended only to strengthen the fight against drugs and groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, considered terrorist by the Colombian government (RT 2009).

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The History of the Republic of Cuba is permeated by external interference. The country became independent from Spain after the Spanish-American War in 1898, when the US, as victorious, occupied the island. In 1902, the country negotiated its independence, renting to US the southern territory of Guantanamo Bay. Initially, a US naval base was established at Guantanamo. However, since 2001, the area serves as a prison to US war enemies, especially those from the conflicts in the Middle East. International pressure to close the prison at Guantanamo Bay is increasing due to allegations of human rights violations by the US administration. The president Barack Obama has said that, with the end of Afghan War, Guantanamo will be closed no later than one year after the complete withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan (The Guardian 2011). On the other hand, the Cuban government, under the administration of Raúl Castro, stated that the renting agreement signed in 1903 between the two nations is illegal based on International Law and Cuba affirms that is not cashing US Guantanamo rent checks since the Socialist Revolution of 1959 (Reuters 2009). The former president Fidel Castro had gave public declarations demanding the unconditional return of the bay to Cuba’s government. Cuba also hosted Soviet military bases and troops during the Cold War, but, with the end of the USSR, the two countries moved away. However, the newspaper The Diplomat recently reported that the Russian Defense Minister stated that Russia is looking to build military bases in Asia and in the Western Hemisphere, including in Cuba (The Diplomat 2014). The Republic of Djibouti is located in the Horn of Africa, in a strategic area near the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, which means access to the Indian Ocean. Shortly after the events of 11 September 2001, Djibouti began to cooperate with the fight against terrorism. Several hundred American troops are located in Camp Lemmonier under US Africa Command (AFRICOM), in order to combat Al-Qaeda groups, especially in Yemen and Somalia. In May 2014, north-American president Barack Obama and Djibouti’s president Ismail Omar Guelleh had signed a 20-years lease on this military installation (The New York Times 2014). The country retains close relations with France too, being host for the largest French foreign military base. According to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the purpose of these military facilities is to promote regional security, since the location of Djibouti allows France to exercise military influence in the Middle East (Council on Foreign Relations 2008). President Guelleh has declared that Djibouti’s Western cooperation means support for international peace and regional stability and contributes to joint programs on economic aid, democratic values and human rights (The New York Times 2014). In 2010, Djibouti also has reinforced its Eastern partnership, thorough an agreement with Japan, which allows the establishment of a Japanese military base in the African country. This installation is intended primary to counter piracy in the region (The Japan Times 2011). Recently, Djibouti’s Defense Minister Hassan Darar Houffaneh has declared the country’s intention in reinforcing military cooperation with China,

120 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations which has funded many infrastructure projects in the region. He has also said that Djibouti is ready to allow Chinese military ships to access its ports in order to increase the operational capacity of Djibouti Armed Forces (Global Times 2014). According to the defense ministry of the Republic of India, the country “will not allow any foreign country to establish a military base on Indian soil”. The context of this declaration was a moment after an American officer being quoted as saying that “the US would station its fighter jets in India and other countries in the future, as part of its larger pivot or re-balancing of forces towards the crucial Asia-Pacific region”. In opposition, the ministry of defense argued that this proposal had never been in discussion between the US and India (Times of India 2013). Another point to be considered is the renovation of a Soviet-era military base (Farkhor/Ayni air base) in Tajikistan, paid by India. There are speculations about India’s perspectives of establishing a military base in Ayni, expanding its strategic ambitions in Central Asia (Asia Times 2010). According to Lachowski (2008), the country will probably envision a promotion and protection of its interests abroad through basing activities due to its rising power in the Asian region. The Republic of Indonesia is an independent state since 1946 and defends the principle of sovereignty and the guidelines of International Law as pillars of its foreign policy. The country does not hosts foreign military bases, however, in recent years the cooperation in the defense sector with the US has increased through the US Foreign Military Financing Program and through the US-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership, which includes security cooperation as joint military trainings (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). TheRepublic of Iraq has a history of receiving foreign troops in its shores. In 2012, the government decided to annul all agreements that enabled the presence of foreign troops in its territory. The decision will directly affect Turkey, which has been maintaining bases in Northern Iraq since the 1990s (Durukan 2012). Another part of Iraq’s history is tied to the US-Iraq Status of Force Agreement, signed in 2008 by former president George W. Bush. Many Iraqi groups protested against this SOFA, assuming that it would legitimize and prolong American occupation since the Iraq War, in 2003. In 2011, the govern of Baghdad rejected US offer to maintain bases in the country, after an announcement from Barack Obama stating that all American troops would leave the country until December 2011 (The Guardian 2011). Also, a logistic base for UK forces was based in Basra, south of Iraq. Near 1,600 troops were withdrawn in 2007 after the completion of Operation Sinbad, which was designed to put Iraqis in charge of Basra’s security (BBC 2008). Being a former member-state of the USSR, the Republic of Kazakhstan believe in its position as a leader of Central Asia, making considerable contributions to strengthening the region’s stability (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). Considering its traditional relationship with Russia as essential, the country hosts some Russian

121 Disarmament and International Security Committee military facilities, such as the Sary Shagan missile testing range and the Balkhash Radar Station (Eurasianet 2013). Recently, there has been a rumor that the US Manas air base would be reallocated from Kyrgyzstan to Kazakhstan due to the latter’s strategic position on the Russian and Chinese borders, with access to the Caspian Sea. However, the Kazakhstan Foreign Ministry has denied the information (Tengri News 2013). During the Cold War, the Republic of Korea hosted foreign military bases in order to support its defenses capabilities against the Democratic Republic of Korea, in the north of the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, until now, the country believes that bilateral cooperation between nations which share common values and the participation in multilateral summits are extremely important to ensure international security (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Korea 2014). In order to contribute to the Asia-Pacific’s stability, South Korea reaffirms its traditional partnership with the north-American government and serves as home to a large contingent of US troops. Such as Cuba, the Republic of Philippines became independent from Spain after the Spanish-American War, in 1898, being under US control until 1946, when the country became independent. Due to its strategic position in the Pacific, Philippines hosts a significant number of US military bases, appearing as a special ally in the Asia-Pacific region. In the first half of 2014, the two countries signed a ten-year defense agreement. Under this new pact, the US will have access to five new military bases in the country (The Washington Post 2014). According to the Philippine President Benigno Aquino III, this agreement “takes our security cooperation to a higher level of engagement, reaffirms our countries’ commitment to mutual defense and security and promotes regional peace and stability” (ISAPE 2014). The agreement might be understood as a reaction to China’s expansion in the South China Sea. However, this intention was denied by both nations. The Republic of Singapore is a well located country in Southeast Asia, with access to the South China Sea. Due to its strategic position, the country is a key ally regarding powers’ interests in Asia. Since 2000, the north-American military presence in the country is increasing, and nowadays Singapore hosts dozens of American warships in its Changi Naval Base, which are designed to operate in shallow coastal waters, like those around the South China Sea. This foreign military presence may indicate the new US foreign policy to the Asia-Pacific region, in order to encircle China as a way to respond to the Chinese naval build-up (Foreign Policy 2013). Singapore also maintains bilateral ties with India. Both countries had signed an agreement in 2008 which states the Singapore forces are allowed to train at Indian Army establishments (The New Indian Express 2012). The Republic of South Africa believes in its potential to grow and leverage its power on the continent to become a leading player on the global space (South

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African Foreign Policy Initiative 2013). South African foreign policy is based on commitment to mutually beneficial partnerships, working for global political and socio-economic stability, security and peace (South Africa Government Online 2014). In this regard, the country values its strategic allies, such as the BRICS. Although there are no foreign military bases in this country, its bilateral cooperation in defense matters is increasing in recent years, including military joint trainings and the presence of foreign troops. The South African National Defense Force (SANDF) has been developing exchange programs with China. According to Maj- Gen Ntakaleleni Sigudu, from South Africa’s Department of Defense, agreements to provide military training and expertise to help building an Africa-based peacekeeping force is essential in the context of internal instability, which characterized the African Continent (Stratrisks 2013). Other BRICS partners such as India and Russia are also negotiating security cooperation with South Africa’s government. Finally, the country has a stable alliance with the United States of America, working together with it on a range of issues impacting the region and the world and developing combined joint exercises to increase defense ability from both countries. To do this, about 1,000 US military personnel are stationed in South African territory (United States Diplomatic Mission to South Africa 2013). The Republic of Turkey understands that the emergence of a new international environment conductive to a global lasting peace must be achieved. However, the country considers that traditional security issues as well as new threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are important matters for Turkish foreign policy, since the state is situated in the Afro-Eurasian epicenter of regional instabilities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). Thus, in order to expand the sphere of peace and prosperity in its region and generate international stability, Turkey values its strategic partnership with great powers such as the Unites States. In this regard, the country hosts two US military complexes of air bases in its territory and NATO early warning missile defender radar. The Turkish government also sent national troops to Afghanistan in the early years of War on Terror, being twice the leader of the International Security Assistance Force, led by NATO. Nowadays, Turkey only maintains a foreign military base in Cyprus, as consequence of the Cyprus dispute between Greeks and Turks (Zanotti 2014). The Republic of Yemen was created in 1990 as a result of the reunification between the Arab Republic of Yemen and the Democratic Republic of Yemen. The country believes there is an urgent need to reformulate the status of Arab nations and their relations, overcoming national crises and empowering the Arab states in order to create a unified and solid union capable to challenge and face the threats surrounding them (Republic of Yemen’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). Currently, Yemen is going through an unstable time, being target of US and UK troops’ interventions and drone attacks. The US government, supported by the

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UK parliament, claimed the presence of Al-Qaeda’s members in the country (The Guardian 2014). According to the World Tribune newspaper, the US was planning to build three military bases in Yemen as part of a program to enhance defense and military cooperation with Arab League’s states. It would be a way to reaffirm the commitment between both countries and improve secure, trade and investments in the region (World Tribune 2013). The geographical position of the Russian Federation hinders its access to hot waters and the low temperatures limit the use of major Russian ports. Therefore, since World War II, it has become important for Russia to set up military bases abroad. With the beginning of Cold War, the Soviet bloc was strengthened and the number of military bases established in USSR member-states has increased as a way to reaffirm the communist’s spheres of influence and neutralize the capitalist bloc’s presence in Eurasia. In this context, soviet military personnel were also present in countries which were not integrated to the USSR but presented communist tendencies such as Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria (Lachowski 2007). After the Soviet Union’s break-up in 1991, Russia inherited many military infrastructures in Eastern European and Central Asian countries. Although Russia has closed numerous foreign military bases since the end of Cold War, due to high maintenance costs, the country still has influence in the former Soviet Republics and need them to extend its projection capability. This way, in order to guarantee these countries as strategic partners, the Russian Federation led the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The CSTO plays an important role to maintain Russia’s influence in Eurasia since it prevents member countries to join other military alliances and provides standardization of weapons, a common air defense system and joint military operations (Lachowski 2007). Since the 9/11 attacks, Russia turned its focus back to Central Asia in order to defend its interests from US-led interventions. According to Russia’s military doctrine, the country deploys its troops in strategically important regions aiming at national and allied security. Today, Russia has about 25 military installations in former Soviet Republics, distributed between ground, air and naval bases. This distribution reflects Russia’s strategic priorities in Central Asia and in the southern territories such as Armenia, Georgia and Crimea and in the Western theatre, adjoining the NATO area (Lachowski 2007). The State of Israel was created in 1948 as a Jewish State. From then on, the balance of power in the Middle East has gained a new member, strongly supported by Western nations. The United States recognized the new state just a few hours after the declaration of independence. According to the Israel Diplomatic Network, both countries share the same democratic values and interests in promoting peace and security in the entire region (Israel Diplomatic Network 2014). In the last decade,

124 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations the warm relationship between US and Israel was strengthened due to the threat posed by Iran and by terrorist groups. In this context, the Jewish country hosts a great number of US military facilities in its territory and develops joint trainings as well as joint researches about new military technology (Israel Diplomatic Network 2014). According to a Stratfor report from 2012, Israel holds military bases in Eritrea, on the Red Sea shores, and considers the possibilities of establishing military facilities in Cyprus (Haaretz 2014). Since the end of the Civil War of 2011, the State of Libya is passing through harsh political instabilities. The country was under administration of the National Transitional Council of Libya, which gave power to the General National Congress to elaborate a new constitution. During the conflict, the Libyan state was target of the military intervention from North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) members in order to implement the United Nations Security Council’s resolution 1973 about the establishment of a ceasefire and of a no fly-zone as well as the imposition of many economic sanctions. Until now, there are troops from countries such as the United States, France and the United Kingdom based in Libya. These foreign military installations are legitimized as a way to provide security transition to democracy and to develop joint military trainings in order to build up the Libyan National Army (Reuters 2013). After the full independence of the Syrian Arab Republic from France in 1946, the country have signed an agreement with the former Soviet Union, prescribing political support and military help to found Syria’s national army. Since then, both nations have a strategic relationship which lasts until today. Under a bilateral agreement from 1971, a soviet naval base was established in the Syrian city of Tartus. Nowadays, this installation remains the only access from Russia to the Mediterranean Sea and is the last Russian foreign military base outside the former USSR (Washington Post 2013).In 2013, Syrian president Bashar al-Assad also has warned that US bases in Middle East could be target of retaliation for strikes against the country (Daily Mail 2013). As a former state from the Soviet Union, Ukraine has served as base for innumerous USSR troops and installations during the Cold War. After the end of the socialist regime, the country signed an agreement with the Russian Federation, which allowed the Black Sea Fleet’s to stay in Sevastopol until 2017, giving Russia all the authority to locate troops on its bases in Crimea. However, Russia’s government has declared that the country had no plans to leave from its Ukrainian bases (Lachowski 2007). Recently, with the conflict between the two countries involving the sovereignty of the Crimea Peninsula, Russia has considered its military bases in the region as part of its federation. On the other hand, Ukraine and the majority of the international community recognize these territories as under Ukrainian jurisdiction. Thus, the hostilities including the status of theses military forces are still

125 Disarmament and International Security Committee uncertain (The Guardian 2014). The history of theUnited Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is associated with expansionism practices, as a result of its naval capabilities, and strong economic relations with foreign countries. As consequence of its policies, the United Kingdom maintains until now a considerable number of military installations abroad. The UK presence in territories as the Falklands Islands and Gibraltar is seen as legitimate by its government as being part of the British Overseas Territory. The country also has bases in the African continent, in states such as Kenya and Sierra Leone, in order to provide joint trainings for these countries’ national armed forces and to ensure the internal stability of these regimes (GOV UK 2014). The British foreign policy is characterized by its Special Relationship with the United States. This traditional partnership allows the US to have military facilities in UK’s territory, as well as in UK’s strategic sites, as the Diego Garcia atoll, located in Indian Ocean, and UK’s Camp Bastion, in Afghanistan. TheUnited Mexican States is a relevant country in the American continent, as it is home to the third largest population in America and ranks among the top five of the region’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Mexico shares a 2,000 mile border through the Gulf of Mexico with the United States, being both countries intricately linked together. This bilateral relationship is based on trade, investments, migration, tourism and environmental concerns. Mexico is seen as the principal transit for illicit drugs and possible avenue for the entry of terrorists into the US. This way, even though there is not a complex of military bases on Mexican territory, many US troops are present in Mexico, primarily aimed at fighting the Drug War. In this sense, joint training stations are developed in Mexico’s territory through the Bilateral Cooperation Agreement on Security, signed by both countries (Storrs 2006). The United States of America has the most assertive role regarding the global network of military bases. According to the Global Research Institute, the US has about 1,000 military bases in 130 countries, being the country with more overseas installation in the world. The number of its bases has increased during the World War II and became enormous in the Cold War, when the dispute for spheres of influence between the capitalist bloc and the communist bloc made military infrastructure abroad really necessary. With the end of the Cold War, the US has gradually decreased its military presence overseas, but the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon represented a new motivation to expand the scope of US bases. However, since 2001, the US has modified the relevance of its areas of operation, shifting focus to traditional European partners to Middle Eastern countries (Lachowski 2007). Asia also plays an important role to the US military network. Traditional Asian partners such as Japan and Philippines were essential during Cold War’s conflicts and now, considering the possible threat of China’s military modernization, the US is turning its attention back to strategic partners in the Pacific region, such as South Korea,

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Australia, India and Indonesia (Cordesman 2012). The US classifies its military bases in host countries by its geostrategic purpose. So, its largest and more relevant bases are called Main Operating Bases and have permanently US troops stationed in there. The Forward Operating Sites is the classification of bases with smaller facilities aimed at bilateral military cooperation. The last category is the Cooperative Security Locations, which serves as platform to security cooperation activities (European Parliament 2009). The costs to maintain military infrastructure abroad are high and the international repercussion of US intervention in host countries contributes to delegitimize US Foreign Policy. Nevertheless, the north-America’s government adopts a discourse of mutual cooperation and defense of democratic values to reaffirm its presence overseas.

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Press TV, “Iran opposes foreign military bases in Afghanistan”. 26 July 2014. Accessed July. 17, 2014. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2012/11/15/272346/iran-against-foreign- bases-in-afghanistan. Public Intelligence. A Look at U.S. Drone Bases in Pakistan. February 17, 2012. http:// publicintelligence.net/a-look-at-u-s-drone-bases-in-pakistan/ (accessed July 03, 2014). Reuters, “American military gets access to upwards of five Filipino bases” 2 May 2014. Accessed 16 July, 2014. http://rt.com/usa/156428-philippines-edca-five-bases/. —, “Cuba not cashing US Guantanamo rent checks”. 17 August 2007. Accessed July 15, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/08/17/idUSN17200921. —, “NATO to advise Libya on strengthening security forces”. 21 October 2013. Accessed July. 19, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/21/us-libya-nato- idUSBRE99K0GX20131021. —, “Niger would welcome armed US drones”. 18 September 2013. Accessed July. 25, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/18/us-niger-drones- idUSBRE98H0PW20130918. —, “No foreign army bases in Egypt”. 12 October 2012. Accessed July 19, 2014. http:// www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/12/us-egypt-army-idUSBRE89B08P20121012. —, “Obama denies US creating military bases in Colombia”. 7 August 2009. Accessed July 18, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/08/07/us-colombia-usa-bases- idUSTRE5765HL20090807. Rosenfeld, Erik. Applications of U.S. Status of Force Agreement to Article 98 of the Rome Statute. Washington University Global Studies Law Review (2003): 273-293. Accessed April 29, 2014. http://digitalcommons.law.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=127 6&context=globalstudies Russia Beyond the Headlines. “Venezuela and Russia sign agreements on security defense”, 30 October 2013. Accessed July 29, 2014. http://rbth.com/news/2013/10/30/ venezuela_russia_sign_agreements_on_security_defense_31283.html. Sarantakes, Nicholas. Keystone – The American Ocuppation of Okinawa and US- Japanese Relations.(Austin: Texas A&M University Press, 2000). Saudi Arabia. Council on Foreign Relation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. . Accessed 17/07/2014. Sealey, Raphael. “The Causes of the Peloponnesian War.” Classical Philology, 1974: 89-109. Shalom, Stephen R. “Securint the U.S.-Philippine Military Bases Agreement of 1947.” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars. 1990. http://criticalasianstudies.org/assets/files/ bcas/v22n04.pdf. 132 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

Shalom, Stephen R. “Securint the U.S.-Philippine Military Bases Agreement of 1947.” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars. 1990. http://criticalasianstudies.org/assets/files/ bcas/v22n04.pdf. Somalia. Somali Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. . Accessed 19/07/2014. South Africa. South Africa Government Online. . Accessed 20/07/2014. —. South African Foreign Policy Initiative. . Accessed 20/07/2014. Storrs, Larry. Mexico’s Importance and Multiple Relationships with the United States. Washington: The library of Congress, 2006. Stratrisks, “South Africa welcomes Chinese military assistance”. 31 July 2013. Accessed July 20, 2014. http://stratrisks.com/geostrat/14423. Tengri News, “Kazakhstan Foreign Ministry denies discussing reallocation of Manas air base”. 27 August 2013. Accessed July. 16, 2014. http://en.tengrinews.kz/military/ Kazakhstan-Foreign-Ministry-denies-discussing-relocation-of-Manas-air-base-22140. Thayer, Carl. Analyzing the US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. May 02, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/analyzing-the-us-philippines- enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement/ (accessed June 29, 2014). The Diplomat, “Russia says it’s building naval bases in Asia and Latin America”. 28 February 2014. Accessed July 15, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/russia- says-its-building-naval-bases-in-asia-latin-america/. The Guardian, “Al-Qaida militants killed in second Yemen airstrike in two days”, 20 April 2014. Accessed July 17, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/ apr/20/al-qaida-militants-killed-yemen-airstrike. —, “France opens military bases in UAE despite Iranian concerns”. 26 May 2009. Accessed July 18, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/may/26/france- military-base-uae>. —, “Ukraine Crisis: Why Russia sees Crimea as its naval stronghold”. 7 March 2014. Accessed July 19, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/07/ukraine- russia-crimea-naval-base-tatars-explainer. —, “US signed deal with Niger to operate military drones in west African state”. 29 January 2013. Accessed July 25, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/ jan/29/niger-approves-american-surveillance-drones. The Japan Times, “First overseas military base since WWII to open in Djibouti”. 2 133 Disarmament and International Security Committee

July 2011. Accessed July 15, 2014. http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2011/07/02/ national/first-overseas-military-base-since-wwii-to-open-in-djibouti/#. U9GAPPldWSo. The Kahimyang Project. Today in Philippine History, March 14, 1947, the Military Bases Agreement was signed. 2012. http://kahimyang.info/kauswagan/articles/1007/ today-in-philippine-history-march-14-1947-the-military-bases-agreement-was- signed (accessed July 2014). The New Indian Express. “Pay more for using military base: India to Singapore”. June 24, 2012. (accessed August 01, 2014). The New York Times. “US signs new lease to keep strategic military installations in the Horn of Africa”, The New York Times, 5 May 2014. (accessed August 01, 2014). The Washington Post, “Remote US base at core of secret operations”. 17 May 2011. Accessed July 19, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/ remote-us-base-at-core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392-197a-11e2- bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html. —, “The four reasons Russia will not give up Syria”. 5 September 2013. Accessed July 17, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/09/05/the- four-reasons-russia-wont-give-up-syria-no-matter-what-obama-does. —, “US and Philippines reach 20-years defense agreement amid rising tensions”. 27 April 2014. Accessed July 16, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us- philippines-to-sign-10-year-defense-agreement-amid-rising-tensions/2014/04/27/ a04436c0-cddf-11e3-a75e-463587891b57_story.html. —, “US drone base in Ethiopia is operational”. 27 October 2011. Accessed July 19, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-drone-base-in- ethiopia-is-operational/2011/10/27/gIQAznKwMM_story.html. The White House. “Fact Sheet: The US-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement”, last modified May 1, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/01/ fact-sheet-us-afghanistan-strategic-partnership-agreement The World Tribune, “US to establish military bases in Yemen”. 9th January 2013. Accessed July 17, 2014. http://www.worldtribune.com/2013/01/09/u-s-to-establish- military-bases-in-yemen/. Times of India. No foreign power be allowed to set up military base on Indian soil: Govt. August 22, 2013. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/No-foreign-power-be- allowed-to-set-up-military-base-on-Indian-soil-Govt/articleshow/21984387.cms 134 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

(accessed June 14, 2014). Turkey. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey. . Accessed 19/07/2014. UN General Assembly. Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. December 5, 1966. http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f04a4c. html (accessed June 29, 2014). United Kingdom. UK Government Digital Service. https://www.gov.uk/. Accessed 18/07/2014. United Nations. “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013”.United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (2013). Accessed May 10, 2014. http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop- monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghan_report_Summary_Findings_2013.pdf. United States of America. United States Diplomatic Mission to South Africa. http:// southafrica.usembassy.gov/press-releases-latest/joint-u.s.-south-african-military- exercise-showcases-bilateral-security-cooperation. (accessed July 20, 2014). University of Michigan Digital Library. Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. February 17, 2006. http://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endc/ (accessed June 24, 2014). UPI. “Afghanistan may be on its own, NATO says”, last modified February 27, 2014, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2014/02/27/Afghanistan-may-be-on-its- own-NATO-says/UPI-64001393523350/ Vanguard. “Groups faults moves to establish US military base in Nigeria”, 16 May 2011. Accessed July 19, 2014. http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/05/group-faults- moves-to-establish-us-military-base-in-nigeria/. Venezuela. Ministerio del Poder Popular para Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela. http://www.mre.gov.ve/. (accessed July 18, 2014). Wohlstetter, A.J. Economic and Strategic Considerations in Air Base Location: A Preliminary Review. Rand Corporation (1951). Accessed May 1, 2014. http://www. rand.org/about/history/wohlstetter/D1114.html. Yemen. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Yemen. http://www.mofa.gov. ye/en/. Accessed 17/07/2014. Zanotti, Jim. Turkey: Background and US Relations. Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2014. Zeijden, Wilbert. Foreign Military Bases and the Global Campaign to close them. Transnational Institute (2009). Accessed April 27, 2014. http://www.tni.org/primer/ foreign-military-bases-and-global-campaign-close-them.

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UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations ISSN: 2318-3195 | v.2, 2014| p. 137-180

THE UTILIZATION OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (UAV) FOR MILITARY ACTION IN FOREIGN AIRSPACE

Giordano Bruno Antoniazzi Ronconi1 Thaís Jessinski Batista2 Victor Merola3 ABSTRACT What can be understood as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), also referred to as drones or RPVs (Remotely Piloted Vehicles), are pilotless aerial vehicles which can be guided either through remote control by a military squad in its home country or that can navigate autonomously based on a pre-programmed software. The main arguments for the effectiveness of a drone strategy can be subdivided into four separate claims: (1) drones are effective at killing terrorists with minimal civilian casualties; (2) drones have been successful at killing so called ‘high value targets’ (HVTs); (3) using drones puts such pressure on terrorist organizations that it degrades their organizational capacity and ability to strike; and (4) the cost–benefit analysis of their use relative to other options—such as the deployment of ground troops—provides a compelling argument in their favor. However, a direct and grave implication of drone warfare is the issue of sovereignty. A considerable percentage of drone operations make use of foreign airspace without the express formal authorization of central governments. By a simple and rational perspective, such acts constitute disrespect to states sovereignty and should, therefore, be condemned by all signatories of the Charter of the United Nations – especially when the non-transparency of the attacks is taken into account. As seen, the topic does not only contain highly controversial questions about the theoretical usage of drones, but also inserts several regions, where drones are militarily operational, into discussion.

1 8th Semester International Relations Student at UFRGS. 2 4th Semester International Relations Student at UFRGS. 3 8th Semester International Relations Student at UFRGS. Disarmament and International Security Committee

What can be understood as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), also referred to as drones or RPVs (Remotely Piloted Vehicles), are pilotless aerial vehicles which can be guided either through remote control by a military squad in its home country or that can navigate autonomously based on a pre-programmed software. Drones can be classified into civilian and military ones, each with different characteristics. The rise of military drones can be understood by two main factors: first, technological advances that allowed unmanned flying objects to be accurately guided over large distances and second, better intelligence gathering, making possible to identify high- value military targets while keeping civilian casualties and other collateral damage as low as possible (Singer 2010). Armed drones are similar to armed manned aircraft since they provide information as well as have strike capacity: they can kill, disable, support fighters on the ground, destroy, harry, hinder, deny access, observe, and track (Davis, McNerney, et al. 2014). It is common to mistake armed UAVs with cruise missiles, since both have a high precision strike. Nonetheless, generally speaking, a UAV can deliver munitions and then return to be reused. There are four key technologies that have changed in recent years allowing such developments: 1) Inexpensive, Precision Navigation; 2) Inexpensive, Reliable Satellite Communication; 3) Lightweight Surveillance Equipment; 4) Lightweight Target Designation Equipment and Precision-Guided Munitions (PGMs). These improvements permit that a missile designed in the 1970s, such as the Hellfire, might be used in a drone and effectively hit a target (Singer 2009). The first technology allows unmanned aircraft to fly long distances without concern about getting disoriented. This technology is available to practically anyone in the world, since its commercial use has expanded in the last years. The second one, low-cost satellite communication, enables users to require only a simple satellite phone with a low-bandwidth communication to know the UAV’s location and how it is functioning. The third technology is constantly evolving and it is one of the main economic advantages of using drones: they can be very small, in part because they are not required to transport a human being, which results directly in relatively small costs. The last one represents a major change in aerial operations: PGMs increases the accuracy of strikes to a point where is possible to aim at a single human being and eventually hit it precisely (Boot 2006). Distinction between armed UAVs can be made in relation to its ranges (long, meaning above 300km, or low) and technology (high, understood as restricted for only some countries, or low, available for most countries). An example of long range and high technology is the US MQ-1 Predator, the MQ-9 Reaper and the RQ-7 Shadow. Although the technology for keeping the Predator, the Reaper, and Shadow in the air is not particularly advanced, the mission equipment that allows them to have an impact on ground combat is more advanced and not widely available. A long range and low technology drone is the Iranian Ababil and it uses basic radio remote

138 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations control to allow unmanned flight and video recording. All of the key technology to build this class of armed UAV is widely available throughout the world (Davis, McNerney, et al. 2014). While these UAVs can include high-resolution cameras, they typically lack stabilization systems needed for high accuracy steering and more advanced sensors. Drones with low range and high technology are small, short-range systems, such as the hand-launched RQ-11 Raven, produced by the United States, and other widely used for commercial purposes such as law enforcement or commercial aerial photography. The navigation technology is widely used and its dual use characteristic is very common: it can be even encountered in toys, like the Wii remote (Davis, McNerney, et al. 2014). Finally, low range and low technology drones have been widely available commercially for many decades. In principle, they could be used as weapons of terrorism, since they can be encountered in any hobby shop and can be reworked with a conventional bomb (Singer 2009).

1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1.1 UNMANNED AIR VEHICLE’S HISTORY: EARLY HISTORY, WORLD WAR I, INTERWAR PERIOD AND WORLD WAR II

UAVs had already been early thought of during the 19th century, with the use of balloons to bomb enemy cities, such as the launch of 200 pilotless balloons with bombs by the Austrians against Venice in 1849. Balloons were also used on the United States Civil War (1862). But the use of balloons had another objective: aerial reconnaissance, as used on the French Revolution (1889), for example. At this point, it was clear which the air power’s two main objectives were: tactical, for supporting ground forces through reconnaissance, supply, and communications; or strategic, for winning the war through the bombing of cities (Shaw 2013) (Blom 2010). The outbreak of World War I (1914 – 1918) marks the begging of the Air War, since it was the first time when aircrafts were used on the battlefield. However, the first use of airspace in war wasn’t for combat, but for reconnaissance. First incursions had the objective of taking pictures and locating enemy combatants. But soon the possibilities of air attack were exploited, when pilots started to carry bombs or guns in order to strike armies, cities and factories. Air combat also started in WWI, when pilots shot each other in direct combat (Johnson 1966). Besides aircrafts, aerial torpedoes and flying bombs were also developed in WWI. Nonetheless, they didn’t have as much success due to problems in the stabilization and operation of the new technologies. In the United States, in 1911, Elmer Sperry tried to use his invention, the gyroscope, on unmanned aircrafts. Until 139 Disarmament and International Security Committee the end of the war, he, along with Carl Norden and Glenn Curtiss, tried to develop an aerial torpedo, trying to use radio technology to control it, but it failed and it could never be used on the battlefield. Another project was being developed in the United States by Charles Kettering, in 1918: an unmanned flying bomb, latter called Kettering Bug, but it failed too, just like similar British and German projects. However, all this effort wasn’t in vain: later they would be used for the cruise missiles (Keane and Carr 2013). Projects of an UAV weren’t interrupted in the Interwar Period. The development of radio technology enabled the emergence of target drones, used on training exercises. In 1936, the term drone was used for the first time to refer to aerial targets. In the United States, in 1938, aerial targets were used for the first time in naval training. Through the 1920s, the Royal Air Force from the United Kingdom tried to develop a radio-controlled unmanned aircraft that could bomb the enemy: Fairey Bee was created on 1933 and a later version, Queen Bee, fought on the WWII (Keane and Carr 2013). World War II (1939 – 1945) began with some UAVs under development. As Germany lost the previous war, its air force was quenched. However, unofficially, the Luftwaffe was already being trained. The Spanish Civil War, in 1936, was the test for Germany’s air force, and Guernica was the first victim of the Luftwaffe bombing. This was also the beginning of the Blitzkrieg, when Air Force and Army acted together and coordinated (Johnson 1966). A defining point of World War II was the Battle of Britain (1940 – 1941), between the Luftwaffe and the Royal Air Force, due to the use of strategic bombing and radars. Germany developed an unmanned flying bomb called V-1, which wasn’t very effective, but did cause a lot of destruction. The British reaction was Project Aphrodite, an aircraft loaded with bombs that would take off with pilots, who would eject when the aircraft was passing the English Canal, and a “mothership” that would direct the aircraft to the target. But this also wasn’t very successful (Shaw 2013) (Cook 2007). The United Kingdom, on the other hand, was pioneer in the development of radars and radio communication, since this was needed to defend its insular position of the Luftwaffe bombing. In the end, one of the results of these two Great Wars was the development of new technologies for air power, which would change forever the ways to do war in the skies (Johnson 1966).

1.2 UNNAMED AIR VEHICLE’S HISTORY: COLD WAR AND WAR ON TERROR

With the end of World War II, the Cold War started and, with developing technologies, UAVs projects start to show real results. The Korean War (1950 – 1953) brought an innovation: the first operational unmanned helicopter, QH-50, from the

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United States (Blom 2010). The Vietnam War (1955 – 1975) saw the most extensive use of drones until then. It was a turning point in the UAV history, because from that moment on it became a sensor instead of a target, acting in reconnaissance missions. The main UAV used by the United States in that war was the Lightning Bug, an evolution of Firebee. The central improvement of this new model was that Lightning Bug could be controlled by ground, unlike Firebee, that was launched from a plane and controlled by it. It performed 3,425 reconnaissance missions and was used to spy Chinese territory (Scheve 2008) (Shaw 2013) (Keane and Carr 2013). In the Yom Kippur War (1973), Israel used Firebees (bought from the United States in 1971) to break the anti-aircraft missiles from Egypt. The use of UAV fueled Israel’s interest in this new technology. Later, in the 1980s, that country would develop modern drones like the Scout and the Pioneer, capable of live video transmissions (Blom 2010) (Shaw 2013) (Scheve 2008). In 1982, when Israel invaded Lebanon, the country also used UAVs to damage the Lebanese air defense system (Cook 2007). Lots of projects of new UAVs were developed in the decades of 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. The great majority was cancelled because of lack of investment or consecutive failed tests. One of these projects was “Aquila”, from the United States, in 1975. The idea was of an UAV that could provide laser designation for a precision monition. The tests did well, but it was cancelled before it entered in production. One of the main obstacles was the size of the components (data link and mission payload), which didn’t fit the vehicle (Blom 2010). The Gulf War (1990-1991), which encompassed Operation Desert Storm and Operation Desert Shield, had a great use of UAVs, mainly the Pioneer, which United States had brought from Israel in 1986. This UAV is still in service after the Gulf War because of its great acclamation, having flown in Bosnia, Haiti and Somalia (Keane and Carr 2013). In the 1990s, the United States gained experience in the use of UAVs (such as with the Pioneer, Hunter, Pointer, Exdrone and Predator) in combat situations, which proved very important in the later War on Terror (Blom 2010). In fact, the War on Terror was another turning point for the UAV history, when it, besides being a sensor, turned into a weapon. After the 9/11 attacks, the United States unleashed Operation Enduring Freedom against Afghanistan (2001) and Operation Iraqi Freedom against Iraq (2003), using UAVs for surveillance, but also - and for the first time - for killing enemies. Equipping the UAV with weapons was a mark on the history of this technology, and the birth of the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs). The main UAVs used on this war were the Predator and the Global Hawk, besides the Israeli Hunter UAV (Blom 2010). The Global Hawk was responsible for providing near-real-time, high-resolution intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance images (Keane and Carr 2013). The Predator, by its turn, could serve both functions: surveillance or target

141 Disarmament and International Security Committee killing. “When it’s not firing Hellfire anti-tank missiles at the enemy, the Predator uses its powerful surveillance cameras to give the theater air component commander continuous real-time surveillance of the battlefield” (Cook 2007, 5). Some of the Predator’s devices are the synthetic aperture radar and the de-icing equipment, which allows its use on overcast weather and for flying above the clouds – decreasing the risk of being detected by anti-aircraft fire– and the Ku-band satellite link, that allows the transmission of real-time full-motion video and facilitates the communication on air (Blom 2010).

1.3 UNNAMED AIR VEHICLES NOWADAYS

There are many UAV systems today, with different objectives and diverse characteristics. UAVs can serve for strategic or operational purposes, can be of short or long range and it can be of small or even micro sizes (Blom 2010).

Nowadays, unmanned aircraft such as the Predator are armed with laser designators and Hellfire missiles so they can perform attack orchestration and target ter¬mination, not just ISR. Other unmanned aircraft, such as Global Hawk, operate almost completely autono-mously, remotely piloted by operators thousands of miles away—this type of vehicle uses GPS and trans¬mits a live video feed back to its operations center. In addition, other unmanned aircraft are so small that they can be hand launched and have become useful in street fighting or other types of close-in engagements, where they can assist the operator in discovering immi¬nent ambushes (Keane and Carr 2013, 569).

Nonetheless, UAVs are not restricted to the United States and Israel only. In fact, in the later years, UAVs have proliferated around the globe. The United States is still the country that most invests in UAVs procurement, research and developing, but this investment has shown to be stable. In the rest of the world, the interest on UAVs is growing. More than 70 countries have UAVs for different purposes. Of these, 50 have projects to develop UAVs, but most are just proposals. 23 countries are developing armed UAVs (China, France, Germany, Greece, India, Iran, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United States and United Kingdom). Israel and the United States are the largest exporters of UAVs, but China and Iran can also compete in this market (Davis, McNerney, et al. 2014).

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2 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The growing production of drones worldwide has been significant in recent years. However, its increasing usage creates a series of questions about its strategic importance in current international affairs, since, with the emergence of a multipolar and more complex world, new security issues arise. Also, its use does not have a clear legal framework, overshadowed in the domestic and international context. The debate about the use of drones has been very superficial inside the United Nations (United Nations 2013), especially regarding its military use (Woods 2013). A discussion of such topic in the Disarmament and International Committee encompasses its significance on strategic terms, its current utilization and its critics on moral and military terms.

2.1 THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF DRONES

The impact of drones in the strategic context is of very much importance. Drones’ costs and size are lower than a manned aircraft. However, since a drone is not operated individually, but as part of a more complex system consisting of several aircraft, sensors, ground control, and satellite linkages, the number of personnel needed to operate a Predator Combat Air Patrol is estimated to exceed 80 people, and 128 soldiers are needed to operate a Platoon of four MQ-1C Gray Eagles (Singer 2010). Still, in overall, drones present a slight advantage over manned aircraft (Davis, McNerney, et al. 2014). Therefore, when relating their low costs with their operational uses, it is shown the advantages to use drones in military operations. Drones like the Predator are often called “hunter-killer”, since they can be used to fly in search for targets and strike them. Surveillance drones can be very effective since due to its low-flying capability they are difficult to observe with a ground-based radar (Walsh 2013). As a result, airspace at low altitude is not strictly controlled, making it possible for one to penetrate into another nation’s airspace without being detected. UAVs’ impact on economy is also of great importance, since, according to the RAND Corporation (Davis, McNerney, et al. 2014), there will be an increase in drone spending on procurement and research and development (R&D) from $6.6 billion in 2013 to $11.4 billion in 2022. Despite major US dominance on UAV procurement and R&D, projections show a relative increase of the rest of the world in this market, since more than 50 countries are currently developing UAVs, compared with more than 70 countries that have already acquired various types of drones. The map below shows current countries developing armed drones.

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Image 1 - Global View of Drone Production

Source: Davis, McNerney, et al., Armed and Dangerous? UAVs and U.S. Security 2014

These trends raise questions such as “are UAVs transforming the conduction of war?”, which requires some deeper investigation. If a country has weak air defenses, it is possible for other countries to take advantage of UAVs to gather intelligence and deliver precise strikes on specific leaders. If the economic expansion of the drone market continues to rise, as it probably will, small, armed UAVs that might be mass-produced in the future probably would cost less, turning non-state actors able to buy or develop them in large numbers and view them as expendable. The capabilities that UAVs give in military terms are significant, but are only transformative in rare circumstances with technological advances in automation, miniaturization, stealth, and other fields that enhance its use in war and against a solid air defense (Hazelton 2013). Nevertheless, armed drones are attractive to policymakers since they change the calculus for the employment of force. In other words, its impacts shape the politics of intervention: leaders can deploy drones instead of directly intervening. Having this in mind, drones, such as other air and sea platforms, are a form of power projec¬tion since they give countries the ability to mount tactical assaults without necessarily putting its personnel directly in danger and, thus, poten¬tially not creating any domestic opposition. However, according to Jacqueline L. Hazelton (2013), it is also possible to consider targeted killings by drones as an element of a defensive strategy:

[…]Targeted killings deter future attacks by denying armed groups the capability to conduct those attacks, and punishing those planning violence against the United States and its interests. The deterrence-by-denial argument requires consideration 144 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

not only of targeted killings but also drone strikes to directly degrade targeted groups’ capabilities in other ways. […] Drone strikes in this analysis might also deter cooperation with a group based on fear or doubt about the group’s likely success. There are several other possible strategic effects of drone strikes. […]Drone strikes can also be seen as the straightforward use of brute force to destroy those who would threaten the United States or its allies. In addition, they are an alliance tool supporting other states, such as Yemen and Pakistan. (Hazelton 2013, 3)

It is known that the most extensive and well-documented campaign of targeted killings is the one conducted by Israel against Palestinian militant organizations. Israel has used missiles fired from drones and from helicopters, bombs dropped from fixed- wing aircraft, armed raids, and snipers to kill militants (Singer 2010). However, there is a small literature that assesses the effectiveness of these targeted killings. Another application of drones, which is still under a more theoretical approach, is the use of mini-drones to “swarm” a target, like a group of bees. Swarms would consist of independent parts with no central leader, implying that a strong self-organization is the key to the whole working. Swarms are very appealing for unmanned war, since they can perform incredibly complex tasks as long as each part follows very simple rules by a controller (Singer 2009). This concept is actually under development: the Santa Fe Institute is carrying out a study on these proliferated autonomous weapons (PRAWNS), trying to apply this concept in robotic warfare. Also under this line of research, Lockheed Martin has a similar program on robot swarms funded by DARPA, called the “Wolves of War” (Walsh 2013). The idea behind this is that, as the PRAWNS spread in an almost random search, they would broadcast to the group any targets they find and then enter in a formation to attack them. If drones are game changers, any country who possesses them could decisively win in the battlefield, but not necessarily the war. Therefore, what matters is their relation with the associated country’s military doctrine, permitting its implementation in any tactical level. States can use armed UAVs in cases where they would otherwise do nothing, while in other situations they might use them instead of using more aggressively and directly approaches. Currently, the proliferation of armed UAVs is similar to the traditional spread of most conventional weapon systems: states capabilities are enhanced, but such is in a measured and evolutionary way (Walsh 2013). It is the way countries use drones with their strategy and policy that could shape the way they conduct conflicts and wars. Thus, something is revolutionary not so much because of what it can do, but rather because of the social, military, business, political, ethical, and legal questions it forces us to ask (Boot 2006). For such reasons, it is definitely a subjective question if currently drones are an evolution or revolution in military affairs, since its recent military uses still has not shown its true potentialities in a war.

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2.2 THE UTILIZATION OF UAVS BY SELECTED STATES

2.2.1 The Informal Policy of the United States of America

Despite being the most prominent user of drones, which, since 2012, started using them for targeted killing, the United States does not have an explicit doctrine or formal policy about their usage. The lack of a policy is pressuring the current government, since drone use is increasing every year. Between 2004 and 2007, in Pakistan alone the United States launched a total of ten drone strikes, evolving to 36 in 2008, 54 in 2009 and 122 in 2010, but declining in the next 3 years (New America Foundation 2013). According to the same source, this tendency of rise from 2009 until 2010, then declining until 2014, also applies to drone usage in Yemen (New America Foundation 2014). Also, fiscal year 2012’s budget included nearly $5 billion for drone research, development and procurement (Davis, McNerney, et al. 2014). Therefore, US strategy is more based on a collection of its conjectural decisions and related strategies than a solid UAV doctrine. The evolution that led to the decision for the usage of drones for strikes is less documented and still has some aspects under secrecy. Its application seems to be based on US counterterrorism policy, which has barely changed between the two administrations, though there has been a shift in tone and emphasis. President Obama has not ended his war on terror, but shifted its instruments by using drone strikes, special operations and sophisticated surveillance to fight a covert war against Al-Qaeda and other Islamist networks. Therefore, the recent approach emphasizes relatively few ‘boots on the ground’ and avoids nation-building missions, as it had been done during former Bush Administration. Such posture has been described by members of Obama’s administration as efficient, and even morally necessary, given the economic and post-Iraq war state of the country (Tandler 2013). This can be seen in former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta’s indication of drones as “the only game in town”, refereeing as an effective way to conduct and conclude the War on Terror (Boyle 2013). There are two main bodies that coordinate drone operations: the CIA and the US Air Force, though the US Army also flies many of these. Placing the CIA in control of drone strikes contributes to the covert nature of the drone activities, especially when this organization does not disclose any details of its operations. For instance, the identification of targets is based on someone “who is an operational leader” or “an operative in the midst of actually training for or planning to carry out attacks against US persons or interests”, but these criteria also creates potential for wrongdoing, in the form of mistaken attacks and civilian casualties (Becker and Shane 2012). Nevertheless, it is still the Executive who has the final word on deciding which target to strike.

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Therefore, the definition of a “personality” strike, that is, strikes targeting named, high-valued terrorists who are known to be planning an attack, could fit in US current actions. However, the commonly named “signature” strikes – strikes targeting “groups of men who bear certain signatures, or defining characteristics associated with terrorist activity, but whose identities aren’t known” – also seem to represent current drone strikes in Yemen and Pakistan (Davis, McNerney, et al. 2014). Such attacks are ordered based on intelligence denoting movement profiles and other indicators even if the names and functions of the targeted individuals are not known with certainty (Tandler 2013). It seems to be that there has been a preference from personality to signature strikes in the last years. According to a recent article in the New York Times, every week, more than 100 members of the government’s national security apparatus gather, by video teleconference, to analyze terrorist suspects’ biographies and recommend the president who should be the next target (Becker and Shane 2012). Names normally get approved after five or six sessions or are taken out if a suspect does not appear to be an imminent threat. There are some legal principles that are used to justify any strike taken by drones. The Authorization to Use Military Force, a joint resolution passed by the Congress three days after 9/11, gives the President the authority to use “all necessary and appropriate force” against those whom determined “planned, authorized, committed or aided” the September 11th attacks (Zapfe 2013). It is also implicitly invoked in some official discourses the principle of national self-defense, present in Article 51 of the UN Charter, indicating that the United States is at war with Al Qaeda, and in this ongoing conflict, the country has the right to use force without official consent of the local government to disrupt and prevent future attacks. When incorporated into a broader strategic framework, drones have been effective at providing troop support or to disrupt terrorist organizations. The US National Strategy for Counterterrorism lists “Disrupt, Degrade, Dismantle, and Defeat al-Qaida and Its Affiliates and Adherents”, eliminating safe havens used by Al Qaeda and taking its leaders off the field (Walsh 2013). The US military’s counterinsurgency doctrine stresses the importance of using force in a discriminate way so as not to alienate or stress local populations. Punishing insurgent organizations is only one of the strategies outlined in the current counterinsurgency doctrine: it also empha¬sizes a confidence building processes between the population and the local government, by providing public goods and coordinating the local government with international actors (Boyle 2013). As it has been shown in the previous section, drones have the capability to punish and deter insurgent organizations. However, bearing the counterinsurgency doctrine in mind, they cannot by themselves establish an effective state authority, since this requires large numbers of ground forces and civilians to pro¬vide services and to gain intelligence from the local population. In the end, drones are most useful in precisely such areas, since they allow the

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United States to project force when the national government has few other options. Nonetheless, such ungoverned spaces present two key challenges for the effective use of drone strikes. First, the absence of military units in the territory makes it very difficult to gather human intelligence on the activities of mili¬tant groups, given a margin of error that can kill wrong targets or civilians. Second, ungoverned spaces also allows armed groups to proliferate and form complex and short-lived alliances, increasing the challenge of targeting only militants that oppose the United States (Walsh 2013). Not only against counterinsurgency action are the United States showing a growing interest to use unmanned vehicles in their national defense programs. Current Navy programs are also moving towards the constant use of unmanned systems due to the threats sensed by the United States in relation to other countries which are creating forms to deny U.S. use and access of sea and air (Singer 2010). The concept of an unmanned vessel, as its technology, is at the initial phases yet. However, US Navy is already exploiting such concepts to integrate them into manned operations. To legitimate its actions, its legislations, its doctrinal reformulation and the current technological advances regarding the use of drones, there will be innumerous challenges for the United States security pol¬icy agenda. Without a consolidated strategy, current operations will face the sound critic that such air strikes are only a short-term successful tactic that may have unplanned long-term con¬sequences. Also, the failure to provide legal justification will lead to growing denunciations of international law violations.

2.2.2 The Dual-Position of Israel

Israel holds a particular position in the Middle East: it is surrounded by states that are against its interests in the region. This is further complicated by the numerous non-state organizations openly hostile to Israel’s claim as a Jewish state, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, which constitutes a danger to the country’s integrity. With that being said, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has the complex task of patrolling and defending the country’s skies through the Israeli Air Force (IAF). Such endeavor is greatly hampered by Israel’s notion of eradicating terrorist threats in foreign territories – notably Gaza – as a strategy of national security (Israel 2009). In that sense, drones are a valuable auxiliary asset to the accomplishment of IAF’s missions, which include the creation of aerial intelligence picture, carrying out search, rescue and aerial evacuation missions, and, most importantly, hitting targets deep into enemy territory (Israeli Air Force 2014). On the other hand, UAVs are also considered a serious threat to the security of Israel (Israel Defense Forces 2013). More recently, the country has been dealing with

148 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations the constant threat of airborne attacks on its northern frontier by Hezbollah’s drones in Lebanon – speculatively supplied by Iranian allies –, or even by Hamas’ ones in West Bank (Dreazen 2014). On April, 2013, two unidentified UAVs were intercepted and downed by the IAF off Israel’s coast. The event occurred a few months after the incident on which another UAV, allegedly from Hezbollah, breached 225km of Israeli airspace over the northern Negev, near the nuclear facility of Dimona, before being destroyed. On the occasion, the IDF stated that any attempts made to violate Israel’s sovereignty would not be tolerated (Israel Defense Forces 2013). While no real damage has been done by terrorist groups to Israel’s infrastructure so far, infiltrating the country’s airspace represents a “propaganda victory” for militias, earning them more credibility among recruits, aside from the fact that drones can help Hezbollah’s missile targeting improve by providing intelligence to the group (Dreazen 2014). The psychological effects of these breaches can also be felt, as a long-felt sense of security and superiority starts being questioned by the population. According to Ophir Shoham (Harel 2013), head of Israel’s Defense Ministry’s Research and Development Division, the development of drone technology was one of the country’s best investments. Israel is on the forefront of unmanned vehicles advancements alongside the United States. Having a long history of innovation on military technology as backdrop, Israel has been able to produce state-of-the-art surveillance drones such as the Eitan and the Heron. It has never publicly confirmed the possession of armed drones, although security officials have privately reported their existence and further utilization for eliminating specific targets in the Gaza Strip (Dreazen 2014). Furthermore, Israel currently stands as the world’s largest exporter of UAVs. As of 2010, 42 foreign governments had acquired Israeli drones, accounting for more than ten per cent of the country’s military exports (Davis, McNerney, et al. 2014).Therefore, drones represent a dual concept for Israel: they can be one of IDF’s means of achieving security as much as they can be a threat to the integrity of the Jewish state in the hands of the enemy.

2.2.3 Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization

In many ways, Russia has a similar struggle against terrorism as the United States. The main difference lies in the fact that the groups targeted by Russia offer a risk of separatism and are settled nearby Russian territory and within it, spreading from Chechnya, to the Caucasus region and as far as Central Asia. Connections between Chechen extremists and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, for example, are well established for decades (Reis and Simionato 2013). This gives evidence to the complex, transnational issue which Russia and its allies have to deal with. In this sense, aviation technology in the form of drones can come as a possible solution.

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Back in 2012, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated how “the role of aviation in armed combat is increasing” and that “aviation systems play a decisive role in achieving military success”. About drones, Mr. Putin said that

[Russia] should very actively develop unpiloted aircraft programmes. According to experts’ recommendations, this is the most important direction in aviation development. Here, we need the full line, including automated strike aircraft, reconnaissance drones and other systems. As you know, unpiloted aircraft are being used more and more actively in armed conflicts. And I must say, they are being used effectively (Putin 2012, online).

However, the efficacy of the country’s unmanned aircraft battalion has been put into question since the Georgian War in 2008, since they were not enough to bring a decisive advantage by air to the Russians (Galeotti 2014). Therefore, the need for modernization is pressing Russia and this does not go unnoticed for its Ministry of Defense, which in 2013 ordered to double the speed of the research and procurement of drones. Before that, in 2012, President Putin had announced a budget of US$12.2 billion to be invested in UAV development through 2020 (Galeotti 2014). At the same time, Russia is willing to differentiate its drone strategy from its North-American counterparts. According to Mr. Putin, “drones are not video games” and Russia is “not going to operate them as other countries do” (Russia Today 2013). The Minister of Foreign Affairs emphasized how Russia values consent above all for drone operations to be conducted in foreign territories (Lavrov 2012). So far, Russia’s coordination with its allies and neighbors for the development of a transnational counterterrorism strategy utilizing drones has shown a steady rise. The main arena for this development is the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), whose member-States are Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Armenia. In 2012, the organization’s Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) conducted a military exercise in Armenia, where, among the presence of high-level officials from all members, Armenian UAVs were utilized (Khachatrian 2012). Furthermore, in 2011, CSTO launched the Interstate Corporation for Development in order to promote scientific, industrial and high-tech cooperation among the former Soviet countries and, more specifically, to build drones (Charnysh 2012). Thus, according to Kotanjian (2013), CSTO drones could even be useful for pacification missions in Afghanistan.

2.2.4 China’s Armed Peace

Drone warfare might be seen as ideal to settle some of the main issues that torment the People’s Republic of China. Its support for terrorism containment

150 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations strategies can be applied to separatist movements in the provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet. Remote reconnaissance is also fit to monitor disputed territories in the South and East China Sea (Erickson and Strange 2013). Accordingly, China’s economic power is sufficient to allow the country to develop its own fleet of unmanned aircrafts, which it is already doing, having rapidly achieved excellence in the late years. For example, an aviation exposition in Beijing showcased the CH-4 model, compared to the North-American Predator. It can carry four to six missiles and has the operational reach of 3,500km (Wickenkamp 2013). Two-year long cyber- attacks perpetrated against defense contractors in the US, focused specifically on drone technology, are attributed to the People’s Liberation Army (Wong 2013). If indeed truthful, these would just showcase the country’s ambitious strategy to attain a forefront position on drone manufacturing, for their own use or for exports, with the aid of international technology – being that voluntary or not. To this day, China has not utilized armed UAVs to exterminate targets outside of its territory, standing firmly by the country’s general position against foreign intervention. However, that was almost reversed. On 2011, the Chinese hunt for a Burmese notorious drug trafficker and warlord, which acted on the Golden Triangle of opium production in China, Myanmar, Laos and Thailand, led a searching party to his hideout in Northeast Myanmar. Security officials were prompt to publicly suggest the utilization of drones to perform an air strike and execute the drug lord. The operation was not taken forward, nevertheless, and China decided to employ a costly ground force to perform a capture in Laotian territory instead (Hong 2014). Whether the decision was motivated by fear of large political retaliation or by lack of trust on the system’s targeting capabilities remains unknown. On the year of 2013, yet another singular event took place. The Chinese navy had sent a surveillance drone to the surroundings of the Diaoyu Islands, claimed by Japan under the name of Senkakus. The maneuver was detected by Japanese patrols and was taken as a serious offense by the Japanese government (Wong 2013). The trend established by China’s drone development is already being classified as “worrisome” by the North American Department of Defense (Defense Science Board 2012, 78-80). As China’s military capabilities grow, it seems to leave the West uneasy regarding its intentions. It is uncertain for how long China may withhold an international drone policy because of political constraints. As an example, combating terrorism in Central Asia through a more comprehensive military cooperation alongside the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has much to benefit Beijing (Reis and Simionato 2013). Furthermore, in relation to territorial disputes, according to a retired major general and director of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, Chinese drones are designed precisely to operate in contested airspace and are a “very useful instrument for safeguarding maritime sovereignty” (Wong 2013). However dormant its intentions on expanding

151 Disarmament and International Security Committee their utilization of drones to foreign airspace may be at the present moment, China is still a relevant player to look out for.

2.3 CRITICISM

2.3.1 Strategic Deficiencies and its Consequences

As it has been seen in the last sections, arguments for the effectiveness of drone strategy can be subdivided into four separate claims: (1) drones are effective at killing terrorists with minimal civilian casualties; (2) drones have been successful at killing so called ‘high value targets’ (HVTs); (3) using drones puts such pressure on terrorist organizations that it degrades their organizational capacity and ability to strike; and (4) the cost–benefit analysis of their use relative to other options—such as the deployment of ground troops—provides a compelling argument in their favor. On behalf of the first argument, the claim that drones are effective at killing terrorist operatives without causing civilian casualties, its critics say it is based on data of questionable reliability and validity (Boyle 2013). Since the US drone program is classified, the government never provides a definitive number of strikes or the casualties from these strikes. Organizations like the New America and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism tried to count the number of militants and non¬combatants killed in drone strikes, but faced several challenges: drone strikes normally take place in remote and dangerous areas, making it difficult for researchers to operate and to identify victims. Also, it is difficult for researchers to differentiate between “militant” and “noncombatant”, since they are not necessarily mutually exclusive (The Bureau of Investigative Journalism 2014). Since current policy sees any individual related to a terrorist group a possible target, the result of this ‘guilt by association’ loses identification standards by which the US selects targets for drone strikes. This appears to be empirically valid, since there are innumerous news relating the deaths of non-combatants and the destruction of buildings (most of them mosques) by such strikes (Foust and Boyle 2012). As mentioned earlier, the concept of ‘signature strikes’, where the criteria to select a target are based not on the combatant status or its identity but rather their ‘pattern of behavior’, reaches many possible individuals as targets: if a person was near a known Al-Qaeda building, or loading a truck with possible bomb-making material or even crossing borders multiple times in a short period, it can be taken to the discussion table as a possible target. Second, the High Value Targets (HVT) argument has also empirical problems: they represent only 2% of the total number of deaths from drone strikes and the remaining 98% of drone strikes have been directed against lower-ranking operatives

152 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations and civilians (Walsh 2013). Even if there is a large margin of error, all empirical studies show that if the principal mission of drone strikes is to eliminate HVT, they are not doing it right. In relation to the third argument, which advocates that drones have been effective at placing sufficient pressure on terrorist activities to degrade their organizational capacity and ability to strike, there is evidence from reports that militants find it harder to operate due to the attacks. However, it does not neutralize them. They may even disperse and expand to other areas, deepening the conflicts in states like Mali and Syria (Boyle 2013). Another critic related to this is that drones are actually counter-productive, since they can foster anti-American sentiment, enabling recruitment to non-state armed groups, and motivating further violent attacks (Walsh 2013). On a long term approach, this can lead to what is known as “blowback”, that is, incidents that arise years later as an unintended consequence of actions taken in the present, for an example, the rise of Taliban or the September 11th attacks (Swift 2012). Walsh (2013) gathered several statistical studies that try to find any correlational cause between drone strikes and insurgents activities. One of them shows a pattern in which increases in terrorism are followed by more drone strikes, that is, spikes in terrorist attacks precede (rather than follow) increases in militant deaths from drones. However, the same study indicates that insurgents can respond to drone strikes by deliberately escalating and concentrating their attacks in other, more populous, and politically important regions, distorting the statistics. Still in relation to Walsh’s gatherings, another research measures both the occurrence of drone strikes as well as the suc¬cess of the strikes in killing leaders of a militant group. What has been found is that drone strikes have no consistent relationship to terrorist violence in Afghanistan4. Finally, in relation to applying strikes only to militant leaders in Pakistan, the research concludes that they do not fundamentally alter the patterns of violence. However, another study finds a strong, positive relation¬ship between drone strikes and subsequent terrorist attacks in Pakistan, suggesting that drones help fuel political violence in the country. What pervades all the researches gathered is that, having drones strikes as a tool for reducing violence, they are not an effective tool for achieving such goal. Also, the relationships between drone strikes and ter¬rorist attacks, especially in Pakistan, are quite variable. In most of the statistical models encountered, Walsh concludes that drone strikes are associated with both an increase and a decrease in subsequent ter¬rorism (Walsh 2013). Since there is difficulty to find a consistent temporal pattern, the determination of such relationships indicated here are hard to determine. These

4 Drone strikes reduce the capacity of the Haqqani network in Afghanistan to respond with violence in the subsequent week, but the network undertakes considerably more terror¬ist attacks in the second week after a drone strike (New America Foundation 2014). 153 Disarmament and International Security Committee problems show the complexity created by drone strikes: its consequences are several for groups’ political violence, expanding propaganda and operational reorganization. This last aspect requires more consideration, since reorganization may be understood as a fragmentation of the terrorist group, making it more difficult for the authorities to employ selective violence (Boyle 2013). Not even drones can collect the necessary amount of intelligence about the location, movements, and communications of all individuals. What can be expected is an expansion of the selective profiling of a target, increasing the indiscriminate violence applied. Retaking the last argument for drone effectiveness, a number of experts have argued that drone strikes are not only effective but even morally required, because they cause fewer civilian casualties than air strikes or ground operations in combat zones. It is difficult to compare the effectiveness of drone strikes versus carefully constructed covert operations against HVTs. Therefore, as the critics have shown, each of the most common claims for the effectiveness of drones is based on weak empirical evidence, questionable assumptions and logical fallacies (Foust and Boyle 2012). It is also interesting to analyze the strategic costs of the use of drones in the affected regions/countries. First of all, the Pakistani government is under intense pressure from growing popular hostility to the drone strikes policy. A Pew Research Center poll in June 2012 revealed that 74 per cent of Pakistanis now consider the United States an enemy (New America Foundation 2013). Pakistani leaders have also felt the growing dissatisfaction and distance between themselves and the American drone policy which is being followed. Not only detachment, but also an antagonism is brewing in the Pakistani government, especially after the humiliating invasion of US SEALs to Osama Bin Laden’s compound. In Yemen, drone strikes are replicating some of the same dynamics evident in Pakistan (Boyle 2013). As also mentioned in the other section, the process to select targets is normally pinpointed by, normally local, paid informants who place small electronic targeting devices in homes, phones or vehicles of suspected terrorists, giving space to question if the suspect is actually a terrorist or person which the informant has personal problems (Singer 2010). Broadly speaking, there might be dangers if drone usage expands without any formal norms: it might undermine the normative prohibition respected by states of requiring a legal basis for the assassination of leaders and government officials. If murder without due process or trial is normalized as a tool of state action, the approach of physical elimination would distort the legitimacy of current relations between states.

2.4.2 Humanitarian Law, War Ethics, Political Implications and Sovereignty

According to Peter Mauer, President of the International Committee of the

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Red Cross (ICRC),

Under international humanitarian law – the rules of war […] – drones are not expressly prohibited, nor are they considered to be inherently indiscriminate or perfidious. In this respect, they are no different from weapons launched from manned aircraft such as helicopters or other combat aircraft. It is important to emphasize, however, that while drones are not unlawful in themselves, their use is subject to international law (Maurer 2013, online).

While many have praised the use of armed drones for their abilities of minimizing civilian causalities, in accordance to the principles of international humanitarian law, a strong opposition has also been formed during the last decade against their usage. One of the main points of criticism towards drone warfare by Human Rights activists lies in relation to a strategic deficiency of the weapons: the difficulty to differentiate combatants from non-combatants. So far, there have been countless reports of hundreds of civilian causalities resulting from targeting mistakes and irresponsible utilization of UAVs in the Gaza Strip, Yemen, Pakistan and Afghanistan (Emmerson 2014). In regard to precision, drone technology undeniably represents a significant evolution for aviation. Yet, all airstrikes are accompanied by collateral damage, which is extremely hard to control, and are subjected to weather conditions or operational issues, even if it originates from a UAV, debunking the widely broadcasted idea that drones have a pinpoint accuracy (Cole 2013). Furthermore, with or without precision, the utilization of drones necessarily involves an expansion of targeting. Whereas in conventional warfare armed combatants are the main focus of obliteration, UAV strikes also target political leaderships of non- state organizations, such as recruiters, preachers and propagandists (Waldron 2013). Aside from that, drone strikes are conducted by operators that may be considered unlawful and protected by secrecy – as the case of CIA agents acting in the stead of the North-American Ministry of Defense personnel, those of which are strictly subject to a military chain of command as well as military ethics (Waldron 2013). This reality makes individual and organizational accountability for humanitarian law violations something extremely hard to pursue. Morally speaking, it is said that drone warfare makes it too easy and cheap for operators to resort to lethal military action. This is further aggravated by what is called the “Playstation mentality”, which consists on lowering the threshold of reality because of the great physical distance between drone operators and the extermination perpetuated by UAVs. Even considering the military chain of command and the professionalism of drone operators, it is reported that the mentality of detachment from the act of killing persists (Cole 2013). Aside from reducing the economic cost of employing lethal actions, UAVs also reduce its political cost in the sense that governments won’t have to deal with the risk of losing soldiers in the battlefield, which

155 Disarmament and International Security Committee gives yet another reason to perpetuate this type of warfare and violence (Cole 2013). Shah (2013) emphasizes that drone warfare leads to the extension of conflicts’ duration – as the case of the War on Terror – which in turn greatly contributes to the social and political destabilization of countries where they take place. Although the United States has claimed responsibility for the elimination of core leaderships of Al-Qaeda in Pakistan through covert tactics involving UAVs, there has been no report of a diminishment of terrorism in the country. In fact, the problem has become even more complex, as terrorists moved from the tribal areas in the Northeast to the highly-populated urban centers of Karachi or Islamabad, since, in opposition to rural scenarios, it is almost impossible for drones to obtain precise targeting among cities. An increasing number of terrorist attacks are taking place in these cities and, as a result, more people are now susceptible to the threat of terror. On the other hand, it can be said that it is difficult to determine precisely if this shift is in fact a direct result from drone strikes in tribal areas. Aside from the expansion of the targeting, it can also be said that drone operations expand the geographical area of the operations, involving covert activities in territories that were not initially delineated in strategy plans (Waldron 2013). The aforementioned covert operations in Somalia are an example of that, as the hunt for terrorist leaderships there targets people that were somewhat connected to sub-state organizations in Yemen. In some cases, drone strikes in both countries even depart from the same military bases, like Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti. Moreover, such argument is supported by evidence of an enlarging North-American intelligence network in Sub-Saharan Africa. Terrorist groups like Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) would all be targets of airstrikes to be launched from drone bases in Burkina Faso, Uganda, Morocco, Niger, Ethiopia and Djibouti (Al Jazeera 2013). As Waldron (2013) points out, there is alarm about the proliferation of this phenomenon, as plans for drone strikes against Mexican and Colombian drug cartels are already being laid out. Finally, there is one more direct and grave implication of drone warfare: the issue of sovereignty. A considerable percentage of drone operations make use of foreign airspace without the express formal authorization of central governments. By a simple and rational perspective, such acts constitute disrespect to state’s sovereignty and should, therefore, be condemned by all signatories of the Charter of the United Nations – especially when the non-transparency of the attacks is taken into account. However, the international law principle of self-defense could be evoked under these circumstances, by alleging that counterterrorism preemptively combats a direct threat to the security of a state (Emmerson 2014). By contrast, legitimizing this new form of warfare can also legitimate it when it is in the hands of opponents, being a rival state or a sub-state organization (Waldron 2013).

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2.4 CASE STUDIES

2.4.1 Pakistan

The current situation in Pakistan is deeply connected to that of its neighbor, Afghanistan. Its roots, in fact, go way backward, tied to the historic rivalry between Pakistan and India and the “Great Game” played in Central Asia. Ever since the country’s independence from the British rule, Pakistan’s Army has enjoyed high levels of autonomy. Such special status, allied with the Army’s perceived responsibility to protect the Islamic State, has allowed the institution to conduct its own missions, following independent pathways that are not always in consonance with that of the central government. In this interim, the Pakistani intelligence organ, the Inter- Services Intelligence (ISI), has played a large role in these missions (Rogers 2014). One of its long-standing policies is that of maintaining a high level of influence over Afghanistan in order to counter-balance Indian aspirations in the region that might be driven against Pakistan. The ISI has been, therefore, greatly responsible for the establishment of the Afghan Taliban – which was initially in accordance to the North-American plan of destabilizing the Soviet Union rule within Afghanistan. The Afghan Taliban was able to handle against Soviet operations by being provided safe-haven and training in the North-Western portion of Pakistan, the so-called Federal Administered Tribal Areas, along its highly porous borders with Afghanistan (Rogers 2014). Soon, the cross border flow of paramilitary groups created an environment that was ideal for the settling of non-state extremist actors, which was enough to attract other groups into the region. Within this context of fostered extremism, Al-Qaeda came into this Pakistani region between 2001 and 2002, establishing there its new base of operations for global terrorism. For Pakistan’s dismay, it also led to the formation of terrorist groups that are against the country’s central authority as well. The Pakistani Taliban is one of those groups, which commits acts of terror against the population as an opposition to the secularization of the State (Rogers 2014). It was in this scenario that the United States came to Pakistan with the mission of eradicating terrorism along the border with Afghanistan, as part of the ongoing War on Terror. The backbone of the North-American operation in Pakistan was and still remains in surveillance and the targeted killing of high and medium-level officials by UAVs – particularly in the region of North Waziristan. Drone strikes in the country are conducted by members of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the military’s Joint Special Organization Command (JOAC) – both organs with a recognized lack of public transparency. The drones are launched from airbases within the country and are suspected to count with the occasional collaboration of the United Kingdom, Germany and Australia (Amnesty International 2013). So far,

157 Disarmament and International Security Committee the total number of causalities caused by drone strikes is estimated between 2,500 and 3,600; of those, between 400 and 950 were civilians. Most of the numbers correspond to the period of Barack Obama’s administration (Serle and Ross 2014). Thus, the “drone war” in Pakistan is one of the world’s most recognized counterterrorism campaigns – and probably one of the most criticized for its many flaws. Its contribution to the aggravation of domestic instability in Pakistan is a well- known fact. For all of the turmoil caused by civilian deaths and operational mistakes, the central government is very critical about North-American actions in the country. It publicly points out that the drone war is a severe offense to Pakistan’s sovereignty and that it must end at once. However, support for these operations can be found in the Armed Forces of the country. It has been stated that the ISI actively gives support to the drone strikes in North Waziristan (Amnesty International 2013). While it is true that drones make it more difficult to support proxy operations by the Afghan Taliban, the annihilation of the Pakistani Taliban ends up being a priority for the ISI, which ultimately allies itself with the CIA in this aspect. Nevertheless, it has been reported that strikes have considerably diminished since 2012, reaching an all-time low in 2013 (Emmerson 2014). Still, the continuous build-up of a strong anti-American feeling in Pakistan is a reality.

2.4.2 Somalia

Ever since 1991, Somalia has suffered the harsh consequences of an enduring Civil War. The conflict led to the collapse of the state, which then on lacked a central authority powerful enough to bring cohesion and stability to the country. Numerous attempts by the international community have been made to reestablish order in Somalia in the past decades. The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) lasted between the years of 1993 and 1995, failing at the renewed intensity of the armed conflicts. External mediation efforts led to the establishment of two transitional governments: the Transitional National Government (TNG) in 2000 and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004. Both were mildly successful in transferring some of the country’s administration back to federal entities, as well as reestablishing national institutions (Menkhaus 2004). The year of 2006 saw the conflict between the TFG, with the aid of Ethiopian troops and U.S. intelligence, against the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a rival administration in southern Somalia. The ICU was defeated and its leadership split, resulting in the emergence of the extremist group Al-Shabab. With the end of the TFG’s mandate in 2012, the Federal Government of Somalia was established, and, among growing stability, the country was able to initiate its slow reconstruction, with many challenges ahead.

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Foreign intervention has had an important role in the continuity of armed conflict in Somalia. The country has been an arena for a proxy war between Ethiopia – seeking a weak, subservient client state – and the Gulf States – encouraging the centralization of a strong conservative ally (Menkhaus 2004). Furthermore, neighbors Kenya and Ethiopia suffer a grave security threat from the spillover of Somali instability. This situation was further aggravated since the merger between Al-Shabab and Al-Qaeda in 2012. In 2013, Al-Shabab claimed responsibility for the Westgate Mall terrorist attack in Nairobi, Kenya, which resulted in 67 deaths (Howden 2013). War lords, terrorist leaders and other non-state actors have been targets for North-American unmanned airstrikes in Somalia since 2011. The campaign started as an expansion of the drone war in Yemen, especially after the revelation of ties between Al-Shabab and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Whereas the United States used to rely on regional forces for stabilization in Somalia, such as the African Union, their most recent plan consists mainly of intelligence work – considered inconclusive by many (Mazzetti and Schmitt 2011). Armed Reaper drones that operate in Somalia are known to be secretly launched from US bases in Djibouti, Ethiopia and the Seychelles. It is also speculated that Kenya hosts a US drone base (Whitlock 2011). All these actions are presumably coordinated by the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), subordinated to the US Africa Command (AFRICOM). So far, civilian causalities in Somalia were very hard to track due to the lack of reliable independent reports and its imposed constraints, albeit some cases have been recognized by the UN (Emmerson 2014).

2.4.3 Yemen

In the case of Yemen, despite growing unpopularity within the local population, drones are showing to achieve its goals regarding United States and Yemen interests against the radical group Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). This organization became prominent in the early 2000s when it conducted terrorist activities in Saudi Arabia, but after a long series of failures in the country, AQAP regrouped in Yemen, merging with the local Al-Qaeda organization in 2009 (Terrill 2013). Also, with the presence of AQAP in the region, there is a growing emergent, parallel insurgent organization, called Ansar al-Sharia, which has militarily held large parts of territory, governing portions of Yemen and providing social services to its local people neglected by the regime (Alkarama 2013). Since Osama Bin Laden’s death, most of the United States military and intelligence resources have been reallocated to neutralize AQAP members by the same methods applied in Afghanistan and Pakistan, especially in relation to drone use (Davis, McNerney, et al. 2014).

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There are two important moments to considerate: the September 2011 death of the terrorist leader Anwar al Awlaki and the use of drones to support Yemen’s May-June 2012 offensive against AQAP insurgents and the Ansar al Shariah organization. The first moment was a test for the Obama government since Anwar al-Awlaki was an American-born cleric, therefore American citizen, and Al-Qaeda propagandist hiding in Yemen. When Awlaki was indicated as a major influence of terrorist attacks, the Obama administration was faced with an urgent question about ordering the killing of an American citizen without any trial (Becker and Shane 2012). After passing a long judicial process that provided the executive branch the possibility to choose al Awlaki’s faith, president Obama gave his approval, and Awlaki was killed in September 2011, along with Samir Khan, an American citizen who was not on the target list but was traveling with him. A second important moment is a series of events that involves what is believed to be the extensive use of drones to support a critical Yemeni government offensive against AQAP in May-June 2012. President Hadi unleashed an offensive against the terrorist organizations which seized territory in the southern provinces in order to restore the government legitimacy and to avoid a spread of anarchy throughout the country (Watts and Cilluffo 2012). Drones have been a valuable asset to aid Yemeni forces as they moved into combat, playing a significant role in winning the campaign, which ended when the last AQAP-controlled towns were recaptured in June 2012 (Tandler 2013). Spillover effects of the fights against terrorism in the country have impacted a lot of provinces, like Al-Baydha. The area was under surveillance because of the influence of armed groups and the potential threat of an influx of militants into the province. This generated a lot of complaints by the side of local inhabitants, since for a year prior to the attack, drones had been flying over the region (Alkarama 2013). These surrounding areas are strategically important due to the highway that passes through it, connecting the provinces of the north to those of the south (Watts and Cilluffo 2012). Nowadays, Defense Department can target suspects in Yemen whose names they do not know. However, even with this approach, it seems that Al-Qaeda’s appeal has also risen in the region. What the media referred as the “escalation of the secret US war” in Yemen can be understood as a terrorism offensive coinciding with an increase in US military and CIA airstrikes against Al-Qaeda leaders in Yemen (Becker and Shane 2012). The local government has relied, in part, on intelligence gathered by the CIA operatives and contractors in the contested tribal areas. Since most of the details are classified, there are rumors that the Yemeni government provides false information to the US government in order to get rid of political oppositions (Boyle 2013).

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3 PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS

Not until recently have the issues regarding the utilization of drones for military action been addressed by the international community. In many ways, this is related to the fact that airstrikes by unmanned vehicles have only started being employed at a significant scale with the advent of the War on Terror. Nonetheless, it is also important to consider that the uttermost complex nature of this phenomenon, alongside the unwillingness of key actors to actively cooperate in multilateral international organizations, has had its share in hampering progress towards cooperation and regulation on the issue. As a result, few declarations regarding UAV strikes and surveillance have been produced so far. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is the world’s primary authority on any matters related to air navigation for civil purposes. Its establishment in 1944 via the implementation of the Chicago Convention broadened and solidified the efforts that led to the previous Paris Convention of 1919 - the first binding document to declare that each state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory. The Chicago Convention was fruitful due to the recognition by all states of the importance of international commerce and free transit of peoples by air, being their collective responsibility to safeguard it, under the auspices of the ICAO. Its Article 6 declared that foreign civil aircrafts were only allowed to fly above national territory when there existed formal agreements between two or more involved states. However, as stated on Article 3(a) of the Convention, the ICAO exempts itself from the responsibility of regulating non- civil flights that are carried out by states due to the largely controversial nature of air traffic by national police forces or the military on foreign territories (International Civil Aviation Organization n.d.). Even so, the Chicago Convention does have specific guidelines regarding unmanned vehicles, present on its Article 8. According to it, no pilotless aircraft can enter foreign airspace without the express authorization or consent by foreign authorities. On 2011, with the recognition of the proliferation of drone technology as a worldwide phenomenon, member-states of the ICAO started working towards the establishment of a regulatory framework for the utilization of UAVs in civil instances, broadening the competence of Article 8. Through cooperative action and intense technical research, states successfully compiled a series of Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs), which, together, serve as regulations for the use of UAVs in domestic or foreign airspace (International Civil Aviation Organization 2011). Although exclusive to the civil utilization of drones, these efforts can be recognized as a valid framework for international cooperation in the area. However, initiatives directed specifically at the armed use of drones in military operations still remain to be seen.

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On 2013, the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Ben Emmerson, unveiled an interim report on extraterritorial drone strikes and their consequences around the world. By collecting extensive data from a number of separate cases with reported civilian causalities in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and the Gaza Strip, Emmerson was able to reach the overall conclusion that UAV strikes conducted by the United States, the United Kingdom and Israel in these locations with the purpose of containing terrorist activities were causing severe violations of human rights and humanitarian law. The high number of deceased civilians caught between the conflicts gave evidence of the operations’ lethality for local populations, previously regarded as overall precise and accurate by foreign states. Furthermore, the Rapporteur pointed out the lack of transparency regarding these strikes, both by extraterritorial intelligence agencies and consenting states, which greatly aggravated investigations and, consequently, the protection of human rights (Emmerson 2014)5. The report ended with a series of recommendations to the United Nations’ Human Rights Council (UNHRC), urging all states to act responsibly and in accordance to the United Nations Charter when utilizing UAVs to combat terrorism (Emmerson 2014). With these conclusions and appointments, the report was brought upon the United Nations’ General Assembly on December 2013. Along the vocal support and leadership of the Pakistani delegation, openly against North American covert operations in its territory, the Assembly was able to include a paragraph regarding drone strikes on the extensive resolution of that meeting, which was named “Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism” – A/RES/68/178. At the end of the sessions, the document was approved with unanimity (The Express Tribune 2013). Similarly, the European Parliament issued a resolution urging for a common position within the European Union on the use of armed drones. Conditions of transparency and consent were once again highlighted by the parliamentarians (Emmerson 2014). Having a proper position from the General Assembly, the subject was then taken to the UNHRC, as initially urged by Emmerson. Once again, Pakistan presented the resolution, with co-sponsorship from Yemen and Switzerland. Among its paragraphs, it stated that the Council “urges all states to ensure that any measures employed to counter terrorism, including the use of remotely piloted

5 Apart from Emmerson’s report, UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Christof Heyns also produced an important document regarding drone technology on 2013. Heyns’ research focused primarily on the risks of increased autonomy on lethal robotics due to a robot’s or UAV’s lack of abilities to make qualitative assessments when dealing with human lives. His findings were presented to the UNHRC on Resolution A/HRC/23/47 (United Nations 2013). 162 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations aircraft or armed drones, comply with their obligations under international law [...] in particular the principles of precaution, distinction and proportionality” (Nebehay 2014). Eventually6, resolution A/HRC/25/L.32 was adopted by the Council on March 2014, but there was no consensus at this time. From the 47 members of the forum, 27 were in favor, 14 abstained and 6 were against – among which were the United States, the United Kingdom and France (Nebehay 2014). However remarkable was the fact that member-states were able to issue a resolution that regarded the utilization of armed UAVs for the first time in the UN system, it is inevitable to notice that the scope of such actions are still fairly limited and only at an initial stage. It is indeed outstanding that the international community has started to actively seek the protection of all peoples by the rule of law against the irresponsible and non-transparent use of drones. But states are yet to surpass the limited scope of Human Rights in order to tackle this complex situation, delving into matters of sovereignty and international security themselves7.

4 BLOC POSITIONS

Despite its policy process indicated in the previous sections, the United States defends the use of drone strikes in the UN (Pilkington e Devereaux, US defends drone strikes as ‘necessary and just’ in face of UN criticism 2013). The Obama administration deems the use of drones as essential to act in world affairs and to eliminate terrorist threats (Obama 2013). Also, an important concern of the Obama administration is the proliferation of drones and the responsible use of these technologies (Zenko 2013). However, when it comes to international law responsibilities, the United States continues to avoid further discussion in other committees like the Human Rights Council (Global Research 2014). Other NATO members are also abstaining from the human rights debate, especially due to specific national interests. France, for instance, is using intelligence gathering drones in Mali (Hirsch 2012) and its planning to produce its own national drones in the next years,

6 Aside from not participating in the first days of the discussions, the United States - along France and the UK - insisted on the occasion that the human rights forum was not the most adequate place to discuss weapon systems. Instead, it suggested talks on the laws of war on a “non-politicized forum”, such as the one sponsored by the International Committee of the Red Cross (Nebehay 2014). 7 Interestingly, on January 2013 the UN Security Council was able to approve the employment of unarmed UAVs by the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO). This was the first time that a peacekeeping mission adopted unmanned systems as part of their operations, recognizing the benefits of surveillance drones to monitor armed groups, displaced refugees and endangered civilians. The initiative was met by a vocal support of the United States (Better World Campaign 2013). 163 Disarmament and International Security Committee after buying American Reapers in 2012 (Hammad 2013). It seems that the country will enter in the drone market by intensifying its investments through cooperation agreements with other European countries (Defense Industry Daily 2014), which, therefore, shapes its drone policy. Similar to its NATO allies, the United Kingdom sticks to a very similar line of action: despite its refusal to divulge ample information, the government is linked with the CIAs strikes in the Afghani territory, having launched more than 400 strikes since 2008 (Cole, New British drone strike stats released to Drone Wars UK 2014). The country is also developing its own UAV, called Tiranis, with very advanced air system technology (Smith 2014). Germany is also entering the drone competition by indicating its internal production as a necessary step in the new contemporary warfare (Medick 2013). However, after declaring that it supports the use of unmanned weapons systems for the purposes of international disarmament and arms control, Germany has suspended the purchase of armed drones on the grounds that it categorically rejects illegal killings (RT 2013). TheRussian Federation’s struggle against terrorism, separatism and extremism is not likely to diminish in the near future, and all indicatives point towards an increase on the use of nationally-produced drones to combat these threats (Galeotti 2014). Russia, nevertheless, emphasizes that its drone policy is based on responsibility and respect to sovereignty (Lavrov 2012). That is one of the main reasons why the country is strengthening the role of the CSTO regionally, so that a coordinated strategy for the use of UAVs can be reached (Kotanjian 2013). Strongly allied to Russia’s stance in this matter due to political and military ties is Kazakhstan. As all nations in Central Asia, transnational crime is a constant threat to its homeland security (Reis and Simionato 2013). However, the country’s recent efforts to negotiate technology transfer deals with Israeli companies in order to establish an indigenous production of drones gives evidence to a new trend of diversification sought out by the Kazakh government (Kucera 2012). Belarus is another strongly committed member of the CSTO with close ties to Russia. Recent military exercises and conventions have showcased some of the country’s joint developments of drone technology with Russian companies. Moreover, Belarusian manufactured UAVs are increasingly being recognized and bought by foreign military forces (Parotnikau 2013). When it comes to the utilization of drones in foreign airspace, China relies on its traditional doctrine of non-intervention and non-interference. All the same, Beijing considers itself free to do whatever it is necessary to maintain peace within its territory, which in its interpretations includes the disputed islands in South and East China Seas (Wong 2013). Furthermore, China has also a considerable share of responsibility for the recent proliferation of drones through the world. Aggressive production and sales strategies have given the right incentive for Chinese companies to widely explore the international market for unpiloted vehicles, notably in Africa and Asia, without the

164 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations political constraints found by the West (Davis, McNerney, et al. 2014). The impending withdrawal of Western military forces from Afghanistan raises concern in Central Asia, as the slow process of state-building has not yet resulted in the assembly of fully capable armed forces for the Afghan government (Reis and Simionato 2013). Reports from the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) bring forth a high number of civil causalities resulting from British and North-American drone strikes in the country, a tendency that has not withered in past months (Emmerson 2014). Moreover, drone strikes conducted by the CIA and JSOC along the border with Afghanistan have met an increasing disapproval by Pakistan’s population and Parliament (Shah 2013). That being said, recent actions such as the announcement of Operation Zarb-e-Azb and UAV acquisitions from China have shown Pakistan’s desire to strengthen its own military capabilities for fighting terrorism and, with that, lower its political costs (Keck 2014) (Santana and Shahzad 2014). At the same time that Israel claims to be “surrounded” by hostility from its neighbors, the country is far from a position of fragility. It is currently on the forefront of drone technology in the world, and allegedly utilizes these capabilities to eradicate threats in foreign territory, notably in the Gaza Strip (Dreazen 2014). Not confirming the use of drones, Israel deemed all of its actions in Gaza as fully legitimate according to international law (Israel 2009). Iran, on the other hand, has a long history of autonomous drone development, notably from reverse engineering, due to its isolation in the international system. It has been accused of supplying proxy non-state actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah in other countries in the Middle East to fulfill its objectives against Israel (Davis, McNerney, et al. 2014). However, recent approximation between Iran and the West indicates a milder stance by the Iranian government. Iraq is passing through a very difficult political moment, with its northern border being controlled by a fundamental Islamic group, which has been calling itself the Islamic State. On August 8th 2014, the United States started airstrikes in the region to protect civilians and fight the rebels. The government of Iraq has called such US help, and agrees with the use of UAVs to protect the Iraqi people and state (Lubold 2014). Somalia, as previously shown, faces an increasing but still unknown numbers of air strikes, with indications that half of them are made by drones (Human Rights Clinic 2012). In regard to recent US drone operations in its territory, Somalia government had been pre-informed with some intelligence information about them. The government believes such actions with international partners are effective in a way that will help the country to be safe from terrorist activities (RBC Radio 2014). On 2013, a military airfield was opened in Niger to serve as a base for drone operations in North Africa. North American UAVs flying from this location are

165 Disarmament and International Security Committee mainly being employed in support to French operations in Mali and surrounding regions. The Nigerien government, concerned with the porosity of the country’s borders, has so far welcomed these actions as viable means to combat terrorism (Schmitt 2013). Djibouti is home to the only permanent military base from the United States in the African continent - and one of the top ranked in terms of covert UAV operations: Camp Lemonnier. Several US drones have flown from Djibouti ever since 2002 and are currently responsible for a generous percentage of all military takeoffs in the region. Due to its strategic location, flights from there can be carried out not only to the Horn of Africa, but also to the Arabian Peninsula, contributing to the notion that Lemonnier is the central base for drone operations in Africa and the Middle East (Whitlock, Remote U.S. base at core of secret operations 2012). With the abduction of more than 200 schoolgirls in 2014, the use of drones became more relevant in Nigeria: at least one US Global Hawk surveillance drone is expected to be used to search the kidnapped girls (Associated Press 2014). However, it seems that the Nigerian government is reluctant in allowing the use of its air space by US drones (Windrem e Miklaszewski 2014). Among the debate on designating Boko Haram as a terrorist organization by the United States, thus allowing a more direct intervention of this country (Ibrahim 2013), the Nigerian government is increasingly inclined to foreign help in military situations involving insurgent organizations (Ong 2014). More controversial with the use of drones in its territory is South Africa, since its legislation has specific requirements that make much of the available UAV unable to comply (News24 2014). In general, South Africa, through active involvement in the International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) Unmanned Aircraft Systems Study Group, is developing guidance material and standards to guide contracting states in the development of their national regulations in relation to UAVs (SACAA 2014). Other African countries do possess special foreign drone bases, like Ethiopia, a country whose relations were previously strained with the United States, but which is now retaking a more intense turn (Fiqir 2011). In Lybia, the use of drones by NATO was very intensive during the 2011 conflict, since the US flew drones to monitor chemical and biological sites (Barnes 2011). Nowadays, the country is currently trying to fortify its sovereignty by impeding the use of its air space by surveillance drones, since they are used to identify and capture Libyan terrorist suspects (Zenine e Nye 2014). Therefore, it seems that a new tendency in reducing the presence of external actors in Libyan territory is under development (Robertson, Cruickshank e Karadsheh 2012). Egypt is showing a new cooperation trend with Israel, by increasing its operations in the Sinai to crack down on the Al-Qaeda militancy by using Israeli-made drones (Dorell 2013). This new cooperation seems to strengthens if the turbulent internal process in the Egyptian political system goes

166 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations by the actual route, since many insurgent groups are emerging, questioning the new government (Yeranian 2013). Ukraine is currently under a very intense political process, with not only a changing government, but also military tension within its borders. The usage of drones is clearly a very strong topic: Ukrainian Security Services and its Ministry of Defense finished an unauthorized flight of an UAV, shooting down the Russian- made device, a serial modification of the “Orlan-10” with an unknown chemical substance (Whiting 2014). A country with deteriorating relations with Israel and thus more reliant on US military assets, including on drone issues, is Turkey. The country has been bombing the Kurdish rebels of the Kurdistan Workers Party in northern Iraq by the use of intelligence gathered by US drones. Also, Turkey unveiled its own drone, known as the ANKA surveillance craft (Matthews 2011). Neighboring Syria’s ongoing civil war does not leave drone usage behind. The speed and accuracy of airstrikes against rebels have increased since government forces began using surveillance drones, with Iran as their probable manufacturer (N. Walsh 2012). Also, a more sophisticated drone technology from Russia has given Syrian government troops new advantages in tracking and destroying their targets, giving much better view of the battlefield and an improved capacity to respond to incoming fire (Warrick 2013). Saudi Arabia has signed an agreement to purchase China’s medium-altitude long-endurance unmanned Pterodactyl I, making it the first Arab country to acquire the drone (Guanzhong 2014). Despite allegations that Saudi Arabian air forces have been participating alongside the Americans in their drone war against Al-Qaeda in Yemen, the Saudi government objects its participation, but does not exclude intelligence cooperation (Nasser 2013). However, despite the confidential information about its operations, it is said that the United States has a drone base in Saudi Arabia to conduct its war against terrorism (Mali 2013). As previously shown, Yemen suffers daily with drone strikes against alleged terrorist locations. Nonetheless, the government seems to be inclined to US help, however indicating that the Yemeni president must first authorize any attack on its territory (Miller 2012). Due to its northern border’s problems, Mexico has been acting together with the United States to combat important drug dealers, using American high attitude unarmed drones, which in a first moment were used only at the border of the two countries, but which now fly deep into the Mexican territory (BBC 2011). This action is in conflict with the Mexican Constitution that prohibits foreign military and law enforcement agents from operating in Mexico, except under extremely limited conditions. Even though, the government has agreed with drone patrol, reinforcing the cooperation between US and Mexico against a common theat. It is important to notice that Mexico agrees with the use of drones in its territory, but all actions are authorized by the government, respecting Mexican sovereignty (Thompson and

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Mazzetti 2011). Colombia also uses UAVs to combat drug trafficking, but with a much stronger support of the United States. The country has been using drones in counterterrorism and counter-narcotics operations, for information gathering, reconnaissance and surveillance against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and other drug gangs (Russia Today 2013). The main drones used in these missions are the Israeli Hermes 900 and the American ScanEagle, but Colombia is also developing its own UAVs, the Navigator X2 and the IRIS UAV (Robbins 2013). Another country in Latin America that has drug trafficking issues is Venezuela, which is also using UAVs to combat the problem. However, different from its neighbors, Venezuela is dealing with that without United States help, developing its own drone with the help of Iran. This UAV, named Harpy-001, is a small one for internal defense use, such as combating drug trafficking, monitoring Venezuela’s border and fighting crime (Ellsworth 2012). Venezuela condemns the use of UAVs by the United States, believing that drones should not be used to disrespect the sovereignty of any country or kill innocent people (Pilkington and Devereaux 2013). Brazil is the country that has the highest number of drones in Latin America, mainly used to protect the Amazon and the Brazilian borders, and also, similar to other Latin America countries, to combat drug trafficking. Also, the country has considered using drones in urban areas, such as the slums in Rio de Janeiro (Russia Today 2013). The UAVs used by Brazil are from Israel; however, Brazil is also developing its own drones, like the Arara, the Tiriba and the Carcará (Earth Imaging Journal n.d.). In partnership with the Israeli Elbit Systems, Embraer has projects to develop and produce the first Brazilian military UAV, called Falcão (Herald Tribune n.d.). Brazil has shown its disapproval on United States actions in the Middle East, especially due to the high number of casualties that this kind of aircraft produces (Pilkington and Devereaux 2013). Cuba stands against the irresponsible use of UAVs by Western nations mainly because it disrespects the basic principle of the international system, namely the sovereignty of all states. The drones used by United States, for example, interfere in internal affairs of other nations by invading the airspace, collecting information and, even worse, killing nationals. Another critical point about the use of UAVs is the great number of casualties it produces, since a huge number of innocent people are killed by drones in ‘accidents’ (Vega 2012). The number of drones in India is increasing: it has purchased UAVs from Israel (Heron UAVs) and plans to buy others. However, the country is also developing its own drone program and is even planning to equip its drones with precision-guided munitions (PMGs), with the collaboration of Israel and the United States. The increasing number of drones in the Indian Forces has the objective of boosting Indian surveillance capabilities in order to defend the country from regional rivals such as Pakistan, and to counter insurgency groups (Keck, India Eyes Drone-Launched Smart Bombs 2013). India does not plan to use its UAVs in foreign territory, but

168 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations agrees with the position that every state has the right to defend itself (Dvorin 2013). Australia has bought drones from United States’ companies and plans to purchase other units from the country, such as the Triton, a maritime surveillance UAV. These drones will be used to patrol the northern border of the country, in the Indian Ocean, in order to protect Australian territory, commercial interests and energy resources (Russia Today 2014). Australia is not contrary to the use of armed UAVs, but agrees on the need of further discussing the topic (Financial Review 2013). The UAV market in Asia Pacific is growing fast and Indonesia is following this trend. The country has a drone program (Wulung), which main objective is the surveillance of the Indonesian territory and its borders. However, Indonesia’s government has long-term plans to develop an armed UAV (The Jakarta Post 2012). Indonesia disagrees with the use of drones in foreign territories, seeing this kind of action as a threat to the sovereignty of the countries (Sambhi 2012). Philippines has two national UAVs (Raptor and Knight Falcon) and is developing a third one. These drones, together with the collaboration of the United States, are used for surveillance and reconnaissance in order to combat separatist and insurgent Muslim groups (Felongco 2013). It is important to notice that the government has authorized these missions, but denies the use of UAVs to combat. However, in 2006, a strike from a Predator UAV is said to have hit a suspected militant camp in Philippines, with the intention of killing an Indonesian terrorist, but the attack did not reach its main target, killing other people instead (Mazzetti, The Drone Zone 2012). Officially, this event is denied by the Philippines’ government, which maintains its position against the use of UAVs for strikes, although authorizing surveillance and reconnaissance missions in its territory. Singapore is also concerned with the rising use of drones in Southwest Asia, and has UAVs from the Singapore Technologies Aerospace and from the Israel Aerospace Industries, both for reconnaissance. Besides that, Singapore has created a special Command in its Air Force for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle in 2007. The discussion about the UAVs is important for Singapore, and it agrees with the use of them in reconnaissance missions (Cohen 2014). As other countries in Southeast Asia, Japan is also investing in UAVs. The main reason for that is the dispute with China over the Senkaku Islands, in the East China Sea (Brimley, FitzGerald and Ratner 2013). China has its UAVs patrolling the area, and Japan is willing to buy Global Hawk UAVs from United States to oppose the Chinese presence in the region and to monitor Japanese territories (Kaiman and McCurry 2013). Japan will not accept that drones from other countries enter in Japanese territory without its agreement, since the country is associated with the Missile Technology Control Regime. The Republic of Korea is also joining the team of countries that has drones, and plans to purchase the American Global Hawks UAVs. The main objectives of the Republic of Korea with the UAVs are to

169 Disarmament and International Security Committee monitor and control the northern neighbor, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, through reconnaissance missions (Hardy 2013). In the beginning of 2013, three foreign drones were found in the Republic of Korea’s territory, and Seoul affirmed that they were DPRK’s spy UAVs (The Guardian 2014), having strongly rejected this kind of action.

REFERENCES

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UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations ISSN: 2318-3195 | v.2, 2014| p. 183-211

APPLICATION OF THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION (CROATIA V. SERBIA)

Diego Bortoli1 Vitória Maturana de Britto2 ABSTRACT

The Balkans have a history of domination by many multinational empires, based on the unification of many different groups of population of the region. Yugoslavia State was formed by States of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. During the World War II, Nazis turned Yugoslavia into a Greater Croatia, a Greater Albania and a Greater Bulgaria, trying to balance and to punish the dominant Serbia. In this way, after the end of the Second World War, Tito’s Partisans helped to defeat the Germans and established dominance in the region. The country remained united until his death, when it was gradually driven to its dissolution. In this scenario, Slobodan Milošević entered in the Serbian political scene, bringing the nationalism. Croatia stated to pursuit for its independence causing many tensions in this area. These tensions turned into a serious conflict where more than 20.000 people died, and more than 600.000 people were displaced. After unfruitful diplomatic negotiations, Croatia filed an application against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999 presented to the International Court of Justice. Among its claims, Croatia requested the Court to adjudge and declare that FRY has violated the Convention of Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and, for violating its responsibilities, that FRY should repair for the damages caused in the conflict. By that, the ICJ judges must decide if Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia nowadays, breached its obligations under the Genocide Convention and if the State has responsibility for the crimes committed during the period of conflict.

1 Diego Bortoli is a second-year student at UFRGS Law School (Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul). 2 Vitória Maturana de Britto is a fourth-year student of UFRGS Law School (Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul) International Court of Justice

1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Balkans have been shaped by a unique history. Like no other part of the continent, southeastern Europe was ruled for two millennia by a series of multinational empires. The region straddles the dividing line between Western and Eastern Christianity, and it is at a crossroads where Christianity meets Islam and where the great trading routes from the Middle East and Africa enter Europe. Over the millennia, these multiethnic empires – ruled by Constantinople or Vienna – produced a mosaic of peoples, cultures, and languages that could not be found in any other part of Europe. All of the region’s major cities were truly multinational, and even though the rural areas were less cosmopolitan, cultural diversity defined the entire Balkan region (Bildt 2001).

a. Pre-World War II Period The World War I (1914-1918) brought, among its consequences, the ceasing of the long-term disputes involving the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires. The collapse of these two major empires that had engulfed the Balkans region for years led to important political outcomes, which left their mark on contemporary history. The conflicts set there in the last century, mainly raised as a result of ethnic contrasts, evolved to such an extent that granted the Balkans the unpleasant nickname of “European powder keg”. Following the worldwide revolutionary idea of the nation-state, backed on the doctrine of self-determination enunciated by U.S. president Woodrow Wilson, many new nations were formed out of the ancient imperial territory. In 1917, fearing German cultural domination and the ambitions of Italy over Slovene and Croat- speaking territories, Croatia and Slovenia accepted to join the Serbian government, calling for a democratic, constitutional “Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes”3, to be ruled by the House of Karadjordjević, the Serb royal family (Prpa-Jovanović 2000). Croatian historians argue, nevertheless, that while the majority of Croats favored either to remain inside Austria or even declare independence confirming

3 “The new state was recognized by the great powers at Versailles on July 28, 1919. (...) To the former Serbian monarchy were added Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Montenegro, and Vojvodina, the latter being an area, formerly part of Hungary, with a considerable Serbian population and rich in Serbian tradition. (...) The new state, under the rule of Regent Aleksandar in Belgrade, did not constitute an equal partnership. A new constitution described Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes as ‘‘three tribes’’ of the same nation. The Montenegrins, however, were not recognized as a separate tribe because their parliament had voted on the eve of the new state’s creation to incorporate themselves into Serbia. The Macedonians were not recognized as a nation because they had been part of the Kingdom of Serbia since the Balkan Wars and were treated as Serbs. The Muslims were recognized as a religiously separate entity and were allowed to have political parties, but, like the Montenegrins and the Macedonians, were not recognized either as a separate tribe or as a nation. The large Albanian minority in Kosovo was simply ignored” (Prpa-Jovanović 2000, 49-50). 184 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

Croatian statehood, the elite (which consisted of a high proportion of Serbs) opted for the union with the Serbs and Slovenes, without consulting the will of the people or the Croatian Parliament, the Sabor (Bellamy 2003). As it turned out, the proposed nation-state consisted of nothing more than a geographic framework, while politically it remained the cockpit of conﬂicting Serbian, Croatian, and Slovenian national interests (Prpa-Jovanović 2000, 50-51). Due to its heterogeneity, as soon as the newborn kingdom was established, a flow of divergences on its political structure took place, polarized between Serbian desire to form the “Greater Serbia” and Croat, Slovene and Bosniak wishes to establish a decentralized federation and, thus, to give a great deal of freedom to each individual nation within the kingdom. As a response to such divergences – which were leading to instability and violence –, King Aleksandar I imposed, in 1929, a “royal dictatorship” and renamed the country the “Kingdom of Yugoslavia”4. He abolished the Constitution, the National Assembly and all the former constituent entities (Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia) (Alves 2013, Bellamy 2003). The false nature of monarchical Yugoslavism tumbled down in 1934, when King Aleksandar was murdered, in France, by Croatian and Macedonian extremists. The King’s death brought about a regrouping of political forces and, as a result, fostered Croatian demands for independence. By 1939, Serb Prince Paul Karadjordjević started talks regarding Serbian-Croatian relations, and eventually reached an agreement, the Sporazum, granting Croatia substantial autonomy (Prpa- Jovanović 2000). With this agreement, internal politics largely stagnated, as the government focused more and more on the course of World War II, which had just broke out and came to impose drastic changes to Yugoslavia’s political organization.

b. World War II and its consequences to the region For Yugoslavia, World War II was not simply the destruction of a conquered state by the Nazi-fascist coalition. It was also a civil war of complex dimensions, as some fought against the Germans who occupied the country, others allied the intruder, some fought to bring back the royal family that had fled to London, and others fought to establish a new government. A trend towards extremism was prompted, fostering the emergence of both fascist and communist political movements, such as the fascist Ustaša, led by Ante Palević, and the communist Partisans led by Josip Broz – popularized by the nickname of Tito (Bellamy 2003). During the conflict, the Nazis dismembered Yugoslavia into a Greater Croatia, a Greater Albania, and a Greater Bulgaria in order to balance and to punish a dominant Western-leaning Serbia, what temporarily resolved the issue of centralism versus federalism (Johnsen 1995). These nationalist feelings, though,

4 “Yugoslavia” means “the country of the southern Slavs”, a king Aleksandar’s attempt to foster a better sense of cultural unity. 185 International Court of Justice erupted into bloody conflicts. Pro-Axis forces, including the Ustaša, the extremist wing of the Croatian nationalist movement, emerged to rule the ruined South Slav state, setting up a puppet Independent State of Croatia which absorbed Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Ustaša promoted a brutal repression of communists, as well as an outright genocide against Serbian population within the “independent state”. In addition, the Ustaša enthusiastically fulﬁlled Nazi demands for the extermination of the historic Jewish and Gypsy communities of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Prpa-Jovanović 2000). By the end of World War II, Tito’s Partisans prevailed by helping to defeat the Germans and by establishing dominance over the many other groups fighting for the control of Yugoslavia. Tito then imposed a communist government based on the Soviet Union. In developing the new Yugoslav constitution, Tito attempted to settle a political scenario that would preclude ethnic and political tensions that had previously stained Yugoslavia in the inter-war era (Johnsen 1995). As it was called, the “Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” (SFRY) was divided into six federate republics – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia – and two autonomous regions – Kosovo and Vojvodina, both located within Serbia (Auty 1966). Although republics within the new Yugoslav state were granted many constitutional prerogatives whilst the state retained few exclusive functions, reality turned out to be different, as Belgrade maintained a tight control over all aspects of Yugoslav society from the first years of communism (Johnsen 1995). That changed in 1948, when Yugoslavia surprisingly broke away from the Stalinist bloc, and the republics’ powers over internal issues increased (McClellan 1969). Conditions continued to improve in 1963, when Tito promulgated a new constitution that further decentralized government establishing considerable legislative independence at the republic level (Auty 1966). In spite of the growing autonomy gained by the republics, separatist movements from Croatia and Slovenia still resented the reinstitution of centralized control of the party from Belgrade, and reinforced their claims for greater decentralization. By 1971, as James Gow (1992) points out, Yugoslavia verged on disintegration and only Tito’s prestige held the country together. Tito deepened his efforts to mantain unity: he proclaimed a new constitution in 1974 and the continuing demands for autonomy were appeased. In 1980, however, Tito died, and Yugoslavia was gradually driven to its end (Gow 1992, Jelavich 1983).

c. Tito’s death and the rise of the nationalist movements Post-Tito Serbia’s response to the unravelling process of Yugoslavia was a strong nationalism, personalized in the figure of Slobodan Milošević, who had just entered the Serbian political scene. Milošević professed an unrestrained Serbian

186 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations nationalism that sought to overturn the existing system in order to restore Serbia and the Serbs to their “rightful place”. The idea of setting a Greater Serbia was then strengthened: “throughout 1989, Serbian nationalists argued that internal republic boundaries artificially divided the Serb nation, and that Serbia reserved the right to speak for all Serbs, not just those living within Serbia” (Johnsen 1995). Milošević seized control over the Serbian Communist Party organization and gained support from the Yugoslav Army. In 1986, he was elected president and, in a short period of time, he overthrew the governments of Kosovo, Vojvodina and Montenegro, attaching these territories to Serbia. He also eliminated all the provisions that guaranteed a reasonable independence for autonomous regions5. Due to the violent Kosovar reaction to the loss of autonomy, the Federal Yugoslav Army (also known as “Yugoslav’s People Army”, the “JNA”) occupied Kosovo in 1990, establishing the benchmark of using the army against a fellow Federal member (Magas 1991). The results of Milošević’s centralizing tendencies naturally caused fear to the other Yugoslav republics. By the end of 1990, the disintegration of Yugoslavia accelerated: Yugoslav republics held elections that resulted in non-communist governments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Croatia and in Slovenia. Furthermore, Croatia and Slovenia expressed interest in coordinating their defense and security policies, which resembled a mutual defense pact against Serbia (Johnsen 1995). It eventually led to the Croatian6 and Slovene declarations of independence on 25 June 1991. Prior to the independence, however, Serbs living in the Croatian borders with Bosnia and Herzegovina and with Vojvodina illegally self-proclaimed the so-called “Republic of Serbian Krajina” on 21 December 1990. This republic was allegedly encouraged and supported by Belgrade with the intention of overthrowing Croatian sovereignty and territorial integrity. Shortly after, on 28 February 1991, rebel leaders called for the union of the “newborn republic” with the Serbs in Serbia, in Montenegro and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, cooperating to bring about the “Greater Serbia” fostered by Milošević’s Serbia (ICJ 1999). The tensions between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) soon turned into serious conflict: from March 1991 onwards Serb insurgent groups linked to the FRY propagated massive attacks onto Croatia, which resulted in the distruction of 59 out of Croatia’s 102 municipalities by the middle of the year. With approximately 100,000 members, these armed paramilitary groups led to the death of 20,000 people and the displacement of more than 600,000 (ICJ 1999).

5 The Socialist Republic of Serbia kept the votes of Vojvodina, Kosovo, and Montenegro within the collective Federal Presidency, what meant Serbia was given effective control of four of the eight votes in the collective Yugoslav Presidency (ICJ 1999). 6 On 28 February 1989, the Croatian Democratic Union was formed under the leadership of Dr. Franjo Tudjman, who would lead Croatia to restore its political independence as a sovereign State (ICJ 1999). With independence in 1991, Tudjman became Croatia’s first president. 187 International Court of Justice

After one-third of the Croatian territory had been seized by rebels and taken under the control of FRY’s officials, a ceasefire agreement between Croatia and the FRY was signed in Sarajevo in January 1992. In February of the same year, a resolution from the United Nations Security Council established peacekeeping missions in four different sectors of Croatia, designated as United Nations Protected Areas (“UNPA”), responsible for putting an end to the armed conflicts within Croatia (ICJ 1999). Alleging unsuccessful peace negotiations with Serbs and the FRY, and responding to the mentioned abuses, the Croatian Army and police forces launched the “Medak Pocket”, “Flash” and “Storm” Operations in order to quickly recover the Serb-occupied areas seized from the Croatia. Immediately prior to the ultimate operation, “Operation Storm”, Serb officials, backed by the FRY, encouraged Serbs to leave the Knin area, professing their belief that safety would not be promoted for the Serb people under Croatian domain. Croatia denied such allegations, stating that the FRY’s was in violation of the Genocide Convention due to its underlying intentions to promote ethnic cleansing (ICJ 1999). Reporting many unsuccessful attempts of diplomatic negotiations with the Yugoslavs, Croatia filed an application against the FRY on 2 July 1999 claiming reparations for the damages caused in the conflict. As the case review progressed, however, Yugoslavia submitted preliminary objections that led the ICJ to suspend the proceedings on the merits of the case and assess whether it had competence or not to run such proceedings. After public sittings held from 26 May to 30 May 2008 and final submissions on behalf of both the Parties and the ICJ, on 18 November 2008, found it had jurisdiction over the case (ICJ 1999). On January 4, 2010, it was Serbia’s round to submit, through a counter- memorial, its genocide lawsuit against Croatia. The referred submission contains a historical account of Serbo-Croatian relations, with a focus on World War II. In this context, they mentioned the massive extermination, expulsions and forced religious conversions of large numbers of ethnic Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia’s puppet state of Nazi Germany employed by the aforementioned “Ustaša”. The application also comprises murder of Serbs who tried to return to their homes within Croatian territory after the end of World War II, as well as the more recent murders of Serbs in the Croatian War of Independence from 1991 to 1995, in the locations of Gospić, Sisak, Pakračka Poljana, Karlovac, Osijek, Paulin Dvor, and due to the Medak Pocket, Flash and Storm Operations. The nowadays Republic of Serbia7 has attempted repeatedly to negotiate a mutual withdrawal with Croatia on the genocide matter, under the belief that

7 With the transformation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into Serbia and Montenegro and the dissolution of that country in 2006, Serbia is considered its legal successor, remaining responsible in full for all the rights and obligations of the State union of Serbia and Montenegro under the UN Charter. 188 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations such conflict would be better solved through peaceful but extrajudicial procedures. Croatia, however, maintains that its main goal, in former Foreign Minister Vulk Jeremić’s words, “is to cooperate on the road towards EU integration, to build good neighbourly relations, to solve problems which we [both Croatia and Serbia] have inherited”, therefore “it would be better for Croatia for it to never come to this [extrajudicial] process”. In 2014, the Court announced it would hold public hearings from 3 March to 1 April at the Peace Palace in The Hague.

2 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

In view of the abovementioned facts, on July 2, 1999, the Republic of Croatia filled an application against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, nowadays Serbia, before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), claiming that Yugoslavia had violated the Genocide Convention, on the following grounds:

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, its officials, agents, and surrogates, have violated Articles II (a)-(d) and III (u)-(e) of the Genocide Convention with respect to the Republic of Croatia and its people. In particular, the Republic of Croatia will demonstrate that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia violated the Genocide Convention by seizing control of the Knin region and eastern Slavonia from 1991 to 1995, shelling and attacking portions of Dalmatia, and driving Croat (and other non-Serb) citizens from these areas with the intent to “ethnically cleanse” these regions, and to unite them with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to form a “greater” Serbian State,

and, secondly, that:

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has not punished individuals who committed acts of genocide, or other acts described in Article III, and it has not provided for effective penalties for such persons. Indeed, it has on many occasions given refuge to such persons within its territory. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has, therefore, also violated its obligations under Article IV and Article V of the Genocide Convention (International Court of Justice, 1999).

2.1 CROATIA’S ALLEGATIONS

2.1.1 As to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice

In its Application, Croatia invokes Article 36(1) of the ICJ Statute, according to which “the jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to

189 International Court of Justice it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force (International Court of Justice, 1945). Croatia declares that both States involved are successor States of the previous Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which signed the Genocide Convention of 1948 and ratified it on 29 August 1950. Thus, under the presumption, based on general principles and rules of International Law, that a successor State continues to be part of a treaty or convention, Croatia and Serbia continue to be bound by the Genocide Convention. Moreover, the Applicant invokes Article 9 of the Genocide Convention8, which states that the ICJ has jurisdiction to resolve disputes between States parties of the Convention in cases of State responsibility for genocide, as alleged by Croatia. The article reads as following:

Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.

On these grounds, Croatia sustains that the ICJ has jurisdiction to entertain the present dispute.

2.1.2 As to Yugoslavia’s violations to the 1951 Genocide Convention

In its Application, Croatia contends that Yugoslavia, through its officials, agents and surrogates, has violated the “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide”, particularly Article 2 (a)-(d), Article 3 (a)-(e, Article 4 and Article 5. Article 2 (a)-(d) of the abovementioned Convention provides:

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (…) (UNGA, 1948).

8 Genocide Convention of 1948. 190 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

This article specifies which acts are contained within the definition of genocide under the Convention. Additionally, Croatia invokes Article 3 (a)-(e), that lists genocide-related actions that lead to punishments, whether they are direct or indirect violent acts:

The following acts shall be punishable: (a) Genocide; (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; (d) Attempt to commit genocide; (e) Complicity in genocide (UNGA, 1948).

According to Croatia, Serbia is accused of genocide since, through state agents and surrogates, it has commited acts provided in the convention. So, by

seizing control of the Knin Region and eastern Slavonia from 1991 to 1995, shelling and attacking portions of Dalmatia, and driving Croat (and other non-Serb) citizens from there areas with the intent to “ethnically cleanse” these regions (…) (ICJ 1999, p. 16, §32), the Respondent would have violated the aforementioned articles. Moreover, Croatia alleges that the Serbia violated the 1951 Convention before “Operation Storm”9, as it “instigated and coerced the Serb population living in the Knin region to evacuate the area, thus creating a second ‘ethnic cleansing’ of the area” (ICJ 1999, p.18, §33). Furthermore, the Applicant mentions violations to Articles 4, which stands against immunity of constitutionally protected persons, as it “persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals” (United Nations General Assembly, 1948). Also, Article 5 states that signatories are legally bound to give effect to the Convention’s provisions and to punish those who commit genocidal acts:

Article 5 The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 (UNGA, 1948).

Croatia therefore claims that Serbia violated the Convention on the Prevention

9 The “Operation Storm” was the main battle of the Croatian Independence War, in 4th August 1995, that targeted and killed Serb minorities in the city of Knin, Croatia (Phenyo Keiseng Rakate, 2000). 191 International Court of Justice and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, through acts of its officials, agents and surrogates, which violated Article 2 and 3. Moreover, in not prosecuting these individuals for their crimes, Serbia also violated its obligations present in Articles 4 and 5 of the Genocide Convention.

2.2 YUGOSLAVIA’S ALLEGATIONS10

During Public Hearings on Preliminary Objections, Yugoslavia held that the Court does not have jurisdiction over the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, because the State only became a Contracting Party to the Genocide Convention on 10 June 2001, with an exception clause to Article IX of the Convention (ICJ 2002, p. 15, §1.4.). Additionally, the FRY contended that the State cannot be held responsible for acts and omissions that occurred before 27 April 1992, simply because there was no Federal Republic of Yugoslavia before that date. For that reason, the Application would be inadmissible while regarding facts prior to the date when the State was formed. Furthermore, the Respondent defended that the claims of Croatia regarding submitting to trial people like Slobodan Milošević, providing information related to the whereabouts of missing Croatians and the returning of cultural possessions were inadmissible or controversial.

2.3 DECISION OF THE COURT CONCERNING PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS11

After Croatia duly filed its Memorial within the time-limit, Yugoslavia raised preliminary objections regarding the Court’s jurisdiction to judge the case and the admissibility of the Application. Under Article 31, § 3, of ICJ Statue, both countries exercised their right, choosing a judge ad hoc each, as it “if the Court includes upon the Bench no judge of the nationality of the parties, each of these parties may proceed to choose a judge as provided in paragraph 2 of this Article” (International Court of Justice statue, 2014). Following the change in the country’s name from “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” to “Serbia and Montenegro”, on 4 February 2003, and the declaration of independence of the Republic of Montenegro on 3 June 2006, Serbia assumed as Respondent12.

10 See Croatia v. Serbia. Preliminary Objections of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 11 See Croatia v. Serbia. Preliminary Objections: Summary of the Judgment of 18 November 2008. 12 Regarding the principle of continuity, there is a presumption that normally the following State 192 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

After oral proceedings, during which Serbia, as Respondent succeeding Yugoslavia, argued that the Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the case firstly because Serbia would lack capacity to be party of the dispute, and secondly due to the temporal lapse of the actions and the independence of Serbia. In addition, if the Court found that it had jurisdiction, the State contended that Croatia’s claims were beyond the Court’s jurisdiction. In its decision, due to the need to identify the Respondent party after the independence of Montenegro, the Court referred to the letter sent by the President of the Republic of Serbia to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In this letter, the President stated that the Republic of Serbia would still be utterly responsible for the former Serbia and Montenegro’s rights and obligations under the UN Charter. Furthermore, the Court attended to the fundamental principle that no State may be subject to its jurisdiction without consenting (ICJ 2008, 3). At this point, Montenegro clarified, in a letter of 29 November 2006, that it did not consent to the jurisdiction of the Court in this dispute. For all that matters, the Court concluded that Serbia was the Respondent in the case. The Court, by ten votes to seven, rejected the first preliminary objection submitted by Serbia, regarding its capacity to participate in the proceedings; by twelve votes against five, the Court rejected Serbia’s preliminary objection in relation to the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the Court under Article 9 of the Convention; by ten votes to seven, the ICJ found that it had jurisdiction to judge the case, according to said Article 9(4); by eleven votes to six, it established that the second preliminary objection did not characterize exclusively as such; and, by twelves votes to five, the Court rejected the third preliminary objection submitted by the Republic of Serbia (ICJ 2008).

2.4 LEGAL THESIS INVOLVED IN THE MERITS

2.4.1 States Succession

In respect of sovereignty over a given territory, concerning international law, “state succession arises when there is a definitive replacement of one State by another” (BROWNLIE, 2008, pg. 649). However, whenever on a territory a State replaces another one, the problem is whether the rights and obligations of the former State are transferred to the new State (CASESSE, 2005, pg. 78). continues to be legally bound for treaties in which the antecessor was party. Yet, in human rights treaties there’s a general rule that new States must respect them, because this category of treaties intend to protect individuals in face to central authorities, and this protection should be continued even “after a change of sovereignty over a particular territory” (CASSESE, 2005). 193 International Court of Justice

The Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, done in 1983 and entered into force in 1996, is a codification of customary rules in this matter of state succession regarding the obligations resultant of international treaties. Its article 2.1. (e) and (f) is very important, since discuss the problem of retroactivity:

Article 2: 1.For the purposes of the present Convention: (…) (e) “date of the succession of States” means the date upon which the successor State replaced the predecessor State in the responsibility for the international relations of the territory to which the succession of States relates; (f) “newly independent State” means a successor State the territory of which immediately before the date of the succession of States was a dependent territory for the international relations of which the predecessor State was responsible; (Vienna Convention, 1983).

The issue of state succession was present in the judgment of the preliminary objections of the present case, Croatia v. Serbia, since it was introduced by the question whether or not the ICJ has jurisdiction to judge the Serbian State (ICJ, 2008). In fact, in their counter-memorial, Serbia defends that the State can’t be blamed by acts committed before their independence day, because it didn’t even exist by the time (ICJ, 2001). Yet, in the judgment of the similar case Bosnia Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia of 1996, the ICJ recalled the fact that since the end of the SFRY, the Yugoslavian State, under a formal declaration, “expressed the intention to remain bound by the international treaties to which the former Yugoslavia was party” (ICJ, 1996). Also, the judgment of 2007 took the same direction, while the Court, in the matter of succession, regarded the history of the Respondent and the United Nations during the period that initiated with the break-up of the SFRY (ICJ, 2007, §87), when Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) claimed to be the successor of SFRY.

2.4.2 Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice

In this case, the jurisdiction of the Court was held by the Croatian State, in their application to the ICJ, under article 36 of the ICJ Statue by the argument that both Croatia and Federal Republic (by the time) were successors of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, signatory of the Genocide Convention (ICJ, 1999). In contrast, in the counter-memorial of Serbian State, it argued that the Court does not have jurisdiction under the article IX of the Genocide Convention (ICJ, 2001), where it’s written that disputes between the contracting parties of this

194 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations convention are submitted to the International Court of Justice (UNGA, 1948), because the facts took place before the existence of the Serbian state (ICJ, 2001). In the case of dispute between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro, due to the allegations of the Serbian State related to the lack of jurisdiction of the Court, the ICJ recalled the fact that, since the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia claimed to be the continuator of the SFTY (ICJ, 2007). For that reason, the Court decided that is has jurisdiction over the case (ICJ, 2007).

2.4.3 Genocide

Genocide, according to the General Assembly Resolution 96(1) “is a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings” (Cryer, 2010). In other words, is the destruction or extermination of members of a national, ethical, racial or religious group, through the performance of specific acts, with a specific intent to destroy said group (Cassese 2008, 127). At first, genocide was considered a category of crime against humanity, not having been prosecuted as a special crime by the Nuremberg Tribunal. However, due in large part to the advocacy of Raphael Lemkin, genocide obtained autonomy as a specific crime with the drafting of the Genocide Convention in 1948 by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Article 2 of the Genocide Convention defines this unlawful act as follows:

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: a. Killing members of the group; b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (UNGA, 1948).

The first important fact about the definition is that it selects the groups which can be the sole target of genocide. Some authors defends that categories such as political and cultural groups have deliberately been withdrawn from the definition, and are thus not protected by the Convention (Cassese 2005, 443). The ICJ in the case Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia stated that “for purposes of establishing genocide, the target group must be defined positively, and not as a ‘non-Serb’ group” (ICJ, 2007). Then, there is the doubt of the necessity of a collective plan of genocide,

195 International Court of Justice which is demystified in Jelisić, when an ICTY Trial Chamber expressed that killings committed by a single perpetrator are enough “to establish the material element of the crime of genocide and it is a priori possible to conceive that the accused kept in secret the plan to exterminate an entire group without this intent having been supported by any organization in which other individual participated” (Cryer, 2010). A second important fact present in the definition is the difference between crimes against humanity and genocide, in which the first requires a “systematic and widespread” conduct, whereas the latter does not (Cassese 2005, 444). There are two elements of the special intent requirement of genocide: first, the act or acts must target a national, ethnical, racial or religious group; second, the act or acts must seek to destroy all or part of that group (Aydin, 2014), which is the dolus specialis (Cassese 2005, 445), according to the article 4 of International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia statue. So, by the second requirement, there must be proof that the intent of the perpetrating state goes beyond the mere direct intent to order the crimes are listed as amounting to genocide: there must be the specific intent to destroy the protected group (Cassese 2005, 445).

2.4.4 Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

In 1947, the Resolution 180 (II) of the UN General Assembly recognized genocide as an international crime, adopting it as the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948. The Convention was a response to the atrocities committed during the World War II. It aimed to constitute a source of obligation for the contracting parties to criminalize genocide, to prosecute the perpetrators within national legal systems and to create a judicial cooperation system between the parties, aiming at the eradication of the “crime of crimes” (Cassese 2008). The Convention set out a careful definition of the crime and contemplated other acts related to genocide, such as complicity and incitation. Although primarily directed at state parties to ensure the complicity of states with the prohibition of genocide, the Convention also imposes on states the obligation to prosecute perpetrators of genocidal acts (Cassese 2005, 443). Although some might consider the the Convention as ineffective at the interstate level, its Article 4 has been used extensively in international and national prosecutions, having contributed substantially to the development of the law in the area This led to the statement that the Convention had gradually developed into customary international law. The importance given to the prohibition of genocide has led to the consideration of the obligations set forth in the Convention as erga omnes, which entitles any member of the international community to impose these legal duties on other states (Cassese, 2005, 444).

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2.4.5 Obligations imposed by the Convention on the Contracting Parties

Article 1 of the Convention asserts two main obligations: the obligation to prevent genocide and the obligation to punish genocide acts. Likewise, Article 3 contributes to the obligation to punish, since it imposes on the parties the duty to punish conducts related to genocide (Cassese 2008). The need to prohibit genocide became an erga omnes13 obligation, as the duty to protect people from genocide belongs to all the States of the international community (Knorr 2011).

2.4.5.1 Obligation to Prevent Genocide

Although the Convention does not specifically impose the obligation not to engage in or to prevent other Parties from committing genocide, it is explicit with regards to the duty to prevent genocide and to punish individuals who commit it (Clark 2008). Nevertheless, Article 9, of the Genocide Convention, suggests that there is an implicit obligation directed to all the Contracting Parties to prevent genocide whether it happens in its own territory or not. When the Convention states, in Article 1, that States must prevent genocide acts, it is understood that the States must take all the actions to avoid genocide, as it said that “the Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish” (UNGA, 1948). The International Court of Justice, in the case judgment of the case Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, defined that not only was genocide prevented because of the deterrent effects of punishment, the duty to prevent genocide had its own autonomous scope which was both “normative and compelling” (Schabas, 2008). By this path, the Court confirmed that the Genocide Convention not only imposes on States a duty to prevent and punish genocide, but also an obligation to refrain from genocide (Cryer, 2010).

2.4.5.2 Obligation to Prosecute the Author of Genocide Acts

Article 4 of the Convention stands that “Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals” (United Nations General Assembly, 1948).

13 Latin term designated to describe that juridical effects of an act or a norm are for everyone and that the States owes this obligation on the way to the international community as a whole. 197 International Court of Justice

The punishment of the authors of genocide acts or actions related to genocide takes place through their prosecution. Due to arguments on the relationship between prosecution and deterrence, i.e. the use of criminalization to deter people from engaging in certain conducts, submitting perpetrators to trial is considered part of the obligation to prevent genocide (Knorr 2011). According to Article 6 of the Convention, individuals charged with genocide or related acts must be tried by competent tribunal, regarding the territoriality of the facts, or by an international tribunal with jurisdiction.

2.4.6 The Duality of Responsibility for Genocide – ICJ

The International Court of Justice in Bosnia v. Serbia, established that there is a “duality of responsibility” under international law, which means that “the same acts may give rise both to individual criminal liability and state responsibility” (CASSESE 2008, p. 129). According to this concept adopted by the ICJ, in an extensive interpretation of Article 1 of the Convention, the Parties do not have the obligation only to prevent and to punish acts of genocide, but also to refrain from participating in genocidal actions. In addition, the Court’s interpretation of Article 3 is that contracting States also have the duty not to engage in “conspiracy, direct and public incitement, attempt to commit genocide, or complicity in genocide” (Cassese 2008, 129).

2.4.7 State Responsibility

According to the ILC, on Article 2 of the International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA):

There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State (International Law Commission, 2001).

In that way, a State is internationally responsible for actions or omissions that are attributed to it under International Law if they constitute breaches of international obligations. As for breaches of international obligations, Articles 12 and 13 of ARSIWA affirm:

Article 12 Existence of a breach of an international obligation

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There is a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of that State is not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or character. Article 13 International obligation in force for a State An act of a State does not constitute a breach of an international obligation unless the State is bound by the obligation in question at the time the act occurs (International Law Commission, 2001).

As for attribution of wrongful conduct, Article 4 of ARSIWA explains that conducts of State organs, as performed through its agents, will be attributed to their respective State:

1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central Government or of a territorial unit of the State. 2. An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the State (International Law Commission, 2001).

State organs listed in Article 4 are not limited to central government organs, to officials at a high level or to people with responsibilities for the external relations (Harris 2010, 425): acts or omissions committed by any organ of the state may give rise to its international responsibility, as long as there is a certain degree of control by the state in question over the perpetrators.

2.4.7.1 Attribution of responsibility to States for acts committed by non-State actors

Firstly, the term non-state actor in the international scene can be understood as a reference to some “’uncivil’ groups determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction and target them against civilian population” (Clapham, 2010). Regarding the fact that these groups usually violate human rights, is an obligation of the State to stop and to punish the non-State actors as to protect the victims (Clapham, 2010). In the area of responsibility, the conduct of a person or a group shall be considered as an act of State under international law if the person or group is in fact acting on the instructions of or under the direction or control of the State, this State in carrying out the conduct, as stated by Article 8 of ARSIWA:

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Article 8 Conduct directed or controlled by a State The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of that State in carrying out the conduct (International Law Commission, 2001).

One issue is that the conducts will only be attributable to the State when the operations was directed or controlled by the State (ILC, 2001). In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ stated that general “overall control” would have been insufficient to ground responsibility (ICJ, 1986). On the other hand, in the Tadić case, the YWCT adopted the approach that the degree of control might vary according to the circumstances and a high threshold might not always be required (Shaw, 2003). In other words, in the YWCT, the Appeals Chamber took the view that acts committed by Bosnian Serbs could give rise to international responsibility on the basis of the overall control exercised by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over the Serbian Army, without any prove of FRY’s instruction (ICJ, 2007, §402). In the case Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia, the Court emphasized that the main point in this case, regarding State’s responsibility, was to determine if the FRY organs “originated the genocide, by issuing instructions to the perpetrator or exercising direction or control, and if, as a result, the conduct of organs of the Respondent, having been the cause of commission of the genocide acts, constituted a violation of the internationals obligations” (ICJ, 2007, §397). The ICJ demonstrated the test to determinate if a person or group may be equated with a State organ, even if not having this “status” under internal law: is not necessary to prove a relationship of complete competence, but it has to be “proved that the person or group acted in accordance with the State’s instructions or under ‘effective control’” (ICJ, 2007, §400). The Court, yet, give emphasis to the fact that it has to “be shown that this ‘effective control’ was exercised” (ICJ, 2007, §400).

2.4.8 Reparations for damages caused by a State’s breach of an international obligation

When a State breaches an international obligation, it must comply with some obligations toward the Victim State. First, the State responsible must cease the wrongful act, if it is still happening. Then, it shall offer guarantees that such wrongful acts will not happen again (Cassese 2005). Article 30, of the ILC Draft illustrates as follows:

Article 30 Cessation and non-repetition The State responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an obligation:

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(a) to cease that act, if it is continuing; (b) to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so require (INTERNACIONAL LAW COMISSION, 2001).

Cessation of the conduct is the first requirement when trying to eliminate consequences of the wrongful act, followed by the reparation of damages (Harris 2010). If the State refuses to repair or to pay compensation to the extent required by the State that suffered the damages, the responsible State must consent to any peaceful attempt to settle the dispute made by the injured State (Cassese 2005). It is interesting to observe the Factory Chorzów case, settled in the Permanent Court of International Justice where the Court established:

The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act-a principle which seems to be established by international practice and in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals-is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out al1 the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in al1 probability, have existed if that act had not been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear ; the award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it-such are the principles which should serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act contrary to international law14 (PCIJ 1928, 47).

There are three forms of reparation stated in the Article 34 of the ILC Draft: restitution, compensation and satisfaction, which can be demand singly or in combination. All sorts of reparations are settled by the ILC Drafts. In case of material damage, the most befitting kind of reparation is restitution, to the possible extent, as exposed in Article 35 of the ICL Draft:

Article 37 Satisfaction 1. The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to give satisfaction for the injury caused by that act insofar as it cannot be made good by restitution or compensation. 2. Satisfaction may consist in an acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology or another appropriate modality. 3. Satisfaction shall not be out of proportion to the injury and may not take a form humiliating to the responsible State (International Law Commission, 2001).

14 See Factory at Chorzów case. Judgment of 13 September 1928 (including the text of the declarations of Judge de Bustamante and Judge Altamira). 201 International Court of Justice

2.4.9 Reparations for Victims of Grave Breaches of International Human Rights

The problem of reparations provided for grave violations of Humanitarian Law and International Humanitarian Law is present in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 60/147 of 2005. According to this document, in cases of gross violations of International Humanitarian Law, provided by crimes under International Law, the State has the obligation to investigate and the duty to prosecute the author of these breaches. Nonetheless, victims of violation have the right to effective and equal access to justice; prompt, adequate and effective reparation for the harm suffered and access to information regarding violations and reparation mechanisms. Regarding this resolution, the reparation must be proportional to the gravity of the violation and in accordance with domestic laws. It may be executed through restitution, compensation, rehabilitation (which includes medical and psychological treatments), satisfaction and, also, by guarantees of non-repetition of the wrongful act (UNGA, 2005).

2.5 LEGAL PRECEDENTS

2.5.1 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) – International Court of Justice

In this case, Bosnia and Herzegovina filled an application, on 20 March 1993, against Serbia and Montenegro, in face of genocide crimes committed by Serbians after the fragmentation of Yugoslavia. The applicant requested provisional measures ordering the Respondent to take, immediately, all the necessary actions to prevent commission of the crime of genocide. In fact, Bosnia and Herzegovina claimed that Yugoslavia, the antecessor of Serbia and Montenegro, its agents, public officials and surrogates violated articles of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide. Furthermore, the Applicant stood for its inherent right, under the Convention and the fact that the UNSC have not acted for preventing the acts of genocide, for self-defense in face of the attacks of Yugoslavia (ICJ 1993a). The Court unanimously held that Serbia and Montenegro should immediately take measures do stop genocidal actions. In addition, unanimously, the Court declared that both States should not take any act that would result in aggravation or extension of the already existed dispute. Finally, by thirteen votes to one, the ICJ decided that Respondent should ensure that any group - military, paramilitary or irregular armed -, directed or supported by the State, would not commit, conspire to commit, direct or publicly promote any act of genocide or of complicity in this

202 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations kind of crime (ICJ 1993b). In its judgment, the ICJ emphasized that, regarding the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the obligation to punish the perpetrator and the obligation to prevent genocide are two distinct yet connected duties (ICJ 2007, 16). The Court found that Serbia did not commit genocide in violation of its obligations under the Convention. The Court expounded that the State did not conspire to commit or to incite genocide, as Serbia was not complicit in genocide and that the Respondent did not violate the obligation to prevent genocide. It was also recognized by the ICJ that, while failing to transfer Ratko Mladić, who was indicted for genocide and complicity in genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Serbia had violated its obligations under the Convention. Furthermore, the Court found that Serbia violated its obligations regarding the provisional measures ordered on 8 April 1992, not taking all measures to prevent genocide in Srebrenica in July 1995 (ICJ 2007, 20). Finally, the Court decided that Serbia should take all the effective steps to transfer individuals accused of genocide or any related acts to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and to fully cooperate with it. Hence, in accordance with the Court’s finding, it was not an appropriate payment of compensation for the alleged Serbian violations of the committed acts, but satisfaction was considered applicable, since the judgment by it self was considered a form of reparation (ICJ 2007, 21-22).

2.5.2 Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pakistan v. India)

The Pakistani Prisoners of War case relates to the Indo-Pakistani War of 197115. On 11 May 1973, Pakistan filled an Application, directed to the ICJ, against India, claiming that the Government of India had violated articles of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The Applicant alleged that a large number of Pakistanis became prisoners of war of India, after the surrender of the Eastern Command of the Pakistan army. During the occupation, India would have encouraged and helped the East Pakistan to declare its

15 The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 was the third war between India and Pakistan. The reason for this war was different from the two previous conflicts. In 1970, Pakistan failed trying to accommodate the demands for autonomy of East Pakistan. For that reason, in 1971, Pakistan’s armed forces tried to defeat the resistance movement. Because of this armed conflict, a lot of east Pakistanis died. Nevertheless, India was organizing, training and providing sanctuary to the Liberation Force in Bengali, the East Pakistani armed resistance. By that reason, and for bilateral attacks, the fighting spread to West Pakistan and resulted in a state of war between India (which supported the independence of East Pakistan) and Pakistan. On 6 December 1971, East Pakistan became an independent country named Bangladesh (BBC 2002). 203 International Court of Justice intention to prosecute a number of Pakistani prisoners of war under Indian custody. The allegations for this trial were the commitment of genocide acts and crimes against humanity (ICJ 1973a). At this specific point, the Government of Pakistan claimed that the jurisdiction over nationals related to genocide crimes committed in Pakistani territory, alleged by Bangla Desh, would be of Pakistan not of other State. Among its claims, Pakistan asked the Court to declare that no other Government or authority is competent to exercise jurisdiction over the one hundred and ninety-five Pakistani nationals in Indian custody, accused of genocide acts in Pakistani territory. Furthermore, as the allegations against the abovementioned war prisoners related to genocide acts, they cannot be misunderstood with the concepts of “crime against humanity” (ICJ 1973a, 7). With the Application, Pakistan filled its request for the indication of interim measures of protection, where the State argued to the Court that the process of repatriation of war prisoners and civilian internees could not be harmed for the charges of genocide. Moreover, it stated that those individuals under Indian custody could not be transferred to Bangladesh for trial until the pronouncement of the Court in relation to Pakistan’s claim to exclusive jurisdiction (ICJ 1973b). The government of India declined to consent to the jurisdiction of the ICJ in the case, so the Court could not proceed with the case, because there was no legal basis for its jurisdiction in the case. In the judgment for the request of the indication of interim measures of protection, the Court, by eight votes against four, decided that the written proceeding should be first addressed to the question of the jurisdiction of the Court in this case (ICJ 1973c, 8). So the ICJ fixed the dates for the Memorial of the Government of Pakistan and the date for the Counter- Memorial of the Government of India. Finally, the Court had removed the case from the list, regarding a letter from the Agent of Pakistani, where he referred negotiations between Pakistan and India, which had resulted in an agreement signed in New Delhi on 28 August 1973. By this letter, the Government of Pakistan officially requested the discontinuance of proceedings in the case (ICJ 1973d, 5). Even though the case was not about violations related to acts of genocide committed by the Respondent, but rather to the jurisdiction to hold to trial the responsible individuals for genocide action, the preliminary discussion between the judges about the jurisdiction of the Court in the case was important, because it opened to the international community the urge to discuss the issue of jurisdiction of the Court in cases related to genocide acts.

2.5.3 ICTY: Prosecutor v. Popovic et al., IT-05-88, 10 June 2010

The Popović et al. case, initiated by Prosecutor of the International Criminal

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Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in 2009, concerned seven former high-ranking Bosnian Serb military and police officials who were convicted of a range of crimes, including genocide, committed in 1995 in relation to the fall of the United Nations protected enclaves of Srebrenica and Žepa, eastern Bosnia, which held tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslim refugees. After the fall of Srebrenica in July 1995, approximately 8,000 men were separated from the women, children and elderly, and transported to locations where they were detained and killed, which is deemed the worst massacre of the Bosnian war (Simons 2010). The two defendants convicted of genocide were Colonels Vujadin Popović and Ljubisa Beara. The three-judge panel at The Hague ruled that the definition of genocide as of the 1948 United Nations Resolution had been met for (i) with intent to destroy a part of the Bosnian Muslim people as a national, ethnical, or religious group, Popović and Beara killed members of the group by planned and opportunistic summary executions and (ii) with the same intent, they caused serious bodily or mental harm to both female and male members of the Bosnian Muslim populations of Srebrenica and Žepa, including the separation of able bodied men from their families and the forced movement of the population from their homes to areas outside the Republika Srpska (Prosecutor v. Popović et al. 2010).

2.5.4 ICTR: Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, ICTR 97-23-S, 4 September 1998

This case is significant in regard of the unprecedented acknowledgment of the direct participation of a head of government in genocide. Jean Kambanda was Prime Minister of Rwanda during the period of mass violence that occurred there in 1994, whereby nearly a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were massacred by Hutu extremists (BBC 2011). Kambanda demonstrated his involvement in direct and public incitation to commit such massacres by supporting broadcasted calls to murder and by the distribution of weapons and ammunition to militias (Swaak- Goldman 2001). The former Prime Minister was arrested in Nairobi, Kenya on 18 July 1997 and transferred to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda on the same day. He was held responsible for the killing of and the causing of serious bodily or mental harm to members of the Tutsi population with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, an ethnic or racial group, as such, and thereby was convicted of committing genocide, stipulated in Article 2(3)(a) of the Statute of the ICTR as a crime, and attributed to him by virtue of Article 6(1) and 6(3), and punishable in reference to Articles 22 and 23 of the Statute. On 4 September 1998, Kambanda was condemned to life imprisonment (Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda 1998).

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2.5.5 ECHR: Jorgic v. Germany, 74613/01, 12 July 2007

This case concerns Mr Jorgic’s complaint about his conviction by the German courts, notably for having committed genocide during the ethnic cleansing which took place in the northern Bosnia’s region of Doboj between May and September 1992. He alleged, in particular, that the German courts had not had jurisdiction to convict him and that their wide interpretation of his crime had no basis in German or international law (Jorgic v. Germany 2007). As regards the definition of genocide, the German trial court ruled that the expression “destruction of a group” used in the German Criminal Code meant the group’s destruction as a social unit in its distinctiveness and particularity and its feeling of belonging together and did not require its destruction in a biological-physical sense. It concluded that the applicant had acted with intent to destroy a group of Muslims in the north of Bosnia. Whilst many authorities had favored a narrow interpretation of the crime of genocide, there had already been several authorities which had interpreted it in a wider way, in common with the German courts. The European Court of Human Rights adjudged that the national courts’ interpretation of the crime of genocide could reasonably be regarded as consistent with the essence of that offence and reasonably foreseeable by the applicant at the material time (Cassese et al. 2010, 229). The ECHR ultimately found that the applicant was lawfully detained after conviction “by a competent court” and also noted that he was found guilty of acts of a considerable severity and duration (Jorgic v. Germany 2007).

3 SUBMISSIONS

The Republic of Croatia requests this Court to adjudge and declare that:

a) The Court has jurisdiction to judge the dispute between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia regarding Yugoslavia’s submission to prosecute the responsible individuals for the genocide acts; b) The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has violated article 2 of the Convention of Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, when people whose conduct had killed, cause deliberate body or mental harm to member of the Croat national or ethnical group, deliberately affected on the conditions of life of Croatians and imposed measures of birth control; c) The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, when complied with the conducts intended to commit the acts of genocide abovementioned , has violated article 3 of the Convention;

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d) The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, even conscious of the possibility of the genocide acts, did not take any action to prevent them, violating article 1 of the Convention; e) The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia failed, violating articles 1 and 4 of the Convention, to bring to trial responsible individuals for the acts of genocide and of incitation of genocide; f) Nevertheless, in face of its responsibilities, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is under the subsequent obligations: (1) To take the effective actions to submit to trial those citizens or other individuals, within its jurisdiction, suspects of having committed the genocide acts or any other act related to it, in particular Slobodan Milošević, former president of RFY, and to ensure that these people will be punished if convicted; (2) To return any items of cultural property, and (3) To pay reparations for damages to Croatians and their properties, as to Croatia for damages to its economy and environment.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia asks this Court to adjudge and declare that (FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA, ICJ, 2002):

a) there is a lack of jurisdiction before the claims brought by the Republic of Croatia against Yugoslavia; Or, alternatively, declare that b) statements based on omissions or acts that happened before the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had turned into the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are not valid. It means that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia can’t be responsible for acts committed before 27 April 1992, when the FRY was proclaimed; c) the possible recognition of the Court is inadmissible, to take effective steps to submit Mr. Milošević to trial, as well as other responsible individuals; to declare the need of providing information concerning the situation and location of missing Croatian citizens and of the return of cultural property of Croatia.

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209 International Court of Justice http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/60/10697.pdf. Accessed on 02 May 2014. ______. Case Concerning Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pakistan v. India). Applications instituting proceedings (filled in the Registry of the Court on 11 May 1973). Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/60/9461.pdf. Accessed on 02 May 2014. ______. Case Concerning Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pakistan v. India). Order relates to the Request for the indication of interim measures of protection and fixing- limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial (13 July 1973). Available at: http://www.icj-cij. org/docket/files/60/6177.pdf. Accessed on 02 May 2014. ______. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America). Judgment of 27 June of 1986. Available at: http:// www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/6503.pdf. Accessed on 18 September 2014. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Statue, 2009. Available at: http://www.icty.org/sections/ LegalLibrary/StatuteoftheTribunal. Accessed on 20 August 2014. International Law Comission (ILC). Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001. Available at: http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/ english/draft%20articles/9_6_2001.pdf. Accessed on 01 May 2014. Jelavich, Barbara. History of the Balkans, Vol. 2: Twentieth Century. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Jillani, Schahzeb. “Scars of Bangladesh in independence war 40 years ago”. BBC NEWS ASIA, 2011. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16111843. Accessed on 27 April 2014. Johnsen, Willian T. Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy. Carlisle: US Army War College, 1995. Accessed 27 April 2014. http://www. strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB159.pdf. Kabblers, Jan. Introduction to International Institutional Law. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Knorr, Michelle. “The International Crime of Genocide: Obligations Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes, and their Impact on Universal Jurisdiction.” Essex Human Rights Review 7, nº 2 (2010). Available at: http://projects.essex.ac.uk/ehrr/V7N2/Knorr.pdf. Accessed on 19 April 2014. Magas, Branka. “The War in Yugoslavia.” Royal United Services Institute Journal (Winter 1991). McClellan, Woodford. “Postwar Political Evolution.” In: Contemporary Yugoslavia: Twenty Years of Socialist Experiment, edited by Wayne S. Vucinich, 119-153. Berkeley:

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University of California Press, 1969. Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). Factory at Chorzów case. Judgment of 13 September 1928 (including the text of the declaration of Judge de Bustamanta and Judge Altamira). Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_A/A_17/54_Usine_de_ Chorzow_Fond_Arret.pdf. Accessed on 04 May 2014. Prpa-Jovanović, Branka. “The Making of Yugoslavia: 1830-1945.” In: Burn This House: The Making and Unmaking of Yugoslavia, edited by Jasminka Udovički and James Ridgeway, 43-63. Durham: Duke University Press, 2000. Rakate, Phenyo Keiseg. “The shelling of Knin by the Croatian Army in August 1995: A police operation or a non-international armed conflict?”International Review of the Red Cross, 2000. Available at: http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jqta. htm. Accessed on 26 April 2014. Schabas, William A.. “Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide”. United Nations Audiovisual Library of Internantional Law, 2008. Available at: http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/cppcg/cppcg_e.pdf. Accessed on 26 April 2014. Shaw, Malcom M.. “International Law”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Stavrianos, Leften Stavros. The Balkans Since 1453. New York: New York University Press, 2000. Steiner, Henry J.; Alston, Philip; Goodman, Ryan. “International Human Rights In Context: Law, Politics, Morals”. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Vyver, Johan D. van der. “Prosecution and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.” Fordham International Law Journal 23, n° 2 (1999). Available at: http://ir.lawnet. fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1666&context=ilj. Accessed on 02 May 2014. United Nations. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, 1978. Available at: http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/3_2_1978. pdf. Accessed on 12 August 2014. United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 2005 (RES 60/147). Available at: http://daccess-dds-ny. un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/496/42/PDF/N0549642.pdf?OpenElement. Accessed on 02 May 2014. ______. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (RES 260 (III)), 1948. Available at: http://www.oas.org/dil/1948_Convention_on_ the_Prevention_and_Punishment_of_the_Crime_of_Genocide.pdf. Accessed on 20 April 2014.

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OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE ACCESS TO THE PACIFIC OCEAN (BOLIVIA V. CHILE)

Cristieli Carvalho dos Santos1 Inaê Oliveira2

ABSTRACT

In the 19th century, Bolivia and Chile got involved in a war known as War of the Pacific. The war’s outcome was the Chilean annexation of a valuable disputed territory on Pacific coast which former belonged to Bolivia’s coastline. As a result of such territorial loss, Bolivia became a landlocked nation. However, Bolivia has never accepted its landlocked nation’s condition and has persistently tried to enter into direct negotiations with Chile in order to recover sovereignty over its lost coastline. Despite statements of high Chilean officials declaring willing to dialogue, direct negotiations proved to be unfruitful. In the face of such circumstances, Bolivia presented a claim against Chile to the International Court of Justice in April 2013. In its application, Bolivia requests the ICJ to adjudge and declare (a) that Chile has the obligation to negotiate with Bolivia in order to reach an agreement granting Bolivia a fully sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean; (b) that Chile has violated this obligations and (c) that Chile must perform the obligation in good faith, promptly, formally, effectively and within a reasonable time. In this sense, the ICJ judges must decide if Chile is bound by international law to enter into negotiations regarding Bolivia’s fully sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean and, if so, whether it has failed to fulfill such obligation.

1 Cristieli Carvalho dos Santos is a fourth-year student of UFRGS Law School (Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul) 2 Inaê Olivera is a second-year student at UFRGS Law School (Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul) International Court of Justice

1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In its origins, the case Bolivia v. Chile, pending before the ICJ since April 2013, constitutes a territorial dispute that dates back to the 19th century. Before analyzing Bolivia’s claim merit per se – and evaluating whether Chile has an obligation to negotiate effectively and in good faith in order to reach an agreement granting Bolivia a fully sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean –, it must be assessed how Bolivia has lost its coastline to Chile and how both States are dealing with the issue. When it comes to understanding how Bolivia has lost its coastline to Chile, it is necessary to consider three elements: firstly, the uncertainty encompassing boundary delimitation among the newly independent former Spanish colonies; secondly, the economic importance of natural resources found at the Atacama Desert in 19th century; and, finally, the armed conflict widely known as the War of the Pacific (1879 – 1883). Chile and Bolivia achieved their independence from Spain in 1818 and in 1825, respectively. These new states, grounded on the uti possidetis juris principle, took possession of the territories that corresponded to their colonial administration (US Department of State 1966). However, the administrative boundaries of Spanish colonies in Latin America were not well defined. As a result of this uncertainty, both nations claimed at least partial ownership over the Atacama Desert by invoking the same principle of uti possidetis (McCray 2005). Uncertainties involving boundary delimitation did not create significant complications until the mid-1840s. By this time, however, the economic importance of the guano and nitrate deposits in the Atacama Desert was discovered. Suddenly, the region’s economic relevance refueled territorial disputes between Bolivia and Chile. In 1942, Chile claimed that its territory extended as far north as the 23rd parallel. Bolivia, in its turn, claimed that its territory extended as far south as the 26th parallel. The richest nitrate deposits were located around the 24th parallel – a region that both countries claimed to own. In 1847, Chile occupied de facto the Mejillones Port, located in the 24th parallel (Fifer 1972, 53). Bolivia endeavored to settle the dispute peacefully, but the Bolivian National Assembly, on May 27 1863, empowered the chief executive to declare war against Chile if a pacific settlement to the dispute could not be reached (St. John 1994, 4).Several scholars (St. John 1994; Farcau 2000; McCray 2005; Sater 2007) sustain that the armed conflict between Bolivia and Chile was delayed solely due to the Spanish intervention threat looming in the region at the end of the 1860s. This threat led Peru, Bolivia and Chile to form an alliance and jointly defend their independence against Spain. As a result of the regional solidarity created by the threat of Spanish intervention, Bolivia and Chile negotiated a treaty in 1866 – often referred to as the Treaty of Mutual Benefits. In this treaty, both parties renounced part of the territorial and mining rights that they had been claiming. The Treaty of Mutual Benefits drew the international

214 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations boundary at the 24th parallel and established a zone of joint mineral exploration running from the 23rd parallel (Bolivian territory) to the 25th parallel (Chilean territory). The joint mineral exploration zone meant that the “two governments agreed to split equally both the proceeds from guano deposits and the tax revenues realized from the production and sale of mineral resources” (St. John 1994, 8). The handicap of this Treaty of Mutual Benefits was that it put Bolivia in a position of disadvantage vis-à-vis Chile. The treaty advanced early Chilean claims and gave access to the richest mineral deposits to the country – deposits that were located north of the 24th parallel. The terms of the 1866 treaty were strongly criticized by Bolivia, and different interpretations of the treaty soon troubled even more the already shaken diplomatic relations between Bolivia and Chile (St. John 1994, 10). In 1871, a new government came to power in Bolivia and it tried to revise the terms of the 1866 treaty, to no avail. A few months later, the Bolivian National Assembly declared null and void all the acts of the previous administration, arguing that the previous executive chief, General Melgarejo, was a self-appointed dictator (Farcau 2000). In 1872, Bolivia and Chile started to negotiate a new agreement on the exploration of nitrate deposits in the Atacama Desert, known as the Lindsay-Corral Agreement. According to Chile, the Lindsay-Corral Agreement was nothing more than a clarification of the 1866 treaty, but political opposition considered the agreement an instrument to expand the Chilean influence over the disputed area. Regardless, Bolivia ratified the agreement on December 5, 1872 (McCray 2005). By this time, Peru also had concerns about the growing Chilean influence in the region. From these common concerns, Peru and Bolivia signed a treaty in 1873, forming an alliance that remained secret until the outbreak of hostilities between Bolivia and Chile (Farcau 2000). The treaty established that its signatories should act in favor of each other in case of threats to independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. A year later, representatives of Bolivia and Chile reopened the negotiations about the Atacama region. They concluded an agreement – known as Treaty of Sucre –, that replaced the 1866 treaty. The Treaty of Sucre maintained the international boundary at the 24th parallel, but ended the collective exploration zones. While these provisions were favorable to Bolivia, the agreement contained a clause that granted Chilean companies operating in Bolivia’s territory a twenty-five year long exemption from tax increases (Farcau 2000). This treaty temporarily relieved the tensions between Bolivia and Chile and the conflict took place only four years later. In 1878, partially driven by an economic crisis in the country, the Bolivian National Assembly approved a ten cents tax per hundredweight of nitrates exported from the Bolivian territory by the Chilean Antofagasta Nitrate and Railroad Company (Sater 2007). To Chile, the tax increase voided the commitment reached in the Treaty of Sucre. Once again, the countries tried to negotiate a pacific settlement,

215 International Court of Justice without reaching an agreement. The Bolivian government canceled the Antofagasta Nitrate and Railroad Company concession and determined that the company should end its activities in Bolivia by February 14, 1879. Chile then instructed its army to occupy the Bolivian coastline. The outbreak of hostilities gave rise to the conflict that came to be known as the War of the Pacific. The War of the Pacific was not “only one of longest struggles of nineteenth-century Latin America; it was one of the few large-scale conflicts to afflict the world at that time” (Sater 2007, 2). In March 1879, one week after Chilean troops had occupied Antofagasta, Bolivia formally declared war and called upon Peru to comply with their mutual defense alliance. In April 1879, Chile declared war on both Peru and Bolivia (Farcau 2000).

Even though the 1873 treaty and the imposition of the 10 centavo tax proved to be the casus belli, there were deeper, more fundamental reasons for the outbreak of hostilities in 1879. On the one hand, there was the power, prestige, and relative stability of Chile compared to the economic deterioration and political discontinuity which characterised both Peru and Bolivia after independence. On the other, there was the ongoing competition for economic and political hegemony in the region, complicated by a deep antipathy between Peru and Chile. In this milieu, the vagueness of the boundaries between the three states, coupled with the discovery of valuable guano and nitrate deposits in the disputed territories, combined to produce a diplomatic conundrum of insurmountable proportions (St. John 1994, 9).

The Chilean army was quite superior to both Peruvian and Bolivian armies, and, by the end of 1879, all Bolivia’s coastal areas were in Chilean control. Hostilities between Chile and Peru continued for three more years and, in October 1883, the Treaty of Ancón, signed by both states, officially ended the War of the Pacific (US Department of State 1966). In the treaty, Peru agreed to a Chilean occupation in the provinces of Tacna and Arica for a period of 10 years – after which a plebiscite should be held to decide the permanent ownership of these provinces. Peru also agreed to unconditionally and perpetually yield to Chile the Peruvian littoral province of Tarapacá – at which the most valuable Peruvian nitrate deposits were located. However, the main effect from the Chilean acquisition of Tarapacá affected Bolivia: “[…] it effectively precluded Bolivia regaining its littoral as Chile could not be expected to give Bolivia territory which would separate Tarapacá from the rest of Chile” (St. John 1994). Once peace had been established between Chile and Peru, the Chilean government moved towards securing a settlement with Bolivia. Peace talks between Bolivia and Chile started in December 1883 and, on April 4 1884, Bolivia and Chile signed a Truce Pact. Over the course of these negotiations, Bolivian representatives pressured to grant Bolivia an access to the ocean either in form of a corridor through Chilean territory or by modifying the Treaty of Ancón in order to cede the provinces of

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Tacna e Arica to Bolivia. Chile refused to sacrifice its own territorial continuity and pointed out that it could not relinquish Tacna and Arica because it did not own them (St. John 1994). As Bolivia continued to insist on an access to the ocean, both countries signed an indefinite truce pact, pending conclusion of a peace treaty. During the period of the truce pact, Bolivia accepted that “the Republic of Chile would continue to rule, subject to the political and administrative regime provided for in Chilean law, the territories that lie between parallel twenty-three and the mouth of the Loa river in the Pacific [Department of Littoral]” (St. John 1994). In May 1895, Bolivia and Chile signed three agreements to find a solution for their pending issues. The most important of these agreements was the Agreement on the Transfer of Territories between the Republics of Bolivia and Chile. In this agreement, it was stated that, if Chile acquired the territories of Tacna and Arica through a plebiscite or direct negotiations, it would transfer them to Bolivia. If Chile was unable to acquire these territories, it would transfer the zone “from the Cove of Vitor to the Valley of Camarones” or any other similar area to Bolivia (St. John 1994, 16). Peru protested against the terms of the treaty and stated that it would not let go any part of its territory neither to Bolivia nor to Chile. In October 1904, Bolivia and Chile finally signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship, considered as a significant diplomatic victory for Chile, whereby Bolivia formally recognized Chilean ownership of its former littoral. In return, Chile guaranteed to Bolivia commercial transit rights and facilities at some Chilean ports. Chile also agreed to recompense Bolivia over its loss and committed to build a railroad from the port of Arica to La Paz. This railroad was concluded in 1913 (Farcau 2000). Faced with the uncertainty surrounding the territorial status of Tacna and Arica, Bolivia proposed to both Peru and Chile that they renounced their aspirations in its favor, which both states refused to. The Tacna-Arica issue was settled only after World War I, through the mediation of the President of the United States. The Treaty of Lima, signed in 1929, stated that Tacna would belong to Peru and Arica would belong to Chile. The Treaty of Lima also established that neither Peru nor Chile could cede these territories to a third state without the prior agreement of the other (MCray 2005). Over the next decades, Bolivia continued asking for a form of sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. In the 1950s, the country revived the issue and proposed to Chile a new round of direct negotiations about it. Chile agreed to discuss the issue, but there was no substantial progress on negotiations since then, in spite of the Bolivian efforts and Chilean public commitments to reach a peaceful and satisfactory agreement over the Bolivian demand for access to the sea (St. John 1994). After many years of fruitless negotiations, Bolivia presented its demand before this Court, arguing that Chile has committed itself through agreements, diplomatic practice and declarations of its highest-level representatives to negotiate in good faith and

217 International Court of Justice effectively with Bolivia in order to reach an agreement granting Bolivia a fully sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.

2 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

In light of the aforementioned facts, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, on 24 April 2013, instituted proceedings against the Republic of Chile before the International Court of Justice.

2.1 BOLIVIA’S ALLEGATIONS

The Plurinational State of Bolivia claims that the Republic of Chile, by failing to comply with its statements that recognized Bolivia’s right of access to the Pacific Ocean, has violated both treaty law and customary international law.

2.1.1 Jurisdiction of the Court

As the basis for the jurisdiction of the Court, the applicant invokes article XXXI of the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (“Pact of Bogotá”) of 30 April 1948, to which both States are parties and that reads as follows:

In conformity with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the High Contracting Parties declare that they recognize, in relation to any other American State, the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory ipso facto, without the necessity of any special agreement so long as the present Treaty is in force, in all disputes of a juridical nature that arise among them concerning: a) The interpretation of a treaty; b) Any question of international law; c) The existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute the breach of an international obligation; d) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation (Pact of Bogotá 1948. Article XXXI).

Both Bolivia and Chile are parties to the Pact of Bogotá. Bolivia ratified it on 9 June 2011 and Chile on 21 August 1967. No pertinent reservation made by either party is in force at the moment.

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2.1.2 As to Chile’s duty to negotiate a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean under treaty law and Chile’s breach of such obligation

In its Application, Bolivia invokes several treaties celebrated between both States whereby Chile has bound itself to grant the former a form of access to the Pacific Ocean. Firstly, the Applicant recalls that, through the treaties of 10 August 1866 and the Treaty of 6 August 1874, the boundary between Bolivia and Chile was established and Chile formally and legally recognized Bolivia’s sovereignty over the coasts of the Pacific Ocean (ICJ 2013). Among the treaties signed by the parties to this case on May 18 1895, the Applicant highlights the Special Treaty on the Transfer of Territories – which, in its preamble, stated that:

The Republic of Chile and the Republic of Bolivia, with the purpose of strengthening increasingly closer ties of friendship to unite the two countries, and the agreement that a superior need and the future development and commercial property of Bolivia requires its free and natural access to the sea, have decided to enter into a special treaty on the transfer of territory for which purpose they have named and appointed their Plenipotentiaries (…) (Special Treaty on the Transfer of Territories, Preamble)

In its Bases I and II, this treaty also provided that, if through a plebiscite or direct arrangements, Chile were to acquire control and permanent sovereignty over the territories of Tacna and Arica, it would undertake to transfer them to the Republic of Bolivia, except for the area from the Quebrada de Camarones to the Quebrada de Vitor - which would remain under Chilean control.In Base IV of the said treaty, it was determined that, if Chile were unable to gain such sovereignty “it undertakes to transfer to Caleta de Vitor up to the Quebrada de Camarones or any other similar area to Bolivia”. Bolivia then refers to the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, signed with Chile on 20 October 1904, through which Chile imposed its rule over the occupied Bolivian territories. This treaty did not cancel previous Chilean declarations and commitments concerning Bolivia’s sovereign access to the sea (Application, 14). Furthermore, Bolivia invokes multiple declarations by which Chile committed itself to grant sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean to Bolivia. Given the statements released by Chile on 20 January 1920 (Application, Annex 9), 20 June 1950 (Application, Annex 10), 10 July 1961 (Application, Annex 11), and especially the Joint Declaration of Charanã of 8 February 1975 (Application, Annex 13), the Applicant argues that the Respondent was willing to grant Bolivia an own and sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. Then, the Applicant asserts that, through a note on 19 December 1975 in the

219 International Court of Justice course of the Charaña negotiations, Chile once more declared itself to be “prepared to negotiate with Bolivia the cession of a strip of land north of Arica up to the Línea de la Concordía” (Application, 16). Nevertheless, the Respondent rejected Bolivia’s proposals for granting an appropriate and sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean on 9 June 1987, contravening its own prior declarations (Application, 16). Bolivia also highlights the joint communiqué issued with Chile and released on 22 February 2000, the second point of which referred to their agreement to put together a work agenda including, without any exclusion, the essential matters of the bilateral relationship. The Presidents of both countries confirmed this position on 1 September 2000 and, in July 2006, the Presidents of Bolivia and Chile agreed on the “Agenda of 13 Points”, which addressed the “Maritime Issue” in point VI. Both States agreed to meet in November 2010 to start working on the Maritime Issue, but Chile unilaterally suspended the meeting, and the negotiation was not resumed. Another attempt at resolving the matter with Chile was, according to the Applicant, the statement given by the President of Bolivia at the 66th session of the United Nations General Assembly on 21 September 2011 in the sense that the channels for a bilateral negotiation with Chile to find a solution for the Bolivian maritime issue remained open. The response received from the Chilean President was that there are no pending issues between the two countries. This positioning was confirmed by the State after Bolivia’s public request in February 2011 for a draft and concrete proposal to remedy the Bolivian confinement, and again after the statement given by the Bolivian President at the 67th session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 20123. Finally, the Applicant presents several resolutions by international entities supporting the debate and negotiations between the two States. The Resolution 426 of the Organization of American States recommended the opening of negotiations between Bolivia and Chile for the purposes of providing Bolivia with a free and sovereign territorial connection with the Pacific Ocean (Resolution 426, 1979). Ten other subsequent resolutions during the following decade were issued by the same organ confirming such Resolution, whereby it was determined that Bolivia’s maritime problem would be kept permanently on the agenda of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States until a solution could be reached. In particular, Resolution 686 of 1983 urges Bolivia and Chile to find a formula to give Bolivia a sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean, on the bases that take into account mutual conveniences and the rights and interest of all parties involved.

3 Application. 220 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

2.2 CHILE’S ALLEGATIONS

In its defense, the Republic of Chile argues that it is not bound by any legal obligations whatsoever to negotiate with the Applicant in order to grant the latter a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, and that Bolivia lacks any legal bases to claim a sovereign right of access.

2.2.1 Jurisdiction of the Court

According to the Respondent, the requirements imposed by article XXI of the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement of 30 April 1948 (used by Bolivia as the basis for the jurisdiction of this Court over the present case) have not been met. More specifically, the Respondent argues that there is no dispute to be settled between the parties, since both have signed the aforementioned treaty of Peace and Friendship. Chile contends that the said treaty has been observed and implemented by both parties for over a century, and that Bolivia has been granted the widest possible right of commercial transit across its territory and ports on the Pacific. Having entered into negotiations innumerous negotiations with Bolivia over the years, the Respondent claims to have fulfilled every possible obligation it might have had towards Bolivia in this matter and that, therefore, there is nothing pending between the two states. Moreover, the Respondent highlights that Bolivia’s initiative to institute proceedings against Chile before the International Court of Justice goes against the Chilean territorial integrity and national interests – which are protected by the essential principles of international law and relations among states, such as the inviolability of treaties and the stability of borders.

3 LEGAL THESES INVOLVED IN THE MERITS

On account of its historical complexity, the case Bolivia versus Chile offers the exciting opportunity for a multifaceted legal analysis. In that sense, the members of the ICJ are invited to analyze the question at hand – whether Chile is bound to grant Bolivia a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean – from different angles.

3.1 LAW OF TREATIES

Traditional law upheld the principle of States’ freedom in the field of treaty making. Under strong pressure from socialist and Third World countries,

221 International Court of Justice momentous changes were introduced, and to a large extent ‘codified’, in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, entered into force in 1980. Most of its provisions either codify customary law or have given rise to rules belonging to the corpus of general law (Cassese 2005). Chile ratified the Convention on 9 April 1981, while Bolivia signed it on 23 May 1969, but it has not ratified it. Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties determines that:

A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when: (a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or (b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.

Therefore, where the signature is subject to ratification, acceptance, or approval, it does not necessarily imply consent to be bound. However, signature qualifies the signatory state to proceed to ratification, acceptance or approval and creates an obligation of good faith to refrain from acts that would defeat the object of the treaty. Besides, where the treaty is not subject to ratification, acceptance, or approval, signature creates the same obligation of good faith and establishes consent to be bound. Signature does not create an obligation to ratify (Brownlie 2008, 610). On May 18 1895, Bolivia and Chile signed various treaties in Santiago with the aim of finally resolving the pending issues between the two states, amongst which was the Special Treaty on the Transfer of Territories. In its preamble, it was announced that

The Republic of Chile and the Republic of Bolivia, with the purpose of strengthening increasingly closer ties of friendship to unite the two countries, and the agreement that a superior need and the future development and commercial property of Bolivia requires its free and natural access to the sea, have decided to enter into a special treaty on the transfer of territory for which purpose they have named and appointed their Plenipotentiaries (…) (highlight added) (Special Treaty on the Transfer of Territories 1895, Preamble)

This treaty also provided, in its Bases I and II that, if through a plebiscite or direct arrangements, Chile were to acquire control and permanent sovereignty over the territories of Tacna and Arica, these areas would be transferred to the Republic of Bolivia, except for the area from the Quebrada de Camarones to the Quebrada de Vitor - which would remain under Chilean control; and, in its Base IV, that if Chile were unable to gain such sovereignty it would undertake to transfer to Caleta de Vitor up to the Quebrada de Camarones or any other similar area to Bolivia.

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Furthermore, the Applicant and the Respondent have also signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship on 20 October 1904, through which Chile imposed its rule over the occupied Bolivian territories. This treaty did not cancel previous Chilean declarations and commitments concerning Bolivia’s sovereign access to the sea4.

3.2 GOOD FAITH

According to Art. 38 (1) (C) in the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the Court “shall apply the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” (Statute of the ICJ 1945, Article 38). Thus, in international law, one may resort to the general principles of law when treaties or customary law are not sufficient to settle a legal question (Lauterpacht 1970, 68; Shaw 2008, 98; Crawford 2012, 134), of which good faith is perhaps the most important, since it underlies several international legal rules. Being a general principle of international law, the principle of good faith constitutes a source of international law, acting to mediate the effects of States’ rights in international law in order to achieve acceptable results when a collision of interests occurs. Fundamentally, good faith is a limitation of State sovereignty necessary to protect other States and their trust and reliance on international law (Reinhold 2013). Good faith was elected by the UN General Assembly as one of the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States5, implying that States shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the generally recognized principles and rules of international law (including the UN Charter). In other words, the principle of good faith requires parties to a transaction to deal with each other, to represent their motives and purposes truthfully, and to refrain from taking unfair advantage that might result from a literal and unintended interpretation of the agreement between them (D’Amato 1992, 599). In general, international law rules such as pacta sunt servanda, abuse of rights, estoppel and acquiescence and the negotiation of disputes are grounded, to some extent, in good faith (Reinhold 2013, 40). When it comes to treaty law, good faith is constantly present, from the time prior to signature to that of interpretation. The

4 Application. 5 The General Assembly Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States from /of 1970 elected several principles... One of such principles was the one that that States shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter, a principle according to which Every State has the duty to fulfil in good faith its obligations under the generally recognized principles and rules of international law. (http://www.un-documents.net/ a25r2625.htm). 223 International Court of Justice concept figures prominently in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, article 31 (1) (“a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”) ( VCLT, Article 31 (1)) and a secondary similar notion is present in the duties of signatories to a treaty prior ratification in article 18 of the VCLT6 (D’Amato 1992). In the early days of the legal system, there was a strong tendency to interpret documents literally. The treaties began to include clauses designed to deal with questions of interpretations and performance. As time went on, those clauses were gradually reduced in size and prominence because the principle of good faith was increasingly understood to be implicit in the treaties, for the principle of good faith is rooted in a natural law conception of customary international law. The earliest systematic writers on international law, including Grotius, Pufendorf and Suárez, conceived international law as founded in natural law, by which they meant the dictates of right reason. Natural law would exclude the exploitation of an advantage deriving from a literal but mutually unintended reading of a treaty or other international agreement (D’Amato 1992, 600). Whether in domestic legal systems or in international law, the overarching nature of good faith as a legal principle turns the task of defining it in absolute terms a substantial challenge. In fact, the understanding of good faith is ever evolving, and it is incumbent upon the members of this Court to assess to what extent has this principle mutated from its original conception in the realm of public international law for the purposes of settling the present dispute.

3.2.1 Unilateral Acts of States

Various kinds of unilateral acts by states may have legal significance or consequence for them. This law-making process, although not provided for in Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, is envisaged by a general rule which has the same rank as those providing for custom and treaty-making (Cassese 2005, 184). They include acts making claims or renouncing them (to territory, for instance), acts of recognition (e.g. of governments) or protests (e.g. against humanitarian intervention in another state) and the ratification of treaties. In addition to such acts that may contribute as state practice to the formation of custom or involve the application of international law rules, a state may accept a legal obligation by a public unilateral act made, either orally or in writing, by a person competent to act on behalf of the State, in relation to the international community at large or one or more States In some respects, the rules

6 See the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 224 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations governing such declarations parallel those applicable to treaties (Harris 2010). This possibility was recognized in the Nuclear Tests Cases and is now the subject of the Guiding Principles adopted by the International Law Commission at its Fifty-eighth session in 2006 . For the purposes of this Study Guide, the most relevant principles are:

1. Declarations publicly made and manifesting the will to be bound may have the effect of creating legal obligations. When the conditions for this are met, the binding character of such declarations is based on good faith; States concerned may then take them into consideration and rely on them; such States are entitled to require that such obligations be respected. 2. Any State possesses capacity to undertake legal obligations through unilateral declarations. 4. A unilateral declaration binds the State internationally only if it is made by an authority vested with the power to do so. By virtue of their functions, heads of State, heads of Government and ministers for foreign affairs are competent to formulate such declarations. Other persons representing the State in specified areas may be authorized to bind it, through their declarations, in areas falling within their competence. 5. Unilateral declarations may be formulated orally or in writing 10. A unilateral declaration that has created legal obligations for the State making the declaration cannot be revoked arbitrarily. In assessing whether a revocation would be arbitrary, consideration should be given to: (a) Any specific terms of the declaration relating to revocation; (b) The extent to which those to whom the obligations are owed have relied on such obligations; (c) The extent to which there has been a fundamental change in the circumstances.

The General Assembly, through its Resolution 61/34 of 4 December 2006, took note of the report by the ILC, recommended the dissemination of the guiding principles and that the Commission continued its work on the topics in its current programme7.

3.2.2 Estoppel

The ratio underlying estoppel is often expressed in the Latin maxim allegans contraria non audiendus est, translated as ‘one should not benefit from his or her own inconsistency’. It is a principle found in all major legal systems, underpinning the various types of estoppel in common law jurisprudence and the civil law concepts of preclusion, debarment and foreclusion (Ovchar 2009, 3). However, a substantial array

7 See GA RES 61/34 of 4 December 2006. 225 International Court of Justice of scholars8 shares the view that estoppel is also a general principle of international law, resting on the principle of good faith and consistency (Brownlie 2008). In the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, estoppel is free from the ‘manifold refinements grafted onto it by domestic legal systems.’ In its transition from the municipal to the international sphere, ‘the concept of estoppel has been broadened so substantially that the analogy with the estoppel of municipal systems may be positively misleading’ (Ovchar 2009, 5). Indeed, according to Brownlie, it is necessary to point out that estoppel in municipal law is regarded with great caution, and that the ‘principle’ has no particular coherence in international law, its incidence and effect not being uniform (Brownlie 2008, 644) Consequently, as observed by Judge Alfaro in the Temple of Preah Vihear Case:

Although there are similarities between estoppel in the jurisprudence of international and municipal courts, there is a very substantial difference between the simple and clear-cut rule adopted and applied in the international field and the complicated classifications, modalities, species, sub-species and procedural features of the municipal system (ICJ 1962, 39).

In the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, estoppel obliges a State “to be consistent in its attitude to a given factual or legal situation”. Such a demand has the potential to encourage finality, stability and predictability (Ovchar 2009, 1). Professor Bowett has stated the essentials of estoppel to be: (1) a statement of fact which is clear and unambiguous; (2) this statement must be voluntary, unconditional and unauthorized and (3) there must be reliance on good faith upon the statement either to the detriment of the party so relying on the statement or to the advantage of the party making the statement (Brownlie 643). The ICJ has not adopted the technicalities of specific forms of estoppel. Instead, it has held that estoppel consists of three fundamental elements: first, a State must make a representation to another; secondly, the representation must be unconditional and made with proper authority; and finally, the State invoking estoppel must rely on the representation. If all three elements are established, an estoppel arises (Ovchar 2009, 4). The Court, therefore, has adopted an untechnical conception of estoppel and applied it as a rule of substance instead of one of evidence or procedure9. And, notwithstanding this simplification, it has been said that the Court has not been consistent in applying estoppel (Ovchar 2009, 5).

8 See judges Alfaro and Fitzmaurice in the Temple Case, ICJ Reports (1962), 39-51, 61-5; Bowett, 33 BY (1957), at 202; MacGibbon, 7 ICLQ (1958) 468-513; Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (1958), 168-72; Report of the ILC on the Law of Treaties, Yrbk ILC (1966), ii-239. 9 See the Separate Opinion of Judge Ajibola in the Territorial Dispute Case (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad). 226 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

Two examples of a broader understanding of the principle by the International Court of Justice are the Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain10 and the Temple Case11. In the former, Nicaragua challenged the validity of the award on several grounds; nevertheless, the Court deemed the award to be valid and declared that it was no longer open to Nicaragua to question its validity, for the State had already recognized the award as valid by its conduct and express declaration. In the Temple Case, Thailand sought to avoid a frontier agreement on the ground of error. In this case, the Court also found that Thailand was fettered by its conduct from asserting that it did not accept the treaty.

3.2.3 The Duty to Negotiate

The process of concluding a legally binding international agreement comprehends multiple successive stages. According to Professor I. William Zartman:

[p]renegotiation begins when one or more parties consider negotiation as a policy option and communicate this intention to other parties. It ends when the parties agree to formal negotiations (an exchange of proposals to arrive at a mutually acceptable outcome in a situation of interdependent interests) or when one party abandons the consideration of negotiations as an option.... In essential terms, prenegotiation is the span of time and activity in which the parties move from conflicting unilateral solutions for a mutual problem to a joint search for cooperative multilateral or joint solutions (Zartman 1989, 4).

Therefore, the first phase is the pre-negotiation phase, which occurs before a mutual commitment to negotiations has been made. The second phase consists in the process of the negotiations per se, during which the negotiating States engage in more substantial discussions. The last stage phase of this process is the period between the conclusion of negotiations and the entry into force of the recently negotiated obligations. Once the agreement enters into force, it creates binding legal obligations for its parties. In that sense, the outcome of the negotiating process is fully protected by law: the parties are legally obligated to perform in good faith the obligations they have assumed and the legal consequences of noncompliance are prescribed (Rogoff 1994-1995, 144-145)12. From an international law perspective, defining the binding nature of the pre-

10 Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain. ICJ REPORTS 1960, 192 AT 213 11 Temple of Preah Vihear Case. ICJ REPORTS (1962), 6 AT 32. 12 See the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 2, article 26. “Every treaty in force is binding on the parties and must be performed by them in good faith.” 227 International Court of Justice negotiation and the actual negotiation is a challenge. Aiming to remedy this situation, the International Law Commission, in its final draft codification of the law of treaties13, suggested an extension of the obligation to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of an eventual negotiated agreement in the negotiating phase. Thus, states participating in negotiations would incur substantive legal obligations as soon as they entered into the negotiating process. This recommendation by the ILC was not welcomed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which does not impose any substantive obligations on negotiating states during the negotiating phase. It has been sustained, however, that such obligations binding upon the parties prior to an actual agreement may be imposed by customary international law or by general principles of law applicable to the relations between states. The doctrine of culpa in contrahendo (“fault in contracting”, whereby parties must act in good faith during preliminary contract negotiations) is well established in many domestic legal systems, and there is authority that supports its international application. The principle of good faith, and most likely that of abuse of rights, presumably also apply to all dealings between states. Any one or all of these doctrines may be applicable in those situations where the actions of a negotiating state with respect to the subject matter of the negotiations cause injury to the interests of another negotiating state during the negotiation period (Rogoff 1994-1995, 147). Such a view of negotiation highlights the more formal process of state interaction and excludes tacit bargaining or other behavior that regulates conflict (Iklé 1964). It also excludes other forms of dispute settlement, such as conciliation, mediation, inquiry, arbitration, reference to international or regional organizations, or judicial settlement, because such procedures require some sort of agreement between the disputing parties which presupposes prior arrangements or negotiations (Rogoff 1994-1995, 147). Additionally, it is useful to distinguish the obligation to negotiate from the obligation to conclude an agreement, for the obligation to negotiate only entails a commitment to some degree of interaction between states in attempting to resolve a dispute or to deal with a common problem (Rogoff 1994-1995). Nevertheless, it appears that, at the current stage of development of international law, there is no general obligation imposed on states, applicable in all situations of dispute or disagreement, to enter into negotiations as a matter of customary or conventional international law. In the UN Charter, for instance, some of the purposes and principles of the U.N. – as stipulated in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter – support the proposition that member states should settle disputes by peaceful means and cooperatively work out their common problems; also, a specific reference to negotiation is made in Article 33, which provides possible methods of

13 ILC Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, 1966. Article 15, (a). 228 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations peaceful dispute settlement in the context of the “Pacific Settlement” procedures in Chapter 6 of the Charter14. However, it does not appear that any of such provisions imposes general obligations on member states to negotiate in the absence of more specific directives found in other Charter provisions (Rogoff 1994-1995). There are, however, two decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which hold that states are obligated to negotiate in certain situations: the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. & N. Ireland v. Iceland) and the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.)15. The understanding expressed by the International Court of Justice in those cases supports the general proposition that States are under an obligation to negotiate in disputes encompassing situations where each possesses legal rights that can only be defined in relation to the legal rights of the other. Thus, once it is determined that customary or conventional international law creates rights for more than one state with respect to a particular matter, in case of a dispute involving that matter, the states concerned are legally bound to enter into negotiations to solve their differences. In addition, once it is settled that an obligation to negotiate exists as a matter of customary or conventional international law, one may specify the content of that obligation by closely investigating the nature of the substantive rights of the states involved. In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ found that the states involved in the continental shelf boundary disputes were obligated under customary international law to delimit the disputed areas by negotiation and eventual agreement. The Court derived this obligation to delimit continental shelf boundaries by negotiation and agreement from its detailed analysis of the legal regime of the continental shelf, from the Truman Proclamation of 1946 to subsequent developments like the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958. According to the Court, the Convention on the Continental Shelf was not opposable by the Federal Republic of Germany because it was not a party to the agreement, and the agreement was not necessarily expressive of customary international law with respect to the delimitation of continental shelf areas between adjacent states. In the Court’s view, however, there did exist applicable rules of customary international law governing the delimitation of continental shelf boundaries between adjacent states.

[D]elimitation must be the object of agreement between the States concerned, and . . . such agreement must be arrived at in accordance with equitable principles ... namely: (a) the parties are under an obligation to enter into negotiations with a view to arriving at an agreement, and not merely to go through a formal process of

14 See the UN Charter. 15 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. & N. Ireland v. Iceland), 1974 I.C.J. 3, 32 (July25); North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 47 (Feb. 20). 229 International Court of Justice

negotiation as a sort of prior condition for the automatic application of a certain method of delimitation in the absence of agreement; they are under an obligation to conduct themselves so that the negotiations are meaningful, which will not be the case when either of them insists upon its own position without contemplating any modification of it. (ICJ 1969, 46-47)

While the ICJ did find an obligation to negotiate on the part of the states involved in continental shelf boundary disputes, it found that obligation specifically in the substantive customary law regime of the continental shelf. The ICJ did not derive the obligation from more general principles of international law requiring peaceful settlement of disputes, but rather from the specific rules and principles of customary international law applicable to the delimitation of continental shelf areas between adjacent states. Furthermore, the Court gave meaning to the requirement of delimitation by agreement by mandating that the disputing states enter into negotiations aiming at such agreement. It is also worth mentioning that in this decision the Court suggested that the scope of Article 33 of the UN Charter may be broader, transcending the procedures for peaceful settlement contained in Chapter 616. In the Fisheries Jurisdiction case, on the other hand, the ICJ took a more expansive approach to the obligation to negotiate. In that case, the ICJ determined that as a substantive matter, Iceland had certain “preferential fishing rights” in particular maritime areas while at the same time Great Britain had certain “traditional fishing rights” in the identical maritime areas. According to the Court, “[n]either right is an absolute one:”

[T]he preferential rights of a coastal State are limited according to the extent of its special dependence on the fisheries and by its obligation to take account of the rights of other States and the needs of conservation; the established rights of the other fishing States are in turn limited by reason of the coastal State’s special dependence on the fisheries and its own obligation to take account of the rights of other States, including the coastal State and the needs of conservation (ICJ 1974, 31).

The ICJ then indicated that: “[t]he most appropriate method for the solution of the dispute is clearly that of negotiation.”(ICJ 1974, 31). Unlike its reasoning in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, where it derived the obligation to negotiate from a specific legal requirement of the customary regime of the continental shelf, in this case the Court found the obligation to negotiate “flow[ing] from the very nature of

16 It is also important to bear in mind, however, the statement given by Judge Ammoun in his separate opinion about the Judgment on the North Sea Continental Shelf cases in the sense that it could not be inferred from the Truman Proclamation, nor from Article 33 of the UN Charter, which concerns disputes the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, and is the less imperative inasmuch as it empowers the Security Council “when it deems necessary, [to] call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.” 230 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations the respective rights of the Parties…” (ICJ 1974, 32). According to the Court, “it is implicit in the concept of preferential rights that negotiations are required in order to define or delimit the extent of those rights…” (ICJ 1974, 32). The reasoning of the Fisheries Jurisdiction case has far-reaching implications with regard to the obligation to negotiate. Once it is determined as a matter of conventional or customary international law that the extent of particular rights of a state must be defined in relation to and in consideration of the rights of another state, it follows that in case of a dispute between those states regarding the precise definition of their respective rights, those states are under an obligation to negotiate. (Rogoff 1994-1995). Moreover, this obligation does not stem from a specific customary norm mandating the settlement of this particular type of dispute through a negotiated agreement, as in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, but rather from a principle of international law requiring negotiation of disputes in situations where the extent of the rights of states are limited by the rights of other states. An obligation to negotiate on the part of states can arise from commitments made in international agreements to which they are parties. Sometimes these commitments are general, such as the promise to settle disputes likely to threaten international peace and security through negotiation or some other peaceful process. Sometimes these commitments are quite specific, such as the promise to engage in ongoing arms control or economic negotiations or to resolve disputed boundary, resource, or environmental questions through agreement. Treaty provisions obligating the parties to negotiate are quite common in both bilateral and multilateral treaties. Such provisions may be included in treaties for a number of different reasons. First, the parties to a treaty may have been able to negotiate solutions to most of their difficulties, but a few small matters might remain unresolved. Rather than postpone agreement on the more significant matters, the parties conclude an agreement that contains a provision to negotiate a solution to the outstanding problem or problems in the future.

3.3 RIGHTS OF LAND-LOCKED STATES

Land-locked States are those that do not possess access to and from the sea. This lack of access engenders a series of disadvantages (such as a crippled competitivity in international trade) and, in this sense, they receive a special legal treatment under international law. Since Bolivia lost its coast in the War of the Pacific (1879-1884), it belongs to this category of states.

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3.3.1 Law of the Sea Convention

The United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (hereinafter ‘LOSC’, ‘Law of the Sea Convention’ or ‘Montego Bay Convention’) was adopted on 10 December 1982 and entered into force on 16 November 1994. Created as a “constitution for the seas” (UN 1998) , the LOSC provides the starting point for any presentation of the contemporary law of the sea (Evans 2006, 625). It is in force for 166 States at the time of writing; however, as most of its provisions consist of a codification of customary international law, the Montego Bay Convention presents itself as relevant even for those States that have not bound themselves to it under treaty law. Nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind that, in spite of the comprehensive nature of this Convention, some of its provisions possess only a ‘framework’ nature, foreseeing the need for further instruments addressing a number of subjects in great detail, and it has indeed been supplemented by a number of other major conventions (Evans 2006, 625). And, as developments are accomplished in other areas of international law – especially customary law –, our understanding of the treaty evolves, further supplementing and amplifying its provisions (Boyle 2005). The Law of the Sea Convention contains some provisions aiming at the protection of land-locked States. As defined in Article 124, a land-locked State is a State lacking sea-coast (Article 124, 1, “a”) and, according to Article 125:

1. Land-locked States shall have the right of access to and from the sea for the purpose of exercising the rights provided for in this Convention including those relating to the freedom of the high seas and the common heritage of mankind. To this end, land-locked States shall enjoy freedom of transit through the territory of transit States by all means of transport. 2. The terms and modalities for exercising freedom of transit shall be agreed between the land-locked States and transit States concerned through bilateral, subregional or regional agreements. 3. Transit States, in the exercise of their full sovereignty over their territory, shall have the right to take all measures necessary to ensure that the rights and facilities provided for in this Part for land-locked States shall in no way infringe their legitimate interests. (LOSC, Article 125)

The core provision consists of Article 125, which enshrines the right of access by land-locked States to and from the sea, and freedom of transit through the territory of transit States by all means of transport. While the provision used mandatory language in relation to access and transit rights, its effect was that land- locked States did not have a self-executing right to access. Instead, transit States were under an obligation to engage in good faith negotiation to facilitate access for landlocked States. Therefore, the Convention made the right of access contingent upon bilateral, sub-regional or regional agreements between the land-locked States 232 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations and transit States, laying down the terms and modalities for exercising freedom of transit (125 (2)). It is also worth highlighting that article 125 (3) allows transit States to take all necessary measures to protect their sovereignty if such transit threatened their legitimate interests. Bolivia, a land-locked State, ratified the LOSC on 28 April 1995, whereas Chile did so on 25 August 1997.

3.3.2 New York Convention on the Transit Trade of Land-locked States

Land-locked States have formed a distinct bloc of nations in the international system (Uprety 2003, 202). Their geographic disadvantage translates into an economic one, as they have their competitiveness undermined without direct seaborne trade. The New York Convention on the Rights of Land-Locked States (hereinafter “New York Convention”) was the first international agreement to recognize the special position of LLS (Makil 1970, 46). It was signed on 8 July 1965 and entered into force on 9 June 1967. The main purpose of this treaty was to incorporate into treaty law the rights and obligations of land-locked states and their neighbors with regard to the movements of goods in transit, and generate universal acceptance therefor (Uprety 2003, 211). By reaffirming the principles of the 1964 Geneva Conference, the New York Convention attempts to proclaim the freedom of access to the sea (Uprety 2003). According to the first of these principles:

The recognition of the right of each land-locked state of free access to the sea is an essential principle for the expansion of international trade and economic development17.

In its turn, Principle IV of the Convention provides that:

In order to promote fully the economic development of the land locked countries, the said countries should be afforded by all States, on the basis of reciprocity, free and unrestricted transit, in such a manner that they have free access to regional and international trade in all circumstances and for every type of goods18.

On another hand, Principle V states that:

17 New York Convention on the Transit Trade of Land-locked States. 18 New York Convention on the Transit Trade of Land-locked States. 233 International Court of Justice

The State of transit, while maintaining full sovereignty over its territory, shall have the right to take all indispensable measures to ensure that the exercise of the right of free and unrestricted transit shall in no way infringe its legitimate interests of any kind.

In accordance with the Interpretative Note of the Principles Relating to Transit Trade of Land-locked Countries, these principles are interdependent, and each one must be interpreted with due consideration to others. The New York Convention is applicable only between Land-Locked States and maritime ports, and the traffic in transit is understood as the passage of goods “throughout the territory of contracting States, between a LLS and the sea, when this passage is a portion of a complete journey comprising a sea transport which precedes or follows directly the passage.”19 The most significant provision of this treaty consists of Article 2 (1) (Uprety 2003, 212), which states that:

Freedom of transit shall be granted under the terms of this Convention for traffic in transit and means of transport. Subject to the other provisions of this Convention, the measures taken by Contracting States for regulating and forwarding traffic across their territory shall facilitate traffic in transit on routes in use mutually acceptable for transit to the Contracting States concerned. Consistent with the terms of this Convention, no discrimination shall be exercised which is based on the place of origin, departure, entry, exit or destination or on any circumstances relating to the ownership of the goods or the ownership, place of registration or flag of vessels, land vehicles or other means of transport used (New York Convention, Article 1).

The Convention also includes situations allowing the prohibitions on access for Land-Locked States. These prohibitions may be determined by transit states for reasons related to public order, for the protection of their essential security interests, in case of war, in the occurrence of a situation endangering the political existence and the safety of a contracting State or by virtue of obligations deriving from international or regional treaties to which the contracting transit state is a party. Although it has been criticized, the New York Convention demonstrates that enforceable rules for transit rights of land-locked States may be elaborated in the framework of a multilateral treaty intended to be universal in scope (Caffisch 1978). The New York Convention was signed by Bolivia on 29 December 1965 (but not ratified until the date of writing) and ratified by Chile on 25 October 1972.

4 RELEVANT JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS

It is to be expected that, in a society of States in which opportunities for

19 See Article 1 of the New York Convention on the Transit Trade of Land-Locked States. 234 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations authoritative and impartial statements of the law are rare, there should be a tendency to regard judicial determination as evidence or, what is in fact the same, as a source of international law (Lauterpacht 2010, 14). Therefore, whereas the International Court of Justice is not fettered by the rigidity of the formal doctrine of precedent, it has, over the course of its existence, largely adopted its substance. The Court follows its own decisions for they constitute a repository of legal experience to which it is convenient to adhere; because they embody what the Court has considered in the past to be good law and also because respect for decisions given in the past makes for certainty and stability, which are the essence of the orderly administration of justice (Lauterpacht 2010, 13). This practice of continuity of judicial precedents also extends to the decisions of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Be it through an indirect acknowledgment of an understanding expressed previously or by a direct reference, the ICJ has resorted to the PCIJ’s case law to construct its own reasoning on multiple occasions. On another hand, no legal rule or principle can bind a judge of the International Court of Justice to a precedent which, in all the circumstances, they feel bound to disregard. In that case, the judge will do what he or she deems to be just through the process of “distinguishing” and in other ways. Nevertheless, a judge is not free to discard judicial precedent altogether; there is an obligation to adduce reasons for departing from the duty of consistency and observance of settled principles. These considerations are of particular urgency in relation to international jurisdiction, which is inherently voluntary in character. (Lauterpacht 2010, 14-15)

4.2 LEGAL STATUS OF THE SOUTH-EASTERN TERRITORY OF GREENLAND (DENMARK V. NORWAY)

On 12 July 1931, the Royal Danish Government brought before the Permanent Court of International Justice a suit against the Royal Norwegian Government. Denmark argued that Norway had, on July 10th, 1931, published a proclamation declaring that it had proceeded to occupy certain territories in Eastern Greenland, which, according to the Applicant, were subject to the sovereignty of the Crown of Denmark. Besides claiming sovereignty over Greenland in this case on the basis of occupation, Denmark also argued that Norway had recognized Danish sovereignty over the island by the “Ihlen Declaration.” M. Ihlen was the Norwegian Foreign Minister. In conversations on July 14th, 1919, with the Danish Minister accredited to Norway, the latter suggested to M. Ihlen that Denmark would raise no objection to any claim Norway might want to make at the Paris Peace Conference to Spitzbergen if Norway would not oppose the claim that Denmark was to make at the same

235 International Court of Justice conference to the whole of Greenland. On 11 July 1919, M. Ihlen, while discussing with with the Danish Minister, asserted that “the Norwegian government would not make any difficulty” concerning the Danish claim. These were the terms used as they were recorded by M. Ihlen for his Government’s own purposes. Denmark contended before the Permanent Court that this undertaking was binding upon Norway (Harris 2010). In its Judgment, the Court declared that:

This declaration by M. Ihlen has been relied on by the Counsel for Denmark as a recognition of an existing Danish sovereignty in Greenland. The Court is unable to accept this point of view. A careful examination of the words used and of the circumstances in which they were used, as well as of the subsequent developments, shows that M. Ihlen cannot have meant to be giving then and there a definitive recognition of Danish sovereignty over Greenland, and shows also that he cannot have been understood by the Danish Government at the time as having done so. In the text of M. Ihlen’s minute, submitted by the Norwegian Government, which has not been disputed by the Danish Government, the phrased used by M. Ihlen is couched in the future tense: “ne fera pas de difficultés”; he had been informed that it was at the Peace Conference that the Danish Government intended to bring up the question: and two years later - when assurances had been received from the Principal Allied Powers - the Danish Government made a further application to the Norwegian Government to obtain the recognition which they desired of Danish sovereignty over all Greenland.

Nevertheless, the point which must now be considered is whether the Ihlan declaration - even if not constituting a descriptive recognition of Danish sovereignty - did not constitute na engagement obliging Norway to refrain from occupying any part of Greenland. ... It is clear from the relevant Danish documents, which preceded the Danish Minister’s démarche at Christiania on July 14th, 1919, that the Danish attitude in the Spitzbergen question and the Norwegian attitude in the Greenland question were regarded in Denmark as interdependent, and this interdependence appears to be reflected also in M. Ihlen’s minute of the interviews. Even if this interdepence - which, in view of the affirmative reply of the Norwegian Government, in whose name the Minister for Foreign Affairs was speaking, would have created a bilateral engagement - is not held to have been established, it can hardly be denied that what Denmark was asking of Norway (“not to make any difficulties in the settlement of the [Greenland] question”) was equivalent to what she was indicating her readiness to concede in the Spitzbergen question (to refrain from opposing “the wishes of Norway in regard to the settlement of this question”) (PCIJ 1933, 69-71)

Thus, on 5 April 1933, the Permanent Court of International Justice delivered its judgment on the matter. The Court considered that a reply nature given by the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs on behalf of this government in response

236 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations to a request by the diplomatic representative of a foreign power in the sense that the Norwegian Government would not make any difficulty in the settlement of a question, in regard to a question falling within his province, is binding upon the country to which the Minister belongs.

4.3 NUCLEAR TESTS CASES (AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND V. FRANCE)

On 9 May 1973, Australia and New Zealand separately instituted proceedings against France before this Court demanding cessation of the atmospheric nuclear tests carried out by the latter in the South Pacific. While the case was pending, the French government declared that it had concluded its series of tests and did not intend to resume them. Upon deciding on whether to dismiss the application, the Court considered the legal relevance of the statements unilaterally given in public by the French authorities in that year. In its Judgment, the International Court of Justice stated that:

463. It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and often are, very specific. When it is the intention of the State making the declaration that it should become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent with the declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even though not made within the context of international negotiations, is binding. In these circumstances, nothing in the nature of a quid pro quo nor any subsequent acceptance of the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from other States, is required for the declaration to take effect, since such a requirement would be inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature of the juridical act by which the pronouncement by the State was made.

474. Of course, not all unilateral acts imply obligation, but a State may choose to take up a certain position in relation to a particular matter with the intention of being bound – the intention is to be ascertained by the interpretation of the act. When States make statements by which their freedom of action is to be limited, a restrictive interpretation is called for.

458. With regard to the question of form, it should be observed that this is not a domain in which international law imposes any special or strict requirements. Whether a statement is made orally or in writing makes no essential difference, for such statements made in particular circumstances may create commitments in international law, which does not require that they should be couched in written

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form. Thus the question of form is not decisive. As the Court said in its Judgment on the preliminary objections in the case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear:

496. One of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of good faith. Trust and confidence are inherent in international co-operation, in particular in an age when this cooperation in many fields is becoming increasingly essential. Just as the very rule of pacta sund servanda in the law of treaties is based on good faith, so also is the binding character of an international obligation assumed by unilateral declarations. Thus interested States may take cognizance of unilateral declarations and place confidence in them, and are entitled to require that the obligation thus created me respected.

4951. Of the statements by the French Government now before the Court, the most essential are clearly those made by the President of the Republic. There can be no doubt, in view of his functions, that his public communications or statements, oral or written, as Head of State, are in international relations acts of the French State. His statements, and those of members of the French Government acting under his authority, up to the last statement made by the Minister of Defence (of 11 October 1974), constitute a whole. Thus, in whatever form these statements were expressed, they must be held to constitute an engagement of the State, having regard to their intention and to the circumstances in which they were made.

531. In announcing that the 1974 series of atmospheric tests would now be the last, the French Government conveyed to the world at large, including the Applicant, its intention effectively to terminate these tests. It was bound to assume that other States might take note of these statements and rely on their being effective. The validity of these statements and their legal consequences must be considered within the general framework of the security of international intercourse, and the confidence and trust which are so essential in the relations among States. It is from the actual substance of these statements, and from the circumstances attending their making, that the legal implications of the unilateral act must be deduced. The objects of these statements are clear and they were addressed to the international community as a whole, and the Court holds that they constitute an undertaking possessing legal effect… It is true that the French Government has consistently maintained, for example in a Note dated February 7, 1973 from the French Ambassador in Canberra to the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, that it “has the conviction that its nuclear experiments have not violated any rule of international law,” nor did France recognize that it was bound by any rule of international law to terminate its tests, but this does not affect the legal consequences of the statements examined above. The Court finds that the unilateral undertaking resulting from these statements cannot be interpreted as having been made in implicit reliance on an arbitrary power of reconsideration. The Court finds further that the French Government has undertaken an obligation the precise nature and limits of which must be understood in accordance with the actual terms in which they have been publicly expressed (ICJ 1974, 472-474).

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Therefore, the Court found, by nine votes to six, that “the claim of Australia no longer has any object and that the Court is therefore not called upon to give a decision thereon” because France had already fulfilled its obligation to hold no further nuclear tests in the atmosphere of the South Pacific and, consequently, the dispute between the two States had already disappeared. The companion case initiated by New Zealand received similar a ruling by the Court (ICJ Reports1974, 478). The undertaking in this case was quite different from that in the Eastern Greenland case for being evidently unilateral, publicly made, not in the course of negotiations and without a quid pro quo. Although there was at the time little evidence to support it, the rule stated by the Court whereby a State may be bound by a unilateral public pronouncement intended by it to be binding without more has, according to some scholars, now taken root. (Harris 2010, 49). To another set of scholars, however, in spite of the Court’s general statement in the sense that France was bound to stop its tests by virtue of its declaration that it would do so,

the normal consequence of a unilateral declaration is either that it is accepted by the State or States to which it is addressed, and it will then become in effect part of a treaty settlement; or it will be ignored and rejected, and the other State or States will not seek to enforce it, so that it will become a dead letter. Even without any explicit acceptance, the moment that one of the addressees of the unilateral declaration seeks to rely on the legal obligation indicated in it, this will itself constitute the acceptance needed to convert it into a bilateral, conventional, relationship. The Nuclear Tests Cases were exceptional in that, for reasons not relevant to the present discussion, the Court was seeking to impose on Australia and New Zealand a settlement of their claims on terms which they had not themselves accepted. Even if we do not go so far as to say that the Nuclear Tests decisions were erroneous, to base a theory of sources on a decision in a case the special facts of which are very unlikely to be repeated, does not appear a sound approach. (Thirlway 2006, 135-136)

In the course of the negotiations between Bolivia and Chile, the latter has presented several declarations with regards to the former’s right of access to the Pacific Ocean. This Court is therefore invited to assess the legal value and relevance of the statements given by Chile.

4.4 ADVISORY OPINION ON RAILWAY TRAFFIC BETWEEN LITHUANIA AND POLAND

In its 1931 Advisory Opinion on Railway Traffic Between Lithuania and Poland, the Permanent Court of International Justice found that the two states were bound by a resolution of the Council of the League of Nations which recommended that: 239 International Court of Justice

the two governments ... enter into direct negotiations as soon as possible in order to establish such relations between the two neighboring States as will ensure the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends...

Poland argued that, in accepting this recommendation, both states undertook the obligation not only to negotiate but also to come to an agreement to open the Landwarów-Kaisiadorys railway sector to traffic. In rejecting this argument, the Court stated:

[that] an obligation to negotiate does not imply an obligation to reach an agreement, nor in particular does it imply that Lithuania, by undertaking to negotiate, has assumed an engagement, and is in consequence obliged to conclude the administrative and technical agreements indispensable for the re-establishment of traffic on the Landwarów-Kaisiadorys railway sector.

4.5 ADVISORY OPINION ON THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF SOUTH-WEST AFRICA

The 1950 ICJ’s Advisory Opinion in theInternational Status of South-West Africa is in the same vein. The question arose as to whether South Africa was legally obliged to conclude a trusteeship agreement with the U.N. to place Southwest Africa under the newly created system of administration and supervision.” In determining that South Africa was under no such obligation, the Court engaged in a close, literal reading of the relevant provisions of the Charter, and rejected the argument that the answer to the question posed be sought in “general considerations” regarding the creation of the trusteeship system and its relation to the existing mandate system of the League of Nations20. Thus, the Court was reluctant to impose a duty on South Africa lacking a clear and specific manifestation of intent in the governing international agreement, even though the agreement involved was the U.N. Charter, where one might think clear indications of object and intent would govern. Judge Alvarez, in his dissenting opinion, indicates that he would go even further. He would derive not only an obligation to negotiate, but also an obligation to reach an agreement, from the language of the Charter read in light of the “spirit of the Charter.”21

20 Advisory Opinion on the International Status of South-West Africa. 21 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Alvarez. 240 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

5 SUBMISSIONS

The Plurinational State of Bolivia requests this Court to adjudge and declare that:

a) Chile has the obligation to negotiate with Bolivia in order to reach an agreement granting Bolivia a fully sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. b) Chile has breached the said obligation. c) Chile must perform in good faith, promptly, formally, within a reasonable time and effectively, to grant Bolivia a fully sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.

The Republic of Chile requests this Court to adjudge and declare that:

a) There is no dispute between Bolivia and Chile, for Chile is not bound by international law to negotiate with Bolivia in order to grant the latter a fully sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, and therefore the Court lacks jurisdiction over the matter. Alternatively, b) The Court lacks jurisdiction, for Chile has already fulfilled its obligation, which was an obligation to negotiate, not to conclude an agreement, and therefore there is no dispute between the two States.

REFERENCES

Brownlie, Ian. Principles of Public International Law. New York: Oxford University Press. 2008. Caflisch, L.C. “Land-locked States and their Access to and From the Sea”. British Yearbook of International Law, 49 (1978). Cassese, Antonio. International Law. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Crawford, James. Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. D’Amato, Anthony, “Good Faith” in Encyclopedia of Public International Law (1992). Available at: http://anthonydamato.law.northwestern.edu/encyclopedia/good-faith.pdf . Accessed on 12 March 2014. Evans, Malcolm D. International Law. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

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Farcau, Bruce. The Ten Cents War: Chile, Peru, and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific, 1879- 1884. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2000. Fifer, J. Valerie. Bolivia: Land, Location, and Politics since 1825. Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1972. Harris, David. Cases and Materials on International Law. London: Thomson Reuters, 2010. Iklé, Fred Charles. How Nations Negotiate. New York: Harper and Row, 1964. International Court of Justice (ICJ). Advisory Opinion on the International Status of South- West Africa. 11 July 1950. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/10/1891.pdf . Accessed on 16 May 2014. ______. Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear. Judgment of 15 June 1962. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/45/4871.pdf. Accessed on 13 May 2014. ______. Case Concerning the Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906. Judgment of 18 November 1960. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/ docket/files/39/4823.pdf . Accessed on 13 May 2014. ______. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case. Judgment of 2 February 1973. Available at: http:// www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/55/5749.pdf . Accessed on 16 May 2014. ______. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases. Judgments of 20 February 1969. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/52/5561.pdf. Accessed on 14 May 2014. ______. Nuclear Tests Case. Judgment of 20 December 1974. Available at: http:// www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/59/6159.pdf . Accessed on 3 May 2014. ______. Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean. Application instituting proceedings (filed in the Registry of the Court on 24 April 2013). Available at: http:// www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/17338.pdf . Accessed on 23 February 2014. ______. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945. Available at: http://www. icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0&. Accessed on 21 April 2014 ______. Territorial Dispute Case. Judgment of 3 February 1994. Available at: http:// www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/83/6897.pdf . Accessed on 28 April 2014. . International Law Commission (ILC). Guiding Principles applicable to unilateral declarations of States capable of creating legal obligations, 2006. Available at: http://legal. un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_9_2006.pdf . Accessed on 29 April 2014. International Law Comission (ILC). Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, 1966. Available at: http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/1_1_1966.pdf . Accessed on 29 April 2014.

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Lauterpacht, Sir Hersch. International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970 ______. The Development of International Law by the International Court.Cambridge: Cambrdge University Press, 2010. Makil, R. “Transit Right of Landlocked Countries: An Appraisal of International Conventions”. Journal of World Trade, 4 (1970). McCray, Daniel Arthur. “Eternal ramifications of the War of The Pacific.” Thesis, University of Florida, 2005. Ovchar, Alexander. “Estoppel in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ: A principle promoting stability threatens to undermine it.” Bond Law Review, 21, 1. Available at: http:// epublications.bond.edu.au/blr/vol21/iss1/5 . Accessed on 17 March 2014. Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). Advisory Opinion on Railway Traffic Between Lithuania and Poland. Advisory Opinion of 15 October of 1931. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_AB/AB_42/Trafic_ferroviaire_Avis_consultatif.pdf . Accessed on 14 May 2014. ______. Case concerning the Legal Status of the South-Eastern Territory of Greenland. Order of 2 August 1932. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_AB/AB_48/01_ Groenland_ordonnance_19320802.pdf . Accessed on 17 May 2014. Reinhold, Steven. “Good Faith in International Law.” UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 2 (2013). Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=2269746 . Accessed on 1 March 2014 Rogoff, Martin A. “The Obligation to Negotiate in International Law: Rules and Realities.” Michigan Journal of International Law, 16 (1994-1995). Sater, William. Andean Tragedy: Fighting the War of the Pacific 1879-1884. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. Shaw, Malcolm. International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. St. John, Ronald Bruce. “The Bolivia-Chile-Peru Dispute in the Atacama Desert.” Boundary and Territory Briefing 6 (1994): 1-32. Accessed on April 27, 2014. Link available at . Thirlway, Hugh. “The Sources of International Law”, in International Law, ed. Malcolm D. Evans (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 18 November 1983 (RES 686 of 18 November 1983 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 4 December 2006 (RES 61/34). Available at: http://www.worldlii.org/int/

243 International Court of Justice other/UNGARsn/2006/90.pdf . Accessed on 27 April 2014. United Nations. Charter of the United Nations, 1945. Available at: http://www.un.org/ en/documents/charter/ . Accessed on 25 April 2014. United Nations Division for Oceans and the Law of the Sea. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: a historical perspective. Available at: http://www.un.org/ depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm . Accessed on 28 April 2014. United Nations. Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982. Available at: http://www. un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf . Accessed on 15 April 2014. United Nations. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. Available at: https:// treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232- English.pdf . Accessed on 20 April 2014. Uprety, Kishor. “From Barcelona to Montego Bay and Thereafter: A Search for Landlocked States’ Rights to Trade through Access to the Sea – A Retrospective Review.” Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Law, 7 (2003). Available at: http:// www.commonlii.org/sg/journals/SGJlIntCompLaw/2003/10.pdf . Accessed on 1 May 2014. US Department of State. “Chile-Peru Boundary”. International Boundary Study 65 (1966): 1-16. Accessed on April 27, 2014. Link available at < http://www.law.fsu.edu/ library/collection/limitsinseas/ibs065.pdf>. Zartman, I. William. “Prenegotiation: Phases and Functions”, in Getting to the Table: the Processes of International Prenegotiation, ed. Janice Gross Stein (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

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UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations ISSN: 2318-3195 | v.2, 2014| p. 247-293

THE SITUATION REGARDING NON-STATE MILITARY ACTORS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Willian Moraes Roberto1 Ana Carolina Melos2 ABSTRACT

The 21st century has seen an increase in the number of actions against the so-called non-state military actors, whose common features are: the fact of being organized groups operating outside state control; their use of force to achieve political objectives; the irregularity of its military actions, in opposition to the most common military doctrines of regular armies; among others. The Middle East, by its turn, is home of maybe the most important and internationally well-known non-state military actors of our time. Besides the wars triggered to fight the terrorist menace, against Al-Qaeda, for example, other non-state military actors have also been involved in conflicts, such as Hezbollah and Hamas. The UNSC, as guarantor of international security and peace, must address such pressing and polemic issue. This topic is relevant not only due to the high polarization that it involves – since one side tends to see all these groups as radical and terrorist actors at the same time that the other side claims the importance to differentiate between all kinds of such groups – but also by the fact that the UN must evaluate all the efforts that it have been taking in regard to non-state military actors, especially after this whole decade of conflicts involving the Middle East and these groups, also updating its approach to them in such region.

1 Undergraduate student of International Relations, 8th semester, at Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). 2 Undergraduate student of International Relations, 6th semester, at Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). United Nations Security Council

1 NON-STATE MILITARY ACTORS

The turn of the millennium and the first decade of the 21st century have witnessed a considerable increase in military conflicts involving non-state actors. This trend makes necessary to examine how these actors can be defined and how their existence threatens states’ sovereignty as well as which military dynamics are utilized by them to achieve their political and military aims. With such conceptualization, it will be possible to focus on the Middle East, one of the world’s regions which currently host some of the most important non-state actors known – namely Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and Hamas.

1.1 CONCEPTS OF NON-STATE MILITARY ACTORS

According to the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) (2011, 6), “most of today’s armed conflicts take place within states and are waged by at least one non-state military actor fighting state forces and/or other non- state actor”. This point to the importance of these types of military groups in contemporary political conflicts, as they are often among the most important parts in internal, regional and international disputes. However, there is a lot of ambiguity when the concepts of non-state military actors are taken into consideration. The terms that are used to define these groups are controversial and reflect the beliefs of who is using them. For example, non- state military actors can be seen as “liberation movements”, “freedom fighters” or “revolutionaries” by some and, at the same time, as “rebels”, “insurgents” or “terrorists” by others. Generally, a state will label a non-state actors depending on the political issues involved – if they pose a threat to its own existence or its allies’, normally they will be defined as terrorists or insurgents; on the other hand, if they serve to delegitimize or weaken adversaries in the international arena, these groups might be named as liberation movements and freedom fighters. Even though most researchers agree that there is no such thing as a universal definition of non-state military actors, DCAF (2011, 7) presents us with a synthetic and convincing one, which shall be taken into consideration: “[a non- state armed actor] is defined as any organized group with a basic structure of command operating outside state control that uses force to achieve its political or allegedly political objectives”. Also according to DCAF (2011), non-state military actors have some characteristics in common well beyond the usage of military means to achieve political aims, such as: linkages to physical territories, the propagation of identities and/or the provision of resources, as well as a need

248 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations for certain levels of relationship with the wider society where they are inserted in. In relation to the territorial issue, the majority of non-state military actors originate inside a determined state, acting within it. However, they might also have the prospects of internationalizing themselves, with the possibility of having representations in other countries, as in the case of Hamas, or also operating clandestinely – this one often related to terrorist groups, as Al-Qaeda. In respect for their actions inside a state, the amount of territory that is under their control points to the level of success they might have acquired for their goals. Such situation can be maintained through local support – voluntarily or by coercion – and/or through foreign sponsors (DCAF 2011). Nonetheless, it must be noted that there might also be cases where non-state military actor’s objectives are only to cause insecurity and instability (terror) for political aims, without necessarily seizing territories for their control. Non-state military actors also need to achieve a way to find resources in order to achieve their goals, such as weapons, uniforms, money and means of transportation and communication. These can be achieved through the local population’s support, foreign sponsors and/or through robbery and smuggling. Besides that, a non-state military actor may grant for its members or supporters additional services, such as security, the application of justice, provision of education and health, lands, among others examples (Skezely 2012) – as it has been done by Hezbollah, in Lebanon. This is exactly the kind of relationship that might develop between such groups and the locals. Another important feature is their capacity of formulating an identity that is usually spread in order to attract volunteers with shared values and political thoughts. Such issue is also related to the groups’ necessity of having good relations to the wider society. According to Skezely (2012), even though coercion is the easiest way to achieve material goods, it is the marketing of the group’s mission and ideals that provides the most durable relationships with civilians and even the society in general. This is because it produces not only strong normative attachments between the group’s causes and the resource providers, but also the belief that the movement in question is the legitimate representative of a cause. After all such characterization, it is of paramount importance to explore what can possibly be considered the main problem brought about by non-state military actors: the fact that their existence poses a threat to the modern concept of state, mainly its defining character, the monopoly of violence. As Max Weber has pointed out in the beginning of the 20th century:

Violence is, of course, not the normal or the only means available to the state. That is undeniable. But it is the means specific to the state. And the relationship of the state to violence is particularly close at the present time. In the past the

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use of physical violence by widely differing organizations – starting with the clan – was completely normal. Nowadays, in contrast, we must say that the state is the form of human community that (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory (Weber 1919 apud Berndtsson 2009, 5; emphasis on the original).

Therefore, the monopoly of violence can be seen as the main characteristic of the modern sovereign state, which in case sustains the state’s position as the main actor in the international system, being the only legitimate wielder of force Berndtsson (2009). This implies that the usage of force and the waging of war are understood as affairs essentially of the state. At the domestic level, it means that the state is the provider of protection for its citizens, implying that they shouldn’t care for their own safety (Berndtsson (2009). Thus, the proliferation of non-state military actors poses a real threat to the modern concept of state sovereignty, raising concerns among all international community. The existence of actors inside the state that start to using violence by their own calls into question the idea that warfare is a state’s domain and also shakes conventional roles that are attributed to the state, such as security and defense1. Finally, the way that non-state actors wage military campaigns to achieve their political goals – through irregular warfare tactics must be addressed. Irregular warfare is usually conceived as

‘an armed conflict where the parts in it do not constitute big units, but small and many groups of actions, and whose ending is not decided through few great battles; on contrary, decision is searched and achieved through a huge number of small individual operations such as robbery, terrorism acts, sabotage, bombings and incursions’ (Heydte 1990, 37 apud Ferreira 2012, 15).

This way,

It is […] the war of the shadows, or ‘in practical terms, irregular warfare is every conflict conducted by a force that has no formal military organization and, overall, lacks institutional juridical legitimation. In other words, it a war waged by non-regular forces’ (Visacro 2009, 13 apud Ferreira 2012, 15).

Although having a non-regular and illegal character, non-state actors’ wars

1 It is interest to note that this is not the first time that states have to face threats to its monopoly of violence throughout history. Nonetheless, it was their capacity to delegitimize such forms of non-state use of force and coercion and to put them under state’s control that has been central to the rise to prominence of the modern concept of sovereignty and statehood (Berndtsson 2009). 250 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations have allegedly political goals. Therefore, an irregular warfare perpetrated by non- state military actors that searches to retain legitimacy towards civilians, would be waged while caring to achieve political support – conquering people’s hearts and minds (Ferreira, 2012). This is the political dimension of the insurgence: the creation of linkages between the group and the population aiming that locals start to back the movement’s goals at the expense of the support previously given to the government. Such political vision presented by Ferreira (2012) is linked to the marketing strategy laid by Skezely (2012). It was only after the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, according to Ferreira (2012), and to Israel’s war against Hezbollah in 2006, that states’ military thinking stopped considering the fight against this kind of actors as a secondary activity.

The experience in the Middle East proved that irregular warfare preponderance in the 21st century is hardly a reversible trend: more and more, armed forces must be able to cope with non-conventional forces in overcrowded urban environments, under pressure from the media and the public opinion (Ferreira 2012, 29).

Therefore, there are many cases in which non-state actors’ actions will trigger instability and will clash with government forces – even more in the cases where these actors do not care about acquiring public support, focusing instead on coercion only. Thus, the UN must watch closely these situations not only in order to help maintain state control and public order, but also to address the current threats against the modern concept of statehood. Therefore, it is of utmost importance for the UN to analyze this phenomenon and decide how and when to act in cases in which these groups do not act responsibly. It is necessary to balance between coercive approaches – sanctioning and/or elimination – and inclusive approaches – balancing, negotiation, inclusion to the state and capacity building – when dealing with this problem, as well as questioning if there must be a global universally accepted framework to deal with them or if the most appropriated way is to analyze case-by-case.

1.2 NON-STATE MILITARY ACTORS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: TERRORISM AND POLITICAL ISLAM

Now that concepts of non-state actors have been fully assessed, we must look upon the Middle East region, since it is there that the most well-known non-state actors are located; the same ones that have been involved in the most intense clashes between non-state groups and government armed forces during the first decade of the 21st century. Namely, we can point to the resurgence of

251 United Nations Security Council the terrorist phenomenon headed by Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), as well as to the ascension to prominence of Hezbollah and Hamas in Lebanon and Palestine, respectively. Nonetheless, some previous considerations should be made in relation to terrorism and Political Islam. Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and Hamas emerged in a context of rising Islamic movements in the 1970s, which are, according to Halliday (2005), transnational in ideology2. All such endeavors were labeled as being part of the resurgence of Political Islam: the desire to rule politics not through a secular regime anymore, but together with the instrumentalization of Islam’s values for political aims, although with different nuances of this religious influence, with this varying from group to group (Hirschkind 1997). Al-Qaeda, for example, since its creation, has tried to act transnationally, inspiring - through its ideology - Muslims to take upon the jihad3 and participate in struggles from one country to another. “That there is an ‘Islamic transnationalism’ is, therefore, unquestionable” (Halliday 2005, 241). However, as this same author affirms, if we take a look upon the origins and bases of these movements, it can be seen that the reasons for their rising is very much located within the society they are part of. The regional context is broader, being their rise, overall, an answer to the secular Arab nationalism’s failures which could not successfully modernize Arab countries and confront Israel in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s and the subsequent subordination of these societies to the West (Visentini 2014). Nonetheless, the form that the movements have taken is mainly against the local state where they originated from. Islamic uprisings took form in Iran – even though this one managed to take control of the state itself –, Algeria, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and in the Palestinian territories. Despite the common characteristic of local roots, when we analyze their evolution, it can be said that these non-state actors have evolved differently. On the one hand, Al-Qaeda has matured by adopting a transnational focus and Hezbollah and Hamas, in spite of transnational links, have grown national causes.

For all the transnational linkages that may exist, they [non-state actors and Islamic movements] confine their activities, and build their support, as much as nationalist

2 The most common claim of Islamist movements is the rejection of the Muslim world into different states – for them, this type of organization is a Western creation imposed to divide their common identity and weaken the original umma, the community of Muslim believers (Halliday 2005). 3 Jihad is a legitimate struggle waged for Islamic people on behalf of their faith. It is a fight against those people who do not believe in the Islamic principles. 252 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

movements do, within particular spaces, that is, the boxes that are modern states4. Analysis over the 1980s and 1990s of, say, the Palestinian Hamas, or the Algerian armed groups, the Lebanese Hezbollah, or the Egyptian Jihad, shows that these were based in their respective countries. They may have involved pan-Islamist symbols, such as the struggle against “Zionism”, or they may have funding and arms procurement, and propaganda, networks abroad, but their emplacement was within their particular countries. Al-Qaeda was an exception, in some measure, to this; yet it too had its origins in revolt against specific states, notably Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and was able to base itself in another state, Afghanistan, because of the alliance it formed with the regime in that state, namely, from 1996, the Taliban (Halliday 2005, 242).

Another feature that must be taken into consideration is what is often labeled as terrorism. Kiras (n.d., 187) defines terrorism as “the sustained use of violence against symbolic or civilian targets by small groups for political purposes, such as inspiring fear, drawing widespread attention to a political grievance, and/or provoking a […] response”. On that account, there is a clear search for the achievement of a political result from such usage of force. Al-Qaeda, specially, has evolved in a manner directly linked to this approach, having spread such practices to targets outside the region. Hezbollah and Hamas, on the other hand, also have used political violence, although not as the only strategy for their survival. Finally, another issue related to political violence and terrorism must be addressed. Commonly, the labeling of an act as terrorist is often used as a manner to deny legitimacy to any political claim that the group in question might make, and not to identify the reasons why it has sought this approach.

[…] to identify and action by any group, state or non-state, as in violation of the rules of the war is not the same as to disqualify the legitimacy of the political claims such a group is making: for sure, acts of criminality lead inevitably to a decreasing sympathy for the causes of a group, but this distinction between method and legitimacy stands. The state wanting to condemn “terrorism” cannot so easily deny legitimation by concentrating on the methods of its opponents (Halliday 2005, 246).

4 It is also important to note that the states themselves will seek to direct transnational contestatory movements. Just like happened with communist states – mainly the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) and this type of movements, as well as in regard to secular Arab states and Arab nationalist movements in the 1950s and 1960s, “from the 1970s onwards rival Muslim states sought, in varying ways, to exert control over the Islamist movements operating in other states” (Halliday 2005, 243) as one more tool in their competition for influence in the Middle East, a trend that continues today, mainly between Iran and Saudi Arabia. 253 United Nations Security Council

Furthermore, it is of utmost importance to note that the Middle East has not only these three groups that have been presented, namely Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and Hamas. In fact, the region presents a huge variety of non-state military actors, being these ones only the most well-know. Such actors are spread throughout the region’s territory, from Pakistan to the Arabian Peninsula, into Africa’s North. Apart from the ones already named, we can point out the existence of Al-Nusra, currently fighting in Syria, a franchise of Al-Qaeda, preaching a radical version of Islam. In the same territory, there were present less radical movements, with secular views, such as the Free Syrian Army. At the same time, ISIS, now the Islamic State (IS), operates in Syria and Iraq, ruling a territory where they proclaim to have formed a new Islamic caliphate. Others non-state military actors operate in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region – mostly at the Pakistani Federal Administered Tribal Areas, such as the Talibans in Afghanistan and the Tehrik-i-Pakistan, or simply the Pakistani Taliban. Last but not least, Al-Qaeda is also present in the Arabian Peninsula through its other franchise, the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which operates in Yemen and is under currently attack of US drones for years. Therefore, discussions regarding non-state military actors encompass a variety of groups in the region. Even though each one of them has its own peculiarities, commonalities may be found among some of these actors. The challenge is that, at the same time, differences exist between them, and this is what leads some countries to back specific non-state military actors, and, on the other hand, label another as fundamentalists and terrorist. Hereupon we choose to deepen our analysis on the most well-known non-state military actors’ cases, since they represent pivotal models of non-state military actors in this region, namely Hezbollah, Hamas and Al-Qaeda.

2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

2.1 TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST: AL-QAEDA’S FOUNDATION

Terrorism is not a recent practice as sometimes it is thought of. Terror has been used by different groups of people since the advent of humanity to perpetrate their ideals. In the Middle East, this practice is related to the expansion of Islamic Caliphates, initiated in the 7th century, after Mohammed’s death. In the 20th century, during the British Mandate5, the region saw an

5 With the end of World War I, the international system saw the fall of the Turkish Ottoman Empire, who has controlled the Middle East since the 15th century. As a consequence, there was established the British Mandate in the region, which was actually a result of the Sykes- 254 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations increase in the number of violent acts between Muslims and Jews – perpetrated by both sides – due to the fostered Jewish migration to the Palestinian territory (Del Roio 2004). Nowadays, terrorist activities are often associated with the most fundamentalist brand of Islam – Wahhabism6, a sect of Sunni Islam, and also the official religion of Saudi Arabia (Roche 2012). Its original aims are to purify the Islamic religion from practices and innovations that deviate it from the fundamental principles established by the prophet Mohammed. Therefore, Wahhab’s main objective was to encourage people to embrace a more orthodox fundamentalist interpretation of Islam (Armanios 2003, 2). Wahhabist thinking is spread through special schools where boys are indoctrinated according to the principles of Quran, namely the Madrasas7 (Roche 2012; Bergen, Pandey 2005). Nevertheless, the use of violence is not an inherent principle in Wahhabist teaching. Some authors hold that this practice has only become usual due to the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, during the Cold War (Armanios, 2003, 3). The invasion mobilized an internal resistance force against the foreign power, which was headed by the mujahideen – a volunteer guerrilla group guided by Islamic principles, deeply influenced by Wahhabi thoughts, which saw their fight against the Soviets as their own jihad against an external occupier (Zalman 2014). These fighters had been financed mainly by the United States government8 in order to prevent the expansion of soviet influence towards the Persian Gulf. Such forces also counted with the support of Saudi Arabia – which financed volunteers

Picot Agreement (1916), which were negotiated secretly between France and England to make a partition of the Turkish territory even before the end of the war (Visentini 2012). It lasted until 1948, when the State of Israel was created. 6 Wahhabism was originated in current-day Saudi Arabia from Imam Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab, an Islamic scholar from the 18th century. It evolved as a form to justify through the religion the unification of the whole Arabic Peninsula under one single power, instead of maintaining all Arabic tribes separated from each other. Muhammad bin Saud, the founder of Saudi Arabia modern dynasty, partnered to Abdul Wahhab establishing a close relation between the monarchy and the Wahhab religion which still lives until nowadays (Armanios 2003). 7 Even though Wahhabism is a Sunni ramification of Islam, there are madrasas from different branches of this religion. These schools are associated to the training of new militants of fundamentalist terrorist groups. In Kashmir, for example, there are a significant number of madrasas where members of terrorist groups, which fight against Indian domain in the region, are coming. It is possible to observe the connection between the schools and the organizations that act in Kashmir: the group Hizb-ul-Mujahidin counts on students from five madrasas, including Jamia Madinatul Ilm, the only Quranic school in the region that indicates male and female students (Neves Jr, 2010, p. 240-241). 8 The US government contributed to the mujahideen struggle against the Soviet forces offering them portable shoulder-fired anti-aircraft systems – the “Stingers” (Katzman 2013). 255 United Nations Security Council to fight –, China, and Pakistan. It was this help that made possible for the mujahideen to put up the fight against the Soviet forces until they withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989 (Visentini 2012). The end of Soviet presence in Afghanistan brought to surface differences among the groups that had fought against the Soviet Union. In fact, an agreement between the United States and the USSR accorded that both sides would cut off military aid to Afghan combatants (Kaztaman 2013, 3), which, subsequently, created a power vacuum in the country. Afghanistan, then, became a scenario for different militia groups’ actions. Some of these kept being supplied by Saudi millionaires related to the spread of Wahhabism, being Osama bin Laden one example of them (Coll 2004, 71). Son of a rich family from Saudi Arabia, bin Laden was educated according to the most fundamentalist principles of Islamic tradition. Following his instructions, bin Laden used his family’s funds to finance the creation of his own organization: Al-Qaeda, which has its origins between 1988 and 1989, in the final period of the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan9. The ideas from Sayyid Qutb10, an Islamist intellectual born in 1906 in Egypt, were the most important inspirations for Al-Qaeda’s ideology. His thoughts are highly critical of some Muslim governments: for him, Arab countries such as Nasser’s Egypt and the Saudi monarchy were illegitimate Muslim governments which incorporated Western policies against the willing of their own people. Therefore, the struggle for the toppling of these regimes would be legitimate, a justifiable jihad (The Guardian 2001). Another of bin Laden’s inspiration was Abdullah al Azzan, an intellectual architect – who also acted directly in the conflict – of the jihad against the Soviet Union (Rollins 2011), who, in fact, named Al-Qaeda (Chaliand, Blin 2007). Al Azzan is an important reference for the fundamentalist Islam struggle against Western influence and the Jewish expansion in the Islamic world (Emerson ?). After his death, Al-Qaeda and the Afghan jihad would follow another strategy in bin Laden’s hands, dodging some precepts preached by al Azzan (Chaliand,

9 It is essential, however, to point that before Al-Qaeda’s foundation, Osama bin Laden had participated in the fight against the Soviet forces when he financially supplied armed groups against the enemy. 10 Qutb, when younger, was sent to study for some years in the United States, having there a direct contact to the American way of life, in total opposition with the Islamic principles he had learnt in Egypt. After some years living in the US, Qutb came back to Egypt and joined the Muslim Brotherhood, which was expelled, in 1954, from the country with the rise of Nasser’s regime. In prison, Qutb wrote about everything he has seen in America and what he thought about Western and Jewish culture and habits and how these people would never be interested in the Islamic issue (The Guardian 2001). 256 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

Blin 2007, 323). At the same time Al-Qaeda was forming, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait took place, in 1990. Saddam Hussein’s actions brought to the Saudi Kingdom the fear of an occupation of its own territory which the monarchy could not defend. This consternation served as an impulse for Saudi Arabia to ask for help from the United States government, who rapidly moved troops to the Saudi country in order to guarantee not only the protection of an oil-rich ally, but also its presence in the region. It is also important to point out that bin Laden has offered Saudi Arabia military help in order to avoid Western presence is Islamic territory, but the House of Saud11 refused. Consequently, this is an important moment to understand the beginning of Al-Qaeda’s struggle against America (Almeida 2004a). In Afghanistan, the power vacuum were being actually advantageous to Pakistan, who intended to settle itself as a power in Central Asia to minimize India’s influence in the zone. Based on this, Pakistan allegedly fostered a specific group in the neighbor country, the Taliban – an Islamic fundamentalist political movement. The lack of central power in Afghanistan provided room for the Taliban forces’ takeover of the country, which it ruled between 1996 and 2001. As soon as this new government came to power, it proclaimed Afghanistan an Islamic Emirate State, recognized only by Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia (Katzman 2013, 47-51). The Taliban government undoubtedly followed Wahhabist principles: Sharia was completely adopted as Afghani law, and Madrasas were established as the only type of school in the country in order to indoctrinate Afghani children, except girls who were not allowed to attend the schools (Kaztman 2003, 5). At the time, bin Laden was living for some years in exile in Sudan after being expelled from Saudi Arabia, due to his position against the monarchy’s alliance with Washington. In Sudan, he developed his first terrorist activities12, focused on weakening the Gulf monarchies he considered corrupted by the Western influence (Chaliand, Blin 2007, 320). Here, it is very important to point out that bin Laden and Al-Qaeda undertook a struggle against not only non-Islamic governments, but also against all Islamic States whose governments were unclean thanks to Western influence, just like Saudi Arabia (The Guardian 2001). Nonetheless, after an unsuccessful murder attempt against then Egypt president, Hosni Mubarak13 - another enemy -, in 1995, Al-Qaeda’s leader was

11 Saudi Arabia’s royal family (Almeida 2004a). 12 As a very rich man, bin Laden has also invested his money to develop infrastructure in Sudan which contributed to the passivity of the local government to his terrorist acts (Chaliand, Blin 2007, 318). 13 Mubarak was considered by different Islamic groups as a traitor of Palestinian cause because of all his political maneuvering in an attempt to achieve peace with the Israeli state (BBC Brasil 2011). 257 United Nations Security Council expelled from Sudan by the local government. Hence, owing to the general international situation, bin Laden decided to move to Afghanistan. There, he would be protected by the new regime of the Taliban, which would turn out to be an important ally for Al-Qaeda. Arriving at Kabul, bin Laden issues his first fatwa14 in Afghan territory, giving a final warning for American forces to leave Saudi Arabia, where they had been since 1990. (Chaliand, Blin 2007, 320). The Taliban administration gave bin Laden the liberty he needed to act. The fact is that the Taliban did not have “funds and technical and administrative know-how” (Chaliand, Blin 2007, 321) to manage its new Afghan state. But that was exactly what bin Laden had to offer. Due to this partnership, the Taliban authorized the reopening of training areas for Al-Qaeda’s volunteers – a practice from the time of the Soviet invasion, when mujahideen used such places to develop their militia force. More and more volunteers came to these fields to participate actively to the struggle against the Western Alliance forces in the region (Chaliand, Blin 2007, 321). It is from this moment on that bin Laden initiated his real struggle to defeat the United States – seen as the major supporter of the corrupt Muslim countries, in bin Laden’s point of view. He and his organization believed they could defeat the United States as the muhajideen had done against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. It was only necessary to draw their enemy to the Middle East, where it would be defeated, as had previously happened to the Soviets (Almeida 2004b). In 1998, he issued his second fatwa whereupon he convoked Muslims to fight against this common enemy, killing them, regardless of distinctions between militaries and civilians targets. Thereby, others fundamentalist Islamic groups came to join Al-Qaeda’s ideals on the fight against Americans. A number of terrorist attacks against Americans and their allies were perpetrated during the 1990s as a preparation15 for something bigger which was coming (Chalian, Blin 2007, 321-325): the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, in September 11, 2001, which caused a general shock in the international public opinion and gave the precedent to the US administration to inaugurate its Global War on Terror (Deutsche Welle 2013).

14 A Fatwa is a legal opinion pronounced by a important jurist according to the Islamic law – Sharia (Hallaq 2013). 15 In 1998, an Arab journal in London published a letter from some fundamentalist Islamic leaders, including bin Laden. The document pointed three reasons why the Islamic people would raise a war against Western: t the US military presence in Saudi Arabia, the sanctions imposed to Iraq – seen as the most powerful Arab State -, and the expansion of Israel in the Palestinian territory. Therefore, the letter talks about the necessity of destroying “Americans and its allies”, delegating responsibility to all Muslim people to undertake this Jihad . The doctrine launched by this document can be seen as the impulse that would be put in practice in the September 11th attacks (Almeida 2004b). 258 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

2.2 THE FORMATION OF POLITICAL ARMED ISLAMIC GROUPS: HAMAS AND HEZBOLLAH

2.2.1 Hezbollah

Hezbollah is an Islamic group created amidst the Lebanese Civil War (1975- 1990) for a variety of reasons. The first reason was the civil war itself, which was a legacy from the Turkish Ottoman Empire domination, ended with World War I, and the subsequent French administration16 (Bustillo 2011, 69). In French hands, Lebanon was administrated by Maronite Christians, which always tried to quash all the Arab presence in the country, denying Lebanese people’s Muslim origins and acting according to Western demands (Bustillo 2011, 71). Lebanon became independent from France in 1943, and the new government organized a system based on religious sectarian differences, in the benefit of the Maronites and at the expense of Muslims (Countries Quest 2006). In addition to this, the creation, in 1948, of the Israeli State in the Palestinian territory (UNSC 1948) created a brand new situation in the Middle East. Palestinian people started to migrate to near Arab states, with Lebanon receiving a significant amount of refugees (Carreras 1991, 192). These Palestinians, located in Lebanon’s southern territories, used the country’s territory to strike Israeli targets. This scenario contributed to worsen the internal conflicts between Christians and Muslims, and in 1975 the civil war started, opposing major Lebanese groups due to Palestinian acts in its territory (Carreras 1991, 192-193). Subsequently, in 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon aiming to crush the Palestinian movement there. Hezbollah was born as a reaction of this invasion and due to Western support for such Israeli actions. Hezbollah’s creation is very closely related to the Iranian thinking of unifying all the Islamic peoples in only one Islamic State, the umma (“Muslim nation”), something expressed in the Iranian Revolution of 197917. In fact, the new regime in Iran sought to expand its revolution to other countries. Syria, which had allied with revolutionary Iran, permitted the entrance of Iranian Revolutionary Guards into Lebanese territory in order to Tehran help Damascus to fight off Israel from

16 The Mandates System was established by the League of Nations in the end of the World War I in order to divide, among the victorious countries, the territories belonging to the states which lost such war. Thereby, Ottoman Empire’s territories were shared, and Lebanon was transferred to French administration (Monteiro n.d.). 17 The Iranian Revolution took place in February 11, 1979, when a popular rebellion rose against Shah Reza Pahlevi regime, which had perpetuated in power for decades in a totally non-democratic state organization, counting strongly on Western powers support. The rebellion got success and the Iranian Republic was established, under Ayatollah Khoemini’s control (Almeida 2014). 259 United Nations Security Council

Lebanon. Therefore, war-torn Lebanon was a fertile ground for the expansion of Iranian thinking: siding with Hussein Musawi, and with the supervision of Syria, Tehran managed to form Hezbollah as its own model (Hirst 2010, 178). This close relation to Iran is also due to Hezbollah’s Shia origins (same as Iran’s), the Muslim sect that lived in Southern Lebanon, the most war affected part of the country. Hezbollah is also the result of a split in AMAL, an Arab acronym for Lebanese Resistance Detachment, which was a Shia militia founded in 1975 by Sayyid Musa al-Sadr – closely related to Syria, which has historically interfered in Lebanese affairs since they both became independent from France in 1943. AMAL opposed the Palestinian occupation of Lebanese territory, which it saw as an aggressive movement by Palestinian forces, thus not opposing vehemently the Israeli invasion in 1982, since it was ultimately responsible for the Palestinian’s departure from Lebanon (Kennedy 2009, 9). Only after they had left, AMAL forces called for the establishment of a National Salvation Committee in order to replace the Palestinians in the struggle against the Israeli siege of West Beirut18, alongside the Lebanese army. Nevertheless, the participation of a pro- Israeli Maronite leader in the committee caused a scission among more radical Muslim members, which disagreed to ally with the Maronites, seen as pro US and Western intervention in Lebanon – one of these was Hussein Musawi. Thus, arranged by AMAL’s dissident Musawi and with the help from Iran, Hezbollah was created as a new organization to fight against Israel’s occupation (Rostami-Povey 2010, 106-107; Kennedy 2009, 10). Hezbollah soldiers served as a Shia movement to expel the Israeli forces from Lebanese territory, also serving as a special force that Khomeini delegated to fight against Israel, one of the enemies of post-1979 Iran. It is important to point out that the existence of Israel is not only the reason that solidified Khomeini’s arguments of an Islamic transnational project, but also what legitimates Hezbollah’s attacks against Israeli people (Hirst 2010, 177-178). The Lebanese Civil War came to an end in 1990 and the Taif Agreements were signed, structuring a framework of pacific coexistence between the different religious sects in Lebanon (Bassel 2006). In addition to that, the accord also encouraged the dismantling of all armed militias in the country which had been created during the war. Nevertheless, Hezbollah was authorized to keep its armed forces as a resistance organization in order to protect the Lebanese territory from future Israeli attacks. In fact, Hezbollah was the only militia with such right granted and this was, once again, due to Israeli actions: Israel did not

18 The siege of Beirute was an Israeli campaign against the Lebanese capital, in 1982, in order to destroy the PLO forces in the country, install a pro-Israel government and, then, consolidate the Israeli occupation in Palestinian territories – West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem. (Chagnollaud 2014; Kennedy 2009, 11). 260 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations exit Lebanon after the siege of Beirut; since 1985, it withdrew to South Lebanon where it established a “security zone” (Saseen 1990). Since Israeli forces were still occupying a large portion of Lebanese territory, and Hezbollah structured itself in the South, the reason for its existence was not over: there was still an Israeli presence to be fought against. Also, Syrian and Iranian support managed to keep the group well-functioning. In 1992, the rise of Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah19 in Hezbollah’s command, after the assassination of Sheikh Abbas Musawi by Israeli forces, brought to the organization’s scenario brand new characteristics. Given the current fact, Nasrallah declared “We say to Jews: the language of force is the only one between us. Leave our soil”, further exacerbating the relations with Israel (Hirst 2010, 244). Nonetheless, it was also in Nasrallah’s hands that Hezbollah took another important step in its history, a watershed one: it conduced the group to participate on legal Lebanese political system in order to be an active part of the country’s political process. At the same time, the organization adopted a social program directed to Palestinian refugees in Lebanese territory, as well as built social network to Shia populations and to other religious sects that lived in the Southern regions (Hirst 2010, 245). Hezbollah eventually has “became the country’s largest political organization” (Hirst 2010, 245): in 1992, during the parliamentary elections, the organization won 12 seats in the Lebanese Parliament (Rostami-Povey 2010), and already in 1998, on the Municipal electoral process, Hezbollah got surprising victories “in the Dahiya and other important areas of the country” (Hirst 2010, 245) . Nevertheless, the engagement of Hezbollah in the Lebanese political process did not stop its use of political violence against its declared enemies, thus being accused of terrorist attacks. It was credited to Hezbollah attacks on American and French targets in 1983 and 1984, as well as the bombing of the Israeli embassy in Argentina at Buenos Aires, in 1992, which killed 22 people (Karmon 2006). Inside Lebanese territory, during Israel’s occupation of Southern Lebanon, Hezbollah’s tactics were mainly of guerrilla nature, such as suicide bombings, hit-and-run attacks and kidnapping of Israeli soldiers (Gaub 2013). Tel Aviv launched two operations in the 1990s to cripple Hezbollah, in 1993 and 1996 – Operation Accountability and Operation Grapes of Wrath, respectively. Nonetheless, they not only were not able to damage the group significantly, but also served to justify and legitimate the continuous existence of the non-state armed Islamic organization in the region, stimulating their jihad against Israeli occupation of Lebanon (Hirst 2010, 249).

19 Nasrallah comes to power after the assassination of the elected secretary-general, Sheik Abbas Musawi, by Israeli forces in February 1992 (Hirst 2010, 243). 261 United Nations Security Council

2.2.2 Hamas

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), founded in 1964, was the first non-state actor to represent the Palestinians, which aimed to guarantee the existence of an independent Palestinian State aside from the Israeli occupation20 (NAD- PLO 2014). Fatah, which was founded in 1965 by Yasser Arafat, is actually the main political and military branch inside the PLO, which took its control when Arafat came to power in the organization (Halliday 2005, 121). It is this faction that nowadays keeps the most part of dialogues between the Palestinian cause and Israel – which is the main reason for its animosity with Hamas, as it will be described (Abu-Amr 1993, 13). Hamas is also a Palestinian organization, which was created in 1987 in the Gaza Strip, during the first Intifada21, as an Islamic Palestinian movement against the Israeli occupation (Abu-Amr 1993, 5). This group is actually a Muslim Brotherhood’s ramification in Palestine, which is an organization formed in Egypt that represents one of “the most powerful movement advocating pan-Islamism”22 (Jawad 1997, 146). From this moment on, Hamas emerged as a group that viewed military struggle against Israel as legitimate, since it occupied Palestinian territory for years: for these Palestinians, negotiations with Israel were not capable of altering the status quo. Article 13 of Hamas founding Charter, which was issued in 1988, states that the group considers previous peace initiatives with Israel a “waste of time and acts of absurdity” (Abu-Amr 1993, 12). Moreover, as an Islamic movement, Hamas has sought to gather inspiration from the revolution in Iran and from Hezbollah’s creation to counter Israel’s occupation and build an Islamic state in Palestine. In fact, Article 15 of Hamas Charter clearly points to its original thoughts against Israel and Hamas’ need to fight against it: “The day that enemies usurp part of Muslim land, jihad becomes the individual duty of every Muslim” (Mirault 2010). Almost in parallel to the beginning of the Intifada and the creation of Hamas as an Islamic movement in opposition of Israel, the PLO was trying to negotiate with the Israelis for a solution to the Palestinian issue. Actually, in its beginning, Fatah has waged guerilla tactics against Israeli forces in the occupied areas (Halliday 2005, 121), something that led to clashes between

20 The organization was actually created by the Arab League and acted under some Arab States’ control and is the first one created to fight for the Palestinian rights and the constitution of a Palestinian State (Halliday 2005, 121). 21 The Intifada was the term used to designate the popular reaction which took place in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank as a response to the Israeli occupation and its violence. 22 Actually, it is important to keep in mind that the Palestine issue is considered much more than just an Arab problem. It involves in the same objective all the Islamic community around the world, thus justifying the Pan-Islamist credentials generally used in relation to Palestine. 262 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations the Israeli Army and the PLO also in Jordan and Lebanon. In fact, the 1982 Israeli invasion into Lebanon was driven mainly to expel Palestine forces from this country, which was almost completely successful. Thus, at 1987, Fatah had already spent several years in the military fighting against Israel. Thereby, in 1988, in Algiers, the leaders of PLO gathered and decided to recognize the State of Israel and the United Nations Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), which established in both cases, among other issues, the withdrawal of Israel forces from the occupied territories (Visentini 2012, 58; UNSC 1967; UNSC 1973). Nonetheless, for Hamas followers, such proximity between the PLO and Israel would lead to nothing, since armed jihad was the main approach to be used in the fight to recover their Palestinian territory. Following such principles, Hamas understood that when the PLO accepted to negotiate with Israel and recognized the existence of the Israeli State, the Palestinian people was put in a step back in relation to its rival, given the fact that the recognition is not reciprocal – which means that, for Israel, there is no Palestinian State yet. Considering that Israel would always start negotiations in a position of force, Hamas considered that the only way to deal with the situation were through the destruction of the Jewish country. This way, during all the 1990s, Hamas would vehemently oppose Fatah’s instance on negotiating with Israel – the group would never recognize the Oslo Accords of 1993, which they saw as a victory for the Israelis, when they got a lot from the Palestinians without giving anything in exchange (Abu-Amr 1993, 13). For achieving its results, Hamas organized its armed branch for the commitment of attacks against Israeli people in order to perpetrate the Islamic jihad. It chose firstly to target military structures and soldiers, having adopted guerrilla tactics during the First Intifada, which were used inside the occupied territories. However, in 1993, Hamas made his first attack with suicide bombings, targeting a bus station in the Jordan Valley, an important change to its previous behavior. This attack was considered a terrorist action, which prompted Western countries, as well as Israel, to classify the organization as a terrorist group. Hamas, besides the use of suicide attacks, also fired short-range rockets and other kind of weapons against Israeli territory (Reis 2011). Actually, Hamas uses the argument of Palestinians’ self-defense to justify its actions. The decision to use suicide bombing attacks rests on the fact that, for Palestinians, these “guerilla tactics” are the only available method applicable against Israel. While Israeli forces count on a conventional army, Hamas needs to fight with limited resources, which makes shocks between the two forces totally disproportional. Israel’s argument about its own attacks against Palestinians consists in prevention acts to anticipate Hamas attempts against Jewish people, which means that both of sides

263 United Nations Security Council utilizes the same reason to justify their acts: self-defense (Honorato 2009). On the other hand of its strategy, Hamas developed an important welfare network provision to the Palestinian population who lives in the Gaza Strip. Services offered ranges from education and health to culture and sport. This way, Hamas managed to achieve popularity among its own people in order to build up legitimacy for its demands, something that would expand on the following years (Rostami-Povey 2010, 171-172).

3 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

3.1 THE RESURGENCE OF AL-QAEDA

The September 11 attacks unleashed the US-lead Global War against Terrorism, which was firs expressed through the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2011, where Washington aimed to take the Taliban out of power as well as to purge Al-Qaeda from Afghani territory. The group’s forces in Afghanistan crumbled rapidly in the face of US forces and military equipment. At the same time, a huge number of countries joined the global coalition against terrorism, with the United Nations in the process of elaborating guidelines to combat terrorism. Having lost its Afghan network at that time, Al-Qaeda dispersed itself, no longer being a coherent structure able to provide fully training as well as safe haven for jihadists. Although weakened, Al-Qaeda was not dead. Taking advantage of its close links within the Pakistani tribal zones – a place where Islamabad’s security forces barely enforced anything –, the movement repositioned itself geographically, and its key leaders flew to Pakistan (Chaliand and Blin 2007). At the end of the 2000s, the US focused its strategy to target and kill Al-Qaeda leaders through drone strikes. Several key figures in the group’s chain of command were in fact killed through this way. However, the major blow to al-Qaeda came in 2011 with Osama bin Laden’s killing by US Special Operation Forces in Pakistan. It was hoped that the terrorist group would disband and gradually disappear. Nonetheless, the group’s message soon after bin Laden’s death was clear:

Are the Americans able to kill what Sheikh Osama lived and fought for, even with all their soldiers, intelligence, and agencies? Never! Never! Sheikh Osama did not build an organization that would die with him, nor would end with him (Maher and Neumann 2012, 3).

264 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

Al-Zawahiri then assumed the role as al-Qaeda’s top leader, who continued to spread the message, rallying supporters and providing inspiration for the jihad continuation. Soon after, the Arab Spring shook the Middle East. Al-Qaeda was enthusiastic about it, since the corrupt regimes that they were fighting against were now being toppled by spontaneous popular uprisings. However this was exactly the problem for the terrorist network: they played no role in unfolding these popular movements. Therefore, as Maher and Neumann (2012) points out, al-Zawahiri tried to turn the tide arguing that if the events escalated so quickly and turned to mass revolts that was because the broader political context was flawed, corrupted, as Al-Qaeda had always spoken against. Nonetheless, such approach was not able to spread and it failed to gather enough attention or support. In Tunisia, the Ennahda Party reached the government, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, both Islamist movements with legal parties that had disputed elections. Instead of igniting revolutions, they just assumed power on the existing political order, something that Al-Qaeda had traditionally criticized. However, in 2013, a coup d’état took the Muslim Brotherhood out of power in Egypt and the Syrian uprising was at a stalemate. The argument for taking power through legal means was then soon dissolved, and Al-Qaeda affirmed once more that they had been right since the beginning, that only through radical changes Islamist parties could reach power. The instability in the region, this far, has proved to be a breeding ground for Al-Qaeda and other terrorist movements that franchised with al-Zawahiri’s group. One of the consequences of the uprising in Libya, for example, was the empowerment of Islamist groups in the Sahel, mainly in Mali, due to the traffic of light and heavy weapons coming from Libyan territory since the fall of Qadaffi, going to the hands, in particular, of the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Political turmoil in Yemen strengthened also the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), especially in its north-western provinces (Maher and Neumann 2012). However, the main comeback of Al-Qaeda can be traced to Syria and Iraq. The civil war in Syria and the huge amount ofjihadists that came into Syrian territory revived one of Al-Qaeda’s most violent branches: Al-Qaeda in Iraq, now renamed as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). This was enabled especially after the US withdrawal from Iraqi territory in 2010 without having stabilized the country (The Economist 2013). In Syria, specifically, an Islamist radical front has been fighting against the al-Assad regime, the front al-Nusra. Their aim would be “destroying the century-old borders of the region, tearing down the hated Sykes-Picot borders drawn by London and Paris in the aftermath

265 United Nations Security Council of World War I” (Rieder 2014). Also, Al-Qaeda’s Lebanese branch, the Abdullah Azam Brigades, is trying to import the Syrian civil war in to Lebanon, in order to turn the whole Levant (Lebanon, Syria and Iraq) into a corridor for Al-Qaeda (Rieder 2014). In 2014, ISIS successfully took control of Fallujah and Ramadi, two cities of the Anbar province in Iraq, one of the places where US troops lost more men during the Iraq invasion. Only after the Iraqi central government asked for equipment reinforcements to the US did Baghdad managed to retake control of that region. Today, as Alani (2014) affirms, it can be said that the conflict in Syria spilled-over to Iraq and combatants from both countries are merged into the ISIS, transiting between Syrian-Iraqi borders almost freely, reinforcing al-Qaeda after many years of absence. This major comeback brings apprehension about the future of Middle East, mainly now that US has scheduled its depart from Afghanistan by the end of the year (NATO 2014), raising fears that Al-Qaeda and its franchised branches might come back to the land where they were expelled from in 2001.

3.2 HEZBOLLAH’S EVOLUTION AND ADAPTATION

Since Israel’s withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah has faced several challenges, although keeping its general identities: an Islamist movement, a political actor, a resistance movement and a user of political violence. The loosening of Hezbollah’s Islamist credentials is a process related to the group’s decision of taking part in the democratic legal process of Lebanon, since 1992, as it has already been seen. Since then, Hezbollah left aside its initial goal of toppling the current political order to install an Islamic republic mirroring the one that exists in Iran. Furthermore, the group has stopped to demand the abolishment of the sectarian system in use by the Lebanese state23. Even though it remained calling itself a Shia movement, Hezbollah sold its image as a group that extends acquired benefits for all religious sects. In fact, what is left of Hezbollah’s Pan-Islamist is mainly related to its ties to Iran and Syria, as well as its support for the Palestinians, which is indeed a support against a common enemy, namely Israel (Gaub 2013). Since 1992, the group has already participated in five parliamentary and three municipal elections, which is an important step in the direction of abandoning its initial Shia inward-looking policy. As a matter of fact, Hezbollah

23 In the current political system of Lebanon, the country’s president is required to be a Maronite, the prime-minister a Sunni and the Speaker of the Parliament a Shia. 266 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations joined the March 8 political alliance since 2005, with the predominantly Christian Free Patriotic Movement, what, in accordance to Gaub (2013), can be seen as a real moment of integration into the Lebanese political scene. Also, in 2005, it has fielded two ministries in the Lebanese cabinet, something that has been repeated in the following three cabinets. One important reason why Hezbollah earned so much popular support, besides the resistance against Israel, was its ability to provide services and resources for the civilian population. As it is pointed out by Rostami-Povey (2010, 112-113),

Hezbollah was the first to provide the social services to those who fought the Israelis in the South and their families. It constructed effective social welfare institutions to bring the Shia communities out of marginalization. Gradually its vast social network supported other deprived communities. The funding for these services came not from government resources but from donations, religious taxes and fundraising. Iran’s financial assistance was also significant […]. Hezbollah begun to fulfill the function of the state as it was able to mobilize resources that the state was not supplying. It provided schools, clean water and electricity for different communities, and its agricultural development in the Beqaa Valley and the South has been impressive.

Analyzing its stance as a resistance movement and a user of political violence and its evolution on this regard, it has already been said that Hezbollah emerged in the Lebanese Civil War as a militia whose goal was to liberate Lebanon from Israel, something that it kept after the Taif Agreements since Tel Aviv continued to occupy South Lebanon. From this moment on, its existence has been questioned since the Israeli withdrawal and its internal and external opponents argue that the time may have come for Hezbollah to put its weapons at the service of the Lebanese Army. The group, however, refused to surrender its arms and affirmed that the resistance rationale was still up to date, since Hezbollah was now a national movement that could protect Lebanon from future Israeli aggressions. The group also bases its arguments on the fact that Lebanon claims that the Sheeba farms, a territory now under control of Israel in the Golan Heights, is actually Lebanese, thus, needing to be free from the Israeli occupation. Hezbollah has been credited for terrorist attacks against a set of targets in the 1980s and 1990s, thus, staring in the list of terrorist organizations of the United States, Israel, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands (Gaub 2013). Its rhetoric during the Second Intifada, initiated in 2000, supported such views, since it described “the United States as the Great Satan and Israel as a cancerous entity, den[ying] the existence of civilians in

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Israel (hence legitimizing its indiscriminate shelling) and generally us[ing] anti- Semitic language” (Gaub 2013, 8). However, since Israel’s withdrawal, the group has opted mainly for the launching of rockets against Northern Israel, not having conducted suicide operations since 1999. In fact, in 2001, Hezbollah has condemned the attacks of September 11 against the United States and the 2007 attack on a UNIFIL contingent. In addition, “while it does advocate Palestinian suicide attacks amongst Israeli civilians, Hezbollah itself has conducted suicide operations only against Israeli military targets, and only in Lebanon (Gaub 2013, 8)”. This is explained by the fact that even though Hezbollah does not accept Israel’s existence and advocates for the liberation of Palestine, it has never operated within Israeli territory. Moreover, the group states that suicide is only legitimate when used in a larger context of jihad, being the liberation of Palestine one such example, but not the killing of innocent civilians for no clear context: that’s why it considers Al-Qaeda’s operations as terrorism (Gaub 2013). The 2006 war with Israel was the watershed moment for Hezbollah in the 2000s, since it affected its stance not only as a resistance movement, but also as a political party and as a user of political violence. After the kidnapping by Hezbollah of two Israeli soldiers in July 2006, Israel unleashed a full-scale war on Lebanon for 34 days, destroying infrastructure and civilian targets in South Lebanon, as well as the Beirut International Airport and the Beirut-Damascus Highway. The United States and the European Union rejected cease-fire calls so that Israel could have time to punish Hezbollah and, indirectly, Syria and Iran (Rostami-Povey 2010). Nonetheless, Hezbollah survived and in fact emerged stronger (Skezely 2012). As soon as the war ended it was Hezbollah’s and Iran’s resources that managed to reconstruct South Lebanon and help the refugees. Skezely (2012) affirms that Hezbollah’s ability to survive the July War and to not suffer a backlash at home was the product of the relationships it built domestically – building civilian support amidst all religious sects – and regionally – with Iran, Syria and Palestine. Politically, after the war which Hezbollah claimed to have won, the group demanded more power in the cabinet, asking not only for a change in the electoral system, but also for a veto for itself and its allies in the government (Gaub 2013). Nonetheless, the opposition did not accept such demands and Hezbollah resorted to the use of force, besieging the parliament, clashing with its Lebanese political opponents. According to Gaub (2013, 7),

as a result, Lebanon was paralyzed for over a year; but Hezbollah’s resorting to violence harmed its narrative as the only Lebanese militia never having used its arms against fellow Lebanese. Perhaps not surprisingly, Hezbollah’s bloc lost in

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the following elections, and it have up the minority veto it had lobbied for.

More recently, new developments have jeopardized Hezbollah’s position in the Lebanese landscape. First, four prominent Hezbollah supporters have been indicated to the UN’s Special Tribunal for Lebanon for being accused of involvement in the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. This led to Hezbollah’s minister withdrawing from the Lebanese cabinet in 2011. Adding to this blow to the group’s ethics, Hezbollah got officially involved in 2012 in the Syrian conflict at the side of al-Assad’s regime, affirming that its overthrown would endanger Lebanon as a whole. Nonetheless, as Chubin (2012) points, its internal and external critics affirmed that the only thing that was in danger with Assad’s fall was Hezbollah’s links with Syria and Iran related to money and weapons transfer. This way, the group would be putting their weapons at the service of an illegitimate ruler in another country, respecting no more the pact that permitted Hezbollah continue to exist as a force out of state control: to serve only as a national resistance against Israel, acting inside the Lebanese territory.

3.3 HAMAS’ CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS

Current developments involving Hamas must be analyzed in two different points of views. On one hand, the group still utilizes political violence in order to achieve their goals, even though this has dramatically diminished during the last years. On the other hand, the Islamist group followed on through the path of participation in the legal process of Palestinian politics. Hamas considers that the use of violence is a necessity imposed by the reality they are living at on the ground. As stressed by Mirault (2010, 28), “for Hamas, the situation of territorial fragmentation proves the inefficiency of the diplomatic negotiation adopted by the PLO and justifies the continuation of the armed struggle”. This way, military actions for Hamas are a source of legitimation and popular mobilization. The same author continues (2010, 28), “Hamas’ terrorist activities contain two main political messages. The first, to Arafat and the PLO, is do not dare ignore us, the second to the State of Israel is that negotiations with the PLO do not constitute the final word”. Therefore, to achieve popular legitimation, Hamas used its fight against the peace process as a manner to gather around the group Palestinians who did not agree with the negotiations, “quickly develop[ing] a hard core of determiner Islamist militants (Mirault 2010, 29)”. The suicide bombings, for example, were a new mean of balancing power with Israel, since Hamas wished “to demonstrate

269 United Nations Security Council through this device that Israel is neither invincible, nor inaccessible” (Mirault 2010, 31). This same author points that from the beginning of the Second Intifada, in 2000, in two years, Hamas killed 649 Israeli victims, 337 in Israel and 312 in the occupied territories. From them, more than two thirds were civilians. In fact, the group justified the bombings against Israelis civilians because this would be an answer to the assassination of Palestinian civilians by Israeli soldiers. Nonetheless, such new tactics deteriorated the legitimacy of their fight in the face of the international community, even though for Palestinians this served to give popularity in relation to Hamas, which was seen as the one able to inflict damage to their occupier. Such internal support might be seen due to the continued backing of Hamas from the local population (Rostami-Povey 2010). In regard to the political process, for Hamas, only the end of Israeli occupation in Palestinian lands would open the way for an end to the current violence. Just after Tel Aviv retreat from the occupied territories that a truce could be achieved with the Israelis and then the real negotiations might begin, in accordance to Hamas’ point of view. The participation in politics was one more step that the group saw as necessary to stop the violence perpetrated by Israel against Palestinians. This, however, as pointed out by Mirault (2010), does not mean that Hamas started to recognize the Oslo Agreements24 as a legitimate process: first of all, the occupation must end, and only then talks about recognition of Israel and the creation of a Palestinian state should occur. Throughout the 1990s, Hamas started to participate in local elections in Gaza. It only took the first big step in Palestinian politics in 2006, when it participated as the legend “Change and Reform” for the legislative elections. It won the majority of seats in the Legislative Council, 74 seats out of 132, emerging as the largest party at Palestine (Mirault 2010). The reasons behind Hamas’ victory are many. First of all, Hamas earned a lot of respect after the Second Intifada, in 2000.

Hama’s popularity grew after the collapse of the peace process and the outbreak of the Second Intifada in September 2000, a revolt which allowed the Islamist Movement to build its notoriety and to assert itself in the name of the Palestinian people the legitimacy of the armed struggle and its leading role in fighting the Israeli occupation (Mirault 2010, 52).

24 The Oslo Agreements were a number of accords signed between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), controlled by Fatah, in 1993 and 1995. They were agreed in order to pursue a peace plan to end the conflict between Israeli and Palestinians. One of the most important points of them was the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA), which were recognized by Israel as the representative of the Palestinian people and also as an equal actor in the negotiations. On the other hand, the PA also had to recognize Israel as a state. This brought up a lot of criticism by the part of Hamas, who refused to recognize Israel as a state, also stating that the Israelis were not de facto doing their part during the peace process. 270 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

Therefore, Mirault (2010) notices that Palestinian people had already lost faith in relation to the Oslo Agreements and that there was a feeling of injustice and frustration due to the perpetual growth of Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Also, Hamas had built a vast network of social services to the Palestinian population in Gaza, which has greatly contributed to their popular support. “Hamas provides the social welfare, health care, education, and cultural and sporting institutions that are crucial for Palestinians living under Israeli occupation (Rostami-Povey 2010, 170)”.

Hamas’ provision of resources is transparently conducted through charity organizations, mosques, unions, schools and sports clubs. The Israelis have tried, with the help of the Palestinian Authority, to close down Hamas’ social work institutions and to freeze their bank accounts. But they face street demonstrations by hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, including Fatah supporters, Christians, secular groups and other communities, who receive the social welfare services provided by Hamas (Rostami-Povey 2010, 171-172).

Anyway, Hamas found itself in 2006 occupying 56% of the seats in the Palestinian legislative chamber. President Abbas asked Hamas to form a government of national unity, even though there have been skirmishes and political divergences between Fatah and Hamas during the 1990s regarding their respective positions in relation to Israel and the peace process. Ismail Haniya, a prominent Gaza leader from Hamas, was appointed as the prime minister. In fact, Israel, and also the United States, did not recognize the election results since they both consider the group a terrorist organization. The then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert declared:

It is clear that in light of Hamas majority in the Palestinian Legislative Chamber and the instructions to form a new government that were given to the head of Hamas, the Palestine Authority is, in practice, becoming a terrorist authority. Israel will not hold contacts with the administration in which Hamas plays any part, small, large or permanent (Mirault 2010, 36).

Abbas’ invitation to Hamas to form a national unity government prompted Israel to impose several sanctions against Gaza. It asked for the international community to impose a financial blockade against the Strip, imposing also a regional one, refusing to send back to Gaza the taxes that Israel got from the Palestinians as an occupier power. It also set up an economic blockade on the Strip’s trade, blocking Gaza’s port and interrupting any exports from Gaza to the outside and limiting its imports. Amidst this and the problems between Hamas and Fatah, Haniya could

271 United Nations Security Council not successfully negotiate with Fatah members to form a coalition government because Hamas refused to recognize the validity of peace agreements previously accorded with Israel. Therefore, Haniya presented a cabinet constituted by only Hamas representatives. This exacerbated tensions with Fatah, whose relationship grew still tenser by the time that Hamas established its own security force in the Gaza Strip, in 2007 – the Executive Force in Gaza, composed by 3,000 members under the Hamas-led Interior Ministry (Mirault 2010). Such act was declared illegal by the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, restarting a new cycle of internal confrontation between Hamas and Fatah, which culminated in mid- June with the Hamas’ takeover of Gaza’s security, expelling Fatah’s forces from there. Abbas rapidly declared a state of emergency and set up an emergency cabinet, dismissing the government of national unity. Israel unleashed as a punitive action against Hamas in Gaza the Operation “Cast Lead”, on 27th December 2008. At this day, one hundred tons of bombs were dropped on Gaza, receiving Haniya’s answer that Hamas would be ready for the struggle. The European Union and the United States endorsed Israel’s actions, even though the first one had went back on its position later. After three weeks of confrontations, Hamas was weakened, with more than 1,250 Palestinians dead, and a unilateral ceasefire was reached on January 18th, 2009. Throughout the conflict, Hamas managed to keep firing rockets on Israeli territory, which boosted its image amidst the population of Gaza, still under control of the group. Recently, the Arab Spring contributed to affect Hamas’ positions. Due to its links with Syria and Iran, states who usually provided the group with military and financial resources, Hamas used to have an operation base in Damascus. Nonetheless, after the Syrian conflict escalated and the al-Assad regime became threatened, Hamas was asked to provide full support to the government in Syria. Afraid of losing support at home if it stood by al-Assad’s side, Hamas refused it and left Syria in the end of 2011. One of the supposed consequences of it was a reduction on the aid given by Iran to the group (Chubin 2012). More isolated than before, Gulf countries such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia managed to take on the vacuum of power left by Syria and Iran and started to developed commercial and investments links with Hamas. Doha, in fact, crafted an agreement between Fatah and Hamas for a new attempt to form a national unity government in 2012, which failed then, but was revived now in April 2014, with results yet to be seen (Ben-David and Ramadan 2014).

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3 PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS

The issue of what actions the UN must employ when dealing with non- state military actors is a very complex question. In fact, until today, there isn’t a general international framework widely accepted of how to deal with this kind of groups. This is due to the fact that there are a huge variety of non-state military actors worldwide, with specificities in each region and at their own foundation and relations with outside powers. It is no different in the Middle East: all these groups in the region have been generally dealt with in a case by case basis by the UN, regional bodies and the states themselves. Generally, when they are considered in a collective manner, the most common framework used is terrorism. Even though there are non-state military actors that clearly use political terror to achieve their aims, other groups do not consider that this characteristic shapes their main identity. Therefore, an approach that deals with these groups considering all as terrorist raises considerable criticism. Furthermore, the very labeling of a group as terrorist implies a political decision, since, as it has already been discussed, for some a non-state actor may be a freedom fighter and for others a separatist/ terrorist/rebel. Another question that must be raised is in relation to the best form to deal with non-state military actors. Usually, the UN uses the sanctioning approach, preferring to cope with the problem coercively. This is because sanctions are also the most common actions perpetrated by states such as the United States, Israel and also European countries. Nonetheless, there is much criticism in relation to such approach, since dealing with these groups purely through coercion is a short-term solution, which may not even address the reasons behind a non-state military actor’s foundation. Therefore, a wider approach that also involves such groups politically is sometimes considered. According to Miretski (2009), the UNSC has already adopted several resolutions dealing with non-state military actors, even enforcing duties upon them. Such facts point to the UNSC’s responsibility to also address intra-state problems, related to non-state military actors, and not only inter-states issues. As laid down by Article 2(6) of the UN Charter, the UN has the authority to ensure that non-members, such as these groups, act in accordance with the principles of the organization for the maintenance of international peace and security. The first UNSC resolution addressing non-state entities, in fact, was adopted in May 1958, with Resolution 50, on the Palestine question (Miretski 2009). Nonetheless, the first and clearest moment in which sanctions and direct obligations were installed upon a non-state entity came years later. They

273 United Nations Security Council were targeted against União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), during the Angolan Civil War, where the UNSC installed sanctions and imposed obligations directly to this group through Resolution 864 (1993). Special resolutions and sanctions have also been raised against the main non-state military actors of the Middle East, namely Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and Hamas. It is important to note that the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has also risen as a prominent non-state military actor in the region lately, defying the current borders of existing states and the stability in the region. However, since it came to the forefront of international discussions only recently, no action against it has yet taken place. Sanctions against Al-Qaeda have been closely linked to the Taleban regime initially, in Afghanistan. Travel bans, freezing of assets and further actions have been designed by the UNSC to address the possible spread of such group. The Council used to work against Al-Qaeda close to other resolutions that tackled terrorism in a broader way25. On the other hand, for Hezbollah and Hamas to be targeted by sanctions as terrorist groups is a more contentious issue. This hampers the possibility of multilateral international sanctions to be laid down by the UN, usually leading to the adoption of unilateral actions by states that condemn both such groups26.

4 BLOC POSITIONS

The United States includes Al-Qaeda, Hamas and the military wing of Hezbollah in its list of terrorist groups around the world. The country considers that non-state military actors’ acts are an affront against the basic rights of every single human being (Karl 2014). Since the September 11 attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the US government has unleashed an international struggle in order to defeat terrorism, seeing fundamentalist Islamic

25 A full list of resolution linked to targeted sanctions used in the fight against terrorism can be find at the Global Policy Forum site in the following link: https://www.globalpolicy.org/security- council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-council-agenda/sanctions/49069.html 26 In relation to Hezbollah, many Western countries classify the group or its military wing as a terrorist organization, while other Arab and Muslim states consider it as a resistance movement (Horowitz 2013; PewResearchCenter 2010). Australia, Bahrain, Canada, France, Israel, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States and also the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council have officially listed Hezbollah, at least in one aspect, as a terrorist organization (PewResearchCenter 2010). The same applies to Hamas. Australia, Canada, Israel, the European Union, Japan, Jordan, the United Kingdom, Egypt and the United States consider the group a terrorist organization. Public opinion in Arab countries, on the other hand, shows a more favorable position toward Hamas (PewResearchCenter 2010). 274 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations groups as the great threat against North-American citizens around the world. In order to meet this goal, the United States, during the Bush Administration, started two wars in the Middle East: the first of them, against Afghanistan, to hunt the Al-Qaeda leader responsible for the September 11 attacks and to topple the country’s Taliban regime; the other one, against Iraq, where supposed nuclear weapons had had been developed by Saddam Hussein’s government (Roberto 2013). The US government also defends the right of the Israeli Army to guard Jewish people’s lives against attacks undertaken by Hamas and Hezbollah. At the same time, the White House reinforces the necessity of preserving Human Rights measures in the conflict zone, asking for Israeli authorities to be aware in relation to the civilian population (Calamur; Chappell 2014). Other worrying point about this issue is the acquisition of sophisticated armaments by Hezbollah, giving them a reach beyond the borders of Lebanon, which Washington strongly believes have been supplied by Iran (Hirschfeld; Gordon 2014). These Hezbollah’s initiatives has provoked an response from the United States Congress, which is now working in new measures to impose sanctions to the jihadist group, in order to decrease its financial founds, discouraging new acquisitions (Lebanon News 2014). However, on the other hand, the United States has also been indirectly involved in Middle Eastern conflicts through the financing of non-state military groups that Washington judges as moderate in their struggle against the local governments which, in turn, are designated by US as not being legitimate anymore27 (Bandeira 2013). Therefore, such groups would cease to be only non-state military actors and would start to transform themselves in the next legitimate representative of its people as soon as the previous regime fell down. This has happened in Libya (2011), when a popular movement took place in order to remove Kaddafi28 from power. The North-American government, jointly to others NATO’s members, provided financial resources, armaments and logistical assistance to non-state military actors, including the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, one of the main rebel groups in the struggle against Kaddafi’s regime (Chossudovsky 2011 apud Bandeira 2013). Washington has

27 This loss of legitimate character of some governments in the Middle East pointed by Washington is related to the use of force against the civilian population authorized by the central administration. 28 Muammar Muhammad Abu Minyar al-Kaddafi assumed power in 1969 in a military coup that deposed king Idris. As soon as he came to power, Kaddafi has tried to implement a lot of reforms in political and economical Libyan systems (Bandeira 2013, p. 252). In 2011, when the revolution started, Libya had a 30% rate of unemployment, and a one third of the whole population was living below the poverty line (CIA 2010 apud Bandeira 2013). 275 United Nations Security Council also been providing rebels in Syria with military equipment and technology in their struggle to fight against Bashar al-Assad’s regime, seen as illegitimate and as a dictatorship (Bandeira 2013). The United Kingdom has been a great US ally in counter terrorism strategies since the beginning of the Global War on Terror, inaugurated right after the September 11 attacks, in 2001. The UK government has contributed with its forces in the North-American pursuit of bin Laden and in the combat against Taliban at Afghanistan. For London, the struggle against non-state military actors, which use terrorism as a tactic, is a very important issue, necessary to be addressed in order to protect and guarantee the United Kingdom interests and the security of its citizens. To achieve this important goal, the UK government has been working, in the last few years, in new measures to improve its strategy into a more effective one, utilizing its intelligence services for detecting threats before they become real (Government of United Kingdom 2011; Home Office 2011). In June 2014, the UK government published a list containing all the non-state military groups considered terrorists and banned under UK law. Such list counts with the names of Hamas and Hezbollah’s military wing, besides listing all the criteria used to identify these groups with this denomination (Home Office 2014). It is also important to point out the partnership firmed with the French government, named as “Entente Frugale”. The agreement intends to establish a military cooperation between the greatest European armies in order to share responsibilities and costs (Abbas; John 2013). Both countries agree with the United States position that despite the existence of terrorist non-state military actors, some groups might turn into the representative of peoples when they are moderate and are fighting against illegitimate governments. Such instance has been proved when London and Paris acted together in the Libyan campaign, assisting rebel groups against the central government of Muammar Kaddafi. Great Britain and France have provided help with their Special Forces with the aim to help insurgents that occupied one of the most important oil facility in Brega, a complex of small cities located in Sirte Bay, a substantial oil reserve for Europe (Bandeira 2013). In Syria, the UK’s government was also accused, by an Israeli communication agency (DEBKAfile), to promote special training to Syrian insurgents against al-Assad’s regime, besides providing weapons to it (Chossudovsky 2012 apud Badeira 2013). France has been working directly in the combat of jihadist groups in North Africa, especially in Mali, where it acts against a branch of Al-Qaeda, the AQIM. The French government believes that these jihadist groups threaten not only the African or Middle Eastern security, but the European as well. To combat this threat is actually a priority of the French’s government foreign

276 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations policy, and achieving this goal is a way to guarantee the presence of France all over these regions29. Nevertheless, it is important to point that military measures are the most important strategy used by the French government in the struggle against terrorism threats and that it considers every jihadist group as a possible menace (Euronews 2013; Hansen 2008). In the scope of the “Entente Frugale” with Great Britain, the French government developed some joint operations (in association to UK’s forces) to support rebel groups in the popular revolution against Kaddafi, in Libya, believing that such struggle was legitimate. Paris was responsible to provide self- defense weapons, stating that this action did not constitute a violation of the arms transfer embargo (Holtom n.d.). Also in Syria, the French government was accused by local media to train deserters from the Syrian Army through agents from the Service Action de la Direction Générale and the Commandement des Opérations Spéciales. These Syrian insurgents, armed and trained by France’s forces, constituted the Free Syrian Army, one of the most important groups that fought against al-Assad’s government (Lussato 2011 apud Bandeira 2013). The Russian Federation has been developing a framework to address non-state military actors under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s (SCO) environment, working directly with the Chinese government in order to eliminate the threats all over its influence zone, in Central Asia, where terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda act (Neves Jr.; Piccoli 2012). The SCO advocates against direct military intervention as a counter terrorism strategy, understanding that the combat against this menace is more than just the employment of force: it is also important to stimulate economic growth in countries where terrorist groups have been acting ultimately, in order to strengthen the central administration before the local population. One example of Russia’s tendency for non-interventionism is the case of the Syrian crisis, which started in 2011. For Moscow, terrorist groups has been trying to overturn the government of President Bashar al-Assad, and the Russian Federation has been one of the greatest advocators against attempts of direct Western military interventions30, vetoing a resolution that tried to impose sanctions against the Syrian government (The Guardian 2011; United Nations

29 Africa is the most important supplier of oil and metals to France even nowadays, that is what justifies the very strong presence of the European country in the African continent (Melly; Darracq 2013). The European country has a more effective presence in Africa as a consequence of the past relations among its former colonies. 30 Russia and China vetoed a resolution elaborated together between the three Western powers (USA, UK and France), in October 2011, in order to guarantee sanctions against al-Assad government, accused in the occasion to use the force against the civilian population in Syria (The Guardian 2011; The United Nations 2011). 277 United Nations Security Council

2011). This was clear when the local government was accused of using chemical weapons against the civilian population in order to contain the rebel jihadist groups, in 2013, and Russia firmly opposed any US or NATO intervention in the country31 (BBC Brasil, 2013). In the case of Libya, Russia again has positioned itself against the direct intervention of Western powers in the conflict between government and insurgents. In fact, Russia has accused Western powers of double standards when dealing with Middle Eastern conflicts, since on one hand they consider Islamic fighters in Lebanon, such as Hezbollah, as terrorists, but, on the other hand, they support armed opposition movements in other countries, such as Syria, which, in most time, are similarly consisted of Islamic fighters. Also, in June 2011, Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, accused the French government of violating the United Nations Security Council’s Resolution 1970, which imposed an embargo on arms transfers inside the Libyan territory (Abu-Aun 2011). For the People’s Republic of China, terrorism and religious fundamentalist are two of the “Three Evils” which threat the country’s stability and security, thus needing to be contained (Chien-peng 2006). In 2001, after the September 11 attacks against the United States and its subsequent Global War on Terror, China has been a supporter of this struggle, participating in multilateral efforts headed by Western powers. Nonetheless, the Chinese administration positions itself totally against direct intervention promoted by foreign forces in internal issues, as happened in Libya and Syria in 2011. In the case of Syria, China’s government pointed out that a military action promoted by Western powers in the country could put in danger not only the local economy, but the whole international oil market, leading to a considerable increasing in prices (Benammar 2013). It has also adopted a similar instance to Russia when pointing at what it considers Western powers’ double standards in relation to terrorism, considering that some radical armed groups that are supported by the West should also be labeled as terrorists (Bandeira 2013). Beijing believes, thus, that all radical and extremist forces should be dealt with through severe means, but keeping in mind what the country which hosts those non-state armed actors considers about them. On the other hand, the government’s posture for internal issues has been questioned in international instances: the severity of the central administration’s acts in the struggle against non-state military actors has, in the other hand, contributed to the outbreak of terrorist movements into its own territory. The

31 Besides the agreement proposed by Russia to United States, about the destruction of Syrian chemical arsenal, Russian government sent maritime task force to Syrian coast in order to guarantee the safety evacuation of Russian citizens from the country if the situation gets into chaos (Iaroslav Viátkin 2013). 278 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations internal combat to these groups has been seen, by the international community, as violations of Human Rights (Chien-peng 2006). In the end of 2001, Chinese government published an estimative in which 800 Chinese citizens Uighurs had received training in guerilla tactics from al Qaeda in Afghanistan. The number was considered as inflated. Actually, since the September 11 September attacks against the United States and the beginning of the Global War on Terror, China has been trying to connect its internal separatist movements to terrorist organization as an strategy to combat these groups that can threat the stability of some important Chinese regions, as Xinjiang (Dynon 2013). However, it is important to distinguish Chinese politics for counterterrorism inside its territory from the ones preached for the external arena: China has been working hard in order to establish a peace zone in the Palestinian territory, avoiding hostilities from both parties, Jewish and Arab. Thus, the Asian power recognized, in 2006, the Hamas government, elected by the Palestinian people, even though it disagrees with its political practices. Having recognized the new Palestinian authority, China has been trying to help broker a ceasefire between Hamas forces and the Israeli army, believing that terrorist actions against the Jewish population will not contribute positively to the negotiations (New Agencies 2006). Argentina positions itself entirely against terrorism in all its forms. The country does not accept religious causes as justifications for these acts. Nevertheless, the Argentinean government does not believe in violent actions as the correct way to solve the problem. Thereby, Cristina Kirchner, Argentina’s president, has been encouraging the dialogue between Israeli and Palestinian’s authorities in order to stop attacks headed by non-state military actors who act from the Palestinian territory, such as Hamas (Infosur hoy 2009). It is also worth remembering that Hezbollah was held accountable for the authorship of the attacks from 1992 and 1994 in Buenos Aires, against the Israeli Embassy and the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association, respectively (Sullivan 2010). Under these circumstances, Argentina sees international cooperation as the best way to reach solutions, eradicating terrorist groups first where they seem more effective and then in other regions where they must probably act. It is also important to stress out the Argentinean large defense on the protection of Human Rights both in relation to terrorist acts and in measures to combat them (Buenos Aires Herald 2013a). Last year, Argentina officially positioned itself against military intervention in the Syrian conflict, stating that the Western attitude would contribute to aggravate the situation in the Middle East. Instead of military actions, Argentinean government has stand up for humanitarian interventions promoted by United Nations (Buenos Aires Herald 2013b). Chile is engaged in the global counterterrorism struggle, being part of

279 United Nations Security Council multilateral organs that work in order to combat these practices, such as the Executive Secretariat of the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (US Departament of State 2012). The South- American country condemns the application of direct foreign military actions to solve countries’ internal issues, such as have been happening in Syria and has happened in Libya. It is important to point out that this position is clearly defended by a majority of Latin-American countries in every multilateral forum they came to make part (Sanchez 2013). Accordingly, Chile’s central administration supported the agreement between US and Russia in order to eliminate the chemical weapons arsenal in Syria’s government power as the best solution capable to prevent Western interventions (Xinhua 2013). The Hashemite Kingdom ofJordan has been facing a menace to its stability trough the presence of radical Islamic groups in its territory and therefore supports strong actions against terrorism. Due to its position, bordering Israel, the West Bank, Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, Jordan is a natural target for non- state military organizations such as Al-Qaeda. Thereby, the Arab monarchy relies on military support from Western powers, such as the United States, the United Kingdom and France for its security (Global Research 2010). The country also suffers directly with the strong presence of the Muslim Brotherhood movement from inside its territory, currently under a conflict between two factions: one more moderate, and other more extremist, which follows strongly Qutb’s thoughts, defending the jihad against Israeli people (World Almanac of Islamism 2013). The Islamic Action Force (IAF), the political representation of Muslim Brotherhood in the country, has close relations with Hamas, supporting its struggle for the Palestinian cause, as well as Hezbollah’s. Nevertheless, the central administration, in order to safeguard its relations with Western powers, has been undertaking efforts to stop the growth of this faction in Jordanian politics: the king has declared that he would not use peaceful means to stop the enemy advance on his domains (World Almanac of Islamism 2013). Despite of having no great amounts of oil, Jordan is considered a key country in the region by Western powers: not only it has been an ally for a long time, but also because of its geostrategic position in the region, acting as a local support to external forces against these jihadist groups (Visentini 2010). Nigeria has been suffering directly from the actions of non-state military actors, such as Boko Haram, a fundamentalist Islamic group that utilizes terrorist attacks as a form of achieving its goals in the region (Sergie 2014). Therefore, the country believes that harsh actions must be imposed on terrorists. The importance of energetic resources from Nigeria, specifically the oil from the Gulf of Guinea, makes the country an important target of Western policies

280 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations to combat Islamic terrorist groups (Magginis 2012). With the objective of preserving the oil reserves of Nigeria, Western countries offered themselves to collaborate with Nigerian forces in the combat against Boko Haram’s expansion and other terrorist groups that may act in Nigeria’s territory (Reuters 2014). Nevertheless, as one of the most important member of the African Union, Nigeria has been a great advocate of African solutions to African problems, condemning military intervention promoted by Western powers in its territory and seeing military actions in the Middle East region with particular uneasy (Cerqueira 2008). Located in a region marked by the action of non-state military organizations in North Africa, Chad has been intensively engaged in a counterterrorist struggle, especially since 2011, in order to combat all the possible threats of terrorism in the Sahel region. To be effective in its goal, Chad’s government has created a Special Operations Liaison Element in Chad to support Chadian counterterrorism forces, which contributes to the formulation of a national strategy against terrorism (US Department of State 2012). Even though Chad is an active member of the Economic Community of Central Africa States (ECOWAS), the country developed this strategy based on bilateral agreements with other countries of the region, mainly Nigeria, Cameroon and Sudan. From this point of view, Chadian forces have been playing an important role in the combat to non-state military groups in North Africa, such as AQIM in Mali, where the Chad government acted together with French troops. On the other hand, Chad is accused to assist the rebel forces which overthrew the government in the Central African Republic, using similar strategies as the ones that Western powers have been employing in the Middle East’s conflicts (Judah 2013). Rwanda is a member of the East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative, an institution created by the US government in order to develop capacities to counter terrorism in the Eastern Africa region. The terrorist threat in Somalia, in the last decade, headed by al-Shabaab, a non-state military organization guided by fundamentalist Islamic principles, was the main impulse for the African countries’ decision to engage in this institution, which counts not only with legal instruments, but also with the usage of direct military intervention when the situation makes it necessary (US Department of State 2013), such as the position of Rwanda in this issue. Australia condemns terrorist acts against the civilian population, considering jihadist groups, like Hezbollah, as dangerous to international security as ISIS, which has been promoting attacks in Iraq. For Australia’s government, the best way to solve the issues which involve terrorism is through governmental agencies of a group of countries (Australian Government 2014). Australia does not believe in violent measures as a solution for this problem, but trusts in

281 United Nations Security Council the success of collective actions in order to promote pluralism, democracy and human rights in regions where terrorist groups are acting. Nevertheless, last year, after the accusations against al-Assad’s government of using chemical weapons against its civilian population, Australia’s central administration positioned itself defending direct military actions promoted by the United States, not confirming, however, if it would cooperate, sending Australian forces (News 2013). In this case, Australia justifies its position through the argument of the violation of Human Rights by the Syrian government, affirming that every time it happens, the international community has to intervene to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe, using the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The Republic of Korea demonstrates concern by the advances of jihadist groups in the Middle East and by the terrorist actions undertaken by them. Most of this position is due to its close relations with Israel: nowadays, both countries represent important commercial partners for each other, including in the armaments market (Ningthoujam 2012). Besides that, it is also important to point out the troubled relations with North Korea as one of the reasons South Korea has been supporting Western actions in Middle Eastern issues. In other words, it is important for the Republic’s government to observe how the international community can respond to what Western powers point as violations of Human Rights, as it happened in Syria, in order to find an opportunity gap to call into question the absurdities promoted by North Korean’s administration (Jang 2014). Lithuania has been an important ally of Western interests in regards to military interventions in order to solve internal conflicts, usually against non-state military actors that uses force to reach their goals. In regard to the Middle East, as an example, during the discussions about the Syrian issue, the Lithuanian Foreign Minister was one of the greatest advocates of United States government actions in its attempt to overthrow al-Assad’s regime (Kane 2013). Luxembourg’s strategy to counter terrorism is totally aligned to the European Union’s position, with no major disagreements on this point: the organization, as a whole, believes in the use of coercive measures as the best way to combat possible threats (Committee of Ministers Chairmanship 2002). Luxembourg has been concerned about the expansion of non-state military actors all over the world, but especially in the Middle East, giving special attention to actions undertaken by extremist jihadist groups, such as Al-Qaeda. Regarding this issue, Luxembourg’s government has been given particular observation to the proliferation of the use of chemical weapons by these groups (Miller, 2013).

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5 QUESTIONS TO PONDER

1. Is it possible to tackle all Middle East’s non-state military actors in the same manner, or is the current approach of case by case basis the best one? 2. Is it able or desirable to negotiate with non-state military actors, or would this mean that their existence as a non-state entity is recognized? Is their adherence to the current state model a fair approach? Should they be incorporated in the formal ranks of state government, or would it eventually lead to internal sabotage or coup d’états? 3. Are the current methods of military use of force against non-state military actors being effective? Should they continue to be used this way or should it be rethink or even thought of together with some other strategy? 4. Is it possible to contain or solve the current problems involving Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and Hamas? Is there any resolution in relation to military non- state actors that might help solve the current problems involving Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and Hamas? 5. How is it possible to tackle these rooted non-state military actors here discussed together with the new problems arising from the Syrian and Iraqi Wars, especially now with the Islamic State rising in these territories?

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Kane, Suzan A. “Europe United in not Supporting a US Attack in Syria”. September 2013. The European Sting. http://europeansting.com/2013/09/09/europe-united- in-not-supporting-a-us-attack-on-syria/ (accessed August 28, 2014). Karl, Jonathan. “Hamas Threatens US After Assassination”. ABC News. March, 2014. http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=131569 (accessed July 19, 2014). Karmon, Ely. “O Jogo Duplo do Hezbollah.” 2006. http://firs.org.br/multimidia/ artigo/o-jogo-duplo-do-hezbollah-101 (accessed May 26, 2014). Karrlsson-Willis, Charlotte. “Bachelet’s comments reinvigorate anti-terrorism debate”. 2013. The Santiago Times. http://santiagotimes.cl/bachelets-comments- reinvigorate-anti-terrorism-debate/ (accessed July 11, 2014). Katzman, Kenneth. Afghanistan post-Taliban governance, security, and U.S. policy. Washington, D.C.?: Congressional Research Service, 2012. Kennedy, Patrick Joseph. “From Mujahideen to Mainstream: The Evolution of Hezbollah.” 2009. https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/ handle/10822/553344/kennedyPatrickJoseph.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed May 5, 2014). Kiras, James D. Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and Insurgency. Indian Strategic Knowledge Online. http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/baylis3e_ ch09.pdf (accessed May 25, 2014). Lebanon News. “U.S. lawmakers draft new Hezbollah sanctions”. The Daily Star. April, 2014. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Apr- 07/252521-us-lawmakers-draft-new-hezbollah-sanctions.ashx#axzz37x9vlesz (accessed July 19, 2014). Lussato, Céline. “France training rebels to fight Syria”. November 26, 2011. PressTV. Magginis, Robert. “Nigeria follows violent path of War-Stricken Somalia”. 2012. Human Events. http://humanevents.com/2012/07/10/nigeria-follows-violent-path- of-war-stricken-somalia/ (accessed July 5, 2014). Maher, Shiraz; Neumann, Peter R. “Al-Qaeda at the Crossroads: how the terror group is responding to the loss of its leaders & the Arab Spring”. The International Study Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. http://icsr.info/wp- content/uploads/2012/10/ICSR_Maher-Neumann-Paper_For-online-use-only1. pdf (accessed May 25, 2014). Masters, Jonathan. “Hamas.”. http://www.cfr.org/israel/hamas/p8968 (accessed May 25, 2014). Mazetto, Francisco de Assis Penteado. “O Terrorismo na História.” 2003. http:// www.ecsbdefesa.com.br/fts/Terrorismo.pdf (accessed May 4, 2014).

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Melly, Paul; Darracq, Vincent. “A New Way to Engage? French Policy in Africa from Sarkozy to Hollande”. Chatham House. May, 2013. http://www.chathamhouse.org/ sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/0513pp_franceafrica.pdf (accessed July 18, 2014). Miller, Melissa. “The Potential of Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the hands of Non-State Actors”. Oxford International Model United Nations. November, 2013. http://www.oximun.org/downloads/positionpapers/UNSCpps.pdf (accessed July 18, 2014). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania. “Nuclear and Cyber Security, Fight against Terrorism”. 2014. http://www.urm.lt/default/en/foreignpolicy/lithuania-in-the-region-and-the-world/lithuanias-security-policy/nuclear- and-cyber-security-fight-against-terrorism (accessed July 5, 2014). Mirault, Alexandre. “Hamas the Challenge of Political Integration”. Master’s thesis. Masaryk University. 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Popular Resistence. http://www.popularresistance.org/latin-americas-anti- intervention-bloc/ (accessed 27 August, 2014). Saseen, Sandra M.. “The Taif Accord and Lebanon’s Struggle to Regain its Sovereighty.” 1990. http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent. cgi?article=1551&context=auilr (accessed May 9, 2014). Sergie, Mohammed Aly. “Boko Haram”. Council on Foreign Relations. May, 2014. http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/boko-haram/p25739 (accessed July 18, 2014). Skezely, Ora. “Hezbollah’s survival: resources and relationships”. Middle East Policy. Vol XIX, nº4, Winter 2012. Singer, Peter. “Do Drones Undermine Democracy?”. The New York Times. January 21, 2012. Sullivan, Mark P. “Latin America: Terrorism Issues”. Eurasia Review. 2010. http:// www.eurasiareview.com/23042010-hezbollah-hamas-activities-in-argentina-brazil- and-paraguay/ (accessed July 18, 2014). The Economist. “The New Face of Terror”. The Economist. September 28, 2013. http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21586832-west-thought-it-was- winning-battle-against-jihadist-terrorism-it-should-think-again (accessed May 25, 2014). The Guardian. “Is this the man who inspired Bin Laden?”. November, 2001. http:// www.theguardian.com/world/2001/nov/01/afghanistan.terrorism3 (accessed May 25, 2014). ______. “Russia and China veto UN resolution against Syrian regime”. October 2011. The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/05/russia- china-veto-syria-resolution (accessed August 27, 2014). The United Nations. “Russia and China veto draft Security Council resolution on Syria”. October 2011. UN News Centre. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story. asp?NewsID=39935#.U_4wgNKwJcQ (accessed August 27, 2014). The Voice of Russia. “Russia is concerned over jihadist attacks against Siryan Armenians in Kessab”. 2014. Radio The Voice of Russia. http://voiceofrussia.com/ news/2014_03_31/Russia-is-concerned-over-jihadist-attacks-against-Siryan- Armenians-in-Kessab-7472/ (accessed July 7, 2014). The White House. “Joint Statement of the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Cooperation in Countering Terrorism”. 2013. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/17/joint-statement- presidents-united-states-america-and-russian-federation- (accessed July 7, 2014). Tiezzi, Shannon. “Chinese involvement in Global Jihad”. 2014. The Diplomat.

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THE SITUATION IN IRAQ

Guilherme Henrique Simionato1 Natália Regina Colvero Maraschin2

ABSTRACT

In 2014, ISIS insurgents advanced over the city of Mosul in Iraq and began a territorial and political expansion that climaxed with the proclamation of the Islamic Caliphate. After 09/11, the U.S. unilaterally carried out the operation Iraqi Freedom to remove the government the Government of Saddam Hussein from power, which had been accused of supporting terrorist groups and of possessing weapons of mass destruction. The Coalition Provisional Authority installed after Saddam’s fall dismantled the Iraqi government and armed forces and implemented neoliberal policies; those measures culminated in insurgent movements, some of which gained support from Al-Qaeda. The aftermath of this context was an extreme polarization between Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds in the country which was reinforced by the Iraqi interim Government and by the new Constitution adopted in 2005. This polarization led to a civil war that was controlled only in 2006. However, since 2011, when President Obama announced the withdrawal of American troops from Iraqi territory and Syria’s Civil War began, the situation in Iraq has worsened, with the emergence of extremist and sectarian movements that considered themselves unrepresented by the Government. In this context, ISIS has gained legitimacy among the population and achieved a dimension that has drawn the attention of the entire international community.

1 Associate Researcher of the Center for International Studies on Government (CEGOV) and International Relations Student at Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). 2 International Relations Student at Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). United Nations Security Council

1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Formerly known as Mesopotamia and considered one of the cradles of civilization, Iraq rests between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and has always been touted as a major cultural center of ancient empires, sheltering many people who contributed heavily to the great ethnic and cultural cauldron pot that today marks the Middle East. However, since its independence, the country has struggled to remain stable: its central geostrategic position places Iraq between regional and global rivalries. The country, however, is not merely an object of others’ foreign policy, and has always kept a proactive role in Middle East politics, as it has always been endowed with great natural resources, from Mesopotamia and the crescent fertile to contemporary Iraq and the oil fields. Today, perhaps suffering by its own virtues, Iraq faces overwhelming instability and violence plaguing the country. Six years after passing through a bloody Civil War, it is already experiencing another one. While is encompassed by the regional balance of power, Iraq actually struggles for not tearing apart.

1.1 RISE AND FALL OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BRITISH MANDATE IN IRAQ

Iraq was the subject of disputes between various empires until the 15th and 16th centuries, when most of its current territory was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire in the form of the provinces of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra. In the late 18th century and early 19th century, due to Europe’s growing strength in the world stage and to the expansion of its global economic interests, triggered by the Industrial Revolution, the Middle East became a focus of colonial disputes. Following Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798, the Empire’s periphery entered into decline and European influence in the region only increased. In that context, and as a response for the suspension of the liberal reforms that were taking place in the Empire, the Young Turk Revolution (1908) occurred, bringing to power a group of officers dedicated to institutional reforms, to Western secularism and to an incipient Turkish nationalism that led to a separation between the Turks who ruled the ottoman domains and the Arabs (Owen 2004). The Young Turk Revolution was a turning point in the history of the Middle East: It set off the political and military conflicts that culminated in the Balkan wars in 1912 and 1913 and led, through the events in Sarajevo (1914), to the beginning of the First World War and to its subsequent consequences for the region (Halliday 2005). Even more important is the fact that the movement inspired the emergence of the Arab nationalism, modernizing and progressive, in opposition to the Wahhabism,

296 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations authoritarian and retrograde, existent in Saudi Arabia. After the outbreak of the World War I, Britain negotiated an agreement with Hussein, Emir of Mecca, promising that, in case of victory, the Arabs would be granted an independent Arab state in the Middle East. The great stimulus for this agreement was the British interest in the Arab support in the front against the Ottomans, who fought alongside Germany. Simultaneously, Britain and France, predicting the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the conflagration, negotiated between themselves the division of the region, which took shape in the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916): the British would have control over Palestine, Iraq and Transjordan, while the French would get Lebanon and Syria (Visentini 2012). In April 1920, at the San Remo Conference, Britain formally accepted the responsibility, under the Mandate system of the League of Nations, to transform the provinces of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul into a modern and self-determined state. Nonetheless, the increasing nationalist movements in the territory caused the British to disengage of their international responsibilities with Iraq as quickly and inexpensively as possible, given the non-compliance of the population to the mandate (Dodge 2006).

1.2 INDEPENDENCE AND THE KINGDOM OF IRAQ

In 1932, Iraq joined the League of Nations and was recognized as an independent state. In this new phase, the Hashemite monarchy structured a predominantly Sunni government that, during the following years, faced revolts of Assyrians, Kurds and Shias, who demanded autonomy and did not feel represented by the ruling power. In the external realm, king Faisal I maintained Iraq’s economic and military ties with the British, got involved in border disputes with other former Ottoman provinces and was included in a dynamic of competing nationalisms such as pan-Arabism, Arab socialism and Nasserism. After the death of Faisal I in 1933, Ghazi, his son, assumed the throne. Unlike his father, Ghazi was unable to balance the nationalists’ demands and the British pressure under the context of the Anglo-Iraqi alliance. Thus, he was seen by Iraqi people as a British proxy and suffered several coup attempts. The first one, in 1936, established a government that lasted 18 months, paving the way for greater military involvement in politics (Library of Congress 1990). In 1939, Ghazi died and Amir Abd al Ilah became the regent. In the context of increasing anti-British feelings among the population, the regime suffered a coup in 1941 and Rashid Ali Kilani rose to power. In response to the country’s rapprochement to Germany led by Kilani, the British invaded the territory,

297 United Nations Security Council deflagrating a war and restoring the rule of Abd al Ilah, in the so-called Anglo- Iraqi War of 1941. Among the consequences of the confrontation were the Iraqi declaration of war against the Axis in World War II and the use of its territory as a base for the British military occupation of Iran and the Levant. Since then, the monarchy came to be seen as completely dissociated from Iraqi nationalism, having little legitimacy and hindering the construction of a national identity (Tripp 2000). In 1958, Iraq signed with Britain, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan the Baghdad Pact, aimed to protect these countries from Soviet influence. The treaty was seen as pro-imperialist by Iraqi nationalists, and, in addition to British actions in the Suez crisis, leaded to the republican movement.

1.3 THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

On July 14, 1958, a group of officers known as the Free Officers, brought the Hashemite monarchy to an end, establishing a Republican Office under the presidential figure of Qasim. Internally, the power was highly concentrated. Measures to decrease the influence of tribal chiefs and landowners were widely adopted by the new Government. Internationally, even with his dissociation of the Communists, Qasim’s left-wing trends aroused concerns in the United States and in its regional allies, at the same time allowing the restoration of Iraqi diplomatic relations with Moscow. Another determining factor for the country’s international affairs was that Qasim laid claim over the newly independent Kuwait, affirming that its territory was part of Iraq. When the members of the Arab League accepted Kuwait’s membership in the organization, the Iraqi government broke off diplomatic relations with them, becoming isolated from the neighboring Arab countries (Library of Congress 1990). By this time, Iraq’s economic resources came mostly from oil. Consequently, in 1960, the country created, along with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, and, in 1961, Qasim created the State-owned Iraq National Oil Company (Dawisha 2009). The dissociation of the Presidency from the political groups and its inability to contain nationalist movements and Kurdish revolts eroded its power and, in 1963, Qasim was ousted by a coup orchestrated by Ba’th Party members. The Bath Party was created in the early 1940s by two Syrian students, Michel Aflaq and Salah ad Din al Bitar. Its ideological goals of socialism, freedom, and unity reflected the deeply felt sentiments of many Iraqis who, during the monarchy, had suffered from economic dislocation, from an extremely skewed income distribution, and from the suppression of political freedoms. Beginning in 1952,

298 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations under the leadership of Fuad Rikabi, the party grew rapidly, especially among the Iraqi intelligentsia. By 1958 the Bath had made some inroads into the military (Library of Congress 1990). The new Presidency was given to ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Aref, a non-Ba’thist officer, and the Government was constituted by military men and civilians. Still, the coup government was short-lived: ‘Aref held a new coup and put the military in control of the country, eliminating all traces of the Ba’th Party from the political structures. In 1966, ‘Aref died and was replaced by his brother, who had to face a resurgence of Kurdish rebellions, international pressures such as the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, oil issues with Syria and internal charges of corruption (Dawisha 2009).

1.4 THE RISE OF THE BA’TH PARTY

In 1968, Iraq faced another coup, which placed the Ba’th definitely in power. Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr became the new President, and Saddam Hussain was appointed as the vice chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, the most important executive and legislative body of the country. With its secular basis and a modernizing, reformist and socializing perspective, the Ba’th was engaged in industrial development policies, military training, social programs, nationalization of the oil industry and in dealing with the constant Kurdish uprisings, Assyrian claims for autonomy and Shi’ite opposition. The regime also relied on the elimination of potential opponents and the conditioning of administrative positions to the party membership. Internationally, it is worth highlighting the emerging rivalry with the Ba’th in Syria for the leadership in the Arab world. While the Iraqi party was ideologically more centrist, nearing the right wing, than the Syrian one, both, due to their strong nationalist content, claimed the real representation of Ba’th’s ideals and tried to undermine the credibility of one another (Visentini 2012). Since their creation this fact has generated mistrusts between both wings of the Party, producing an important rivalry that constantly guided Syrian and Iraqi foreign and security policy. In the mid-1970s, Bakr fell ill and in 1979 Saddam Hussain, who had been accumulating power, replaced him as president. Under Saddam, Iraq came to be ruled by a Sunni rural elite (Cordesman 2007).

1.4.1 Saddam’s rule

Upon taking power, Saddam Hussain ruled by surrounding himself of loyal officers and starting a personality cult that portrayed himself as the representative

299 United Nations Security Council of all the people of Iraq. His domestic policy was based on social initiatives and economic development plans, aimed to the strengthening of the country and the improvement of the living conditions of the population. However, the regime also adopted anti-kurdish policies, held the Al-Anfal campaign and persecuted Assyrian minorities. Internationally, Iraq maintained its relations with USSR and attempted an approach with the United States and its conservative allies of the Gulf, guided by a project of consolidation of a leadership role in the region. With the fall of Iranian Shah and the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979, Iraqi relations with Iran, which followed a tense development pattern, reached a tipping point: Saddam saw the Iranian Revolution as a chance to expand the country’s power in the neighborhood, to dominate the Gulf oil reserves, to solve territorial issues and to contain the Shia revolutionary impulses that arose in Iraq and were supported by Iran (Khoury 2014). Furthermore, given that the Iranian Revolution brought to power a regime contrary to the West, threatening oil supplies and western powers’ transit through the Persian Gulf, Saddam Husain believed that he would be granted international support for a conflict against Khomeini. Thus, in 1980, he ordered the entry of his troops in the Iranian territory. The U.S. opposed Iraq’s invasion of Iran and did not support Iraqi ambitions to acquire territory and influence in Iranian ground. This American policy began to change in 1982, once Iran was able to push Iraqi forces and go on an offensive, forcing Iraq to turn to the West and to the Southern Gulf States for aid. In this context, the US feared an Iranian conquest of Iraq that could destabilize the Gulf; U.S. President Reagan began bending towards Saddam in an effort to halt Iran’s efforts to invade Iraq, providing money, weaponry, and intelligence to help Iraqi forces in the war. The National Security Directive stated that the U.S. would do whatever was necessary and legal to prevent Iraq from losing its war against Iran. In 1988 a ceasefire between the parties was signed (Cordesman & Khazai 2014) The first Gulf war consolidated Iraq’s position as the most militarized state in the region and as a bastion against the Islamic Republic of Iran, mostly because of the U.S. support. However, the costs of the war were great, not only in the social level, but also for the economy. The military defrayal drained state’s resources and Iraq nearly doubled its foreign debt, owned mainly to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. With a drop in international oil prices, the country’s condition of payment deteriorated: The Saudis forgave the debt, but Kuwait did not yield to the pressure, and Iraqi speeches towards the country became more belligerent (Khoury 2014).

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1.4.2 Foreign intervention and Baath’s demoralization

In 1990, shaken by an internal crisis and overlooked by external allies, Iraq invaded Kuwait, seeking annexation and seizing its assets as a way to pressure the other Arab Gulf states into debt forgiveness and aid (Cordesman & Khazai 2014). The action was immediately condemned by the international community; the UN Security Council approved in the same year Resolution 661 and Resolution 678, which imposed an embargo on the country and established for 1991 as the deadline for the complete withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. During this period, the United States, hegemon in the international system since the fall of the USSR, sought to prevent the emergence of regional powers that could challenge its influence. Its main strategy for this objective was the offshore balance, which comprised the use of regional allies, such as Saudi Arabia, to check the rise of potential opposing states (Brzezinski 1997; Visentini 2005). After the invasion of Kuwait, concerned with the region’s oil, the defense of Saudi territory and with Saddam’s rise as a prospective leader of the Arab world, the US began to consider a military option, deploying troops in Saudi Arabia in what was called Operation Desert Shield. In 1991, North Americans, leading a coalition of countries, gave start to the Operation Desert Storm, an air campaign that lasted 42 days. The coalition’s ground offensive began a few days later, when Iraq agreed to withdraw troops from Kuwait, but refused to accept Security Council’s resolutions which established weapons inspections and the elimination of the country’s armaments. At the end of February, President Bush declared the victory of the American alliance and called a cease-fire, which Iraq readily accepted. After the war and with Clinton’s ascension, motivated by the end of the Soviet threat, the recent practical demonstration of U.S. military power in the First Gulf War (1991) and the euphoria generated by it (which became known as Pax Americana), a new preemptive doctrine emerged within the United States neoconservative circles (Visentini 2005). Headed by Paul Wolfowitz, deputy defense secretary of Dick Cheney, this doctrine consisted in the maintenance of U.S. conventional strike forces on alert in order that, where and when appropriate, they could carry out preemptive strikes on countries commonly engaged in nuclear, chemical or biological researches deemed as threats to the status quo (Jervis 2003, 376). However, critics of this doctrine claimed that its true purpose rested on the willingness to avoid that any regional power could be able to challenge U.S. unipolarity and, therefore, its interference capability on such region. The Wolfowitz Doctrine, as it became known, was incorporated into the official United States doctrine already in 1993, in an official document entitled “Defense Strategy for the 1990s”, and signed by Dick Cheney himself (Jervis 2003, 386-388; Keegan 2005, 122; Bandeira 2013, 140).

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In this sense, sanctions, weapons inspections, selective use of force and the establishment of a no-fly zone were the consequences of the Gulf war, which were maintained to ensure Saddam Hussain’s containment. The following twelve years of international control over the Iraqi military and economy put the country under a humanitarian crisis, which triggered sectarian conflicts and undermined the power of the Ba’th (Khoury 2014). In October 31, 1998, president Bill Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act, a set of proposals that included financing Iraqi opposition groups and stated that “should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime” (Keegan 2005, 126). Particularly, in 1998, the United States conducted direct air strikes against Iraq’s military facilities, allegedly related to mass destruction weapons, in the operation called Desert Fox. By 2002, Saddam Hussain and the international media constantly accused the United States of violating Iraq’s air space and conducting several air strikes in strategic facilities not related to armaments. According to Arnove (2007, 13):

Iraq’s supply was badly damaged, leading to numerous deaths from otherwise easily preventable waterborne diseases. Electricity was available only intermittently throughout the country, and hospitals and other essential institutions lacked vital materials, many blocked by the United States, which repeatedly exercised its veto power in the United Nations sanctions committee to cancel or hold up contracts for alleged “dual use” items (civilian goods with a potential military application). Among the banned items were lead pencils, because “carbon could be extracted from them that might be used to coat airplanes and make them invisible to radar”, and materials needed for water-treatment facilities.

The issue of weapons of mass destruction was the most hit points during the 1990s. Indeed, Saddam had used chemical weapons against the Iranians, who, soon after, had used against Iraq also. Shortly after the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War, the UNMOVIC (United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission) was created. This commission was supposed to monitor and inspect the whole country, looking for any chemical or biological weapons. Saddam has insisted that Iraq no longer possessed weapons of mass destruction, while the UNMOVIC intended to inspect the whole country to declare it free of these capabilities. The Iraqi government was worried in providing the proper written documentation demonstrating that it had nothing to hide; the US and Britain, however, wanted substantive evidence that all weapons of mass destruction in Iraq had been eliminated. The latter goal was unreachable without a physical occupation of Iraq. In this sense, “UNMOVIC established an impossible goal to meet; and Iraq, even providing all possible documentation, lacked any credibility” (Keegan 2005, 141).

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In March 2002, UNMOVIC’s president, Hans Blix, declared that Iraqis were cooperating with the commission more effectively than in the past. He announced that he had investigated U.S. claims about the existence of mobile biological warfare laboratories and underground facilities, but had failed to prove any of these assumptions. Soon after, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), El Baradei, rejected the claims of the British intelligence service that Iraq had obtained a supply of uranium from Nigeria (Keegan 2005, 148-149). In general, the 90s exposed Middle East’s nationalist regimes as dysfunctional and outdated. Iraq, maybe the last and one of the most successful model of secularist and nationalist Arab state, failed to achieve the more advanced stages of progress, the ones that incorporates a higher level of democratization in society and in its institutions. However, it is not possible to assert that the claimed successful states of Middle East achieved this also. This is the case of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and the other conservative Gulf monarchies. The acknowledgment of this dualism is essential to understand contemporary disputes in Arab states internal and external affairs, since the current instability, generated by extremism, fundamentalism and sectarianism, has been fueled by the struggle between them and its allies. Therefore, the Iraqi case was (and is) emblematic in this sense: the initial years of last decade beheld events that exposed this situation, this is the case of the 11/09 tragedy and its political responses, what will be seen immediately.

2 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

2.1 OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (2003)

After 09/11, the Western foreign policy became more incisive about Islamic non-state armed (and unarmed) groups, classifying the most of them as terrorists. In the wake of Afghanistan’s invasion in 20011, and with the global hype surrounding the attacks on the World Trade Center, President George W. Bush Jr. denounced Saddam Hussein for possession of chemical and biological weapons and the direct support to terrorist groups involved in the attacks at New York. Thus, Bush sought to gather broad support to conduct a brief and intense military operation to remove Saddam from power, to confiscate Iraqi chemical weapons and to capture the Islamic extremist enemies of the U.S., which, in his words, represented a constant threat to American national security and international stability. However, unlike post 09/11 reactions, both the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and a large part of the international community (including countries such as Luxembourg, France and

1 Which allegedly and explicitly supported bin-Laden training activities, sheltering al-Qaeda head commander. 303 United Nations Security Council

Germany, U.S. traditional allies) concluded that there were no convincing indicators over these charges (Keegan 2005, 135). Many antiwar movements emerged in the international academy. They claimed that U.S.’ true desire was to retain control over Iraq’s oil fields —the second largest in the world at the time. Moreover, considering the strategic interests involved, it would be convenient for American interests a new client state in the region, as indicated by the Wolfowitz Doctrine (Dodge 2005; Arnove 2007; Bandeira 2013). In addition, possible link between Saddam and bin Laden was ironically inconsistent, since the first was an Arab secularist, faithful to the nation-state strong role in regional dynamics, while bin-Laden always loathed geographic boundaries, being a Salafist believer, stating that all Muslims must be unified into a single nation with no territorial restriction. According to Keegan (2005, 127), “if Osama bin Laden had tried to promote their beliefs In Iraq, surely his fate would have been the same of Saddam’s enemies”. However, certain that Iraq posed a latent threat, the U.S. acted unilaterally, with solely British, Polish and Australian support, and on 20 March 2003 it unleashed the invasion of Iraq, with operation Iraqi Freedom. From bases in Kuwait, the primary goal was to initially unseat President Saddam Hussein; then, to seek and destroy Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction as well as the terrorist cells. Later, the state-building process would immediately start. As stated, this first step should last only a few months, allowing the transfer of political control to Iraqi policy makers. Completely unstructured after more than a decade of sanctions, Iraq was unable to offer significant resistance to the coalition forces. Baghdad’s fall was surprisingly quiet2: most of the Iraqi officials disowned by thousands before even getting in combat against coalition forces. Thus, 21 days after starting Iraqi Freedom, on 9 April, the primary stated goal was met: the government of Saddam Hussein had been overthrown, and Baghdad was occupied. On May 1st, George W. Bush declared that Iraq mission was fully accomplished (Keegan 2005, 13-20). Although the U.S. have sought a conventional, short and high-tech conflagration, soon after the 1st may announcement it became clear that it confronted a Guerrilla Warfare and a Complex Irregular Warfare situation. Attacks were carried out by insurgents without a structured order of battle, composed by a few fighters with no uniforms, holding mostly AK-47 rifles and easily hiding among Iraqi civilians (Hammes 2006, 173). Bush’s “Mission Accomplished” actually achieved its primary objectives, but few expected it to be so expensive. Over the next 8 years, until the

2 The meager forces of the Iraqi army were displaced mainly to the southern front, while the Republican Guard was protecting the capital, Baghdad. This left the north of the country into the hands of Kurdish militias, backed by U.S. helicopters, which provided supplies and close air support in the times it was needed. Unlike in 1991, the role of Iraqi Air Force was almost irrelevant: Just after disabling the few anti-aircraft missiles of Saddam, the coalition had air superiority in much of the territory. 304 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations full withdrawal in 2011, about $800 billion were spent (Londoño 2013; Cordesman & Khazai 2014 17), which, added to similar spending in Afghanistan, greatly compromised the hegemonic position held by the country, reducing their payment capabilities, innovation capacity and even its legitimacy as a global leader. However, more harmed were the Iraqi administration and its people.

2.2 STATE-BUILDING PROCESS: OIL, SECTARIANISM AND NEGLIGENCE

Bush believed that Saddam’s overthrow and the liberation of Iraq would motivate Iraqi people to assume government command in a few months. In this sense, the mission was to put the country’s government under the authority of a group of apolitical Iraqi leaders within ninety days. According to Keegan (2005, 257), an ideological posture was adopted: the immediate goal was to transform the authoritarian regime in a functioning democracy with a strong idealistic nature. However, early it became clear that the invasion of Iraq unleashed forces that the U.S. had not anticipated and was not prepared to face. Washington promptly “discovered” that it had gone to war for misleading reasons. There were no mass destructions weapons nor terrorist facilities. The Pentagon also did not have any meaningful plan for stabilization and reconstruction of the country (Cordesman and Khazai 2014, 17). Soon, Iraq has emerged in chaos: stores were looted, people were stolen and houses were raided. The only safe places were the country’s oil fields (Arnove 2007, 8). The expected popular support never arrived. A poll conducted by the Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies in May 2004 revealed that 92% of Iraqis viewed the foreign troops as occupying forces and only 2% as liberators. In the same poll, only 7% of Iraqis demonstrated confidence in the Coalition forces (Arnove 2007, 28-29). Namely, differently than expected, criticism came also from Shia and Kurdish population, representing respectively 60% and 15% of the Iraqis (CIA 2014). An ad hoc administration that would serve as a transitional authority, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), was created. Soon, on May 12, 2003, the former Ambassador Paul Bremer was indicated as CPA’s coordinator, becoming the central authority. Once assumed, Bremer made three decisions that reverberated throughout the U.S. occupation, being largely responsible for Iraq current chaos. First, he outlawed the Ba’ath party, forcefully retiring 100,000 newly-hired government officials for having links with the party. Them, he dissolved the Iraqi army, putting 400,000 soldiers (predominantly Sunni) in the streets (Cordesman and Khazai 2014, 7). As these ex-employees and ex-servicemen would hardly get any regular jobs, they soon became unemployed, as well as more than half of the Iraqi population

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(Mohamadian 2012, 241). Third, Bremer stated that the CPA administration would hire no one that had been associated to Ba’ath, even though this requisite had been compulsory for public officials under Saddam’s rule. Moreover, foreign companies, most oil enterprises and of logistical support troops, favored hiring private security companies (PSC) for security; they also relied on predominantly foreign personnel over Iraqi nationals. Immediately, a broad ethnic-religious segregation process took form inside the country, as well as a rising of anti-American sentiment, creating the basis for fundamentalism and the rise of extremist armed groups. Moreover, US authorities have passed more than a hundred regulations designed to strengthen the occupation, aiming primarily to open Iraqi market, implementing neoliberal policies in virtually every industry in which Saddam had had control. Every aspect of Iraqi economy, with the exception of oil, were completely open to transnational companies (Arnove 2007, 17). The dismantling of public administration has revolted the population, whose nationalism always overcame most political and religious differences, fueling the resistance against the coalition.

Image 1 - Iraq’s Distribution of Religious and Ethnic Groups

Source: Adapted from Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection. Texas University.

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A the end of 2004, these actions triggered strong insurgency movements, which were led by Sunni fundamentalist groups that gradually replaced the supporters of Saddam Hussein and sought external help to expel the invaders, namely Al-Qaeda, which was now really in the game. It is worth noting that the first signs of Al-Qaeda in Iraq only then appeared, markedly after Saddam’s fall. This new actor severely prompted sectarian divisions in the country (Figure 1), leading to extreme polarization between Sunnis, Shias and Kurds by levels never seen before (Cordesman and Khazai 2014, 7). On June 28, 2004, Paul Bremer dissolved CPA and passed the administration to an Interim Iraqi Government (IIG), later replaced by the Iraqi Transitional Government. The Shia Iyad Allawi was Iraq’s first prime minister after Saddam Hussein. From May 2005 to May 2006, who held the position of prime minister was Ibrahim al-Jaafari, also a Shia. During his government, in October 2005, Iraq’s new constitution was ready. Under strong influence of the occupying authorities, the constitution enshrined sectarian divisions in Iraqi society. According to Phyllis Bennis (2005, online), the Constitution “is not a sign of Iraqi sovereignty and democracy taking hold, but rather a consolidation of U.S. influence and control”, which “could transform the current violent political conflict into full-blown civil war between ethnic and religious communities.” Still on the sectarianism of the constitution, Bennis (2005) states:

Instead of balancing the interests of Iraq’s diverse population by referencing its long-dominant secular approaches, the draft constitution reflects, privileges and makes permanent the current occupation-fueled turn towards Islamic identity [...]. In historically secular Iraq, the shift in primary identity from “Iraqi” to “Sunni” or “Shia” (although Iraqi Kurdish identity was always stronger) happened largely in response to the U.S. invasion and occupation; it does not reflect historical cultural realities. The draft constitution Promotes not just federalism as a national governing structure, but an extreme version of federalism in Which all power not specifically assigned to the central government devolves automatically to the Regional Authorities — setting the stage for a potential division of Iraq largely along ethnic and religious lines (Bennis 2005: online).

In this sense, as Iraqi oil is concentrated in the northern (Kurdish) and southern (Shia) parts of the country, the Sunni population (who live in west and central portions near Baghdad) lose mostly in the new constitution, considering the unequal distributions and the extreme federalism3.

3 The constitution “asserts that ‘Oil and gas is the property of all the Iraqi people in all the regions and provinces,” and that the federal government will administer the oil and gas from “current fields” with the revenues to be “distributed fairly in a matter compatible with the demographic distribution all over the country.’ But that guarantee refers only to oil fields already in use, leaving future exploitation 307 United Nations Security Council

In December 2005 elections, the coalition lead by the Dawa Party4 emerged victoriously and its leader, Nouri al-Maliki, became prime minister. According to Anthony Arnove (2007, 74), both Dawa and its main ally, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, always received financial, political and military support from Tehran. Cordesman and Khazai (2014, 7) also recognize the Iranian influence:

Iran, in turn, supported the Shias and saw the developing conflict as an opportunity to limit U.S. influence and power. Iran took advantage of the porous border, newfound freedom of communication and transportation between the two countries, and post-war chaos to develop unprecedented and broad-based influence in Iraq. Iran also sought to extend its influence across a wider spectrum of liberal secularists, the Kurds, and Shia Islamists. Reports by coalition forces show that Iran used money, weapons, training, and other forms of support to bolster both Shia and non-Shi’ite allies inside Iraq, in order to disrupt US forces and ensure Iraq was too weak to pose a challenge to Iranian security and interests (Cordesman and Khazai 2014, 7).

In this context, one can classify American efforts in Iraq’s state-building process as problematical. Cordesman (2006, xxi-xxii) summarizes the main mistakes, as “the failure to plan and execute efforts to maintain the process of governance at the local, provincial, and central level”. Moreover, the failure to anticipate and prepare for Iraqi expectations after the collapse of Saddam’s regime. The author adds, “the failure not of almost 2/3 of Iraq’s known reserves (17 of 80 known fields, 40 billion of its 115 billion barrels of known reserves), for foreign companies - because the next section of the constitution demands ‘the most modern techniques of market principles and encouraging investment.’ Further, Article 11 states explicitly that ‘All that is not written in the exclusive powers of the federal authorities is in the authority of the regions.’ That means that future exploration and exploitation of Iraq’s oil wealth will remain under the control of the regional authorities where the oil lies - the Kurdish-controlled North and the Shia-dominated South, insuring a future of impoverishment for the Sunni, secular and inter-mixed populations of Baghdad and Iraq’s center, and sets the stage for a future of ethnic and religious strife (Bennis 2005: online).” 4 “Although the party is religious and Shia in orientation, its core has always had a strong Iraqi identity. Indeed, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there were disputes in the party between those who agreed with the Iranian concept of wilayat al-faqih (‘‘rule of the Islamic jurist’’) and those who rejected clerical rule. One such group, which included an educated younger generation, favored Iraqi nationalism and democracy. Today Dawa leadership is a composite essentially of three exile groups: those who have been living in Iran, those from Syria and Lebanon, and those from England. Lacking an organized militia, they are at a disadvantage with their two Shia rivals, SCIRI and the Sadrists, both backed by armed units. Much of the party’s history was spent as a clandestine, underground movement that had little contact with the West and rejected many of its principles. While some Dawa leaders have had ties with Iran and have lived there, these ties are not as strong as SCIRI’s. Dawa’s main strength in the government lies in its current control of the prime ministry, the key political post.” (United States Institute for Peace in Cordesman 2007: 134-135) 308 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations only to anticipate the threat of insurgency and outside extremists infiltration” but also to “deploy elements of U.S. forces capable of dealing with counterinsurgency, and nation-building as U.S. forces advanced and in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the regime” (Cordesman 2006, xxii). Amidst all these errors, there are still accusations of corporative corruption, fraud and explorative contracts, overbilling of buildings and contracts, among others. Companies like Halliburton, Bechtel and others were constantly accused of taking advantage of the dramatic situation. Iraqi population was forced to pay high prices for imported oil, even being one of the largest producers in the world, thus benefiting transnational branches, like the giant Kellogg, Brown & Root (subsidiary of Halliburton). It was typical for the population to wait days in the queue to buy fuel for their cars. Likewise, the situation of schools, hospitals and electricity network was wretched (Arnove 2007, 78). The Iraqi army itself, traditionally the backbone and the source of cohesion of the country, was still in crumbs: In 2007, a Pentagon report to the U.S. Congress recognized that Iraq did not possess a single battalion able to operate independently of coalition forces (Arnove 2007, 108).

2.3 IRAQ’S CIVIL WAR (2006-2008)

As it have been seen, the post-invasion chaos, the flawed state-building process and the constant external interference in Iraqi internal affairs (mainly by US, England, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies) have led to the fragmentation of the country. In this sense, response from the Deputy Prime Minister of Saddam Hussein, Terek Aziz5, to a French journalist in 2002 illustrates the sectarianism problem in Iraq, as well as the alleged artificiality of its unit:

But Iraq is one of the oldest institutions in the world! Seven thousand years ago, it already existed as a state, with laws, with an army, with an administrative system. The current unit [2002] is not artificial! It is the continuation of history, in the form of a modern republic, which follows the rule of the Ottomans and the monarchy. Christians, whose installation is prior to Islam, remained, like the Kurds, in the north. Muslims came from the Arabian Peninsula, and fought the Persians who had settled. Christians stood beside him, to fight, as Arabs, the Persians who were atheists. The divisions between Arabs and non-Arabs, Sunnis or Shias, Christians or Muslims are fictitious. [...] There has never been a sectarian conflict between the different components of Iraqi society. You Europeans tend to apply your own criteria to the world, your particular vision.

5 Christian, Terek Aziz was an ancient member of the Ba-ath, as well as former Foreign Minister of Saddam Hussein (during the war with Iran); besides, he held the post of Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq until the fall of the regime in 2003. 309 United Nations Security Council

As the religious wars bloodied Europe for centuries, you conclude that between Shias and Sunnis can only be a bloody confrontation. [...] When I first joined the Baath, no one questioned me being a Christian. That is the reality of Iraq. This is why, despite wars and the embargo, all attempts to divide our society have failed (Aziz in Denaud 2003 81-82).

However, the actors involved in Iraq after U.S. occupation in 2003 dramatically changed the sectarian situation. Basically, three politico-ideological factions were developed. The first, formed by the coalition forces, by al-Maliki’s government and his Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and by the Kurds (Peshmerga6), including moderate Shias and some moderate Sunnis. The second, formed by some Ba’ath remnants (unified under the Supreme Command for Jihad and Liberation) and, mainly by Sunni fundamentalists of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)7. Finally, the third was formed by the Shia Sadrist movement8, embodied by its armed arm, Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM, or the Mahdi Army9), led by Muqtada al-Sadr10, and by the Shia fundamentalists from the Special Groups11 and from the Badr Brigades12.

6 “The Kurds have also their own militiamen force, allowed by Iraqi constitution, numbering perhaps 75,000 fighters and called peshmerga” (Katzman 2014, 13). 7 AQI also was called Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), after becoming the contemporaneous Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). 8 “Although identified with Moqtada al-Sadr and the rapid growth of his militias in 2003 and 2004, the movement actually has its origins in the ideas and networks of his father, Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, who was the leading Shi’a opponent of the regime inside Iraq in the 1990s. In terms of sheer power and ability to mobilize support, it certainly outweighs Dawa and successfully challenges SCIRI. While its leaders are not in the top rank of decision makers, it is now a force to be reckoned with on the street, in the UIA, and in the country” (United States Institute for Peace in Cordesman 2007: 315). 9 Militia formed by Sadr in 2004. It has been considered anti-U.S. The March 2007 “Measuring Stability” reports said this militia had “replaced AQ-I as the most dangerous accelerant of potentially selfsustaining sectarian violence in Iraq.” (Katzman 2009, 27). In 2007 August Sadr declared JAM’s ceasefire. 10 With great social bases in the lower classes, “al-Sadr remained the most activist Shi’ite religious leader, although he was still a relatively low-ranking cleric. A charismatic preacher, he continued to call for Coalition withdrawal and advocate a strongly religious Iraqi state” (Cordesman 2007, 312). 11 U.S. designation for some pro-Iranian militias: the Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, the Promised Days Brigades, and the Asa’ib Kata’ib Hezbollah. They get strong mainly after Mahdy Army had become just a political party. 12 “The Badr Brigades, because they are linked to the mainstream ISCI faction, have not been considered an anti-U.S. militia or an insurgent groups. During 2005-2007, ISCI’s Badr militia folded into the ISF, particularly the National Police and other police commando units. The Badr Brigades were originally recruited, trained, and equipped by Iran’s hardline force, the Revolutionary Guard, during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, in which Badr guerrillas conducted forays from Iran into southern Iraq to attack Saddam regime targets. Badr fighters were recruited from the ranks of Iraqi prisoners of war held in Iran. However, many Iraqi Shiites viewed ISCI as an Iranian puppet and Badr operations in southern” (Katzman 2009, 26). 310 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

In January 2006, the Mujahedeen Shura Council was created, “an insurgent umbrella group” that “unifies several neo-Salafi elements under the leadership of al-Qaeda” (Cordesman 2007, xxvii). Just over a month later, on February 22, 2006, the Shia shrine Askariya (“The Golden Mosque”) of 1.200 years was attacked in the holy city (Shia) of Samarra, 125 km north of Baghdad. In Askariya were deposited the bodies of the 10th and 11th of Shia Imams. Sunni AQI claimed the attacks, setting off a wave of unprecedented violence. Before long, dozens of mosques were destroyed by both parties, and several attacks occurred on urban centers related to the factions: the Shia’s groups conducted attacks in Anbar province and in Baghdad (where Sunnis are the majority), whereas AQI focused mainly in the Shia al-Sadr, in the suburb of Baghdad. A few months after the attack on the Golden Mosque, the country was experiencing a deadly Civil War, which lasted for at least two years. While practicing terrorist acts among themselves, the Sunni and Shia extremists in fact fought against government troops of al-Maliki, especially in Anbar province and its capital Ramadi, and in the cities of Fallujah, Basra, Baghdad and al-Sadr. The bulk of the battles against the coalition and ISF, however, had al-Sadr’s al-Mahdi as an adversary (Cordesman 2007, 310). Over the Civil War’s years, there were many internal cracks in Sunni side and among the Shias, some more nationalist, others more pro-Iran or pro-Salafists and Al-Qaeda. As seen in the table below, there was a substantial increase in civilian deaths in the period, mainly from the assassination of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of AQI, by US forces on June 7, 2006. According to Katzman (2009, 23-24), the strategy of al-Qaeda had always been to provoke a Civil War and weaken the central government and the coalition troops; the organization was responsible for about 90% of suicide bombings with high number of deaths. Their resources and methods were vast: rocket- propelled grenades (RPG), improvised explosive devices (IEDs), mortars, direct fire weapons, suicide attacks, and occasional mass kidnappings. These weapons systems as well as vast financial resources arrived by various means and came mainly from Saudi sheiks, but also from countries where al-Qaeda is stronger, such as Egypt, Pakistan and UAE (Dickinson 2013, 4). However, an important source of finance has always been the collection of tolls, robberies and extortions on the local population and tribal leaders. However, since 2006 end and early 2007, a movement among moderate Sunnis who sought to curb the extremism of Al-Qaeda and the Special Groups, began trying to promote reconciliation with the Shias and put end in the civil war, known as “Sunni Awakening” (Cordesman 2007, xviii). Compounded by former anti-American insurgents, these militias called themselves Sons of Iraq (SOI) and were commanded by tribal warlords funded, trained and monitored by the Pentagon (Duarte, 2013, 42-43). SOI personnel reached impressive numbers, about 95,000 men, while most of other factions (the Mahdi Army) had approximately 60,000

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(Katzman 2014, 24). These numbers are justifiable, since SOI was largely composed by the unemployed ex-soldiers that Paul Bremer retired in 2003. Almost at the same time, the United States, having realized the strengthening of extremist militias, worked to reshape its troops in Iraq, in what became known as the strategy of “surge”: 35,000 men were added to those already 130,000 stationed at the time (International Crisis Group 2008, 2). According to Duarte (2013, 42), in addition to this surge, a more attentive approach with the more moderate Sunni started to be implemented (like SOI), and these groups were monitored and received tactical and operational support from American troops when needed. Gradually, these strategies started working, fighting al-Qaida and co-opting the most moderate groups. There was a process of delegation of responsibilities to these leaders, mainly with the transfer of funds to help rebuild the Iraqi infrastructure. This resulted in a fall of violence to normal levels (2003-2006) since the end of 2007 as well as considerable decrease in Sunni-Shia clashes, a situation that remained stable until the US withdrawal in 2011 (Duarte 2013, 43).

2.4 U.S. WITHDRAWAL

In the 2010 elections, as in 2005, the Sunnis decided to resort to the boycott, since most of their candidates had their applications denied by the government of al-Maliki, allegedly for having links with the Ba’ath (Fadel 2010). Thus, the door was opened to Shia parties. An opposition party (but also pro-coalition), which have been with most of the seats in Congress — the Iraqi National Movement (INM) of Ayad Allawi, which includes Shias and Sunnis, won 24.72% of the accents. The Shia coalition government, led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki got 24.22%, while a third party (Shia also) — the National Iraqi Alliance of al-Jaafari - which includes much of the Sadrist Movement, won 18.2% of the total seats (Cordesman and Khazai 2014, 10). In 2010, negotiations between the Iraqi government and the US failed to reach an agreement about coalition troops’ permanence in Iraq. The United States made a requisition including the full immunity for its nationals in Iraq, which was the biggest disagreement of the negotiations, since this would block the Iraqi justice to judge any act committed by thousands of Americans in the country (Cordesman and Khazai 2014, 11). This point was a matter of national interest and of great popular appeal, considering recurrent scandals of abuse, torture and human rights’ violations by both the US military, and by contracted officials from military and private security companies (PMSC)13 — the prime example was Abu Ghraib prison case, where photos

13 The PMSC were present in Iraq since the beginning of the US occupation and can be divided on Private Military Companies (PMC) and Private Security Companies (PSC). The first one, in 312 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations of US officials torturing and humiliating Iraqi (mostly Sunnis) prisoners leaked. In this sense, considering the loss of immunity as an unacceptable condition, on October 11, 2011 President Barrack Obama announced the US full withdraw by the end of that year (Cordesman and Khazai 2014, 8), as indeed occurred. Before that, however, a bilateral agreement was signed between the two countries, — the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) — which sought to dictate the foundations for US-Iraq economic and security cooperation, aimed to demonstrate that the US would remain concerned about the future of Iraq14. The US left Iraq emerged in a sectarian turmoil intensified by the March 2010 elections, and in a very different situation than planned by neoconservatives since the 90s: while declaring US loyalty, Maliki has kept strong links with Iran (Cordesman and Khazai 2014, 10). He also showed a series of disagreements with Washington, especially in the last two years of American presence in Iraq as noted above. Besides having lost substantial credibility, the US had about 4,486 dead and 33,183 soldiers seriously injured. Much worse, however, were the Iraqi numbers: about 1.5 million dead during the nine years of occupation and more than 3 million people displaced from their homes, many of them with no inclination to return to their areas of origin, considering the lack of public security and basic services, or simply because their homes no longer exist (Bandeira 2013, 144).

theory, primarily supports coalition troops and ISF in matter of logistics, while the latter are usually contacted by transnational corporations to protect their territory and property (Isenberg 2008, 29). However, both are portions of the same problem: the irresponsibility that might be generated due to accountability’s absence. There are several cases that contracted personnel have opened fire against civilians without any apparent reason. The most famous case occurred in September 2007 when one of the largest PMSC operating in Iraq, Blackwater, without receiving any prior attack, killed 17 civilians and wounded 20 more in Nisour Square, Baghdad, when escorting a convoy of diplomats (Isenberg, 2008, 79). The case has generated outrage in Iraqi society even within the administration itself and eventually leading to the elimination of complete immunity to PMSC by country legislators in 2007, although it just has been applied since 2009 (Palau-Loverdos and Armendáriz 2011, 48). The numbers of mercenaries were impressive, estimated, in 2008, nearing 30,000 employees by agencies linked to the US and over 48,000 linked to construction companies, agencies and international organizations, NGOs and other private companies (Palau-Loverdos and Armendariz 2011, 34). Even nowadays, PMSCs represent a point of instability in Iraq, since they are practically armed militias in the service of companies, who want to protect their property and employees from any potential threat: about 10,000 contractors remain engaged in Iraq nowadays (Katzman 2014, 35). 14 Among SFA provisions were some U.S. commitments: never use Iraqi facilities to launch any attacks against a third nation, nor would seek permanent bases in Iraq; commitment in investing in the Iraqi infrastructure sectors, especially electricity, oil and gas. Iraq and its economic development would also be encouraged through the Dialogue on Economic Cooperation and the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (Cordesman and Khazai 2014, 9). 313 United Nations Security Council

2.5 POST-OCCUPATION: THE MALIKI’S NEW ERA

Since the US withdrawal at the end of 2011 and the Syrian Civil War eruption in the same year, the situation in Iraq has worsened. The country has been suffering with the reemergence of violent Shia militias and Sunni extremists movements like al-Qaeda and ISIS. Moreover, according to Cordesman and Khazai,

it suffers from pressure from Iran and near isolation by several key Arab states. It has increasingly become the victim of the forces unleashed by the Syrian civil war. Iraq is a nation burdened by […] the failure to create a viable political system and effective governance in the years that followed [the invasion]. It is a nation that is deeply divided along sectarian and ethnic lines and whose internal divisions have become steadily deeper and more violent since US and other outside forces left at the end of 2011 (Cordesman and Khazai 2014, 3).

Iraq’s problems are primarily the result of sectarian divisions fostered by several actors, with a system of government that only deepens such situation, as has been previously seen. Moreover, it is noticed that, from 2011 onwards, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki sought to strengthen its authority within the political scenario of the country, centralizing power in his figure through various ways, such as appointing weak and subservient officials to key departments, such as Defense, Interior and National Security. Furthermore, many opponents have accused Maliki of using Iraq’s 14,000-men from the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) and the Iraqi Special Operations Force (ISOF) to intimidate their Sunni opponents (Katzman 2014, 21). Indeed, some actions of Maliki did proceed in that direction, as when, on December 19, 2011, one day after US has left the country, he ordered the arrest of his Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi (head of the largest Sunni party Hiraqiyya) by murder accusations. Hashimi received asylum in Turkey, while a court in Baghdad condemned him to death. A year later, in another case that generated major impact, Maliki pushed over his finance minister Rafi al-Issawi, also a Sunni, arresting ten of his bodyguards under murder charges. Rafi al-Issawi resigned as minister and took refuge in Anbar province with other Sunni leaders (Katzman 2014, 21-22). This situation has been generating a wave of anger among the Sunni population, which began feeling discriminated and excluded of Iraqi society. The unity feature that characterized Maliki’s government between 2005 and 2009 elections completely disappeared. His approach to Iran was also source of criticism among Sunnis, who still had fresh memories of the 1980-88 war. The Iraqi Security Forces are predominantly Shia, while much of the nation’s prison population is Sunni. The de-ba’athfication process had deepened still further. Even moderate Sunnis like some of the Sons of Iraq, whose role as a Maliki ally had always been essential to Iraq’s stability, were unhappy with the Prime Minister, mainly because

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Maliki only trusted light and ineffective weapons to them. This authoritarianism of al-Maliki, along with charges of corruption, nepotism and racism, spawned protests in major Sunni provinces such as Anbar, Salahuddin and Nineveh (Cordesman and Khazai 2014, 129-131). However, the Sunni population was not alone in complaining about Maliki’s actions. The Kurds protested that their constitutional autonomy was being denied by Baghdad. The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)15 wanted to export oil to Turkey directly, without interference from Baghdad. In January 2014, this resulted in a crisis, when the KRG built itself a pipeline that ran through much of the Turkish territory, completely ignoring an existing pipeline controlled by the central government of Iraq (Cordesman and Khazai 2014, 15). Naturally, in these terms, all profits from the deal would be retained by KRG. This kind of clash with the Kurds is becoming increasingly usual, what hardly happened when the country was occupied. In March 2013, the Kurdish ministers suspended their participation in the Maliki government. The turning point of Maliki’s legitimacy seems to have been the Erbil Agreement (2010), which represented an initiative from the opposition to participate actively in the administration’s decision-making processes. The agreement dictated power sharing among regions and ethnic groups, factions, and more regionalized divisions of gains from oil and natural gas. Maliki, alleging that the proposal was unconstitutional, refused to sign it, causing revolt among opposition leaders (Cordesman and Khazai 2014, 15, 108).

15 “The Iraqi Kurds have long been divided between two main factions—the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, PUK, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, KDP. The two have abided by a power sharing arrangement forged in 2007, but they have a history of disputes and sometimes armed confrontation. The KRG has a President, Masoud Barzani, directly elected in July 2009, an elected Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA, sometimes called the Kurdistan Parliament of Iraq, or KPI), and an appointed Prime Minister. Since January 2012, the KRG Prime Minister has been Nechirvan Barzani (Masoud’s nephew), who returned to that post after three years during in which the post was held by PUK senior figure Barham Salih. Masoud Barzani’s son, Suroor, heads a KRG “national security council.” Over the past five years, however, a new faction has emerged as a significant group in Kurdish politics—Gorran (Change), a PUK breakaway. The electoral success of Gorran, coupled with the continued infirmity of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani (head of the PUK), has shifted Kurdish political strength to the KDP” (Katzman 2014, 13). According to Cordesman and Khazai (2014, 167), “the Peshmerga now present the problem that they act as an independent force along the uncertain border between the KRG and the areas controlled by the central government. Even during the time US forces were present, there was several times when the Peshmerga and Iraqi Security forces had limited clashes and confrontations that could have led to much wider fighting.” 315 United Nations Security Council

2.6 THE RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE

These centralizing actions produced an unstable environment, where sectarian polarization increased even more. Over time, arrangements for sharing power and responsibilities between central management and regional leaders, one of the factors responsible for the post-civil war stabilization (2006-2008), were crumbling. Several extremist groups were still armed, just waiting for instability to return (Katzman 2014, 9). Dissatisfaction against Maliki, and the related protests constituted the expected opportunity for such groups (AQI/ISIS mainly) to increase jihadist’s recruitment, as well and grew their legitimacy before the Iraqi population. Moreover, the Syrian civil war attracted many foreign jihadists to the region, with a spillover effect of violence and weapons spreading. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) took advantage of this, reinforcing their extremist ideas, as well as their Salafi pan-regionalism: it empowered the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), expanding its actions into Syrian territory, always seeking to align itself with al-Nusra – the affiliate of al-Qaeda in Syria. The Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS)16, through their leader Harith al-Dari, considered one of the greatest Sunni intellectuals, declared that the “Iraqi government [is] illegitimate because it is a result of [US] occupation…Maliki has attacked the people, so the people defended themselves, rose up and revolted. So it has now been transformed into a revolution” (Cordesman and Khazai 2014, 22). During the first third of 2013, the number of protests has increased substantially, most resulting in brutal repression, which constantly produced civilian deaths and casualties (Katzman 2014, 18). Sunni leaders have started calling his followers to take up arms and overthrow Maliki from power. In the political scene, Sunni party Iraqiyya abandoned the Iraqi congress. Violence levels have become disturbing: 2013 recorded the highest death and casualties numbers since 2007. By the end of 2013, violence escalated further. ISIS’ advances were supported, in addition to Sunni insurgents, by ISF defectors, by some members from SOI and by other jihadists (Katzman 2014, 21). Soon, many cities fell under ISIS control. In early 2014, ISIS’ head, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, claimed to be the general command of al-Qaeda forces throughout the Levant, leading to a schism between ISIS and al-Nusra, in Syria. This split included many conflagrations between both factions, forcing al-Qaeda’s overall leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, to intervene against Baghdadi (Cordesman and Khazai 2014, 188). However, Iraqi insurgents belong also to other groups than ISIS only. There are still many ex-Ba’athists, as the Naqshabandi Order (JRTN), which houses many former military officers of Saddam Hussein, dispensed in 2003. Moreover, the Sons

16 Created after US 2003 invasion, AMS claims being Sunni population’s representative in Iraq. According to Cordesman and Khazai (2014, 22), the AMS “consolidated ties with Islamist fighters and ‘acknowledged a temporary alliance with al-Qaeda’ and denounced the Shia led government in Baghdad”. 316 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations of Iraq, although mostly loyal to the central government (and part of its payroll), lost some members to the insurgency. Shia groups, although initially restricted to supporting the ISF against Sunnis, now, from the middle of 2013 onwards, in response to attacks on their holy places, started conducting retaliatory attacks also by themselves (Katzman 2014, 10-11). On April 30 of 2014, Iraq held general elections. The electoral system is unicameral (with a Council of Representatives, COR) and the Prime Minister is elected by internal vote through parliament. While still chaotic and beset in several cities, Iraq’s electoral process was relatively calm. Allegations of fraud appeared, but on May 19 the Higher Election Commission (IHEC) announced the results: Maliki’s coalition managed better than expected, keeping the majority of the seats (Katzman 2014, 24). Shortly after breaking up with al-Nusra, Baghdadi also broke with the central al-Qaeda. The latter, through its leader Zawahiri, declared that ISIS is very extremist, classifying Baghdadi as expansionist and irresponsible. On June 10, insurgents led by ISIS advanced on Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq, almost without resistance from the Iraqi Army: Iraqi generals immediately removed their uniforms and flew away; most soldiers defected or were massacred. Such facility in conquering Mosul exposed the precariousness of Iraqi forces. In addition to poorly equipped, the Army has suffering for years with tribalism and corruption that diverted the scarce resources that would be allocated to supplies and acquisitions. In a few days, the rebels took much of North and West of the country. In order to protect the important city of Kirkuk (oil rich and considered an historical capital for Kurdish people), the Central Government of Kurdistan sent his peshmerga militia to guard it, since the Iraqi army also abandoned the city. This, in practice, enlarged the Kurdish controlled area, and its rulers have declared that the peshmerga would not leave soon. Mosul’s fall can be considered a turning point of ISIS overwhelming rise. Since then, together with the territorial gains in Syria, the group now holds significant independence of resources in relation to their donors – as seen, individuals from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and Turkey, mainly. Soon there were rumors that about US$ 400 million were stolen just a bank in Mosul, although sources indicate that there is relevant evidence of the fact (Kenner 2014). However, the group quickly increased their capabilities, whether through compulsory taxation on local people or by looting the rich markets of Mosul. They also seized huge amount of armored vehicles, main battle tanks, artillery pieces and assault weapons left behind by the retreating Iraqi army (Zarete & Sanderson 2014). However, it should be noted that, alongside ISIS, many Baathists and other Sunni groups control the city. In this context of justified euphoria, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has dissolved Sykes-Picot Syria-Iraq border and proclaimed the Caliphate. Additionally, stressed

317 United Nations Security Council that now the group name would be simply ‘Islamic State’. In the statement, ISIS calls upon all Muslims to pledge subservience to the new Caliph Ibrahim, Baghdadi’s original name (McQuaid 2014, 12). This, according to the announcement, makes all institutions (including modern States) irrelevant: everything is subordinated to the Caliphate (McQuaid 2014, 12). Although it was almost immediately condemned by most Islamic leadership (including Sunnis), this news wowed thousands of Muslims throughout the world, especially the Syrian and Iraqi insurgents, who finally found themselves represented by their own state. In August the numbers of foreign fighters fighting alongside the ISIS were around 3,000, coming from at least 81 different countries (BBC 2014b). Encompassing more than 90,000 square kilometers (same size of Jordan), the territory controlled by ISIS goes from Raqqa in Syria to Mosul, Tikrit and Fallujah north Baghdad, as shown in Figure 2. The new Caliphate also controls much of Syrian oil and gas fields, and several Iraqi refineries. Operations are financed by the sale of these resources in the black market, generating US$ 1 to 3 million a day (Johnson 2014), in addition to the electricity supply taxes and extortion money from kidnapping and other taxation (Packer 2014). Importantly, although declining in percentage terms, part of the budget still comes from foreign donors. Huge amount of resources (vehicles, weapons and money) is also stolen or diverted from other Syrian opposition groups, including the moderate ones that are financed by the West.

Image 2 - Islamic State Controlled Area

Source: BBC.

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However, the strength of ISIS cannot be explained only by these conditions. According Yochi Dreazen (2014), the militants are becoming efficient in ruling the conquered territory, gaining significant popular support and hindering its expulsion. According to him, the American intelligence already identified methods similar to the Lebanese group Hezbollah, which provides to local people basic services like electricity, water, sewage, security and justice. Additionally, the organization kept many local politicians and bureaucrats in their jobs. This led the counterinsurgency expert David Killcullen (former adviser to Gen. David Petraeus) to assert that “ISIS is the most dangerous terrorist group in the world because they combine the fighting capabilities of al Qaeda with the administrative capabilities of Hezbollah”, being clear that “they have a state-building schedule and an understanding of the then importance of effective governance” (Dreazen 2014, online). The United States’ Defense Secretary, Chuck Hegel, stated that the group is more sophisticated and well-funded than any other ever seen (Aljazeera 2014b). In early August, about 1,100 American military advisors were already in Iraq, in order to protect the embassy and its staff in Baghdad, as well as American citizens in Erbil, the Kurdish capital and an important commercial center (Packer 2014). August witnessed the most important events of the year since then. First, the ISIS advances over the town of Sinjar, capital of Yazigi minority, decimating thousands of people, making an even greater amount refuge in the mountains near the city and causing a humanitarian crisis. In addition, the group marched toward and sieged Erbil, which is located 40 km West of Mosul. Almost immediately, the Kurdish and Iraqi central government called for international help to contain the group. Four days later, President Barrack Obama authorizes limited airstrikes to protect Erbil and provide coverage for the withdrawal of the displaced Yazigis, creating a humanitarian corridor with participation of USA, UK, Turkey and the Kurds (Lubold 2014). The advance on Erbil was somewhat unexpected, since ISIS already fought on two fronts (against Assad Army in Syria and against the Iraqi Army) and even then had a distant relationship with the peshmerga. Few hours after the first American air strikes, a channel of arms transfer directly to the Kurds appeared (an unprecedented fact, until them everything passed through Baghdad) coming from the United States, United Kingdom and France (Aljazeera, 2014a; Whitlock & Jaffe 2014), days after Italy and Germany started the same process (Siebold & Landucci 2014). In the same speech he announced the attacks, Obama emphasized the urgent need for a new and more inclusive government in Iraq, urging that Maliki transfer the power to Haider al-Abadi, also Shia and Dawa Party member, been recommended by Iraq President, Fouad Massoum. This was the period in which Nouri al-Maliki has lost virtually any support that supported him in power even with the growing criticism, in the external spectrum – from Iran and U.S – and in the internal one – from his own party and from Ayatollah al-Sistani, the main

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Iraqi Shia leader. Although Maliki has outlined a desire to remain in office even by force, just days after the strikes, he announced that it would peacefully transfer the command to al-Abadi within a month. Since then, the air attacks did not cease, targeting in a daily basis ISIS’ advanced positions near Erbil and Mosul, as well as key points and leadership in the whole country, mainly using F/A-18 carrier-based fighters and attack drones. These actions have provoked reactions in some fundamentalist groups throughout the world. The most prominent were the statements supporting ISIS from the main Al Qaeda branch in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and from the Nigerian militants of Boko Haram – who already put itself as part of the Islamic caliphate (Aljazeera 2014; Al-Moshki 2014). In addition, there are reports that Iran has also conducted some operations in conjunction with the Kurds in the north, seeking to keep the extremists away, but Tehran denies the fact (Aljazeera 2014c). South from Mosul, the Iraqi army and some Shiite militias still fighting the ISIS to retake the oil rich cities of Tikrit and Baiji. For now, the Kurdish area seem to be safe with the help of the United States Air Force. However, the Iraqi forces remains weak. The solution of a New Sunni Awakening to send away the extremists, as it was in the Civil War of 2006-2008, is in the agenda discussed (Downing 2014). However, none of the promises made to the Sunni leaders at that time were met: their militias were not incorporated into the Iraqi forces, their political participation remained null and repression of Sunnis continued to grow. As seen, it even took many of these local leaders to support ISIS or other extremist groups. However, with Maliki fall and the diplomatic intervention of the United States, some leaders already waved that are willing to fight the rebels, but this time the requirements are even more relevant: they want heavier weapons and more federal autonomy (Downing 2014). This, together with the already troubled situation in Kurdistan, now with peshmerga strengthened politically and militarily, may lead to the dismemberment of the country. With ISIS virtually surrounding Baghdad, the Kurds constant clashing with the central government and with the Caliphate connecting the Syrian civil war and the chaos in the other side of the border, Iraq’s future is, thus, unpredictable. It faces the problems created by oil overdependence, which generates 90% of government revenue and is 80% of its international trade. Moreover, since 2003, significant efforts in Iraq’s regeneration has been very slow. Accordingly, the country is currently experiencing a crisis in their own government and its administrative structure, which produces increasing sectarianism levels, high unemployment taxes (20% of adults) and endemic poorness (23% of Iraqis lives below the “absolute poverty line”). This situation gets even more complex when considering Iraq’s strategic geopolitical position and the burden generated by this, thus being involved in regional and global rivalries at the same time that country struggles to get out of another Civil War with at least 1.3 million people displaced from their homes (BBC 2014).

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3 PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS

As previously noted, the Iraqi crisis involves the future of the entire region. However, the most substantive actions taken so far have been taken bilaterally, between Iraq and a second country: Iran, USA, Turkey, Jordan, among others. One possible cause, and a factor hampering this conciliation, is the need for de facto cooperation between historical rivals, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq, USA and Jordan. Even though the current situation in the country is directly linked to the Syrian Civil War, there are no significant multilateral efforts that take into consideration the two cases as one. In this sense, and given the political, sectarian and regional contest for leadership, the case of the Kurds seems to be very significant. After years of instability involving the Kurdish majority province north of Baghdad and their demands for self-rule, much of the international community declares that Iraq ought to remain unitary, although some recent actions went in another direction (as the case of Turkey receiving oil directly from Iraqi Kurdistan). Accordingly, in a recent statement, the Arab League, besides condemning the recent extreme actions of ISIS, also “reiterated its commitment to respecting Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, political stability, national unity and rejecting any interference in its internal affairs” (Middle East Monitor 2014: online).

3.1 UN ROLE IN IRAQ

Meanwhile, the United Nations has been dealing with the Iraqi situation for over three decades. However, it was in the 1990s, after the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein, that the UN, through the UNSC, began to play a key role in the Iraqi issue and even in the daily routine of its people. As explained earlier, this was due to the sanctions imposed by the UNSC (Resolution 661), which primarily aimed to punish Saddam for his destabilizing acts and also to prevent the country from developing capabilities that could threaten the stability of Middle East, as well as threatening its own people. This was the case of mass destruction weapons (chemical, biological and nuclear) and their warhead delivery vectors (mainly missiles and rockets of medium and long ranges) (Resolution 687, 707, 715, 1051 and 1441)17. As previously mentioned, the UNSC opposed the 2003 US-UK-led invasion of Iraq, but was overruled by these powers. Aware that the action of punishing the perpetrators (US and UK) would not help the reconstruction of the country the UNSC decided to participate in this process with Resolutions 1483 (05/2003) and 1500

17 It should be recalled here the very context of these actions, which took place in a time marked by the Pax Americana of the 1990s, coupled with the low profile of the Russian and Chinese politics at the time, had direct effects on UNSC actions (Visentini 2012). 321 United Nations Security Council

(08/2003). The documents defined a Special Representative for Iraq (the Brazilian diplomat Sergio Vieira de Mello), the creation of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and the adoption of a new role for the organization in the country, based on auxiliary functions and limited liability (Katzman 2009, 19). However, just three months after the establishment of the Special Representative in Iraq, the UN headquarters in Baghdad was the target of a car bomb: 15 staff members were killed, including Sergio Vieira de Mello. This fact caused the organization to retreat and rethink its model of humanitarian aid in Iraq (Katzman 2009, 19). Only in 2004, under strong U.S. pressure, the UN actually returned to the country in order to collaborate with its democratization, mainly through the formation of an interim Iraqi government, which was confirmed by Resolution 1546, endorsing the creation of the Iraqi Interim Government. Since then, the UNSC resolutions on Iraq have extended UNAMI’s mandate, the last of which (Resolution 2169/2014) protracted it until July 31, 2015 (UNSC 2014d). Accordingly, UNAMI’s role has not changed much since its introduction, having mainly a conciliatory role, especially among Arabs and Kurds, in addition to the significant role involving elections and the formation of new government (Katzman, 2009, 19). Moreover, attention should be paid to the fact that Iraq went through a Civil War (2006-2008) without the UNSC’s significant attention; in fact, the UN role at that time was, apart from claims for ceasefire, only played through statements supporting U.S.’ and UNAMI’s minor actions. Therefore, it is possible to realize that throughout the American occupation the UN had a timid role in the reconstruction of Iraq. Since the withdrawal of troops from the Coalition in 2011, the situation has not changed: even after growing conflagrations between ethnic groups, fundamentalist militias and Iraqi official forces, the UN, and especially the UNSC, seem to fail in giving proper attention to Iraq and the geopolitical situation that encompasses it. Concerning the rise of ISIS, the United Nations has declared its highest level of emergency in the country in mid-August, after the Yazidis massacre (Aljazeera 2014e). In addition, the Security Council, through its President Mark Lyall Grant (United Kingdom), has released a press statement supporting the new Prime- Minister Haider al-Abadi. The nomination was “an important step towards the formation of an inclusive Government that represents all segments of the Iraqi population and that contributes to finding a viable and sustainable solution to the country’s current challenges” (UNSC 2014a). In the Resolution 2169 (2014), the Security Council expressed grave concern over the Iraqi humanitarian crisis, condemning the attacks perpetrated by terrorist groups. It also stressed, “the only way to address this threat is for all Iraqis to work together by addressing needs in the security as well as the political realm” (UNSC 2014d), emphasizing the importance of UNAMI and the international community

322 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations supporting these efforts. However, substantive actions addressing the issue are scarce. Once again demonstrating the importance of the debate concerning the real role the United Nations should play in Iraq. However, a more relevant measure was materialized in the Resolution 2170, adopted on August 15, 2014 (UNSC 2014e). In the document, UNSC first condemns ISIS’ violent actions, as well as its international supporters, who are channeling money and weapons to the group. Second, it “calls upon all Member States to take national measures to suppress the flow of foreign terrorist fighters” to Iraq and Syria. Third, it express concern that oil fields owned by ISIS and other groups are generating great income, increasing their material and personal capabilities: any state facilitating or involved in financing extremists may lead be target of sanctions, according to the resolution. Lastly, the Council includes ISIS in the same situation of al-Qaeda in the Resolution 2161 (UNSC 2014c), recommending asset freeze and travel bans over individuals or institutions that are linked to the extremists, and proposing an arms embargo over these actors. Six new suspect donors were add in the al-Qaeda Sanctions List. The situation in Iraq requires political and institutional creativity both at the bilateral and, especially, at the multilateral level. It is necessary to deal with controversial issues that have hindered the country’s reconstruction, jeopardizing Iraq’s stability. The free flow of money and weapons to militants in places like Iraq and Syria must be held accountable. In addition, policies that promote sectarianism or separatism (Kurds) cannot be tolerated. In this sense, another gap to be filled is the new situation created by the merging of the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, which cannot be treated separately, as ISIS’ expansion has shown.

4 BLOC POSITIONS

The United States closely follows the development of the situation in Iraq. According to Washington, Iraqi security forces have proved unable to defend some portions of the territory, a fact that jeopardizes Iraq and its people and that, in the future, can affect American interests in the region (Harris 2014). The U.S. warned other Arab States, especially allies such as Jordan, about the threat ISIS poses for them. Congress is analyzing President Obama’s request for financial support to equip members of the moderate Syrian opposition in order to avoid spillover from the crisis in Syria to Iraq and from the crisis in Iraq to Syria (Cooper 2014). Washington has supplied ISF with military equipment and has sent 300 American military advisers to Iraq to set up joint operation centers (Cooper 2014). In addition, 1,100 U.S. elite troops have been deployed to Iraq to provide security to the American Embassy, the Baghdad airport and other facilities in the

323 United Nations Security Council country (Packer 2014). Those troops, specified the president, will not assume combat roles. The United States declared that its first option to deal with the situation is diplomacy, so that those involved can resolve the crisis without resorting to violence or depend on the American Army (Strange & Merat 2014). However, Washington has already sent ships to the Gulf (Al Jazeera 2014) and conducted airstrikes against ISIS, aiming, as affirmed, to protect American personnel, Iraqi minorities, important cities and infrastructure such as the Mosul dam (Lubold & Stackpole 2014). Obama also has authorized surveillance drones on Syrian territory, letting the door open to future airstrikes in that country (Lubold & Sobel 2014). The White House states that any action taken by the U.S. is to be combined with the efforts of the Iraqi Government to promote stability and ensure the legitimate interests of all communities in the country (Obama 2014). Furthermore, to Washington, the Kurds’ support and association to the Iraqi government is essential to keep the country united and capable of fighting the threat (The American Interest 2014). In addition, Washington is arming and offering air support to the Kurdistan Regional Government’s fighters, the peshmerga (Van den Toorn 2014). The United Kingdom believes that the primary responsibility to deal with ISIS terrorism and with Iraq’s chaotic security situation rests in the Iraqi authorities. Although London has excluded the possibility of military action and is working together with the U.S. to find a solution to the crisis, sources assert that the debate over the issue is in development. Shubert (2014) stated that the Labour party leadership “is not ruling anything out regarding the backing of military involvement in the tumultuous north of Iraq, and that the party is closely monitoring the situation. However, according to the Prime Minister, even though Britain is engaging in a warplane mission in Iraq to monitor ISIS, British forces will not be sent to fight the terrorists. Cameron also stated that Britain would look favorably to Kurdish forces’ request for arms (Watt 2014). UK’s main objectives are three: stabilize the situation, prevent the deterioration of the humanitarian condition and achieve a union between the Iraqi leadership so they can build a unified response to the aggression (UK 2014b). The United Kingdom intends to offer Iraq support, so that the country can withstand the attacks against its government and prevent ISIS to gain control of the territory and incite sectarianism among Sunnis and Shias. Finally, the UK links the crisis in Iraq with the brutality of Bashar al-Assad’s rule in Syria; to control this spillover effect, London is providing security support for governments in the region, such as Lebanon and Jordan (UK 2014a). France declares its support to Iraqi authorities in their fight against terrorism, calling for the establishment of a national unity. According to the French, only with the inclusion of all components of society in Iraq’s political life and institutions would enable the achievement of a sustainable solution to the current instability. For them, the advancement of ISIS endangers the unity and sovereignty of Iraq and threatens

324 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations the stability of the region as a whole, a fact that demands an assertive response of the international community (France 2014). Considering the current situation in Iraqi Kurdistan catastrophic, Paris will start supplying arms to the Kurdish forces fighting against ISIS (Aljazeera 2014a). France is an active participant in the EUJUST LEX, the European Union mission to train Iraqi civilians to assist in the strengthening of the Iraqi state (France ONU 2014). Paris also has substantive bilateral relations with Iraq, especially in the area of security cooperation and counter-terrorism, providing investigative training and exchanging intelligence information, among others. According to France, the response to the crisis cannot be only military, having also to be political. The country’s means of action involve support to Iraqi authorities and mobilization of the international community to fight terrorism (France 2014). In addition, the French Government also believes that Iraq must work with the United Nations to provide humanitarian assistance to its population, stressing the key role of UNAMI in the crisis (France ONU 2014). Australia sees the situation in Iraq as a serious threat to international peace, demonstrating great concern with the possibility of part of Iraqi territory falling under the unrestricted control of the militants of ISIS. Australia is also alarmed with the possibility of spillover to the region and with the developments of the humanitarian issue in Iraq (Glenday 2014a). According to the Australian Government, the current analyzed possibility of action refers to financial aid and humanitarian assistance, not ground troops. However, Prime Minister Tony Abbott does not rule out military involvement in Iraq in face of a situation of a “potential genocide” (Halliday 2014). The country is working together with the United States to pull off a response to the crisis (Glenday 2014b). China has major interests in ensuring that the Iraqi crisis reaches a fast and well structured resolution, since the escalating violence poses a threat to the Chinese energy interests and is condemned by Beijing’s foreign policy principles. The growing influence of terrorist groups and their impact in domestic terrorism is a great concern for the PRC, so it has been heavily investing in global anti-terrorist efforts. With the objective of increasing its role in the Arab world and to respond to ISIS advances, People’s Republic of China has pledged to increase bilateral cooperation with Iraq, mainly in the security realm. Maliki’s government has always been an important partner to China, being one of the main destinies of Chinese foreign investments in the region. Notwithstanding, Beijing doesn’t want to get directly involved in the Iraqi conflict and also advocates against foreign intervention, resorting to dialogue to solve the crisis (Tiezzi 2014). To the Chinese government, foreign airstrikes may trigger further escalation of the conflict and lead to humanitarian disasters that affect mostly civilians (China 2011). In addition, PRC supports Iraq’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and praises Iraqi Government’s efforts to promote political reconciliation and

325 United Nations Security Council maintain national stability (Keck 2014); claiming that self-determination should not necessarily involve national independence and that stateless nations are not necessarily to be given states, the Chinese consider that the Kurds’ demand for independence endangers Iraq’s territorial integrity and national security (Shichor 1969). Opposition to all kinds of separatist movements is a principle of Beijing’s foreign policy. The Russian Federation claims that the US-led invasion of 2003 and the improper restructuring of Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussain are the causes of the current crisis (The Daily Star 2014b). For the Kremlin, terrorism is escalating in the region because the U.S. occupation did not pay attention to Iraq’s internal political processes nor facilitated national dialogue, pursuing only its own interests. In addition, according to the Russians, the US forces withdrew from Iraq at a time when the Iraqi military was still far from prepared to ensure law and order throughout its territory (The Voice of Russia 2014). Russia is extremely worried about the outbreak of large-scale terrorism encompassing Iraq and Syria, which may affect other countries in the region and the international community in general. Moscow affirms that it is solidly behind the actions of Baghdad to decisively confront ISIS and aims to provide practical support to the Iraqi authorities in their struggle against terrorism: Up until now, the Iraqi government has already confirmed receiving from Moscow five Su-25 jets, an air-ground support and anti-terrorism mission aircraft (Russia Today 2014). The solution for the crisis, according to the Kremlin, depends on the achievement of a national consensus and on an inclusive dialogue with all Iraqi communities (Russia MFA 2014). Like the other members of the Arab League, Jordan shows great concern with the deterioration of the security situation of Iraq, strongly condemning the recent wave of terrorist attacks. Amman is troubled by the advances ISIS has made in Iraqi territory and, as ISIS fighters have reached the border between Iraq and Jordan, the Jordanian border guards reinforced troops, tanks and armor along the frontier to stop any advances by ISIS into Jordanian ground (Booth & Luck 2014). The government believes that Iraqi democratic forces must work together, on the basis of the Constitution, to overcome the crisis. The joint action of the political and military forces from Iraq and the Government of Kurdistan is also seen as an important step towards restoring security in the regions taken by ISIS (EEAS 2014). Being a strong ally to the west, Jordan has hosted the US lead training of the Iraqi Security Forces, working closely to Washington to build its own counterterrorism forces and to delineate a regional response to ISIS advances (Hussein 2014). Nonetheless, Jordan rejects any attempt of external interference in the domestic affairs of Iraq (Trend 2014). Finally, the country states that it is imperative that the international community applies the sanctions set out in resolutions 1267 and the 1989 UN on ISIS (EEAS 2014). Argentina stresses that international cooperation is an important step to achieve peace and stability in Iraq and believes that initiatives such as UNAMI are essential to

326 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations structure the Iraqi society. For the country, it is important for the region as a whole to be involved in the search for a solution to the crisis. Argentina believes that an integrated approach should be the basis for any Security Council plan, not focusing only on the security aspect, but also on the political and social spheres (Tokatlian 2013). According to the government, Iraq’s stability is closely related to the reconciliation between the national communities and the strengthening of the country’s institutions, led by its own citizens. Argentina also worries about the humanitarian issue, especially with the civilians killed in terrorist attacks (UNSC 2013a). Chad encourages UN missions such as UNAMI, given their important role in the targeted country’s stability and political and economic development. Chad shows great concern for the protection of civilians and the respect for human rights, defending the supply of humanitarian aid to Iraqi population. Chad believes it is very important that the neighboring countries all get involved in the search for a solution to the crisis, and supports a political resolution to the situation (UNSC 2014c). As well as Chad, Chile reiterates the importance of protecting civilians, responsibility of Iraqi authorities. According to the country, it is necessary to ensure the Iraqi population access to humanitarian assistance. The United Nations should continue its presence in Iraq through the works of UNAMI. For Chile, the growth of terrorism in some regions is alarming, and it is essential to empower national forces to face the threats and challenges posed by this type of action; in this sense, the country encourages bilateral security agreements (UNSC 2014c). The Republic of Korea is apprehensive with indiscriminate terrorist attacks occurring in Iraq. The growing instability in Iraqi territory jeopardizes the businesses of the 80 Korean companies installed in the country. The Korean Government condemns all forms of terrorism and supports the efforts of Iraq’s administration and people to overcome the current situation and restore peace and stability (Republic of Korea 2014). For Korea, the support of UNAMI and the international community is essential to Iraq’s stability. The country also argues that Iraqi forces should be trained so that they can protect civilians effectively and ensure that those responsible for the attacks are penalized (UNSC 2013a). Lithuania, like the other members of the European Union, has a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Iraq, signed in 2012, which focuses on cooperation in combating terrorism and in ensuring human rights, among other areas. The country is attentive to the possibility of overflow between the various crises in the region, and sees the engagement of all countries in the Middle East as essential to stabilize and resolve the crisis (EPRS 2014). For Lithuania, Iraq must lead the process of pacification, relying on the support of a renewed mandate of UNAMI. The international community, in return, should provide support for Iraqi security forces. Luxembourg does not see foreign military interventions as a negative action to contain terrorism. Worried about maintaining the integrity and territorial unity

327 United Nations Security Council of Iraq, the Government of Luxembourg emphasizes the importance of a joint action, not only military, but also political, between Iraqi and Kurdish forces, to restore security in the country. For Luxembourg, the various sectors of Iraqi society must engage in dialogue to find solutions to avoid sectarianism and violence and to promote reconciliation. It is of utmost importance the role of other countries in the region in stabilizing the crisis (European Parliamentary Research Service 2014). Facing a similar situation in its own territory with Boko Haram and stateless people such as Igbos, Yorubas and the Ijaws, Nigeria stands against external interventions in the crisis. For the country, the international community should limit itself to providing support in sectors such as intelligence, counter-terrorism and military training, in addition to providing financial aid and sending armaments. Nigeria praises initiatives such as regional coalitions led by Iraq itself to undertake actions aimed at stabilization (Nnawetanma 2014). Rwanda sees with great concern the possibility of spillover of ISIS’ actions. The country is not prone to support foreign military intervention, preferring a process of national reconciliation and peace agreements led by the Iraqis themselves. However, Rwanda believes that the international community should have an active role to prevent the escalation of the situation and the further deterioration of the humanitarian situation: Other countries should equip Iraqi forces, so that they are able to deal with the reality of the crisis. Finally, Rwanda believes that Iraq’s long- term stability depends on the joint action of neighboring countries and the region as a whole and on the support of UNAMI (UNSC Meeting Record S/PV.7035 2013).

QUESTIONS TO PONDER

1. Is it possible to isolate the Iraqi Situation from the Syrian Civil War? 2. How can the Security Council prevent the free flow of weapons and money coming from individuals in other countries? 3. Acknowledging that these transfers already exist in the case of Syria for moderate groups, how can the accountability be strengthened in order to avoid arming ISIS? 4. Is it the personal sanctions on these donors the best method to punish and avoid ISIS’ support? 5. What are the ideal role of UNAMI in Iraq and how this body can be strengthened?

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France ONU. Iraq. Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations in New York. http://goo.gl/Qe37xe (Access in 22 June 2014) Glenday, James. Tony Abbott doesn’t rule out sending troops to Iraq. ABC News. 13 June 2014a. http://goo.gl/AXLwsJ (Access in 25 June 2014) —. Iraq crisis: Tony Abbott reaffirms support for United States in response to militant insurgency. ABC News. 15 June 2014b. http://goo.gl/tz7VO2 (Access in 25 June 2014) Halliday, Fred. The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Halliday, Josh. Tony Abbott says Australia does not rule out military action in Iraq. The Guardian. 12 August 2014. http://goo.gl/jYi1hc (Access in 27 August 2014) Hammes, Thomas X. The Sling and the Stone: on War in the 21st Century.Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2006. Harris, Shane. Obama Considering Military Action in Iraq. Foreign Policy. 13 June 2014. http://goo.gl/7UyABt (Access in 20 June 2014) Hussein, Ahmed. U.S. to resume training ISF in Jordan, says official. Iraqi News. 8 May 2014. http://goo.gl/IBzkyQ (Access in 20 July 2014) International Crisis Group. Iraq After the Surge I: the new sunni landscape. Middle East Report Nº 74. Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2008. Isenberg, David. Private Security Contractors in Iraq. Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008. Jervis, Paul. Understanding the Bush Doctrine. Political Science Quaterly, 2003 (366- 388) Johnson, Keith. The Islamic State Is the Newest Petrostate. Foreign Policy. 28 July 2014. Katzman, Kenneth. Iraq: Politics, Governance and Human Rights. Report for Congress, Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2014. —. Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security. Report for Congress, Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2009. Keck, Zachary. China and Iraq Expand Energy and Defense Ties. The Diplomat. 27 February 2014. http://goo.gl/ErYtxj (Access in 22 June 2014) Keegan, John. A Guerra do Iraque. Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 2005. Kenner, David. The Islamic State Isn’t Circumcising Women and Didn’t Steal $400 Million Either. Foreign Policy. 24 July 2014. Khoury, Dina. Iraq during wartime: Soldiering, Martyrdom and Remembrance.

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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Library of Congress. Iraq: a country study. Federal Research Division, Washington, 1990. Londoño, Ernesto. Study: Iraq, Afghan war costs to top $4 trillion. The Washington Post. 28 March 2013. http://goo.gl/Gg2piI (Acess in 27/08/2014) Lubold, Gordon. U.S. Airstrikes Hit Islamic State Fighters Near Erbil. Foreign Policy. 08 August 2014. Lubold, Gordon & Sobel, Nathaniel. Situation Report. Foreign Policy. 26 August 2014. Marine Corps. Iraq: an Introduction to the Country and People. Washington: Martine Corps Institute, 2002. McQuaid, Julia. Reviving the Caliphate: Fad, or the Future? Arlington: CNA Corporation, 2014. Mohamadian, Ali. U.S.’s Foreign Policy and Nation-State Building in Iraq. Asian Social Science, 1st January 2012 (236-246) Nnawetanma, George. What the Iraq crisis means for Nigeria. 1st July 2014. http:// goo.gl/0F8ISl (Access in 05 July 2014) Obama, Barack. Press Conference by President Obama on Iraq. Council on Foreign Relations. 13 June 2014. http://goo.gl/7U4UuZ (Access in 26 June 2014) Owen, Roger. State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East. London: Routledge, 2004. Packer, George. The Common Enemy. The New Yorker. 25 August 2014. http://goo.gl/MdBilx (Access in 25 August 2014) Palau-Loverdos, Jordi, and Leticia Armendaríz. The Privatization of Warfare, Violence and Private Military & Security Companies: A factual and legal approach to human rights abuses by PMSC in Iraq. Barcelona: Council of the City of Barcelona, 2011. Republic of Korea. Press Release: MOFA Spokesperson’s Commentary on the Worsening Security Situation in Iraq. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014. http://goo.gl/HWf0c1 (Access in 25 June 2014) Russia MFA (Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Speech by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and his answers to questions from the mass media during his meeting with young diplomats of the Republic of Tajikistan. Dushambe, 30 July 2014. http://goo.gl/a6PZsA (Acess in 27 August 2014) Russia Today. Target ISIS: First batch of Russian fighter jets arrives in Iraq. 29 June

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—. Resolution 2170 (2014) on Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, adopted on August 15, 2014e. Van den Toorn, Christine. How the U.S.-favored Kurds Abandoned the Yazidis when ISIS Attacked. The Daily Beast. 17 August 2014. http://goo.gl/06uIyi (Access in 27 August 2014) Visentini, Paulo. A Primavera Árabe: Entre a Democracia e a Geoolítica do Petróleo. Porto Alegre: Século XXI, 2012. —. O mundo pós-Guerra Fria: O desafio do (ao) “Oriente”. Porto Alegre: Século XXI, 2005. Watt, Nicholas. UK should be prepared to use military prowess against Isis, says Cameron. The Guardian. 18 August 2014. http://goo.gl/PNmvum (Access in 27 August 2014) Whitlock, Craig & Jaffe, Greg. U.S. sending weapons directly to Kurdish forces, officials say. The Washington Post. 11 August 2014. http://goo.gl/YEDji0(Access in 26 August 2014) Zarate, Juan & Sanderson, Thomas M. How the Terrorists Got Rich: In Iraq and Syria, ISIS Militants Are Flush With Funds. The New York Times, June 28, 2014.

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ENERGY TRANSITION AND CHALLENGES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

Bruna Jaeger1 Patrícia Machry2 ABSTRACT

This section deals with the debate on the challenges generated by the Energy Transition. “Energy Transitions” are based on the notion that an energy resource, or a group of energy resources, dominates the market for a period or era, until it is challenged and eventually replaced by other(s) resource(s) (Melosi 2010). Since the 1970s, when the world watched two major oil crises, states and corporations began discussing alternatives that could replace oil as the basis of the global energy mix. In recent years, this process has intensified. The use of clean energy sources (hydro, nuclear, wind, solar, tidal, geothermal, biofuels) emerge as possible replacements for fossil fuels. However, this is not an easy transition. There are many questions about the ability of these new sources to meet world energy demand, which is growing. In addition, proposals that include increased use of new forms of fossil fuels (shale gas, tar sands, ultra- heavy oil) keep the world dependent on finite fuels and generate huge impacts on the environment. In this sense, the WEC seeks to discuss possible solutions to this energy challenge. Ie, how to perform the transition to a post-oil era without affecting energy supply, maintaining equitable distribution of electricity and without destroying the environment. 1 Bruna Jaeger is a 8th semester International Relations undergraduation student at UFRGS and director of the WEC. 2 Patrícia Machry is a 6th semester International Relations undergraduation student at UFRGS and assistant director of the WEC. Ministerial Roundtable of the World Energy Council

1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1.1 THE CONCEPTS OF ENERGY TRANSITION AND ENERGY SECURITY

According to Kerr Oliveira (2012), the concept of energy basically refers to three aspects: natural energy resources, the infrastructure logistics of energy, and the set of techniques, knowledge and energy development. In other words, this can be understood as an Energy System.

Energy refers to the set of basic processes of extraction, capture and processing of natural energy resources. Also includes consumption systems or end use of different forms of energy that occur in the main productive activities (industry, agriculture, utilities, trade, transport and communications). Finally, energy can be understood as the capacity to make decisions regarding the use of energy infrastructure and investment in Research & Development (Kerr Oliveira 2012, 19).

As it already have been pointed out, “Energy Transitions” are based on the notion that an energy resource, or a group of energy resources, dominates the market for a period or era, until it is challenged and eventually replaced by other(s) resource(s) (Melosi 2010). An Energy Transition is not an abrupt change from one reality to another. It is a transformation that evolves through considerable time, and that can lead to greater diversity in the energy market (Yergin 2013). Energy Transitions are not sudden breakthroughs that follow periods of prolonged stagnation. Rather, they are processes that unfold continuously, gradually changing the composition of the resources used to generate heat, motion and light. These transitions also replace the dominant methods of energy conversion, increasing efficiency in energy-dependent processes (Smil 2013). The concept of Energy Security can be understood as the state in which a country or region has a level of energy availability that is sufficient to maintain reasonable rates of economic growth and development (Klare 2004). In the long term, it means the ability to magnify the power consumption without major obstacles in terms of technology, infrastructure, power generation and distribution, or availability of energy resources. In addition, the ideal conditions for Energy Security shall ensure the integrity and security of energy infrastructure (Yergin 2006). Kerr Oliveira (2012) ranks the main Energy Security Strategies in three broad categories: (I) Energy Self-Reliance, which can be operationalized through the diversification of energy sources, decentralized infrastructure for generation and distribution of energy, energy innovation, and energy efficiency; (II) Security of External Energy Supply, which involves the diversification of foreign suppliers, or the militarization of the energy resources control abroad; and (III) Regional Energy Integration, which

338 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations is achieved through the integration of infrastructure and energy supply chains in a region or continent.

1.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF ENERGY FOR HUMANKIND: AN OVERVIEW

There are several ways in which energy can transform human life. According to energy analyst Daniel Yergin, these transformations can be summarized in the simplest forms: the access to lighting, cooling, heating and transportation (Yergin 2004, 716). Before the light bulb was invented, lighting could be provided by the sun, candles, oil and gas lamps. Access to light gave men a whole variety of choices, as productive hours were extended once they no longer depended on sunlight. Access to heating by burning wood also made a difference to mankind, from cooking to the survival in cold temperatures. Cooling, on the other hand, allowed men to live and perpetuate the species in arid zones. Finally, the energy revolution that took place with the industrialization represented a change also in terms of transportation, when steam power was applied to boats and trains and resulted in locomotives and steam ships. People could travel on railways many times faster than on foot, transforming also the way services and goods were transported. Energy can also be easily related to civilization and social development. Societies that remained agrarian for a long time and were not touched by industrialization had little population growth (Grigg 1980). That is because demographical increases have to rely on an expanding energy supply, for the simple reason that whenever human population grows, societies begin to require more of everything in order to satisfy the basic material needs of individuals: food, water, fibers, clothing, shelter and so on (Klare 2002). Therefore, alongside with developments in production (generally the spread of industrialization), communications, transportation and military, increases in human numbers can also enlarge the demand for natural resources3. According to Goldemberg (1998, 7), energy is an essential ingredient for development, therefore the energy consumption per capita could be a good meter of a nation’s quality of life, wealth and development4. Since humans first appeared on Earth, controlling energy resources has been a major concern for survival. As men learned how to use and control energy, they increased their power to alter the environment around them, producing more food and building bigger and stronger shelters. As centuries passed by, societies became

3 Michael Klare stresses that increases in personal wealth also contributes for an insatiable appetite for energy, as people start to desire more resource-intensive commodities as they get wealthier (e.g. private automobiles) (Klare 2002, 15). 4 Energy is a relevant variable to understand the different capacities among great powers: the richest and most developed nations present the greater amounts of energy consumption (Kerr Oliveira 2012). 339 Ministerial Roundtable of the World Energy Council more complex, which led to an increased use of energy resources to maintain such new arrangements. A variety of new energy resources were discovered throughout the years, and the control over them turned to be a main concern of states, as they believed that this control would render them powerful within a competitive international system. Yet, during a period of over fifty thousand years, humankind relied only on a single form of energy: human muscles (Smil 1994). Human labor power was for centuries an important source of mechanical energy: not only it was responsible for agricultural production, but it was also crucial for the formation of armies to defend territories since the Ancient Ages (Kerr Oliveira and Brandão 2011). Fire was discovered by burning wood, animal dung and charcoal, providing heat, and this discovery came as a means to complement human strength in providing energy. The domestication of animals also turned out to be an important source of energy, since animal traction proved to be useful for transporting people and goods. Later, the use of water and wind to generate power gained importance, and windmills and water-wheels became the most powerful mean to use energy until the invention of the steam engine (Smil 1994). In the end of the 18th century, a wave of technological advances led to a process of modernization which later became known as the Industrial Revolution. In that moment, men discovered the potential of fossil fuels - starting with coal -, and steam engines rendered windmills and water-wheels obsolete. This use of coal and other fossil fuels such as oil and natural gas showed an energy intensity as never seen before (Smil 1994). With developments in the energy system such as changes in the production, transmission, storage and consumption of energy, a wide range of industrial branches started to become viable. The use of steam engines also held important developments on military affairs, as they fastened the speed of troops and the transport of supplies. Between the 18th and 19th centuries, the aforementioned innovations regarding coal use deeply changed the textile production. They also revolutionized metallurgy and steel industry, allowing the creation of a whole new naval industry. On the second half of the 19th century, electricity started to be used, completely altering means of communication with the advent of the telegraph. The introduction of telephone and radio changed forever the conduct of warfare, as they facilitated communication between troops and led to the invention of coding. They also revolutionized communications, allowing real-time transmission of events to the civilian population. Almost at the same period, the development of oil refining processes ended up constituting a whole complex of industries connected to the petrochemical sector. These petrochemical developments enabled the arrangement of electric, aerospace and nuclear industries, which deeply influenced the war industry (Kerr Oliveira 2012).

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1.3 ENERGY TRANSITIONS THROUGHOUT HISTORY

In the last centuries, technological and productive revolutions were always strictly related to transformations in energy systems5. Every time the main source of energy changed, other modifications also took place with it, such as transformations in military craft, capital accumulation and international hegemony (Kerr Oliveira 2012; Arrighi 1996). To historian Giovanni Arrighi, commerce development and accumulation of wealth led to the constitution of a more advanced form of production and energy management, and these factors were crucial for the emergence of modern capitalist states (Arrighi 1996, 39-40). Therefore, in this analysis, energy becomes fundamental for states’ accumulation of power, as it impacts defense capacities, economical and productivity competitiveness, social welfare and access to goods and services. States that can use energetic infrastructure more efficiently can achieve more relative power than the ones which are less developed in such area. When human force and animal traction were the most important energy sources, a powerful nation would be the one with an enormous population and large pastures. For instance, the huge supply of human energy contributed to grant the Chinese Empire with great power (Kerr Oliveira and Brandão 2011). Later on, when men discovered that energy could be provided by burning wood, nations who had access to forests were the ones who accumulated more power. Merchant cities of northern Italy first manipulated wood, but the true hegemonic states turned out to be the maritime ones, especially Portugal, because of its access to great forests in America. Wood became the main raw material of European economies, serving both for fueling and for the construction of tools (Nogueira 1985). However, even though wood is a renewable6 source of energy – as it can be easily replaced by reforestation -, the demand for it started to grow faster than its replacement, and a new source started to become more popular: mineral coal (Kerr Oliveira 2012). Simultaneously with the status of coal as the fundamental and predominant energy resource, England raised as the great hegemonic power of the 19th century. The importance of control over coal sources grew remarkably, since it became decisive for wars and for the sustainability of production, transportation and communication systems in the Industrial Revolution era. England benefited

5 An energy system involves and connects natural energy resources with the infrastructure, technology and knowledge related to the use of many different forms of energy. It includes the extraction of natural resources and the transformation of nature forces in other forms of energy or work through different means and types of converters (Kerr Oliveira 2012). 6 According to the International Energy Agency, “renewable energy is energy that is derived from natural processes (e.g. sunlight and wind) that are replenished at a higher rate than they are consumed. Solar, wind, geothermal, hydropower, bioenergy and ocean power are sources of renewable energy” (OECD/IEA 2014). 341 Ministerial Roundtable of the World Energy Council from the almost inexhaustible supply of Scottish coal reserves (Kerr Oliveira and Brandão 2011). Nonetheless, the energy model based on coal would not survive the expanding energy demand of an increasingly industrial and wealthier world. The transition of the Coal Era to the Petroleum Era was slow. Differently from the transition from wood to coal, the transition to the intense use of oil did not occur due to an extinguishment of coal reserves, but because a new technology proved itself to be significantly more efficient. Petrochemical revolution led to other energy innovations such as aeronautical turbines and propelled rockets fed by petroleum- based fuels. The former led to a revolution in transportation; the latter permitted a restructuration in communications, as it led to surveillance and observation from the space (Kerr Oliveira 2012). The most powerful nations of the 20th century were precisely the ones which had major consumption and production of oil: the United States of America and the Soviet Union. While the First World War consolidated the use of radio in the battlefield, the Second War proved to the entire world that a huge availability of fuel to feed navies and aviation was central to winning any campaign (Kerr Oliveira 2012). The bipolarity of the balance of power structured during the Cold War was reinforced by the easy access and domain over natural energy resources detained by the USA and the USSR. By the end of that century, industrialized countries were fully adapted to fossil fuels. Coal and natural gas continued to provide power, while oil was consolidated as essential for transportation and industries. Capitalism expansion allowed petroleum to become the most important fuel of the present, therefore starting to be related to the American hegemony. Thus, it can be definitely said that the great dominant power of a specific period always turned out to be the one which had control over the current energy model. However, this did not happen without jeopardizing the ones who were left behind in industrialization. Nations that could not follow the most powerful ones on this process turned to be on a dependent and subordinated position. As high quality of life is related to energy consumption, populations who cannot count on modern energy forms are also the poorest in the world. This leads to increasing competition among states, mainly over the domain of natural resources and control of new technologies. The desire for self-sufficiency over energy issues drives developing nations to find alternative sources in order to diversify their energy matrix, in an effort to increase their independence and relative power (Yergin 2006). The current energy model based on the preeminence of oil has been showing signs of weakness since the 1970s. The petroleum crisis of 1973 and 1979 were samples of this system’s exhaustion. In both situations, the worldwide dependence on this energy source spread a major crisis, and the debate over alternative sources started to become important. Other forms of energy such as nuclear and hydroelectric power, biomass, solar and wind, seem to be an interesting alternative. It is

342 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations not known if the world will be able to maintain an energy matrix based on scarce and polluting fossil fuels for a very long time, and therefore it is of extreme importance to debate over a possible new energy transition that might be happening just now.

2 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

According to the World Economic Forum (2013), there is currently major attention focused in the next Energy Transition: the expectation or the possibility of a significant change in the global energy mix. In relation to this possibility, some questions stand out. What would be the nature of the mix change? How fast would it be? How long could it take? The answers to these questions will have a profound impact on the global energy system for producers and consumers worldwide.

2.2 TRANSITION TO A POST-OIL ERA

In the 1970s, the energy model centered on oil showed its structural limits for the first time. Before 1973 and the subsequent oil crises, the global energy mix was composed by 86.6% of fossil energy, with 46.1% of oil, 24% of coal and 16% of natural gas (IEA 2009). In that period, nuclear energy and hydropower accounted for less than 3% of primary energy produced in the world. The first signs of exhaustion from that model were appearing, as it became clear that the world could not continue to generate sustained economic growth by expanding the consumption of finite fossil energy at the same rate that occurred in the years 1940- 1960. It became evident the need to establish a major transition to a “Post-Oil Era” (Kerr Oliveira 2012). Although the construction of a new model may have a high economic and technology cost, this development seems to be the only way that would allow increased energy supply on a global scale. In this sense, the post-oil Energy Transition has major impacts on issues of socio-economic development, environment, regional integration and international security. Particularly, the theme that permeates this debate is centered on the concept of Energy Security of a State or group of States. The structural characteristics of this crisis seem to be irreversible and are becoming increasingly clear: it is a crisis of the entire current energy model based on fossil hydrocarbons (coal, oil and gas) (Yergin 2006).

Today there is a renewed and much more intense focus on what kind of Energy Transition might be ahead and what timing it might be. Two factors have converged to generate this focus. The first is the concern about climate change and the traction of carbon policy in many countries and international forums. The second is the 343 Ministerial Roundtable of the World Energy Council

worry that the current energy mix will not prove adequate to meet the rapidly growing energy needs of emerging market nations. The shifts in the balance within the mix will have direct consequences for all participants in the world’s energy industry – incumbents, new entrants and innovators, governments and, of course, for all the peoples of the world (Yergin 2013, 2).

The energetic model that is proposed by many studies is based on the view that it should overcome the actual one, which is dependent on finite energy resources. This way, it would allow the structuring of a new model that makes possible to generate energy almost virtually infinite, with fairly low costs in economic, social and environmental terms (Kerr Oliveira 2012). However, the challenges of the different stages of a Great Energy Transition underway can significantly increase the likelihood of conflicts in the twenty-first century, marking disputes between different States’ energy security strategies, especially if they are willing to dispute the last largest reserves of oil and gas (Fuser 2008). With the increase in oil prices in the 2000s, this debate has been resumed, partly by new environmental pressures, but mainly due to limitations presented by the actual energy model. The current energy mix is composed by 86.9% of fossil energy, with 33.1% of oil, 29.9% of coal and 23.9% of natural gas (British Petroleum 2013). In percentage terms, the global energy mix reduced dependence on fossil fuels about 10% over the last 30 years, which was at 95% in 1973. Crude oil remains the main energy resource; however, their representation in the overall mix was not so low in 13 years. However, considering that the world has doubled the total energy consumption, in reality the dependence on these energy sources has increased in absolute terms (Kerr Oliveira 2012). Although nuclear energy in its current stage of technological development is still dependent on finite energy resources (uranium, plutonium, thorium), this alternative to fossil fuels increased its participation in the global energy mix to 4.5%, while hydropower is at 6.6% and other renewable energies (wind, solar, geothermal) reached 1.9% of the total primary energy produced (British Petroleum 2013). Therefore, as it can be seen, the current model, based on fossil fuels, can be considered “monoenergetic”, i.e., one major source is responsible for most of the energy produced (Nogueira 1985).

Table 1 - Composition of energy mix by source and by region Natural Other Nuclear Hydro Coal Oil Gas Renewable North America 7.6% 5.7% 17.1% 30% 37.3% 2% Latin America 0.7% 24.9% 4.2% 22.2% 45.4% 2.3% Europe and Eurasia 9.1% 6.5% 17.6% 33.3% 30% 3.3%

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Natural Other Nuclear Hydro Coal Oil Gas Renewable Middle East 0.04% 0.6% 1.2% 48.6% 49.3% 0.01% Africa 0.8% 5.9% 24.1% 27.4% 41.3% 0.35% Asia and Pacific 1.5% 5.7% 52.2% 11.2% 27.8% 1.3%

Source: Developed by the authors based on data from British Petroleum (2013).

Image 1 - Energy demand by 2035 and share of global energy consumption growth 2012-2035

Source: IEA (2013)

The International Energy Agency conducted a study on energy scenarios to 2035, highlighting the increasing global demand for energy. With an average growth of energy demand of 1.7% per year, oil consumption in the world will reach 120 million barrels per day by 2030 (IEA 2003). With a world GDP growth of around 1% in 2030, US$16 trillion would be needed in investments in the construction and expansion of global energy infrastructure, 60% of it in the electricity sector and 38% in the oil and gas sector (IEA 2003). Hence, humanity faces the following problem: maintaining current existing energy infrastructure, which extends to the maximum possible duration of the current energy mix, implies the use of relatively scarce fuels unevenly distributed 345 Ministerial Roundtable of the World Energy Council geographically, costly and highly polluting. Kerr Oliveira (2012) introduces the debate on the crisis of the Oil Age, which involves three main shortcomings. The first considers that oil, as a finite resource, is in a process of exhaustion which will be accelerated in the coming decades, creating an unprecedented crisis (Campbell 2005). This position is summarized in the thesis of “world peak oil” (Hubbert 1956), which can be considered the most pessimistic approach, or “catastrophic”. The second one also considers oil a fossil and a finite resource, but sees its reserves as sufficient to supply mankind for a long time, probably for decades, with the greatest solutions to the expansion of oil extraction being the development of new technologies and exploration of new reserves (Deming 2003; Clarke 2006). Finally, the third approach, more optimistic, states that oil is not a fossil resource, but one of mineral origin (Gold 1987). According to this view, it would be formed deep inside the Earth, mainly from mineral carbon, which significantly alters the calculations of the total available volume in the crustal. In this model, formation of more oil would be a constant, although at a relatively slow rate. What this discussion shows is that there is a great difficulty in estimating how much oil can still be found. As there is a large margin of error in such calculations, it is also difficult to predict a date for the global peak oil. Both in the intermediate and in the pessimistic scenario, the maintenance of high prices tends to favor the replacement of oil and other fossil fuels for other sources of cheaper fuels. This could reduce pressure on oil, postponing its exhaustion (Yergin 2006). The reduced capacity of extra oil production, or the lack of capacity for rapid expansion of its supply, would be one of the most important factors in explaining the rise in the prices in 1998 to 2000. With the demand virtually equal to the supply, any kind of risks to the global production may alter prices (Kerr Oliveira 2012; Klare 2005). “Considering the immense variety of petroleum based products, the more likely it is that their high cost restricts its use to those purposes that cannot be easily replaced” (Kerr Oliveira, 2012, 145). Anyway, it is clear that a major world oil crisis might occur from the fall of world production of this resource. Due to the increase in costs that this will bring upon, such process is likely to extend the disputes for oil throughout the world. How this will happen is almost unpredictable for now, but the more a country is prepared to make this transition less it will be likely to suffer the consequences of the crisis. States that go through the Energy Transition earlier may advance more competitively in the Post-Oil era. States, or block of states, which are more advanced in planning their Energy Security will be able to make through this transition in an easier way and with less political, economic, social and environmental costs (Kerr Oliveira 2012).

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2.3 IMPACTS OF ENERGY TRANSITION

In this section, it will be explained the main impacts of the current Energy Transition to the International System, listing aspects related to International Security, Socio-Economic Development, Regional Integration and Environment.

International Security Energy can be considered an essential feature to understand relations of hierarchy, power distribution and security among states. Besides having direct implications for society and economy, the energy system also affects politics and war. In this sense, the ability to decide about the use of energy resources is central to ensuring the sovereignty of a state. The definition of Energy Decision Center of a state refers to the capacity of planning and autonomous controlling the generation and the use of energy inside the country, what directly influences the ability of states to transform energy resources in power (Kerr Oliveira 2012). As an example, without modern energy use, a country would be unable to use basic weapons of contemporary warfare, which rely on fuels and electricity for their operation systems. Therefore, “the success of the Energy Security Strategy of a state or group of states influences the perception of the distribution of power in the International System” (Kerr Oliveira 2012, 19). The concept of National Logistics refers to planning the use of multiple means to accumulate political, economic, industrial, technological and military capabilities in order to, ultimately, accumulate power and ensure the safety of the country (Sebben 2010). National Logistics planning can also expand the deterrent capabilities of a state if it is successful in turning the national logistical infrastructure into a mechanism able to defend its territory in case of foreign attack (Martins 2008). At the center of such planning is energy infrastructure, which supports the operation of all other strategic infrastructure of National Logistics, such as communications, transport and industrial production (Kerr Oliveira 2012). This way, energy is central to military and defense logistics, as well as being crucial to the long term sustainability of any country strategy (Lins 2006). In this sense, the control of energy resources and the energy distribution infrastructure can be considered central variables in global geopolitical disputes. Moreover, it can be an excuse or motivation for conflict between energy commodities exporters and suppliers. Logistics, energy infrastructure, and the pattern of energy consumption are understood as mechanisms of power transformers, and can be considered as key variables to the competition in the International System (Kerr Oliveira 2012).

Socio-Economic Development Virtually all basic public services depend on energy for their operation.

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Contemporary political institutions depend on energy for its maintenance and proper functioning: treatment and pumping of water, street lighting, health systems, communications, and especially production processes and transport systems, i.e., the flow of people and essential goods. Nations that have become richer and more developed are those that managed to master a set of innovative energy technologies, which impacted on their political, economic and productive systems, thus enabling the achievement of a high degree of capital accumulation and in life quality. Currently, these countries are highly industrialized and with extensive ability to decide in a sovereign way issues related to their own Energy System (Kerr Oliveira 2012). Today, the index of average energy consumption is one of the most reliable variables to assess a population’s life quality and is highly correlated to a number of other economic and social indicators (Goldemberg 1998). The correlations between energy and development prompted the International Energy Agency to propose an analysis of countries using an Energy Development Index in order to complement the analysis with United Nations’ Human Development Index (IEA 2010). There is a need for programs aimed at expanding access to electricity, as increasing access to energy can be one of the fastest ways to improve life quality of a population, reducing poverty and inequality. Especially when it points out that about 2 billion people worldwide have no access to energy on a regular basis or affordable prices (IEA 2011). The current world energy mix might be characterized as clearly concentrating wealth and highly exclusionary. Currently, between 4 and 5 million people die each year related to the lack of basic energy and sanitation infrastructure causes (IEA 2011). Kerr Oliveira (2012, 64) describes this as an “almost energy apartheid”. If the 3.5 billion poorest people in the world, which includes the 2.7 billion who lack modern energy sources for cooking, had the same pattern of energy consumption per capita as Canada, this would represent an increase in about three times the current global primary energy consumption (Kerr Oliveira 2012). Surely this fact points to major challenges for developing countries. Such restrained energy demand on global scale cannot be fully satisfied with the current scarce and finite energy sources. Hence, this also justifies the necessity of a large and deep global Energy Transition, which enables support for all mankind a pattern of life quality, consistent with the current technological stage.

Regional Integration Regional integration processes based on the economic integration of productive chains, consumer markets and political integration between states in the same region and with common interests has been accelerated by the integration of infrastructure. For most states, regional integration is one of the few alternatives to expand its consumer market in order to sustain technological innovation and industrial production, in addition enabling the expansion of jobs for the available

348 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations labor force. “Maintaining the current trends, it seems that the countries or regions that are not integrated into blocks are in serious danger of disappearing economically or even politically” (Kerr Oliveira 2012, 56). Regional infrastructural integration of energy, transport and communications is a key step in this process, since it enables the integration of consumer markets, workforces, regional production chains. It also favors the building of common political institutions between countries of the same block. Ensure that decision- making for investment in energy infrastructure occur at the national level may not be sufficient when compared to the importance that such decisions can have on regional-continental level.

Environment Any process of Energy Transition has also significant impacts to the environment. The model based on fossil fuels, in particular oil, is in debate over the past four decades as it would be responsible for increasing environmental damage and emission of polluting gases into the atmosphere. Therefore, the discussion on which energy source will prevail is central to assess potential environmental impacts as well as the sustainability of the energy model in question. In recent years, the environmental legal apparatus has significantly increased, besides the fact that there was an increase in world public opinion for the adoption of renewable and cleaner energy sources. Such sources would be central in mitigating the impacts of the increasing global demand for energy. The reconciliation of exploitation/production of oil and environmental preservation requires specific instruments for environmental control in order to prevent and/or mitigate environmental damage from this activity. The potential environmental impacts of the oil industry varies, the most well-known being against the population associated with leaks in oil tankers and oil terminals, causing contamination and environmental degradation of oceans and seas. However, other environmental impacts are inherent in this activity, which are related to changes in water quality and contamination of marine sediments, interference in animal’s migration routes, interferences in coral reefs, mangroves, marine ecosystems, and social uses related to fishing activity.

2.4 ALTERNATIVE ENERGY

New sources of energy are at the core of the 21st century Energy Transition process. Thus, next section seeks to assess the potential and deficiencies of the main new forms of energy, especially those considered renewable and/or clean sources.

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Wind Energy Wind energy is achieved through the usage of wind to produce electricity through aero-turbines. It is considered one of the cleanest forms of renewable energy available, since it does not emit air pollution throughout the electricity generation process. However, the construction of wind turbines requires extensive use of rare minerals that generate serious environmental impacts in its processing (Kerr Oliveira 2012). Nevertheless, wind energy is a promising complementary option as source of energy, since wind farms can be allocated both on land and at sea. High costs for purchasing wind turbines is one of the biggest problems related to wind energy, due to the need of rare earth materials7 for producing turbines, as already pointed out. Although wind farms do not demand large areas for their construction, the market for purchasing aero turbines is concentrated in very few companies, which difficult the access to it around the world. After the global economic crisis of 2008, demand from developed countries for wind turbines felt, especially in Europe, thus diminishing its acquisition costs, which, in turn, allowed for an extension of the acquisition of these technologies by countries of Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America (Global Wind Energy Council 2012). Even though wind power cannot be used as the basis of the new energy mix, since even the entire wind power capacity was installed it would not be sufficient to meet world consumption., it can fulfill an important role as complement to other sources such as hydropower.

Hydroelectricity Hydroelectricity is produced by the kinetic energy of falling water in an area of significant declivity. Such kinetic energy is converted into electricity by turbines that intercept the water flow. This energy form is considered clean since after moving the turbines, the water returns to its normal cycle without contaminants or residues derived from the energy producing process. In addition, the level of air pollutants emission is almost negligible. It is noteworthy that the energy potential of hydroelectric stations varies according to the size of the declivity, the magnitude and the efficiency of hydro turbines According to the World Energy Council (2014), only about a third of the world’s hydroelectric potential has been used, corresponding to 17% of global energy consumption. The overall potential for hydropower production is still small forward to the expansion of world energy consumption; however there is still a great potential to be explored. The chart below shows the hydroelectric capacity installed by region. It can be noticed that East Asia and Europe, with over 20% of installed capacity, are those whose hydroelectric potential is better exploited. In

7 A rare earth mineral is a mineral which contains one or more rare earth elements as major metal constituents. 350 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations this sense, Latin America and especially Africa, which had high economic growth in recent years, have yet vast hydroelectric potential to be harnessed, what may be fundamental for sustaining the growth in energy demand in these continents.

Image 2 - Hydropower Installed Capacity by Region.

Source: World Energy Council (2014). Moreover, hydropower has advantages in regards to the possibility of its storage, which may be accomplished through the construction of large artificial dams. This differentiates it from other forms of energy production such as solar or wind, whose production does not allow storage. Also in these terms, when compared to other energy sources that also enable storage, such as biomass, hydroelectricity has a relatively lower cost (Kerr Oliveira 2012; Sauer and Carvalho 2013). However, the construction of artificial lakes and dams has environmental and social costs, especially due to the fact that the flooding of large areas implies the displacement of several species of animals and riparian populations, as well as the destruction of large green areas. On the other hand, the hydrological changes caused by water storage enables the construction of waterways, facilitating transport and logistics, which in some regions may even facilitate regional integration (World Energy Council 2014). Tidal Energy The use of tidal energy to drive generators and produce electricity has great potential of production in geographic terms. First, most of Earth’s surface is covered by oceans and seas (about two thirds of it), and, second, because the majority of the world population lives in coastal areas (World Energy Council 2014; Kerr Oliveira 2012). Energy can be obtained from the seas by harnessing tidal power, by the force of the waves and by temperature variations given the depth of the seas and oceans. Nevertheless, this form of energy is still incipient and undeveloped, which makes

351 Ministerial Roundtable of the World Energy Council the financial costs of implementing and maintaining such energy parks very high. Analyzing the three previously mentioned ways of obtaining energy from the sea, it can be seen that tides are a global resource that might be used through the building of dams that harness the tidal flow to release water through turbines, or by the exploitation of ocean currents. However, both technologies are still nascent: as the turbines should be installed at sea (under the sea, in large vertical towers, or suspended in vessels), financial costs are quite high. Nonetheless, energy from the waves is a renewable form of energy, with many significant advantages over other energy sources, such as the low environmental cost and the continuous flow of energy. Also, are the most widespread of use of maritime energy potential mode (Emerging Energy Research 2010; Kerr Oliveira 2012; South West MEP 2012; World Energy Council 2014).

Solar Energy Solar energy is a renewable form of energy considered ecologically viable and with high productive potential. The two main mechanisms of obtaining energy through sunlight are photovoltaic collectors and thermal collectors. Photovoltaic collectors convert solar radiation directly into electricity without the use of engines. Nevertheless, they are not the most efficient way of harnessing solar energy. Thermal collectors, on the other hand, can be used for household heating, both in terms of home and water. The main difficulty for using solar energy is the intermittence of the source, either daily or seasonal, which results in low efficiency in areas of high humidity or where there are many rainy days during the year, as well as in areas of high latitudes, where day length is shorter during a great part of the year (Kerr Oliveira 2012; World Energy Council 2014). In addition, the financial costs for the implementation and maintenance of solar collectors are still quite high, which impedes its spread. With the increased production of collectors, nonetheless, it might be possible that in the coming decades the cost of production will fall significantly.

Geothermal Energy The use of geothermal energy is the use of heat from inside the earth to generate electricity. This source of energy is an alternative with great potential as it leverages a virtually endless source of energy to heat water, using the pressure of boiling water to move steam turbines, like a thermoelectric plant. Differently from thermal energy, it does not burn fuel, thus being considered a clean source of energy (World Energy Council 2014; British Petroleum 2014). Among the problems of such energy source is its dependency on very specific geographical regions to be advantageous. In this sense, it is needed a source close to the surface, which means installing stations in regions with high volcanic or tectonic

352 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations activity, that are geologically unstable. For this energy source being indeed feasible, it would require the development of technologies that allow the capture of this heat source from any point on Earth’s surface. Moreover, it would be necessary to develop techniques for drilling in ultra-deep areas of the earth’s crust, which is currently unviable (Kerr Oliveira 2012; British Petroleum 2014). It is estimated that currently the geothermal potential could supply 8.3% of global electricity consumption (World Energy Council 2014).

Biomass and Biofuels Biomass refers to any organic matter, usually in solid form, which can be used as fuel to produce electricity. In this sense, its origin may be from agriculture, lumber mills or waste, municipal or industrial. The decomposition of this biomass produces biogas, which is composed mostly of methane (Kerr Oliveira 2012; World Energy Council 2014).

The energy resources of biomass can be classified in several ways, however it should be recognized that the flows of biomass energy are associated with biofuels which, in turn, can be presented in three main groups, according to the origin of matter composed. Thus, there are biofuels from wood (dendrofuels), biofuels from non- forest plantation (agrofuels) and municipal waste (Nogueira and Lora 2003, 1).

Currently, biomass energy meets 10% of the world energy consumption (Schill, 2013). Of these 10%, about two thirds are produced in developing countries, which have sought to harness the potential of this energy source more intensively in the last decade. Biomass stands out as a renewable energy because it reuses discarded materials, including organic waste, which qualifies it as a source of environmentally sustainable energy. Liquid biofuels - ethanol, biodiesel and vegetable oils - stand out because they are simple substitutes for hydrocarbon fuels, especially for transport and industry. In 2010, biofuels accounted about 3% of world consumption of fuels, with ethanol being responsible for 73% of such consumption, while biodiesel accounted for 27% (Schill 2013; World Energy Council 2014). Both ethanol and biodiesel can be produced from various plant species: cane sugar, corn, cassava, sunflower, etc. They have a huge potential for exploitation because all these different plants can be grown in different seasons, which reduces the negative effects of seasonality. Moreover, in ecological terms, biofuels are considered a renewable and environmentally sustainable source because they are biodegradable and their emission of pollutants is lower than those emitted by fossil fuels, besides the fact that planting areas also offset greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, biofuels have been considered a relevant alternative. Nonetheless, competition with the oil industry still hinders its rise (World Energy Council 2014).

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Nuclear Power Nuclear power is based on the use of heat from exothermic nuclear reactions to produce electricity. Given the difficulties to ensure the safety of nuclear power plants, as well as the high financial costs involved in the production of this form of energy, nuclear power has never succeeded in establishing itself definitively on the basis of global energy. Although, this is a clean source of energy, and can contribute to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Also, the costs of energy production are stable in the medium and long term, since it is possible to predict the energy production of a nuclear reactor. Figure 3 shows the installed capacity of nuclear power from uranium by region of the globe. Clearly, North America, Europe and East Asia are the main producers of such kind of energy, since the costs of installing a nuclear power plant are quite high (World Energy Council 2014).

Image 3 - Uranium Installed Capacity by Region.

Source: World Energy Council 2014. The possibility of nuclear energy becoming an alternative in the Energy Transition lies in the possible use of more conventional radioactive elements, other than uranium and plutonium, or in changes in the production process of this energy. Uranium and plutonium can be used for purposes other than the production of energy, i.e., for war purposes. Moreover, uranium reserves are small compared with world demand, and are concentrated in specific regions such as Oceania, which accounts for about a third of the world reserves (World Nuclear Association 2014). Another problem is the residue derived from the uranium enrichment process since nuclear waste is highly dangerous, either by security issues, or for environmental reasons. In this sense, the use of metals such as thorium can prove to be a paradigm

354 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations change in nuclear energy production. The use of thorium as nuclear fuel dates from the mid-1950s and 1960s. Thorium is safer than uranium and plutonium, it is not efficient for war purposes, it has abundant reserves and the reactor needed for its use is smaller, which can reduce the cost of installing a nuclear power plant (Kleina 2011; Kerr Oliveira 2012). The nuclear waste originated from it would be inert after a time, which reduces the environmental impact and the possibility of it being used for military purposes. Although there are plants that have advanced in the use of thorium, reactors are still incipient, pointing that this is not an immediate alternative for possible energy shortages (Hamman 2013). In terms of nuclear energy production process, the great revolution would be the use of nuclear fusion as a mechanism for obtaining electricity. In theoretical terms, the process of nuclear fusion can generate virtually endless amounts of energy without producing air pollution or highly dangerous nuclear waste (Kerr Oliveira 2012). This mechanism is based on the generation of energy by replicating what happens inside the sun and in thermonuclear weapons, such as hydrogen bombs. Although this technology has not been developed significantly, there are large investments for research in the area (World Energy Council 2014; Kerr Oliveira 2012). Hydrogen The use of hydrogen as a fuel is one of the most promising alternatives in terms of energy production for the future. However, its production, transport, storage and conversion to a form of usable energy are still unresolved problems. Hydrogen has the advantage of being much more flammable than fossil fuels and do not producing toxic waste, since the fuel burns completely, generating only water vapor as residual waste, i.e., thus being a clean source of energy. In potential terms, it could be used in various stages of the production processes, replacing petroleum efficiently, which lead several authors to believe in that hydrogen will be the central element in the transition to the post-oil era (Geller 2002; Kerr Oliveira 2012; World Energy Council 2014). The most serious problem for generating energy from hydrogen comes from the fact that it is not found in pure state at nature. For the production of the fuel it is necessary to use large amounts of energy, which makes its use disadvantageous. This way, hydrogen cannot be considered an alternative in the short and medium term, as production costs are still quite high.

Electromagnetic Energy and Virtually Endless Radiation (light, microwaves, space radiation) The use of electromagnetic energy and space radiation is directly linked to the space domain, since outer space has virtually endless energy in the form of microwave radiation. There is already certain capacity for the transformation of microwave radiation into electricity, yet it is still not an economically feasible technology since it largely

355 Ministerial Roundtable of the World Energy Council depends on the use of semiconductor materials of high costs (Kerr Oliveira 2012). There are projects that seek to develop a solar energy collector to be installed on the space, capable of emitting concentrated microwave to the ground (Lee 2013). The project is still in its experimental stage and the first prototype might be launched in 2025, but questions as how to capture the microwaves are still unresolved. If the project succeeds, it will reduce the energy costs of KW/h in about 15% (Murphy, 2012). However, the use of this form of energy increases the disparity between developed and developing countries, as it depends on the control of space technologies that are too costly.

Expansion of Energy Efficiency Increasing energy efficiency is one of the strategies to counter the challenges derived from the Energy Transition. Energy efficiency relates to improvements in certain sectors of the energy system (generation, distribution or consumption), or gains in efficiency that involve substantial changes in the energy mix (the energy sector, industry or the transportation sector). Since it may expand the energy capacity of a country, increasing energy efficiency is considered a “new energy feature”, since it helps to reduce dependence on primary energy resources (World Energy Council 2013). According to Kerr Oliveira (2012), investments in energy efficiency can be divided into two types. The first, in the whole economy of a country (relationship between GDP/energy intensity), and the second is related to specific technologies for increase efficiency in generation, distribution or consumption of energy. The great advantage in the expansion of energy efficiency is that there is no time limit for such measures to be employed, and the cost can be diluted over time.

Unconventional Oil Against the grain of renewable energies is the use of “new” forms of fossil fuels8 as an alternative to the Energy Transition, especially non-conventional oil, which corresponds to the ultra-heavy oil, oil sands and shale (Johnson, Crawford and Bunge 2004; Kerr Oliveira 2012). The ultra-heavy oil is a form denser than normal; the main global reserves are in the Americas, particularly South America. Commercial exploitation of all these unconventional forms of oil has higher costs than conventional oil and they do not constitute a sustainable alternative energy to the environment, since they are even more polluting than conventional oil9 (Kerr Oliveira 2012; World Energy Council 2014). Moreover, it deeps energy

8 Besides the unconventional (ultra-heavy) oil shale and oil sands, these new forms include gasification or liquefaction of coal. 9 On the other hand, they resize the world energy panorama by introducing the possibility of oil not being anymore a finite fossil resource. 356 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations asymmetries that exist between countries, as the world’s reserves are concentrated in a few countries more than conventional oil for example.

2.5 THE WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL AND THE ENERGY TRANSITION

The world is currently facing huge and unprecedented uncertainties in relation to safeguarding a safe Energy Transition. States and leaders are faced with three major challenges: 1) significantly increasing the supply of energy to all humankind; 2) replacing the current fossil fuel-based energy matrix array for a cleaner, more abundant and less expensive one; and 3) accomplishing this endeavor without the occurrence of major conflicts or wars between states vying for control of finite energy resources. Image 4 - Three key interconnected policy areas are necessary to support the transition to sustainable energy

Source: World Energy Council 2013 (a)

From the study of the Trilemma Energy, World Energy Council (2013) produced a report with scenarios for the situation of global energy in 2050 and launched 10 key messages:

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1) Energy system complexity will increase by 2050. 2) Energy efficiency is crucial in dealing with demand outstripping supply. 3) The energy mix in 2050 will mainly be fossil based. 4) Regional priorities differ: there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ solutions to the energy trilemma. 5) The global economy will be challenged to meet the 450 ppm target without unacceptable carbon prices. 6) A low-carbon future is not only linked to renewable: carbon capture, utilization and storage (CC (U) S) is important and consumer behavior needs changing. 7) (CC (U) S) technology, solar energy and energy storage are the key uncertainties up to 2050. 8) Balancing the Energy Trilemma means making difficult choices. 9) Functioning energy markets require investments and regional integration to the deliver benefits to all consumers. 10) Energy policy should ensure that energy and carbon markets deliver. (WEC 2013(a))

Therefore, the Ministers present at the meeting of the World Energy Council will be faced with many questions on the subject of Energy Transition. At what level of the energy transition process we find ourselves at the moment? Until when the current energy model will be viable in economic, environmental and social terms? How to solve international security problems inherent in energy issues? What measures must be adopted to overcome the socio-economic and environmental predicaments? How to promote regional integration processes that optimize the energy security of all? What forms of energy generation should guide the nascent model? The answers to these questions are central to the direction that the Energy Transition process will take as well as to its future impacts.

3 PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS

In 2002, the United Nations created the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD). This summit discussed the relationship between poverty reduction, energy access, energy security, energy transition and climate change. UN-Energy was created by the UN two years after that: a mechanism on the energy field in which different UN agencies can relate to assure cohesion and interconnection when it comes to energy matters. Besides that, it also serves as a mean to support countries on their transitions to a sustainable scenario. UN-Energy is organized around three major themes, each of them being coordinated by two United Nations organizations. One of them is “energy access”, which is coordinated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank. Another theme is “renewable energies”, coordinated by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the United Nations Environment 358 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

Programme (UNEP). The last one is “energy efficiency”, which is led by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (UN-Energy 2014). During the petroleum crisis, from 1973 to 1974, the International Energy Agency, IEA, was created, as a reaction from developed countries to the oil crisis and the OPEC. Back then, it aimed to help countries coordinating their reactions to great interruptions on oil supply. Nowadays, IEA’s main focus is directed to four major areas: energy security, economic development, environmental awareness and global engagement on energy issues (IEA 2014). The World Energy Council (WEC), by its turn, is the most important network of countries and enterprises that look for debates related to the energy system, its sustainability and stability. The Council exists since 1923 and it is strongly supported by the UN. In the beginning, the WEC essentially gathered specialists in order to deal with multiple energy issues. However, with time, it evolved to a world forum seeking for a future where sustainable energy is a possible picture. WEC’s intention is to work over energy matters in a most expanded way, therefore being a most inclusive organism. This means that all the stakeholders on every energy deployment can be part of the discussions and the decision makings: NGOs, enterprises, universities, governments and so on. There are around 3000 registered members, from over 90 countries. WEC’s major event is the World Energy Congress, the most influent energy summit of the world. Twenty-two congresses have already taken place since 1924, the last one hosted in 2013 by Daegu, South Korea. WEC outstands for its enormous amount of studies, with publications of great technical and informational levels. The World Energy Issues Monitor, from 2014, is one of the most recent of it, covering the current energy agenda as well as its evolution over time. The World Energy Trilemma: time to get it real – the agenda for change is another of WEC’s papers, which seeks to support policy makers and the energy industry on facing the three main energy challenges: energy security, energy equity and environmental sustainability. Finally, the World Energy Scenarios: composing energy futures to 2050, is the result of another intensive research, and it shows prognostics on energy consumption and all the difficulties that will be faced on the next decades (WEC 2014).

4 BLOC POSITIONS

The United States of America is at the center of discussions about global energy transition. Historically, it is among the major producers and consumers of energy in the world, occupying the actual second position. Moreover, it was involved in wars whose background was the competition for energy resources, as occurred in Iraq in 1991 and 2003 and Libya in 2011. In recent years, the country has faced a

359 Ministerial Roundtable of the World Energy Council debate on the future of its energy, which is based on the use of hydrocarbon resources, especially oil and natural gas. Fossil fuels account for about 82% of total energy consumption in the country. On the one hand, the US has deepened its dependence on fossil resources, especially after the discovery of vast reserves of shale gas. On the other, it has invested in the so-called “Green Revolution”, under which it seeks to expand the use of energy derived from renewable or clean sources. This way, the US has adopted a conservative position with respect to the energy transition model. Major US initiatives to address the challenges of energy transition are related to the pursuit in reducing its external vulnerability. In this sense, it has been seeking to diversify oil suppliers, minimizing the importance of the Middle East in its imports of this feature, use the shale gas - despite possible environmental implications - and invest in highly expensive projects in financial terms to try to get virtually infinite energy especially by, for example, capture energy in outer space. I.e., the initiatives have been aimed at resolving the dilemma internally (EIA 2014; DOE 2014). Canada is one of the world’s five largest energy producers and is an especially significant producer of conventional and unconventional oil, natural gas, and hydroelectricity. Its economy is relatively energy-intensive when compared to other industrialized countries. Canada is the third largest producer of natural gas and controls the third-largest amount of proven oil reserves in the world, after Saudi Arabia and Venezuela (EIA 2014). It stands out as the largest foreign supplier of energy to the United States. But Canada is profoundly dependent on the United States, since virtually all of its crude oil exports are directed to US refineries. However, economic and political considerations are leading Canada to consider ways to diversify its trading partners, especially by expanding ties with emerging markets in Asia. Canada’s unconventional oil sands are a significant contributor to the recent and expected growth in the world’s liquid fuel supply. Also, the country is the world’s third-largest producer of dry natural gas and the source of most US natural gas imports. Moreover, Canada is a net exporter of electricity to the United States, and most of its energy needs are met by hydroelectricity. Only China and Brazil produce more hydroelectricity. Conventional thermal power plants satisfy most of Canada’s electricity needs not met by hydroelectricity (EIA 2014; Canada Energy 2014). Mexico is a major non-OPEC oil producer and is among the largest sources of US oil imports. Since Mexico’s total oil production had been declining substantially, it had a direct impact on the country’s economic output and on the government’s fiscal health. Mexico’s total energy consumption in 2012 consisted mostly of oil (53%), followed by natural gas (36%) (EIA 2014). Natural gas is increasingly replacing oil as a feedstock in power generation; however, Mexico is a net importer of natural gas. Mexico nationalized its oil sector in 1938, and PEMEX was created as the sole oil operator in the country. PEMEX is the largest company in Mexico

360 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations and one of the largest oil companies in the world. However, in December 2013, the Mexican government enacted constitutional reforms ending PEMEX’s monopoly on the oil and gas sector and opening it to greater foreign investment. The United States received approximately 71% of Mexico’s oil exports and Mexico was the destination for 44% of U.S. exports of motor gasoline (EIA 2014). This way, it is relevant to note that Mexico is believed to possess considerable hydrocarbon resources in the deepwater Gulf of Mexico that have not yet been developed. Despite Mexico has no international oil pipeline connection, theft of oil from pipelines by organized crime groups has become increasingly problematic. Most of Mexico’s electricity generation comes from fossil-fueled power plants, while hydroelectricity supplied about 11% of Mexico’s electricity generation in 2013 (EIA 2014; SENER 2014). Brazil is the eighth largest consumer and tenth largest producer of primary energy in the world (British Petroleum 2013). Total primary energy consumption in Brazil has increased by more than one third in the past decade because of sustained economic growth. Moreover, Brazil has made great strides in increasing its total energy production, particularly oil and ethanol. The largest share of Brazil’s total energy consumption comes from oil and other liquid fuels (47%), followed by hydroelectricity (35%) and natural gas (8%), and hydropower accounted for 80% of the electricity generation (EIA 2014; MME 2014). More than 90% of Brazil’s oil production is offshore in very deep water and consists of mostly heavy grades. In 2011, Brazil’s liquid fuels consumption surpassed its production (EIA 2014). Petrobras - the dominant participant in Brazil’s oil sector - plans to increase its Brazilian refining capacity, since the country imports great part of its refined oil. Brazil’s pre-salt announcements immediately transformed the nature and the focus of the country’s oil sector, and the potential impact of the discoveries upon world oil markets is vast. Besides, the pre-salt areas are estimated to contain sizable natural gas reserves, which if proven could increase Brazil’s reserves by 50%. Unites States, China and India are the major importers of Brazilian crude oil. However, the country maintains strong energy links with the neighboring, such as Paraguay, Argentina, Bolivia, Venezuela and Uruguay, especially in hydropower, oil and natural gas. In this sense, Brazil is expected to deepen ties with the region, which if integrated, could achieve the status of great energy superpower in the XXI century (Kerr Oliveira 2012). Bolivia is economically dependent on its energy production, especially natural gas, which represents 50% of its exports (IMF 2012). The energy consumption is also based on hydrocarbons, which represent 80% of the total, the remainder being waste and biomass, hydroelectricity and other renewable features (EIA 2014). Bolivia is an oil importing country, however, it is key to the supply of natural gas in South America, mainly via pipelines into Brazil and Argentina. The state company YPFB has sought new partnerships for investment in new areas for natural gas exploration in

361 Ministerial Roundtable of the World Energy Council the country. Being a poor country, 2.2 million Bolivians do not have adequate access to electricity (IEA 2012). In this sense, as well as Paraguay, the country depends on foreign investment and especially the integration with neighboring countries in order to diversify the economy, strengthen the development and reduce regional disparities. Besides the economic similarity, like Bolivia, Paraguay has a central geostrategic position in South America. The two countries have even clashed in the Chaco War (1932-1935) to compete in a region that previously had been thought to have oil. It was the geopolitical centrality that led Paraguay to negotiate with Brazil for building the binational Itaipu Hydroelectric Power Plant, one of the world largest and which accounts for about 75% of the energy consumed in Paraguay (Itaipu Binacional 2012). The country has no energy reserves of hydrocarbons, however, hydropower exports to Brazil guarantees significant contribution of resources, since the country does not consume all it could claim in the division of Itaipu’s production. Colombia has seen a great increase in oil, natural gas, and coal production in recent years after the implementation of a series of regulatory reforms. The government implemented a partial privatization of state oil company Ecopetrol (Empresa Colombiana de Petróleos S.A.) in an attempt to revive its upstream oil industry. However, after nearly a half-decade of relatively secure operations, attacks on oil and natural gas pipelines have increased. Expanded oil production will require discoveries of reserves and improvements to infrastructure safety. Colombia is self-sufficient in natural gas supply and recently began exporting to neighboring Venezuela. In 2011, the country was the fifth-largest coal exporter in the world. Besides, 60% of Colombia’s electricity generation is derived from hydropower (EIA 2014; Colombia Energía 2014). Argentina is the largest producer of natural gas and the fourth largest oil producer in South America (British Petroleum 2013). The domestic demand for energy has grown rapidly in the country, however, the increase in oil and natural gas production has not met this demand, which makes Argentina dependent on imports of these resources, especially refined liquids. Together, natural gas and petroleum match for about 86% of energy consumption. A smaller share of the country’s total energy consumption can be attributed to nuclear, coal, and hydropower (EIA 2014). In order to counter the energy bottleneck, the Argentine government began investing in tariff incentives to companies that do partnership with the state owned ENARSA. In May 2012, the Argentine government, claiming under investment in the country hydrocarbon sector, passed legislation confirming the expropriation of the YPF, the largest oil producer in the country (EIA 2014). Moreover, Argentina has sought to strengthen the proposed energy integration in South America, as it is currently part of a network of regional transmission of natural gas, which passes through Bolivia, Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. Also, Argentina maintains interconnections in electricity with Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. In this sense, the focus on

362 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations regional integration can guarantee the country a stronger position in the context of global energy transition (Kerr Oliveira 2012). In recent decades, China has experienced a great economic growth, which has increased energy demands of the country, which went from an exporter of oil to one of the largest importers in the world. In the last decade, China has become the world’s largest consumer of energy, a situation which has brought many challenges for the country. Especially because the energy mix of the country is mostly centered on fossil energy resources, about 90%, mainly coal, that meets 69% of total consumption (EIA 2014). This scenario brings challenges to energy security of the country, which has sought to respond to this situation basically in two ways. On the one hand, the country has been trying to expand investments in renewable energy sources such as hydroelectricity, and, secondly, to increase the integration of infrastructure pipelines with neighbors such as Kazakhstan and Russia. Both measures aim to minimize its external vulnerability, which imports most of its oil from the Middle East, a region of high political instability (Kerr Oliveira 2012). Moreover, the country has also sought to invest in nuclear energy, following a trend that has prevailed in East Asia, especially in Republic of Korea and Japan. These two countries were using nuclear energy as a major alternative to reduce dependence on imported resources energy (the Republic of Korea imports about 85% and Japan about 86% of energy consumed), especially oil, as it does not possess significant energy reserves. However, after the nuclear accident in Fukushima in 2011, many of the projects to build new plants were suspended or postponed, and has been gradually resumed (Brites 2014). The two countries have also been investing in alternative sources like tidal, yet it still does not represent a great energy source. India is among the top energy consumers in the world; however, the country still suffers from enormous difficulties to supply the growing demand. The basis of the country’s energy mix is coal, which accounts for just over 40% of total consumption (EIA 2014). Nonetheless, the very significant use of solid biomass (about 23%), especially wood and trash, shows that the country still lacks a system of modern energy generation, as well as inefficient use of wood waste and is highly toxic and lethal, especially to be used in poorer areas in the home environment (Kerr Oliveira 2012). India is also an importer of oil, and has sought to diversify its partnerships, since actually it has more than 60% of its imports from the Middle East. The great problem, however, is the lack of access to modern energy sources, with 25% of the population having no access to energy. Similarly, Pakistan has suffered energy shortages, which leaves about 30% of the population without regular access to electricity. The country’s energy mix is based on natural gas (about 48%), however, the country lacks a solid network of gas pipeline infrastructure, which has restricted the industrial capacity of the country (The Dioplomat 2013). This way, the country has sought to ally themselves with neighbors in the quest for

363 Ministerial Roundtable of the World Energy Council building projects of common pipeline. I.e., has focused on regional integration as an alternative for energy deficiencies. Over the past decade, Indonesia has increased by approximately 50% its energy consumption. The country that historically has consolidated itself as an exporter of energy resources, has been trying to reorient its production to the domestic market. The country is a leading exporter of liquefied natural gas and coal. Coal have been the energy source whose use has grown more in recent years, becoming the second leading source only behind oil. The country still stands out for being at the heart of disputes over control of routes, since its narrow territorial waters spend much of the flow of energy resources directed to Asia (Brites 2014). In relation to renewable and clean sources, the country has a high rate of utilization of geothermal energy and has been investing in biofuels (EIA 2014). The Russian Federation is one of the biggest energy powers in the world. It is the second largest natural gas producer and the third largest oil producer in the world, a condition that makes it one of the leading exporters of world energy (EIA 2014). Its economic growth in recent years has led the expansion of energy exports, accounting for about 70% of total exports of the country (EIA 2014). Besides the energy derived from oil, Russia stands out from nuclear energy, ranking third in the world in production of this form of energy. The abundance of energy resources make the country not to invest substantially in new forms of energy, which makes its energy mix concentrated around fossil fuels, especially natural gas. Another consequence of this scenario is derived from disputes linked to the geopolitics of pipelines, which creates enormous pressure on its borders, which often become zones of disputes and actions of neighbors’ separatist groups (IEA 2014). Kazakhstan, an oil producer since 1911, has the second largest oil reserves as well as the second largest oil production among the former Soviet republics after Russia. The key to its continued growth in liquids production from this level will be the development of its giant Tengiz, Karachaganak, and Kashagan fields. Kazakhstan is land-locked and lies a great distance from international oil markets. The lack of access to a seaport makes the country dependent mainly on pipelines to transport its hydrocarbons to world markets. It is also a transit country for pipeline exports from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan is a Caspian Sea littoral state. The legal status of the Caspian area remains unresolved, mainly driven by a lack of agreement on whether the Caspian is a sea or a lake. Until all states agree on a definition, legal status of the area will remain unresolved. The vast majority of Kazakhstan’s electricity generation comes from coal-fired power plants, concentrated in the north of the country near the coal producing regions (EIA, 2013). Ukraine has a strategic position in close proximity with Russia, which explains its importance for trade in natural gas and oil. There are two major pipeline systems that transport natural gas from Russia to Western Europe through Ukraine: the

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Bratstvo (Brotherhood) and Soyuz (Union) pipelines. In the past, disputes between Russia and Ukraine over natural gas supplies, prices, and debts have resulted in interruptions to Russia’s natural gas exports through Ukraine, with the latest one occurring in 2009 (EIA 2014). Most of Ukraine’s primary energy consumption is fueled by natural gas (about 40%), coal (about 28%), and nuclear (about 18%) (EIA 2014). Only a relatively small portion of the country’s total energy consumption is accounted for by petroleum and renewable energy sources. More than half of the country’s electric supply comes from its uranium and coal resources. Fossil fuel sources (46%) and hydropower (6%) generate the remaining of Ukraine’s electricity (EIA 2014; IEA 2014). The United Kingdom is the largest producer of oil and the second largest producer of natural gas in the EU. The Kingdom established many targets for renewable energies, but oil is still the most important source for its energy consumption. The majority of the electricity produced in the UK is generated from fossil fuels, essentially coal. Renewable energy, however, accounted in 2013 for more than 15% of the total generation. Renewable energy use more than tripled from 2000 to 2012 (EIA 2014). The UK is also planning a decarbonization of its energy system – the Low Carbon Transition Plan -, seeking for declining on over 80% greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. With its well-designed policies for renewable energy, energy efficiency and climate change, Denmark is a strong voice internationally on these matters. Danish policies are based on strong governmental institutions with very clear obligations and responsibilities. The Danish Renewable Energy Action Plan expects almost 52% of total electricity consumption to be met by renewable energy sources by 2020 (EWEA 2011). Almost 60% of this will be wind, and biomass mainly will make up for the rest. Its long-term goal is to become a sustainable low-carbon society, completely independent of fossil fuels use by 2050. The energy solutions leading to this goal include building green transport and promotion of smart grids. Danish government is to implement a series of actions aiming not only to achieve these goals but also to secure Denmark’s position as world leader in energy, climate and environmental technology (IEA 2011). Comparatively to other European countries, energy use in Turkey is low. In the past years, the Turkish main focus has been on improving energy efficiency in order to reduce pollution and assure energy supply security for its economy. The country faces many energy policy challenges, since it needs reforms on the power and natural gas sector, and also an urgent decrease on energy-related CO2 emissions – which have been increasing since the 90’s. With growing economy and energy demand, the government seeks for investments in natural gas and electricity infrastructure, and mostly for a diversification in its energy mix (EIA 2014, IEA 2009). Oil represents about one-third of France’s primary energy consumption. The

365 Ministerial Roundtable of the World Energy Council country has little domestic natural gas production, importing it from other European countries, and the government has banned the use of hydraulic fracturing10. Nuclear power is the main source of French electricity generation, and the country is the second largest producer of biofuels in Europe, after Germany (EIA 2014). The French have recently started to worry about energy transition and further discuss it in both international and domestic forums, looking for partnerships in that matter with Italy and Germany. The energy transition strategy is based on energy efficiency and sobriety and on priority to renewable energies (Ministère de l’Écologie, du Développement durable et de l’Énergie 2012). They believe that any energy policy must balance between security of supply, cost and sustainability, in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 75% until 2050(Le Roux 2012, Gautier 2014). French policies aims on securing its huge nuclear power, reducing emissions within the transport and buildings sectors, and on the growing regionalization of the energy sector in Europe – by expanding infrastructure and interconnections with neighboring countries to stabilize electricity and gas markets. France faces multiple challenges, since its energy development strategy is very ambitious and expensive (IEA 2009). The country believes that the energy future must, therefore, be thought on a common European space, in which France has a key role to play (Le Roux 2012). The Netherlands is the second-largest European producer and exporter of natural gas, following Norway. In 2012, petroleum accounted for more than a half of the country’s energy consumption, and natural gas for 36%. Most of its energy is generated by fossil fuel-fired power plants, but more than 15% is generated from renewable resources, mainly biomass, waste and wind (EIA 2014). Netherlands is very important to the region due to its integrated supply chains11, but it is still one of the economies most intensive on fossil-fuels and CO2 in Western Europe. The Dutch government is prioritizing actions to support sustainable economic growth, and the country can benefit a lot on this matter from expanding interconnections with neighboring countries (IEA 2014). Back in 2012, Germany was the largest energy consumer in Europe, and the eighth in the world, what gave it huge influence over the European energy sector. It was also the fifth larger producer of nuclear energy, and petroleum still was its main source of energy. However, the country is also a preeminent regional and world leader when it comes to renewable energy use: it is the largest European producer of non-hydro renewable electricity – being solar and wind the biggest sources (EIA 2014).Germany has been working on an energy transition strategy since the 1980’s, in a program called Energiewende. The first German publication on this matter called on the total abandonment of nuclear and petroleum energy. Goals were

10 A drilling technique used to extract shale oil and gas resources (EIA 2014) 11 It pipeline system connects the country with the United Kingdom, Germany and Belgium (EIA 2014). 366 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations elaborated on greenhouse gas reductions, energy efficiency and raise of renewable energy use (The Economist 2012, Morris and Pehnt 2012). Yet, this German energy transition is facing some critics, because it seems that the country cannot accomplish to eliminate completely fossil-fuel and nuclear dependence on its own: these ambitious objectives affect European neighbors, and therefore a strategy must start to be thought on a regional level (Eddy 2014, The Economist 2012, EurActiv 2014). The German Energywiende has impacted especially Poland, effecting grid stability and Polish electricity markets. Through the last years, Poland’s main priority has been energy security. Although it had some improvements on increasing the country’s share of renewables, it is still far from being put firmly on a low-carbon path. In 2011, coal accounted for 55% of Polish primary energy supply and 92% of electricity generation12, which makes the country face a plenty of climate and environmental challenges. The strength of the coal industry, the abundance of coal in the region and its subsequent competitive relative price are major obstacles for Poland to follow the environmental measures proposed by the EU (EIA 2013). Poland has to improve its energy efficiency and its efforts on diversifying the country’s energy mix in order to decarbonize it (IEA 2011). The National Renewable Energy Action Plan ofItaly has set the goal to achieve a 23% share of renewable sources in gross final consumption of energy by 2020. However, the country relies heavily on imports to meet its energy needs (EIA 2013) and still is strongly dependent on fossil fuels. Throughout this century, Italy’s greenhouse gas emissions grew and the Italian government did not put major efforts to develop energy infrastructure (IEA 2009). Also, the country’s rate of wind energy installations has decreased 65% in 2013 (Purchas and Gimon 2014), proving that Italy still has some great challenges to face towards a clean and renewable energy future. Considering all of that, it can be perceived that energy policy decisions made in one EU country may affect the other EU member states as well. The transition might be successful only if it is embedded in a broader European framework. Coordination and cooperation among European countries is therefore the solution to avoid conflict (Hockenos 2014). In Africa, progresses on sustainable energy models are much more discrete than in the most developed countries of the world. South Africa is the African country with the largest energy consumption, and it relies on its large coal deposits to meet most of its energy needs, since it has limited reserves of oil and natural gas. The country holds around 95% of Africa’s total coal reserves. The coal industry is, however, responsible for serious air, land and water pollution. South African shale gas resources are very notable, though this industry is still very small in the country. In 2012, renewables were responsible for only 1% of primary energy consumption’s

12 Poland is the second largest coal producer in Europe, behind Germany (EIA 2013). 367 Ministerial Roundtable of the World Energy Council totality. This strong dependence on coal made South Africa the principal dioxide emitter of the continent (EIA 2013). The largest oil producer in Africa is Nigeria, and the country has also the continent’s largest proven natural gas reserves. Nigerian electricity generation per capita is one of the lowest of the world, and its energy sector faces severe problems due to an aged infrastructure and low maintenance. Oil spills and natural gas flaring are responsible for generating brutal environmental problems, and pollution by the oil companies are seriously damaging air, soil and water. Traditional biomass and waste account for more than 80% of the country’s total energy consumption, and transition for a clean and renewable energy system is still very far away from Nigerian reality (EIA 2013). Meanwhile, Algeria is the largest natural gas producer and the second largest oil producer in Africa. Its economy is heavily reliant on the hydrocarbon sector, which is responsible for almost all export earnings. Currently, almost a hundred percent of the country’s electricity generation comes from fossil-fuel sources. The country consumes a very insignificant amount of hydropower, coal and traditional biomass. However, unlike its neighboring countries, the Algerian government has recently created a program which aims on reducing this fossil-fuel dependence and producing around 40% of domestic consumed electricity from renewable energy sources by 2030 (EIA 2013). Middle Eastern countries also face some energy issues due to some political instability and infrastructure hindrances. The situation of the energy sector in Syria, for example, is quite alarming. It has been in constant turmoil since the beginning of the hostilities between government and opposition forces within the Arab Spring framework. Both oil and natural gas production have decreased drastically since 2011, not only because of the conflict but also because of the sanctions imposed by the US and the EU. Energy infrastructure has been seriously damaged, and the country is facing challenges on the supply of heat and fuel oil to its citizens. Talks over a clean and renewable energy transition are very distant and unlikely to take place in the Syrian government as long as the crisis continues, and it is improbable that the energy sector might recover in the short-term analysis (EIA 2014). Iran is the third largest natural gas producer in the world and it has the second largest reserves in the world. When it comes to oil, it has the fourth largest proven reserves. International sanctions have been compelling Iran to redefine its energy system, and the lack of investment and technology is harmful for the sector. Natural gas and petroleum represent together 98% of Iranian total energy consumption. Energy wastage is one of the country’s most significant energy issues, since it recycles much less energy than the average of most countries (EIA 2013). Almost one-fifth of the world’s oil proven reserves is located in Saudi Arabia, the largest producer and exporter of petroleum in the world. Although it has

368 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations significant reserves of natural gas, its production remains extremely limited. The electricity demand in the country has been growing in the past years, for what the government plans to increase its generating capacity. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is also the largest consumer of petroleum of the Middle East. In 2013, large investments were made on renewable energy, in accord with the Saudi goal of generating around a third of the Kingdom’s energy demands using renewables, especially solar, nuclear, geothermal and wind power. Still, it remains questionable whether a country so economically dependent on petroleum will be able to perform such a transition (EIA 2013, Arab News 2013). Israel is not one of the major producers of oil or natural gas, and it has always been an importer of the latter, but this scenario may change in the next decade. Over the past years, some significant natural gas resources were discovered in the country. This fact may transform it from major importer to great exporter of this resource, which will become the country’s primary energy resource. The growth of the natural gas sector is even very likely to reduce Israeli’s consumption of coal, which is mainly used to generate electricity (EIA 2014). Besides natural gas, the energy regime that is emerging in Israel, alongside with the already on-going socio- technical transition, includes also oil shale, biomass, nuclear, wind and solar energy as alternatives to oil and coal (Teschner and Paavola 2013, Ministry of National Infrastructures, Energy and Water Resources n.d.). Israelis believe that the energy transition must be integrated with transitions in other sectors, such as technology and industry (Teschner, McDonald, et al. 2012). Qatar is the largest explorer of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) in the world. Like its neighbors, this country also relies on the energy sector to sustain its economy. The country does not pursue any coal or nuclear generating capacity, and all of Qatar’s current generating capacity is natural gas-fired. Some discussions about potential solar power projects took place recently, and intensive research is being made in order to help Qatar and other Gulf countries to develop a low-carbon energy transition (EIA 2014, Meltzer, Hultman and Langley 2014). The energy sector is heavily based on oil in Iraq, which has the fifth largest crude oil reserves in the world and it is the second larger producer of crude oil in OPEC. However, even with these huge reserves, oil production has been below the potential levels, due to infrastructure and political constraints. The country has plans on tripling the generating capacity by the end of 2015. Around 90% of its energy needs are met with petroleum, and the rest is supplied by natural gas and hydropower. Iraq’s hydrocarbon resources have not been completely exploited yet, and just a part of its fields is in development (EIA 2013). The government is looking on developing solar and wind plants in the next years, and by 2016, it plans on generating 400MW of its electricity from renewable sources - what represent about 2% of the total generating capacity. It may be a tiny step, but it shows a growing

369 Ministerial Roundtable of the World Energy Council preoccupation on pursuing a cleaner energy mix (Iraq-Business News 2013).

5 QUESTIONS TO PONDER

1. What are the major challenges faced by emerging countries and how could they meet their energy needs in a “Post-Oil” Era and how would they deal with the economic and technological costs involved in such scenario? 2. How can countries prevent themselves from this transition’s impacts on International Security? 3. To what extent can this Energy Transition effectively impact the current processes of Regional Integration? 4. Is there any way for this changes to occur without leading to interstate conflitcts and wars over control of energy resources? 5. Which energy model corresponds to your country’s objectives and goals? What should be the nature of the expected change in the global energy mix?

REFERENCES

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SHALE GAS REVOLUTION?

André França1 Katiele Menger2 ABSTRACT

The outstanding growth on the exploration of shale gas in the United States in the last decade has generated a great buzz in the academy and in the media. The debate has been multidisciplinary, covering environmental, economic, social and geopolitical aspects. This articles aims to present a panorama of all this facets of the debate on the viability of shale gas as an energy resource for the 21st century. In the first part of this article, we proceed with a historical track of the emergence of the shale gas industry in the US and a technical explanation of what constitutes this energy resource. In the next section, weanalyze the main points in the debate on shale, bringing considerations from the critics and supporters, offering arguments from multiples angles. This is a very divided conundrum, generally conducted by environmentalists (that tend to oppose shale gas) and energy industry associations (that generally support shale). Later, we proceed with a prospect of the Energy Information Administration of the United States on the possibilities of shale gas development worldwide and briefing on the framework of international regimes that have to be considered on this debate. Finally, we make a short consideration on the interest of each represented on the simulation of the Ministerial Roundtable of the World Energy Council on the development of shale gas.

1 André França is a 7th semester International Relations undergraduation student at UFRGS and director of the WEC. 2 Katiele Menger is a 4th semester International Relations undergraduation student at UFRGS and assistant director of the WEC. Ministerial Roundtable of the World Energy Council

1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1.1 GAS MARKET EVOLUTION3

For better understanding the impact of unconventional gas in the world supply market, it is essential to comprehend the history and trajectory of the gas industry, as one that is, and has always been, very different from oil (Stevens 2010). Gas market used to be essentially a regional one. It was organized this way for a fundamental reason: the so-called ‘tyranny of distance’ (Stevens 2010). Given that gas is defined as a high-volume low-value commodity, its transport cost made gas commerce almost impracticable far off places. Because of costs in liquefaction, transportation by sea and regasification, natural gas trade is generally done by pipelines that cross neighboring countries, under long-term agreements negotiated bilaterally (Kropatcheva, 2013); making prices differ greatly from one region to another, and also making it hard to enforce a gas exporters unity4, like the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. Furthermore, there is a series of other constraints that have barred the full development of an international gas market. For instance, the necessity of large capital investment to build infrastructure, that made it hard for developing countries to integrate this market; and the domination of national markets by state owned companies, which worked in monopoly systems and hampered the developing of private companies and so the development of a diversified market (Stevens 2010). In the 1990s, the challenge of improving gas market and turning it into an essential part of the world energy supply trades started to be overcame. Many technological advances in gas storage and transport made it possible for gas trade to start becoming an international one, not only regional anymore. As happened with oil, gas initiated its full development when its transport costs started to decline. When the constraints related to natural gas exploration, production and especially its exportation began to be reduced; demand for gas arisen. Together with it, rose the speculation over the future of gas market and its growing share in energy supply market, which was reinforced by its advantages as an energy supply: the intrinsic properties of natural gas make it a cleaner fuel compared to coal and crude oil.

3 Following Stevens (2010), unconventional gas can be defined as resources that, after the initial well has been drilled, require further processing before it can flow, whereas conventional gas requires no such processing and flows naturally. 4 There is no organization of gas exporting countries that could maintain gas prices high by controlling the supply, like OPEC for oil exporters. There is only a Gas Exporting Countries Forum, whose main objectives are exchanging information about gas exploration and production for improving gas market, developing technologies, and assuring the sovereign rights of member countries over their natural gas resources. 378 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

By importing LNG (liquefied natural gas), countries can improve the affordability, flexibility and security of their national energy diet while reducing their CO2 footprint (Chappin, Praet and Dijkema 2010). Notwithstanding, despite the prospects of a huge development of gas market, in 2007 the conjuncture changed dramatically to a much more favorable for gas market development because of two main reasons: the global economic recession, which reduced gas demand, and the rise of unconventional gas production in the United States, that, by increasing the quantity of gas in the market, made its price go down. Developments of unconventional gas in the United States, called the Shale Gas Revolution, caused, for some analysts, “huge investor uncertainties at all stages of gas value chain” (Stevens 2010, VII). However, for others, ”the opening of the Shale Gas reservoirs represents an important change that we view as positive for both the oil and gas industry and, consumers” (MLG Group 2012, 2). For now, one can only say that it is a consensus that unconventional gas will surely have many implications in the energy supply market.

1.2 WHAT IS SHALE GAS AND WHY ITS USE CONFIGURES A REVOLUTION?

Essentially, shale gas is the gas deposited inside shale rocks. Its relevance is based in two particular characters: it tends to overlie world’s conventional oil and gas reservoirs5, and it is an unconventional gas, which means that it has insufficient permeability to flow naturally to a wellbore, as happens with natural gas, therefore demanding a complex process for being extracted from rocks. Also, as will be further explained, shale gas is changing the world’s supply market configuration. Some countries that today really depend on oil and gas imports, like South Africa or Argentina, are facing the possibility of filling their energy needs with the exploration of their shale fields, and countries like United States are reducing their imports from the petroleum exporting countries, which are already searching new buyers. There are also other kinds of unconventional gases such as gas hydrates, coalbed methane, shallow biogenic gas and tight gas. More specifically, shale and tight gas development are influencing directly the whole energy supply market, due to their profitability and future prospects (SHALETEC). Large scale exploration of shale gas in the last decade was enabled due to the improvement of two already existent techniques, hydraulic fracture (figure 1), or fracking, and horizontal drilling. None of those techniques is new, once both were developed more than fifty years ago. What really changed is that over the past ten

5 Stevens (2010) states that unconventional gas resources are estimated to be five times those of conventional gas. 379 Ministerial Roundtable of the World Energy Council years, those techniques were really improved. Drilling efficiency was accelerated, what consequently made it possible to more gas supply at a lower cost per unit (Stevens 2010).

Image 1 - The geology of natural gas resources

Source: EIA 2011. Horizontal drilling is a drilling process in which the well is turned horizontally at depth. It is normally used to extract energy from a source that itself runs horizontally, such as a layer of shale rock. When examining the differences between vertical wells and horizontal wells, it is easy to see that a horizontal well is able to reach a much wider area of rock and the natural gas that is trapped within the rock. Thus, a drilling company using the horizontal technique can reach more energy with fewer wells (Curtis 2011).And Hydraulic fracturing is the process of producing fractures in the rock formation. It is done by pumping large quantities of fluids, such as water, sand and certain chemicals, at high pressure down a wellbore and into the rock, for stimulating the flow of natural gas or oil, increasing the volumes that can be recovered (EnergyFromShale). Nonetheless, it is important to consider that shale wells production depletes much faster than conventional gas wells, and thus more wells are required for extracting shale. However, the continual improvement of technology shows ”that producers have become increasingly successful in managing decline rates over the past few years and that they appear to have become better at softening the impact 380 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations of decline rates as the hydraulic fracturing technology develops” (Stevens 2010 11). In addition, the environmental impacts of shale gas exploration should not be disregarded. There are some concerns that must be taken into consideration: chemicals used in the hydraulic fracturing may contaminate water; fracking leads to physical effects that increase seismic activity; the land use requirement competes with densely populated areas. Also the emissions of carbon dioxide and methane are bigger when compared with the drilling for conventional gas (Stevens 2010), (IGU 2012), (Krupnick, Gordon, and Olmstead 2013). Moreover, the development of shale gas exploration and production is quite different all over the world, and the main base of comparison until now comes from the United States’ exploring and producing system. Although the process of extracting shale may differ in some countries, the consequences of its exploration, or its role as a ‘game changer’ in energy supply market, are almost the same.

1.3 UNITED STATES AND THE SHALE GAS REVOLUTION: CAN IT BE SPREAD?

When considering whether shale gas revolution may spread to beyond the United States, it is required to comprehend the main factors that made the boom of shale gas start in the North American territory. Some of the most important factors that settled the appropriate conjuncture for shale gas emergence in the United States are the ones that follow. First, the experience in drilling and its tough geological knowledge, since they started extracting gas and oil 150 years ago. Second, an act that, until 2002, provided a credit when there was a decline in oil price that could encourage investors’ migration for the cheaper sector to reduce the switch from unconventional gas to oil products when oil prices fell. Third, the population huge acceptance of the idea of exploring gas reserves, once there is the subsoil property rights by the landowner from which many can profit. Finally, a dynamic industry that responds to the needs of the operators, making the gas market to be constantly improved (Stevens 2010). As stated by Wang and Krupnick (2013), a number of factors converged in the early 2000s to make it profitable for firms to produce large quantities of shale gas, but the most important factor was technology innovation, which was facilitated by government research and development programs, and private entrepreneurship that aimed to develop unconventional natural gas. Nevertheless, some of the key technologies, like hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling, were largely developed by the oil industry to explore and produce oil instead of unconventional natural gas. From 2000 to 2009, United States shale gas production has leapt from 1% to 20% of its national energy production total. Also, “several analysts say that the

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[United States], or at least North America, [are] also likely to become energy self- sufficient in a couple of decades due to unconventional gas and oil’ (Vihma2013 3). It is doubtful whether the same conditions may appear in other places, if the revolution has conditions to spread and under what other conditions it could be possible. Stevens (2010), when defining shale gas prospects outside the United States, points that:

In Western Europe, the prime targets (based upon geology) are Poland, Germany, Hungary, Romania, Turkey and the northwest of England. In particular, Exxon Mobil, Conoco-Phillips and Chevron have all signed or are negotiating exploration agreements for shale in the Lublin and Podlasie Basins in southeast Poland. In 2009, the industry and the German National Laboratory for Geosciences launched a research programme for gas shale in Europe (GASH) that aims to assess the volumes in place and the ability to produce them profitably in Western Europe. In Latin America much attention is being directed to Argentina and Chile. China and India have expressed strong interest in CBM given their extensive coal deposits, and China also appears interested in the potential of developing shale gas. In Canada, the National Energy Board believes there is potentially at least 1,000 tcf6 of shale gas to be found (5).

2 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The recent developments of the shale gas industry in the United States led to an intense public debate on the various aspects of the so-called “Shale Gas Revolution”. With projected total reserves of 37 trillion cubic meters (tcm) of unconventional gas (which includes tight gas and coalbed methane) (International Energy Agency [IEA] 2011, 102), many have proclaimed the future energy independence of the United States. Positively, it would be based in a resource that, notwithstanding being a fossil fuel, is much less pollutant than oil and, specially, coal. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) of the American government foresees the beginning of natural gas net exports for the United States to happen within less than 15 years (2014, CP-9). All of this led to much international attention by governments and energy industries all over the world. The perspective above mentioned is expected to change radically and quickly the energy market worldwide, with obvious effects on economics, geopolitics and more else. Not only the United States are expected to experience this shale gas boom, but also other countries with large shale deposits such as China, Argentina, Australia and Poland may have new and important roles on energy production (IEA, 2011). Briefly, shale and other unconventional gas resources are expected to be “game changers” domestically and internationally. Controversies accumulate, nonetheless. Environmental, social and public

6 Trillion cubic feet, a commonly used measurement for gas. 382 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations health viability is under scrutiny by researches affiliated to the academia, to NGOs, to industry associations and international organs, such as the World Energy Council. The results of these studies vary greatly and reflect a fight for public opinion endorsement or veto. Consensus is far from being reached. The next sessions intend to analyze the main points of this debate, bringing considerations from the critics and supporters of the unconventional gas resources. Thus, it offers arguments from multiples angles to base the discussions of the Ministerial Roundtable of the World Energy Council.

2.1 GENERAL ASPECTS OF NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION AND SUPPLY

A critical aspect of natural gas production, for both conventional and unconventional sources, is the necessity of continuous expansion of the number of wells drilled in order to maintain the flow rate of gas. “Typically, the production from a new conventional gas well will decline by 25% to 40% in its first year” (Hughes 2011, 18). Also, a historical perspective of natural gas production shows that, even with an increased drilling activity, total production declines due to ever lower initial productivity of the wells. In the United States, production peaked in 1973, with 7,000 gas wells being drilled every year. In the 2006-2008 period, to reach a close volume to 1973’s production, four times more wells were drilled annually (Hughes 2011). The law of diminishing returns generates ever-growing costs and demands constant infrastructure expansion. With a complex infrastructure 100% larger than in 1990, the United States production of natural gas achieved only a 21% increase in production (Hughes 2011). Price and its volatility are key variables to determinate the commercial competitiveness of a product. Examined from the past, natural gas prices show extreme changes in short periods. Another important aspect of natural gas pricing is that, although world market integration has increased, it stills responds greatly to a regional logic, as it has already been exposed. Figure 3 demonstrates that, despite a general pattern of similar variation over time, prices differentiate greatly across the globe. The EIA’s projection of steady future low prices of natural gas in the US and high prices abroad feeds the perspective of American producers taking the opportunity given by the spread between the domestic and international prices to boost exports. Nonetheless, the ignored price volatility represents a great financial risk for producers and there are doubts that the current prices are profitable (Hughes 2011, 19).

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Image 2 - Gas prices evolution in U.S., Europe and Asia

Source: Hughes 2011, 20

2.2 SHALE GAS PARTICULARITIES AND ISSUES

Generally, unconventional gas shows further technical difficulties compared to conventional sources. First, the decline rates of a shale gas well are typically higher, between 63% and 85% for the first year only (Hughes 2011). Even with productivity being high, depletion steeps production fast. So, relying on shale gas to expand natural gas production exacerbates the necessity of continuous and ever intensive drilling activity, accompanied by higher capital expenditure per well and need of expanding infrastructure. The cost of a shale gas well ranges from between US$ 2 million and US$ 10 million each, depending much of the geology of the play, the number of hydraulic fracturing and other technical considerations (Hughes 2011). Furthermore, Hughes (2011) raises questions over the metrics used by most studies supporting what he calls the “shale gas panacea”. Most of it estimates unconventional resources and its recoverable fraction on an in situ basis, which means the total amount of a play. However, according to the author, two other

384 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations metrics are fundamental in determining the viability of an energy resource: (i) the rate of energy supply – basically the rate of production of the resource; and (ii) the net energy yield – that is the difference between the energy input required in the production and the energy produced. The focus of the analysis of Hughes (2011) is on the resource quality, instead of its volume. Shale plays are found in a variety of places around the world and with different sizes of reserves. A play with larger reserves does not imply, nevertheless, a more commercially rentable play. Within a play, the so-called sweet spots concentrate large volumes of gas in small areas and so, are where the most profitable wells can be drilled. Due to geological characteristics, a large play can have fewer sweets spot than a smaller one; and so, become less profitable. Furthermore, as the productivity in the sweet spots diminishes, production moves to regions with marginal or uneconomic production. The rate of energy supply and the net energy yield decreases. And more wells, at a higher cost, have to be drilled in order to maintain production (Hughes 2013, 50). The figure 4, below, shows graphically the considerations above mentioned, considering the net energy produced, the concentration of resources, the difficulty of extraction and the price and technological limits in the exploitation of gas and oil resources.

Image 3 - The pyramid of oil and gas resource volume versus resource quality

Source: Hughes 2013, 37

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2.2.1. Demand Dynamics of Shale Gas

Higher production costs, caused by greater technical challenges in shale gas exploration, may undermine its viability. “In the United States, natural gas prices are projected to fall to US$ 4.63 per thousand cubic feet by 2015. By one estimate, however the spot gas price of shale gas should amount to US$ 7.5-8 per thousand cubic feet to recover the still cost extraction” (DELL 2010 apud KPMG 2011, 18). These prices in the United States are explained by the great expansion on drilling that happened during the 2006-2008 period coupled with an economic recession that resulted on less demand of energy. Reaching a price that balances the returns of the investments and the competitiveness of shale gas compared to other fuels is critical to its success, in the view of its supporters and critics (Hughes 2011; KPMG 2011; Muller and Muller 2013). Expanding the demand side becomes essential to shale gas producers. Government support through public policies is essential to enhance a transition to a natural gas-based energy mix. Also, its advantages as the least pollutant fossil fuel available could be explored to help bring down greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions turning it even more attractive. Demand expansion for natural gas would come, mainly, from two activities: electricity generation and transportation. Today, burning coal is the main source of electricity generation worldwide, accounting for 41% of such amount. While shale gas carbon footprint in its generation is in the range of 423 to 535 g CO2e/kWh, coal emits 837 – 1130 g CO2e/kWh (MacKay and Stone 2013, 4). This has been the main appeal in favor of replacing coal- fired plant by gas-fired ones as a way to cut down carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Not only in many developing countries coal has a significant share in electricity generation, but also in the developed world: where nuclear plants have been shut down, coal is granting a greater weight. There has also in the United States a lobby for the government to stimulate natural gas-running vehicles production (starting by subsides for commercial fleets) and the refitting of older vehicles to start burning gas (Hughes 2011).

2.3 ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS RELATED TO SHALE GAS EXPLORATION AND INDUSTRY’S REPONSES

Much has been discussed about the environmental risks related to shale gas exploration through articles and news on the main newspapers and TV channels around the globe, even by the Oscar-nominated documentary, GasLand. Public concern with water contamination, seismic activity and other issues led to a moratoria on shale gas production on the states of New York and Pennsylvania (United States), in the province of Quebec (Canada), in South Africa, Bulgaria and France (The Royal Society and The Royal Academy of Engineering 2012). National and international

386 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations authorities on energy, NGOs, the academia and the gas industry promptly entered in the discussion not only to satisfy public questioning, but also to elaborate general measures aiming at creating sustainability criteria to unconventional gas production. Reports by a variety of sources show a large consensus on the recommendations to shale gas industry for granting public support through the diminishing the environmental impact of its activity (The Royal Society and The Royal Academy of Engineering 2012; IEA 2012; Muller and Muller 2013; Shell Oil 2011). The Golden Rules for a Golden Age of Gas 2012 report by the International Energy Agency (IEA) is the main document concerning this matter, having inspired the European Commission Recommendation on the minimum principles for hydraulic fracturing (Collet 2014). The wide geographical distribution of unconventional resources deposits and the difficulties of extracting them explain much of the potentially larger impact of these operations. Drilling is more invasive and more wells are necessary per area than in conventional gas fields7. The highest level of depletion also contributes to demand a more intensive drilling activity when compared to conventional natural gas. Unconventional developments, thus, tend to be extended across larger geographic areas, demanding a much larger scale and resulting in larger industrial footprints, such as roads, truck traffic, air emissions and sound pollution (IEA 2012; Hughes 2013). The core of most criticism in relation to environmental impacts of the shale gas industry is water, particularly the contamination of aquifers and other underground water reservoirs. This specific subject has dominated much of the public debate in all countries with perspectives of exploring shale gas, leading France to ban hydraulic fracking inside its borders. Environmentalists worry that ground water could be contaminated by leakages of methane from fracking, passing though poorly done cementing jobs on wells and arriving to the aquifers, making it improper for human consume. The US Environmental Protection Agency reported a case of a drinking water supply contaminated by hydraulic fracturing in Pavillion, Wyoming (DiGiulio et al 2011 apud The Royal Society and The Royal Academy of Engineering 2012). Some experts state, nonetheless, that this risk is minimum as shale gas formations are 3,000 to 4,500 meters underground, while aquifers are usually 300 meters underground, making a leakage through the rock unlikely (International Gas Union [IGU] 2012). Yet, these risks could be even lower by assuring the use of best practices in well design and construction to ensure proper stress resistance of the seal and by a systematic verification of its quality (IEA 2012). Contamination of surface water could also happen due to improper disposal of toxic fluids from hydraulic fracturing, including radioactive elements. The fluid pumped in the shale at high pressure is a mixture of water and chemicals additives, in the production phase called completion. A large part of it then returns to the surface

7 “Whereas onshore conventional field require less than one well per ten square kilometers, unconventional fields might need more than one well per square kilometer” (IEA 2012, 19). 387 Ministerial Roundtable of the World Energy Council and can be recycled, disposed or reutilized. The contamination of surface reservoirs by wastewater and spills has been pointed out as one of the main preoccupations by experts in government, industry, universities and NGOs, showing a high degree of consensus among them. Still, much the attention of the public debate is not centered in this matter (Krupnick, Gordon and Olmstead 2013). The consumption of water, as well, is another critical point: between 2 million and 8 million gallons per well are used (Hughes 2011). The production of shale gas could lead to competition for such resources with other activities in the same region, such as agriculture. This way, water availability can be a great constraint for shale gas activity. The Tarim Basin in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region holds some of China’s largest shale deposits, but also suffers from severe water scarcity (IEA 2012, 32). Thus, development of shale gas in China has been focused in other regions. Alternatives to the usage of fresh water, nonetheless, have been raised by the industry. Hydrocarbon-based fracturing fluids, such as propane, can eliminate the water from the fracking process (IEA 2012, 32). Deep brines – salty water – wells at shallow depths are found in virtually all shale gas regions for its typical geological formation and can be a – sometimes even cheaper – source of water (Muller and Muller 2013, 6-7). Cases of seismic activity associated with unconventional gas production have been reported, such as the Cuadrilla shale gas operations in Blackpool, United Kingdom, and in Youngstown. Seismic events are inherent to hydraulic fracturing, as it creates cracks in rocks deep beneath the surface. Most of these go totally unnoticed by the local population because of their low intensity. Greater shocks occur when fracking intersects and reactivates existing faults, though. Hydraulic fracturing is not the only anthropogenic process that can trigger small earthquakes: deeps mining, construction of large building or damns, and most activities involving altering the underground. A previous careful survey of the geology of the area to be explored can avoid enhanced risks, nevertheless (IEA 2012). The application of these precautionary measures impact the overall cost of production of shale gas. The IEA (2012, 56), based on the Golden Rules elaborated by the organ, estimates a total 7% raise in the cost of drilling and completing a shale gas well with this. Due to the necessary large scale implied in the Golden Rules Case (better explored in session 2.4.), the relative costs of production are expected to diminish because of economies of scale. Further efficiency savings from better, long term planning of the production have the potential to reach approximately 5%. (IEA 2012, 60).

2.3.1 Unconventional Gas, Greenhouse Gases Emissions and Global Warming

The substitution of coal-fired electricity generation plants by gas-fired ones has been lobbied as one way to reduce the global CO2 emissions. In fact, a comparison

388 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations between the most efficient current generation technologies for coal- and gas-fired plants shows that emissions can be reduced from 1.82 pounds of CO2 per kWh to 0,8 pounds of CO2/kWh with this change (Hughes 2011). Yet, these statistics consider the burner-tip emissions of those plants and not the entire supply chain of electricity generation for both sources, which should include one sensitive aspects of shale that is methane emission. Methane has between 72 and 105 times the Global Warning Potential (GWP) of CO2 as greenhouse gas (Howarth et. al 2011 apud Hughes 2011). Howarth et al (2011 apud HUGHES 2011) proposes the consideration of the full-cycle GHG emission for a better understanding of the impacts of this substitution on the electricity generation fleet. Because of the differences on the composition of coal and shale gas, Howarth et al. concludes that on a 20-year time frame basis, the best-in-class gas technology fueled by shale gas would produce between 21% and 52% more emissions than best-in-class coal technology, according to the GWP criteria used. As time goes by, though, this difference get smaller, until, after a 50- to 60-year time frame, total emissions by coal overtake those of shale gas. On a 100-year time frame, the best-technology coal emits 32% more than its gas equivalent (Howarth et al. 2011 apud Hughes, 2011). This trend is explained by a much shorter lifetime of methane in relation to carbon dioxide coupled with much stronger GWP of the first. If Howarth et al. (2011)’ statistics are to be considered – there has been harsh criticism to his studies by authors such as Richard and Elizabeth Muller (2013, 8) – promoting shale gas as “bridge fuel” to a future of renewables, while using a less pollutant fossil fuel, would actually be totally counterproductive. On the medium- term, emissions would grow and so would global temperature. International Energy Agency’s projected 2035 scenario of a boom on shale gas production foresees a growth of 20% in energy-related emissions – though being 0.5% lower than the 2035 baseline project –, but it considers only carbon dioxide emissions. Nonetheless, the report is clear in stating that promoting “a greater role for natural gas in the global energy mix does not bring environmental benefits where it substitutes for other fossil fuels, natural gas cannot on its own provide the answer to the challenge of climate change” (EIA 2012, 93). Promoting natural gas should be only a part of a wider energy policy that seeks greater energy efficiency with widespread application of technologies such as carbon capture and storage and more.

2.4 A SUCCESSFUL FUTURE SCENARIO FOR UNCONVENTIONAL GAS

On the Golden Rules for a Golden Age of Gas report of the International Energy Agency (2012), a hypothetical scenario for 2035 is projected in which, with appliance of the golden rules, the level of environmental performance and public

389 Ministerial Roundtable of the World Energy Council acceptance certifies the shale gas industry with a “social license to operate”. This scenario, called the Golden Rules Case, assumes that the entire resource base for unconventional gas – estimated by IEA in 331 trillion cubic meters, of which 208 tcm are of shale gas – is accessible for development, including where restrictions are currently in place. This session briefs the International Energy Agency projections. On the demand side of the Golden Rules, natural gas is expected to overtake coal as the second most important fuel in the energy mix, accounting for one-third of the increase in primary demands. China will lead this growth (representing more than the growth of all the OECD countries put together), sustaining a leading role in the Asia-Pacific region both in the demand and supply sides. The expansion of unconventional gas production in North America could make the United States takes the place of Russia as largest gas producers, with 820 billions of cubic meters (bcm) and 785 bcm of total gas production in 2035 respectively. Canada and Mexico would contribute with more 740 bcm to the North American total, even though the regions share in the unconventional gas market would fall to 45% in 2035 – compared to 70% today. The Asia-Pacific region has great potential for expansion. In the Golden Rules Case, China becomes the second-largest producer of unconventional gas, after the United States, with 390 bcm in 2035. The domestic supply of unconventional gas in India reaches 90 bcm in the same year, while Indonesian production has a potential to rise to 55 bcm. Australia, with large amount of both conventional and unconventional gas, produces 170 bcm of gas – 65% coming from the latter (IEA, 2012). In Latin America, the largest potentials for unconventional gas development are in Argentina (with a large base of shale gas), followed by Venezuela (tight gas) and Brazil (for shale). Of a total 70 bcm domestic production of gas, Argentinian shale would represent 50% of it, much coming from the Vaca Muerta formation. The ample Venezuelan and Brazilian conventional resources are expected to delay a significant production of unconventional gas in these countries. Peru and Bolivia, however, could produce 5 bcm each; Paraguay and Uruguay 3 bcm each in 2035 (IEA 2012). Unconventional gas production in the European Union could moderate its decaying natural gas production and import dependence. Poland could reach a 34 bcm production in 2035 (90% of it from unconventional sources), while total OECD European countries production would fall from 2010’s 304 bcm total to 285 bcm (IEA 2012, 81-87). This worldwide expansion of natural gas markets creates strategic challenges to today monopolistic suppliers, such as Russia and Qatar. Production in Russia, for instance, is expected to grow by 20% compared to 2010 numbers; still, these are below the foreseen levels by Russian companies’ outlook for 2035 (IEA 2012, 83). A boom in the production of conventional gas coupled with growing domestic demand is expected to be experienced in Africa, from Nigeria to Angola

390 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations and Mozambique. In North Africa, nonetheless, a slightly significant share of gas production is expected to come from unconventional source, reaching 8% of the domestic output in Algeria.

3 PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS

Due to the novelty of the subject, the exploitation of shale resources has not yet been a topic of intergovernmental discussion on the main international forums. The International Energy Agency and the World Energy Council have been somewhat active in the recent years on the discussion, producing reports, issuing statements etc. International industry foundations, such as the International Gas Union, also have been responsible for some important studies in the area. Nonetheless, the debate on the viability of the exploitation of shale gas is tied to some larger international commitments related to, for instance, the protection of water reservoirs and the control of greenhouse gas emissions. One of the provisions under article 2 of the Kyoto Protocol (United Nations 1998) is the “(viii) [l]imitation and/or reduction of methane emissions through recovery and use in waste management, as well as in the production, transport and distribution of energy”. This is directly related to the above mentioned controversy on whether shale gas helps or not softening the effects of climate change. The same article, under the seventh clause, calls for the implementation of “measures to limit and/or reduce emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol in the transport sector”, one of the sectors which the lobbyists of natural gas in the US say is promising for the future. The international commitments with respect of water are stated under the Protocol on Water and Health of the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Water Courses and International Lakes. The terms of this agreement are the ones that better address the worries about shale gas. Article 4, clause c, states the need to ensure “[e]ffective protection of water resources used as sources of drinking water, and their related water ecosystems, from pollution from other causes, including agriculture, industry and other discharges and emissions of hazardous substances”. Article 5, clause a, though strictly related to water-related diseases, could be a precedent approach to the uncertainties of shale gas exploitation:

The precautionary principle, by virtue of which action to prevent, control or reduce water-related disease shall not be postponed on the ground that scientific research has not fully proved a causal link between the factor at which such action is aimed, on the one hand, and the potential contribution of that factor to the prevalence of water-related disease and/or transboundary impacts, on the other hand (United Nations 1999).

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On the regional level, The European Union’s “Recommendation on minimum principles for the exploration and production of hydrocarbons (such as shale gas) using high-volume hydraulic fracturing” is the most advanced framework until now. Approved in January 2014, it delivers its member states a general guideline on fracking, demanding previous environmental and geological risk assessments, water management plans, widespread monitoring of all possible impacts and public transparency. Due to opposition of some governments, especially from the United Kingdom (Krukowska and Bakhsh 2014), the final document does not bind and leaves the regulatory activity to national governments.

4 BLOC POSITIONS

Image 4 - Technically Recoverable Shale Gas Reserves by Country

Elaborated by the authors, with data from EIA (2013). The countries that are not displayed on

392 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations the graphic above are considered to have no considerable reserves, or are currently developing researches in the area to estimate them.

North America is the most advanced region in the exploitation of shale gas and oil reserves. Canada and the United States hold the largest experience in this new market of unconventional gas. The prospects of a production boom projects a future scenario where the two countries, along with Mexico, will become net exporters of natural gas. With lower costs, North American LNG could be sold to the Asian and European markets, affecting pricing worldwide. United States of America is the leading country in the development of shale gas and shale oil industry in the globe. Though it has not the largest reserves discovered to date – with 665 tcf of technically recoverable gas, the US ranks fourth in the world (EIA 2013, 10) – the country has the most consolidated experience in the exploitation of shale8. In 2010, shale gas accounted for over 20% of its natural gas production (Stevens 2012); and by 2018, it should become a net exporter of gas (EIA2014, CP-9). This fact is expected to change not only the global market of natural gas, with its various economic impacts, but also the international politics and geopolitics of energy. It would represent less dependence on the Middle East and Africa for its imports of energy, the possibility of (at least partially) replacing traditional suppliers in the Asian and European markets and creating new interdependent relations with them. Canada is another shale gas rich country, with 2,413tcf of in-place reserves, 773 tcf of which are technically recoverable (EIA2013)9. Shale gas is already in advanced stages of development, accounting for 15% of all Canadian natural gas production – the third largest in the world (Chong and Simikian 2014). As demand for imports of gas decline in the US, Canada has been looking to develop new markets, with special attention to Asia – where prices are high and Canadian LNG could be more competitive. Then, several companies have already announced plans of investing in liquefaction plants in order to export shale gas production (Chong and Simikian 2014). Mexico has great potential of profiting from its shale gas reserves of 2,233 tcf (in-situ), located along the Gulf of Mexico. The 545 tcf of technically recoverable

8 Strong controversies not only on the prognostics of shale oil reserves, but also on the reliability of the IEA, have surfaced after an announced two thirds write down in total American shale reserves in a report still to be released by the agency (Sahagun 2014). 9 A report by the Canadian parliament, and based on its national Geological Survey, estimates the national reserves of shale gas in 4,995 tcf (Chong and Simikian 2014); largely surpassing the projections made by the Energy Information Admnistration of the United States. Nonetheless, the report states that, in many basins, industry claims of shale gas reserves have not been independently verified by public authorities. 393 Ministerial Roundtable of the World Energy Council reserves of unconventional gas is potentially larger than its conventional resources. The first initiatives on the Mexican shale industry date to 2011, while PEMEX, the national oil company, foresees the beginning of the commercialization of this resource by 2015 (EIA 2013, II-2). The development of a domestic shale gas and shale oil market in the USA poses a threat to Mexican exports of energy; and so, PEMEX is looking forward to attend the European market (Harrup 2014). Due to its dependence in imports of natural gas from Russia, the debate on the possibility of reproducing the success in the development of the shale gas industry has been especially strong in Europe. Though dependence on Russian gas varies a lot from country to country, there has already been a movement to diversify the suppliers of natural gas for Europe. Leaked documents have shown that the European Union has been pressing the American government to expand shale production in the negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) trade deal (Carter and Sheppard 2014). In addition, further developing the indigenous shale gas industry, which is still at early stage, could enhance energy security of these countries. There is not a consensus within the European Union about profiting or not from the opportunity of developing shale resources (Florette 2012). Nevertheless, as above mentioned, a general framework for the EU has been approved sooner this year. Poland is the country with the greatest potential of shale resources in the European Union due to favorable infrastructure, public support and an experienced industry of onshore conventional gas and oil, as well as coalbed methane – another unconventional gas source. EIA reports a total in-situ reserve of 763 tcf, being 148 tcf of it considered technically recoverable (EIA 2013, 1-7). Besides being at an early phase, the exploration of shale plays has been considered “disappointing” so far in Poland. In 2012, ExxonMobil abandoned its activities in the country after drilling the first wells; other companies, such as Marathon, Talisman, ConocoPhillips and Chevron, have been cautious because of poor results from this first initiatives (EIA 2013, VIII-3,4). The Energy Information Administration (US) point to the need of better geological studies to locate the best areas for drilling and successfully implementing hydraulic fracturing programs. Interestingly, despite the interest of many western European countries of diminishing the dependence on the Russian through Polish shale, 25% of all the shale gas permits issued were conceded to Russian companies (World Energy Council 2012, 9). France falls short, with 727 tcf of in-situ and 137 tcf of recoverable shale gas in its territory. Nonetheless, public aversion to the development of shale industry is especially high among the French. The worries about environmental impacts led to a prohibition of hydraulic fracturing by the national government in 2011 (Baudet 2013). Most industry representatives argue that this decision impedes their activity in the country (Collet 2014). Some politicians, such as the Minister of Industrial

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Renewal, have stressed the importance of researching alternatives to hydraulic fracturing, stating their support to methods still being developed as the propane injection (Khalatbari 2014). With in-place reserves of 134 tcf of shale gas, the United Kingdom ranks second in the European Union in terms of advance and support of shale resources industry. With substantial 26 tcf of technically recoverable gas (EIA 2013, 1-7), the British industry is still beginning its development; it has already been under public scrutiny, nonetheless. After reported seismic activity following the hydraulic fracturing of wells by Cuadrilla in early 2011, government suspended activities for 18 months for further considerations (EIA 2013, XI-8). Germany is one of the countries that presented the strongest public debates on shale industry, mostly focused on the environmental impacts. Fracking has been used for over 50 years in the country, with no sound opposition until the beginning of the debate on shale gas. In 2013, the federal government decided to suspend the submission to the Bundestag, until the September elections, of a draft law for regulation on hydraulic fracturing, which would demand large protection of water reservoirs and the need of environmental impacts assessment (Vetter 2013). About only 12% of all natural gas consumed in Germany comes from national resources, with large dependence on the Russians. With 80 tcf of in-place shale gas reserves – about 17 tcf of it are technically recoverable (EIA 2013, 1-7), industrials claim that shale could halt the decline on national gas production, increasing energy security and lowering costs to an economy with large need of energy to its strong industrial sector (Eckert 2014). The national government faces a challenge to ensure energy supply after the decision of shutting down all nuclear power plants until 2022, following the disaster of Fukushima in 2011. Denmark is one very special case. As the other Scandinavian countries, it is known for being ecologically avant-garde, with plans to have a 100% clean energy mix in the energy and transportation sectors by 2050 (Becker and Verner 2014). Due to controversies on shale gas exploration, the Danish government has been precautions in developing its 32 tcf technically recoverable reserves out of a total 159 tcf of in-place reserves (EIA 2013, 1-7). It has issued permits for the local subsidiary of Total to conduct research surveys and test drillings to check economic viability. The results of these activities are expected to be the basis for a future policy towards shale gas (Becker and Verner 2014 23). Shale gas could deter natural gas production decline from North Sea, which granted for long independence of gas imports. Although there are some uncertainties about the estimates, there is a strong potential for shale gas development in the Netherlands. Its shale reserves are estimated in 26tcf of recoverable areas and 151tcf of proven gas reserves (EIA 2013). In 2011, some test wells were planned to be drilled, but due to public resistance, and some political and economic matters, it was stopped. Up to now, the drilling of

395 Ministerial Roundtable of the World Energy Council shale wells has been suspended, and it will not be allowed until a study promoted by the government, on the possible risks and effects of exploration of shale gas, is concluded (de Rijke, 2014). Italy has no considerable shale reserves (EIA 2013), and there is little investment on investigations about the country’s unconventional gas potential (Natural Gas Europe 2013). This lack of governmental interest on shale, verified by declarations that Italy will not develop shale production, is explained by environmental concerns and the attention given to conventional hydrocarbons production (Moloney 2013). Russian Federation’s shale reserves are especially large – 1,920 tcf of in-situ gas, being 285 tcf technically recoverable (EIA 2013). Russia has been for long time the major producer and exporter of natural gas. Its energy power plays an important role as material basis for its strong foreign policy. Thus, the future development of shale gas in other countries, enhancing global competition on the natural gas market by LNG exports, possibly affects Russian economic and political strength (Kropatcheva 2014). Growing costs for the exploration of conventional resources, nonetheless, made Russian companies pay more attention to shale resources. Rosfnet signed agreements with ExxonMobil and Statoil to use horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing in Russian basins (EIA 2013) and Gazprom assumed the possibility of buying American gas firms as a way to access technology in shale gas exploration (The Moscow Times, 2010). Algeria is a major gas exporter, and its economy is extremely dependent on the profits from gas selling; however, its local demand is increasing in a way it will interfere in the exports. Therefore, extra gas reserves would enable its prominence in gas market to keep fueling the country’s development (AfDB report 2013). Algeria owns 3,419tcf of proven gas reserves and 707tcf of recoverable areas (after China and Argentina, it is the third biggest technically recoverable shale gas reserve in the world), and has already signed exploration agreements with some companies. However, there are many concerns over the increasing of shale exploration in the country. The fracking process demands a huge water supply, and the use of this scarce resource should not harm some sectors, like the agriculture. Also, Algeria does not yet have experience with the regulations and monitoring that are required in the fracking process, which are really important for making sure it will not cause environmental problems (AfDB report 2013). For South Africa, development of shale gas could be a game changer for the economy, given that more than 70% of the country’s energy supplies come from coal, and it has almost no production of gas. The country has the eighth biggest reserve of technically recoverable shale gas resources in the world, with 1,559tcfproven gas reserves and 390tcfof recoverable areas. However, the reserves are believed to be spread over a geographical area, much of it is desert, and water shortages would be a major constraint (AfDB report 2013, p 15). The shale gas exploration is in process

396 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations of regularization, as South Africa’s cabinet proposed new technical regulations to govern petroleum exploration, particularly standards for shale gas exploration and hydraulic fracturing, and they are about to be released (EIA 2013, p 8; SouthAfrica. info), what will lead shale gas exploration in the country to begin. Although Nigeria does not have shale gas reserves, it is the largest oil producer in Africa, holding the largest natural gas reserves on the continent, and was the world’s fourth leading exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in 2012. Given it, the country’s importance on the topic lies on its dependence on natural gas and oil exports, whose prices may decline if shale takes its share in the global supply market. United States and South Africa, Nigeria’s important gas and oil buyers, are between the countries that have the biggest shale reserves in the world. If the shale exploration develops around the world, and increases in its commerce partners, the country will have to be prepared for the impact it may lead to its economy. China accounts for the biggest shale reserves in the world, with 4,746tcf of reserves in place and 1,115tcf of technically recoverable areas, and is the only country, besides US and Canada, that produces shale gas in commercial quantities (EIA 2013). China is turning its investments in gas industry, once it is a way to decrease the air pollution caused by coal burning. The government believes in a wide development of shale industry in the country, and plans to considerable increase its production. Sinopec, a state owned company, plays the principal role in shale extraction. However, the process is still been improved, and China’s biggest challenge is technological, once it lacks the necessary personnel and equipment to exploit its shale gas reserves on a large scale (Tomsen and Davies 2013). Given this necessity, China and the US started, in 2009, the US-China Shale Gas Resource Initiative - a joint effort to enhance investment and technical cooperation aimed at accelerating shale gas development in China (JES 2013). India and Indonesia, both having the greatest shale reserves in Asia (the first with 584 tcf of shale reserves in place and with 96 tcf of recoverable areas, and the former with 303 tcf of shale in place and with 46 tcf of recoverable areas, following EIA) are likely to emerge just behind China as major shale gas players in the coming decades, but both face similar or greater obstacles to reach that point (Tomsen and Davies 2013). They need technology for extracting shale, and lack infrastructure for distributing the gas when extracted. Indonesia, as an archipelago, presents unique obstacles to developing the distribution networks necessary for large-scale shale gas production (Tomsen and Davies 2013). Also, their water resources are scarce, and there are some predictions that they will decrease in the next years, what poses a question about the viability of hydraulic fracking. Nonetheless, in spite of all those difficulties, India has interest in developing shale industry. The Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), an Indian public enterprise, has already drilled a shale well and plans to dig 30 shale gas exploratory wells across the country. These explorations

397 Ministerial Roundtable of the World Energy Council are expected to be carried out in alliance with ConocoPhilips, a US-based oil company that is leader in shale gas and deep-water exploration. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan faces problems with supplying its energy demand. Even though the country produces gas and oil, it depends on imports for fuelling its local needs. Pakistan has 586 tcf proven shale gas reserves, and 105tcf of recoverable areas, but lacks capital and technology domain to start the exploration (EIA 2013). Recently, the Petroleum Ministry implemented a Shale Gas Policy that regulates exploratory licenses, and now plans to allow foreign companies for exploring some areas (Williams 2013). Israel has no reported shale gas reserves. Nonetheless, important offshore natural gas reserves have been recently discovered in the Mediterranean Sea. These could change Israeli position in the energy market, from energy imports dependent to a major exporter of natural gas to Turkey, Egypt and even Palestine (Alray, 2014; Ayyub, 2014; Mitnick, 2014). The findings have set a dispute with Lebanon, as the Lebanese authorities affirm that activities the Leviathan and Tamar basins affect its resources located offshore (Aziz, 2013). Part of the resources are also found under Gaza Strip’s maritime territory, but Israeli naval force currently control the Palestinian coast (Ahmed, 2014). Turkey has considerable shale gas reserves, 163tcf risked gas in place and 24tcf of technically recoverable areas according to an IEA (2013) estimative. A state owned company and other private companies already started exploring shale, but the country lacks technology and information about shale extraction, so there is a need to establish cooperation agreements with countries such as the USA that can share their knowledge in this area. A Turkish committee has already visited those countries and some wells are been drilled in a partnership with a company from US and one from Canada (Natural Gas Asia 2013). It is also uncertain whether the exploitation of shale gas can be profitable, but given the country dependence on energy importing, it could be a way of filling the country’s energy demand for a period of time. Also, the lack of a legislation regarding shale extraction raises environmental concerns, once there is no regulation on the process (Natural Gas Europe 2013). Argentina has the second largest in-place shale gas reserves in the world, with most of its 3,211 tcf located in the Neuquen basin, bordering the Andes. Important exploration programs are being implemented and early-stage commercial production is already underway in this basin by companies such as ExxonMobil, Total and YPF, aiming at profiting 802 tcf of technically recoverable gas in the country (EIA 2013, V-2). Three other basins in the Argentinian territory show potential for prospection, but Neuquen “already a major oil and gas production area from conventional and tight sandstones, (…) is emerging as the premier shale gas and shale oil development area of South America” (EIA 2013, V-5). YPF, the Argentinian state oil company, has announced joint investments in drilling of $1 billion with Chevron and $1.5 billion

398 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations with CNOOC, a Chinese state oil firm (EIA 2013, V-13). Many other companies are also drilling in Neuquen. With large conventional and unconventional reserves, Argentina emerges as a probable mass exporter of gas, with large potential markets in the region, such as Chile and Brazil. With 1,279tcf of shale reserves in place, and 245tcf of technically recoverable areas, Brazil shows up as the 10th country with the biggest shale reserves in the world (IEA 2013). The country’s state owned company, Petrobras, controls almost all the shale exploration in the country, which occurs in small scale. Studies are been conducted by Petrobras agency that explores shale gas, and the country is taking part in Venezuela’s recent shale exploration. Furthermore, Brazil’s National Petroleum Agency (ANP) issued fracking regulations, stating that fracking must not harm the environment, and announced several new regulations to ensure groundwater sources are protected (ANP 2014). Bolivia is a great natural gas exporter, and the development of shale exploration around the world, principally in Brazil and Argentina, its major buyers, could really affect its share in the energy supply market. Bolivia accounts with 154tcf of shale reserves in place, and 36tcf of technically recoverable areas, however, there is no short-term perspective on exploring it. The government just considered that future developments of shale industry need to be preceded by responsible evaluation, and is closing partnerships with Argentinean companies to start researches on its shale fields (LA RAZÓN 2013). Colombia, which already exploits heavy oil reserves, has potential shale reserves of 308 tcf of in-place gas, being 55 tcf recoverable (EIA 2013). The commercial exploration of its shale fields is under studies by the government, which is also conducting the elaboration of the licenses and determining the regulation to shale gas production in the country. Paraguay has the 4th biggest shale reserve in South America, with 350 risked gas in place and 75tcf of technically recoverable areas (EIA 2013). Its reserves are located in the South Cone, the area of the greatest South America reserves. Paraguay has no natural gas production or significant proved reserves, than the development of shale industry could fundamentally change the domestic energy outlook in Paraguay. Also, Petropar, a state owned company, and private companies have ratified intent to produce shale gas in the southeastern region of the nation(Lavaller 2012). Japan has very limited domestic energy resources, which meet less than 15% of its internal demand. The country is the third largest oil consumer and importer of the world, and is the world’s largest importer of liquefied natural gas (EIA 2013). Its major importers are Southeast Asia countries and Middle East oil and gas producer countries. Recently, Japan closed a deal involving American and Japanese companies, where they settled that Japan will receive large supplies of low-priced natural gas starting in 2017 (REUTERS 2014). Also, in the beginning of the year,

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Japan Petroleum Exploration Co (Japex), a private Japanese company, started the country’s first commercial shale production and intends to increase it, although there are no public estimative of Japan shale resources. Just like Japan, South Korea domestic resources are insufficient, and do not meet the countries internal demand. Energy imports meet about 97% of its energy needs, making South Korea one of the world’s biggest energy importers (EIA 2014). However, it seeks to be part of world’s energy supply market, and if they cannot as a producer, they can as an investor. As a country that leads the world’s high-tech development, it closed partnerships in LNG development projects with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Indonesia (NATURAL GAS ASIA 2014). In addition, SK E&S, South Korea’s third biggest conglomerate, concluded a contract with Freeport LNG in United States, where it is stated that they will import large quantities of shale from US, starting in 2020. As world’s major petroleum and natural gas exporters, and as members of OPEC, Iran, Iraq, Qatar and Saudi Arabia represent the countries whose economy relies on energy sector. Therise of US production and exports can change the share of global supply market, and may force them to lower their prices. However, they are already searching for alternatives, and some of them have shale reserves that can be explored in long-term. For Iran, US shale gas industry is hampering the development of the Iran- Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline. With US shale gas competitive prices, both countries are considering to buy gas from US and do not move along with the gas partnership with Iran (Dipaola and Tuttle). Iraq is one of the world’s largest oil producers, and it may benefit from joining pipeline projects and investment agreements in its prominent oil industry. Furthermore, in the Iraqi Kurdistan, the region where a big part of the oil reserves is located, there are also significant shale fields that have not yet been exploited. The Kurdish Regional Government, that took control of the northern part of Iraq after Saddam Hussein’s fall, has shown interest in conducting studies on the shale reserves and exploring them (TAHA 2013). Studies on Kazakhstan shale gas potential have not yet been conducted, so it cannot be affirmed whether the country has or not shale reserves (EIA 2013). However, it is important to consider that Russia’s largest shale reserve is located right above Kazakhstan’s northern border, so probably it has considerable shale fields, as cam be seen in EIA’s map of world’s shale reserves (EIA 2013). In addition, the country is a major petroleum producer and exporter, whose share on the world’s energy supply market is increasing (Alexander’s Gas and Oil, 2006). Qatar, as stated by Oxford Business Group (2013), is investing in shale-related projects in North America and elsewhere to help maintain its position as one of the top players in the global gas market.

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The world’s biggest oil producer, Saudi Arabia has, as stated by The Saudi Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, estimates of over 600 tcf of unconventional gas reserves, more than double of its proven conventional reserves. But many of the factors that made the shale gas boom in US possible are still lacking in Saudi Arabia. However, the kingdom aims to invest in shale development in long term (Reuters 2013), andRussia’s Lukoil is already discussing a deal with SaudiArabiato exploit unconventional gas deposits in the kingdom’s desert region (Natural Gas Asia 2014). The importance of Syria in the topic is not directly related to its shale reserves, once, according to EIA (2014), the country has only considerable shale oil resources that are not already been fully explored. Then, its relevance is based on a geopolitical question. Syriais going through a hard period, once a series of conflicts between government and opposition forces are happening. Also, some sanctions were imposed by European Union and United States, what further damaged the country’s energy sector (EIA 2014). However, Syrian and Russian government closed a deal allowing exploration and drilling off the Syrian coast, that has up to 122 tcf of natural gas reserves. This deal puts Russia, which has enormous shale reserves, in an important position in the Eastern Mediterranean energy supply market (Natural Gas Europe 2014). With 57tcf of reserves in place, and 128tcf of technically recoverable areas, Ukraine has Europe’s third largest shale gas reserves (EIA 2013). The country relies on imports from Russia for fueling its gas demand. However, according to Reuters (2013), Ukraine signed a $10 billion shale gas production-sharing agreement with Royal Dutch Shell and later with U.S. Chevron, what can be seen as step in a drive for more energy independence from Russia. For now, the territorial divisions and the unstable period that the country is passing through hampers the full exploration of the countries shale reserves, once many of the conflicts take place in locals were they are located (W. Lijdsman, 5). However, the president stated that the agreements with foreign companies would enable Ukraine to be full sufficient in gas by 2020 (Reuters 2013).

5 QUESTIONS TO PONDER

1. Considering the broader global needs for energy transition, could shale gas be a “bridge fuel” option to a future cleaner energy mix? 2. Is shale gas exploitation suitable to every country or region in the world? Under which social, economic and environmental conditions should it be or should it not be developed? 3. What advantages and disadvantages would shale gas bring to the energy

401 Ministerial Roundtable of the World Energy Council markets? Would it weaken the current oligopoly and boost competition, lowering prices? Or could it be a factor of destabilization?

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International Energy Agency. Golden Rules for a Golden Age of Gas. Paris, 2012. International Gas Union. Shale Gas: the Facts about the Environmental Concerns. International Gas Union, 2012. Japan Times. “Abe to Ask Obama to boost shale gas exports to japan”. Japan Times. . http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/04/20/national/politics-diplomacy/abe- to-ask-obama-to-boost-shale-gas-exports-to-japan/#.U6b1cfldVfw (accessed June 22, 2014). Joshua Mitnick, “Israeli Offshore Natural Gas Is Headed to Egypt”, Wall Street Journal, MAY 6th, 2014, accessed August 7ht, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/ articles/SB10001424052702303417104579545902477622762 Khalatbari, Azar. “Gaz de schiste : qu’est-ce l’extraction au propane?”, Science et Avenir, January 29, 2014, accessed May 20, 2014, http://www.sciencesetavenir. fr/nature-environnement/20140129.OBS4126/gaz-de-schiste-l-extraction-au- propane-defendue-par-montebourg.html. Koshkin, Pavel. “Does the U.S. shale gas revolution threaten Russia and OPEC?”. Russia Direct, May 22, 2014. http://www.russia-direct.org/content/does-us-shale- gas-revolution-threaten-russia-and-opec (accessed June 7, 2014). KPMG. Shale Gas: a Global Perspective. KPMG Global Energy Institute, 2011. Kropatcheva, Elena. “He who has the pipeline calls the tune? Russia’s energy power against the background of the shale “revolutions”. Energy Policy 66 (2014): 1–10. Krupnick, Alan, Gordon, Hal and Olmstead, Sheila. Pathways to Dialogue: What Experts Say about the Environmetal Risks of Shale Gas Development. Krukowska, Ewa andNidaaBakhsh. “U.K. Lobbied in Brussels to Halt EU Legislation on Shale Gas”, Bloomberg, January 15, 2014, accessed 10 May, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-15/u-k-lobbied-in-brussels-to-prevent- eu-regulation-on-shale-gas.html. Lewis, Renee. “China shale gas boom will hit poor African exporters hard, finds study”. Al Jazeera America, May 7, 2014, http://america.aljazeera.com/ articles/2014/5/7/china-fracking-africa.html (accessed June 2, 2014). MacKay, David J. C. and Timothy J. Stone.Potential Greenhouse Gas Emissions Associated with Shale Gas Extraction and Use. London. Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2013. Mishra, Richa. “Difficult choice: For ONGC, it is US shale or Iran gas.”. The Hindu Business Line, April 13, 2014, http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/companies/ difficult-choice-for-ongc-it-is-us-shale-or-iran-gas/article5908671.ece (accessed June 16, 2014).

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Moscow Times. “Gazprom May Buy U.S. Shale Firm”, The Moscow Times, May 10, 2010, accessed May 20, 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/ gazprom-may-buy-us-shale-gas-firm/406379.html. Moloney, Liam. “Italy Won’t Develop Shale Gas as Plans National Production Boost”. http://www.4-traders.com/ENEL-SPA-70935/news/Italy-Wont-Develop- Shale-Gas-as-Plans-National-Production-Boost-16510608/ (accessed August 8, 2014) Muller, Richard A. and Muller, Elizabeth A. Why Every Environmentalist Should Favour Fracking. Centre for Policies Study, 2013. Matalucci, Sergio. “Better Politics Could Lead Italy Towards a Technologically Advanced Energy Market”. Natural Gas Europe, august 13th, 2013. http://www. naturalgaseurope.com/italy-gas-interview-butti (accessed August 8, 2014) Natural Gas Asia. “Saudi Arabia to Use Shale Gas for Power Plant.” October 14th, 2013, http://www.naturalgasasia.com/saudi-arabia-to-use-shale-gas-for-power- plant (accessed June 20, 2014). Natural Gas Europe. “Turkey Starts Fracking for Shale Gas.” September 24th, 2013, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/turkey-fracking-shale-gas-thracian-se-regions (accessed June 2, 2014). Natural Gas Europe. “Moscow and Damascus Discuss Gas amid Syria’s Civil War.”January, 1st, 2014, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/russia-syria-natural- gas-soyuzneftegaz (accessed June 20, 2014). Natural Gas: The Global Energy Arbitrage.New York: Neuberger Berman LLC, 2012. Nikkei Asian Review. “Japan to get hands on cheap US shale gas starting in 2017”. Nikkei, February 13th, 2014, http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Economy/ Japan-to-get-hands-on-cheap-US-shale-gas-starting-in-2017 (accessed June 3, 2014). Okumus, Olgo. “How Europe Would Benefit from Russia’s Investments in Iraq”.. Natural Gas Europe, September 19th, 2013 ,http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/ europe-would-benefit-from-russia-investments-in-iraq (accessed June 7, 2014). Okumus, Olgu. “Turkey’s Shale Gas Boom or Bubble.” A look at Turkey’s shale gas future. October 29th, 2013. http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/turkey-shale-gas- boom-or-bubble (accessed June 2, 2014). Oxford Bussines Group. “Qatar: Expanding energy horizons.” The Middle East, June 10th, 2013, http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/economic_updates/qatar- expanding-energy-horizons (accessed June 18, 2014). “Pakistan Approves Shale Gas Policy.” Pakistan Approves Shale Gas Policy. http://

406 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations www.energyandcapital.com/articles/pakistan-approves-shale-gas-policy/3121 (accessed June 2, 2014). Paredes, Jimena. “Bolivia ocupa el quinto lugar en reservas de shalegas.” La Razon , May, 28th, 2013 , http://www.la-razon.com/economia/Bolivia-quinto-lugar- reservas-shale_0_1841215875.html (accessedJune 3, 2014). Peak Oil News and Message Boards. “Brazil Advances in the Shale Game”. http:// peakoil.com/production/brazil-advances-in-the-shale-game (accessed June 3, 2014). Pentland, William. “Sorry, Shale. Iraq Is The Real Oil Revolution.” Forbes. http:// www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/2014/01/31/sorry-shale-iraq-is-the-real-oil- revolution/ (accessed June 7, 2014). People’s Daily Online. “Chinese companies eye US new energy”. December 30, 2013, http://www.china.org.cn/environment/2013-12/30/content_31042669.htm (accessed June 19, 2014). Polityuk, Pavel, and Richard Balmforth. “Ukraine signs $10 billion shale gas deal with Chevron.” Reuters. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/05/us-ukraine- chevron-idUSBRE9A40ML20131105 (accessed June 20, 2014). Reguly, Eric. “Energy giants eye Italy as south embarks on new oil boom”. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/international-business/ european-business/energy-giants-eye-italy-as-south-embarks-on-new-oil-boom/ article16404351/ (accessed August 8, 2014) Reuter. “Japex begins Japan’s 1st commercial shale oil production”. Reuters. http:// af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL3N0MZ19L20140407 (accessed June 22, 2014). Reuters. “South Africa proposes rules for fracking shale gas.” Reuters. http://www. reuters.com/article/2013/10/10/safrica-fracking-idUSL6N0I02BI20131010 (accessed June 2, 2014). Rigzone. “Italy Says Shale Gas Production Never Taken Into Consideration. http:// www.rigzone.com/news/oil_gas/a/129961/Italy_Says_Shale_Gas_Production_ Never_Taken_Into_Consideration (accessed August 8, 2014) Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering. Shale Gas Extraction in the UK: a Review of Hydraulic Fracturing. London, 2012. Sahagun, Louis. “U.S. officials cut estimate of recoverable Monterey Shale oil by 96%”, The LA Times, May 20, 2014, accessed 22 May 2014, http://www.latimes. com/business/la-fi-oil-20140521-story.html. Schavemaker, Yvonne. “Shale gas in the Netherlands.” http://www.shale-gas- information-platform.org/areas/the-debate/shale-gas-in-the-netherlands.html

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(accessed June 2, 2014). Shale Colombia 2013. http://www.shale-colombia-2013.com/ (accessed August 7, 2014) Shale Gas and Its Implications For Africa And The African Development Bank: African Development Bank Group, 2013. Shaletec. “What is shale gas and why it is important?”.Shaletec. http://www.shaletec. org/whatis.htm (accessed September 11, 2014) Shell Oil. Shell Onshore Tigh/Shale Oil & Gas Operating Principles. Shell Oil, 2011. ShevanTaha, “The promise of Shale Gas”. US-Middle East Youth Network. http:// www.usmeyouthnetwork.org/the-blog/category/oil%20gas15e7ad7fc5 (accessed July 30, 2014) SouthAfrica.info. “Shale gas exploration ‘to be game-changer for SA’ .” . http://www. southafrica.info/about/government/stateofnation2014f.htm#.U4u_HvmwJJ0 (accessed June 2, 2014). Stevens, Paul. The ‘Shale Gas Revolution’: Hype and Reality. London: Chatham House, 2010. Stevens, Paul. The ‘Shale Gas Revolution’: Developoments and Changes12. London: Chatham House, 2012. The Hindu. “Shale gas: ONCG to drill more wells in Cambay.” January 1, 2014, http://www.thehindu.com/business/Industry/shale-gas-oncg-to-drill-more-wells- in-cambay/article5526061.ece (accessed June 2, 2014). Tomsen, Jennifer and Marc Davies . “Shale Gas in Asia: Significant Reserves, Substantial Challenges.” Bloomberg BNA. http://www.bna.com/shale-gas-in-asia- significant-reserves-substantial-challenges/ (accessed June 4, 2014). Tin, Yufei. “US firms “very interested” in unlocking Brazil shale gas potential.” Oil and Gas Technology, august 19th 2013, http://www.oilandgastechnology.net/ upstream-news/us-firms-%E2%80%9Cvery-interested%E2%80%9D-unlocking- brazil-shale-gas-potential (accessed June 3, 2014). Verdu, Bernard. “UnconventionalGas in Paraguay.” May 2012, . http://www. geologiadelparaguay.com/Unconventional-Gas-in-Paraguay-Grupo-Montecristo. pdf (accessed June 3, 2014). Vetter, Alexandra, “Shale gas in Germany- the current status”, Shale Gas Information Plataform, October 2013, accessed May 20, 2014, http://www.shale- gas-information-platform.org/areas/the-debate/shale-gas-in-germany-the-current- status.html

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UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations ISSN: 2318-3195 | v.2, 2014| p. 411-443

GOVERNMENT AND CORPORATIVE INTERNET SURVEILLANCE

Gabriela Jahn Verri1 Luiza Bender2 Eduardo Dondonis3 ABSTRACT

Although surveillance is often recognized as a social phenomenon rather than as state practice, the vertical employment of surveillance techniques by powerful actors such as governments and economic corporations has acquired a bold and extensive character in the last few decades. Accompanying the technological revolution the world has been undergoing since the dawn and popularization of keen communications and information technologies such as, and most notably, the Internet, surveillance practices adopted yet another shape: cyber surveillance. The inestimable power of acquiring and processing immense amounts of data about a growing number of subjects presents as much an instrument as a menace to the global society. This essay briefly analyzes the historical context of surveillance and the technologies that allow its employment today. We further attempt to outline the most common cyber surveillance practices, it’s basic technical features, and how states and corporations relate to cyber surveillance domestically and internationally, as active as well as passive agents. Finally, a discussion is drawn regarding the legitimacy and legality of cyber surveillance practices in the context of transnational relations and human rights protection.

1 Fourth-year law undergraduate at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). 2 Luiza Bender Lopes is a 6th semester student of International Relations at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). 3 Eduardo Dondonis Pereira is a 6th semester student of International Relations at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). World Summit on the Information Society Forum

Power does not reside in institutions, not even in the state or in large corporations. It is located in the networks that structure society. (Castells 2010, 342)

1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

It is undeniable that as the nature of communication changes, the means to attain information follows. And information is key to the well being of states, not only strategically, but also from a human rights perspective. Surveillance, as means of obtaining information, is in no way an illegitimate policy per se. As any power the democratic state legitimately holds, surveillance ultimately exists to preserve human rights and social values. Nonetheless it can be a dangerous weapon against them, as it frequently is the case with power.

1.1 THE CONCEPT OF PRIVACY

To properly understand what it means to be under surveillance it is necessary to clarify what the term ‘privacy’ actually entails. Despite being used in philosophical, political and legal discussions, there is no single definition for the term. Its most accepted origin is in Aristotle’s work, most notably in his distinction between the public sphere of political activity and the private sphere associated with family and domestic life (DeCew 2013). Currently, most dictionaries define privacy as “the state or condition of being free from being observed or disturbed by other people”. Before the written concept of privacy appeared with the development of privacy protection in American law from the 1890s onward, amendments in the United States Constitution already addressed the issue, most notably the Fourth Amendment of 1789 (Richars 2012). As a part of the American Bill of Rights, it prohibited unreasonable searches and seizures and required any warrant to be judicially sanctioned. The amendment was adopted in response to the abuse of a general search warrant issued by the British government, a major source of tension in pre-Revolutionary America (DeCew 2013). English Common Law, as it was, had no recognized right to privacy, only offering minor protection in the form of the breach of confidence clause, which was employed when information delivered in confidence was disclosed to others (Phillipson & Fenwick 2000). At the same time, a more systematic discussion of the concept of privacy arose with an essay published in the Harvard Law Review, entitled “The Right to Privacy” by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis. The essay focused on violations caused by

412 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations recent inventions such as photography and newspapers, and it emphasized the invasion of privacy brought about by public dissemination of details related to a person’s private life (DeCew 2013). Warren and Brandeis thus laid the foundation for a concept of privacy that has come to be known as “control over information about oneself” (Warren and Brandeis 1890). 1.2 THE EMERGENCE OF GUIDELINES FOR CORRESPONDENCE INTERCEPTION AND WIRETAPPING

Included in the Fourth Amendment of the American Constitution, as well as in several constitutions from European countries, is a basic legal principle know as the secrecy of letters. It states that sealed letters in transit shall not be opened by government officials or any person that not the sender or the receiver. However, many countries that usually oblige to such law are known for having committed postal censorship at different times in their history. This inspection of mail, including the opening, reading and selective obliteration of letters, most often by government authorities, is known to happen during wartime and periods of civil disorder. During both World War I and II, countries members of both sides organized enormous operations for the monitoring of letters and their contents (Fiset 2001). With the innovations in means of communication, the principle of the secrecy of letters was naturally extended to telephony and electronic information. Nevertheless, most national telecommunications laws had breaches that allowed the interception and monitoring of information by wiretapping and similar methods (Richards 2012). In the United States, warrantless wiretapping was not considered a constitutional harm for a long time. When cases of wiretapping were taken to the American courts, they were soon dismissed because of the lack of success that the subjects had in proving that the government had actually targeted them. Martin Luther King Jr., for example, had all his telephones wiretapped from 1963 to 1965, when he was considered a threat to public order by the FBI. The wiretap was an attempt to obtain information on King’s private activities to discredit him (Richards 2012).

1.3 IMPORTANT LANDMARKS OF REGULATION

The first steps for the regulation of the protection of privacy, both in the public and in the private spheres, were taken by the end of the Second World War. Founded in 1934, the United Nations aimed at reaffirming people’s faith in fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth of the human person. Soon after, in 1948, the UN’s General Assembly approved the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN 1948). Two of the thirty-five clauses of the Declaration deal directly

413 World Summit on the Information Society Forum with issued related to privacy. Article 12 states that no one should be subjected to arbitrary interference with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence, being protected of do by law. Article 19 states that everyone has the right to freedom of though and the right to receive and impart information through any media and regardless of frontier (UN 1948). As supplement for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the General Assembly approved two further international treaties in 1966, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. On the ICCPR, Articles 17 and 19 referred to issues of privacy, mostly with the same wording as the corresponding articles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In the 1970s, two important sets of regulations were approved. The first was drafted by the International Telecommunication Union. An independent organization born from the International Telegraph Union, the ITU officially joined the UN after its foundation, becoming a specialized agency responsible for issues relating to information and communications technologies. The International Telecommunication Convention was approved in 1973. Despite having recommendations using member countries to develop important telecommunication structures and to safeguard the privacy of international correspondence, the Convention recognized the sovereign right of each country to regulate its own telecommunications (ITU 1973). The second set, approved in the same year, was The Code of Fair Information Practices. Created by the United States’ department of Health, Education and Welfare, it affirmed that no personal data record-keeping systems whose very existence was a secret should exist. It also stated that any person had a right to find out what information about them was recorded and for what it was used (Gellman 2014). Another landmark for privacy protection, especially addressing state surveillance, was the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in the United Sates. During the 1970s major domestic surveillance programs came to light. The FBI, the CIA and other government agencies had been engaging in “pervasive surveillance of politicians, religious organizations, women’s rights advocates, anti-war groups, and civil liberties activists” since the beginning of the Cold War (O’Harrow 2006, 18). Such schemes were not restricted to communications interception but went as far as to interfere with civilian’s private lives by anonymously contacting employers and relatives. These revelations brought about social upheaval to which the government responded with the 1974 Patriot Act and the FISA in 1978, both of which established further legal instruments to protect civilians’ information and communications from government interference. Despite the fact that both are often viewed as “key safeguard[s] against domestic spying” by civil rights activists, there is still criticism regarding the actual

414 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations effectiveness of these regulations1 (O’Harrow 2006). Finally, in 1980, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development published the Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy, the first internationally agreed set of privacy principles (OECD 1980). Eight important principles were elaborated for national application by each member state. The most prominent were the ones that referred to purpose specification of the collection of data and to the safeguard of personal information. The signatories were urged to adopt appropriate domestic legislation on topics regarding privacy, to support self-regulation, to provide for reasonable means for individuals to exercise their rights and to ensure that no unfair discrimination occurred against data subjects (OECD 1980).

1.4 SURVEILLANCE AND THE INTERNET

It wasn’t until the development of the Internet that ICT acquired the vigorous character for which they are known today. The Internet exceptionally increased people’s capacity to communicate and generate information. Its fluid and democratic character is, however, not only responsible for unprecedented possibilities for sharing and networking, but it also creates an environment of vulnerability for information flowing online. Thus, with the advent of the Internet, privacy protection dialogues and initiatives became even more crucial for human rights promotion as a whole (CCHRP 2013). The Internet dates from the Cold War period and has its beginning in the ARPANet (Abbate 2000). In response to the apparent technological superiority achieved by the Soviet Union in the 50s, the Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA) is established in the United States in 1958 as a centre for research and development linked to the U.S. Department of Defense (Launius 2014; Hafner and Lyon 1998). By the end of the 1960s, Robert Taylor, the director of ARPA’s Information and Processing Techniques Office, had the project of the ARPANet under way, a system of electronic links between computers that would allow researchers around the country with similar work to share resources and results more easily. On december 1st, 1969, the ARPANet was born (Abbate 2000; Hafner and Lyon 1998). In 1972, the ARPANet went public during the First International Conference on Computers and Communication. The presentation stimulated further research on the subject among the scientific community throughout the western world, and subsequently, new networks emerged (Griffiths 2002). Throughout this period of diffusion, networks were still a multitude of different techniques and protocols, with

1 For instance, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), established by the FISA to supervise government investigations and communications interception, is known for its recurring permissive character, rarely denying applications for electronic surveillance. 415 World Summit on the Information Society Forum the ARPANet still as the backbone of the entire system. The preponderance of the ARPANet in regard to the other network models developed was mostly due to the centrality of the American academical community and the substantial funding by the American government. By 1982, other similar systems around the world started to adopt the TCP/IP standard – and this is the point generally considered as the birth of the Internet as we know today (Griffiths 2002). The Internet may be conceptualized, therefor, as a network which allows connection of comupers, databases and computed networks through technological specifications, protocols and communication standards (Canabarro 2012). In 1989, Tim Berners-Lee, a British scientist from the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), suggested the standard World Wide Web, whose aim was to facilitate access and organize large amounts of information circulating on the Internet (Johnson 1994). The standard World Wide Web has facilitated the popularization of the Internet, once it allowed the common people to post and share information through websites. In spite of having invaluably linked its intermediate structures to sovereign territories, the Internet was conceptualized as a world free from government regulation. This assertion of autonomy was represented by both the Electronic Frontier Foundation, institutionally, and documented through the Declaration of Cyberspace Independence (Barlow 1996). However, by 1991 the establishment of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) structured official government regulation of the Internet. The IANA was the result of an agreement between the then ‘root authority’2 controller Information Science Institute (ISI) of the University of Southern California and the United States Department of Commerce. The United States then made its pledge to Internet governance by means of the publication of the Green Paper, which claimed total authority over the Internet Root by the US government (Goldsmith & Wu 2008; Drake 2008). With the increasing number of users and technical capabilities, digital media gradually became the focus of national intelligence agencies, giving rise to cyber surveillance practices used to date. Combining the everyday-use character of the Internet with its potential for “processing speed, storage capacity, miniaturization, affordability, availability, portability, spatial reach, and scope of application”, states attain means to keep themselves well-informed at the same pace that civilians’ fundamental rights, which had already been secured in the eras of telephony and mail, are put in jeopardy (Benett, Clement & Milberry 2012). And do, the recurring trade-off between freedom and security is given yet another shape.

2 Described by Wu & Goldsmith (2008, 29-30) as “the power to issue orders respecting domain names and numbers and have those orders obeyed.” 416 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

2 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

2.1 DEFINITION OF CYBER SURVEILLANCE

Until pioneer author Michel Foucault studied and described the phenomenon, surveillance was commonly associated with autocratic and totalitarian states and their control over their populations (Richards 2012, 5). This interrelation, however, has become essentially inaccurate with the advent of electronic communication technologies and, especially, the Internet (Boyle 1997, 186-88). Even before communication acquired such dynamic character, surveillance was already perceived as much more than a top-down means of exercising power, but as a complex network composed of numerous agents (Foucault 1977, 135-69). Today, the use of surveillance technology has not only found overall acceptable justification in democratic societies, but has completely crossed the public-private border and expanded to the corporative sphere (Richards 2012, 7-8). David Lyon describes governmental and corporative surveillance as the “focused, systematic, and routine attention to personal details for purposes of influence, management, protection, or direction” (Lyon 2007, 14). The most common form this practice takes in the context of information and communication technologies (hereinafter ICT) is still so-called data surveillance, which implies the collection and retention of information about an “identifiable individual”, often from multiple sources3, which help recognize multiple activities and establish a pattern of behavior in both the virtual and material realms (Stanley & Steinhardt 2003, 3). Although less common and fairly recent, institutional Internet surveillance may also acquire the shape of media surveillance, done by means of – recognized or ignored – image (still or video) and sound hoarding through a subject’s personal apparatus such as private webcams and microphones, as well as screen-recording (RWB 2013, 9-33; Stanley & Steinhardt 2003, 2-4)4. The so-called Information Society we now experience, where “the amount of stored information grows four times faster than the world economy” (Mayer- Schönberger & Cukier 2013, 9) is said to be a new social system in which expansion of the quantity of information generated is reshaping the way we relate to information, communication and, therefor, with each other (Webster 2014). There are many aspects of the digital revolution that has brought change in the way we deal with information. From the rise of social media to the plummeting costs of communications technologies behind mobile phones and computers, the staggering amount of technological

3 Identified within digital networks. 4 For practical as well as academic reasons, “communications surveillance” will be grouped under both data and media surveillance (Tokson 2009; Stanley & Steinhardt 2003). 417 World Summit on the Information Society Forum innovation continuously expands our capabilities to produce and stack information in an unprecedented scale (Webster 2014; Castells 2000). In a context of massive and rapid flows of information, such as is the case of the Internet, personal data is increasingly being stripped of its intimate character (Hope 2011, 8). Public entities have long had the means of legally obtaining private details about citizen’s lives through warranted criminal investigations and allegedly justifiable preservation of national security, complying with the principles of necessity and proportionality (Brown & Korff 2009; LaRue 2013, 3). However, the lack of international as well as self regulation by states when it comes to data and communication interception on the Internet – arguably because of the ever changing and evolving nature of such technologies – has made users unsure about the safety of their information and communications. Not to mention the evident breach in private Internet surveillance regulation in most states as well as by the international community as a whole (La Rue, 2013).

2.2 BASIC TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF CYBER SURVEILLANCE

Data retention and analysis has been increasingly incorporated in the social and institutional spheres in many areas: public health, business and global economy, national and public security, government-citizen relationships, environmental resource management, among many others. Big data analysis5 is responsible for a revolutionary way of making decisions in which information is formatted into quantified data to allow insights based on correlation (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier 2013). For purposes such as this, data retention is as much a menace – for its invasive potential – as it is a highly advantageous tool. Thus, a critical analysis of corporative and governmental surveilling strategies is due. Internet surveillance performed by public and private actors are mainly shaped into two categories: mass and targeted surveillance. Both have become equally popular among governmental agencies for their usefulness and effectiveness in criminal investigations, protection of national security, fight against cybercrime, among other purposes. However, both are also equivalently dangerous when imprudently used by authorities and powerful enterprises. It’s important to technically decipher these technologies in order to better understand their uses and appeal as well as their risks to society.

5 Described by Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier as “the ability of society to harness information in novel ways to produce useful insights or goods and services of significant value” (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier 2013, 2). 418 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

2.2.1 Mass Surveillance of Network Activity

As an extensive cyber surveillance method, mass surveillance of network activity allows institutions to intercept, collect and keep an immense amount of data through searches on online communication flows. Using narrow filters (such as specific terms, dates and locations) these software are able to quickly browse through network communications and simultaneously trace enormous quantities of specific data as well as its sources (Hosein & Palow 2013, 1081-83). This kind of technology is commonly associated with two main purposes. Firstly, its use as a consumers marketing research tool has been gaining popularity among the private sector. Intelligence companies as well as Internet service providers (hereinafter ISPs) and other technical intermediaries are selling personal data of millions of users to enterprises that, at the very least, want to be informed of consumers’ personal characteristics on an intimate level (Lyon 2010, 238). Virtually non of the United Nations member-states have any regulation concerning the trade of personal information among private institutions (La Rue 2013). Again, the justification for this commonly lies on the recent character of this type of activities which requires public policy to continuously evolve in order to accompany them (Wagner 2011, 15). Secondly, governmental bodies have also been accredited for using these technologies “lawfully” against national security threats, particularly in campaigns against terrorism and cyber crime (Chen & Wang 2005). Surveillance of network activities is predominantly associated with state practice through communications surveillance (Hosein & Palow 2013). Many public intelligence agencies around the globe6 are known to use systems that operate extensively tracing communications data (RWB 2013, Fuchs 2012). This practice consists basically of tracking, storing and analyzing information about the character of communications (i.e. when, from where, from and to whom an e-mail was sent), rather than their contents. This information is often referred to as ‘metadata’, and is the essence of arguably the least invasive exercise of governmental cyber surveillance (NISO 2004). Notwithstanding, such mild employment of this technology is the basis for a more aggressive genre of cyber surveillance: so-called ‘dataveillance’. As described by Brown and Korff (2009, 123), dataveillance is the monitoring of the ‘data trails’ left by individuals in various transactions. Through broad metadata analysis, operators are able to combine communication flows and databases into shaping a single person’s online activities. Ultimately, these compositions can generate thorough and detailed behavioral outlines, a practice known as ‘profiling’ (Brown & Korff 2009, 123-30). Profiling through metadata analysis is becoming increasingly cheaper,

6 Namely from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Australia, New Zealand, China, Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, Iran, Vietnam etc. (Cupa 2013; Fuchs 2012; RWB 2010; RWB 2013; Stanley & Steinhardt 2003) 419 World Summit on the Information Society Forum especially for public entities (La Rue 2013, 11). A growing number of governmental intelligence agencies confirm to have their own communications surveillance software such as the FBI’s ‘Carnivore’ and ‘Echelon’, a program run in collaboration by the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence agreement between the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (MacDonald, Ben-Avie & Carrion 2013, 9; Stanley & Steinhardt 2003, 8-9). Nevertheless, profiling requires neither groundbreaking technology nor specific software. Much like enterprises with commercial purposes, as mentioned above, authorities can get the information they need for profiling from third party service providers by making plain requests (which in many cases do not require judicial approval) to ISPs and Internet companies (La Rue 2013, 12; Mac Donald, Ben-Avie & Carrion 2013). For instance, by the end of 2013 the number of communications data to the estimative of such requests the United Kingdom and France make per year (UK 2011, 29; European Commission 2011). Even so, states do not have to go as far as collecting communications data and strictly private online information to create portraits of an individual’s persona and activities. Through mechanisms of social media monitoring, intelligence and investigative agencies can acquire accurate information about one’s location, relationships, opinions, beliefs, political views and a vast amount of other information states conventionally should not supervise (La Rue 2013).

2.2.2 Targeted Electronic Surveillance

Instead of loosely scouring the Net for potential wrongdoers or threats to the public interest, this intensive cyber surveillance method is used to monitor each specific target at a time. Unlike mass surveillance, targeted electronic surveillance typically involves a suspect or a specific piece of information. Due to its meticulous features, it allows its operators to go much deeper into a subject’s electronic information than simply online and communications data. In fact, so-called ‘offensive surveillance technologies’ not only allow total access to all information stored in one’s computer and online accounts, but are able to map every single click in a spied device (Cupa 2013; Hosein & palow 2013; La Rue 2013; Stanley & Steinhardt 2003). On the one hand, this surveillance system as most harmful for its qualitatively thorough character, considering that the level of privacy violation is much grater than that experienced with mass surveillance (Hosein & Palow 2013). On the other, however, its specificity and the fact that these intrusions are usually justified by suspicion – reasonable or otherwise – supports the assertions that targeted surveillance is less dangerous to society as a whole when it comes to freedom of speech and privacy protection (MacDonald, Ben-Avie & Carrion 2013).

420 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

The latter argument, however, is based on two inaccurate assumptions. The first is the notion that these highly invasive software are always deliberately operated. Yet, they can be unknowingly installed by their very subjects as a virus alongside another program or even disguised as a completely different software. For example, in August 2012, a program called AntiHacker, which declared to protect computers from invasion, was discovered in Syria. Once installed the program actually ran a version of DarkComet, a software that can activate webcams, record keystrokes and retrieve passwords from the victim’s device (RWB 2013, 33). Secondly, that argument would only be valid if government surveillance was always accurately proportionate, judicially warranted and based on concrete legitimate suspicions. But as access to these software rises and their costs decrease, their use becomes worryingly arbitrary (La Rue 2013; PCLOB 2014; RWB 2013; Wagner 2012). This is just one of the increasingly popular electronic surveillance techniques commonly referred to as Trojan horse software (Fuchs 2012). These intrusion programs are able to attain remote access to computers and smartphones through backdoors or system vulnerabilities. In other words, operators can not only extract any stored information, but can also monitor and control all activities performed in the device, including tracking keystrokes and activating cameras and microphones already attached to it (Hosein & Palow 2013, 1080). Spread around the globe, there are numerous companies in the billionaire market of surveillance that produce this kind of technology, such as Gamma International (United Kingdom), Hacking Team (Italy), Amesys (France), ZTE Corp (China), Trovicor (formerly known as Nokia Siemens Networks; Germany/ Sweden) and Blue Coat (United States). All of the aforementioned companies have reportedly engaged in business or at least verifiably negotiated with governments of several countries7 (Hosei & Palow 2013, Fuchs 2012, RWB 2013, Wagner 2012).

2.3 STATE AND CORPORATIVE PRACTICES

2.3.1 State Internet Surveillance

The purposes and modalities of employment of cyber surveillance technologies take numerous forms. In the public sphere it can be related to issues of public health, public safety, national security, economic protection, all the way to media censorship and political repression (Hosein & Pallow 2013; RWB 2013). Although

7 Egypt (Gamma International), Libya (Amesys, ZTE Corp), Tunisia (Trovicor, Blue Coat), Syria (Blue Coat), Burma (Blue Coat), Iran (Trovicor), Germany (Trovicor), United Arab Emirates (Hacking Team) and China (Blue Coat). 421 World Summit on the Information Society Forum some justifications are more reasonable than others, given the considerable power states – and particularly intelligence agencies – hold in our modern society, no cyber surveillance operation is excused from scrutiny. Illustratively, a software that allows authorities to uncover the identity of a child pornographer and make a lawful arrest may do the same to a dissident journalist in a dictatorial regime, resulting in their apprehension and execution (Tokson 2009, 2129-58; RWB 2013, 45). Intelligence agencies hold power that is ultimately directed at protecting social values and interests, and precisely for being backed by this raison d’être have great potential to violate them. In the words of Bruneau and Matei (2008, 915) “[a]ny armed force strong enough to defend a country is also strong enough to take it over”. Transparency is key to ensure that the ends to which means such as surveillance aspire are proportionate, justifiable, and thus welcome by civilians, paradoxically, secrecy may be indispensable for such institutions to work efficiently and effectively (Cepik 2001). The dilemma of efficiency versus oversight in democratic societies sustains that institutions such as governmental intelligence agencies must operate under supervision while calling for secrecy to operate efficiently8 (Bruneau 2008). States employ these confidential strategies through cyber surveillance in a determined set of circumstances and for specific purposes. Formally, these are usually: during criminal investigations, for the preservation of national security, public health management (particularly control of infectious diseased), for the protection of public order and morals and for governmental intelligence and strategic purposes (UK 2012; UNESCO 2014; European Commission 2011). However, the vague significance of some of these grounds allow surveillance practices that, in a more meticulous perspective, lack in necessity and proportionality. Although privacy law in international legal instruments is often broad and, thus, rather delicate, according to customary international law, the violation of privacy usually requires certain circumstantial prerequisites, which may or may not be in accordance with domestic legislations. For instance, there is the question of control over the controllers. A surveillance operation would ideally only be admissible if the endeavor and the actors performing it are being supervised by an independent, equitable authority9 (Boraz & Bruneau 2006; Bygrave 1998). In criminal investigations, the lawful and typical use of cyber surveillance firstly, requires judicial order and secondly, is applied individually to the suspect in search of a particular piece of information. In such cases, there must be a compelling reason to believe the procedure is valuable and even indispensable (European Commission

8 Cepik (2003) argues that accountability mechanisms and external oversight are essential to legitimate classified operations of such organisms. While Luban (1996) reasons that the justification for secretive activities must be publicly declarable as to legitimately sustain these practices. 9 Legal provisions for violation of the right to privacy will be more thoroughly discussed further in this session. 422 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

2011, 23). Hence, Internet surveillance for the purpose of criminal investigations should be essentially targeted ones. Nevertheless, random and extensive operations involving third-parties and searches for unspecific data are increasingly common. Moreover, the judicial oversight has become dispensable, not only because procuring it is time-consuming, but also for its undesirably – from an investigative perspective – rigorous criteria for granting warrants (Mihr 2013). Considering the requirements for lawful surveillance during criminal investigations – proportionality, necessity, precision – as they are understood by international customary law, as well as by mainstream interpretations of international treaties such as the UDHR and the ICCPR, mass network surveillance would seem unemployable, considering that an enormous amount of subjects and information are examined, most of which are useless for crime detection and prevention (Kerr 2003). But the fact is that these practices are used by investigative agencies in search of information that might lead to legitimate arrests. However effective and beneficial mass surveillance technologies might be for public safety, it cannot be ignores that they compromise the right to privacy of thousands of individuals, “subjecting entire population[s] to routine criminal investigation” (Walter-Echols 2009, 31). Extensive cyber surveillance methods find greater admissibility under national security and moral protection purposes, mainly because of the topics’ broad nature (Heywood 2011, 296). From identifying and defusing terrorist activities to persecuting ideological dissidents, - a practice which is not restricted to authoritarian regimes – the cyber surveillance operations grounded on national security take many different shapes and underlying motivations. For instance, communications and metadata (a.k.a. ‘communications data’) have been systematically examined by national security agencies around the globe under suspicion of threat to national security in diverse ways (terrorist attack, espionage, fraud, disclosure of classified information etc.). Yet, after being collected and analyzed, these data are often retained for no specific reason or period of time, a practice which clearly violates a number of local, regional and global principles and norms that regulate the right to private life (UK 2012; Wagner 2012; RWB 2013; Cupa 2013; European Commission 2011; HRW 2014). A recurrent dilemma brought about by domestic national security surveillance lies on the grounds for suspicion and the surveillance operations carried out because of them. The focus of such type of surveillance is usually individuals with seemingly “unorthodox political beliefs” (Hosein & Palow 2013, 1103). Meaning that those who are most frequently targeted for official cyber surveillance supported by national security justifications (i.e. political dissidents) are precisely the ones whose right to privacy should be most rigorously protected, once these subjects’ political subversion is not only essential to democracy, but may put them in a vulnerable position in the face of governmental power (Hosein & Palow 2013, 1104). Originally used in the monitoring and notification of infectious diseases,

423 World Summit on the Information Society Forum surveillance as means to preserve public health is older than Internet itself. But with the emergence of ICT its uses have broadened and with it the potential for overstepping private information. Today, health-related surveillance technology are most notably related to electronic patients’ records (EPRs) and genetic research – besides its inceptive purpose (Graham &Wood 2003, 240). Data collected and stored by EPRs is highly valuable for fast and accurate diagnosis and treatment. They comprise vast databases with patients’ medical history, medication, test results, procedures and therapies, not only facilitating individual patient care, but fueling medical intelligence to an unprecedented degree (van der Ploeg 2002, 62). However, this massive accumulation of personal information is not only beneficial, considering that access to it may not be restricted to public healthcare bodies, reaching private ones – such as insurance companies – as well as other public spheres – such as law enforcement agencies – for purposes far beyond health promotion (Hu 2013). For Stanley & Steinhardt, this is where major worries about genetics assortment lie. Firstly, insurance companies with access to customers genetic information may grossly affect what they’re charged and even if the service will be provided to them, “with the result that a certain proportion of the population could become uninsurable”. Secondly, genetics-based employment discrimination is already on the rise, with employers searching for the healthiest most capable employees (Stanley & Steinhardt 2003, 5). Finally and most tangible is the use of medically stored genetic information for law enforcement purposes.

The pressure to integrate, for example, medical and police databases for law enforcement purposes will become more and more intense as forensic science improves and with the increasing popularity of biocriminology and the pressure for pre-emptive law enforcement policies such as DNA screening (Graham & Wood 2003, 241).

Cyber surveillance may also be associated with intelligence and strategic activities. However, due to the nebulosity of these matters, when surveillance operations related to them are publicized – which is rarely the case – they are formally put under the national security umbrella. Such practices commonly include cyber espionage10 and cyber warfare11 and have been gravely addressed by, for example, the United Nations Security Council Working Group Report and the United Nations General Assembly in 2013 (Mihr 2013).

10 Described by Anja Mihr (2013, 18) as the “stealing of national intelligences or industrial data stored in digital formats on computers and IT networks.” 11 Namely the “combination of technical warfare instruments in the cyberspace” performed by states or international organizations through military or intelligence agencies (Mihr 2013, 17). 424 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

Data collected by ISPs arouses the interest of both private and public bodies. The most notable use by the first is, as mentioned above, in consumers marketing (Lyon 2010). Companies buy users’ personal information “to get certain behaviors, preferences, usages, interests and choices of customers in order to […] supply them with targeted advertisements” (Allmer 2011, 580). This extensive range of private information and metadata can also be sold to surveillance enterprises or directly to public entities. In fact, states normally do not have to purchase this data from ISPs considering they can acquire them through simple requests, as aforementioned (MacDonald, Ben-Avie & Carrion 2013). The real core of the information market, however, is represented by the surveillance corporations that master the business of data interception and collection as an end in itself (Lyon 2003). Other private institutions take advantage of the services provided by these companies, but their number one customer is still in the public sphere. Virtually all of the national intelligence agencies around the globe which conduct cyber surveillance operations are fueled by the expanding market of surveillance technologies. If states themselves cannot always be relied upon to manage cyber surveillance appropriately and in accordance with human rights standards, than the control held by the private sector over such technologies are considerably unsettling (Wagner 2012). Proposed regulation of these companies’ practices comes from basically two directions. The first is the alleged commitment some enterprises express toward self- regulation, which translates to a voiced resistance to sell their services to authoritarian regimes that, ironically, constitute a menace to human rights protection12 (Laidlaw 2012). Secondly and most naturally, the pressure for state-regulation grows with the rapid technological developments the surveillance industry brings about. Currently, there is still virtually no domestic or international regulation to restrain the industry’s activities (La Rue 2013, 20).

2.4 HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION

Considering cyber surveillance is also a state practice, it is assumed it exists for the purpose of populations’ well-being. As previously stated, state surveillance aims at reinforcing a series of interests that contribute to the public good and, consequently, to human rights preservation and promotion. This is not always so easily accomplished, as the realization of some rights tend to compete with others. Moreover, non-state practices also threaten said fulfillment, seeing as private

12 In spite of the fact that many of these companies have showed such reluctance in engaging in buisiness with certain controversial regimes, many authors have questioned and even more reports have contradicted those positions. See Morozov 2011. 425 World Summit on the Information Society Forum companies also have interests to protect. If the importance and usefulness of cyber surveillance is to be recognized, an analysis from a human rights perspective is due.

2.4.1 Right to Privacy

Information technologies have laid out an overwhelming number of possibilities for states to carry out investigations – both official and unofficial – in a much more effortless fashion than ever before. That combined with the recurrent breach of privacy protecting laws in the cyber world may normalize the use of surveillance and data retention technologies in a way that disregards the right to privacy (Brown & Korff 2009), designated in Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations 1948) and in Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (United Nations 1966). Although global legal standards regarding restriction of the right to privacy are generally rather vague – mentioning “unlawful”, “arbitrary” and “abusive” interference – (UDHR 1948, art. 12; ICCPR 1966, art. 17), on practice, the requirements for such restrictions comply with those of the European Convention on Human Rights, which states:

There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others (ECHR 2004; art. 8 (2)).

Although still not particularly well-defined, the premises for exemption of the right to privacy are more clearly outlined in the ECHR. However, as mentioned before, the imprecision of terms such as “national security”, “public safety” and “protection of morals”, to mention a few, give grounds for cyber surveillance operations that are often disproportionate in regard to the human rights violations they bring about (UNESCO 2013). Traditionally it is expected that privacy violations conducted by the state are previously authorized by a judicial or executive organ. This assumption was adapted from legal standards of privacy relating to correspondence and telephonic communication (Richards 2012, 4). On account of the notable differences between these classic means of communication and the Internet, existing regulations that should be applicable to all of these vehicles commonly fall short on protecting this fundamental right in the context of ICT (Brown & Korff 2009). Additionally, since surveillance was initially regulated, two requirements for its 426 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations use were laid out: accountability and transparency. The first relates to information data subjects13 must have about which organs have access to their personal data, which of these, specifically, and for what purposes. The second designates the obligation states have to keep society well-informed about what are the types and purposes of surveillance techniques to which they might be subjected (Fuchs 2012, Lyon 2007). These principles are encompassed by a more specific and exhaustive rule of surveillance, which is prohibition of secrecy. According to international standards, surveillance must never be concealed from its subject. As Richards (2012, 3) bluntly states “secret surveillance is illegitimate”. Yet, privacy-disrupting cyber surveillance operations are continuously undertaken by both the public and the private sector without the slightest awareness of their targets (La Rue 2013).

2.4.2 Freedom of Expression

The violation of the right to privacy is not exhaustive regarding compliance with human rights. Privacy protection relates to freedom of expression in various, and even contrasting ways (UNESCO 2012). By depriving individuals of their privacy and even anonymity before uninvolved third parties, cyber surveillance agents are also hindering freedom of expression. Expressing one’s thoughts, especially through communications technologies, requires trust in the recipient and the medium. If that trust is broken for fear of having one’s communications intercepted, sharing information and expressing one’s mind become immensely restricted (UNESCO 2012; MacDonald, Ben-Avie & Carrion 2013; Laidlaw 2012; LaRue 2013) . On the other hand, the right to privacy may also conflict with and prevent the realization of freedom of expression. Sharing private information acquired by systematic data mining, while possibly violating the privacy of the data subjects, may be considered of essential public interest, vindicating the right to disclose this data and exercise one’s right to freedom of expression (Castells 2010). When such information is obtained through clearly unlawful means, the overpowering of privacy in relation to freedom of expression is somewhat easily defensible. However, when, for instance, publicly shared personal data is collected, analyzed and published the antagonism between freedom of expression and privacy becomes blurred and more debatable. Regulation of these principles and their interrelations is key to ensure that human rights are protected to the possibly fullest,

13 Individuals subjected to data interception, collection or analysis (Brown & Korff 2009). 427 World Summit on the Information Society Forum

[...]recognizing that the exercise of the right to privacy is an essential requirement for the realization of the right to freedom of expression and to hold opinions without interference, and one of the foundations of a democratic society.(UNGA 2013).

3 PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL ACTION

In 2013 the world saw a decisive moment in the issue of cyber surveillance. Major revelations about state and non-state practices related to online data interception surfaced, sparking debates already underway about an alternative attitude toward Internet governance. The notorious Snowden case (further examined below), at least indirectly, brought to light other exploits in the world of cyber surveillance among the international community. Thus, pressing discussions about a global, pluralized Internet arose and efforts for the improvement of privacy protection standards in the cyber world eventually became unavoidable. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 1966, in its Article 17, makes provisions for the protection of the right to privacy, but it wasn’t until 1988 that the Human Rights Council issued a General Comment regarding the interpretation of this article in specific regard to data protection. The Comment states that authorities should only call for individuals’ personal information if it’s “essential in the interests of society as understood under the Covenant”, that such gathering of information should always be regulated by law, and that “individuals should have the right to ascertain […] what personal data is stored […] and for what purposes” and which authorities hold control over these files, among other requirements (UNHRC 1988). In 2011, the European Court of Human Rights issued a report on the Court’s Internet-related case-law. It was only later that the documents would come to be regarded as a groundbreaking submission for international legal frameworks on privacy protection on the Internet (Mihr 2013). The report argues that there is a positive obligation14 by states to protect individuals’ personal data from interference, being by third parties or by the state itself. Moreover, it asserts that “personal information stored in the interests of national security” must be accompanied by “adequate and effective guarantees against abuse by the State” (ECHR 2011, 7). Finally, on the topic of secret surveillance, the Court observes that “system[s] of secret surveillance designed to protect national security entail the risk of undermining or even destroying democracy on the ground of defending it”, but also acknowledges

14 In the sense that states should protect personal data and the right to private life not only by reprimanding unlawful practices of the kind, but by actively ensuring “an effective deterrent against grave acts to a person’s personal data” (ECHR 2011, 7). 428 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations the legality of the practice if adequate safeguards are guaranteed by law to supervise these activities (ECHR 2011, 8). The UNHRC, in its 20th session, affirmed that “the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online” (UNHRC 2012, para. 1). This expression was subsequently repeated by several other documents on the subject, among which, a statement by Reporters Without Borders before the HRC in its 24th session. The organization called for the adoption of the “International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance”15. RWB pointed to

a shift from surveillance of communications based on the rule of law (in particular legally authorized targeted surveillance based on clear criteria) to mass surveillance through untargeted collection of communications data of ordinary citizens where no lawful grounds for surveillance exist (RWB 2013a, 2).

The NGO stated that the set of principles it urged UN Member states to adopt was in total accordance with the reports issued by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, in his April 2013 report on state surveillance on the Internet. The report made by the Special Rapporteur identifies and describes cyber surveillance practices around the globe, as well as analyzes numerous countries legal provisions for the protection of online data, ultimately making recommendations concerning private sector regulation, government transparency, effective legal protection, among others (UNGA 2013a). During a meeting held in October 2013, several organizations responsible for the Internet’s technical infrastructure, such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and major ICT corporations, met in Uruguay to discuss, among others, questions related to cyber surveillance, finally issuing the Montevideo Statement, which “expressed strong concern over the undermining of the trust and confidence of Internet users globally due to [...] revelations of pervasive monitoring and surveillance” (ICANN 2013). In November 2013, during the 68th meeting of the General Assembly, a resolution was introduced by Brazil and Germany concerning the protection of the right to privacy in the digital age. The document is said to be a cornerstone on the regulation and policing of privacy protection and data interference practices on the Internet (Zilowkowski 2013), calling upon states

to review their procedures, practices and legislation regarding the surveillance of

15 A set of principles “developed by [NGOs] Access, Electronic Frontier Foundation and Privacy International” in a “global consultation with international experts in communications surveillance law, policy and technology from civil society, industry and elsewhere” (RWB 2013a, 2) (Available at https:// en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text). 429 World Summit on the Information Society Forum

communications, their interception and collection of personal data, including mass surveillance, interception and collection […] (UNGA 2013a).

The resolution as well as the heads of states’ presentations represented a trend toward a decentralization of the cyber world, which, since its inception, has been managed, developed and expanded by the United States. This recently forged process of de-Americanization of the Internet can be explained by a variety of different factors. For instance, the leaked information about control the U.S. holds over online data everywhere shone a light over a fact that many suspected, although few were conscious of its significance: the United States – and its companies – are startlingly well-informed of what flows on the Internet. This insurgence also called for an overdue worldwide democratization and diversification of the Internet through the Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of the Internet Governance held in São Paulo to discuss the new, multi- polarized directions of Internet governance. During the conference, also known as NETmundial, stakeholders from various relevant groups (state agents, companies, civil society) gathered to discuss the future of the Internet in many of its aspects, particularly stating that surveillance “undermines trust in the Internet and trust in the Internet governance ecosystem” and calling for further dialogue on the topic (NETmundial 2014).

4 BLOC POSITIONS

The European Union holds in its jurisdiction a significant number of intelligence companies that develop surveillance-oriented software and, on that account, has regulated some private practices in this sector. For instance, in 2011 the European Parliament passed a resolution banning European companies from providing ICT systems to countries which the EU fears might employ these technologies for purposes contrary to human rights standards16 (Fuchs 2012). Moreover, Internet companies in Europe are also prohibited from providing personal users’ data to nations with privacy protection policies regarded as “inadequate” by the organization17 (Stanley & Steinhardt 2003, 15). The European Commission is also following the shift in Internet dominance which aims to decentralize the Internet’s structural core. As a personal advocate for the multipolarization of the Internet, the vice-president of the EC, Neelie Kroes stated in her letter to the 50th ICANN High Level Governmental Meeting, held in June 2014, that “it is our political responsibility to ensure that the governance

16 Namely Argentina, China, Croatia, India, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey and Ukraine. 17 A typification commonly applied to non-Western countries, but which also include the United States. 430 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations of the Internet is open and inclusive of all stakeholders, compliant with human rights and respectful to the rule of law” (Kroes 2014). In March 2014, the European parliament supported a resolution suspending a data protection agreement between Europe and the United States that allows “U.S. firms [to] self-certify as being in compliance with EU privacy law18” (Cleland 2014). In April 2014, the controversial Data Retention Directive (approved by the European Commission in 2006) was declared invalid by the European Court of Justice after being questioned by constitutional courts across Europe – most notably Germany and Sweden. The Directive’s content, which was being challenged for its incongruity with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, included mandates for indiscriminate metadata retention for time periods not inferior to six months and not superior to two years for possible future criminal investigations (ECJ 2014). Germany has publicly expressed its concerns over American-centered information and communication networks and the contribution of this phenomenon to the scandalous revelations made in 2013 regarding the American National Security Agency (NSA) and the surveillance power it holds globally19 (Brown 2010). Thus, the country has been promoting the idea of a “national Internet”, which studies how their “citizens’ online information can be stored on domestic servers” – a position also held by Brazil, China and Russia (Jiang & Okamoto 2014; Aaltola 2013). Nevertheless, Germany reportedly makes use of various electronic monitoring programs mostly for the purpose of criminal investigation. In October 2011, the use of a Trojan horse program code-named R2D2 came to light, and a subsequent discussion over its legality and proportionate use arose (CCC 2011). Switzerland was also accredited for the employment of the R2D2 in investigations carried out by national security agencies (Cupa 2013, 419). Swiss legislation requires ISPs to keep communication records for at least six months, and the apprehension of this data by national authorities is only granted by court order (RWB 2003b, 111). In December, 2013, weeks after making statements reproaching American surveillance schemes, France passed legislation that allows for real-time online data interception by several public officials (Willsher 2013; Segura 2013). Due to their knowledge-based society and economy, Sweden and Norway represent one of the most notable regions when it comes to online activity and dependence. Added to the countries’ frequently unsurpassable – even by the United States – levels of connectivity and innovation, their geographical position is one of the factors that makes them key actors in the ICT international setting (Giacomello 2005). For instance, most of the Russian cyber flows to the West, particularly the United States, passes through submarine cables in the Baltic Sea, giving the Scandinavian

18 EU Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of personal data. 19 Discussed further in this section. 431 World Summit on the Information Society Forum nations great potential for data interception as well as, and thus, loading them with significant responsibility for data and privacy protection (Aaltola 2013). The United Kingdom was one of the initial sponsors of the Data Retention Directive and, as such, has internal regulation that mandates ISPs to retain user communications data for at least one year (Brown 2010, 95). The British government argues that it is the indiscriminate use of communications data, rather than its storage, that threatens the efficacy of Article 8 of the ECHR (Brown 2010, 102). However, the legislation that outlines the requirements for national authorities to access collected data is also a point of controversy. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act of 2000 allows over 200 governmental agencies to retrieve metadata of online activities without warrants or court orders, but “using a self-certified administrative notice” (La Rue 2013, 15; Brown 2010, 102). Furthermore, along with the UK, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand make up the “Five Eyes” arrangement, which runs the Echelon surveillance system, monitoring communication flows around the globe through data-mining. Each of the five national intelligence agencies oversees a designated region, examining political, military, diplomatic and economic content of communications (Che 2007; Lyon 2006; Ziolkowski 2013, 440). Nonetheless, Echelon is only one of the American surveillance programs that focused media and public attention in 2013, when other exploits of the National Security Agency came to light through the unauthorized disclosures of one of its contractors, Edward Snowden. Snowden exposed – among other, telephone-based surveillance operations – a program run by the NSA called Prism, which targeted individuals’ electronic communications, such as e-mails and phone calls, through filter taps placed in fiber-optic cables throughout the world. The program was originally authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, but was subsequently changed and operated outside of the limits set forth by the FISC. For instance, only non-US persons believed to be located outside of the American territory were to be targeted, but these provisions were often understatedly disregarded (USPCLOB 2014; Ziolkowski 2013; Aaltola 2013). On March 14, 2014, the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) stated its intentions of “transition[ing] key Internet domain name functions to the global multistakeholder community” (NTIA 2014). Particularly, the NTIA intends to entrust the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) with the “root-zone- file”20 by October 2015. With this, the American administration hoped to show its apparent intentions to loosen its hold on the Internet’s core in contribution to a global Internet community (Cleland 2014; NTIA 2014).

20 “The essential core-addressing database that the Internet depends upon to ensure any Internet- addressed device can link to any other Internet-addressed device.” (Cleland 2014). 432 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

Russia’s recent asylum grant to whistleblower Edward Snowden was officially grounded on the country’s voiced commitment to the protection of privacy and freedom of expression (HRW 2014). Contrastingly, since 2007, the Russian government has been increasingly employing and investing in its system of electronic communications intervention, the System of Operative-Investigative Measures (SORM), run by its Federal Security Service (FSB). Every ISP in the country is physically linked to the FSB by underground cables, and although a court order is necessary for the agency to monitor online activity, the warrant does not have to be presented to the ISPs, but to a supervisors inside the FSB itself. Whether for fear of a US-dominated Internet and American surveillance programs, which the Russian government argues threatens their nationals’ online privacy, or for aspirations of greater supervision over their online activities, the country has been bringing ICT inwards and promoting a campaign for Internet de-globalization21 (Soldatov & Borogan 2013; Jiang & Okamoto 2014). Furthermore, SORM has also been imported by other Commonwealth of Independent States members. As one of the system’s employers, Ukraine has also installed a Russian social network monitoring program, the so-called Semantic Archive (Soldatov & Borogan 2013, 30). Ukraine’s National Security Council was also criticized by local human rights activists for its lack of transparency. The Council allegedly controls around 80% of the country’s cyber traffic and has been reported to only grant licenses to Internet Service Providers that agreed to install the agency’s technological system that allows it to keep these supervision operations (Ligabo 2008, 12). China’s “great firewall” has long been the country’s reliance when it comes to information and communication restriction on the Internet. The Chinese firewall allows authorities to block foreign websites and restrict online content by word filtering. As the number of Internet users in the country rises (42,1% in 2013), the monitoring of online activity, carried out by at least five governmental bodies, grows harder (RWB 2013b). With the largest population of netizens in the globe, the Chinese struggles to keep control of its cyber space at the same time that they are faced with the need to keep it open to the outside, particularly for the sake of business and contact between Chinese citizens and emigrants (Yang 2013). Lewis (2006) argues that, with the swelling number of users and the rise of social media, control over online content decreases and the Chinese firewall, which was once enough to keep their netizens within reasonable boundaries, is now falling short on protecting individuals from undesirable content. Therefore, the government’s solution has been, in the last few years, to gradually complement the nation’s Internet control

21 On July 31st 2014, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev signed a decree that makes it mandatory for individuals to provide identification whenever accessing public WiFi hotspots. Companies providing the services are required to register its users. 433 World Summit on the Information Society Forum apparatus (previously greatly operated by humans) with surveillance software, in it’s majority, bought from both Chinese and Western (American in tis majority) intelligence companies (RWB 2013; Lewis 2006, Mueller, Kuhen & Santoso 2011). Furthermore, in 2013 Mandiant Corporation, an American cyber security consultant, uncovered a Chinese hacking group directly linked to the People’s Liberation Army. The cyber espionage scheme APT1, profiled by Mandiant, was found to have infiltrated over 100 American companies (141 across the Western world), keeping business records by the terabyte and with attacks lasting as long as four years (Mandiant 2013). Contrastingly, an outraged response to the American surveillance system disclosed in 2013 was manifested on the 20th of June 2014 when China published a book entitled “How is the United States Surveilling China”. The book is said to describe American surveillance schemes on China and it’s leaders and several other countries and was compiled by China’s Internet Media Research Centre (Xihnua 2014). With a remarkably high rate of communications data requests22, the Republic of Korea was classified by the 2013 “Freedom on the net” report23 as partly free in regard to its cyber space (La Rue 2013, 12; Freedom House 2013). After the 2001 spying scandal performed on Japanese subjects by the intelligence network Echelon, Japan expanded its then feeble Internet monitoring framework. Although some insist on the precedence of Japan’s link to the ‘Five Eyes’ over this incident, the fact is that the country has been reportedly engaging in surveillance activities with this coalition since, at the least, 2001 (RWB 2003, 70; Giacomello 2005, 74). The Philippines has state-of-the-art criminal legislation concerning a range of cyber crimes, including data interception, alteration and theft and Internet interference and sabotage. Reporters Without Borders drew attention to the Cyber Crime Prevention Act 2012, identifying it as a hindrance to the realization of freedom of expression in the Philippine web (RWB 2013). Malaysia, on the other hand, has overall weak legal oversight on the Internet according to NGOs and other international organizations (RWB 2010; ASPI 2014). Moreover, cyber regulation that does exist in the country has been reported to have “the potential to allow government to strongly regulate information within the country” (ASPI 2014, 33). Cambodia has been addressed by several NGOs for its weak privacy and freedom of expression legislation. Moreover, the government has expressed its aspirations to combat the abuse of freedom of expression on the Internet and stated that its online privacy policies aim at preventing terrorism and trans-boundary crimes as well as protecting national security and social order (HRW 2013). In Laos

22 - 37 million requests per year in a country with a population of 50 million. 23 Survey conducted by the NGO Freedom House analyzing 60 countries’ level of freedom on the Internet. 434 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations the government controls domestic ISPs as well as the content of online publications. Although the country legally protects Laotians privacy on the Internet, they are prohibited from “publishing information that could damage the country’s unity and integrity” and there have been numerous complaints of e-mails being intercepted or even edited before reaching their destination (Thierer & Crews 2003, 6). Websites like Google and Facebook have issued figures that put India only behind the United States in number of requests for personal user information (HRW 2013, 337). Nevertheless, these numbers are bound to decrease for in 2013 the country got its Central Monitoring System underway. The system allows Indian authorities to intercept and store communications data directly from ISPs (as well as Telecommunication Service Providers) without a court order or warrant or even having to request companies fort such information (India 2013; Xynou 2013; Moody 2013). Pakistan has been addressed by local as well as international NGOs regarding its mass cyber surveillance program on civilians, especially after the joint statement, issued on behalf of other nations24, during the 24th meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Committee (Privacy International 2013; Freedom Network 2013; Bytes for All 2013). The pronouncement called for more rigorous Internet regulation by states as to better secure privacy protection. Criticism to the country’s standpoint is founded on worries about Pakistan’s ambition to enhance its surveillance capabilities, which has been verified by research institutions and Pakistani civil society. In a Citizen Lab report, researchers have found that the country has installed surveillance and remote control software purchased from Canadian “web threat manager” Netsweeper (Citizen Lab 2013). Iran has been conspicuously monitoring Iranian cyber space since it went online in the 1990s. Although in the last few years many Iranian ISPs have been privatized, the government still holds tight control over its population’s Internet activities (Freedom House 2012; RWB 2013). Furthermore, the country is developing its own search engine as part of an ambitious plan of creating so-called “Halal Internet”, Iran’s own Intranet, which, given the government’s total control over the network, would “allow large-scale surveillance and the systematic elimination of dissent (RWB 2013, 25). In Saudi Arabia, all 30 ISPs are connected to the country’s Internet monitoring organ for the purpose of examining content for “offensive or sacrilegious material”. This link compromises not only Saudi individuals’ freedom of expression, but also gives the Saudi government broad access to communications data and even content, jeopardizing the right to privacy in the country (Thierer & Crews 2003, 227). Saudi authorities have justified their close watch over Internet activity as a legal measure

24 Cuba, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Ecuador, Russia, Indonesia, Iran, and China. 435 World Summit on the Information Society Forum for combating radical ideology and extremism in the kingdom (Ansary 2008). In the United Arab Emirates, evidence of the employment of electronic monitoring devices by at least three major online security companies has been found25 (RWB 2013). The country admittedly uses Internet filtering software on political and religious content. Ultimately, there is no legal protection for users, rather, “Internet misuse” is criminalized (OpenNet 2005). Although Israel hosts many companies that provide electronic data monitoring software around the world, its government’s alleged cyber surveillance venture – if it exists – is yet to be uncovered. However, the country’s law on data protection, the Information and Technology Authority, has been praised for its regular updates concerning online privacy protection (Sage 2013). Although, human rights watchdogs and NGOs have often regarded netizens in South Africa as overall free in the cyber world (RWB 2005; Freedom House 2013), recent reports have criticized the country’s communication interception regulatory framework, RICA26, describing it as being as invasive as the American monitoring apparatus (Hutchison 2013; De Wet 2013). Nigeria has purchased intelligence devices from both Blue Coat and Israeli defense company Elbit Systems with the intent of implementing a comprehensive Internet surveillance facility by 2016 (RWB 2013, 8; Freedom House 2013). As for Rwanda, the country’s cyberspace is considered “partly free” by the NGO Freedom House, which has addressed recently passed legislation that, although aimed at protecting online media and journalists, presents a threat to freedom of expression online, by allowing high ranking officials to intercept and monitor online communications (Freedom House 2013). Most notably expressed through President Rousseff’s statement after the reports of mass surveillance carried out by the United States and the United Kingdom on Brazilian subjects (UNGA 2013b; Boadle 2013), Brazil positioned itself as a leading actor in the “development of a global Internet governance mechanism to protect the right to privacy” (HRW 2014, 223). Along with Germany, the country proposed, in November 2013, a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly which set forth guidelines for privacy protection, inspection of communications and personal data collection online and their regulation (UNGA 2013b). Moreover, Brazil’s recently sanctioned Internet civil framework, the so-called “Marco Civil”, represents the country’s commitment to human rights protection on the Internet, establishing the roles and responsibilities of actors such as the state, ISPs and users, regulating personal data protection and safeguarding Net Neutrality, privacy and the free flow of information online (RWB 2013, 40; Brazil 2014).

25 Namely Blue Coat, Gamma International and Hacking Team. 26 Acronym of Regulation of Interception of Communication and Provision of Communication- Related Information Act 436 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

Such as is the case with President Rousseff and other Brazilian political leaders, communication records of authorities in Mexico were also found in the NSA records, including those of president Enrique Peña Nieto, who condemned the unlawful surveillance operations (Ziolkowski 2013, 445-449). A stand regarding the incident also came from Argentina and Venezuela. Although the latter was identified by a study that located devices by American online security company Blue Coat which had surveillance and tracking potential (RWB 2013, 28). Lastly, Uruguay has been commended for its freedom of expression and privacy protection legal framework and its overall institutional competence for guaranteeing these rights online (Freedom House 2013; US 2013).

QUESTIONS TO PONDER

1. How can binding legal frameworks be established internationally for the protection of the right to privacy and freedom of expression in face of cyber surveillance practices? 2. How can a balance be established between national security and public order and privacy protection on the Internet? 3. How can the international community protect civilians from surveillance in the digital age? 4. What are legitimate circumstances in which state and private actors can employ data interception mechanisms? 5. To what extent can states acceptably carry out cyber surveillance activities extraterritorially?

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LEGAL AND POLITICAL MEASURES TO ADDRESS CYBERCRIME

Matheus M. Hoscheidt1 Elisa Felber Eichner2

ABSTRACT

This article presents the development of cybercrime and what countries have done to address it, as well as the most troublesome aspects of this emerging international regime.In the twenty first century, the regulation of cyberspace is an essential dimension of the protection of the fundamental rights of individuals.There must be new organizational forms in order to combat cybercrime, entailing integrated international and public/private partnerships and bearing a multistakeholder approach.On top of that, the study shows that there are two main axes of disagreements among countries: the fora in which countries want to discuss such topic, whether regional or international, and the accurate definition of what the term cybercrime truly comprises.

1 International Relations undergraduate student at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. 2 4th semestre student of International Relations at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. World Summit on the Information Society Forum

1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

“In 2011, at least 2.3 billion people, the equivalent of more than one third of the world’s total population, had access to the internet. By the year 2017, it is estimated that mobile broadband subscriptions will approach 70 per cent of the world’s total population. By the year 2020, the number of networked devices will outnumber people by six to one, transforming current conceptions of the internet. In the hyperconnected world of tomorrow, it will become hard to imagine a ‘computer crime’, and perhaps any crime, that does not involve electronic evidence linked with internet protocol (IP) connectivity.” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013. 1.1 DEFINING THE CONCEPT

Defining the meaning of cybercrime is not an easy task. McQuade (2011, 2) points out that cybercrime is a broad construct for many emerging sorts of abuse and crime enabled by Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). It embraces harmful behaviors that take place via cyberspace and that transcend geopolitical jurisdiction, confusing traditional law enforcement investigation tactics and methods. A technical definition of cybercrime would be the “use of computers or other electronic devices via information systems such as organizational networks or the Internet to facilitate illegal behaviors’’ (McQuade 2008, 16).

1.2 THE EVOLUTION OF CYBERCRIME

Cybercrime did not spring up as a problem overnight. In the early days of computing and network, computers were million-dollar huge mainframes with a limited number of users. Besides, by that time, average criminals possessed neither the necessary hardware nor the technical expertise to benefit from such digital opportunity. Working with early systems required the ability to communicate in the 1s and 0s of binary calculation1 that computers understood (Shinder 2002, 50), and it was a privilege of few. The cybercrime issue emerged and grew as computing became easier and less expensive. When data began to move from one computer to another through networks, information became much more vulnerable and some people started to

1 Binary calculation is a numerical system that uses only two symbols, 0 and 1. Leibniz, a German mathematician, studied this system deeply in the XVII century; however, it was only with the advent of electronic digital computers that it was put into practice. Currently, all computers internally use binary system for storage and manipulation of numbers and data (Weber 1998, 12). 446 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations look for ways to exploit it for their own illegal purposes. It was in the 1940s when one of the first digital computers, the Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer (ENIAC), was devised by Dr. J. Presper Eckert and Dr. John W. Mauchly. ENIAC was a giant machine that required more than 1500 square feet of floor space and could do about 1000 calculations per second, compared with the millions of calculations per second attained by modern personal computers (PCs). The Doctors kept on developing their studies and, in 1949, they introduced the Binary Automatic Computer (BINAC), which stored data on a magnetic tape, and the Universal Automatic Computer (UNIVAC), the first commercially marketed computer (Shinder 2002, 51). These early computers had some inherent security advantages: they were standalone systems, huge and expensive, and almost nobody knew how to use them. In the 1960s, the Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) developed the Programed Data Processor (PDP-1), the first computer used for commercial time sharing, which means that the owners of the computer used to rent computer time for other business, laboratories and programmers who could not afford to buy one of their own. Since numerous people and businesses were using the same computer, data and programs stored on it were vulnerable. Hacking had just found its major opportunity to step in (Shinder 2002, 52). It is important to remember that communication networks existed long before there were computers. Telephone networks had been steadily growing for about 60 years when the first real computers started being developed in the 1940s. Actually, the first electronic hackers were people who used to break into phone systems to make long distance calls without having to pay for them. These telephone network hackers became known as phreakers (Shinder 2002). John Draper, a U.S. Air Force engineering technician, discovered that the whistle of the toy included in the boxes of Cap’n Crunch cereal could produce the 2600Hz signal that granted access to an American telecommunications corporation’s long distance service. Draper developed the blue box, a tone generator set to reproduce the 2600Hz frequency that allowed phreakers to make the free calls (Alaganandam 2005). He was arrested afterwards for the same reason. Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak, who later founded Apple Computer, are reported by several sources (including Wozniak himself) to have made and sold blue boxes in the early 1970s (Shinder 2002, 54). Many of the first computer hackers began their criminal careers as phone phreakers. In the 1950s, students of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) established the basis for what would emerge as the hacker subculture (McQuade 2009). It was in 1961 that the first hacker’s group came about at the MIT, shortly after the Institute got its first PDP-1. The members of the group used to program for the sheer joy of it, which was the original essence of the term “hacking”. It was only in the late 1960s and early 1970s that hacking became associated with the radical

447 World Summit on the Information Society Forum

“Yippie” movement2 and took on a negative tone (Shinder 2002, 52). It was in the 1970s that the first affordable personal computer became available, the Altair 8800. From that moment on, it was possible for individuals to buy their own computers and learn how to program. Altair gave birth to hacking as we know it today. Other low-cost computers followed Altair, such as the famous IBC PC (International Business Machines Personal Computer), which entered the home consumer market and spread the revolution of the Personal Computers. As computers became available and affordable to a wider public, the desire to expand the machines’ processing capacity and facilitate the sharing of different databases grew fast, and the idea of interconnecting PCs led to the creation of a network of computers (Shinder 2002, 54). Since then, the following hacking faced opened doors. The first computer networks consisted of one computer (a mainframe) and many terminals that, once connected to it, could ran programs on it and access its files. Nonetheless, these terminals did not possess processing power of their own, which means that, if the system went down, no one on the network could do any computing. Searching for a solution to this problem, companies started to develop means that would enable users to link independent computers. Therefore, in 1979, three American companies – DEC, Intel and Xerox – got together to create Ethernet standards, in order to make it easier for vendors to create compatible products (Shinder 2002, 55). Ethernet gave companies a way to link their computers easily and almost inexpensively. Networked PCs emerged as a popular alternative to mainframe computing. Shortly thereafter, as well as creating a LAN (Local Area Network) by networking PCs together at one location, PCs could also be linked to each other from remote locations using a modem and telephone lines. Owing to this progress, the first Bulletin Board Service (BBS), a computer system consisting of one or more modems, was created in the United States for users to dial in, download files, and carry on public virtual discussions. The system was a huge success, and BBSs sprang up all over the country (Alaganandam 2005). This combination of telecommunications with computers in the late 1970s and 1980s marked the beginning of the cyber threat debate. Evidently, early hackers and phreakers also enjoyed the new technology and started using BBS as a way to communicate with one another and share their tricks and techniques. As a result,

2 Founded by Abbie Hoffman, whose name became a symbol of radical activism, in the mid-1960s, the “Yippies” were members of the Youth International Party (YIP!) who used to promote demonstrations in order to protest the military involvement of the United States in the war in Vietnam. The party was dedicated to merging New Left activism, advocating social justice for all; nevertheless, much of the Yippies’ activism consisted of guerrilla street theater and public pranks to bring attention to their causes. The Yippies created absurdist political demonstrations suggesting incredible acts of civil disobedience and disrespect, such as placing LSD in a city’s water supply or nominating a pig as a presidential candidate (Shawyer, 2008). 448 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations the BBSs generated the first large-scale method of distributing pirated software, and specialized in sharing of pornographic contents. Early BBSs were slow, and the popularity of these forums began to decline in the 1990s, when Internet access became commercially available at an affordable price and the World Wide Web made the BBS systems seem hopelessly outdated (Mazoni 2009). Even though commercial Internet was growing, getting online was far from easy. For a user to connect to the Internet, it was necessary to obtain, install and configure a number of settings that could be tricky for ordinary users. However, there was an easier way to get online: through online services. Companies such as America Online (AOL), CumpuServe and Prodigy provided their subscribers with software that would enable them to connect to their service with relative ease (Alaganandam 2005). The problem was that this ease of use also attracted criminals who were not technically proficient. Besides, criminals tried to benefit from the anonymity of online services, making it easier for them to change their identities and cover their tracks. Back in 1957, the government of the United States authorized the creation of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) in response to the launch of Sputnik 1, the Soviet Union’s first artificial Earth-orbiting satellite. ARPA’s first project was the development of a satellite of its own for the United States. In the 1960s, however, as the Cold War continued, the possibility of a nuclear war and the necessity to maintain communications made ARPA’s involvement with computing begin (Mazoni 2009). The need to create a wide area network to connect government, military and university sites, to allow researchers to share sources and results more easily, is the cornerstone of the creation of ARPANet afterwards, one of the world’s first packet switching networks3. Although worldwide network was steadily growing, in 1986 there were still only about 5000 computers on the Net. By this time, the National Science Foundation (NSF), which maintained the Internet control, established five supercomputer centers, resulting in an enormous increase in available connections. By 1989, there were over 100,000 hosts on the network (Shinder 2002, 60). In the early 1990s, ARPA ceased to exist, and ARPANet started being managed by NSFNet (Mazoni 2009). The NSFNet grew and, even though commercialization of Internet officially began in 1995, in 1992 there were already over one million Internet hosts. Until then, security had not been a major concern to researcher scientists, who were more interested in what technology could do than in securing

3 Dr. Licklider, one of ARPA’s researchers, developed the packet switching technology in the 1960s. Responsible for creating a system that would connect researchers’ computers and allow the sharing of existing sources among different sites, Dr. Licklider found out a way of retracing an original message, even if one node had been taken out of the net. That is, if a packet of data was sent to a destroyed computer, the packet could still get through by taking a different path (Shinder 2002, 59). 449 World Summit on the Information Society Forum it. As Dunn Cavelty (2012, 106) would say:

The networked information environment – or cyberspace – is pervasively insecure, because it was never built with security in mind. The dynamic globalization of information services in connection with technological innovation led to a steady increase of connectivity and complexity. The more complex an IT system is, the more problems it contains and the harder it is to control or manage its security.

It was in 1988 that the wake-up call for security occurred. Robert Morris Jr., a doctoral (PhD) candidate at Cornell University, released the ﬁrst Internet worm (a self-replicant program) (McQuade 2009). The worm was released and spread all over the United States, infecting thousands of computers and shutting down a large portion of the Internet. From that moment on, Internet users realized that someone in their midst harbored malicious intent (Shinder 2002). The first malicious programs may have shocked users by causing computers to behave in unexpected ways. However, as soon as it was widely recognized that computers store something valuable – information -, criminals saw an opportunity. Viruses that started to appear in the 1990s presented much more of a threat: they were used to steal confidential information, such as bank account details and passwords (Alaganandam 2005). In 1996, a hacker shut down the Public Access Networks Corporation in New York using a hack attack called “cancelbot”. Over 25,000 newsgroup messages were destroyed and, in the same year, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Air Force computers were hacked. In the spring of 1999, a man called David Smith released the “Melissa” Worm by using a stolen America Online account to post a message promising access to pornographic Web sites. The virus rapidly spread through email messages, replicating and sending itself through computer networks (McQuade 2009). The Melissa virus did not cripple the Internet, but it was one of the first computer viruses to get the public’s attention. From 1996 to 2000, many high-profile web sites such as eBay, UNICEF, The New York Times and Microsoft were victims of hackers. Many other major websites as Yahoo! and Amazon were also shut down (Alaganandam 2005). In 2000, another huge attack happened: a Philippine programming student released the “I Love You” Worm causing signiﬁcant damage to computers running Microsoft Windows (McQuade 2009, xxi). The I Love You virus, also called the Love Bug, filled email gateways, as it multiplied exponentially across the Internet. The worm appeared as an attachment to an email message that once was opened, used to delete a variety of multimedia files on the victim’s computer and, afterwards, on PCs with Microsoft Outlook installed, would send a copy of itself to every address in the address book (McQuade 2009). One email message quickly became a hundred

450 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations messages, which exploded into thousands of messages clogging the Internet. It took only six hours for the virus to spread worldwide, costing losses of billions of dollars. When it comes to cyberspace, the spread of virus is just one of the threats that we should be aware of. Illegal accesses, data interference, forgeries, frauds, child pornography and infringement of copyrights are a few examples of all the offenses we are exposed to. In 2000, for instance, the emergence of peer-to-peer (p2p) networks and other ﬁle-sharing programs enabled people to share and download music for free, resulting in loss of royalties for artists (McQuade 2009, xx). In 2004, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children logged a 39 percent increase in number of reported incidents of child pornography on the web in the previous year (McQuade 2009, xxii). Malicious code and hack attacks comprise only a small portion of the overall criminal activity that in some way use or depend on the Internet. Cybercrime involves many other issues we should be aware of.

2 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Canabarro & Borne (2013) make clear distinctions of what is cyberspace, Internet and Web. These are useful concepts commonly employed interchangeably, leading to conceptual misunderstandings. According to Kuehl (2009, 29), “cyberspace is a domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify and exchange information via networked information systems and physical infrastructures”. Hence, cyberspace also encompasses telegraph networks, radio, fixed/mobile telephony and satellite systems for air traffic control and maritime navigation (Canabarro and Borne 2013). Since the concept of cyberspace is much broader than that of Internet, it is no wonder that cybercriminals, such as phreakers, existed long before Internet came to existence. Internet was a technological solution to connect computer and computer networks (Kurose and Ross 2010). Due to its technical features, it became a central node for computer networks. The World Wide Web (WWW), by its term, is an application “running” on the Internet. It owns visual properties and develops electronic sites that grant access to content stored in computer through hyperlinks (Canabarro and Borne 2013). In the same way, Internet also supports many other applications, ranging from mobile apps (whatsapp and snapchat, for example) to PS4 games. Cybercrimes can be carried out with IT electronic devices and information systems, not limited to the Internet. Electronic IT devices comprehend servers, desktops, laptop, minicomputers, scanners, copiers, fax machines, telephones and mobile phones, pagers, gaming consoles and other devices that may connect to computerized networks (S. McQuade 2011, 2). Such devices can operate either in standalone modes or via wired or wireless telecommunications networks. These

451 World Summit on the Information Society Forum computer-controlled networks, also known as information systems, “consist of organizational intranets that connect devices to servers or the Internet (and therefore the World Wide Web)” (S. McQuade 2011, 2). Examples of information systems are intranets, which connect computer workstations of individual users to servers, and the Internet itself, where the WWW rests. These systems allow people using computers and other devices to create, change, send, receive, manipulate, archive and destroy digitized information. There are other examples of worldwide computerized networks, such as MILNET, used by the U.S. Department of Defense, and Internet2, a computing platform and organizational consortium of university, industry and government entities aiming to develop and deploy advanced network technologies (S. McQuade 2011, 5). The fast growing aspect of cybercrime is strongly related to a phenomenon called as commodization. Commodization of IT devices means that these gadgets are becoming readily available, less expansive, more versatile, more functional, easier to use and more commonly used. They have now larger memory and processing speed and support many types of online and standalone activities (sending and receiving text messages, simultaneous Web browsing, listening to music, watching movies, etc.). This feature has led to worldwide Internet connectivity, deeply changing manufacturing, transportation, commerce, education and governance (S. McQuade 2011). Increasing ICT and connectivity of the Internet open the door to rising productivity, faster communication and immeasurable convenince, but also to the risk of criminal exploitation (Choo and Grabosky , Cyber Crime 2013, 2). Such trend has not only created new patterns of cybercrime, but also transformed important aspects of traditional crime. Massively distributed e-mail, also known as spam, represents a new form of legally prescribed behavior, but street drug trafficking may now also benefit from ICT devices used to coordinate sales through encrypted text or voice messages (S. McQuade 2011).

2.1 MAIN ASPECTS OF CYBERCRIME

One of the main differences between traditional crime and cybercrime or crimes facilitated by IT is that software applications, ICT devices, operating systems and malware design complexities are expanding potential effects in terms of scale of denial, disruption, destruction or theft of data and associated financial costs of restoring information systems integrity (CERT Coordination Center 2003, 2). The CERT Coordiantion Center (2003) analyzed six major trends in the patterns of cyber-attacks: 1) rising automation and speed of attack tools; 2) Increasing sophistication of attack tools; 3) Faster discovery of vulnerabilities; 4) Increasing permeability of firewalls; 5) Increasingly asymmetric threat; and 6) Increasing threat

452 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations from infrastructure attack. These trends raise awareness of the need for fast and efficient responses to cybercrime. Cybercrimes can be more harmful than traditional ones, since cyber offenders can deploy multiple attacks at any time, from anywhere, partly or completely anonymously, against information systems. Besides, since organizations detect illicit use of electronic device through information systems and electronic monitoring, a well-developed cyber-attack can cover its own traces. Cybercrimes can also damage critical infrastructure and other hardware structures (S. McQuade 2011). There is a variety of categories to label cybercrimes and cybercriminals. Typologies varies considerably in their cut-points and criteria, often creating standalone conceptual frameworks. Examples of categorizations include

hackers, crackers, phreakers, and pirates (Lee 1991); utopians, cyberpunks, cyber spies, and cyber terrorists (Young 1993); pranksters, hackers, malicious hackers, personal problem solvers, career criminals, extreme advocates, and a catchall group consisting of malcontents, addicts, and irrational or incompetent people (Parker 1998); and activists, hactivists, and cyber terrorists (Denning 1999) (S. McQuade 2011, 8).

Even though there is not a universal typology for cyber-offenders, some main categories are widely used:

1. Hackers, computer trespassers, and password crackers who disrupt or deny computer services, publicly disclose security flaws and write or distribute harmful software. Hackers may also find, exploit, or expose security vulnerabilities through phishing scams4 and other technics (S. McQuade 2008, 46); 2. Harassers and extortionists who use technologies to harass, threaten, distribute password without permissions, annoy and coerce; 3. Academic cheats that use IT devices to plagiarize or cheat on assignments or exams or who fake research methods or findings for profit or fame; 4. Data snoops who illegally access to information systems merely to look at data or files (S. McQuade 2008, 46); 5. Music, movie, and software pirates who use IT to violate copyright laws by illegally copying, distributing, downloading, selling, or possessing software

4 Phishing, or fishing, is when cybercriminals attempt to deceive potential victims into revealing private information about themselves or their computer accounts, such as usernames, passwords, and financial or bank account numbers. Phishing can occur in several different technical ways, but typically involves a cybercriminal sending a digital message that purports to be from a trusted source organization, asking users to input private information (S. McQuade 2008, 139-140). 453 World Summit on the Information Society Forum

applications, data files, or code; 6. Stalkers, pedophiles, and other cyber sex offenders who use online and/or in-person methods when needed to acquire illegal sexual pleasure from or power over people (S. McQuade 2008, 46). 7. Cyber terrorists5 who seek to advance their social, religious, or political goals by installing widespread fear or by damaging either critical infrastructure or critical information infrastructure (S. McQuade 2008, 46).

These categories are more appropriate to name cyber-offenders rather than cybercriminals. The concept of cybercriminal implies that of cybercrime, meaning an illegal act enabled, fostered or eased by ICT devices and information systems. As a legal concept, cybercrime is not a consensus in different national legal frameworks. The definition of cybercrime is still a domestic sovereign decisions an object of international cooperation. In countries such as the United States6, offenses against intellectual property, like piracy and academic cheating, are considered serious cybercrimes. It is not the case for many developing countries. In fact, any computer user is likely to have inadvertently or intentionally committed some form of online abuse, like sharing network passwords in violation of university policies, illegally downloading music, movies or software. These conducts are abusive, potentially harmful and, depending on his legal context, criminal (S. McQuade 2011). Finding common ground definitions for cybercrime is still a challenge for international organizations, governments, congressional representatives, NGOs, international agencies and other stakeholders. Most usual cyber offenses include web-based data mining for intelligence gathering on potential targets, creation and distribution of malware, spam and phishing schemes, mass credit card fraud and identity theft, password cracking, along with corporate espionage, theft of intellectual property and piracy. Among many cybercrimes, child pornography stands out for being so offensive and for receiving huge attention from legislators, enforcement bodies and media companies. U.S. federal law clearly outlaws the creation, distribution and possession of child pornography. Many other countries do the same, but not all of them. Thus, online content legally created, distributed or accessed online in one country can be illicit in

5 Defining cyber-terrorists as cybercriminals is also quite controversial, because terrorism conceptualization does not relate to the nature of the act, but to its political and ideological goals; that being said, DOS attacks, defined as cybercrime, can also be considered an act of cyber terrorism, depending on the goals that motivated the attacks. In fact, virtually any cybercrime could be considered cyber-terrorism depending on its motivating goals. Besides, cyber-terrorist acts are often understood as acts of cyberwar, not cybercrime. 6 Choo and Grabosky (2013) argue that the US are particularly careful about online child pornography, theft of US-owned intellectual property and threats to U.S. government and commercial systems. 454 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations another one (S. McQuade 2011). This structure creates a sort of international division of cybercriminal behavior. Cambodia and other Southeast Asian nations have neglected human trafficking, usually fostered by child abusers engaged in pornographic productions, sales, cybersex or lives of prostitution (Hughes 2003). Smuggling young girls and boys with such intent is now a transnational crime phenomenon that takes place in impoverished countries, where victims face hard economic conditions (Chinov 2000). Countries that strongly regulate cybercrime, like Myanmar, barely host cybercriminals, resulting in a reduced number of victims. According to (2013), “Countries with many persons skilled in information technology, but which offer fewer opportunities for legitimate enrichment (such as Russia), have many offenders”. Nations with IT-skilled individuals and plenty of corporate connectivity, as the United States and those from western Europe, are used to having more victims. Chinese and Indian increasing affluence makes them likely to experience a prominence of cybercrime in the near future (Choo and Grabosky 2013). In the fight against cybercrime, it is important to remark how ICT development affect the way crime and policing coevolve. McQuade (2011) argues that technological complexity favors high-tech criminality and damages effective policing, due to long- standing bureaucratic routines, law enforcement and security organization inertia, inefficiencies associated with centralized government technology procurement, technology-driven operating platforms, limited use of IT in law enforcement organizations and misperception in police cultures regarding new/old tchnology needs and skills. Furthermore, sometimes technology-oriented leadership fails to recognize and use the potential of emerging ICT (S. McQuade 2011, 3-4). Some forms of cybercrime are worth being analyzed separately. Complex sorts of malware7 and remotely controlled bot networks8 are one of the most potentially harmful cybercrimes. Botnets may simultaneously gather information, hack and launch denial-of-service (DOS) attacks9 through remotely controlled computers. 7 Malware refers to a number of harmful software specifically designed to attack computer systems, networks or data. The expression combines the words “malicious” and “software”, and it is usually used to describe computer viruses, Internet worms, keystroke logging programs, rootkits, spyware, botnets, and the like. Malware can be the cause or the source of other types of attacks, such as denial of service attacks, phishing and spam (S. McQuade 2008, 121). 8 Bot networks, or only botnets, are computers under the control of a single entity, usually without the knowledge or consent of the owners or users of those computers. Infected computers are running software known as a “bot” (from “robot”), and these affected computers are often referred to as “bots” or ‘‘zombies”. “Botnets are used by the controlling entity, sometimes known as a ‘botherd’ or ‘botherder’, to perform one or more functions on computers owned or used by other people. Expert botherds are able to distribute functions across individual computers running a bot (such as cracking passwords) or have them work in concert (e.g., engaging in a denial of service attack)” (S. McQuade 2008, 12). 9 “Denial of service (DOS) attacks are cybercrimes in which the primary goal is to deny users of 455 World Summit on the Information Society Forum

As for malwares, on the other hand, “Cryptoviruses” can attack computers, encrypt data and cause threats. “Metamorphic worms” can change their design depending on security measures found in order not to have their true destructive power recognized (S. McQuade 2011). Besides,

Viruses, Trojans, worms, and adware or spyware can infect digital cell phones and other types of mobile devices in ways that stick unsuspecting victims with huge phone bills, damaged operating systems or software applications, lost or damaged data, or worse (S. McQuade 2011, 6).

Regarding the worldwide phenomenon of online child pornography, the American Youth Internet Safety Surveys of 1999 and 2005 surveyed around 1,500 youths from 10 to 17 years of age. In the first surveyed, 6 percent were harassed online within the past year; 5 percent received unwanted solicitations for sex, 3 percent received a solicitation that included an attempt to contact the youth in person, over the phone or via postal mail, among other findings (Finkelhor, Wolak and Mitchell 2000). Results from the 2005 survey were quite similar and concluded that one in three were victimized online and that victims felt angry, sad or depressed and often did not tell their parents what was going on for being afraid of losing computer privileges (Wolak, Mitchell and Finkelhor 2006). The same study showed that many cyber offenses remain unreported and undetected and that young people victimize each other online as much as they are victimized, stressing that cybercrime against youth embraces much more than adult sex offenders targeting teenagers. Misinformation among adults result in a lack of education and training about information security and how to cope with cyber threats. For McQuade (2011), however, “congress, most state legislatures, the media, and policing agencies continue to emphasize enforcement and regulatory strategies concerning sexual predators rather than education as means to prevent cyber offending”. Fighting cybercrime is not limited to youth. It is neither a single nation’s responsibility, urging for worldwide responses. Policymaking must work not only to respond to IT-enabled crimes, but also to prevent progressively complex cybercrimes (S. McQuade, Cybercrime 2011). Political measures aiming to address this and other forms of cybercrime must consider educational policies for the right use of ICT devices connected to information systems. McQuade (2011) points out that most students use their ICT devices without close parental supervision, positive role modeling or school computers or other types of electronic devices access to an information system or its resources. DOS attacks often involve flooding a computer network with massive amounts of data in a short period of time so that servers cannot keep up with the amount of data being transmitted” (S. McQuade 2008, 63). For further information about types of DOS attacks, se McQuade (2008). 456 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations instruction on how to be safe, secure and ethical online. Other findings of his research demonstrate that a) kindergarten-age children are exposed to content that makes them feel uncomfortable, b) cyber bullying starts in second grade, c) illegal pirating of music, movies and software via peer-to-peer10 networks begins in fourth grade, d) by middle school, adolescents engage in many forms of cyber-enabled abuse, spanning academic dishonesty to purchasing illegal and prescription drugs online, among others (McQuade and Sampat 2008). Identity theft is also a widespread cybercrime. Results of a survey concerning identity theft that took place in 2004 in the United States show that

About 1.6 million households experienced theft of existing accounts other than a credit card (such as a banking account), and 1.1 million households discovered misuse of personal information (such as social security number)…. Ten percent of the households with incomes of $75,000 or higher experienced identity theft; that was about twice the percentage of households earning less than $50,000. [And] across all types of identity theft, the average amount lost per household was $1,620” (Baum 2006, 1).

Piracy is usually carried out with organized criminal groups. In opposition to fraud-related criminal groups, they often consist of link-minded individuals who do not even know each other personally. Some groups engaged in creating and distributing movies music or software are called warez groups. Such groups practice piracy in an underground community known as The Scene, where they distribute copyrighted material, including television shows and series, movies, music, music videos, games (all platforms), applications (all platforms), ebooks, and pornography (Choo and Grabosky 2013). Unknown individuals from The Scene leak files and upload them to filehosts, torrents and ed2k. Warez groups are constantly competing for faster leaks, best quality materials and access range. Many online pirates are information technology specialists with no criminal backgrounds. “Drink or Die” was a famous pirate group whose members were located all around the world, in countries like United Kingdom, United States and Australia. In 2001, a joint police operation managed to detect and prosecute its members. One of them had never been in the United States, even though he was finally extradited, convicted and imprisoned there (Urbas 2006). Many recent movements have questioned the idea of mere criminalization of piracy. The Access to Knowledge (A2K) works “towards greater access to knowledge builds on previous and ongoing efforts by citizens’ groups working for access to

10 The term peer-to-peer refers to the concept that in a network of equals (peers) using appropriate information and communication systems, two or more individuals are able to spontaneously collaborate without necessarily needing central coordination (Schoder 2005). Widespread use of peer- to-peer technologies for piracy is related to torrent download systems. 457 World Summit on the Information Society Forum information and education rights in general” (Access to Knowledge n.d.). Likewise, open source software and hardware movements claim for changes in the current standards of intellectual property protection. The rise of Pirate Parties brought about concerns such as “consumer and authors rights-oriented reform of copyright and related rights, support for information privacy, transparency and free access to information” (PP International 2009).

2.2 ORGANIZED CYBERCRIME

Analyzing the role of organized criminal groups in cyberspace, Choo and Grabosky (2013) distinguish three categories of organized crime groups that commit ICT-related crimes. Firstly, there are traditional organized criminal groups that make use of ICT to enhance their terrestrial criminal activities. Secondly, they list organized cybercriminal groups, which operate solely online; and, at last, organized groups of ideologically and/or politically motivated individuals, including state and state-sponsored actors, who make use of ICT to conduct their criminal conduct. Many traditional organized criminal groups have been involved in cybercrime until recently. Examples include Asian triads and Japanese Yakuza11, whose criminal activities adopted computer software piracy and credit card forgery and fraud (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 2007). Traditional organized crime groups from eastern Europe have also engaged in extortion from online gambling and pornography websites by threatening to deploy DOS attacks with botnets (Choo 2007). Choo and Grabosky (2013) also point out that organized cybercriminals have a great deal of technical expertise to offer terrorist groups in terms of communications, intelligence, propaganda and psychological warfare, recruitment, and training. Besides, ordinary cybercrimes, like spam and fraud schemes, identity and immigration crimes, may be used to raise funds to finance their operations. This is particularly true after formal funds transfers have come under larger scrutiny from anti-laundering authorities. Tamil Tigers, for example, are known to have practiced credit card fraud to support their operations. Similarly, Imam Samudra openly asked for its followers to commit credit card fraud. Many criminals operate cyberspace functionalities to harass or threaten political adversaries. Mail bombing strategies, in which thousands of emails or webpage visits are used to degrade a system, were used in 1999, when the White House website was overload with visits after the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during NATO’s air campaign against Servia. Nowadays, botnets are best tools to deploy DOS

11 Triads are notorious organized criminal groups that operate mainly in China (Gertz 2010). Yakuza, by its term, is a big transnational organized crime group originated in Japan. 458 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations attacks, like in those against Estonian servers in 2007. After Estonian government relocated a Soviet-era memorial, criminal organizations sought to intimidate it, but there are no further evidences of Russian government’s engagement. A similar situation happened with Dalai Lama’s Tibetan exile centers around the globe. In March 2009, many of them were invaded by a sophisticated surveillance system. This activity came out to be traced in Chinese locations and in Southern California. Some suggest these actions were made by patriotic hackers or even by the government itself despite official sources denied participation (Choo and Grabosky 2013). Members of the Citizen Lab of the University of Toronto also set up “honeypots”12 in order to successfully track hackers around the world (Deibert 2013). These sorts of crime are really hard to trace, since offenders can attack from proxy servers in third countries to conceal their identity. Technical expertise of invaders may turn tracing activities into a very time consuming task. Google reported, in January 2010, that attackers located in China made up a sophisticated and coordinated access attack in many Gmail accounts, including those of Chinese human rights activists. Once again, the Chinese government denied any sort of responsibility in these attacks. In the same year, a worm malware called “Stuxnet” disrupted uranium enrichment centrifuges in Iran. The software was programed to make centrifuges work the way the attacker wanted, hiding its own traces from the equipment operator (O’Murchu, Chien and Falliere 2010, 1-2). The degree of sophistication of the attack raised concerns about the participation of national governments, namely the United States and Israel (Markoff and Vance 2010; Mankoff 2011). When it comes to investigating and prosecuting cybercriminal activities, evaluating if they were state-sponsored activities is fundamental for international responsibilization. In 2013, American President Barack Obama ordered to some national security and intelligence officials a list of potential targets for US cyber-attacks, leaving no room for further speculations of whether governments engage in cyber-attacks or not (MacAskill and Greenwald 2013). In 2011, South Korean government reported the infiltration of China-based hackers in online gaming websites. These players intended to use automated softwares to get gaming points and exchange it for money. Abovementioned examples show how hard it is to determine clearly whether cybercrimes either were committed by organized cybercriminals, by government agencies or by both combined. Addressing cybercrime as a global matter requires close coordination between national and international agencies. Choo and Grabosky (2013) point out what cross-national struggle against organized cybercrime should aim: (1) legislative harmony, (2) a framework of law enforcement cooperation and (3) the

12 Honeypots are traps aimed at tracking, detecting and deflecting attempts of unauthorized use of information systems. 459 World Summit on the Information Society Forum capacity to investigate and, if necessary, to prosecute. This is also the case for any other terrestrial transnational organized crime. Main investigative and technical assistance agencies that deal with international cybercrime include Carnegie Mellon’s CERT Coordination Center, FBI Cyber Division, the High Technology Crime Investigators Association, the Information Systems Security Association, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), etc. Cybercrime is not a recent phenomenon, but it has escalated quickly in the last couple of decades. Besides, policing cybercrime presents a pattern of technological “arms race” between offenders and accountable bodies. This race seems to be far from ending. Most likely, as ICT becomes more pervasive, its use as a tool and as a target of cybercrime tends to increase. There are many sorts of cybercriminal activities, and the legal definition of what is considered a cybercrime varies from country to country. In fact, legislative uniformity and international standards are two of the greatest political challenges for the ICT international regime. There must be new organizational forms in order to combat cybercrime, entailing integrated international and public/private partnerships and bearing a multistakeholder approach. In the twenty first century, the regulation of cyberspace is an essential dimension of the protection of the fundamental rights of individuals. From now on, cyberspace regime may determine the range of achievements in terms of civic, political, economic and social rights, since it is a source of private information, knowledge and access to labor market. Any sort of model of “criminal code” for cybercriminals must also consider the relevance of a legal framework that protects fundamental rights of those who interact with cyberspace.

3 PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS

In the 21st century, the Internet entered a new phase in its existence. With the rise of cybercrimes, the establishment of policies to provide protection to society against crime in cyberspace turned out to be indispensable, emphasizing the need for legislations in accordance with current technological development. The way countries want to come up with these policies, however, varies from state to state, turning out to be a source of conflict in the cybercrime regime. Even though there are plenty of international regulations in this regard, like those of the General Assembly, the ECOSOC and the outcome documents of the WSIS, many countries seem to be more minded to approach it in a regional basis, challenging multilateral and international commitments. This is the case for the regulations of the European Union, the Organization for American States, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Economic Community of West African States.

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In November 23, 2001, the Convention of Budapest of the European Council took place (Mazoni 2009). The treaty elaborated during the Convention was the first international treaty to address computer crime, specifically referring to security of computer networks, copyright violations, computer fraud and child pornography. Non-member States of the Council of Europe also took part of the Convention. The Convention on Cybercrime listed some measures to be taken at national level regarding four types of cybercriminal offences (Convention Committee on Cybercrime 2001):

1. Offences against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems: such as illegal access and interception and data interference; 2. Computer-related offences: including forgery and fraud; 3. Content-related offences: related to child pornography; and 4. Offences related to infringements of copyright and related rights.

This Convention aimed at creating legal provision for specific types of crime, as well as at promoting international cooperation, given the universalization of offences. In addition to that, the Convention highlighted the importance of all legal provisions laid down by Member States to be complying with the respect of fundamental human rights and civil liberties, such as the right to privacy, intimacy, freedom of expression and public access to knowledge and the Internet. The Convention on Cybercrime of Budapest entered into force in 2004, and, two years later, the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime was launched, addressing the criminalization of acts of racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems (Mazoni 2009). As the first treaty related to computer crime, the Convention of Budapest showed the dire importance of the subject and presented the means to make cyberspace a safer place. The Convention paved the way for further multilateral and multiskateholder initiatives in both global and regional levels. Apart from the Budapest Convention, many other regional, global and multilateral measures have been taken to address cybercrime. The Organization of American States (OAS) created the Inter-American Cooperation Portal on Cybercrime. The Portal aimed at strengthening cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of such crimes, fostering exchange of information and experiences among its members and advising OAS member States to enhance and strengthen cooperation with international organizations and mechanisms (Organization of American States 2011). The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), concerning integrity and security of the e-commerce environment, also made great advances on its discussions when designing the “Strategy to ensure trusted, secure and sustainable

461 World Summit on the Information Society Forum online environment” (APEC, 2005). Other organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), had further and deeper discussions regarding the subject. In 1997, the Group of Eight (G8) released a Ministers’ Communicate that included an action plan and principles to combat cybercrime and protect data and systems from unauthorized impairment (Chang, et al. 2003). The United Nations, especially through the General Assembly (UNGA) and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) released a number of resolutions related to this subject. In 2001, the UNGA approved a resolution (A/RES/55/63) addressing cybercrime, called “Combating the criminal misuse of information technologies”. This resolution stressed the role countries should play domestically in eliminating safe havens for those who criminally misuse information technologies. Besides, it remarked how such transnational issues must be investigated and prosecuted by all concerned States in a coordinated way. Since then, countries raised awareness about the importance of user education to prevent and combat criminal misuse of ITs. Finally, the resolution also alarmed that solutions to address cybercrime must take into account both the “protection of individual freedoms and privacy and the preservation of the capacity of Government to fight such criminal misuse” (UNGA 2001a, 2). In its Resolution 55/59, the UNGA granted a mandate to the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) of the United Nations to “develop action-oriented policy recommendations on the prevention and control of computer-related crime” (UNGA 2001b, 2), while also reaffirming UNGA’s commitment to prevent, investigate and prosecute these crimes. Further Resolutions, like RES/56/121, also stress that countries should consider regulating criminal misuse of information technologies, remarking the plan of action of the CCPCJ about high technology and computer-related crime (UNGA 2002). Resolution 63/195 briefly points out the role of addressing cybercrime in order to face many sorts of transnational organized crime (UNGA 2009). UNGA Resolution 65/232 noted the convening of an intergovernmental expert group “to conduct a comprehensive study of the problem of cybercrime and responses to it by Member States, the international community and the private sector…” (UNGA 2011, 4). Such responses might involve exchange of information on national legislation, best practices, technical assistance and international cooperation, aiming to improve existing and to propose new national and international, legal or other responses to cybercrime. The Resolution particularly refers to technical cooperation activities relates to piracy, cybercrime, sexual exploitation of children and urban crime (UNGA 2011). ECOSOC Resolution 2009/22 took note of the European Convention on Cybercrime as the only international treaty specifically addressing “computer related fraud, computer-related forgery and other forms of cybercrime that may contribute

462 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations to the perpetration of economic fraud, identity-related crime, money-laundering and other related illicit activities” (ECOSOC 2009, 2). The same resolution encouraged Member States to

adopt useful practices and efficient mechanisms for supporting and protecting victims of economic fraud and identity-related crime and, to that effect, enable effective cooperation between public and private sector entities through computer emergency response teams or other mechanisms providing an emergency response capability to public and private organizations requiring technical support and advice during periods of electronic attack or other network security incidents (ECOSOC 2009, 3).

In 2012, ECOSOC emphasized the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (2000) as the main tool of the international community to fight transnational organized crime, like cybercrime, piracy and others (ECOSOC 2012). As part of the WSIS 2003, held in Geneva, the WSIS Plan of Action called governments and the private sector to prevent, detect and respond to cybercrime and misuse of ICTs. In its Declaration of Principles, WSIS participants stated that a global culture of cyber-security needed “to be promoted, developed and implemented in cooperation with all stakeholders and international expert bodies” (WSIS 2003). The same document stated that,

Within this global culture of cyber-security, it is important to enhance security and to ensure the protection of data and privacy, while enhancing access and trade. In addition, it must take into account the level of social and economic development of each country and respect the development-oriented aspects of the Information Society (WSIS 2003, 5).

In 2007, the Council of Europe opened for signatures the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse. Among many related issues, Article 20 of this Convention addresses offences concerning child pornography. It criminalizes child pornography production, offer, distribution and ownership. This Convention has been signed by 31 member States of the Council of Europe. The European Union adopted other cybercrime-related directives, including Directive 2000/31/EC regulating e-commerce, Council of Europe Framework Decision 2001/413/JHA concerning fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment, EU Directive 2002/58/EC about personal data and privacy and the Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA, which regulates attacks against information systems (UNODC 2013, 64). Regional organizations are fruitful fora to discuss and implement cybercrime- related legal frameworks. In 2001, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) adopted an Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Offences related to

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Computer Information (2001). In 2009, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization addressed cybercrime in its Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of International Information Security. In 2010, the League of Arab States signed a Convention on Combating Information Technology. In 2011, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) displayed Directive 1/08/11 on Fighting Cyber Crime within ECOWAS. Finally, since 2012, the African Union has developed a Draft African Union Convention on the Establishment of a Legal Framework conducive to Cyber Security in Africa13 (UNODC 2013, 64). The International Telecommunication Union has addressed cybercrime-related activity with a stronger technical approach. In 2012, it released a document called “Understanding cybercrime: Phenomena, challenges and legal responses”. It embraced major topics of the subject, such as the challenges of fighting cybercrime, anti-cybercrime strategies and international and regional frameworks (ITU 2012). In 2013, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime also published a “Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime”, comprising many of aspects of that matter, like global connectivity, legislation and frameworks, law enforcement and investigations, electronic evidence and criminal justice, cybercrime prevention, etc (UNODC 2013). The analysis of past international actions to address cybercrime shed light on two main axes of disagreements among countries: the fora in which countries want to discuss such topic, whether regional or international, and the accurate definition of what the term cybercrime truly comprises. Southeast Asian countries strongly involved in the production of child pornography, for instance, may fear that international actions end up compromising their sovereignty and their right to combat such crimes by themselves. At the same time, they may feel more comfortable to discuss these problems in a regional level where their bargaining power would be more consistent. Heavy producers of intellectual goods, like developed countries, on the other hand, may be much more worried about the struggle against piracy and equivalent frauds which jeopardize their businesses. Since piracy takes place in a worldwide basis, developed countries shall attempt to regulate it in the international level.

13 Many of these binding regional frameworks were first developed as mere non-binding instruments within regional organizations. It is the case for the Commonwealth Model Laws on Computer and Computer-related Crime (2002) and Electronic Evidence (2002), the East African Community Draft Legal Framework for Cyberlaws (2008), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Cybersecurity Draft Model Bill (2011), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Model Law on Computer Crime and Cybercrime (2012) and the League of Arab States Model Law on Combating Information Technology Offences (2004). The ITU also made available Model Legislative Texts on Cybercrime, e-Crime and Electronic Evidence (2010) and a ITU/ Secretariat of the Pacific Community Model Law on Cybercrime (2011) (UNODC 2013, 64). 464 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

4 BLOC POSITIONS

According to Glickhouse (2013), in 2005, Argentina was one of the first countries in the continent to establish a Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT), a national bureau to respond to cybercrime. In 2008, it passed a cybercrime law, pointing out penalties for crimes like hacking, child pornography, illicit data interception, fraud, etc. Argentinian authorities have developed expertise to fight cybercrime, even working along with Chile and Spain on “Operation Unmask” to “uncover a transnational hacking ring that had brought down government sites in Chile and Colombia” (AS-COA 2013). Latin American countries, including Venezuela, took part of “Operation Historia” (2013), coordinated by Interpol’s bureau in Argentina, which targeted child pornography distributors online. The parliament of the Bolivarian Republic tightened internet rules in 2010, with a bill that bans online messages inciting hatred, or political and religious intolerance. Political opposition called the bill another step towards censorship, though (BBC 2010). The Australian industry daily suffers giant losses due to hack attacks to numerous Australian offshores. In 2011, the Commonwealth of Australia had more than four thousand businesses prejudiced by these offenses (Araujo Filho 2011). In order to reverse this situation, the country believes international cooperation is the key to solve this problem, since no Nation can handle fighting this type of crimes by their own. Cooperation with foreign agencies that fight against cybercrime is essential to gain larger access to information (AFP 2014), making it easier to investigate and identify actors of crimes committed inside the country. Internally, each Australian State and Territory has its own computer-related offences legislations that are similar to the Commonwealth legislation (AFP 2014). The fact that online banking systems are widely used in the Federative Republic of Brazil makes this activity even more attractive in the country, which is one of the biggest sources of banking Trojans (Bestuzhev 2014). In 2012, two laws against cybercrime became effective in Brazil: the “Azeredo Act” and the “Carolina Dieckmann Act” were signed into Federal Laws, amending and revising the Brazilian Penal Code. The first, defines crimes committed in the digital environment and via access to information technology devices; the latter, defines the counterfeiting of debit and credit cards as a criminal offense (Barreto; Brancher 2013). The unprecedented laws opened doors to the approval of the Brazilian Internet Bill of Civil Rights, in 2014. The Bill is appointed as a global reference for international legislation addressing global computer network (Martins 2014). In order to maintain the open nature of the network and based on the principles of ensuring net neutrality, freedom of expression and privacy of users (Congresso Nacional 2014) the law ensures the rights of users rather than simply criminalize actors. With more citizens gaining access to the Internet each day, Cambodia

465 World Summit on the Information Society Forum announced its first official law against cybercrime in 2012. Carlson (2014) says that, although the law was created in order to protect its users, the draft was written without the input of civil society and only after launched people realized it threatens to curb free speech. According to the author, this law belongs to a set of regulations that, despite called reforms, when examined in depth could prove to have a repressive nature. The question in the country is to what extent this law will be advantageous to Cambodian population and from what point it becomes an instrument of government repression (Burt 2014). In 2000, the Government of the Commonwealth of Canada submitted a report to all Ministers responsible for justice in the country entitled “A National Agenda to Combat Organized Crime”. The report recommended “lawful access” to national security agencies in order to investigate specific cases of serious crimes, such as drug trafficking, money laundering, child pornography, murder and terrorism (Royal Canadian Mounted Police 2014). The country is also signatory to the additional protocol to the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention concerning the criminalization of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems. Especially since the 1980’s, cybercrime has also caused serious damage to Chinese society. As cybercrimes in the economic field in the People’s Republic of China were happening more frequently, even reaching international scale, in 1994, the State Council issued its first law on computer crime. The amendments on the legislation of the country were growing, as well as China’s concerns about cyber security. In response to that, in 2001, the country submitted the “New China Criminal Legislations in the Progress of Harmonization of Criminal Legislation Against Cybercrime”, in order to try to diminish, identify and combat this type of illegal acts (Yong 2011). Egypt is also facing the threats cybercrime brings to businesses and individuals. Financial damage caused by malicious web attacks have become more frequent in the country, leading it to fight this kind of illegal acts (Olwan 2013). In 2007, the country was writing a legislation that would strengthen legal provision related to this type of crime (Council of Europe 2009). In the following year, however, the country got involved with other subjects and such efforts slowed down. Estonia is especially concerned about this issue. In April 2007, the country was the victim of large-scale attacks against its information systems. Banks, newspapers, agencies and all government websites were shut down all of a sudden. A politically motivated cyber attack was launched aiming to paralyze a country’s entire digital infrastructure (Ruus 2008). The episode achieved such a magnitude that, since then, it has been called the world’s first Cyber War. For the first time, a cyber threat became a real national security threat (Bagchi 2013). After the attacks, and in spite of them, Estonia emerged as a world leader in cyber security, creating the NATO Cooperative

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Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence, in order to provide cyber defense support to all members of the alliance (US Embassy 2010). In addition, Estonia has officially showed its support to the expansion, to as many countries as possible, of the Council of Europe’s activities in fighting cybercrime. The country states that cooperation is of vital importance in the prevention of the crime, since cyber security is a global concern (Estonia 2012). In addition to ratifying the Convention on Cybercrime, France is also a signatory and ratifying country of the Convention on the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (Council of Europe 2014b), condemning any pornographic material that visually depicts a person appearing to be a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct (Council of Europe 2014c). As well as France, Germany is also signatory of the Convention on Cybercrime of Budapest (Council of Europe 2014a). Due to the need of fighting cybercrime, Germany approved new laws in 2007, criminalizing a number of computer-related offenses that were not previously criminalized. Its main objectives were to denounce the misuse of devices and attacks that affect private computer (Gercke 2007), not only systems from companies and official institutions. The 2000’s Information Technology Act is the main legislation responsible for the misuse of computer and Internet in India. Cybercrime in the country is ruled by no exclusively dedicated legislation. Even though the country does have penalties for various types of cybercrime, as imprisonment and fines, India still must focus its further activities on the matter of law enforcement in order to achieve a substantive solution to the cyber problem (Council of Europe 2009). India also stands as a great condemning country of child pornography. The Islamic Republic of Iran is said to be increasingly using the virtual environment to monitor their population through network and use the cyber space as a tool to propagate and strengthen their governments (DiCYT 2011). The country has approved in 2009 a Computer Crimes Law. Noneheless, the cited Law is both ambiguous and dangerous, accused to violate human right laws and freedom of expression principles, being considered the latest apparatus of the Iranian censorship (Lafloufa 2013). Japan is one of the non-member States of the Council of Europe that ratified the Convention on Cybercrime (Council of Europe 2014a). In the Convention, Japan stressed its concerns about the misuse of devices, by being favorable to the prohibition of acts of unauthorized obtainment and storage of another person’s identification code, and acts that facilitate unauthorized computer access and threaten children’s protection against offenses occurred in this environment. Although the country signed the Convention in 2001, a legislation that fully implement the treaty is still pendent. The Federation of Malaysia considers cybercrime one of the most serious economic and national security challenges faced nowadays. Due to the threat

467 World Summit on the Information Society Forum represented by these type of crimes, the country created the “CyberSecurity Malaysia”, an agency that helps preventing or minimizing disruption to critical information (Malaysia 2014). Although successful, the agency still lacks on quantity of cyber security professionals, making the identification of these type of crimes much more difficult. Malaysia is still a big victim of e-commerce fraud and the borderless character of cyber space is another great challenge to be overcome (Dato’ 2014). According to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the country, together with Laos, are the only members of ASEAN that do not have specific cybercrime regulations. Laos, however, despite not having a specific substantive or procedural law related to the issue, is trying to implement an e-commerce act that may pave the way for a consistent legislation on cybercrime (Council of Europe, 2009). Mexico still has only a few substantive and procedural criminal legislation regarding this topic. Despite that, the Government of the country enforces the need to be careful when dealing with personal information, mainly when it touches upon the issue of free expression. It also stresses the importance of internet service providers to become more responsive to the problem of cybercrime. Mexico is also a country that should focus on elaborating a draft law on cybercrime and e-commerce (Council of Europe 2009). In 2006, the Kingdom of Norway also ratified the Convention on Cybercrime (Council of Europe 2014a). The country still does not have an effective national policy regarding the detection, prosecution and prevention of this type of offences. Nevertheless, Norwegian authorities give high priority to the discussion of serious cybercrimes, and, since 2007, the country has been working on a new penal code that could probably result in penal provisions on computer-related crimes (Council of Europe 2014c). Pakistan has done important investments in infrastructure development to increase telephone density and universalize access to the Internet. However, to fully exploit the opportunities of ICTs, the country still needs to develop capabilities to adapt, maintain and reconfigure existing technology to specific requirements (Khan 2006). The 2006’s Electronic Crime Bill was soon adopted by the country in the form of a Presidential Decree (Council of Europe 2009). The possibility of transforming this Bill into a proper law is a good opportunity to ensure its legislation is compatible with international standards. Over the years, cybercrime has caused companies to lose millions of dollars, and groups within the Russian Federation, together with China, are believed to be the source of over 50 percent of these types of malicious software. The number of incidents of attacks on Russian banks has more than doubled from 2009 to 2010 (Rifkind 2011). The fact that the country has not ratified the Convention on Cybercrime of Budapest (Council of Europe 2014a) just makes these internal cases more visible, stressing the importance of creating a legislation more punitive and

468 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations compatible with international standards. Spam messages, malwares and stealing of personal information are some of the most common offences faced by the Republic of Rwanda, which still lacks a strong cyber security system. Although the country has one of the lowest cyber threats worldwide, it does not neglect the importance of these offences and believes that setting early warning and sensitization to institutions and small and medium enterprises could help raising awareness and avoiding new threats to harm businesses (Nyesiga 2013). South Africa is another signatory country of the Convention on Cybercrime. Despite having signed it in 2001, the country has not ratified the document yet (Council of Europe 2014a). South Africa owns laws to prosecution and adjudication of cybercrime offenses. Experts point out that the ratification and full implementation of the Convention by South Africa would represent a great reference to other countries in southern Africa (Council of Europe 2009). Switzerland ratified the Budapest Convention in 2011. The Swiss Coordination Unit for Cybercrime Control (CYCO) raised concerns about online crime after a report showed that, in 2013, for the first time, economic crimes were more frequent than those related to child pornography (Swiss Info 2013). As a global financial hub, Swiss authorities worry about the fraud and unauthorized access crimes. These sorts of cybercrimes are even addressed in the Swiss Penal Code, according to Articles 143 (Unauthorized access to data processing system) and Article 144 (Damage to Data). Sweden is a signatory and ratifying country of the Convention of Budapest (Convention of Europe 2014a) and the Convention on the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (Council of Europe 2014b). As well as Sweden, Ukraine is also a ratifying member of both documents (Council of Europe 2014a). However, the latter country, despite having ratified the Convention on Cybercrime in 2006, still has not fully implemented some of its provisions. One of the main reasons is the fact that the country still faces difficulties in the relationship between law enforcement and Internet service providers (Council of Europe 2009). The United Kingdom and the United States of America are also ratifying countries of the Convention of Budapest (Council of Europe 2014a). The first, when it comes to guaranteeing cyber security, defends the extension of extra-territorial jurisdiction over a variety of offenses contained in the document. Lately, the issue that concerns UK the most is the protection of children from harmful material on the Internet, such as online pornography, abusing images and cyber-bullying (Parliament UK 2014). The latter stands out for making so many reservations in the Resolution achieved by the Convention. The reservations are mostly related to the infringement of copyright and related rights and misuse of devices (Council of Europe 2014c). Cybercrime is one of the greatest threats facing the USA, what arouses the country’s attention for national security. Since 9/11 attacks to the World Trade Centre and Pentagon and the consequent dissemination of the idea that Internet

469 World Summit on the Information Society Forum provides several advantages for terrorists that are not found in the physical world, the fight against cybercrime and terrorism have evolved together (Chargualarf Jr. 2008). This joint work has been really advantageous for the country, as it achieves significant results when fighting both types of offenses. According to the FBI, the key priorities of the US Government are combating computer networks intrusions, identity theft and fraud (FBI 2014). When it comes to cyber security, the Oriental Republic of Uruguay is especially concerned about inter-State espionage and to what extent it is or is not considered a type of cybercrime, since these activities may involve invading and altering the lives of nations and persons (Aguerre; Baldomi 2009). Despite its concerns, at present, there is a lack of legislation regulating cybercrimes in Uruguay. Although several cyber laws have been presented to parliament, once proposed, they are ignored and disregarded (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2013). Uruguay has also not ratified the Convention on Cybercrime (Council of Europe 2014a).

QUESTIONS TO PONDER

1. In what extent is cybercrime different from other types of crimes and how does it affect the measures to combat it? 2. How can governments, IGOs, NGOs and private companies work together in order to address cybercrime? What are the main difficulties faced during this process? 3. If cybercrime comprises many sorts of crime (child pornography, fraud, money laundry etc.), should all of these abuses be addressed together by international regulations, or should international community address them separately? 4. What is the relationship between developed and developing countries in the fight against cybercrime? How developing countries, despite not having access to all features of information control that developed countries do, can equally protect their population from this type of crime? 5. How can the WSIS Forum prevent States from neglecting the impact of cybercrime on its population? Is it posible to force States to adopt a more strict legislation regarding this topic? 6. How is it possible to regulate cybercrime without harming the population’s access to the network and to information?

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REFERENCES

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Bestuzhev, Dmitry. Brazil: a country rich in banking Trojans. In: . Accessed June 07, 2014. Burt, Chris. Proposed Cambodian Cybercrime Law Challenges Free Speech Online. 2014. Disponível em: . Acesso em: 07 jun. 2014. Canabarro, Diego Rafael, and Thiago Borne. “Ciberespaço e Internet: Implicações Conceituais para os Estudos de Segurança, por Diego Rafael Canabarro e Thiago Borne.” Mundorama, January 19, 2013. Carlson, Kimberly. Cambodia’s Draft Law Turns Free Speech into Cybercrime. 2014. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/05/cambodian-cybercrime-draft-law- threatens-freedom-expression-online (accessed August 25, 2014). CERT Coordination Center. “Overview of Attack Trends.” Pittsburgh, 2003, CERT Coordination Center. Chargualaf Jr., Joseph. Terrorism and Cybercrime. 2008. https://www.google.com. br/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CD EQFjAC&url=http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=706659&ei=Qdn7U7GfDMqc8 QH5koD4Cg&usg=AFQjCNGAKr6NtQKZyQD6Rs86TzSncISfcA&sig2=wW CX90DnHu2GWUKg5CU3Kg (accessed August 25, 2014). Chang, Weiping, Wingyan Chung, Hsinchun Chen, and Shihchieh Chau. An International Perspective on Fighting Cybercrime. Berlin: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2003. Chinov, Mike. Aid workers decry growing child-sex trade in Cambodia. September 14, 2000. Choo , Kim-Kwang Raymond , and Peter Grabosky . “Cyber Crime.” In Oxford Handbook of Organized Crime, by L. Paoli. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Choo, Kim-Kwang Raymond. “Zombies and botnets.” Trends and Issues in crime and criminal justice, March 2007: 6. CNN. South Korea’s ‘Best of the Best’ tackle cyber crime. January 14, 2013. http:// edition.cnn.com/2013/01/14/world/asia/south-korea-hackers (accessed June 21, 2014). Congresso Nacional (Brasil). Projeto de Lei: Marco Civil. In: . Accessed June 07, 2014. Council of Europe. Action against economic crime. 2014. http://www.coe.int/t/ DGHL/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/default_en.asp (acesso em 2014).

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Council of Europe. Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse. 2014b. In: < http://conventions.coe. int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=201&CM=7&DF=08/06/2014&CL= ENG>. Accessed June 09, 2014. Council of Europe. List of declarations made with respect to treaty No. 185. 2014c. In: . Accessed June 08, 2014. Council of Europe. Convention on Cybercrime: Member and Non-Member States of the Council of Europe. 2014a. In: . Accessed June 08, 2014. Council of Europe. Project on Cybercrime: Final Report. 2009. In: . Accessed June 08, 2014. Dato’, Mahfuz Bin. Cybercrime: Malaysia. 2014. http://www.skmm.gov.my/ skmmgovmy/media/General/pdf/DSP-Mahfuz-Majid-Cybercrime-Malaysia.pdf (accessed August 26, 2014). Deibert, Ronal. Black Code: Inside the Battle for Cyberspace. Toronto: Signal, 2013. DiCYT. Hackativismo: crime cibernético ou legítima manifestação digital? 2011. http:// www.dicyt.com/noticia/hackativismo-crime-cibernetico-ou-legitima-manifestacao- digital (accessed August 25, 2014). Dunn Cavelty, Myriam. The Militarisation of Cyber Security as a Source of Global Tension February 1, 2012. Strategic Trends Analysis, Zurich, Möckli, Daniel, Wenger, Andreas, eds., Center for Security Studies, 2012. SSRN: http://ssrn.com/ abstract=2007043 (accessed July 28, 2014). Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). “International cooperation in the prevention, investigation, prosecution and punishment of economic fraud and identity related -crime.” ECOSOC Resolution. New York: United Nations, July 30, 2009. —. “Strengthening international cooperation in combating transnational organized crime in all its forms and manifestations.” ECOSOC Resolution. New York: United Nations, September 17, 2012. Estonia. Spokesperson’s Office. Estonia Supports Council of Europe’s Fight Against Cybercrime. 2012. In: . Accessed June 08, 2014. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Cyber Crime in Depth. 2014. In: < http://

473 World Summit on the Information Society Forum www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/cyber>. Accessed June 10, 2014. Ferreira, Barreto; Brancher. Internet Law Acts defining cybercrime offenses in Brazil are signed into law. 2013. In: . Accessed June 23, 2014. Finkelhor, David, Janis Wolak, and Kimberley Mitchell. “Online Victimization: A Report of the Nation’s Youth.” National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, Washington DC, 2000. Gercke, Marco. Interview: Germany and new cybercrime law. 2007. In: . Accessed June 08, 2014. Google. “Cybercriminal activity.” Last modified December 6, 2005. ALAGANANDAM, Hemavathy. Cybercrinal Activity: Systems and Networking: The Evolution of Cybercrime. Accessed April 29, 2014. http://sysnet.ucsd. edu/~cfleizac/WhiteTeam-CyberCrime.pdf. Hughes, Donna. “Sexual Exploitation and the Internet in Cambodia.” Journal of Sexual Aggression, 2003: 6-23. International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Understanding cybercrime: Phenomena,challenges and legal response . Geneve: ITU , 2012. Inter-Parliamentary Union (Uruguay). Consideration of Requests for the Inclusion of an Emergency Item in the Assembly Agenda. 2013. http://www.ipu.org/conf-e/130/ emrg1.pdf (accessed August 26, 2014). Khadam, Nadia. “Insight to Cybercrime.” PhD diss., Hanyang University Seoul, 2012. Kuehl, Dan. “From Cyberspace to Cyberpower: Defining the Problem.” In Cyberpower and National Security, by Franklin Kramer, Stuart Starr and Lerry Wentz, 664. Washington: National Defense University Press, 2009. Kurose, James, and Keith Ross. Redes de Computador e a Internet: Uma Abordagem Top-Down. São Paulo: Addison Wesley, 2010. Lafloufa, Jacqueline. Computer Crimes in Iran: Online Repression in Practice. 2013. http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/37385/en/computer-crimes-in- iran:-online-repression-in-practice (accessed August 25, 2014). Malaysia. CyberSecurity. Corporate Overview. 2014. http://www.cybersecurity.my/ en/index.html (accessed August 25, 2014). Mankoff, John. Malware Aimed at Iran Hit Five Sites, Report Says. New York Times. New York, February 11, 2011.

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Markoff, John, and Ashlee Vance. Fearing Hackers Who Leave No Trace. New York, January 19, 2010. Martins, Helena. Entenda o Marco Civil da Internet. 2014. http://www.ebc.com. br/noticias/brasil/2014/04/entenda-o-marco-civil-da-internet (accessed August 25, 2014). Mazoni, Ana Carolina. “Crimes na Internet e a Convenção de Budapeste.” Centro Universitário de Brasília, 2009. Mazoni, Ana Carolina. “Crimes na Internet e a Convenção de Budapeste.” Bach. Diss., Centro Universitário de Brasília, 2009. McQuade, Samuel. “Cybercrime.” In The Oxford Handbook of Crime and Public Policy, by Michael Tonry. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. —. Encyclopedia of Cybercrime. London: Greenwood Press, 2008. McQuade, Samuel, and Neel Sampat. Survey on Internet and At-Risk Behaviors. Rochester: Rochester Institute of Technology Libraries, 2008. Nyesiga, Dias. Rwanda Warned On Cyber Crime. 2013. http://allafrica.com/ stories/201305062241.html (accessed August 25, 2014). Olwan, Remi. Cybercrime threatens Egyptian businesses and individuals. 2013. In: . Accessed June 8, 2014. O’Murchu, Liam , Eric Chien, and Nicolas Falliere. W32 Stuxnet Dossier: Version 1.3. Dossier, Cupertino: Symantec, 2010. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. The Economic Impact of Counterfeiting and Piracy. Technical Report, Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2007. Parliament UK. Internet and Cybercrime. 2014. In: < http://www.parliament.uk/ topics/Internet-and-cybercrime.htm>. Accessed June 10, 2014. PP International. About the PPI. December 30, 2009. http://www.pp-international. net/about (accessed August 8, 2014). Reporters without Borders. United Arab Emirates: Tracking “cyber-criminals”. March 11, 2014. http://12mars.rsf.org/2014-en/2014/03/11/united-arab-emirates- tracking-cyber-criminals/ (accessed June 2014). Rifkind, Jarrod. Cybercrime in Russia. 2011. In: . Accessed June 09, 2014. Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Technological Crimes – Canadian Legal Instruments:

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UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations ISSN: 2318-3195 | v.2, 2014| p. 479-529

A PRESENÇA DE POTÊNCIAS EXTRARREGIONAIS COMO AMEAÇA À MANUTENÇÃO DA ZONA DE PAZ E COOPERAÇÃO

Jéssica da Silva Höring1 Leonardo Weber2 Marília Bernardes Closs3 RESUMO

A Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul, criada em 1986, tem o objetivo de garantir a manutenção da paz e cooperação nesta região. No tópico A será discutida a presença de potências extrarregionais no Atlântico Sul e as consequências disso para a Zona de Paz e Cooperação. Mais especificamente, será debatida a presença da Inglaterra, da França e dos Estados Unidos no Atlântico Sul. Em especial, serão discutidas as implicações disso para o exercício da soberania pelos países costeiros, tendo em vista a importância estratégica dessa região para os interesses de diversos Estados, seja por seus recursos ener- géticos e minerais, pelas rotas marítimas, ou pelos arranjos de cooperação que vem surgindo nesse espaço sul-atlântico. Frente à nova dimensão estratégica que o Atlântico Sul tem tido nos últimos anos, cabe ao Encontro Ministerial da ZOPACAS discutir quais medidas devem ser tomadas pelos Estados membros para fortalecer os mecanismos de cooperação regional.

1 Aluna do oitavo semestre do curso de Relações Internacionais da UFRGS. E-mail: [email protected] 2 Aluno do oitavo semestre do curso de Relações Internacionais da UFRGS. E-mail: [email protected] 3 Aluna do oitavo semestre do curso de Relações Internacionais da UFRGS. E-mail: [email protected] Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul

1 ANTECEDENTES HISTÓRICOS

1.1 A EXPANSÃO MARÍTIMA EUROPEIA E O TRÁFICO NEGREIRO

O Atlântico Sul, e os oceanos de modo geral, tiveram sua importância geo- política gradualmente potencializada a partir da expansão ultramarina europeia no século XV. A formação precoce do Estado português, em comparação com os outros países do continente, colocá-lo-ia na dianteira das rotas marítimas mundiais. Inicialmente motivado pelo objetivo de contornar a África e estabelecer uma comunicação anual entre Lisboa e Goa, na Índia, Portugal criou entrepostos para fins comerciais e de defesa na costa ocidental do continente africano. A vitória portuguesa sobre os Otomanos na Batalha de Diu, em 1509, assegurou o domínio luso sobre essa rota. Ao longo do século XVI, a projeção naval portuguesa foi expandida até o Extremo Oriente, passando pelos estreitos de Málaca e chegando a Pequim (Penha 2011, 29). As ilhas meso-oceânicas do Atlântico Sul tiveram importante papel logístico na manutenção da chamada “Rota das Índias” controlada por Portugal. Usando inicialmente os arquipélagos de Madeira e Açores, Portugal avançaria também para as ilhas de Tristão da Cunha, Ascensão, Santa Helena, e para o arquipélago de Cabo Verde. Esses pontos eram usados como plataformas dos descobrimentos e tinham a função de parada e abastecimento dos navios (Penha 2011, 29). Após a descoberta do Brasil, o controle luso do Atlântico Sul seria sedi- mentado através do tráfico de escravos entre os dois lados do oceano. O uso de mão de obra africana na colonização do Brasil iniciou-se em 1554, seguido pelo estabelecimento do exclusivo comercial de 1580, que garantiu o monopólio do comércio colonial a Portugal, principalmente do tráfico de escravos. Protestando contra as leis portuguesas, a Holanda criou a Companhia das Índias Ocidentais e a tese do mare liberum, a qual defendia a livre navegação dos mares (Moraes 2014, 241). Além disso, os batavos invadiram o Nordeste brasileiro em 1624, as ilhas sul atlânticas em 1633 e Angola em 1641. A gradual ascensão naval holandesa teria forte impacto na supremacia marítima de Portugal, pois lhe tomou também suas posições nas bases de Java, Sumatra e Málaca. Após a retomada do Nordeste e de Angola em 1648 e 1654, respectivamente, Portugal teria de restringir sua presença ao Atlântico Sul (Penha 2011, 30-32). Ciente de seu declínio na segunda metade do século XVII, o governo português buscaria evitar sua derrocada completa através da associação com outra potência, a ascendente Inglaterra. A aliança luso-britânica foi motivada pela necessidade de Portugal assegurar sua independência frente à Espanha, que dominou toda a península durante a União Ibérica (1580-1640). Além disso, é possível relacionar o domínio espanhol com o fim da supremacia naval portu-

480 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations guesa. A Espanha não soube utilizar a engenhosidade da marinha de Portugal demonstrada desde a Batalha de Diu, e acabou derrotada pela Inglaterra em 1588, na campanha da Invencível Armada. Separado novamente da Espanha, Portugal fez acordos comerciais com os ingleses e cedeu enclaves na Índia e na África em troca de proteção. O eixo central dessa aliança girava em torno do comércio de escravos africanos, por um lado, e das manufaturas inglesas, de outro (Penha 2011, 34). Conquanto a associação com a Inglaterra tenha retardado a decadência portuguesa, transformações partindo das colônias ao longo do século XVIII per- turbariam a estabilidade do comércio atlântico. Embora a demanda brasileira por escravos estivesse normalmente concentrada nas regiões produtoras de açúcar, o início das atividades mineradoras, seguido por movimentos de contestação na Costa da Mina4 africana, somariam as condições para gerar interesses contrários ao domínio português nos dois lados do Atlântico. No Brasil, os grupos ligados ao tráfico negreiro passavam a controlar tal atividade usando seus próprios navios, sem a necessidade de recorrer à marinha portuguesa. Apesar de Portugal ter respondido a isso com a criação de companhias destinadas a redirecionarem os fluxos comerciais, o país não obteve sucesso. Assim, fortaleceram-se os laços diretos entre as colônias portuguesas, notadamente entre a Bahia e o Golfo da Guiné, e entre o Rio de Janeiro e Angola (Penha, 2011 37-38). O estreitamento econômico e político entre a África e o Brasil foi potencial- izado com a transposição da Corte portuguesa para o Rio de Janeiro em 1808, resultado da invasão napoleônica a Portugal. Se as relações atlânticas já estavam se tornando autônomas, elas ganharam status político e jurídico quando o Brasil foi declarado Reino Unido a Portugal e Algarves, tornando-se o centro de todo o império. A breve, mas definidora, experiência do Brasil como metrópole de todas as colônias portuguesas daria estatuto de realidade ao projeto de D. Pedro I de, após a independência, construir um império que unisse as duas margens do Atlântico, assentado em uma monarquia escravagista, sediada no Rio de Janeiro (Penha 2011, 52). Entretanto, como o Brasil independente priorizou o reconhecimento internacional do governo, teve de abdicar dessa possibilidade. Portugal obviamente desejava manter suas antigas colônias africanas, enquanto a Inglaterra trataria de forçar a ruptura dos laços entre Brasil e África ao longo do século XIX. Por isso, o acordo de independência com Portugal, mediado pela Inglaterra, con- tinha uma cláusula na qual o Brasil comprometia-se a negar as propostas de união política vindas das colônias africanas, notadamente Angola, onde as elites tinham profunda identificação com seus pares brasileiros (Penha 2011, 56).

4 A Costa da Mina corresponde à região do Golfo da Guiné, o qual forneceu grande parte dos escravos destinados ao continente americano. Atualmente, os países que ocupam a região são Gana, Togo, Benim e Nigéria. 481 Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul

Paralelamente às independências latino-americanas, os Estados Unidos iniciavam sua projeção política sobre o hemisfério ocidental, anunciando unilat- eralmente a Doutrina Monroe, em 1823. Embora contivesse, inicialmente, um conteúdo ético em defesa da autodeterminação dos povos e da não intervenção nos novos Estados, a Doutrina ganharia contorno diferente no fim do século. Em adição às intervenções que já vinham sendo feitas pelos Estados Unidos na América Central e no Caribe, o Corolário Roosevelt, de 1904, imprimiu novo tom à Política Externa Estadunidense, visando a legitimar a ingerência em tais países quando julgasse necessário (Bandeira 2008, 2-4).

1.2 O IMPERIALISMO NA ÁFRICA E A MARGINALIZAÇÃO DO ATLÂNTICO SUL

Ao reordenamento das relações internacionais europeias após o fim das Guerras Napoleônicas seguiu-se a construção e a consolidação do império global britânico. O desenvolvimento da indústria naval e a invenção da energia a vapor requereram bases para o abastecimento de carvão da marinha britânica. Para isso, a Inglaterra empreendeu a tomada das ilhas mesoatlânticas que haviam pertencido a Portugal e estavam nas mãos dos holandeses, assim como as ilhas Malvinas, em 1833, embora a Argentina já houvesse declarado soberania sobre elas após a independência da Espanha (Penha 2011, 45). A outra forma de estabelecer sua supremacia naval foi através do desmantelamento do tráfego comercial entre os dois lados do Atlântico Sul. Via pressão diplomática e gradual endurecimento das políticas contra o tráfico de escravos, a Inglaterra conseguiu fazer com que o Império Brasileiro extinguisse tal comércio em 1850 com a lei Eusébio de Queiroz. Esse ato marcou a ruptura das relações do Brasil com a África, que só seriam retomadas mais de um século depois, com a Política Externa Independente de Jânio Quadros, em 1961. O avanço europeu sobre o interior do continente africano nas últimas décadas do século XIX marcaria o domínio das potências imperialistas sobre o território, especialmente França e Inglaterra. Até meados do século, a presença europeia havia se limitado a pontos estratégicos do litoral. Além disso, com a construção do Canal de Suez em 1869, e do Panamá em 1914, o Atlântico Sul sofreria uma forte marginalização, visto que ambos provocaram um desvio volumoso do fluxo de comércio que antes passava pela parte austral do Atlântico (Penha 2011, 63-64). Parte deste esvaziamento estratégico seria revertida, quando, durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial, o Atlântico Sul desempenharia papel importante no esforço de guerra e na logística dos Aliados. O saliente nordestino do Brasil e a formação da ponte aérea Natal-Dacar para o envio de suprimentos aos princi-

482 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations pais teatros de guerra deram ao governo brasileiro poder de barganha durante o conflito, devido à sua importância estratégica (Moura 1980, 93). Ainda no contexto de guerra, foi criada a IV Frota da Marinha dos Estados Unidos, em 1943, para operações específicas na parte sul do oceano. Os aviões da IV Frota, fundeada em Recife, patrulhavam a região compreendida entre o Nordeste Brasileiro e a África de modo a identificar submarinos inimigos ou navios fura- dores do bloqueio contra o Eixo (Bandeira 2008, 4). Entretanto, essa revalori- zação do Atlântico Sul foi bastante fugaz e esgotou-se junto com a guerra. Parte disso se mostra na desmobilização da IV Frota, em 1950, e sua absorção pela II Frota, que opera no Atlântico Norte. De todo modo, o conflito abalaria irrever- sivelmente os impérios europeus no continente africano.

1.3 A GUERRA FRIA E O SURGIMENTO DE POLÍTICAS DE PODER REGIONAL

A relativa decadência europeia, diante da ascensão de EUA e URSS, ambos anticolonialistas, seria o palco da reordenação das relações sul atlânticas. Nesse contexto pós-conflito é que foi processada a descolonização africana, sendo que a maior parte das independências ocorreu entre o fim da década de 1950 e o início da década de 1960. Enquanto a Inglaterra manteve um perfil mais baixo durante e após a perda de suas possessões coloniais, a França reagiu intervindo nas lutas de libertação nacional. Ambas as nações continuariam influenciando os rumos do continente através de um sistema de dependência neocolonial (Visentini 2013, 124-125). A França foi mais bem-sucedida em fazer da África uma fonte de recursos, sendo que os laços entre o país e o continente vêm permanecendo independente do governo, num esquema que pode ser chamado de Françafrique, como sugerido por Verschave (2004). A relativa facilidade com que a França conseguiu renovar tais laços decorreu, em parte, do baixo interesse das duas superpotências no continente africano durante a Guerra Fria. Entretanto, especialmente ao longo da década de 1970, haveria espaço para que se desenvolvessem concepções estraté- gicas autônomas por parte dos países costeiros. A África do Sul, por sua vez, mantinha-se como aliado principal do ocidente na África Austral e no controle da Rota do Cabo, dividindo os oceanos Atlântico e Índico. O Partido Nacional Africânder, que tomou o poder em 1948, desejava maior autonomia para a marinha sul-africana e a devolução da base naval de Simonstown, sob controle inglês. Como a Inglaterra não cedeu livremente às intenções da África do Sul, o resultado das negociações foi a expansão e mod- ernização da marinha sob forte dependência de equipamentos britânicos. Além disso, foi assinado o Acordo de Simonstown, em 1955, que criou um comando unificado, o South Atlantic Command, liderado por uma autoridade britânica e

483 Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul destinado a proteger a África Austral (Fiori 2012, 153). Em busca de capitalizar maior legitimidade para seu governo, a África do Sul passou a defender a cria- ção de uma organização mais ampla que a de Simonstown e que englobasse os Estados Unidos e os vizinhos sul-americanos na contenção ao comunismo. Foi nesse sentido que iniciou visitas aos governos militares da América do Sul em 1967, para articulação da proposta da Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Sul (OTAS). Entretanto, uma ameaça soviética nessa região parecia alarmista nesse momento, mesmo aos olhos ocidentais, e só ganharia força com as independên- cias das colônias portuguesas. Outro país de importância continental, a Nigéria obteve sua independên- cia da Inglaterra em 1960 e enfrentou a tentativa de secessão da região de Biafra em uma guerra civil que durou de 1967 a 1970. Vitoriosa no conflito e cercada de ex-colônias francesas, a Nigéria logrou construir uma política externa bastante ativa e de liderança no mundo negro. Além de capitanear a integração de sua região através da criação da Comunidade Econômica dos Estados da África Ocidental (CEDEAO), a Nigéria teve papel importante no isolamento diplomático da África do Sul do apartheid (Oliveira 2012, 93). Foi também de iniciativa nigeriana a contraposição ao projeto da OTAS e a sugestão de uma organização de caráter regional para o Atlântico Sul, a qual seria absorvida pela diplomacia brasileira. Ao final da década de 1970, o ativismo externo da Nigéria tinha um discurso que minimizava a ameaça soviética, apontando para o rac- ismo sul-africano como mal maior do continente. O país também defendia que o único eixo possível de uma organização para o Atlântico Sul era aquele que passava por Brasil, Nigéria e Angola (Penha 2011, 185). Quanto ao Brasil, este construíra, desde a Segunda Guerra Mundial, um pensamento naval subordinado à estratégia global dos Estados Unidos e ao papel que tinha na defesa contra os submarinos soviéticos no Atlântico Sul (Silva 2014, 206). Entretanto, o Brasil foi sempre cauteloso quanto à possibilidade de acordos militares fora do Tratado Interamericano de Assistência Recíproca (TIAR) e, por isso, nunca demonstrou grande interesse pela ideia da OTAS. Ademais, o regime militar brasileiro estava gradualmente construindo, desde fins da década de 1960, uma política externa voltada para a África, cujo símbolo maior foi o reconhecimento dos regimes marxistas independentes em Angola e Moçambique, por parte do presidente Ernesto Geisel em 1975. Por isso, a opção de integrar uma organização junto à África do Sul do apartheid mostrava-se com um custo estratégico e político muito alto. Embora a diplomacia e a estratégia brasileiras não dessem atenção maior às questões marítimas do país, o Atlântico Sul foi sempre considerado importante, como exemplifica a chamada “Guerra da Lagosta”. Esta foi um conflito diplomático entre Brasil e França envolvendo a pesca do crustáceo na costa nor-

484 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations deste do país na primeira metade da década de 1960, especialmente no governo de João Goulart. A negativa brasileira em aceitar a presença de navios franceses na região, seguida de apresamentos feitos pela Marinha de Guerra do Brasil, levaram ao envio de belonaves francesas à costa brasileira (Lessa 1999, 116). Embora tenha sido resolvida sem conflito real, a Guerra da Lagosta demonstra uma antiga prerrogativa brasileira de não aceitar a livre presença estrangeira em sua plataforma continental. Como o Brasil manteve uma postura moderada quanto à OTAS, era a Argentina o principal defensor sul-americano de uma cooperação militar naval nos moldes propostos pela África do Sul. Após o fim do governo de Juan Perón, em 1974, houve aumento das preocupações geopolíticas argentinas em sua pauta de política externa. As preocupações estavam centradas na divergência com o Brasil sobre a construção da hidrelétrica de Itaipu, na disputa com o Chile sobre o Canal de Beagle e na reivindicação frente à Inglaterra pelas ilhas Malvinas. Estes três temas recolocaram a importância estratégica do Atlântico Sul para a Argentina, que desejava constituir um triângulo de ação Prata-Malvinas-Beagle, mantendo-se como potência na bacia platina, assim como controlar a rota do Cabo Horn e con- solidar sua projeção sobre a Antártida (Penha, 2011, 136). Com a relativa aproxi- mação entre Brasil e Argentina, decorrente do Acordo Tripartite Itaipu-Corpus, em 1979, a OTAS passou a ser vista menos como uma iniciativa para neutralizar o Brasil, e mais como uma forma de projeção dos interesses argentinos sob um esquema securitário mais amplo (Penha 2011, 136-137). De todo modo, foi a aproximação União Soviética com as colônias portuguesas independentes que reacendeu as preocupações ocidentais sobre o Atlântico Sul, visto que a URSS passou a ter bases permanentes na Guiné Bissau, Cabo Verde, Angola e Moçambique (Penha 2011, 85-86). Ademais, alguns anos antes, em 1967, o fechamento do Canal de Suez pelos países árabes durante a Guerra dos Seis Dias havia relembrado aos países ocidentais da importância da Rota do Cabo para o comércio de petróleo. Essa sucessão de eventos deu credibilidade à ideia defendida pela África do Sul de uso do oceano como forma de contenção ao comunismo. Além disso, o governo de Ronald Reagan, empos- sado em 1981, reafirmaria a importância do Atlântico Sul e defenderia a criação da OTAS, a modernização das marinhas regionais e venda de armas aos países aliados (Penha 2011, 181). A organização seria uma forma de fundir o TIAR com o Acordo de Simonstown, dentro do contexto de retomada da rivalidade da Guerra Fria. Entretanto, o impulso dado à criação da OTAS seria neutralizado pelo ponto de inflexão representado pela Guerra das Malvinas, em 1982. 1.4 A GUERRA DAS MALVINAS E A CRIAÇÃO DA ZONA DE PAZ E COOPERAÇÃO DO ATLÂNTICO SUL (ZOPACAS)

485 Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul

O curto, mas definidor conflito envolvendo a Argentina e a Inglaterra pela posse das ilhas Malvinas remete a uma longa disputa militar e diplomática de mais de um século entre os dois países. O arquipélago das Malvinas é constituído por duas ilhas principais, Soledad e Gran Malvina, e aproximadamente outras 700 ilhas menores e rochedos. Os franceses foram os primeiros a estabelecer um assentamento no arquipélago, em 1764 mas, por contestação espanhola, repas- saram o direito sobre as ilhas à Espanha em 1767. Em 1765, um ano após a chegada dos franceses, o inglês John Byron chegou às ilhas e, em nome do Rei da Inglaterra, declarou soberania sobre esses territórios. Após negociações entre Espanha e Inglaterra, acordou-se que os britânicos poderiam permanecer em Port Egmond, ao mesmo tempo em que esta restituição não afetaria o direito de soberania da Espanha sobre o arquipélago. A Espanha repassou o domínio do arquipélago a Buenos Aires, em 1820. Contudo, em decorrência de uma série de crises entre os EUA e a Argentina, em dezembro de 1831 os Estados Unidos atacaram as ilhas, e, sob esta conjuntura, em 1833 o comandante britânico James Onslow chegou a Puerto Soledad, expulsou os poucos colonos argentinos que ainda se faziam presentes na região, e iniciou a colonização britânica nas ilhas. Desde então, a Argentina reivindica seu direito sobre as ilhas Malvinas, além de uma série de outros territórios: a Antártica, as ilhas Geórgia do Sul, Sandwich do Sul, Ilhas Orcadas do Sul, e as Ilhas Shetland do Sul (Hope 1983; Coconi 2007). A disputa entre os dois países permaneceu no âmbito diplomático até a década de 1980. Com a decadência do regime militar argentino, sob o governo do general Galtieri, julgou-se que a retomada das ilhas revitalizaria o apoio popular ao governo. Além disso, a Argentina cometeu os erros de supor que a Inglaterra não responderia militarmente à invasão e de que os EUA priorizariam o TIAR e dariam suporte à Argentina (Penha 2011, 140). Com a posterior derrota na guerra e a desilusão com os EUA e com a África do Sul, a qual disponibilizou a base naval de Simonstown à Inglaterra, a Argentina abandonou a ideia da OTAS. O conflito expôs as insuficiências das capacidades militares dos países da região, especialmente as aeronavais, e impulsionou a aproximação entre Brasil e Argentina (Penha 2011, 140-141). Dessa forma, o Brasil encaminhou à Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas a proposta de criação de uma Zona de Paz e Cooperação no Atlântico Sul, em 1985, que contou com oposição estadunidense e sul-africana. Coube à Nigéria a articulação política em torno da proposta do lado africano, e esta teve sucesso em sua aprovação, também pelo apoio dos aliados sul-americanos, inclusive da Argentina. A ideia materializou-se na resolução n. 41/11 da ONU, em 1986. Centrada nos objetivos de afastar a confrontação militar, a presença de armas nucleares e a construção de bases estrangeiras na região, a resolução também pedia aos países costeiros o respeito aos princípios de não intervenção, soberania e

486 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations integridade territorial (Penha 2011, 187). Desde sua criação, em 1986, seguiram-se sete Reuniões Ministeriais da ZOPACAS: no Rio de Janeiro (1988), em Abuja (1990), em Brasília (1994), em Somerset West (1996), em Buenos Aires (1998), em Luanda (2007) e em Montevidéu (2013). A Reunião de 1990 contou com a entrada da Namíbia, e a de 1994, com a da África do Sul redemocratizada, totalizando 24 membros. Ao longo da década de 1990, embora tenham ocorrido várias reuniões, a ZOPACAS assistiu a certo esvaziamento. Parte disso resultou do fim da Guerra Fria e da amenização do motivo que levara à sua criação, a militarização externa. O governo de Itamar Franco, no Brasil, buscou relançar a ZOPACAS, tanto como forma de auxiliar a pacificação de Angola, ainda em guerra civil, como para direcionar a cooperação num sentido voltado também ao desenvolvimento socioeconômico (Hirst; Pinheiro 1995, 19). Desde o fim da década de 1990, a ZOPACAS ficou cerca de dez anos sem Reuniões Ministeriais. A revitalização recente da organização deu-se através da Iniciativa de Luanda, uma série de colóquios sobre questões de interesse comum lançada por Angola no ano de 2007, culminando na VI Reunião, em sua capital. Assumindo a presidência, Angola defendeu a conciliação do caráter biológico- geográfico do Atlântico Sul com sua face geoestratégica, ou seja, Angola desejava dar ao grupo um contorno mais securitário (José 2011, 242).

2 APRESENTAÇÃO DO PROBLEMA

2.1 A IMPORTÂNCIA ESTRATÉGICA DO ATLÂNTICO SUL

O Atlântico Sul vem ganhando espaço no cenário político internacional, em razão de uma série de motivos de ordem política, econômica e estratégica que serão explicitados ao longo deste artigo. Das diversas formulações existentes para a delimitação da Bacia do Atlântico Sul, conjugou-se aqui o conceito apli- cado por Penha (2011, 17), tal seja o de um Atlântico Sul enquanto construção histórica, e a demarcação geográfica proposta por Therezinha de Castro (1999, 19). O Atlântico Sul é assim compreendido como um espaço marítimo geográf- ico que abarca três frentes continentais – América, África e Antártida – e três cor- redores estratégicos – ao norte, a zona Natal-Dakar, e, ao sul, entre a Antártida e o continente africano, a Rota do Cabo, e entre a Antártida e a América do Sul, a Passagem de Drake –, onde, historicamente, ocorreram importantes fluxos econômicos e culturais e cujos contornos políticos dependem sempre do relacionamento entre os países que compõem suas margens africana e sul-americana. Neste sentido, esta bacia é compreendida, em seu limite norte, desde uma linha

487 Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul que tem início no Amapá, no Brasil, até a Mauritânia, no continente africano contornando o arquipélago de Cabo Verde, e que se estende ao sul até o paralelo 60°, de acordo com o Tratado da Antártida. No início do século XXI fica claro um processo de alargamento nas relações entre os países que compõem o Atlântico Sul. De acordo com Saraiva (2012, 13), este decurso simboliza o “mediterranismo” Sul-Atlântico, isto é, o encurtamento das distâncias que lhe é conferido pela dinâmica de solidariedade e cooperação sul- sul. A emergência de novos polos de poder no Sistema Internacional, o processo de democratização no continente africano, a descoberta de importantes recursos minerais e energéticos nas duas margens do Atlântico Sul e a importância potencializada das rotas comerciais e estratégicas, em alternativa às passagens oceânicas convencionais, foram fatores que marcaram a reinserção do Atlântico Sul no cál- culo estratégico das relações internacionais5. Destarte, esse movimento de forças no Sistema Internacional requer uma investigação dos aspectos geopolíticos, geo- econômicos e geoestratégicos da Bacia do Atlântico Sul. O Atlântico Sul, além de ser o elo entre a África e a América do Sul, também facilita o contato entre estes países e o continente asiático, através do Oceano Índico, mediante a passagem do Cabo da Boa Esperança, ou através do Oceano Pacífico, via Passagem de Drake. Para além da projeção de interesses sul-americanos e africanos nesta bacia, há de se considerar também os avanços chineses e indianos na região, que se desdobram em novos arranjos estratégi- cos, estes baseados em estruturas de cooperação alavancadas pela igualdade e fomento ao desenvolvimento com responsabilidade social (Pereira e Barbosa 2012). A presença chinesa na África se intensificou a partir de 1993, quando aumenta a demanda de petróleo pela China, a fim de alavancar seu crescimento. A partir de então, a China intensifica sua relação com a África – que já era vista como a “nova fronteira” para investimentos e obtenção de recursos minerais e energéticos – principalmente nos seguintes países: Sudão, Angola, República Democrática do Congo e Nigéria6. Os interesses indianos assemelham-se aos

5 A criação da ZOPACAS relaciona-se, especialmente, com a última onda de descolonização no continente africano, principalmente na região da África Austral, envolvendo as antigas colônias portuguesas. Neste sentido, convém destacar o processo de independência de Angola, que se desdobrou em uma Guerra Civil com contornos regionais, envolvendo a participação de países como a África do Sul do apartheid e o Zaire (atual República Democrática do Congo) e potências extrarregionais como a União Soviética, Cuba, Estados Unidos, Inglaterra e França, e diretamente relacionada com a libertação da Namíbia, que era controlada pela África do Sul (Penha 2011). 6 Após a repressão dos Protestos na Praça da Paz Celestial pelo Governo Chinês, em 1989, e o embargo sobre a venda de armas que foi imposto pelos Estados Unidos e pela União Europeia diante disso, a China passou a investir em novos parceiros, especialmente na África. Ao contrário da relação com os Estados Unidos e com a União Europeia, a China não impõe condicionamentos políticos, como a proteção aos direitos humanos, para as trocas econômicas, ao mesmo tempo em 488 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations da China: aquisição de recursos minerais e energéticos por um lado, investimento no setor de serviços, de outro, e uma maior preocupação em obter apoio político, em razão do ganho em importância que a Índia tem tido no cenário internacional (Penha 2011). Este novo panorama político tem criado um impasse para a estratégia norte-americana e europeia na região, os principais atores extrarregionais sob uma perspectiva histórica. Há décadas os Estados Unidos vêm buscando fontes mais seguras para suprir sua demanda energética, em alternativa ao Golfo Pérsico. Isso advém das constantes tensões nesta região, particularmente após os atentados do 11 de Setembro de 2001. O fornecimento de petróleo a partir do Atlântico Sul, apresenta-se como uma opção viável e, acima de tudo, estra- tégica; a proximidade da bacia com os principais centros de consumo, Estados Unidos e Europa, e de outros centros, especialmente China e Índia – via articu- lação Atlântico-Índico e Atlântico-Pacífico –, facilita o controle dos fluxos de petróleo, e permite intervenções mais rápidas e eficazes (Fiori 2012). A Bacia do Atlântico Sul apresenta vasta gama de recursos minerais estraté- gicos. As reservas dispostas na costa sul-americana totalizam aproximadamente 1,1% das reservas mundiais de petróleo e 0,4% das reservas de gás, para além do potencial ainda inexplorado nas plataformas continentais argentina e brasileira7. A África dispõe de 8% das reservas mundiais de petróleo e 7% das reservas de gás natural. O Golfo da Guiné detém 3,5% das reservas mundiais de petróleo, isto é, a segunda maior concentração de hidrocarbonetos do mundo. Angola e Nigéria são os maiores produtores da região, perfazendo cerca de 4 milhões de barris diariamente, mais da metade de toda a produção de petróleo do continente africano. Com importância também significativa temos a República Democrática do Congo, Gabão, Guiné Equatorial, São Tomé e Príncipe, Costa do Marfim, Mauritânia, Mali e Gana. As reservas de gás natural da África do Sul vêm sofrendo um esgotamento progressivo; contudo, há grandes quantidades de gás de xisto a serem explorados futuramente, e o país contribui com 4% das reservas mundiais de carvão (Brozoski 2013; Fiori 2012; Penha 2011). Além da atividade pesqueira, o leito oceânico do Atlântico Sul é tam- bém fonte de importantes minerais estratégicos, como, por exemplo, as crostas cobaltíferas, os nódulos polimetálicos (contendo níquel, cobalto, cobre e man- ganês), os sulfetos polimetálicos (contendo zinco, prata, cobre e ouro), além de que investe em setores primordiais, particularmente infraestrutura (Penha 2011). 7 Nesta dimensão, 0,9% dos recursos petrolíferos estão em território brasileiro – sendo que destes, 95% do petróleo e 85% do gás estão localizados na plataforma continental brasileira – e 0,2% em território argentino; cada um possui 0,2% das reservas globais de gás natural. Se somados os demais países sul-americanos, a proporção é de 18% do domínio sobre as reservas de petróleo mundiais e 3,5% sobre as reservas de gás natural (Brozoski 2013). 489 Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul areia monazítica, contendo quantidades significativas de urânio, e depósitos de diamante, ouro e fósforo (Fiori 2012; Pereira e Barbosa 2012). A exploração destes recursos pelos países costeiros e a produção de componentes de alto valor agregado pelos mesmos estimula o processo de transição tecnológica, importante motor para o desenvolvimento econômico e social nacional. Do mesmo modo, calcula-se que a Antártida, assim como as Malvinas, contenha importantes reservas minerais e energéticas, especialmente urânio, cobre e chumbo (Brozoski 2013). Nas últimas décadas a África tem sido apresentada como a nova fronteira energética mundial. Os Estados Unidos importam cerca de 60% do petróleo que consomem. O Golfo da Guiné, que já supera o Golfo Pérsico como o maior provedor de recursos energéticos para os Estados Unidos, representa 15% das importações estadunidenses, havendo estimativas de que esse número cresça para 25% até 2015 (Fiori 2012, 147).

Em 2011, a Nigéria exportou mais de 2 milhões de barris de petróleo por dia, sendo 33% para os EUA (9% das importações estadunidenses), 28% para a Europa, 12% para a Índia e 8% para o Brasil. Para a África do Sul as exportações foram de 3% do total e para o Sudeste da Ásia (incluindo China) 5% do total exportado. Angola exporta quase toda sua produção, cerca de 75 mil barris diários, sendo 45% de suas exportações para a China, 23% para os EUA e 9% para a Índia. A Guiné Equatorial exporta quase toda sua produção petroleira, destinando 30% de suas exportações para os EUA, 41% para a Europa (sendo os principais destinos 14% para Espanha e 13% para Itália), 10% para o Canadá e 7% para a China (ainda 6% para o Brasil). O Congo (Brazzaville) exporta 90% de sua produção, sendo 49% de suas exportações para os EUA, 31% para a China e 10% para a França. O Gabão exporta 90% de sua produção e tem como principais destinos EUA e Europa (Fiori 2012, 139-140).

De acordo com Richardson et al (2012), a região entre o Atlântico e o Pacífico foi a que demonstrou o maior crescimento em comércio marítimo depois da Guerra Fria. Essa guinada em direção ao Atlântico Sul gera importantes desdobramentos para os países costeiros. O desenvolvimento portuário é evidente em Luanda e Lobito, em Angola, em Walvis Bay, na Namíbia, e Santos, Suape e Açu, no Brasil (Richardson et al 2012; Pereira 2013). O aperfeiçoa- mento das estruturas portuárias torna-se ainda mais relevante em uma conjuntura em que o tamanho dos navios tende a aumentar, em razão do aumento nos custos em combustível e no melhoramento das tecnologias. Ora, em um horizonte de diminuição da capacidade do Canal de Suez e do Canal do Panamá – embora o acordo entre China e Nicarágua referente à construção de um canal interoceânico na Nicarágua possa demonstrar o contrário (Saiki 2013) –, as rotas do Atlântico Sul ganham premência como via de comunicação intero- ceânica (Richardson et al 2012). 490 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

As rotas marítimas do Atlântico Sul enquadram-se dentro do conceito de Sea Lines of Communication – SLOC –, isto é, as linhas de comunicação entre dois oceanos que permitem as relações comerciais, logísticas e militares entre diferentes pontos oceânicos. Sua centralidade está assente no fato de que o Estado que controlar as SLOCs detém, consequentemente, o controle do mar e pode, portanto, interferir no resultado de uma guerra (Lindsey 1988). A geó- grafa brasileira Therezinha de Castro apontou quatro rotas no Atlântico Sul, as quais seriam indispensáveis ao desenvolvimento e projeção do Brasil (Castro 1999 in Neves 2013, 20). Excluindo a rota sul-americana, que perpassa o Rio da Prata até Trinidad, e adicionando a Passagem de Drake, as outras três rotas são aplicáveis aos contornos geopolíticos de toda a região. A Rota Europeia é compreendida pela conexão entre o continente europeu e a América do Sul e África, através do estrangulamento do Atlântico, entre o Nordeste Brasileiro e Cabo Verde. Este corredor é essencial para todos os Estados localizados ao norte da linha do Equador. No sentido leste-oeste, temos a Rota Africana, conectando África e América do Sul. De acordo com Penha (2011), os eixos desta relação são as zonas marítimas do Nordeste ao Sudeste brasileiro (Salvador-Rio de Janeiro) e Angola-Nigéria (Luanda-Lagos). A Passagem de Drake, entre a América do Sul e a Antártica, é outra importante rota do Atlântico Sul. Sua relevância enquanto linha de comunicação marítima comercial não é tão acentuada como a Rota do Cabo, mas ainda assim importa para a passagem de embarcações maiores. Sua centralidade está na projeção de forças para a América do Sul e Antártica, principalmente, além de permitir o controle de fluxos nas direções Atlântico-Pacífico. Por fim, temos a Rota do Cabo da Boa Esperança. Enquadrada na conexão interoceânica da África do Sul, a Rota do Cabo congrega três continentes, afora ser passagem de recursos do Oriente Médio para a Europa e Estados Unidos8 (Neves 2013, 20). O Atlântico Sul também dispõe de uma diversidade de ilhas que lhe imprimem caráter estratégico para projeções sobre a África, a América do Sul e a Antártica. A existência de porções continentais sobre os oceanos permite o estabelecimento de bases militares, atribuindo aos países facilidades de apoio aeronaval, como veremos a seguir9. Inserido neste recorte estratégico enquadra-se a tese dos três triângulos geoestratégicos do Atlântico Sul. De acordo com esta formulação da geógrafa Therezinha de Castro, existem três triângulos estratégicos na bacia sul

8 A Rota do Cabo é via de passagem de 66% do petróleo europeu e 26% do petróleo norte- americano (Fiori 2012, 140). 9 Das ilhas que compõem a bacia sul-atlântica, as de maior significado estratégico são as ilhas de Ascensão, Santa Helena, Tristão da Cunha, Gough, São Pedro, São Paulo, Bouvet, Fernando Pó, São Tomé e Príncipe, Shetlands do Sul, Sandwich do Sul, Geórgias do Sul, Malvinas, Trindade, Martim Vaz, e Fernando de Noronha. 491 Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul atlântica, cujos vértices estão dispostos de acordo com as ilhas aí presentes. O primeiro triângulo é formado pela conjunção das Ilhas Ascensão, Santa Helena e Tristão da Cunha – todas sob controle britânico – e serve de base para projeções sobre a América do Sul, por um lado, e apoio para o controle da Rota do Cabo, por outro. O segundo triângulo tem seus vértices no arquipélago de Fernando de Noronha, na ilha de Trindade – ambos possessões brasileiras – e no arquipélago das Malvinas. Sob esta localização, é possível projetar forças sobre a costa americana brasileira, argentina e uruguaia, além de permitir o controle da passagem Atlântico-Pacífico. Importante destacar que, neste triângulo, somente o arquipélago das Malvinas é controlado por uma potência extrarregional e, ainda assim, não abarca a totalidade do controle interoceânico, visto que o controle sobre a passagem de Drake é melhor administrado a partir de Punta Arenas, no Chile, e Ushuaia, na Argentina. O terceiro triângulo é formado pelos arqui- pélagos subantárticos de Shetlands do Sul, Orcadas do Sul e Gough, Geórgias do Sul e Sanduíches do Sul. Therezinha de Castro aponta que esta formação costuma não ser bem guarnecida, sendo rota alternativa para projeções sobre a América e a África (Castro 1999 in Neves 2013, 22). O Reino Unido apresenta um cinturão de ilhas no Atlântico Sul, muitas delas conquistadas ainda na época dos descobrimentos, enquanto outras são contestadas até os dias de hoje, como é o caso das Malvinas, Geórgia do Sul e Sanduíche do Sul. A maior parte destas ilhas tem alto valor estratégico, pois constituem vértices dos triângulos geoestratégicos de Therezinha de Castro. Outrossim, a soberania sobre estas ilhas implica o direito à exploração de suas respectivas zonas econômicas exclusivas, muitas das quais apresentando reservas minerais e energéticas. As possessões britânicas dividem-se em dois grupos: ilhas meso-oceânicas – Tristão da Cunha, Ascensão e Santa Helena – e ilhas perian- tárticas – Shetlands, Geórgia do Sul, Gough, Sandwich do Sul, Orcadas do Sul e as Malvinas (Fiori 2012). Destas ilhas, algumas merecem apreciação especial. A ilha de Ascensão é umas das mais importantes no Atlântico Sul. De grande dimensão, mas montanhosa, não é muito favorável à instalação de bases militares, não havendo também nenhuma instalação portuária; entretanto, seu aeroporto apresenta uma pista de 1500 metros, fator premente para projeção de forças. Atualmente, esta ilha é compartilhada com os Estados Unidos. Apesar de pequenas e com difícil condição de habitabilidade, o progresso tecnológico permite que as ilhas de Santa Helena e Tristão da Cunha sejam utilizadas como base de apoio para as aeronaves não tripuladas, cujo relevo está na vigilância e segurança do Atlântico Sul. Por fim, o arquipélago das Malvinas permite a pro- jeção de forças sobre a Passagem de Drake e o Estreito de Magalhães, além de permitir reivindicações territoriais sobre a Antártica (Neves 2013; Reis 2011).

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Imagem 1 - Os Triângulos Geoestratégicos

A análise dos atributos geoestratégicos, geoeconômicos e geopolíticos da Bacia do Atlântico Sul exige a colocação de conclusões prévias e retomada de ideias centrais.Fonte: Em Neves primeiro 2013, 24lugar, é evidente o renascimento desta região no contexto político e estratégico internacional e sua centralidade no fomento de arranjos de cooperação sul-sul, com ênfase na cooperação para o desenvolvimento socioeconômico dos países. Em segundo lugar, as riquezas dos países costeiros, inseridas em um contexto de progressivo esgotamento das fontes de recursos energéticos internacionais, potencializam a tendência para o recrudes- cimento de intervenções extrarregionais.

O Sistema Internacional mais uma vez tem se mostrado progressivamente instável, na medida em que as grandes potências continuam dispostas a defender seus interesses, se necessário, por meio da força contra os mais fracos. A instabilidade política tornou-se crescente no mundo, especialmente em regiões disputadas entre as grandes potências. (...). Tornaram-se ainda mais claras as novas disputas internacionais pelo controle de reservas de recursos petrolíferos ou gasíferos, ao ponto de se estabelecer uma clara disputa estratégica pelo controle das rotas de passagem ou escoamento destes recursos através de oleodutos ou gasodutos (Kerr de Oliveira 2010).

493 Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul

A debilidade dos países costeiros em prover sua própria segurança, somada ao extenso controle de áreas estratégicas por potências extrarregionais, deve servir como ponto de partida para o desenvolvimento de suas capacidades militares e criação de estruturas de cooperação regional em segurança e defesa. Neste sentido, é essencial avaliar o equilíbrio de forças no recorte sul-atlântico e, particularmente, os esforços dos países costeiros em incrementar suas capacidades e sua integração regional.

2.2. A PRESENÇA MILITAR EXTRARREGIONAL

Como apresentado anteriormente, a quase totalidade do controle sobre o Atlântico Sul é historicamente exercido pela(s) grande potência(s). Assim, os países costeiros, sejam da América do Sul ou da África, não logram estabelecer sua presença efetiva, assegurar seus interesses ou possuir autoridade sobre o Oceano. Como será tratado abaixo, hoje em dia três países conseguem, ao menos parcialmente, assegurar sua presença no Atlântico Sul: os Estados Unidos, a Grã-Bretanha, e em menor medida a França. Os três países o fazem, majoritari- amente, com base nas suas grandes capacidades militares e influência política e econômica. Consequentemente, a presença das três potências no Atlântico Sul fere um dos princípios norteadores da ZOPACAS: o da não-militarização. Uma das maiores consequências disso é a ameaça à soberania dos países costeiros. Afinal, como será tratado adiante, nenhum dos países do grupo tem capacidades militares à altura destas potências extrarregionais. Assim, além da impossibili- dade de os países costeiros exercerem a soberania sobre o mar territorial, na zona contígua ou na Zona Econômica Exclusiva10, há constrangimentos decorrentes da grande capacidade dissuasória e da ameaça exercida pelas Forças Armadas britânicas, francesas e estadunidenses. Entretanto, é preciso diferenciar dois conceitos aqui discutidos: o de não-militarização e o de desmilitarização.

A questão da não-militarização do Atlântico Sul refere-se especificamente às atividades relacionadas às questões e interesses internacionais alheios à região, de maneira a não afetar de modo algum o programa de modernização e desenvolvimento tecnológico das Forças Armadas dos países das áreas. É importante, pois, que fique claramente entendido que o conceito de não- militarização da área por países a ela estranhos não pode ser confundido com

10 Segundo a Convenção das Nações Unidas sobre o Direito do Mar (UNCLOS), o país tem soberania no mar territorial, direito de exercer jurisdição na zona contígua e direito de soberania no que diz respeito à exploração dos recursos naturais na água, no leito do mar e no subsolo na Zona Econômica Exclusiva (UNCLOS 1982). 494 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

o desmilitarização no sentido de redução da capacidade de atuação de militares dos países da região (Penha 2011, 187).

Ainda segundo Penha (2011, 187), a ZOPACAS exerce, inclusive, uma função contrária à da desmilitarização, pois promove a cooperação entre as Forças Armadas dos países-membros, especialmente entre as marinhas. Ou seja, a ZOPACAS atua no sentido de buscar a “não-militarização” da região, entendida enquanto presença de interesses e capacidades extrarregionais, mas não no sentido de desmilitarização, já que promove a modernização militar dos seus países consti- tuintes. Por outro lado, a presença de potências extrarregionais tem crescido paulatinamente no Atlântico Sul, fato que, na maioria das vezes, enfraquece a arquitetura institucional buscada pelos países costeiros e, consequentemente, ameaça à soberania destes. Percebe-se, então, que a militarização do Atlântico Sul por parte de potências extrarregionais pode constituir-se como uma ameaça à Zona de Paz e Cooperação no Atlântico Sul. Cabe, portanto, investigar mais especificamente a presença das três potências extrarregionais no Atlântico Sul.

2.2.1 A presença militar extrarregional: os Estados Unidos no Atlântico Sul

Após domínio de Cuba, por parte dos EUA, com a vitória na guerra contra a Espanha, então potência colonial, em 1898, e o domínio de Porto Rico e das Ilhas Virgens, já era clara a intenção dos Estados Unidos em dominar as rotas do Golfo do México e as aspirações de construção do que viria a ser o canal do Panamá (Bandeira 2008). Posteriormente, a extensão das forças estadunidenses às Filipinas os consolidaria como detentores de importante poderio naval, firmando-se como uma potência marítima em dois oceanos. A partir de então, os EUA estabelece- ram-se como um grande poder no Oceano Atlântico, tanto ao Norte quanto ao Sul. Entretanto, é a partir do final da década de 1990 e início da década de 2000 que os Estados Unidos passam a desenvolver para o Atlântico Sul uma estratégia substancialmente diferente do que fez durante toda sua história. Após a queda da União Soviética e o fim da Guerra Fria, houve um desin- teresse dos Estados Unidos pelo Atlântico Sul e pelos países costeiros em função da perda de importância estratégica destes. A aparente falta de ameaças globais frente à hegemonia estadunidense fez com que o país reduzisse seu orçamento e seu pessoal militar em cerca de 30% e se desengajasse de áreas que teriam perdido sua importân- cia estratégica (Battaglino 2009). A conjuntura internacional, entretanto, mudou significativamente a doutrina dos Estados Unidos para todo o globo e, consequentemente, sua estratégia para o Atlântico Sul a partir dos atentados terroristas contra as embaixadas estadunidenses em Nairobi (Quênia) e Dar el Salaam (Tanzânia) em

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1998 e do ataque de 11 de Setembro de 2001 (Ploch 2011). A partir de então, os Estados Unidos passaram a identificar o terrorismo como a principal ameaça a sua liderança global, como expressado em documentos como a Estratégia Nacional de Segurança de 2002 e 2006. Sendo o terrorismo uma ameaça transnacional, sem Estado soberano responsável por este, é consequência disto a definição do mundo como um cenário unificado para executar operações militares; para tal, há a manutenção e a acentuação da expansão da infraestrutura militar dos EUA para o globo, a qual já ocorria desde a Guerra Fria11 (Battaglino 2009). Concomitantemente à ameaça terrorista, os Estados Unidos também iden- tificam em seus documentos de defesa, como na Revisão Quadrienal de Defesa (2001), a ascensão de novos polos globais ou regionais de poder e a existência de Estados falidos como ameaça a sua liderança global. Para Battaglino (2009), inicia-se a busca estadunidense pela Integrated Global Presence, a qual é baseada em um crescente número de bases estadunidenses no exterior por meio da expansão dos Comandos Unificados Combatentes12. Frente a tal cenário, a materialização da mudança de doutrina estadunidense para o Atlântico Sul se dá em três ações: o restabelecimento da IV Frota dos EUA, em julho de 2008, o fortalecimento do United States Southern Command (Southcom) e a criação do Africom, em outubro de 2008. Pela primeira vez, os EUA possuem uma estrutura militar que conta com seis Comandos Unificados Combatentes e seis frotas no globo. De acordo com as ações mencionadas acima, percebe-se que os EUA completaram o estabelecimento de sua capacidade global de projeção de forças (Battaglino 2009, 37). A IV Frota é responsável pela segurança do Atlântico Sul, comportando os navios, submarinos e aeronaves que fazem a defesa da área sob responsabilidade do Southcom (Maclay, et al. 2009). Consequentemente, a IV Frota trabalha conjuntamente com o Southcom e é responsável pela região da América Latina. Segundo Maclay et al (2009), o objetivo oficial declarado da IV Frota é estreitar a cooperação e a parceria dos países da região por meio de cinco missões: apoio a operações de manutenção de paz, assistência humanitária, auxílio a desastres, exercícios marítimos tradicionais e apoio a operações antidroga. Entretanto, a

11 É consequência disso a ampliação dos orçamentos militares estadunidenses a partir do governo de George W. Bush, totalizando um aumento de 70% entre 2001 e 2007 (Battaglino 2009). 12 Os Comandos Unificados Combatentes são estruturas militares estadunidenses que se respon- sabilizam por regiões específicas do globo. Os seis Comandos Unificados Combatentes mencionados acima são Northcom, responsável pela América do Norte; o Southcom, responsável pela América Latina; o Africom, responsável pela África; Centcom, responsável pelo Oriente Médio e Ásia Central; Eucom, responsável pela Europa e Pacom, responsável pela Ásia-Pacífico (U.S. Department of Defense 2011). 496 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations leitura mais detalhada dos documentos oficiais dos EUA sobre a Frota mostra interesses adicionais além dos supracitados: primeiramente, a emergência dos interesses da China no hemisfério ocidental é considerada pelos Estados Unidos como uma ameaça à sua hegemonia na região. Adicionalmente, os EUA afirmam em seus documentos que a ascensão social e econômica brasileira nos últimos anos também pode vir a apresentar um desafio aos interesses estadunidenses. Finalmente, a ascensão daquilo que é chamado pelos Estados Unidos de “neo- populismo radical”, como a emergência de governos de esquerda na América do Sul, também é considerada uma afronta à hegemonia estadunidense (Maclay, et al. 2009; Department of Defense of United States of America 2008). Conforme Battaglino (2009), a reativação da IV Frota insere-se na estra- tégia dos EUA de efetuar a ocupação e o controle dos denominados espaços comuns. Tal conceito, desenvolvido por Barry Posen (2003), diz respeito às áreas que não pertencem, a princípio, a país algum, mas que dão acesso a todo resto do globo. Battaglino (2009) também destaca que o conceito de Posen trata principalmente das áreas do mar e do espaço aéreo, espaços para os quais a extensa maioria dos países não tem instrumentos econômicos e, principalmente, militares para controlar de maneira eficaz. Posen (2003) salienta que o comando sobre tais espaços é o centro da hegemonia dos EUA; afinal, nenhum outro país conta com a infraestrutura militar necessária para exercer o controle sobre aqueles e, assim, somente os EUA têm a capacidade de projeção de forças para eventuais conflitos em praticamente qualquer lugar do globo. Frente à reativa- ção da IV Frota, as reações de grande parte dos países latino-americanos foram contrárias à atitude dos EUA. Ademais, além do restabelecimento da IV Frota, os EUA arrendam a ilha de Ascensão – de posse inglesa. A lógica da ampliação e fortalecimento do Southcom é semelhante. Sua forma oficial e contemporânea foi lançada em 1963; entretanto, dentre os Comandos Unificados Combatentes, sempre tivera menos recursos (Maclay, et al. 2009). Em 1990, o Southcom estabeleceu como objetivo o combate às ameaças “emergentes” e “não tradicionais”, dentre as quais destacava-se o tráfico de drogas. Segundo Tokatlián (2009), os Estados Unidos alteraram, com o fim da Guerra Fria, seu “inimigo” na América Latina: com a queda da URSS, o alvo no tráfico de drogas/narcoguerrilha, e a guerra às drogas se tornou um dos principais pilares da política dos EUA para a América Latina, especificada na Estratégia Nacional de Controle às Drogas (National Drug Control Strategy) de George W. Bush. Foi com base na cunhagem do conceito de “narcoguerrilha” que o Southcom ampliou suas funções na região13. Se, em 1997, expandiu-se

13 Em 2002 o Congresso dos EUA aprovou a ampliação de seu escopo, à medida que autorizava que as capacidades antes utilizadas para o combate à droga fossem, a partir de então, utilizadas para combater o terrorismo e a narcoguerrilha (Battaglino 2009). A materialização de tais mudanças 497 Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul para incluir o Mar do Caribe e o Golfo do México, atualmente o Comando trabalha conjuntamente com a IV Frota14. Dentro dos objetivos estabelecidos pelo Southcom, de manter a capacidade de operar nos espaços, águas internacionais, ar e ciberespaço comuns mundiais e a partir deles, em outras palavras, manter o comando dos espaços comuns (Bataglino 2009, 37), a cooperação entre o Comando e a Frota é fundamental.

Com as operações navais da IV Frota, os Estados Unidos complementam o anel de bases militares, que envolve Comapala, em El Salvador; Guantánamo, em Cuba; Comayuga, em Honduras; Aruba, em Curaçao; e Manta, no Equador, de onde deverá ser transferida para a Colômbia. (Bandeira 2008, 16).

Destarte, percebe-se que há concomitantemente um esforço progressivo para que a região do Atlântico Sul se funda com a região do Atlântico Norte, e em direção a um processo de militarização das relações dos EUA com a costa ocidental do Atlântico Sul. Na outra margem do Atlântico, os EUA têm atuado de maneira relativamente semelhante. A criação do Africom, em outubro de 2008, representa o esforço pelo controle da costa oriental do Atlântico Sul. Se, durante a Guerra Fria, a África encaixava-se unicamente nos interesses estraté- gicos dos EUA de contenção do comunismo soviético, com a queda da URSS o continente passou por uma fase de esquecimento por parte da superpotência americana15. Entretanto, após os atentados terroristas supracitados, a política externa estadunidense para a África alterou-se profundamente, pois ganhou novas proporções à medida que o país passou a identificar uma série de interesses estratégicos no continente. A África passou a constar como região de prioridade nas Estratégias de Segurança Nacional de 2002 e 2006. Desta maneira, o Africom foi criado, segundo o próprio Comando, como ferramenta para assegurar os interesses estadunidenses na África (Ploch 2011). Para atingir tais objetivos, o Africom realiza operações de cooperação com as Forças Armadas dos países africanos e, quando necessário, empreende ações militares para a defesa de seus interesses (Deen 2013). Segundo o Departamento de Defesa, os principais temas que interessam aos EUA na África, e que fizeram com que a política destes foi a aplicação do Plano Colômbia, representando a presença militar estadunidense na Amazônia, e a manutenção de grande presença militar no Peru, no Suriname e na Guiana (Bandeira 2008). 14 O comando conta atualmente com 17 instalações de radar (principalmente na Colômbia e no Peru), três Espaços de Segurança Cooperativa (CSLs Aruba, e Comalapa) e duas Bases Militares (Guantánamo, em Cuba, e Soto Cano, em Honduras) (Battaglino 2009, 36). 15 A sede oficial do Comando fica numa localização próxima à cidade de Stuttgart, na Alemanha; tal fato decorre da recusa por parte de todos os países africanos em sediar o Comando, temendo as consequências para as balanças de poder regionais africanas (Nathan 2009). 498 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations para o continente mudasse, são: petróleo, expansão do terrorismo16, conflitos armados, entre outros (Ploch 2011). Pelos motivos já comentados, os EUA têm um crescente interesse no petróleo africano. Entretanto, é importante destacar que, anteriormente à criação do Africom, grande parte do Norte e do Leste africanos eram cobertos pelo Eurocom ou pelo Centcom. Contudo, frente à ascensão dos países do Golfo da Guiné como fornecedores de petróleo aos EUA, estes prontamente esforçaram-se para institucionalizar a militarização no continente, baseando-se no Africom: percebe-se que há o interesse vital, por parte do Comando, em assegurar o fornecimento seguro de petróleo à potência. Desde o anúncio da fundação do Comando, houve uma série de declara- ções por parte dos países e de organizações, como será tratado na seção “Ações Internacionais Prévias”. Além disso, muitas críticas têm sido levantadas quanto às reais intenções e consequências do Africom. Primeiramente, poucos atores políticos africanos realmente creem que os objetivos do Comando são estabi- lizar o continente africano, e grande parte dos países o vê como uma forma de os EUA assegurarem o controle do futuro da África, considerada a “nova fronteira de exploração e investimentos” – ou seja, uma forma de neocolonialismo (Nathan 2009). Destacam-se também as críticas emitidas pelos africanos à maneira da criação do Comando – uma declaração unilateral do governo dos EUA, sem qualquer tipo de diálogo ou transparência com os Estados africanos (Nathan 2009). Ainda, teme-se que a criação do Africom e a presença militar estadunidense no continente esvaziem as instituições decisórias e de diálogo dos Estados africanos. Afinal, em casos como nos conflitos na Líbia, em 2011, e no Mali, em 2012 e 2013, o Comando estadunidense e os EUA ignoraram as decisões de organismos como a União Africana (Nathan 2009). Desta forma, há a possibilidade de o Africom tornar-se o centro dinâmico-securitário africano e, consequentemente, os países africanos ficarem marginalizados nos processos decisórios acerca do próprio continente. Nota-se que, dos dois lados do Atlântico Sul, os EUA vem fortalecendo sua presença militar na última década. O crescimento da importância estraté- gica do Oceano para a potência norte-americana fez com que este adotasse uma abordagem que, muitas vezes, choca-se com as perspectivas dos países costeiros.

2.2.2 A Presença Britânica no Atlântico Sul

O Atlântico Sul exerceu papel central para o estabelecimento do império

16 Dentre estes os grupos terroristas mais importantes na África, estão a Al-Qaeda, o Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), o Al-Shabab e o Boko Haram. 499 Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul ultramarino britânico. Para a consecução deste objetivo, os estrategistas da Marinha Inglesa acreditavam que o Reino Unido deveria controlar rotas maríti- mas estratégicas (Penha 2011). Deste modo, ao longo de sua história, o Reino Unido estabeleceu uma presença territorial destacada na Bacia do Atlântico Sul, o que lhe confere capacidade estratégica singular atualmente, superior, inclusive, aos próprios países costeiros. Em razão disso, mostra-se necessária uma investigação deste cenário estratégico e, à luz de um estudo de caso da Guerra das Malvinas, o mapeamento dos constrangimentos conferidos ao concerto sul-atlântico. O Reino Unido possui uma das marinhas mais bem equipadas do mundo. De acordo com o IISS (2013, 187-188), a Marinha Britânica dispõe de um ativo de 32 mil homens, é dotada de onze submarinos, sendo quatro deles nucleares, cinco destróieres, treze fragatas, 22 navios de patrulha e defesa costeira, 41 navios anfíbios, 16 navios destinados a guerra de minas, e 10 navios para logística e suporte. Dois porta-aviões estão em fase de construção e devem ser comissionados a partir de 2017, o que tende a exacerbar a presença britânica na bacia sul atlântica. O Reino Unido possui também forças atuando no Atlântico Sul, especialmente nas ilhas Malvinas, onde há cerca de 1500 soldados permanentes, um navio patrulha e um navio escolta, e eventualmente um submarino em Ascensão e Serra Leoa, com aproximadamente 20 soldados em cada. Além disso, há também um destróier em estado de patrulha permanente no Atlântico Sul (Guimarães 2014; Faria 2011).

2.2.3 A guerra das Malvinas

Para compreender os fatores que desencadearam a Guerra das Malvinas, é necessário investigar as mudanças que se perpetraram dentro do governo argentino. O governo militar que tomou o poder nos anos 1970 deu centralidade aos assuntos geopolíticos, dentre eles a disputa com a Grã-Bretanha pelas ilhas Malvinas17. As disputas territoriais entre a Argentina e a Inglaterra foram sendo exacerbadas à medida que se agravava a crise nacional nos dois países. A invasão das ilhas Malvinas pela Argentina, em 02 de abril de 1982, teve um fator relevante, que foi o descontentamento com o regime militar do então presidente, Leopoldo Galtieri, no sentido que a reconquista de territórios historicamente contestados possibilitaria a reaproximação do governo com a sociedade. Da mesma forma, o

17 Os geopolíticos argentinos defendiam a ideia da Atlantártida. De acordo com esta ideia, a pro- jeção de poder nacional se daria através do triângulo Prata-Malvinas-Beagle, permitindo à mesma manter influência sobre a bacia do Prata e controlar a rota do Cabo Horn – a partir das Malvinas e das ilhas periantártidas – e a Antártica. Os objetivos argentinos estavam, entretanto, bloqueados pela Grã-Bretanha, que controlava as ilhas Malvinas, Shetlands e Geórgia do Sul (Penha 2011, 136-137). 500 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations governo neoliberal de Margaret Thatcher encontrava-se em uma situação de mar- ginalidade internacional – por conta da fracassada intervenção militar no Canal de Suez e da ida ao Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI) – e descontentamento interno – em virtude da crise econômica e social que se desenrolava no país (Penha 2011; Espósito Neto 2005). Ademais, em um quadro de novo aumento nos preços do petróleo, desembocada a partir da Revolução no Irã, em 1979, e da Guerra Irã-Iraque, em 1980, as perspectivas de exploração petrolífera no arquipélago sul- atlântico tornava seu controle ainda mais importante (Kerr de Oliveira 2014). O estopim para o conflito armado, que já vinha sendo orquestrado, começou com um escândalo envolvendo a expulsão de um grupo de trabalhadores argentinos nas ilhas Geórgia do Sul, em 19 de março de 1982. Em virtude da ofensa britânica, os militares argentinos, juntamente com o Chefe de Operações do Estado Maior, Mario Benjamín Menéndez, decidiram executar a “Operação Azul”, que consistia no desembarque de militares nas ilhas Malvinas, a fim de expulsar os militares e oficiais britânicos e retomar seu direito sobre o arquipélago, sem exercer violência. O desembarque argentino aconteceu ao sul das ilhas, com cinco mil soldados, que, sem dificuldade, dominaram a ilha (Coconi 2007). No dia seguinte, o Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas aprovou a resolução número 502, exigindo a retirada imediata das forças argentinas e o ces- sar das hostilidades. Em 26 de abril, por sua vez, a Comissão de Trabalho da Conferência de Ministros de Relações Exteriores do TIAR adotou uma resolução em que se respaldava a reivindicação de soberania argentina sobre as ilhas, exigia-se o fim das hostilidades pelo Reino Unido e o fim do conflito. Essa resolução teve 17 votos a favor e 4 abstenções, dentre elas os Estados Unidos (Coconi 2007). Em 07 de abril, a Grã-Bretanha anunciou o bloqueio naval de 200 milhas em volta da Argentina, e em 10 de abril a Comunidade Econômica Europeia anunciou embargo sobre os produtos argentinos, sendo a União Soviética o único país a dar apoio à Argentina. Em 25 de abril, a Grã Bretanha retomou a soberania sobre as ilhas Geórgia do Sul, danificando seriamente o submarino argentino Santa Fé, e, em 29 de abril, atingiu as Malvinas, impondo bloqueio naval total. Em 30 de abril, os EUA abandonaram a neutrali- dade e suspenderam a ajuda militar e econômica à Argentina, desestruturando o arranjo solidário proposto pelo TIAR. A ofensiva britânica sobre as ilhas Malvinas teve início em 01 de maio. Neste momento do conflito, foi afundado o cruzador argentino General Belgrano, evento de desestabilização da frota argentina. Em 29 de maio, teve início a ofensiva britânica em direção à capital Port Stanley, que foi retomada em 14 de junho. As forças argentinas se renderam no dia seguinte (Coconi 2007; Nackle Urt 2009). A Guerra das Malvinas foi um dos momentos mais importantes na história sul- americana e atesta a fragilidade dos países do Atlântico Sul em lidar com ingerências externas. Em termos estratégicos, o conflito evidenciou a importância da interdependência entre

501 Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul o poder aéreo e o poder naval e a centralidade do navio aeródromo para a vitória britânica18. Os submarinos nucleares da Marinha Britânica também foram essenciais, pois garantiram a zona de exclusão em torno das ilhas Malvinas. O míssil antinavio AM39 Exocet, utilizado pela Argentina, comprovou a eficácia da combinação REVO (arranjo entre aeronaves de patrulha marítima, de diversão e de ataque) e sua capacidade em causar baixas em veículos de superfície. Por fim, ao analisarmos os meios de combate dos oponentes, percebe-se que a Grã-Bretanha tinha superioridade na comparação dos poderes combatentes navais e aéreos, particularmente porque seu equipamento era mais moderno e eficaz19.

2.2.4 A presença militar extrarregional e a militarização: a França no Atlântico Sul

Ainda que em menor proporção, quando comparada aos EUA e à Grã- Bretanha, a presença francesa no Atlântico Sul é bastante significativa. Como demonstrado, a potência europeia mostra interesse nos dois lados do Atlântico: na costa sul-americana, a materialização disto se deu na Guerra da Lagosta, iniciada em 1961, e na posse até hoje de um território ultramarino no Oceano, a Guiana Francesa. É na costa africana, entretanto, que ficam claros os interesses franceses pelo Oceano. Desde que foram concedidas as independências aos Estados africanos que tinham a França como metrópole, esta busca assegurar sua influência por diversos meios e instrumentos sobre os países nascentes. Desde então, houve a formação daquilo que Verschave (2004) denominou de Françafrique, uma “rede através da qual foram estabelecidos diversos sistemas de dominação, com o objetivo de manter a dependência dos países africanos em relação à antiga metrópole” (Oliveira, Silva e Paludo 2013, 164). Ainda segundo Verschave (2004), os principais objetivos da atuação francesa no continente africano eram a obtenção de Estados-clientes e a aquisição de matérias-primas. Uma das principais materializações da dependência das ex-colônias em relação à França é a criação da Comunidade Financeira Africana, ou Zona do Franco, que adota o Franco CFA como moeda. Ainda que, segundo o próprio autor do termo, a Françafrique tenha se desmontado de maneira consistente ao final da Guerra Fria, grande parte da dependência dos países africanos em relação à França permanece até hoje. Concomitantemente, muitos dos interesses e instrumentos franceses na região

18 “Ficou demonstrado que navios de guerra e aviões de ataque têm vantagens e desvantagens no cumprimento de suas missões: navios se deslocam a 500 milhas por dia e aeronaves de ataque a jato a 500 milhas por hora, mas enquanto as aeronaves só podiam cumprir suas missões num período de horas, navios e submarinos permaneceram na área de conflito durante semanas” (Poder Naval, 2014). 19 Para maiores detalhes a respeito do balanço das forças, consultar: http://www.naval.com.br/ blog/2010/02/19/malvinas-a-questao-esta-de-volta/. 502 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations permanecem vivos20. A manutenção de relações comerciais assimétricas e dos vínculos de dependência econômica são exemplos disto. Além disso, destaca- se a manutenção das intervenções militares. No Livro Branco de Defesa da França, de 2008, o chamado Arco das Crises – que comporta as regiões do Oriente Médio, do norte da África e da Ásia Central - é enfatizado como zona de interesse francês, sendo a estabilidade de diversos países sob influência francesa fundamental para a manutenção do status da França como grande potência. Nota-se, assim, que a África continua fundamental para a estratégia global francesa. A partir de 2002, o país realizou intervenções na Costa do Marfim, que levaram, em 2011, à queda do ex-presidente Laurent Gbagbo, no Chade, diversas intervenções na República Centro Africana, na Líbia (em cooperação com a OTAN e com o Africom) e, mais recentemente, no Mali. Atualmente, a França mantém suas tropas no último país mencionado, desde a intervenção feita no início de 2013 por meio da Operação Sérval, bem como na República Centro Africana, país no qual ao qual a potência europeia tornou a intervir militarmente em 2013. Ainda, a França até hoje atua em missões de paz lideradas pela ONU na Costa do Marfim e na República Democrática do Congo. Finalmente, a França possui uma base militar permanente no Gabão e uma base no Senegal – as chamadas Les Forces Française du Cap Vert; assim, quase metade das tropas francesas fora do continente europeu encontra-se na África (Borba, et al. 2013). Além dos interesses e da influência francesa na África, a França se faz presente no Atlântico Sul em função da posse da Guiana Francesa. O território foi colônia francesa até 1946, quando tornou-se um departamento ultramarino francês. A principal e a mais dinâmica atividade no departamento é a presença do Centro Espacial de Kourou, o centro de lançamentos da Agência Espacial Europeia21. Ainda, a importância da Guiana Francesa é destacada em função da ratificação francesa da Convenção das Nações Unidas sobre o Direito do Mar (UNCLOS), o que lhe dá o direito dá exploração dos recursos marítimos da região. Ademais, segundo Borba et al (2013, 134), enquanto a França tem for- ças terrestres pouco significativas, a Força Aérea e, principalmente, a Marinha francesas fazem com que o país seja considerado uma potência relevante. Esta última passa atualmente por um processo de modernização, no qual a busca pelo desenvolvimento tecnológico é priorizada. Além disso, o porta-aviões Charles De Gaulle, importante instrumento para projeção de forças, é capaz de carregar

20 Dentre estes, destaca-se o interesse francês em petróleo e em metais, principalmente no urânio do Níger, o qual tem grande relevância para a segurança energética da França, já que dele advém um quarto da energia elétrica do país (Melly e Darracq 2013). 21 O centro, operacional desde 1968, é de extrema importância para a Agência Espacial em função da sua latitude – extremamente próxima à linha do Equador –, o que faz do manuseio dos satélites mais simples e menos custoso. 503 Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul até 40 aviões de combate. Concomitantemente a isso,

(...) um acordo militar foi firmado entre França e Grã-Bretanha. Conhecido como Entente Frugale, visa à coordenação das forças armadas de ambos os países nos seus diversos níveis de atuação [...]. O desenvolvimento de uma sólida base industrial de defesa, bem como a consolidação de uma doutrina militar conjunta, configuram os eixos norteadores da aproximação franco-britânica (Borba, et al. 2013, 133).

Em 2006, o então presidente francês, Jacques Chirac, fez mudanças significativas na doutrina francesa, trazendo a dissuasão e a retaliação nuclear para primeiro plano na estratégia nacional. Ao mesmo tempo, declarava uma estratégia de prevenção e, se necessário, intervenção contra países emergentes, especialmente contra aqueles Estados que, segundo a perspectiva francesa, pactuam com o terrorismo (Yost 2006).

2.3. ATUAÇÃO DOS PAÍSES COSTEIROS DO ATLÂNTICO SUL FRENTE À PRESENÇA DE POTÊNCIAS EXTRARREGIONAIS

Desde a criação da ZOPACAS, os países costeiros do Atlântico Sul vêm somando esforços para a consolidação de uma arquitetura institucional que resulte na retirada – ou, ao menos, diminuição – da presença de potências extrarregionais no Atlântico Sul. Entretanto, para que as potências extrarregionais de fato se retirem do oceano, é necessária uma capacidade dissuasória dos países costeiros. Afinal, se as Forças Armadas dos países costeiros não têm capacidades mínimas para evitar ingerências externas, as grandes potências mencionadas acima sentem- se capazes de ocupar o “vazio, mesmo que declarações legais de instituições como a ZOPACAS demandem o contrário. Assim, cabe averiguar quais medidas estão sendo tomadas pelos países para que haja a alteração do status quo. Nos últimos 15 anos, muitos países costeiros do Atlântico Sul vêm buscando um processo de modernização de suas Forças Armadas. O Brasil é um dos exemplos: desde o início do primeiro governo de Lula da Silva, mas, principalmente, após a descoberta dos recursos naturais na camada do pré-sal, o governo brasileiro vem publicando uma série de legislações que mudaram consideravelmente a política de defesa brasileira. Busca-se um processo de modernização das Forças Armadas concomitantemente à utilização destas como um instrumento de inclusão social, de desenvolvimento sócioeconômico e de inovação tecnológica. Assim, objetiva-se a superação nas Forças Armadas da dependência tecnológica, especialmente dos

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EUA22, com vistas à criação de uma indústria de defesa autônoma. No que tange ao Atlântico Sul, o Brasil desenvolveu o conceito de Amazônia Azul, área sobre a qual busca manter sob sua soberania. Para tal, a Marinha do Brasil vem desenvolvendo uma série de projetos, dos quais se destacam os esforços brasileiros pelo aumento da frota de submarinos convencionais e pela criação de um submarino nuclear. Para isto, sublinha-se o Programa de Desenvolvimento de Submarinos, que objetiva lançar ao mar em 2016 quatro submarinos convencionais Scorpène de tecnologia francesa a ser transferida ao Brasil, e, em 2022, um submarino nuclear (BRASIL, 2012). Ainda, importa ressaltar a busca brasileira pela duplicação de sua frota naval a partir da criação de uma Segunda Esquadra e de uma Segunda força de Fuzileiros a ser sediada no Norte/Nordeste do país. Finalmente, destaca-se a nova política da Marinha do Brasil de reaparelhagem, baseada na construção nacional como prioridade e na busca de compras internacionais com transferência de tecnologia, evitando as tradicionais compras de material sucateado de potências como Estados Unidos. Outro país que tem aumentado paulatinamente sua atenção às Forças Armadas é Angola. O país saiu de sua guerra civil em 2002, com a vitória do MPLA sobre a UNITA. As forças, anteriormente rebeldes, da Unita integraram-se às Forças Armadas angolanas, aumentando grandemente o número de efetivos, especialmente do exército. À vista disso, Angola tem atualmente o segundo maior exército dentre os países da África subsaariana, perdendo apenas para a República Democrática do Congo (RDC)23, além de ter o maior número de forças de segu- rança por habitante (Silva 2012). Ainda segundo Silva (2012), as Forças Armadas angolanas atualmente são bastante experientes em função da longa guerra civil pela qual o país passou. Angola aumentou consideravelmente seus gastos com investimentos militares24. Contudo, uma das maiores fragilidades das FAA é a Marinha. Afinal, se as FAA foram modeladas para o combate durante a guerra civil, esta não se estendeu a cenários marítimos de guerra. Assim, Angola tem de contar com uma defesa antinavio com patrulha aérea controlada pela Força Aérea, em função da falta de navios e vetores confiáveis na sua Marinha (Silva 2012). Tais fatos fizeram com que o país aumentasse recentemente os gastos na Força e desenvolvesse importantes parcerias no setor, como a Namíbia e o Brasil. Na Força

22 Afinal, o Brasil tradicionalmente importa produtos já não mais utilizados pelos EUA a baixo preço, porém sem transferência de tecnologia. 23 Segundo Silva (2012), apesar de RDC ter o maior exército dentre os países africanos, este fato se dá em função de uma ampliação recente, iniciada em 2008, do número de efetivos do exército. Apesar disso, segundo o autor, o exército da República Democrática do Congo, segundo o autor, é bastante inefetivo para a segurança do país. 24 Em 2010, superou a África do Sul no quesito em termos de valores absolutos, e, em termos proporcionais ao PIB, o país tem o maior gasto da África austral (Silva 2012). 505 Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul

Aérea, entretanto, Angola tem capacidades mais avançadas, principalmente em função da posse de aeronaves de quarta geração, como o Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker. Na África, existem outros países que se destacam em termos de Forças Armadas. Dentre eles, o principal é a África do Sul, o qual tem as Forças Armadas mais bem equipadas em termos tecnológicos. Diferentemente de Angola, a Marinha sul-africana conta com números significativos, especialmente de fragatas e submarinos. Entretanto, as capacidades da Marinha sul-africana são divididas entre o Oceano Índico e o Oceano Atlântico, o que faz com que o país fique relativamente mais frágil no Atlântico Sul. Outro fator fundamental de se destacar comentar acerca da África austral é o estabelecimento, em 2008, da South African Development Community Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG), força que opera sob responsabilidade da SADC e da União Africana e é composta por 6.000 soldados advindos dos países da instituição (Silva 2012). Importa notar que o estabelecimento da SADCBRIG se deu em um momento em que os EUA já discutiam internamente e planejavam o lançamento do Africom. Já a Nigéria, por sua vez, tem atualmente a Marinha mais forte dentre as africanas, ainda que muitos dos equipamentos requeiram um processo de modernização em função do estado de deterioração (IISS 2013). O país é um poder econômico e militar crescente no Golfo da Guiné e capitaneia o processo de integração regional, materializado atualmente na ECOWAS25. Outro fator que deve ser levado em consideração é a cooperação sul-sul entre os países da ZOPACAS. Dentre os casos de cooperação sul-sul, destacam-se as contemporâneas relações entre o Brasil e diversos países africanos. Há mais de uma década, o Brasil ampliou consideravelmente as relações com o continente africano, passando a cooperar com a África direcionando seus investimentos para setores de longo prazo, especialmente para as áreas de infraestrutura e para setores das Forças Armadas. Além da indução do Estado brasileiro, a partir de suas empresas estatais, o Brasil tem atuado fortemente em ações de cooperação militar, dentre as quais se destacam a venda de aviões Super Tucano para Angola, o apoio do Brasil na estruturação de grande parte da Marinha da Namíbia, os acordos de coopera- ção bilaterais firmados entre Brasil e Angola, Namíbia, Nigéria, Senegal e Guiné Equatorial, o desenvolvimento conjunto entre Brasil e África do Sul do míssil ar-ar, denominado Projeto A-DARTER, entre outros (MRE, 2011). Outras iniciativas bastante significativas empreendidas pelos países- membros são os exercícios militares conjuntos ocorridos nos últimos anos. Tradicionalmente, os exercícios navais que têm o Atlântico Sul como palco são comandados pelos EUA. Exemplos disso são o exercício Unitas, que atualmente tem focado em combate a problemas como terrorismo, imigração ilegal e o tráfico

25 A região do Golfo da Guiné e, mais especificamente, as capacidades militares da Nigéria, serão melhor trabalhados no tópico B deste guia. 506 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations de drogas internacional; o exercício Obangame Express, o qual tem expandido o número de países membros, especialmente europeus (Lopes 2014); e o Plano de Coordenação da Defesa do Tráfego Marítimo, criado sob escopo do TIAR (Penha 2011). Contudo, nos últimos anos, os países costeiros do Atlântico Sul têm empreendido alguns exercícios conjuntos de maneira mais autônoma. Destes, destacam-se o Atlasur, desenvolvido por Brasil, Argentina, Uruguai e África do Sul, e o Fraterno, que reúne Brasil e Argentina, com o objetivo de estreitar as rela- ções entre as duas marinhas (Penha 2011). Outra iniciativa de importância são os exercícios Ibsamar, desenvolvidos sobre o escopo do IBAS e, portanto, envolvendo Índia, Brasil e África do Sul, que destacam-se por comportar, além do exercício, um fórum de cooperação marítima. Nota-se, assim, que nos dois lados do Atlântico Sul há movimentações em prol da modernização de suas Forças Armadas, especialmente capitaneadas por países chaves como Brasil, África do Sul, Nigéria e Angola. Por outro lado, fica evidente que há a tentativa da superação da dependência tecnológica das potências tradicionais, como os países europeus e os EUA. Um dos principais instrumentos para isto é a cooperação sul-sul. Com esta, os países-membros da ZOPACAS têm desenvolvido relações menos assimétricas e, consequentemente, mais propícias para seu desenvolvimento, seja este econômico, social ou tecnológico. Por outro lado, ainda que as diversas manifestações e ações em prol da deso- cupação do Atlântico Sul por parte de potências extrarregionais e as atitudes mencionadas acima tenham sido tomadas, os países costeiros ainda se encontram em situação de grande vulnerabilidade frente às grandes potências, principalmente no que tange a temas militares e econômicos. Além da já mencionada dependência às grandes potências em relação à tecnologia, muitas das economias africanas dos países membros da ZOPACAS, em função das gigantes reservas de petróleo, são extremamente dependentes do recurso natural, fato que faz com que tais Estados sejam muito dependentes das demandas externas pelo hidrocarboneto. Exemplo disso é a economia angolana, a qual, entre 2005 e 2007, teve um crescimento do PIB próximo a 20% e, em 2008, com a crise internacional, enfrentou uma desaceleração que levou a uma queda para o crescimento de aproximadamente 0,1% ao ano (Silva 2012). Além disso, ainda que alguns países, como Brasil, África do Sul, e Argentina, tenham capacidades militares significativas, estes representam uma porcentagem pequena frente ao restante dos países-membros da ZOPACAS: grande parte dos países da instituição ainda tem Estados fracos, que não conseguem dar condições básicas de saúde, educação, alimentação e infraestrutura às suas populações. Consequentemente, são países com economias frágeis e cujas Forças Armadas são vulneráveis. Afinal, após o “triunfo” e a propagação neoliberal da década de 1990, os poucos Estados africanos que tinham, de maneira mais consistente, alguma capacidade estatal, diminuíram-na. As consequências disso

507 Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul são sentidas até hoje, com as ainda presentes e constantes guerras civis e conflitos armados (Kerr de Oliveira 2010).

3 AÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS PRÉVIAS

A militarização de origem externa ao Atlântico Sul ainda não produziu declarações ou resoluções especificamente contrárias à presença estrangeira na região, exceto quando se trata de zonas disputadas, como as Ilhas Malvinas, ou do caso do Africom, sobre o qual os países africanos sofreram maior constrangi- mento e acabaram tendo de se pronunciar. Entretanto, os países que pertencem geograficamente ao Atlântico Sul tem reiterado o interesse em protagonizar e resolver os problemas da região por si sós, através da cooperação. Ou seja, é esse tipo de ação internacional prévia que tem sido construída no que tange à militarização do oceano, uma reação indireta à ingerência extrarregional na área, ou mais direta e específica como nos casos citados. As ações estão subdivididas de acordo com suas respectivas regiões e organizações: a própria ZOPACAS, e as duas costas do Atlântico Sul: a América do Sul e a África. Como ficará claro, cada uma dessas esferas regionais tem tratado da militarização exógena no Atlântico Sul de uma forma distinta, embora estejam unidas pela ZOPACAS.

3.1 ZONA DE PAZ E COOPERAÇÃO DO ATLÂNTICO SUL

Como mencionado anteriormente, a criação da ZOPACAS por meio da resolução n. 41/11 da AGNU, em 1986, deu um primeiro passo no sentido de declarar oposição à presença de armas nucleares e construção de bases estrangeiras na região. Depois de anos de baixa articulação entre os países do grupo, a já citada Iniciativa de Luanda convergiu na VI Reunião Ministerial da ZOPACAS, em 2007, quando foi elaborado o Plano de Ação de Luanda, que deveria servir como guia até a r eunião seguinte. O Plano foi incorporado pela resolução n. 61/294 da Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas e reafirma a cooperação entre Estados, especialmente os pertencentes à região, como a melhor forma de res- olução de problemas no Atlântico Sul (UN 2007). Foi igualmente reforçada a inter-relação e inseparabilidade das questões de paz e segurança com as de desenvolvimento. Assim, a ZOPACAS não foi apenas revitalizada em seu sentido político, como também começou a dar um formato mais securitário aos seus objetivos. A Reunião Ministerial de 2007 também criou 4 grupos de trabalho da ZOPACAS: (i) cooperação econômica; (ii) combate a atividades ilícitas e crime organizado; (iii) manutenção da paz e operações de apoio à paz; e (iv) pesquisa

508 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations científica, meio ambiente e questões marítimas (Fiori 2012, 154). Em seguida, a Declaração e o Plano de Ação de Montevidéu, assinados na VII Reunião, em 2013, deram maior especificidade às intenções declaradas de cooperação em matéria de segurança marítima, também indicando o interesse dos países membros em terem maior protagonismo no manejo dos problemas do Atlântico Sul, assim como enfatizaram a chamada cooperação Sul-Sul (Brasil 2013a). O Plano prevê cooperação em monitoramento, controle e vigilância de embarcações, combate a atividades ilícitas e crime transnacional, incluindo troca de dados e treinamento na operação de Identificação de Longo Alcance e Rastreamento de Navios (Brasil 2013b). Quanto à cooperação específica em defesa, os membros concordaram em: incrementar a interação entre suas Forças Armadas; viabilizar transparência quanto às políticas de defesa e a troca de infor- mações, como Livro Branco, Estratégia Nacional, Doutrina etc; buscar meios para reforçar suas capacidades navais e aéreas; promover exercícios militares conjuntos no Atlântico Sul e estabelecer um Grupo de Trabalho dentro das opera- ções de paz da ONU para explorar futuras oportunidades de cooperação entre os membros (Brasil 2013b). A Declaração de Montevidéu também reafirmou a resolução n. 31/49 da Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas, de 1976, referente à soberania das Ilhas Malvinas (Brasil 2013a). A Declaração expressa preocupação sobre o desenvolvimento de exploração ilícita de hidrocarbonetos na área, assim como o aumento da presença militar britânica na região, o que seria uma viola- ção da resolução citada, que justamente pede que se evitem ações unilaterais da Argentina e do Reino Unido.

3.2 ORGANIZAÇÕES REGIONAIS SUL-AMERICANAS

A União das Nações Sul-Americanas (Unasul), instituição que inclui os 12 países da América do Sul, não possui uma política declarada referindo-se ao Atlântico Sul. Entretanto, a organização vem reiterando seu apoio à Argentina na questão das Ilhas Malvinas e o fez novamente em sua última reunião, em 2013, na Declaração de Paramaribo (Unasul 2013). O Mercado Comum do Sul (Mercosul), embora seja um bloco comercial, tem se posicionado historicamente a favor da Argentina nesta mesma disputa. Em 2012, o grupo emitiu a “Declaração de Mendoza sobre uso, conservação e aproveitamento soberano dos recursos e riquezas Naturais”. A Declaração foi motivada pelo anúncio de que a negociação britânica com empresas internacionais para prospecção de petróleo na região das ilhas estaria em estágio avançado (Banco 2012). Da mesma forma, a declaração sobre “Intercâmbio de informação sobre navios e artefatos navais vinculados à questão das Ilhas Malvinas” comprometeu os países a compartilharem informa-

509 Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul

ções potencialmente relacionadas à exploração petrolífera ou mineral ilegal na área ou que incluam as Ilhas Malvinas como parte da rota de navios. O intercâmbio de informações também visará a impedir que navios com a bandeira dos territórios ultramarinos entrem nos portos dos países signatários (Banco 2012).

3.3 ORGANIZAÇÕES REGIONAIS AFRICANAS

Desde o anúncio da criação do Africom, houve uma série de contestações por parte dos países e das organizações interestatais africanas. Primeiramente, a União Africana, através de seu Parlamento, aprovou uma recomendação a todos os governos da institu- ição de não aceitarem os pedidos do governo dos EUA de implementar o Africom no continente (Ploch 2011). A Southern African Development Community (SADC, na sigla em inglês) emitiu declaração afirmando preferir o auxílio estadunidense “à distân- cia”, sem presença física no continente, enquanto a Community of Sahel-Saharan States (Cen-Sad) declarou-se veementemente contrária à instalação de qualquer comando militar estrangeiro. A Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), por sua vez, também se opôs fortemente à criação do Africom (Nathan 2009).

4 POSICIONAMENTO DOS PAÍSES

No que diz respeito à questão da presença extrarregional no Atlântico Sul, a Argentina é um dos países com maior interesse no assunto. A disputa pelo arquipélago das Malvinas, principalmente com o Reino Unido, é importante pilar de sua política externa. A condenação ao militarismo britânico é uma política de Estado argentina, a qual resultou na aprovação, em 2012, da Declaração de Ushuaia – documento aprovado pelo Congresso da Nação e que legitima a soberania argentina sobre as Malvinas. De acordo com a Secretaria de Assuntos Relativos às Ilhas Malvinas, Geórgias do Sul, Sandwich do Sul e Espaços Marítimos Circundantes da Argentina, o Reino Unido continua adot- ando uma postura belicista, através da militarização do Atlântico Sul. Invocando a nova Revisão de Segurança e Defesa Estratégica britânica, de 2010, a Argentina defende que o objetivo do Reino Unido é, através de uma base nas ilhas Malvinas, ter apoio para o estabelecimento de uma presença militar em escala global (Télam 2014). O governo de Cristina Kirchner tem buscado aproximar- se do Brasil no âmbito regional, havendo concordância em diversos temas, como cooperação via Mercosul e Unasul e a desvinculação dos Estados Unidos das questões regionais sul americanas. Através de sua política latino-americanista, Cristina Kirchner vem buscando fortalecer a Unasul e a Comunidade de Estados

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Latino Americanos e Caribenhos como instituições legítimas para a resolução de problemas regionais (Merke 2014). A nova Política de Defesa Nacional do Uruguai, de 2014, reconhece a pre- sença de potências estrangeiras no Atlântico Sul como uma ameaça à manuten- ção desta região como zona de paz. O governo de Pepe Mujica, bastante voltado para a questão das liberdades individuais e o desenvolvimento social de seu povo, entende a presença britânica nas Ilhas Malvinas como uma ameaça latente à paz na região. Isto afeta a zona oceânica responsável pelas comunicações e atividade econômica marítima do país, e é uma preocupação para todos os países da região (El Día 2014). O Uruguai tem uma política externa baseada nos princípios de não intervenção, multilateralismo e respeito pela soberania dos Estados. Apesar da importante influência dos vizinhos Brasil e Argentina, o país tem diversi- ficado suas relações e sua participação em organizações internacionais, sendo, portando, observador da Aliança para o Pacífico, organização vista com relutân- cia pelos vizinhos sul-americanos (Princeton University 2014c). Detentor de uma das economias mais ricas da África, o atual governo do Camarões busca manter boas relações com os países africanos, envolvendo-se em uma série de organizações, como a Comunidade Econômica dos Estados da África Central, e fomentando a integração na região centro-africana, como um importante passo para a manutenção da paz e desenvolvimento local. Antiga colônia francesa, o Camarões ainda mantém importantes vínculos com a França, inclusive acordos militares. Possui também boas relações com os Estados Unidos, União Europeia – seu principal parceiro comercial – e, progressivamente, vem aproximando-se da China, que investe em projetos de infraestrutura no país (Foreign Affairs 2014; Mbonjo 2013; Visentini 2012). No que diz respeito ao Atlântico Sul, o país tem uma unidade militar especializada em segurança marítima e combate à pirataria e tem tido importante papel na segurança no Golfo da Guiné, havendo promovido o primeiro encontro entre a ECOWAS, a Comissão do Golfo da Guiné e a ECCAS – Economic Community of West African States – para tratar do tema (Kendemeh 2014). Historicamente, o Gabão foi um dos países mais importantes para a política francesa na África pós-colonial, no sentido de manter sua influência nas antigas colônias e obter benefícios disso. Ainda hoje, o Gabão possui rela- ções importantes com a França, havendo inclusive uma base militar francesa em Libreville, capital do país. Além disso, a China vem se inserindo progressivamente em território gabonês, principalmente em busca de recursos naturais, sendo o petróleo responsável por 50% do PIB e 80% das exportações gabo- nesas (Visentini 2012). A política externa do Gabão é focada na promoção de seu desenvolvimento e na cooperação com outros países, de modo a contribuir para a paz e segurança em sua região e no Sistema Internacional (República

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Gabonesa 2011). O arquipélago de São Tomé e Príncipe, um dos PALOP – Países Africanos de Língua Portuguesa – e membro da Comunidade de Países de Língua Portuguesa – CPLP –, tem uma posição geopolítica estratégica no Atlântico Sul. O país dispõe de importantes recursos naturais, como petróleo, além do potencial hidrelétrico. Desde o início dos anos 1990 sua política externa está voltada para os países do Ocidente, principalmente Estados Unidos e Europa Ocidental e, além disso, mantém até hoje relações com Taiwan, ao invés da China. São Tomé e Príncipe realiza exercícios navais conjuntos com os Estados Unidos no Golfo da Guiné, havendo negociações para o desenvolvimento de instalações militares navais na região (Visentini 2012). Além da cooperação com os Estados Unidos, o relacionamento com a União Europeia, através das reuniões União Europeia-África, e com os membros da CPLP constitui prioridade para sua política externa. A adoção de uma política multilateral e a aproximação com os países emergentes, em busca de recursos naturais, é vista como uma estratégia para fomentar seu próprio desenvolvimento, cuja economia ainda se apresenta deficitária e dependente de assistência externa (Jornal ST 2014). Há potencial para exploração do petróleo na Zona Econômica Exclusiva de São Tomé e Príncipe, além da Zona de Desenvolvimento Conjunto – área marítima dividida com a Nigéria – onde já atuam diversas empresas petrolíferas (Visentini 2012). A Guiné Bissau tem sua política externa pautada na questão do desenvolvimento econômico e social, com enfoque no multilateralismo e na inte- gração regional. Com uma posição estratégica no Atlântico Sul, por ser passagem de rotas marítimas, a Guiné Bissau tem desafios internos a superar, em razão das constantes instabilidades políticas e das diversas tentativas de golpes de Estados pelos quais o país passou nos últimos anos. A instabilidade política neste país, além das diversas divisões étnicas e dos problemas decorrentes do tráfico de droga internacional entre América do Sul e Europa, são pontos que favore- cem a interferência de outros Estados na política guineense, principalmente se levarmos em consideração o potencial petrolífero nesta região (Visentini 2012). Depois do período socialista, a Guiné Bissau passou a privilegiar a cooperação com os países europeus e, principalmente, Portugal e o Brasil (Krieger 2014; Visentini 2012). Juntamente com Cabo Verde, Gana, Guiné, Mauritânia, Senegal e Serra Leoa, requer a extensão em 200 milhas de sua plataforma continental (MacauHub 2014). O governo atual de Ernest Koroma, em Serra Leoa, tem buscado a recon- strução do país, que ainda sofre com os resultados da guerra civil, o combate à corrupção e ao narcotráfico. O país tem importantes vínculos políticos e econômicos com a União Europeia, principalmente com o Reino Unido. Com o início da estabilização política, Serra Leoa tem buscado se aproximar dos viz-

512 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations inhos Libéria e Guiné, através de um projeto de integração envolvendo o Rio Mano. O crescimento econômico apresentado decorre da exploração de dia- mantes, de doações da ONU e investimentos na área de mineração (European Union 2014a; Visentini 2012). O Togo é um país ainda muito dependente de doações internacionais e assistência externa. Mantém relações estreitas com a França que, além de maior doador ao país, foi também apoiador do Governo do general Eyadema26. Apesar dos problemas territoriais existentes com Gana e Benin, o governo tem buscado se aproximar dos seus vizinhos regionais e se esforçado para o progresso democrático, com apoio da União Europeia, da União Africana e da CEDEAO – Comunidade Econômica dos Estados da África Ocidental (European Union 2014b; Visentini 2012). Os principais parceiros externos de Gâmbia são Taiwan, Gana, Nigéria e Senegal. O país tem buscado diversificar o destino de suas exportações, dirigindo- as não só à União Europeia, mas também para a África e a Ásia. Devido às ações violentas que se seguiram ao golpe militar, em 1994, diversos países ocidentais impuseram sanções econômicas, fazendo com que a Gâmbia se aproximasse de países considerados párias naquela época, como Nigéria, Líbia, Iraque, Irã, Cuba e Taiwan, até 2003, quando iniciou um processo de legitimação política e combate à corrupção. Apesar de ser membro da Commonwealth, ficou suspensa de alguns de seus órgãos até 2001, devido ao golpe de 1994. Atualmente a China vem tendo uma presença crescente neste país, ao lado de Senegal, Reino Unido, Holanda, Costa do Marfim e Brasil (Visentini 2012; John 2012). A Costa do Marfim é um país cuja política externa é bastante voltada para os países ocidentais. Após a ascensão do Partido FPI (Frente Popular Marfinense) ao poder, o qual adota uma postura mais anticolonialista, as relações da Costa do Marfim com a antiga metrópole, a França, sofreram uma grande mudança. Sobretudo, a intervenção francesa no conflito civil que começou em 2002, evento em que os franceses destruíram a Força Aérea Marfinense, prejudicou as relações entre estes países. Sob o nome de Operação Unicórnio, a França enviou cerca de 3.000 soldados para auxiliar a Operação das Nações Unidas na Costa do Marfim, uma ação de manutenção de paz, havendo sido uma das mais con- trovérsias intervenções francesas na África. A Costa do Marfim é um país que

26 Étienne Eyadema foi um general togolês que comandou o golpe de Estado contra o primeiro Presidente do Togo após a independência da França, Sylvanus Olympius. Posteriormente, Eyadema se tornaria o próprio presidente do Togo, em 1967, permanecendo no poder até sua morte, em 2005. Durante sua gestão, houve forte centralização do poder, sobretudo pela relação do Estado com as forças armadas. O ponto mais importante é que o Togo de Eyadema esteve ligado à política pós-colonial francesa da Françafrique, havendo forte influência francesa no processo de tomada de decisões no Togo, sejam elas políticas ou econômicas (Whiteman 2005). 513 Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul se destaca regionalmente como detentora da segunda maior força econômico- militar da CEDEAO (Africa in World Politics 2013; Visentini 2012). Angola tem um papel chave na dinâmica do Atlântico Sul. Segunda maior produtora de petróleo do continente africano e o maior fornecedor de petróleo e maior parceira comercial da China no continente, Angola tem uma política bastante semelhante à do Brasil no que diz respeito ao Atlântico Sul, sendo o Brasil um dos parceiros prioritários de Angola, ao lado de China, Estados Unidos e Portugal (Kiala e Ngwenya 2011, 06). A política externa de Angola sempre esteve voltada ao fortalecimento do país e superação das mazelas causadas pela guerra civil, tendo como prioridade o desenvolvimento da infraestrutura do país. Com o fim da guerra civil, o país diversificou seus parceiros, aproximando- se dos Estados Unidos e da Europa, e tem buscado reinserir-se regionalmente, sempre mantendo uma importante relação com o Brasil. Angola tem concentrado sua atenção na política de segurança regional na África Austral, principalmente em relação à República Democrática do Congo. A cooperação com os Estados Unidos é importante para Angola por razões políticas, econômicas e securitárias, particularmente no que diz respeito à segurança marítima no Golfo da Guiné (Malaquias 2011; Visentini 2012). A segurança no Atlântico Sul é uma questão essencial para Angola, tendo em vista que a produção de petróleo e suas atividades contribuem com aproximadamente 85% do PIB angolano (Visentini 2012). Angola investe na consolidação de uma instituição de cooper- ação no Atlântico Sul e não é do seu interesse a presença de potências externas na região. Sobretudo, para Angola importa que os países cooperem em segurança e na estruturação de suas capacidades de defesa. A SWAPO (South-West Africa People’s Organisation), que surgiu como o movimento de libertação nacional da Namíbia, continua sendo a força política mais importante no país. Apesar de sua base socialista, o partido vem abrindo espaço para uma economia mista e com investimentos externos. O país é bastante dependente do setor da mineração, sendo o quinto maior exporta- dor de minérios do continente africano, com destaque para a produção de urânio (Visentini 2012). A Namíbia dá bastante importância à organizações regionais, como a União Africana e a SADC (Southern African Development Community), além do movimento dos Não Alinhados. Sua política externa foca nas organizações de países em desenvolvimento, como o G-77 e em todos os programas destinados ao fomento da cooperação sul-sul e do diálogo Norte- Sul (República da Namíbia 2014). O Brasil é um importante parceiro na área naval, havendo cooperação desde os anos 1990 entre as duas Marinhas para o fortalecimento das capacidades defensivas da Namíbia, além de ter realizado o levantamento da plataforma continental do país (Reis 2011). Desde o fim do regime segregacionista do apartheid, a política externa

514 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations da África do Sul introduziu a Cooperação Sul-Sul como um de seus mais significativos pilares. Além da entrada em blocos como o Movimento de Países Não Alinhados, os BRICS e o IBAS, o país é hoje um líder regional e coordena importantes instituições da África Austral, como SADC e SACU. Dentro das diretrizes da chamada “Nova Diplomacia”, a África do Sul hoje busca a resolução dos problemas africanos por parte dos próprios africanos (Visentini e Pereira 2010). Para tal, o Estado – uma potência econômica e militar regional – é um dos líderes da integração da África Austral, um dos mais importantes atores na União Africana e na SADCBRIG. Além disso, o país coordenou a intervenção da SADC no Lesoto, em 1998, e, em 2003, coordenou uma missão da UA no Burundi. Assim, ainda que a África do Sul mantenha atualmente importantes relações com as potências europeias e, principalmente, com os EUA, o Estado busca evitar a presença de potências extrarregionais no continente africano e no Atlântico Sul. Quando da criação do Africom, a África do Sul foi um dos Estados africanos mais críticos ao comando, lançando uma série de declara- ções contrárias (Ploch, 2011; Deen, 2013). Por outro lado, após a instalação do Comando, a África do Sul passou a colaborar com o Africom, e um dos seus principais portos, o de Simon’s Town, é bastante utilizado para operações estadunidenses. Na última década, o Brasil vem tomando uma série de medidas bastante significativas para o Atlântico Sul. A aprovação de legislações de defesa tornou clara a intenção brasileira de tornar o Atlântico Sul uma zona livre da presença de potências extrarregionais e cuja soberania seja dos países costeiros. Assim, a Marinha do Brasil, segundo a Estratégia Nacional de Defesa (2008), tem atualmente como objetivo a negação do uso do mar para inimigos, o controle de áreas marítimas e a projeção de poder. A já mencionada criação do conceito de Amazônia Azul, com a delimitação da Zona Econômica Exclusiva brasileira e sua Plataforma Continental, mostra que o país estabeleceu o Atlântico Sul e os recursos nele inseridos como estratégicos para a consolidação plena de sua soberania (Brasil, 2008). O Brasil posicionou-se contrariamente ao restabelecimento da IV Frota desde o seu anúncio, bem como emitiu declarações contrárias ao fortalecimento do Southcom. Por se tratar de uma potência regional e liderança que busca fomentar a integração sul-americana, o Brasil entende que a militarização do Atlântico Sul por parte de potências extrarregionais prejudica a governança baseada nos princípios da ZOPACAS que os países costeiros têm buscado desenvolver e acredita que os mecanismos para a resolução dos problemas securitários sul-americanos e africanos devem ser regionais. Finalmente, o Brasil, sob o âmbito da UNASUL e da Comunidade de Estados Latino-americanos e Caribenhos (CELAC), declarou o apoio à Argentina no que tange à soberania das Malvinas. A Nigéria é atualmente a maior economia africana, tendo superado a

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África do Sul no primeiro semestre de 201427 (The Economist 2014). Sua economia, entretanto, tem a base dinâmica centrada no petróleo e, consequentemente, é grandemente dependente do setor de exportação. Por deter a maior reserva e produtora de petróleo na África e por ser atualmente uma das principais fornecedoras do recurso para os Estados Unidos, o país recebe crescentes atenções da comunidade internacional e, principalmente, dos EUA. Na Nigéria, no século XXI tem crescido a atuação do grupo extremista Boko Haram28. Alguns dos ataques do grupo nos últimos tempos, dentre os quais se destaca o sequestro de 230 meninas no nordeste do país, no primeiro semestre de 2014, e a incapacidade do governo central nigeriano de controlar e exercer a segurança na plenitude de seu território fizeram com que o princípio de responsabilidade de proteger (responsability to protect, ou R2P) fosse discutido pela comunidade internacional. Frente a isto, a questão da presença de potências extrarregionais é de grande importância à Nigéria. Um fato que torna ainda mais complexa a situação foram as informações vazadas pelo Wikileaks, que afirma- vam que a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), o Reino Unido, além das sabidas Arábia Saudita e al-Qaeda estariam treinando e financiando os guerrilheiros do Boko Haram (Bowie 2012). Desde o primeiro anúncio da criação do Africom, a Nigéria foi uma de suas maiores críticas (Deen, 2013). Além disso, o país posiciona-se geograficamente cercada de países que foram colônias francesas, dentre os quais muitos ainda sofrem grande influência da França. A presença de potências extrarregionais – principalmente dos dois mencionados acima – nos assuntos securitários da região do Golfo da Guiné e do Saara-Sahel ameaça, em alguma medida, a liderança que a Nigéria tem buscado promover na região, além de esvaziar os mecanismos securitários de instituições como o ECOWAS. A República Democrática do Congo (RDC) ainda hoje vive situação de grande instabilidade. O país viveu nas últimas décadas duas grandes guerras, nas quais estavam envolvidos diversos países e grupos militares não estatais. Atualmente, a ONU está presente no país por meio da sua missão MONUSCO, a qual foi renovada em março de 2014, na tentativa de estabilização da RDC. O Estado con- golês possui uma série de debilidades institucionais, incluindo a falta de monopólio da coerção interna ao país (Silva 2011). Assim, a República Democrática do Congo é ainda muito dependente de seus parceiros internacionais. Por outro lado, a RDC posiciona-se de maneira a preferir uma arquitetura institucional e securitária for- mada pelos atores regionais. Deste modo, a presença de potências extrarregionais no

27 O reconhecimento da Nigéria como detentora do maior PIB africano em 2014 se deu porque o Estado não atualizava a fórmula do cálculo do seu Produto Interno Bruto desde a década de 1990. A partir da atualização da fórmula e do recálculo que seguiu a atualização, a Nigéria foi reconhecida como tal. 28 O Boko Haram é um grupo jihadista que emergiu na década de 2000. 516 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

Atlântico Sul é vista com receios por parte do Congo. Historicamente, a Libéria tem sua política externa alinhada ao Ocidente e, mais especificamente, aos Estados Unidos. O Estado africano, apesar de viver situação de relativa estabilidade desde 2003, após a eleição de Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, sofre com diversos conflitos internos e com o transbordamento de conflitos regionais, principalmente da Costa do Marfim e da Guiné. O país passou por uma intervenção da ECOWAS e, posteriormente, recebeu uma missão observadora da ONU durante a década de 1990. Assim, a presença de outros países ou intervenções externas dentro do seu território tem sido relativamente recorrente na história recente da Libéria. As relações do país com os EUA são bastante profundas, principalmente no que tange às relações militares. No governo de Ronald Reagan, houve um significativo aprofundamento destas quando os EUA passaram a treinar e financiar as Forças Armadas do então chefe de Estado, Samuel K. Doe. As relações ganharam nova força na administração de George W. Bush, pois os EUA passaram a cooperar para a reestruturação do exército liberiano, principalmente a partir da empresa militar privada DYNCORP – a qual não tem tido grande sucesso na função (Pajibo e Woods s.d.). Além disso, a Libéria é atualmente uma das grandes defensoras do Africom e da instalação de bases estadunidenses no continente africano (Pajibo e Woods s.d.). O governo acredita que o Comando pode unir os interesses dos EUA e dos países africanos ao tentar montar uma estrutura de segurança para o continente (Sirleaf 2007). A Guiné Equatorial tem se destacado nos últimos anos no cenário internacional. Durante a última década, o país se tornou o terceiro maior exporta- dor de petróleo na África, e o maior destino do recurso são os Estados Unidos (Visentini 2012), além de grande parte das empresas petrolíferas que atuam no país serem estadunidenses, sendo a ExxonMobil e a Chevron as mais relevantes. Além disso, os EUA são o principal parceiro econômico da Guiné Equatorial, seguido da China, da Espanha e da Itália (Emerging Equatorial Guinea 2014). Com os recursos econômicos obtidos com o petróleo, os quais representam grande parte das receitas do Estado, o país africano tem buscado se modernizar, principalmente na área de infraestrutura. O país tem um histórico complicado com potências extrarregionais desde sua independência em relação à Espanha, pois esta foi obtida com uma série de controvérsias. Atualmente, porém, o país mantém boas relações com Estados europeus e com os EUA. Exemplo disso é a relação entre a Guiné Equatorial e o Africom, pois o país recebe uma quantidade significativa de ajuda em capacidades militares e treinamento do Comando. Por outro lado, o atual presidente do país, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, já lançou uma série de declarações criticando a presença e a interferência externa nos assuntos internos à Guiné Equatorial, bem como condenou a presença de potências extrarregionais no país (Lewis 2011). Já o Benim tem postura pare-

517 Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul cida, mas atualmente é um importante parceiro dos Estados Unidos no continente e tem se beneficiado dos programas de ajuda do Africom. Ademais, o país tem recebido ajuda do comando para a formulação da sua estratégia marítima (Brown 2013). A presidência pró-tempore da ZOPACAS é atualmente exercida por Cabo Verde. O país tem aumentado sua atuação no Atlântico Sul nos últimos anos e tem formulado uma política externa mais ativa, principalmente em organismos internacionais, como na ZOPACAS (InfoPress: Agência Cabo-Verdiana de Notícias 2012), a Comunidade de Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP) e a União Africana (A Nação 2014). O Estado também lidera um grupo com seis outros países – Guiné Bissau, Gana, Guiné, Mauritânia, Senegal e Serra Leoa – que atualmente requer a extensão em 200 milhas de sua plataforma continental (MacauHub 2014). O estudo para o requerimento foi feito em parceria com o governo da Noruega, e o pedido já recebeu apoio de países como Portugal e Noruega (MacauHub 2008). A política externa de Cabo Verde, entretanto, esteve historicamente voltada para a Europa, com diversas tentativas do país para ingressar na OTAN e na União Europeia, sob a justificativa de não ter capacidades para defesa própria (Visentini 2012). Apesar da tradição histórica de não alinhamento de Gana, iniciada com o líder nacional Kwane Nkrumah, o país, desde 1990, aproximou-se significativamente da Inglaterra e dos Estados Unidos, especialmente no governo do ex-presidente, John Koufur (Visentini 2012). O país é um dos mais influentes na região e um dos grandes apoiadores da ECOWAS, além de comportar o principal centro de treinamento de tropas de paz nas proximidades da capital, Acra (P. F. Visentini 2012) e um Cooperative Security Location do Africom. O Comando estadunidense também tem tido atuação relevante com a execução de exercícios para a defesa dos recursos minerais offshore ganenses (Brown 2013). O Senegal tem hoje uma política externa voltada para as potências ocidentais - fato materializado, principalmente, num significativo aprofundamento das suas relações com a ex-metrópole, França (Sall 2013) e com os Estados Unidos. A França e o Senegal mantêm relações bastante íntimas e complexas, tendo a França mantido uma de suas mais importantes bases na África no país por 50 anos, a qual fora fechada em 2010 por questões econômicas do país europeu (Brown 2013). Além disso, o país tem se mostrado um grande parceiro dos EUA na Guerra ao Terror, sendo sede da terceira maior embaixada estadunidense no continente africano. O país é um grande receptor de ajuda do Africom, principalmente na área de construção de capacidade operacional para o país (Brown 2013), com ênfase no contraterrorismo. Exemplos disso são o fato de o Senegal ter assinado Bilateral Immunity Agreement de proteção para militares dos EUA, ter sediado a conferência na qual foi assinado o Pacto

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Africano contra o Terrorismo, em 2001, os EUA serem o maior contribuinte em recursos econômicos do país e, finalmente, milhares de soldados senegale- ses terem recebido treinamento pelo State Department’s Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance. Ademais, o país é membro do Trans- Saharan Counterterrorism Partnetship, programa desenvolvido pelos Estados Unidos com o objetivo de combater o terrorismo na região do Saara, do Sahel e do Magreb. Já a Guiné tem uma relação complexa frente a intervenções externas no país. No final da década passada, na então administração do militar Moussa Daddis Camara, o Estado viveu um momento conturbado, durante o qual fora cogitado pela comunidade internacional o envio de tropas de potências extrarregionais para a estabilização do país. A Guiné, entretanto, declarou que entenderia a presença de tropas extrarregionais no país como uma declaração de guerra (Sidiqque 2009) e que entraria em combate com as forças internacionais que interviessem no Estado (Jean-Matthew 2009). Seu atual presidente, Alpha Condé, segue uma linha de maior cooperação com as grandes potências, pois entende que estas exercem um papel fundamental para o desenvolvimento da Guiné. A Guiné detém, atualmente, a maior reserva mundial de bauxita e é responsável pelo fornecimento de 24% das importações estadunidenses do recurso (Arieff 2011). Além disso, os Peace Corps estadunidenses estão presentes no país desde 1962 e o país assinou, em 2002, um acordo com os Estados Unidos para aprovar a presença de pessoal militar e civil para o treinamento das Forças Armadas guineenses (United States Department of State 2013); afinal, os EUA têm atuado fortemente na reforma das Forças Armadas que tem ocorrido na Guiné (Arieff 2011).

5 QUESTÕES A PONDERAR

1. De que forma os países membros podem fortalecer sua soberania e autonomia via projetos de cooperação e desenvolvimento da região do Atlântico Sul? 2. Que tipo de medidas podem ser adotadas pela ZOPACAS de modo a fortalecer sua capacidade de resposta conjunta em uma situação de ameaça à soberania de algum dos membros, ou da manutenção da área livre de ingerências extrarregionais? 3. Até que ponto a presença de potências extrarregionais pode ser aceita de modo a contribuir para a manutenção da segurança no Atlântico Sul?

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4. De que maneira os recursos naturais presentes no Atlântico Sul afetam a segurança regional? 5. Como a coordenação na área de defesa e de segurança é afetada pela assimetria de capacidades militares - especialmente aeronavais – dos países da região?

REFERÊNCIAS

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UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations ISSN: 2318-3195 | v.2, 2014| p. 531-565

PIRATARIA NO GOLFO DA GUINÉ

Giovana Esther Zucatto1 Michele Baptista2

RESUMO

Desde 1990, a ação de piratas se tornou uma realidade na costa leste africana, sobretudo na área conhecida como Chifre Africano. O problema também vem crescendo na margem ocidental do continente, principalmente no Golfo da Guiné, fato este que coloca em risco importantes vias marítimas internacionais e o transporte de petróleo na região, ameaçando a segurança e a paz no Atlântico Sul. Este tópico discutirá maneiras de combater as ações criminosas no Golfo da Guiné, que está relacionada não somente com ataques a cargueiros de petróleo, mas ao tráfico de drogas, ao contrabando de armas, ao abastecimento e pesca ilegais. Dentro dessa discussão, importa que os delega- dos atentem às peculiaridades da região, buscando alternativas que estejam em consonância com os princípios da Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul.

1 Aluna do oitavo semestre do curso de Relações Internacionais da UFRGS. E-mail: [email protected] 2 Aluna do sexto semestre do curso de Relações Internacionais da UFRGS. E-mail: [email protected] Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul

1 HISTÓRICO

1.1 A COLONIZAÇÃO DO GOLFO DA GUINÉ E A PARTILHA DA ÁFRICA

O continente africano passou a ser explorado ainda no século XV, a partir das grandes navegações que resultaram na conquista portuguesa de territórios africanos, como Ceuta em 1415 e Cabo Verde em 1445 (Davis 2005). Por conseguinte, na medida em que a presença portuguesa se consolidava na África, iniciavam-se as atividades comerciais de escravos e ouro, originando o comércio atlântico de escravos no Golfo da Guiné em princípios do século XVI (Penha 2011, 31). Cabe destacar que o comércio de escravos no Golfo da Guiné foi decorrente de duas razões: primeiramente, porque permitia o desenvolvimento da produção açucareira nas colônias portuguesas nas Américas e em São Tomé; em segundo lugar, devido à demanda crescente hispano-americana por escravos (Abshire 1969, apud Penha 2011). Em troca desses recursos que viabilizavam o domínio europeu, os africanos recebiam produtos de baixo valor, como aguardente, tabaco e manufaturados europeus. A ocupação e expansão do capitalismo mercantil na África era legitimada por uma série de fatores ideológicos, como a evangelização e missões civilizatórias que tinham como justificativa libertar o povo africano da suposta barbárie (Luna 2007, 5). Assim sendo, muitos missionários e viajantes exploradores, que foram até à África, tiveram um papel importante no processo da colonização europeia. Todavia, também eram praticadas medidas econômicas que impulsionavam a exploração e aperfeiçoavam o comércio, como controlar o curso dos rios com a finalidade de escoar os produtos da costa africana até os portos europeus (Luna 2007, 6). A corrida por áreas de influência no território africano foi intensificada pela crise econômica que eclodiu na década de 1970. Tornou-se necessário aos europeus abrir o comércio direto para os produtos africanos e os manufaturados europeus, o que exigia uma ruptura do controle de acesso ao interior (Visentini 2010). Assim, foram estabelecidos, de forma autônoma, inúmeros tratados e acordos pessoais que favorecessem os Estados Europeus. Como consequência, esse cenário favoreceu a convocação da Conferência de Berlim no dia 15 de novembro de 1884 a 26 de fevereiro de 1885 (Luna 2007). A conferência estabeleceu medidas para uma partilha coordenada da África. Através dela, foram acordadas regras para a liberdade do comércio e igualdade de condições para os países concorrentes, colocando fim ao protecionismo na região (Visentini 2010). Outro objetivo fundamental estipulado foi a regulamentação da ocupação da costa ocidental do continente (Luna 2007, 7). Nesse contexto, como estipulado pelo conceito de uti possidetis, o domínio dos territórios só seria efetivo caso houvesse ocupação de fato (Goes 1991). Para isso, deveria

532 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations existir uma autoridade que, além de assegurar o domínio, respeitasse a liberdade e trânsito do comércio. Embora, como já citado anteriormente, os europeus estivessem presentes no continente desde o século XV, foi através da Conferência de Berlim que a dominação passou a ser efetiva. Assim, a história e a política da África passaram a ser definidas pela diplomacia europeia (Visentini 2010). O continente se transformou em objeto do imperialismo dos beneficitários, sendo remodelado geopoliticamente, socialmente, e economicamente.

1.2 O PROCESSO DE DESCOLONIZAÇÃO

Esta ocupação colonial se estendeu até aproximadamente 1960, comumente conhecido como o “ano africano”, marcado por uma série de movimentos de independência (Visentini 2010). Esses foram fortemente influenciados pelas duas guerras mundiais que eclodiram durante a dominação europeia na África. Frente à situação que se desenhava, alguns elementos se mostraram chaves ao projeto de descolonização. São exemplos a postura anticolonialista adotada pelos Estados Unidos, que viam vantagens econômicas no surgimento de Estados emancipados, uma vez que suas indústrias multinacionais enfrentavam obstáculos devido às políticas dos impérios coloniais (Visentini 2010). Já URSS, também com uma postura anticolonialista, via a oportunidade de expandir sua área de influência. Cabe citar, além disso, o sistema das Nações Unidas; as reivindicações africanas por emancipação, o papel da Conferência de Bandung e das guerras anticoloniais da Ásia (Visentini 2010). Pode-se dizer, por conseguinte, que as independências foram acontecendo de forma relativamente controlada; entretanto, muitas guerras civis marcaram esse processo, como as ocorridas no Congo e na Argélia (Visentini 2010). Isso se dava porque ainda existia uma renúncia entre as potências coloniais em aceitarem as reivindicações africanas. É o caso das metrópoles mais fracas, que tentaram proteger seus interesses por meios militares. Portugal, por exemplo, incapaz de manter a dominação econômica sem o domínio político, lutou longas guerras para resistir à descolonização (Schmidt 2013). Tais conflitos gerados durante a descolonização fizeram a África ser inclusa nas disputas da Guerra Fria. Nesse contexto, os EUA, que primeiramente eram a favor dos movimentos emancipatórios, viam, nessa nova conjuntura, uma oportunidade de acesso às matérias primas e aos mercados que antes eram controlados pelos impérios coloniais. Desse modo, Washington também se aproveitou da oportunidade para promover as ideologias e políticas econômicas americanas nos novos Estados (Schmidt 2013). Como consequência, os EUA ajudaram a reprimir movimentos africanos que

533 Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul iam contra seus interesses e influenciavam a tomada de poder por aqueles regimes que fossem favoráveis aos seus interesses (Schmidt 2013). A URSS, em contrapartida, pretendia diminuir a influência ocidental no continente. Por fim, outro ator importante foi a República Popular da China. Esta via o continente africano como uma arena onde se projetar e combater o imperialismo(Schmidt 2013). Nesse contexto, cabe mencionar ainda as políticas neoliberais impostas ao continente africano. Muitos empréstimos foram contraídos pelos países da região entre 1970 e 1980. Os governos sucessores, então, para sanar as dívidas foram forçadas a pagá-las através de moeda estrangeira, ajuda externa e novos empréstimos (Schmidt 2013). Por conseguinte, o pagamento da dívida contraída através de governos estrangeiros, bancos e as instituições financeiras internacionais continuaram a consumir uma grande parte das receitas do governo africano. Assim, serviços essenciais, bem como desenvolvimento econômico, não recebiam devidas atribuições (Schmidt 2013). O neoliberalismo econômico ainda vinha acompanhado pelo controle político. Assim, a renegociação de acordos econômicos, de empréstimos do FMI e os programas de ajuda estavam ligados às reformas democratizantes, respeito à oposição e à realização de eleições livres multipartidárias. Ou seja, governos socialistas derrotados militarmente, ou impossibilitados de receber ajuda externa deveriam se adaptar às novas regras ou seriam substituídos por outros governos mais favoráveis aos interesses dos EUA (Visentini 2010). A implementação do neoliberalismo político e econômico apresentou, portanto, elementos de desfuncionalidade para os Estados recém formados, resultando em um momento de regressão do continente (Schmidt 2013).

1.3 O PETRÓLEO NO GOLFO DA GUINÉ

No período que se desenrolou desde a colonização, como exposto acima, foram descobertos hidrocarbonetos na região e, em especial no Golfo da Guiné. Como se pode analisar na figura de número 2, o primeiro país na região a descobrir jazidas de petróleo em seu território foi o Congo, passando a produzir somente alguns anos depois, em 1957. Logo em seguida, tem-se a Angola, que descobriu sua primeira reserva em 1955 e onde atualmente as empresas ocidentais controlam 90% do petróleo da região (Ukeja e Ela 2013). Importante ressaltar ainda a posição da Nigéria, que fez sua primeira descoberta em 1956 e hoje possui as maiores reservas do hidrocarboneto no Golfo (Ukeja e Ela 2013). Embora a região seja rica em hidrocarbonetos, a relação entre governos e empresas petrolíferas na região foi desenvolvida de forma pragmática até aproximadamente a década de 1990 (Taylor 2012). No entanto, a invenção de tecnologias para a extração de petróleo offshore tornou a região atrativa às

534 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations empresas petrolíferas ocidentais. A partir disso, empresas de extração começaram a se instalar na região. Tem-se, como exemplo, as norte-americanas Walter Oil & Gas e United Meridian Corp (UMC) que tomaram posições importantes, tal como no norte da ilha de Biko, localizada no Guiné Equatorial (Oil&GasJournal 2004). Essa é uma área geológica em justaposição aos locais de produção de Nigéria e Camarões. Outro exemplo que vale mencionar é a Nigéria, que em 1990 iniciou um programa para desenvolver suas próprias empresas, o que resultou em 10 petrolíferas nigerianas de inicialização, entre elas a OPL 224, hoje em dia chamada de OML 115 (Oil&GasJournal 2004).

Tabela 1 - Dados petrolíferos de países do Golfo da Guiné Oil reserves Crude oil Year of first Revenue Tear of first in 2009 production in Discovery of Reserve/ production (billion 2009 (1000 oil and or gas Production barrels) barrels/day) Angola 1955 1956 9,0 1.906,4 12,9 Cameroon 1955 1978 0,2 76,9 7,7 Congo 1951 1957 1,6 267,8 16,4 DRC 1970 1975 0,2 16,4 33,4 Equatorial 1991 1992 1,1 322,0 9,4 Guinea Nigeria 1956 1958 36,2 2207,8 44,9 Gabon 1956 1957 2,0 242,1 22,6 Sao Tome 2006 2012 0,0 0,0 0,0 and Principe Fonte: Ukeja e Ela 2013.

1.4 ORIGENS DA PIRATARIA

Com os primeiros registros datando dos roubos de mercadorias fenícias e assírias pelos gregos em, aproximadamente, 735 a.C, a pirataria marítima ocorreu em regiões diversas por toda a história, tendo foco especialmente o Mar Mediterrâneo e o Mar Morto, mas também o Mar Vermelho e o Oceano Índico (Royal Naval Museum Library 2002; RNML 2002; Fernandes 2009). Com a colonização do continente americano, os piratas passaram a atuar principalmente

535 Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul no Atlântico, atacando navios que voltavam da América. Esse período ficou conhecido como “Época de Ouro da Pirataria” (Fernandes 2009). Nessa fase, o Mar do Caribe era o principal foco de ataques, uma vez que passavam, nessa região, inúmeros navios transportando mercadorias valiosas, como ouro, oriundos das colônias das grandes metrópoles, como a Espanha. Já neste período, a atividade se desenvolvia em áreas em torno de rotas comerciais de valor e de locais que, carecendo de autoridades estatais, se constituíam em verdadeiros paraísos aos piratas (Fernandes 2009). Esses locais serviam como pontos de encontro, onde vendiam mercadorias roubadas, recrutavam tripulações, consertavam barcos e viviam livres de perseguições. Embora a pirataria atual seja muito pouco semelhante aos eventos ocorridos nos séculos passados, uma vez que passou por mudanças em seu padrão geográfico de ocorrências, finalidade e motivações, está longe de ser uma prática exclusiva do passado (Caninas 2009). Nas últimas décadas, houve um aumento considerável no número de ataques, trazendo o assunto novamente aos fóruns de debate. Dito isso, nos últimos anos, tem-se as linhas de costa africanas como zonas atrativas à pirataria, especialmente as localizadas no Golfo da Guiné e no Golfo de Aden (Escorrega 2010). A ocorrência de tal prática se verifica, como em outros momentos históricos, em torno das rotas comerciais e de transporte de petróleo, e próxima a Estados com baixa capacidade estatal1, onde se proliferam os “paraísos dos piratas”. A incapacidade de determinados governos da região para lidar com essa atividade ilegal tem desestabilizado o comércio marítimo e a extração de petróleo offshore, afetando, portanto, a economia dos países envolvidos (Escorrega 2010).

2 APRESENTAÇÃO DO PROBLEMA

O potencial energético dos países do Golfo da Guiné é gigantesco: atualmente, esses produzem aproximadamente 5,4 milhões de barris de petróleo bruto por dia (The Royal Institute for International Affairs 2013, 14), e a região acumula reservas comprovadas de 50,4 bilhões de barris (Ukeje & Mvomo Ela, 2013). Entre os maiores produtores da região, destacam-se Nigéria e Angola2

1 O conceito de “capacidade estatal” aqui utilizado retoma Tilly, que apresenta a ideia como “a capacidade efetiva do Estado de penetrar na sociedade e alterar a distribuição de recursos, atividades e conexões interpessoais” (Castellano 2012). Mas também procura integrar o conceito de capabilities, ou as capacidades estatais necessárias para empreender tais mudanças. 2 É importante ressaltar que as reservas petrolíferas da Nigéria são estimadas em quarenta bilhões de barris, o que tornaria o país o décimo primeiro maior produtor mundial de petróleo. Entretanto, o país tem capacidade de refinar somente uma parcela muito pequena desse produto, 536 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

(Escorrega 2010); além de produtores em ascensão, como o caso do Congo- Brazaville, outros países que já passaram da fase de maturação da exploração de petróleo, como Camarões e Gabão, e novos produtores, especialmente a Guiné Equatorial (Vrëy 2010) . Essa abundância de petróleo ainda reúne excelentes condições, como sua qualidade – com baixo teor de enxofre – e sua localização de extração, uma vez que a maior parte das jazidas são offshore – cerca de 1.000 a 2.000 metros de profundidade –, o que garante a rentabilidade da produção (Escorrega 2010). Ademais, o Golfo da Guiné também apresenta grande potencial para a produção de gás natural, o que aumenta ainda mais o interesse dos maiores consumidores de energia mundial (Mañe 2005). Outro motivo essencial que estimula a ascensão da importância estratégica do Golfo da Guiné é sua ótima posição geográfica de proximidade com os mercados da Europa e da América do Norte. Dessa forma, o transporte de mercadorias, por via marítima, torna-se mais simples, seguro e rápido, resultando em um menor custo comparado com as exportações vindas do Golfo Pérsico (Escorrega 2010). Ao mesmo tempo, o escoamento do petróleo na região não passa por nenhum ponto de estrangulamento – áreas marítimas estreitas com grande concentração de navios e mais suscetíveis a casualidades que possam impedir o trânsito, como o Estreito de Málaca ou o Canal de Suez. Consequentemente, muitos já são os países que dependem da região para assegurar seus consumos energéticos. Cabe destacar, nesse contexto, países como os EUA que, atualmente, contam com 15% do seu abastecimento proveniente do Golfo da Guiné; China e Japão, que importam quantidade considerável de gás e petróleo; além de países europeus que são abastecidos pela região, e a crescente presença brasileira, especialmente através da Petrobrás. (Trifia 2013, 14). Entretanto, o Golfo da Guiné não tem atraído atenção somente pelo seu grande potencial. O Estado moderno na África foi estabelecido para servir como um instrumento de dominação e exploração dos recursos naturais pelas potências coloniais da Europa. Em muitos casos, os Estados nacionais não foram capazes de remodelar aquele projeto e desenvolver suas instituições políticas e sociais após sua independência. Isso levou à incapacidade dos Estados em realizar até mesmo as mais básicas responsabilidades, incluindo estabelecer a lei, ordem, segurança e coesão social (Ukeje & Mvomo Ela, 2013). O Golfo da Guiné, a despeito de não apresentar nenhum Estado completamente degradado, como a Somália, por exemplo, é assolado pela equação riqueza em recursos minerais, instituições fracas, corrupção e pobreza. Nesse sentido, tem chamado a atenção o aumento da pirataria nas águas da região. Essa prática foi intensificada – atualmente o Golfo da Guiné é um dos o que aumenta a exportação de hidrocarbonetos da região (Allen 2012, 2). 537 Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul principais centros de pirataria mundial – principalmente após o recente “boom” do petróleo, que acarretou na ascensão de indústrias petrolíferas, assim como intensificou o tráfego de hidrocarbonetos na área. Dessa forma, com a contínua passagem de navios mercantes que saem dos países do Golfo, especialmente da Nigéria, e se dirigem para os mercados europeus e estadunidense, somando-se à incapacidade dos Estados de protegerem suas águas jurisdicionais, foram registrados 48 ataques em 2013, o que representa cerca de 13% dos registros mundiais (Dyer 2014). Esse cenário se dá justamente em uma das áreas que tem se tornado foco dos interesses estratégicos das maiores economias do mundo, ao mesmo tempo em que constitui um enclave ao desenvolvimento da costa ocidental africana. O combate aos crimes marítimos passa, necessariamente, pelo entendimento das suas raízes. Dessa maneira, o presente estudo busca apresentar as razões sócio-econômicas que levam as populações locais à criminalidade, em um primeiro momento. Após, para a compreensão da natureza dos crimes praticados, é apresentado um panorama da pirataria na costa africana: aqui, faz-se necessário a comparação com os crimes na costa leste, especialmente na Somália, onde a comunidade internacional já apresentou algumas respostas – as quais, cabe salientar, não foram em sua totalidade exitosas. Por fim, é apresentado um panorama das capacidades dissuasórias dos países do Golfo da Guiné e as possibilidades de desenvolvimento e aprimoramento das mesmas – aqui o foco será, por razões óbvias, as capacidades marítimas.

2.1 ECONOMIA NO GOLFO DA GUINÉ: A “MALDIÇÃO” DOS HIDROCARBONETOS

Em 2013, a Nigéria ultrapassou a África do Sul e assumiu o posto de maior economia africana. Segundo o Departamento de Estatísticas da Nigéria, o PIB do país alcançou 90,22 trilhões de nairas, equivalente a US$ 509,9 bilhões de dólares (Ohuocha 2014). Esses dados contrastam não só com a realidade do Golfo da Guiné que apresenta alguns dos mais pobres do mundo, embora tenha algumas das águas mais lucrativas para as atividades legais e ilegais, mas com a própria situação nigeriana. O crescimento guiado pelos investimentos estrangeiros na exploração de petróleo e gás não tem sido capaz de redirecionar a renda dos hidrocarbonetos para a diversificação das economias africanas e para a melhoria do padrão de vida das populações locais. Os Estados do Golfo da Guiné podem ser classificados como o que Achile Mbembe (apud Ukeje e Mvomo Ela 2013) denomina “off shore States”: Estados cuja sobrevivência dependente dos rendimentos de fontes naturais, no caso do

538 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

óleo e do gás, mas que, ao mesmo tempo, não conseguem se utilizar dessa renda para impulsionar outros setores de suas economias. A causa dessa limitação no desenvolvimento dos “off shore states” está em um processo conhecido como doença holandesa:

A doença holandesa é a crônica sobreapreciação da taxa de câmbio de um país causada pela exploração de recursos abundantes e baratos, cuja produção e exportação é compatível com uma taxa de câmbio claramente mais apreciada que a taxa de câmbio que torna competitivas internacionalmente as demais empresas de bens comercializáveis [...]. É um fenômedo estrutural que cria obstáculos à industrialização [...] [e] gera externalidades negativas nos outros setores de bens e serviços comercializáveis da economia impedindo esses setores de se desenvolverem (Bresser-Pereira, Marconi e Oreiro no prelo).

Nesse sentido, Terry Lin Karl (apud Rosa 2011) apresenta o conceito de “paradoxo da abundância”, afirmando que a riqueza natural abundante pode ser fonte de sérios problemas em países que têm um Estado fraco. Segundo o paradoxo da abundância, a destruição de um sistema econômico nacional decorre da confiança excessiva na renda de fontes naturais, através da doença holandesa. Nas economias africanas, a doença holandesa não só impede a industrialização dos países, como também acarreta na perda de competitividade de outros segmentos do setor primário. Um exemplo bastante ilustrativo de “off shore State” é o da Guiné Equatorial. Enquanto o setor de exploração do petróleo aumenta rapidamente, outros setores tradicionais, como agricultura e a extração, são abandonados. Importa aqui ressaltar que esses segmetos empregam um volume de mão-de- obra muito superior às petroleiras. Não é por acaso que a economia da Guiné Equatorial tem sido deteriorada por altos índices de inflação e desemprego. Ao invés de diversificar a economia, as renda dos hidrocarbonetos a transforma em um obstáculo. O paradoxo da abundância está, ainda, fortemente interligado às falhas institucionais e ao alto nível de corrupção nos Estados. No Golfo da Guiné, os países também são caracterizados pela tendência de os governos estabelecerem um sistema de administração da riqueza nacional centralizada, marcado pelo confisco das rendas do petróleo pelo governo e pelas elites nacionais que, por seu turno, os usam para administrar extensivos, porém informais, sistemas de patronagem (Ukeje & Mvomo Ela, 2013). Assim, o aumento do influxo de renda não acompanha melhorias no aparelhamento estatal e na distribuição de renda, com os rendimentos do petróleo sendo monopolizados pelas elites locais e as empresas estrangeiras privadas. Outro agravante da situação socioeconômica dos países do Golfo da Guiné é a pesca intensiva ilegal, não relatada e não regulamentada (ilegal, unreported,

539 Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul unregulated - IUU fishing) por parte de navios estrangeiros na região. A pesca ilegal já havia sido identificada como uma das causas do aumento da pirataria na Somália e, no Golfo da Guiné, o processo é semelhante: dada a incapacidade estatal de controlar suas águas jurisdicionais, os navios estrangeiros não cumprem com os acordos de pesca previamente estabelecidos e extrapolam grandemente seu volume de pesca. As consequências da pesca superextensiva são devastadoras: estima-se que 40% das atividades pesqueiras no Golfo da Guiné sejam ilegais, implicando prejuízos de cerca de US$ 1,5 bilhão ao ano para os governos da região (Anymadou 2013). Paralelamente, as comunidades locais que dependem da pesca não conseguem competir com os pesqueiros estrangeiros – maiores e melhor financiados – perdendo sua atividade de subsistência básica. O resultado é a degradação ambiental somada ao aumento do desemprego. As altas e persistentes taxas de desemprego, sobretudo nas camadas mais jovens da população, a ausência de subsídios e apoio do Estado às atividades econômicas locais e a degradação ambiental, tanto da pesca, quanto os campos de petróleo, tornam as zonas costeiras áreas de atividade criminal de baixa- intensidade (Bizouras 2013). As organizações criminais encontram, assim, um terreno fértil para expandir suas atividades. Dentre as populações marginalizadas, há aqueles que encontram na pirataria uma alternativa muito mais rentável que as atividades de subsistência já degradadas. Em suma, a descoberta de hidrocarbonetos acabou tendo efeitos colaterais bastante negativos que aprofundaram as desigualdades sociais e a criminalidade na costa do Golfo da Guiné. A dependência excessiva de tais recursos acaba causando o abandono dos setores até então tradicionais, gerando a degradação de segmentos da economia. Ao mesmo tempo, impede a diversificação e o impulso a novos setores; a instalação das petroleiras absorve mão-de-obra em pequena quantidade, não conseguindo compensar a massa de desempregados que emerge. Ao mesmo tempo, há a degradação da pesca, atividade da qual comunidades costeiras dependem, em grande parte devido à atividade ilegal de pesqueiros estrangeiros, que muitas vezes estão envolvidos em outras formas de crime organizado no mar, como o tráfico de drogas (Anymadou 2013). As massas marginalizadas daí resultantes ficam vulneráveis à atividade criminal: desemprego, desigualdade de renda, ausência de alternativas para elevação social e mobilidade econômica, e corrupção persistem e se transformam no combustível da pirataria (Bizouras 2013). É fundamental que aqui se faça uma ressalva: o grande problema em relação à exploração de hidrocarbonetos pelos países do Golfo da Guiné está na forma como essa acaba se dando, através de uma dependência excessiva em detrimento de outros setores da economia, gerando inflação e desemprego, além do insucesso em utilizar a renda do petróleo para a melhoria do padrão de vida

540 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations da população. No entanto, deve-se ressaltar que as altas taxas de crescimento nesses países nos últimos anos têm sido justamente lideradas pela explosão no setor de exploração de petróleo e gás. Os investimentos que os governos têm conseguido realizar nas suas economias e no reaparelhamento das capacidades dissuasórias são possibilitados grandemente pelos rendimentos da extração de hidrocarbonetos. Paradoxalmente, é a relação com esse mesmo setor que está na raiz do aprofundamento de muitos dos problemas socioeconômicos no Golfo da Guiné.

2.2 CRIMES MARÍTIMOS: PIRATARIA NA COSTA AFRICANA

Oceanos são, por natureza, áreas cinzentas; na maior parte das vezes estão além da capacidade de controle direto do Estado: a sua imensidão os torna mais difíceis de gerir. Desde a virada de milênio, áreas marítimas se tornaram um canal fácil para o influxo de atividades criminosas ajudadas pela vulnerabilidade de muitos Estados, os quais, muitas vezes já assolados pela criminalidade em terra, têm sido incapazes de impor controle sobre seus territórios marítimos. Tais áreas não governadas se tornam lugares de produção de rotas de trânsito para muitas atividades criminais, particularmente o tráfico de drogas e de armas e a pirataria (Ukeje & Mvomo Ela, 2013). Muitas vezes insegurança marítima e continental são interdependentes, e eventualmente inseguranças em terra causam crimes marítimos (Vrëy 2010). Antes de prosseguir, é necessário clarificar a tipologia aqui utilizada. Segundo Vrëy (2010), as atividades criminais que acontecem no mar correspondem a um amplo espectro de categorias, sendo errôneo classificar a todas como pirataria. O autor utiliza-se da divisão feita por Dilon (apud Vrëy 2010) em quatro categorias: corrupção – atos de extorsão ou conluio contra embarcações marítimas praticadas por autoridades governamentais ou portuárias; roubos marítimos – ataques que acontecem no porto ou enquanto a embarcação estiver atracada ou ancorada; pirataria – ações contra navios em rota e fora da proteção das autoridades portuárias em águas territoriais, estreitos ou alto mar; e terrorismo marítimo – crimes contra embarcações levados a cabo por organizações terroristas. Contudo, a especificação acima utilizada para pirataria não cobre todos os dilemas enfrentados pelos países do Golfo da Guiné; muitas vezes, a falta de dados e a pluralidade das ações – saber se foi uma organização terrorista que levou o ataque a cabo, por exemplo – dificulta a classificação em uma das categorias. Faz-se necessário retomar o artigo 101 da Convenção das Nações Unidas sobre o Direito do Mar: crimes marítimos são considerados pirataria quando cometidos em águas internacionais, ou seja, fora da jurisdição de qualquer

541 Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul

Estado. Trata-se de um ponto de fundamental importância, pois ele é usado para justificar os tipos de medidas a serem tomadas para prevenir e combater as atividades ilícitas praticadas no mar – especialmente no que tange à intervenção de potências estrangeiras. No entanto, esta apresentação utilizará a ideia de pirataria como um conceito guarda-chuva, fazendo maiores especificações quando necessário. Assim, utilizando-se ainda de Dilon (apud Vrës 2010), em uma proposição mais ampla: pirataria é o ato de abordar ou tentar abordar qualquer navio com a intenção aparente de cometer assalto ou qualquer outro crime, com a aparente intenção ou capacidade de uso da força. Para entender a pirataria no Golfo da Guiné, e extrair valiosas lições a fim de evitar a propagação dessas atividades criminosas nas águas da região, faz-se mister compreender a experiência do Golfo de Áden, que difere grandemente da situação do Golfo da Guiné em vários níveis. Na Somália, a situação do Estado é bastante mais precária do que no Golfo da Guiné. O Estado colapsou em 1991, com a queda do governo de Siad Barre e, à exceção do período de governo de seis meses da União das Cortes Islâmicas, as sucessivas administrações somalis têm sido incapazes de estabelecer qualquer forma de segurança, seja no continente ou em mar. A Somália ainda carece de uma delimitação de sua Zona Econômica Exclusiva, o que implica a ausência de controle sobre os seus direitos de pesca. Não é nenhuma surpresa que as taxas de desemprego sejam altíssimas; a incapacidade estatal de assistir à população somou-se à superexploração ilegal da pesca por barcos estrangeiros, resultando em um cenário extremamente precário para a população local. Em dezembro de 2004, a costa somali foi assolada pelo tsunami que atingiu o Oceano Índico, tornando ainda mais precárias e degradantes as condições de vida das comunidades costeiras. Os pescadores, que não podiam depender do Estado e viram seu meio de sobrevivência sucessivamente destruídos, passaram a atacar navios assistencialistas do World Food Program (Bizouras 2013). Os “sucessos” obtidos nos primeiros ataques rapidamente demonstraram duas conclusões mutuamente reforçadas, que apenas aumentaram a demanda por pirataria e levaram à explosão dos ataques: a proporção de dinheiro investido e o retorno era significativamente desproporcional; além disso, a estrutura organizacional das ações era de fácil reprodução e de baixo custo (Bizouras 2013)3. O que aconteceu em seguida foi um aumento vertiginoso da pirataria na Somália, que acabou se expandindo para o leste do Oceano Índico, em

3 Segundo Bizouras (2010), os resgates aumentaram, no geral, de 300 mil dólares em 2007 para 2 milhões de dólares em 2009. Ao mesmo tempo, o capital investido pelas organizações criminosas girava em torno de 10 mil a 15 mil dólares. Mesmo após se deduzir os gastos com subornos – que podem chegar a 25% do valor total e despesas em terra, cada pirata fatura entre 10 e 15 mil dólares, 50 vezes mais que a renda anual média dos pescadores, de cerca de 300 dólares. 542 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations direção à Índia e ao Estreito de Málaca. A facilidade da reprodução da estrutura organizacional criminal e a total incapacidade estatal somali em impedir o aumento da pirataria, ou mesmo dissuadi-la, possibilitaram a escalada desses crimes no Golfo de Áden. Ainda, os grupos criminosos perceberam que era possível se aproveitar da política de clãs – dada a quase total inexistência do Estado – como forma de minar as possibilidades de punição dos piratas. Não tardou para que outros países percebessem a ameaça que representava a pirataria no Chifre da África e passassem a tomar iniciativas para conter seu avanço e garantir a segurança dos navios que transitassem na região. Foram deslocadas para a região forças multinacionais – muitas vezes privadas – que se encarregaram de combater os piratas. A militarização da região, que acaba impedindo outras atividades econômicas de se desenvolverem, é justificada nas particularidades da pirataria na Somália. Como a maior parte dos ataques acontece em águas internacionais, além da costa somali e fora de quaisquer águas territoriais, é mais facilmente legitimada a presença de forças estrangeiras. Ao mesmo tempo, não são levadas a cabo iniciativas de melhoria das capacidades estatais – até porque muitos representantes das as elites locais estão satisfeitos com a renda da pirataria. Essa ausência de instituições estatais, e, obviamente, da presença de uma guarda costeira efetiva, acabam justificando a pesada interferência naval de outros países (Anymadou 2013). É importante ter conhecimento da realidade da pirataria no Golfo de Áden, especialmente para que se evite uma escalada semelhante na costa ocidental. No entanto, é preciso ter em mente que – e por que – as contramedidas adotadas não podem ser as mesmas. Em primeiro lugar, em termos de capacidades estatais dos países do Golfo da Guiné, a despeito de frágeis, são bastante superiores à da Somália, onde o Estado é praticamente inexistente. Nesse sentido, há uma grande janela de oportunidade para o incremento das capacidades estatais, desde as legislações até os aparelhos coercitivos estatais. Além disso, enquanto na Somália os ataques ocorrem em alto mar, ou seja, fora da jurisdição de algum país, no Golfo da Guiné os crimes se dão em águas jurisdicionais, o que envolve questões diretas de soberania – não sendo esses ataques reconhecidos pela Convenção do Mar como atos de pirataria. Outra diferença crucial está nos interesses envolvidos: no Chifre da África, os ataques significam uma ameaça a entidades estrangeiras e a reação se dá por uma resposta externa, já a pirataria no Golfo da Guiné significa um perigo real para os países da região e sua dependência nas fontes de recursos naturais e no comércio originado no Golfo – mesmo que os ataques se deem a navios com bandeiras estrangeiras (Vrëy 2010). Ou seja, é uma questão de interesse direto dos países e fundamental para sua sobrevivência e soberania. A forma como as ações são conduzidas em geral também configura uma grande diferença entre as duas regiões. Os piratas somalis têm como objetivo

543 Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul principal a renda dos resgates: sequestram as embarcações e mantém reféns suas tripulação e carga a fim de conseguir dinheiro dos donos ou contratantes do navio. Já no Golfo da Guiné, como ressalta Anymadou (2013), os piratas lançam ataques principalmente da Nigéria, com o objetivo de roubar a carga – na maior parte das vezes petróleo –, equipamentos, ou qualquer tipo de bens da embarcação ou da tripulação. Os sequestros são muito raros em comparação à pirataria no Oceano Índico; por outro lado, o uso da força é mais intenso e é maior, com os piratas menos preocupados com a sobrevivência dos reféns. No Golfo da Guiné, o nível de violência é mais alto e mais sofisticado: os criminosos fazem uso até de foguetes, enquanto que na Somália dificilmente a violência escalou a esse nível (Barrios 2013). Na costa ocidental, há uma forte conexão entre o roubo de petróleo e seu subsequente tráfico ilegal. Um exemplo clássico é um ataque ou sequestro de um cargueiro carregado com petróleo e navegando em águas nigerianas, ganesas ou cameronesas. O petróleo é então transferido para outra embarcação e vendido diretamente para terceiros navios ou mesmo no mercado negro em terra, com os ataques sendo coordenandos muitas vezes à distância, evidenciando uma organização bastante complexa (Barrios 2013). Ukeje e Mvomo Ela (2013) apresentam ainda outros exemplos: de ataque à terra partindo do mar, como a prédios bancários acontecidos em Limbé4 em 2008; ataques sucessivos à instalações diversas na península de Bakassi – disputada por Camarões e Nigéria; confrontos entre embarcações das guardas costeiras e supostos navios de organizações piratas; entre outros. É possível perceber que os ataques não são oportunistas, mas bem planejados e organizados, voltados para alvos específicos, principalmente cargueiros transportando petróleo ou navios levando bens de alto valor, o que indica para a possibilidade de os piratas receberem informações valiosas e possivelmente instruções vindas de fontes em terra (Barrios 2013). Em 2012, foram reportados ao International Maritime Bureau 58 incidentes ou tentativas de pirataria no Golfo da Guiné, dos quais 37 envolveram o uso de armas de fogo. Só nos primeiros três meses de 2013, 15 incidentes já haviam sido registrados (Anymadou 2013).

4 Cidade localizada no litoral de Camarões. 544 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

Figura 1 - Ataques e tentativas de ataques em 2012

Fonte: Adaptado de Ukeje e Mvomo Ela (2013).

Na esteira da pirataria, vêm outros crimes: roubos, tráfico de armas leves, tráfico humano e migração ilegal aumentaram desde o início dos anos 2000. O tráfico de drogas também figura como um agravante, uma vez que atualmente o Golfo da Guiné se tornou rota de trânsito no comércio global de narcóticos – a Nigéria está no centro da rota de trânsito das drogas que vêm da América do Sul e vão para a Europa, os Estados Unidos e a Ásia (Ukeje & Mvomo Ela, 2013). A tendência é, dessa maneira, um aumento generalizado da criminalidade no Golfo da Guiné caso a pirataria não seja contida e suas causas revertidas.

2.3 CAPACIDADES DISSUASÓRIAS

Até recentemente, os países do Golfo da Guiné estavam focados nos problemas em terra, enquanto a segurança marítima era dificilmente levada em conta nos cálculos e planejamentos estratégicos. Essa menor prioridade à segurança costeira deve-se ao déficit de capacidade em termos de aquisição, manutenção, desenvolvimento e regulamentação das fontes necessárias requeridas para estabelecer e exercer presença crível nas águas territoriais. Contudo, ao contrário da Somália, os países do Golfo têm empreendido melhorias em suas

545 Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul capacidades para impedir o aumento e a institucionalização da pirataria. Um fator impulsionador para a melhoria das Guardas Costeiras e Marinhas nacionais é que, no Golfo da Guiné, boa parte das atividades criminais acontece no perímetro inferior a 12 milhas náuticas da costa, ou seja, dentro das águas territoriais (Anymadou 2013). Se os crimes acontecem dentro da jurisdição dos países, é de responsabilidade – e exclusividade – das forças nacionais a execução de contramedidas. Ou seja, trata-se de garantir a soberania nacional não só contra os piratas, mas contra possíveis incursões de forças externas em seu território marítimo. Assim, em escala nacional, a tendência é a reforma dos quadros normativos que regem a defesa e a segurança para complementar e impulsionar a ação estatal no mar (Ukeje & Mvomo Ela, 2013). Nas esferas operacional e tática, os países têm procurado aumentar a vigilância, observância e monitoramento como maneira de obter mais informações sobre as atividades ilícitas, além de facilitar na localização dos alvos. A partir dos dados do The Military Balance de 2014, é possível tirar conclusões mais tangíveis das capacidades dissuasórias dos países do Golfo da Guiné. A maior e mais poderosa marinha da região é a nigeriana. Juntamente com a Guarda Costeira, soma um efetivo de 8.000 homens e está dividida em dois comandos: Comando Ocidental, baseado em Apapa, e o Comando Oriental, localizado em Calabar. Dentre suas principais embarcações estão uma fragata da classe Aradu, uma corveta da classe Enymiri, 2 embarcações costeiras para guerra de minas, além de diversos navios de patrulha. A Nigéria conta, ainda, com 5 helicópteros no ramo de aviação naval. Dados os desafios colocados pelo aumento na pirataria no Golfo e pelos militantes no delta do Níger, a modernização das forças armadas nigerianas tem se focado na marinha, com navios de patrulha oceânica e costeiros e barcos de patrulha rápidos entre as prioridades. Já Angola, por outro lado, possui como maior desafio à segurança nacional a ação de grupos separatistas na província de Cabinda; assim, a marinha acaba não recebendo tanta atenção em detrimento de maiores investimentos nas forças terrestres – suas forças navais são compostas basicamente por navios de patrulha. Nos outros países do Golfo da Guiné, a situação das marinhas é bastante semelhante. As principais embarcações são navios de patrulha costeira, com algumas aquisições mais recentes de navios de patrulha oceânica e de apoio logístico, como no caso da Guiné Equatorial e da Costa do Marfim5. A imagem geral é de forças navais incipientes, com grandes desafios em termos de capacidades e organização. O exemplo mais extremo desse quadro é a Libéria, que teve sua guarda costeira reativada em 2010, contando apenas com botes infláveis de casco rígido (IISS 2014).

5 Para maiores especificações, ver The Military Balance 2014, publicação do International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS). 546 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

2.3.1 Cooperação Multilateral

Se na Somália a resposta à pirataria veio verticalmente de atores externos, no Golfo da Guiné o panorama é um tanto diferente. O que se percebe é uma tendência à cooperação no sentido de melhorar as capacidades dos países do Golfo da Guiné a fim de que esses possam lidar com o aumento da criminalidade em suas águas jurisdicionais. Vrëy (2010) ressalta que as potências ocidentais tem buscado utilizar uma versão de intervenção naval menos militarizada, focando-se mais em medidas de construção estatal. Estas medidas importam não só para a melhoria das capacidades estatais, mas para que as comunidades locais se sintam incluídas em um processo que lhes diz respeito diretamente. Embora em muitos países da costa ocidental ainda exista certa carência de um entendimento no nível político sobre a importância do domínio marítimo, a região tem a vantagem de ser um dos blocos mais politicamente coerentes da África Subsaariana, compreendendo comunidades locais que entendem os impactos econômicos da insegurança marítima na região (Anymadou 2013). Contudo, algumas potências têm extrapolado os acordos de cooperação para uma presença naval permanente, como forma de garantir seus interesses localmente (especialmente no que diz respeito aos fluxos de hidrocarbonetos). Nesse sentido, é preciso destacar a atuação dos Estados Unidos e da OTAN na região, reforçada pela criação do Africom. As missões navais da OTAN, lideradas pelos Estados Unidos, foram introduzidas no Golfo de Áden em 2008-2009, objetivando detectar, romper e suprimir a pirataria baseada na Somália (Anymadou 2013). Já no Golfo da Guiné, essa presença é um pouco mais recente e tem se dado especialmente através da Operação Prosperidade e do exercício militar Obangame Express. Este último, sob o escopo do Africom, teve sua última edição no mês de abril de 2014 e contou com a participação das seguintes nações: Alemanha, Angola, Bélgica, Benim, Brasil, Camarões, Costa do Marfim, Dinamarca, Estados Unidos da América, Espanha, França, Gabão, Gana, Guiné Equatorial, Holanda, Itália, Nigéria, República do Congo, Portugal, São Tomé e Príncipe, Togo e Turquia (Força Aérea participa no Obangame Express 2014 2014). A cooperação multilateral precisa ainda, como forma mais eficaz de combater a pirataria, colaborar para a criação e o fortalecimento das instituições. Uma lição valiosa de cooperação regional vem do caso de Malásia, Cingapura e Indonésia, em seus esforços em diminuir a pirataria no estreito de Málaca. O lançamento da Patrulha do Estreito de Málaca, em 2004, resultou da ambição desses países em reverter a imagem de que estariam destinando maiores esforços em segurança marítima e mudar a associação das suas águas com crimes marítimos. O que importa ressaltar nessa experiência é que os esforços para policiar as águas foram combinados com o fortalecimento das instituições em terra e maiores esforços em processar e punir os

547 Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul envolvidos com pirataria (Anymadou 2013). Trata-se assim, de um exemplo que clarifica a força da iniciativa regional elevada a diferentes escopos como forma de combater a pirataria.

2.3.2 O uso de Companhias Privadas de Segurança

Por fim, uma das questões mais controversas em relação às contramedidas à pirataria é o uso de companhias privadas de segurança, debate este levantado pelo uso intensivo que foi feito delas no combate à pirataria no Golfo da Guiné. Atualmente, forças privadas não são autorizadas a operar dentro das águas territoriais dos países do Golfo da Guiné. Na Nigéria, no Benin e no Togo, os donos de navios que quiserem escoltas armadas podem pagar para as polícias armadas ou militares nacionais, contratando forças públicas para garantir a segurança de suas embarcações. As companhias de segurança marítima privadas não possuem permissão para entregar e utilizar guardas armados nas águas costeiras, sendo autorizados a atuar apenas com capacidades não armadas (Anymadou 2013). Além da contratação direta pelos donos dos navios, Anymadou (2013), levanta a possibilidade da parceria entre governos e iniciativa privada como forma de assegurar o controle das águas jurisdicionais. Esses acordos existem enquanto possibilidade, mas o seu emprego ainda é pouco cogitado pelos Estados, dadas as diversas controvérsias que rondam o uso de empresas privadas de segurança. Um dos pontos cruciais é a inexistência de leis internacionais que rejam o uso de forças privadas: não há nada específico sobre treinamento padronizado, posse de armas e possibilidades de emprego de indivíduos armados. Essa ausência de regulamentação acaba possibilitando incidentes, como o acontecido em outubro de 2012, envolvendo a Marinha nigeriana e a embarcação MVMyre Seadiver, de uma empresa privada de segurança russa. A embarcação foi abordada pela Marinha nigeriana, acusada de entrar ilegalmente nas águas do país em posse de armas. A despeito das alegações de que a empresa possuía licença para carregar armamentos, a decisão das autoridades nigerianas foi de multar pela posse e a importação ilegal de armas e munições (Anymadou 2013). A ausência de controle ainda pode resultar em proliferação de armas e munições, assim como treinamentos, para grupos separatistas e terroristas que se multiplicam na região. É evidente que o combate à pirataria passa por ações que envolvem o uso da força, mas é importante a reflexão acerca do caráter dessas medidas e quais os atores envolvidos.

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3. AÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS PRÉVIAS

Tendo percebido as consequências devastadoras que crimes marítimos, em especial a pirataria, podem causar aos países do Golfo da Guiné e também à comunidade internacional, estes têm tentado promover alternativas e soluções a fim de encontrar meios de prevenção e combate a essas práticas ilegais. Nesse contexto, primeiramente cabe destacar a Convenção de Montevidéu que, assinada em 2013 pelos países-membros da ZOPACAS, ressalta a necessidade de continuar preservando um Atlântico Sul livre de instabilidade, tráfico de drogas e pirataria. Já no que se trata especificamente ao Golfo da Guiné, a Declaração reitera a importância de um esforço coordenado regionalmente para conter a pirataria na região (Declaração de Montevidéu 2013). Ademais, ainda é declarada a extrema urgência de parceiros internacionais assistirem aos países e organizações da região com a finalidade de:

reforçar as capacidades desses para combater a pirataria e o assalto à mão armada no mar no Golfo da Guiné, incluindo a sua capacidade para conduzir patrulhas regionais, para estabelecer e manter centros de coordenação conjuntas e centros de compartilhamento de informações conjuntas e para a implementação efetiva da região estratégia, conforme estipulado nas resoluções do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas 2018 (2011) e 2039 (2012) (Declaração de Montevidéu 2013, Artigo 110).

Dito isso, pode-se analisar as Ações Internacionais Prévias adotadas dentro do âmbito da ZOPACAS sobre três perspectivas: a nacional – que será abordada no tópico de Posições dos Países –, a regional e a internacional. Assim sendo, a partir desses dois últimos níveis, encontram-se, a seguir, alguns dos tratados, convenções e demais iniciativas mais significativas para a prevenção e combate de crimes marítimos, como a pirataria.

3.1 AÇÕES REGIONAIS NO CONTINENTE AFRICANO

3.1.1 Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)6

A partir de outubro de 2009, a ECCAS tem trabalhado em uma estratégia de segurança para o Golfo da Guiné baseada em dois elementos: primeiramente,

6 Criada em 1983, a ECCAS tem como objetivo principal promover e fortalecer uma cooperação harmoniosa, balanceada e autossustentável em todas as áreas de atividade econômica e social com o fim de alcançar a autossuficiência coletiva e a elevação do padrão de vida da população dos países da África Central (United Nations Economic Comission for Africa 20-?a). 549 Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul a criação de um Centro de Coordenação Regional de Segurança Marítima da África Central (CRESMAC, em inglês), tendo a tarefa de reforçar as habilidades de militares e civis dos países membros; e em segundo lugar, promover uma sinergia entre os países da Comissão do Golfo da Guiné e da Comunidade Econômica dos Estados do Oeste Africano (International Crisis Group 2012). Essa estratégia ainda conta com seis objetivos, sendo eles o compartilhamento de informação e gestão, vigilância conjunta do espaço marítimo, harmonização das ações no mar, introdução de um imposto marítimo regional, aquisição de equipamentos para uso comum e, por fim, a institucionalização de uma conferência marítima periódica (ICG 2012). Para melhor atingir seus objetivos de manter a paz e segurança na região, a ECCAS divide a África Central em três zonas geográficas: A, B e D, cobrindo uma faixa de Angola às fronteiras marítimas de Nigéria e Camarões (ICG 2012). Dentre essas zonas, a D - que cobre Camarões, Gabão, Guiné Equatorial e São Tomé e Príncipe - é vista como a de maior risco de insegurança marítima (ICG 2012). Dessa forma, em 2009, os países membros assinaram um acordo de vigilância marítima nessa zona. Seguido desse acordo, houve a adoção do Plano de Vigilância Conjunta, intitulado SECMAR7 (ICG 2012). O SECMAR tem como objetivo facilitar a aquisição de recursos navais pelos países membros, assim como prevê a abertura de um centro de coordenação multinacional em seus centros operacionais marítimos. Enquanto isso, no longo prazo, os planos SECMAR visam à abertura de passagem nas águas territoriais para navios de países membros, para que esses tenham o direito de perseguir e fazer uso de armas contra os piratas (ICG 2012).

3.1.2 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)8

Apesar de ter poucos avanços quando comparado à ECCAS, a ECOWAS tem dado seus primeiros passos para desenvolver sua própria estratégia marítima 7 SECMAR é dividido em duas fases: SECMAR 1 e SECMAR 2. A primeira, que entrou em ação em outubro de 2009, é designada para manter a zona D segura, livre de pirataria, pesca ilegal, tráfico de drogas, imigração ilegal e poluição marítima (International Crisis Group 2011). Já a segunda, que entrou em ação em fevereiro de 2011, tem como objetivo inicial combinar forças aéreas e navais, fazendo uso de helicópteros de vigilância e de barcos de patrulha. Entretanto, nenhum helicóptero de vigilância esteve disponível na ação (ICG 2011). Por fim, cabe ainda destacar que SECMAR 1 e SECMAR 2 buscam promover a realização de operações conjuntas que envolvam parceiros internacionais (ICG 2012). 8 A ECOWAS foi fundada em 1975 através do Tratado de Lagos e tem como missão promover a cooperação e integração em um contexto de União Econômica do Oeste Africano (United Nations Economic Comission for Africa 20-?b). 550 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations integrada, com base em esforços regionais para fortalecer uma integração econômica. Para isso, a comunidade tem trabalhado na elaboração de uma estratégia que destaca a necessidade de os Estados membros adotarem uma abordagem de governança mais integrada no que se trata de assuntos marítimos, enfatizando ainda a necessidade de melhorar a governança de óleo e gás como forma de prevenção de conflitos (ICG 2012). Por fim, assim como a ECCAS, a ECOWAS também planeja delinear três zonas operacionais com um centro de coordenação em cada uma delas. Em setembro de 2012, foi criada a Zona E - uma zona “piloto” na capital de Togo, Lomé, abrangendo ainda Nigéria, Benim e Níger (ICG 2012).

3.1.3 Comissão do Golfo da Guiné

Criada em 2001 na capital de Gabão, Libreville, a Comissão do Golfo da Guiné começou suas atividades em 2007, contanto com oito Estados membros9. O objetivo primordial da Comissão é facilitar consultas regionais para, assim, prevenir, gerir e resolver os conflitos que possam surgir a partir da delimitação das fronteiras marítimas e da exploração econômica e comercial dos recursos naturais dentro das fronteiras dos países africanos (Guinea Gulf Comission - Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea 2013). Ou seja, a Comissão é um mecanismo permanente com a função de gerenciar as ameaças e problemas comuns da região, em especial no que se refere ao domínio específico da segurança marítima. Dessa forma, esta Comissão serve como uma ponte entre instituições regionais já existentes, como a ECCAS e a ECOWAS, podendo favorecer a harmonização das políticas e atividades dentro do Golfo da Guiné (Guinea Gulf Comission - Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea 2013). Em 2012, a Comissão assinou a Declaração de Luanda sobre a Paz e Segurança na região do Golfo da Guiné. Essa afirma que, devido à crescente insegurança marítima, os Estados membros da comissão precisam estabelecer uma cooperação regional e um diálogo interestatal. A Declaração apela ainda para a Comissão aplicar e monitorar a paz no Golfo da Guiné (The Institute for International Affairs 2013).

9 Os membros da Comissão são Angola, Camarões, Congo, Gabão, Guiné Equatorial, República Democrática do Congo, São Tomé e Príncipe e Nigéria (Guinea Gulf Comission - Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea 2013). 551 Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul

3.1.4 Cúpula de Chefes de Estados e de Governo sobre Proteção Marítima e Segurança no Golfo da Guiné

Entre os dias 24 à 25 de junho de 2013, chefes de Estado e Governo da ECOWAS, ECCAS e da Comissão do Golfo da Guiné se reuniram em Yaoundé, capital de Camarões, para discutir e assinar adotar documentos estratégicos em resposta às atividades ilegais no Golfo da Guiné10 (African Union - A united and strong Africa 2013). A Cúpula de Yaoundé mostrou o crescente comprometimento dos líderes africanos em solucionar os problemas que assombram suas populações. Dito isso, a Cúpula adotou três documentos: a Declaração de chefes de Estados e governos da África Central e Ocidental sobre a proteção e segurança em seu domínio marítimo comum; o Memorando de entendimento entre ECCAS, ECOWAS e a Comissão do Golfo da Guiné sobre Proteção e Segurança Marítima na África Central e Ocidental; e, por fim, o Código de conduta para repressão da pirataria, roubo à mão armada contra navios e atividades ilícitas na África Central e Ocidental (Guinea Gulf Comission - Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea 2013). A declaração enfatiza a necessidade de seus signatários trabalharem juntos na promoção de paz, segurança e estabilidade na área marítima central e ocidental da África através da mobilização de recursos operacionais adequados. Ademais também é frisado o dever da ECCAS, da ECOWAS e da Comissão do Golfo da Guiné em promover atividades voltadas para a cooperação entre seus membros (International Peace Institute 2014). Já o memorando tem como finalidade facilitar a coordenação e execução de atividades conjuntas, a partilha de experiências e informações, a harmonização das leis sobre pirataria e outras atividades ilegais, além de prever o estabelecimento de um centro de coordenação inter-regional para a implementação de uma estratégica regional para a segurança marítima (IPI 2014). Por fim, assinado em 25 de junho de 2013, o Código de Conduta tem como objetivo assegurar a plena cooperação na repressão do crime transnacional organizado no domínio marítimo, tais como terrorismo marítimo, pesca ilegal, pirataria, entre outros11. Assim como o Código de Conduta de Djibuti, este

10 Além dos mencionados, ainda participaram da Cúpula Estados membros da União Africana, da União Europeia, a Organização Marítima Internacional (IMO, em inglês), a Organização Marítima da África Central e Ocidental (MOWCA, em inglês), o Comando dos Estados Unidos para a África (AFRICOM) e o Centro de Estudos Estratégicos Africanos (ACSS, em inglês) (African Union - A united and strong Africa 2013). 11 Os países signatários do código são: Angola, Benim, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Camarões, Cabo Verde, República Centro-Africana, Chade, Congo, República Democrática do Congo, Costa do Marfim, Gabão, Gâmbia, Gana, Guiné, Guiné-Bissau, Guiné Equatorial, Libéria, Mali, Níger, 552 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations código, assinado em 2013, também procura incentivar a partilha e a comunicação de informações entre os Estados, a adoção de medidas de repressão a pessoas suspeitas em atividades ilegais no mar e a repatriação de marinheiros vítimas de criminalidades marítimas12 (The Institute for International Affairs 2013). Ademais, o código também prevê a cooperação no desenvolvimento e promoção de programas educacionais de treinamento para a gestão de recursos marinhos (Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against ships and Ilicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa 2013, artigo 14).

3.2 NÍVEL INTERNACIONAL

3.2.1 Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas

Em 2011, os 15 membros do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas condenaram todos os atos de pirataria e roubos à mão armada cometidos nas costas dos países do Golfo da Guiné através da resolução 2018. Esta ainda incentiva os membros da ECOWAS, da ECCAS e da Comissão do Golfo da Guiné a desenvolverem uma estratégia marítima abrangente (UN, 2011). A resolução do Conselho de Segurança ainda ressalta a importância da cooperação entre os países do Golfo e as indústrias navais, destacando que estas devem trabalhar em conjunto com a Organização Internacional Marítima (IMO) para prestar orientação aos navios que chegam na região, evitando, assim, crimes marítimos (UN, 2011). Em 2012, o Conselho de Segurança da ONU pela primeira vez debateu sobre a pirataria na região do Golfo da Guiné através de uma perspectiva global, e não somente a partir da análise dos problemas da região (The Institute for International Affairs 2013). O resultado se concretizou através da resolução 2039, onde se pode dar destaque ao artigo 3, que deixa clara a responsabilidade primária dos Estados do Golfo da Guiné em conter a pirataria e outros crimes marítimos na região, uma vez que essas práticas acontecem em águas jurisdicionais (UN, 2012). Além disso, também cabe mencionar o apelo para que os países do Golfo adotem medidas preventivas em nível nacional e regional, contando com o suporte da comunidade internacional quando disponível. Também é destacada a importância de acordos mútuos com o fim de desenvolver e implementar

Nigéria, São Tomé e Príncipe, Senegal, Serra Leoa e Togo (Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against ships and Ilicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa 2013). 12 O Código de Conduta Djibuti, acordado em janeiro de 2009, visa à repressão de ações de piratas que agem no Oceano Índico Ocidental, Golfo de Aden e no Mar Vermelho (International Maritime Organization 2014a). 553 Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul estratégias de segurança nacional, incluindo o estabelecimento de uma estrutura legal para a prevenção e repressão aos crimes cometidos no mar (UN, 2012).

3.2.2 International Maritime Organization (IMO)

A IMO adotou uma estratégia para a implementação de medidas sustentáveis de segurança marítima para África Ocidental e Central com a finalidade de implementar as ações identificadas no Código de Conduta de Yaoundé adotado em 2013. Em suma, o objetivo da International Maritime Organization é fazer com que seus Estados Membros presentes na África Ocidental e Central coloquem em prática legislações nacionais que criminalizem a pirataria e outras atividades marítimas ilegais. Ademais, a organização também planeja ter na região técnicos operacionais e logísticos treinados para desempenhar suas responsabilidades no que concerne a todos os aspectos da segurança marítima e da proteção do meio ambiente marinho (International Maritime Organization 2014a). Por fim, em dezembro de 2013 durante a 28ª sessão da Assembleia da IMO, foi aprovada a resolução de número 1069 sobre a prevenção e repressão da pirataria, assalto à mão armada contra navios e atividades marítimas ilícitas no Golfo da Guiné (International Maritime Organization 2014b). Esta resolução sugere aos países da região a adoção, através de uma estreita cooperação com as organizações regionais e internacionais, de todas as medidas possíveis dentro do direito internacional para assegurar que todos os atos ou tentativas de pirataria e outras atividades ilegais sejam abordadas imediatamente. Além disso, a resolução também solicita que os governos realizem contribuições ao fundo da organização, de modo a melhorar a assistência aos países do Golfo e o desenvolvimento das capacidades nacionais e regionais, para que esses Estados possam aperfeiçoar a governança marítima em águas de jurisdição nacional (International Maritime Organization 2014b).

4 POSICIONAMENTO DOS PAÍSES

A Nigéria encara a questão da pirataria na região do Golfo da Guiné como de máxima importância para sua segurança, já que as atividades ilícitas em alto mar são, muitas vezes, ligadas à criminalidade em terra. Em primeiro lugar, é preciso ter em mente que o epicentro das atividades é a região do Delta do Níger, onde se concentram, de um lado, grande parte das petroleiras no país, e de outro, grupos armados como o Movimento para a Emancipação do Delta do Níger. Assim, para a Nigéria, a pirataria é uma ameaça não só para sua economia

554 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations grandemente dependente de petróleo, mas também para a segurança nacional e regional. O país conta com uma das marinhas mais bem equipadas da região, e tem empreendido esforços no sentido de melhorar suas capacidades de combate à pirataria, adquirindo infraestrutura de vigilância e navios patrulha – foram 80 nos últimos três anos (Nigéria 2011). A Nigéria também defende a importância dos esforços regionais, especialmente dentro do escopo da Comissão do Golfo da Guiné (CGG). Em consonância com a posição nigeriana, estão o Congo e a República Democrática do Congo, membros da CGG, que, a despeito das suas áreas litorâneas reduzidas, temem a ligação da criminalidade no mar com os grupos insurgentes que atuam no continente africano. Já a Guiné Equatorial, que sofre com o aumento dos atos ilícitos em suas águas, promove o maior engajamento da CGG na questão, além de usar a questão da pirataria como forma de promover o debate sobre os limites das águas jurisdicionais no Golfo da Guiné. Camarões também tem sentido os efeitos econômicos do aumento da pirataria nas águas do Golfo da Guiné. Cerca de 95% da produção de petróleo do país se dá em plataformas em alto mar, onde os ataques têm ameaçado as exportações não só de petróleo, mas de gás natural e bauxita (Stearns 2010). Nesse sentido, o governo camaronês tem defendido uma abordagem holística para a pirataria, através de soluções inovadoras “compatíveis com o contexto e a escala deste flagelo para os Estados da região e para a comunidade internacional” (Camarões 2013). Ganha importância aqui a ação no âmbito regional: além de ser membro da CCG, o país já demonstrou interesse em abrigar um centro de coordenação regional para segurança marítima, com a participação do AFRICOM (Kindzeka 2014). Camarões, Guiné Equatorial e Gabão possuem acordos com os Estados Unidos, autorizando o uso de seus aeroportos pela Força Aérea Norte-Americana, reiterando uma possível intervenção extrarregional no Golfo da Guiné. O Gabão também é membro da CGG e tem visto os ataques aumentarem em suas águas jurisdicionais. A Costa do Marfim defende um maior engajamento de forças navais internacionais no Golfo da Guiné, nos moldes do que foi levado a cabo no Golfo de Áden. Contudo, para o país é necessário que em primeiro lugar se harmonizem os quadros jurídicos regionais para permitir que os países enfrentem coletivamente os atos de pirataria (Costa do Marfim 2013). De forma parecida, São Tomé e Príncipe, país que possui uma posição estratégica no Golfo da Guiné, tem defendido uma estratégia baseada sobretudo na cooperação militar, tanto com países africanos, mas também com forças extrarregionais, especialmente Portugal. Gâmbia tem buscado reforçar suas capacidades navais, uma vez que a grande ameaça para sua segurança marítima e desenvolvimento econômico tem sido a pesca ilegal em seu litoral. Além disso, suas águas estão na rota de importantes linhas de comércio internacional. Nesse sentido, Gâmbia tem

555 Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul

Taiwan como seu principal parceiro no fortalecimento de sua marinha, que doou embarcações para colaborar na patrulha das águas gambianas (Jallou 2013). A Guiné Bissau também enfrenta o problema da pesca ilegal em suas águas jurisdicionais. Na medida do possível, as forças de segurança do país apreendem os navios pesqueiros infratores, mas ainda assim o governo reforça a necessidade de melhoria das capacidades militares e judiciais para combater os crimes no mar. Como membro da CPLP, apoia as iniciativas regionais contra a pirataria. Para Cabo Verde, a alternativa encontrada para combater a pirataria foi nas companhias privadas de segurança. Em uma ação destinada a contrabalancear o aumento da pirataria no Gofo da Guiné, o governo concedeu licença para a Cape Verde Maritime Security Services (CVMSS), permitindo que a empresa delegasse direitos exclusivos para empresas privadas de segurança marítima que desejem usar a ilha como uma base para o embarque e desembarque de equipes de segurança armadas. A empresa britânica SeaMarshals Ltda foi a primeira empresa a receber autorização para utilizar Cabo Verde como base para as operações de segurança na região da África Ocidental (Shipping News and Views 2012). Ao mesmo tempo, o país mostra-se confiante numa nova “estratégia para a segurança marítima”, em que será necessária uma “maior comunicação entre os organismos a nível nacional não só no tratamento da informação mas na formação dos quadros para uma melhor prevenção” (CargoNews 2014). Benim tem sido palco da ação de grupos oriundos principalmente da Nigéria. Ao mesmo tempo em que a economia do país depende grandemente do comércio marítimo, especialmente das taxas arrecadadas no Porto de Cotonou e da exportação de algodão, faltam meios para impedir ou mesmo perseguir efetivamente os atacantes. Como resposta, além de demonstrar apoio às iniciativas regionais e procurar investir na melhoria de suas capacidades militares, o país chegou a pedir ajuda ao Conselho de Segurança das Nações em 2011 como forma de chamar a atenção da comunidade internacional para o assunto (Nações Unidas 2012). Já Gana tem concentrado seus esforços em equipar sua Marinha, além de ter criado uma unidade de Polícia Marítima: a ideia é combater a pirataria, ao mesmo tempo em que protege as instalações petrolíferas do país e as fronteiras marítimas (The Maritime Executive 2013). A Libéria recentemente conduziu exercícios militares conjuntos antipirataria com a Marinha francesa. Ao mesmo tempo, o país é assistido pelos Estados Unidos na melhoria das capacidades operacionais de sua guarda costeira (McGarry 2013). Além da Libéria, outros membros da ECOWAS afirmam seu interesse em reduzir a criminalidade nas águas do Golfo da Guiné, apostando na cooperação regional, levada a cabo não só dentro do escopo das organizações regionais, mas entre elas igualmente: Guiné, Senegal e Serra Leoa. Estes países apresentaram pouquíssimos casos de ataques a navios em suas águas; por outro

556 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations lado, é grande a preocupação com a pesca ilegal, realizadas por grandes pesqueiros de outros países, que acabam por minar a principal atividade econômica de parte das populações locais. O governo da Namíbia acredita na participação dos organismos regionais, especialmente a União Africana e a SADC, como a forma mais adequada de se lidar com o problema. No caso, cooperação somando-se a capacidades militares: o presidente namíbio levantou a necessidade de recrutar mais homens e mulheres para defender o território e as águas jurisdicionais do país (Hartman 2012). Togo tem logrado algum progresso com patrulhas navais constantes, mas ainda carece de meios navais. O governo togolês defende, ainda, a cooperação, especialmente com seus vizinhos, em ações contra a pirataria. As águas de Angola ainda não foram matizadas com muitos ataques, no entanto, o país já demonstra preocupação com a questão; com o fim da guerra civil, o país tem se mostrado cada vez mais disposto a auxiliar os vizinhos na solução de seus problemas. Membro da CGG, da CPLP, da ECCAS e da SADC, defende a adoção de uma estratégia de segurança marítima coerente com a situação do Golfo da Guiné e da África austral e que responda às implicações internacionais da questão da pirataria na África (Chatham House 2012). Aliás, para o país é vital a participação da CPLP, tendo inclusive defendido a formação de forças de patrulha conjunta no Golfo da Guiné dentro do escopo da organização. A África do Sul é o país com as maiores capacidades militares na costa ocidental africana. A despeito de não ser diretamente afetado por crimes de pirataria em sua costa, tem grande interesse na luta contra a pirataria no Golfo da Guiné, tanto por a região estar na rota comercial sul-africana, quanto pelo entendimento de seus desdobramentos para a segurança no continente. Nesse sentido, a África do Sul tem contribuído para a operacionalização da Estratégia de Segurança Marítima da SADC (SADC MSS), o Código de Conduta do Djibuti e da Estratégia Marítima Integrada Africana 2050 (AIMS 2050) em apoio à Convenção das Nações Unidas sobre o Direito do Mar de 1982 e a Organização Marítima Internacional para a Segurança da Vida Humana no Mar (Jumat 2014). Do outro lado do Atlântico, o Brasil assume papel de liderança nos esforços permanentes para a estabilidade do Atlântico Sul. Nesse sentido, busca auxiliar os países africanos a fortalecerem suas Marinhas; além de doar ou vender meios militares, oferta vagas em suas academias militares e participa de simulações de ações antipirataria com países da costa oeste africana. O Brasil também auxiliou na criação da Marinha da Namíbia e patrocinou a participação dos militares africanos no Seminário sobre Vigilância Marítima realizado na cidade de Salvador em 2013 (Ministério das Relações Exteriores 2013). O Brasil adota uma posição de respeito à soberania dos países da ZOPACAS, atuando

557 Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul diretamente na melhoria das capacidades nacionais dos países membros. Importa ao país o combate à pirataria no Golfo da Guiné, ainda, por sua ligação econômica com os países africanos e pela possibilidade das atividades ilícitas no mar virem a castigar a costa brasileira. Da mesma forma, o governo da Argentina acredita que a pirataria não pode servir como um álibi para a intervenção nos países afetados. O problema deve ser enfrentado primariamente nas organizações regionais, agências especializadas ou mesmo na Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas, sempre se levando em conta a UNCLOS. Não se deve extrapolar a noção de pirataria para uma ideia de ameaça global, especialmente no que concerne à militarização excessiva e ao uso de armamentos por navios privados. Para o país, o combate à pirataria deve partir da construção de capacidades nacionais, não só militares, mas econômicas e legais (Argentina 2012). O Uruguai possui um posicionamento alinhado aos seus vizinhos sul-americanos; para o país, a questão da pirataria deve ser discutida primariamente dentro das organizações regionais e da ZOPACAS, sempre preservando o princípio da autonomia nacional.

5 QUESTÕES A PONDERAR

1. De que maneira o aumento dos crimes marítimos nas águas do Golfo da Guiné configura uma ameaça à soberania dos países da região? 2. Quais são as medidas que os países das ZOPACAS podem levar a cabo para combater a pirataria no Golfo da Guiné? 3. Como utilizar as lições tiradas do combate à pirataria no Golfo de Áden para a situação na costa ocidental? 4. Em que medida a participação de potências extrarregionais e/ou o uso de companhias privadas de segurança deve ser encorajada ou não para se atuar contra a pirataria? 5. Como coordenar as ações das diversas organizações regionais africanas com a esfera de cooperação da própria ZOPACAS?

REFERÊNCIAS

Abshire, D. 1969. Portuguese Africa. London: Pall Mall Press. African Union - A united and strong Africa. 2013. African Union - A united and strong Africa. Acesso em 13 de Junho de 2014. http://pages.au.int/maritime/ 558 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations events/summit-heads-state-and-government-maritime-safety-and-security-gulf- guinea-yaounde-cameroon. Argentina. “Open debate on the Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Piracy”. Discurso do Representante da República Argentina, Ministro Mateo Estrémé, ao Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas. 2012 Anymadou, Adjoa. Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Lessons Learned from the Indian Ocean. Londres: Chatham House, 2013. A Nação. “Diplomacia: 2014, um ano cheio de desafios.” A Naçõ. 2014 01-Janeiro. http://www.anacao.cv/online/index.php?option=com_content&view=article& id=3978:diplomacia-2014-um-ano-cheio-de-desafios&catid=82&Itemid=503 (accessed 2014 13-Junho). Barrios, Cristina. Fighting piracy in the Gulf of Guinea: Offshore and onshore. European Union Institute for Security Studies , 2013. Berglee, Royar. 2012. Em World Regional Geograph: People, Places and Globalization, 465-613. Morehead: Morehead State University. Bizouras, Nikolaos. “Piracy, State Capacity and Root Causes: Lessons from the Somali Experience and Policy Choice in the Gulf of Guinea.” African Security Review, 2013: 1-17. Bresser-Pereira, Luiz Carlos, Nelson Marconi, e José Luís Oreiro. “Doença Holandesa.” Em Structuralist Development Macroeconomics. Londres: Routledge, no prelo. Bowie, Nile. “CIA Covert Ops in Nigeria: Fertile Ground for US Sponsored Balkanization.” Global Research. 2012 11-Abril. http://www.globalresearch.ca/ covert-ops-in-nigeria-fertile-ground-for-us-sponsored-balkanization/30259 (accessed 2014 19-Abril). Brown, David E. “AFRICOM at 5 years: the maturarion of a new US combatant comand.” The Letort Papers - US Army War College Press. Strategic Studies Institute, Agosto 2013: 125. Camarões. Opening Speech by the Head of State of the Republic of Cameroon. Summit of the Heads of State and Government on Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea. Yaoundé, 24-25 de Junho de 2013. Caninas, Osvaldo Peçanha. 2009. “Pirataria marítima moderna: História, situação atual e desafios.” Revista da Escola de Guerra Naval, 101-122. Acesso em 28 de agosto de 2014. http://www.egn.mar.mil.br/arquivos/revistaEgn/ dezembro2009/Pirataria%20mar%C3%ADtma%20moderna%20-%20 Hist%C3%B3ria%20-%20Situa%C3%A7%C3%A3o%20atual%20e%20

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Desafios%20-%20Osvaldo%20Pe%C3%A7anha%20Caninas.pdf. CargoNews. “Cabo Verde quer mais formação contra pirataria.” Cargo Edições Ltda. 29 de Junho de 2014. http://www.cargoedicoes.pt/site/Default.aspx?tabid =380&id=10399&area=Cargo (acesso em 10 de Julho de 2014). Chatham House. Angola and the Gulf of Guinea: Towards an Integrated Maritime Strategy. Relatório da conferência do Fórum de Angola a bordo do HMS Dauntless, Londres: Chatham House, 2012. “Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against ships and Ilicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa.” The Yaoundé Summit on Maritime Safety and Security. Yaoundé, 2013. “Declaração de Montevidéu.” VII Encontro Ministerial da Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul ZOPACAS - Declaração de Montevidéu. Montevidéu, 2013. Dyer, John. 2014. “news vice.” Vice News. 19 de Março. Acesso em 30 de abril de 2014. https://news.vice.com/articles/world-s-piracy-danger-zone-moves-to- west-african-waters. Emerging Equatorial Guinea. “Overview.” Emerging Equatorial Guinea. 2014 Fevereiro-3-4. http://www.emergingeg.com/en/equatorial-guinea (accessed 2014 13-Maio). Guinea Gulf Comission - Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea. Summit of Heads of State and Government on Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea. 2013. http://www.golfedeguinee2013.cm/ggc (acesso em 13 de junho de 2014). Escorrega, Luis Carlos Falcão. 2010. “Estratégia Americana para a África: A importância do Golfo da Guiné.” Revista Estratégia. Fernandes, Tathyana Zimmermann. 2009. “prof-thaty blogspot.” Histórias. 19 de setembro. Acesso em 30 de abril de 2014. http://prof-tathy.blogspot.com. br/. “Força Aérea participa no Obangame Express 2014.” Força Aérea Portuguesa. 14 de Abril de 2014. http://www.emfa.pt/www/noticia-553-forca-aerea-participa- no-obangame-express-2014 (acesso em 14 de Maio de 2014). Goes, Synésio Sampaio. 1991. Navegantes, bandeirantes e diplomatas. Brasília: Funag/IRPR. Hartman, Adam. “Namibia: Sea Piracy Is a Concern to Namibia.” All Africa. 10 de setembro de 2012. http://allafrica.com/stories/201209100422.html (acesso em 03 de Julho de 2014).

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IISS. The Military Balance: The annual assessment of global military capabilities and defence economics. Estocolmo, 2014. InfoPress: Agência Cabo-Verdiana de Notícias. “Cabo Verde associa-se ao Brasil e outros países ribeirinhos na reactivação da ZOPACAS.” InfoPress. 2012 30-Agosto. https://www.inforpress.publ.cv/cooperacao-mlt/67648-cabo- verde-associa-se-ao-brasil-e-outros-pases-ribeirinhos-na-reactivao-da-zopacas (accessed 2014 16-Junho). International Crisis Group. Implementing peace and security architecture (I): Central África. Bruxelas: International Crisis Group, 2011. International Crisis Group. The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone. Bruxelas: International Crisis Group, 2012. International Maritime Organization. Djibouti Code of Conduct. 2014a. http:// www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PIU/Pages/DCoC.aspx (acesso em 16 de junho de 2014). —. IMO Strategy for implementing sustainable maritime security measures in West and Central Africa. 2014b. http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/WestAfrica/ Pages/WestAfrica.aspx (acesso em 16 de Junho de 2014). International Peace Institute. “Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea: Assessing the Threats, Preparing the Responde.” Nova York, 2014. Jallou, Amadow. “Gambia: Taiwan Strengthens Gambia’s Maritime Security - Donates Three More Patrol Boats.” All Africa. 26 de Agosto de 2013. http:// allafrica.com/stories/201308261309.html?viewall=1 (acesso em 10 de Julho de 2014). Jean-Matthew, Tamba. “Guinea: Junta Leader Vows to Counter Foreign Intervention.” All-Africa. 2009 4-Outubro. http://allafrica.com/ stories/200910050731.html (accessed 2014 20-Junho). Jumat, Wayne. “Quadrilateral cooperation: Angola, Brazil, Nigeria and South Africa.” Institute for Global Dialogue. 29 de Maio de 2014. http://www.igd. org.za/home/8784-quadrilateral-cooperation-angola-brazil-nigeria-and-southafrica- (acesso em 10 de Julho de 2014). Kaade, Christos. “The Gulf of Guinea: Maritime Piracy’s New Global Nerve Center.” Fair Observer. 3 de Março de 2014. http://www.fairobserver.com/ region/middle_east_north_africa/gulf-guinea-maritime-piracys-global-nerve- center-18429/ (acesso em 5 de Julho de 2014). Kindzeka, Moki Edwin. “US, African Countries Team Up to Tackle Piracy in Gulf of Guinea.” Voice of America. 23 de Abril de 2014. http://www.voanews.

561 Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul com/content/us-african-countries-team-up-to-tackle-piracy-in-gulf-of- guinea-/1899510.html (acesso em 07 de Julho de 2014). Lewis, David. “Eq. Guinea’s Obiang slams foreign intervention in Africa.” Reuters. 2011 Junho-30. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/30/ozatp- africa-summit-idAFJOE75T0JC20110630 (accessed 2014 29-Junho). Luna, Maria Elisa Teófilo de. 2007 O mosaico africano do Golfo da Guiné: perspectivas para a atuação diplomática brasileira. Cursos de Altos Estudos, Brasília: Instituto Rio Branco MacauHub. “Cabo Verde presents request from seven countries to extend continental shelf to UN.” MacauHub. 2014 12-Junho. http://www.macauhub. com.mo/en/2014/06/12/cabo-verde-presents-request-from-seven-countries-to- extend-continental-shelf-to-un/ (accessed 2014 29-Junho). —. “Cape Verde: Portugal provides support in process of extending continental shelf.” MacauHub. 2008 6-Fevereiro. http://www.macauhub.com.mo/ en/2008/02/06/4512/ (accessed 2014 29-Junho). McGarry, Bryon. “Liberian Coast Guard, French Navy conduct joint anti- piracy training.” DVIDS. 23 de Abril de 2013. http://www.dvidshub.net/ news/105667/liberian-coast-guard-french-navy-conduct-joint-anti-piracy- training#.U8OPw_ldXUW (acesso em 04 de Julho de 2014). Ministério das Relações Exteriores. “Combate à pirataria e aos ilícitos marítimos no Golfo da Guiné.” Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Itamaraty. 27 de Junho de 2013. http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/ combate-a-pirataria-e-aos-ilicitos-maritimos-no-golfo-da-guine/print-nota (acesso em 06 de Julho de 2014). Nações Unidas. Report of the United Nations assessment mission on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. 19 de janeiro de 2012. Nathan, Laurie. “AFRICOM: A Threat to Africa’s Security.” Contemporary Security Policy, Abril 2009: 37-41. Nigéria. Assessing the work of the Nigerian Government on Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea. Discurso do Assistente Especial Senior do presidente da República Federal da Nigéria, senhor Oyewole Leke, no Le Meridien Piccadilly. Londres, 24 de agosto de 2011. Ohuocha, Chijioke. “Nigéria supera a África do Sul como a maior economia do continente.” Reuters. 06 de Abril de 2014. http://br.reuters.com/article/ worldNews/idBRSPEA3501420140406 (acesso em 14 de Maio de 2014). Oil&GasJournal. 2004. Geology will support further discoveries in Gulf of Guinea’s

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Golden Rectangle. 02 de Fevereiro. Acesso em 28 de Agosto de 2014. http:// www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-102/issue-7/special-report/geology-will- support-further-discoveries-in-gulf-of-guineas-golden-rectangle.html. Pajibo, Ezekiel, and Emira Woods. “AFRICOM: Wrong for Liberia, Disastrous for Africa.” n.d. http://www.afjn.org/focus-campaigns/militarization-us-africa- policy/105-commentary/356-africom-wrong-for-liberia-disastrous-for-africa. html (accessed 2014 15-Maio). Penha, Eli Alves. 2011. Relações Brasil-África e Geopolítica do Atlântico Sul. Salvador: Editora da Universidade Federal da Bahia. Ploch, Lauren. “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa.” Estados Unidos: Congressional Research Service, 22 de Julho de 2011. Rosa, Sérigio Inácio da. Projeto Angola-Brasil e o Paradoxo da Abundância. Dissertação apresentada ao programa de pós-graduação em Planejamento Regional e Gestão de Cidades , Campos dos Goytacazes : Universidade Campos Mendes , 2011. Royal Naval Museum Library. 2002. “Royal Naval Museum.” National Museum of the Royal Navy. Acesso em 30 de abril de 2014. http://www. royalnavalmuseum.org/info_sheets_piracy.htm Sall, Alioune. “The Foreign Policy of Senegal Since 2000.” Edited by South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). South African Foreign Policy and African Drivers Programme Occasional Papers (2013). Schmidt, Elizabeth. 2013. Em Foreign Intervention in Africa, 1-55. New York: Cambridge University Press. Shipping News and Views. “Seamarshals Gains First License as Cape Verde Fight Against West African Piracy.” Shipping News and Views. 07 de Dezembro de 2012. http://shippingandfreightresource.com/news/2012/12/07/seamarshals- gains-first-license-as-cape-verde-fight-against-west-african-piracy/ (acesso em 06 de Julho de 2014). Sidiqque, Haroon. “Guinea warns against foreign military intervention.” The Guardian. 2009 14-Dezembro. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/ dec/14/guinea-foreign-troops-war-warning (accessed 2014 30-Junho). Silva, Igor Castellano da. Guerra e Construção do Estado na Rep. Democrática do Congo: a definição militar do conflito como pré-condição para a paz. Edited by Dissertação de Mestrado. Vol. Ciência Política. Porto Alegre: Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, 2011.

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Silva, Igor Castellano da (Responsável). “Capacidade Estatal: Democracia e Poder na Era Digital.” ISAPE. 17 de dezembro de 2012. http://isape.wordpress. com/category/edicoes-isape-debate/capacidade-estatal/ (acesso em 20 de agosto de 2014). Sirleaf, Ellen Johnson. “Africom Can Help Governments Willing to Help Themselves.” 2007 25-Junho. http://allafrica.com/stories/200706251196.html (accessed 2014 23-Maio). Stearns, Scott. “Piracy Cuts Oil Production in Cameroon, Threatens Future Investment.” Voice of America. 08 de Abril de 2010. http://www.voanews. com/content/piracy-cuts-oil-production-in-cameroon-threatens-future- investment--90356909/159695.html (acesso em 07 de Julho de 2014). Taylor, Magnus. 2012. Royal African Society. 2 de Fevereiro. Acesso em 28 de Agosto de 2014. http://www.royalafricansociety.org/blog/oil-and-governance- gulf-guinea The Economist. “Africa’s New Number One.” The Economist. 2014 12-Abril. http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21600685-nigerias-suddenly- supersized-economy-indeed-wonder-so-are-its-still-huge (accessed 2014 5-Junho). The Institute for International Affairs . Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea. London: Chatham House, 2013. The Maritime Executive. “Ghana’s President Supports Strengthening of Maritime Borders, Security.” The Maritime Executive. 09 de Agosto de 2013. http://www. maritime-executive.com/article/Ghanas-President-Supports-Strengthening-of- Maritime-Borders-Security-2013-08-09 (acesso em 06 de Julho de 2014). Ukeja, Charles, e Wullson Mvomo Ela. 2013. African approaches to maritime security - The Gulf of Guinea. Abuja: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. UN. “United Nations Security Council.” Nova Yorque, 2011. Resolução 2018. __. “United Nations Security Council.” Nova York, 2012. Resolução 2039. United Nations Economic Comission for Africa. ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States. 20-? http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/ ecowas-economic-community-west-african-states-0 (acesso em 04 de Junho de 2014). __.ECCAS - Economic Community of Central African States. 20-? http://www. uneca.org/oria/pages/eccas-economic-community-central-african-states-0 (acesso em 4 de Junho de 2014). __. ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States. 20-? http://www.

564 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations uneca.org/oria/pages/ecowas-economic-community-west-african-states-0 (acesso em 04 de Junho de 2014). __. ECCAS - Economic Community of Central African States. 20-? http://www. uneca.org/oria/pages/eccas-economic-community-central-african-states-0 (acesso em 4 de Junho de 2014). United Nations Security Council. “Resolution 2018.” Nova Yorque, 2011. __. “Resolution 2039.” Nova York, 2012. Visentini, Paulo Fagundes. 2010. A África na política internacional: O sistema interafricano e sua inserção mundial. Curitiba: Juruá. Visentini, Paulo Fagundes. Os Países Africanos: diversidade de um continente. Porto Alegre: Leitura XXI, 2012. Visentini, Paulo, and Analúcia Danilevicz Pereira. “A Nova África do Sul: política, diplomacia e sociedade.” In África do Sul: História, Estado e Sociedade, by Paulo Visentini and Analúcia Danilevicz Pereira, 268. Brasília: FUNAG/ CESUL, 2010. Vrëy, François. “Bad order at sea: From the Gulf of Aden to the Gulf of Guinea.” African Security Review, 2010: 17-30.

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UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations ISSN: 2318-3195 | v.2, 2014| p. 567-579

GUIDELINES FOR IPC JOURNALISTS

Aline de Ávila Rocha1 Carolina Carvalho Trindade2 Marcel Hartmann3

ABSTRACT

This paper purpose is to introduce the proceedings of UFRGSMUN’s International Press Committee to those who applied as journalists at our United Nations’ simulations. The readers will be informed about the types of publications that will be published at our event and the materials available to produce them. They will be presented to the guidelines of the world’s top news vehicles in order to learn how to fit the facts in many differents points of view. As our Model United Nations intends to be most faithful to real UN conferences the journalistic body should know how to behave gracefully, managing to do their reporting job according to a high posture.

1 4th semester International Relations student at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. 2 4th semester Journalism student at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. 3 8th semester Journalism student at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. International Press Committee

1 PURPOSES

Information, according to the Oxford Dictionary, means: “Facts provided or learned about something or someone; What is conveyed or represented by a particular arrangement or sequence of things”. The main scope of any media is to delivery the information of some event to the public in order to present the situation. Usually, in conferences as important as the United Nations, the only way to do this mediation is through the news and reports provided by the press. This journalistic body does not belong to the UN: it is compound by journalists from all around the world representing any press agency; and they are present there to cover the discussions collecting and sharing the information. It is known that media vehicles are not that imparcial considering one event. The one that relates what have seen reports the happening according to their believes, political position, agency policies or country position - which is the reason why there are many different impressions about one situation. It would be unrealistic to think that the publications, the opinion and the behaviour of journalists in such events would not affect the general public. Understanding that, UFRGSMUN created its own International Press Committee (IPC) where its main objective is to provide a real experience about the effects of the press in such important world wide conferences. Those who chose to subscribe to this committee will be dealing directly with journalism, and should be faithful to the idea of provinding clear information to your readers, considering the background history about the activities happening in the simulations, and also trying to fit this content in some type of approach that each editorial policy requires. At the same time, the other delegates, participating in different committees, will be challenged to deal with the repercussions of their decisions being spread to the event media. During the conference, the delegates of IPC will have differents way of approach, to make the event as most real as possible, by interviewing the delegates, taking pictures and making use of social media. Each delegate will be assigned to one of the seven other committees to report the discussion and, eventually, other facts that may influence the conference itself. When presenting these reports, they should choose one or two editorial policies that fits better to the position of the country they are writting about [view topic four]. Besides covering the simulation, the journalist may be asked to help the chairs to make a fictitious news or “crisis” in order to contribute to the delegates debate and keep their discussion in its path. Those reports and crises should be sent to the IPC editorial board, compound by its directors, as soon as possible, in order to be printed. The news will pass by a quick revison, as they would in any real newspapper. Its content will not only be revised in order to correct grammar or typographical errors, but also to identify if the content fits the editorial policy intended. It is not up to the directors of IPC or

568 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations the directors of the committee simulated to agree with the way the news was written, yet, its their job to certify if the content are faithful to the ideals of the press the journalist chose to simmulate. Although those reports will not be placed in any newspaper, the delegates of IPC, identified here as journalists, will be given a space in our journal, UFRGSMUN Daily. Differently of the reports, this newspaper does not have the scope to simmulate news, it will be made mainly by the editorial board and will figure facts of the event itself. There will be a column destinated to the daily summary of the simulations of each committee, written by the journalists of IPC. Having in mind that a new edition should be available to the participants and staff everyday at the coffee break, this summary should be available to the editorial board at least two hours early.

2 RESOURCES

2.1 REPORTS

News reports are the work instrument of any journalist. They are the most common format of sharing information and should bring the most recent facts to the general public. The IPC will be working with reports, whose public should mainly be the delegates of the committee the journalist are covering, even though they are not restricted to such delegates. The publication of those reports will be made imediatly after written and revised by the editorial board, in order to keep the flow of information continuous, and will not be printed in any newspaper. However, the editors of IPC should place a header on each news given to them so the readers will know in which newspaper those reports would be published. In order to do that, each journalist must prepare his news based in one editorial policy [see item four], which can change along the sessions, indicating it at the report sent to the editorial board.

2.2 PRESS RELEASES

Press releases are articles send by institutions or agencies in order to provide information to the media. In UFRGSMUN, we will consider the material given to the journalists by the chairs of the committees as press releases. As said before, chairs usually create “crises” in order to contribute to the debate. These “crises” should be received by the journalists as a press release and, if necessary, rewritten to adapt its content to a press vehicle. After written, the report, which will be based in the release, should be aproved not only by the editorial board of IPC, but also by the chairs of the committee they are responsible for.

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2.3 PHOTOS

Althought photojournalism will not be the main format to UFRGSMUN press, it is highly impropable that such events would not be covered thropugh the use of pictures. Journalists may use their own equipment (cellphones, smarthphones, tablets, ipods, compact cameras, DSLR cameras, disposable cameras), even if they are not professional, to keep track of the simmulations. It is important to know what to photograph. There should not be more than one or two shots of the whole room for a day, unless something excepcional happens. An outstanding delegate could be the subject of a picture, as so as a delegate who receives some news about its country, or even a very fierce discussion. If the photograph is covering one very important fact, it could be sent to the editorial board for it to be printed with a report. On the other hand, if the picture is only updating an alredy printed news, or just covering ordinary facts, they should be published only on twitter [see below].

2.4 INTERVIEWS

Interviews are one of the many forms of investigation. We highly encourage the journalists of IPC to perform many interviews with the delegates before writing the reports. Those interviews, however, should not disturb the debates and discussion of the simulations. We must remember that the journalist is a guest on those discussions and should not interrupt it. This way, interviews must be realized outside the conference rooms, at the end or the beggining of a session. Journalists, sometimes, may be called by a delegate to perform an interview. This is very common on all political areas, and it is a way to create important relationships with the delegates. However, journalists should be aware of the intentions of the informatiom given to them. Some press conferences may happen where all the journalists on IPC may be called. At a press conference a journalist should not only be alert to whom is speaking, but also collect past information to formulate complex, smart questions to the delegates. Depending on the editorial policy the journalist may have chosen to represent, their questions can lead to one or other conclusion, so it is important to decide for which vehicle the journalist will write for before performing any interview.

2.5 TWITTER

The International Press Committee will be responsible for a twitter account.

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The journalists of IPC, as well as the editorial board, will be given access to this account, from where delegates of all committees could rely on to get information of what is happening in the simulations. The delegates of IPC should focus on updating stories about the committee they are covering, but they can also tweet news of the event in general. Outside news should not be featured in this tool, and the tweets, diffently from the reports, should not be guided by any editorial policy. It is important to remember that tweets cannot be edited after posted, so it is very important that the delegates use this tool carefully. Delegates may not exclude or modify other delegates tweets, and the editorial board would not modify any tweet content. If a tweet somehow does not o follow the rules or offend, afront or insult a delegate, a staff member or any person or brand related to the event is allowed to immediately delete it through the editorial board.

2.6 UFRGSMUN DAILY

As usual in MUNs, there is a journal where it will be published information about the event. UFRGSMUN will not bedifferent. Nnetheles, until the 11th edition, UFRGSMUN Daily had only content reports about the previous day of simulation as well as columns such as “spotted”, “quotes” and “social events”. This year, the journal will share space with the news written by the delegates that will simulate in International Press Committee. The column granted to the delegates should be a summary of the sessions of that day and the evening before. Understanding that each journalist will be responsible for covering one committee, they should prepare a short text about the simulations they are accompanying and deliver it to the IPC editorial board two hours before the coffee break of that day, which will be about two in the afternoon (2:00 pm).

3 GUIDELINES

When operating between two fields of knowledge - the one which is acquired and the previous one-, journalism reveal to the population everyday facts which were not experienced or which were experienced in other ways. It is a field of “production and circulation of senses” (Benetti 2008, p. 107). When producing news, journalism affects reality since it reproduces a past evenement using one of many availabe points of view. Thus, it is not imparcial or just a mirror of reality, since it takes part on changing the way an evenement is told to people. Telling a history using certain kind of words or focusing on certain details instead of others are choices which demonstrate reality comprehensions. With that said, we will analyze how news are made, its caracteristics and particularities.

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3.1 NEWS VALUES

News values are criteria used by journalists in order to list what should be reported and what should not. They operate a selection and construction of what is selectionated (Bourdieu apud Traquina 2002, p. 186) - in other words, they demonstrate and interfere in a given event. They are fundamental to understanding news production and the choices that editors and other journalists face when deciding which piece of information is news while another is not. We can classify news values as selection or construction. The ones of selection are referred to the criteria journalists use at the selection of evenements (Wolf apud Traquina, 2002). In other words, they are the basis from which the journalist will select the ocurrences which should be transformed in news. On the other hand, construction news values operate at the “backstage”, suggesting “what should be stressed, what should be omitted, what shoud be priority in this construction” (Traquina 2002, pp.186-187). Here are the news values, according to Traquina:

3.1.1 Proeminence

Occurrences featuring well-know individuals or institutions are newsworthy. For example, an evenement including a president calls more attention than if it was with another person.

3.1.2 Proximity

This value occurs both in geographic and cultural terms. A child kidnap in Zimbabwe may not be in the New York Times because most of the times the USA are not interested in small incidents occurred in Africa. If it does, it probably will not be on front page news.

3.1.3 Impact

The number of people whose lives will be influenced in some way by the subject of the story influence if an ocurrence turns into an article. The greater the consequence, and the larger the number of people for whom an event is important, the greater the newsworthiness.

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3.1.4 Novelty

Disruption in normality is a news value since it presents to the public what it is new. Traquina (2010) says the journalistic world is interested by what happens for the first time.

3.1.5 Timeliness

The more recent, the more newsworthy. In some cases, timeliness is relative. An event may have occurred in the past but only have been learned about recently.

3.1.6 Notability

The quality of being visible is a value which guides journalists. A workmen break is more tangible than the weak conditions of the workers. What can be best pictured by the public is notable and is a news value.

3.1.7 The bizarre

The unusual, unorthodox, or unexpected attracts attention. A classic example of this is dog-bites-man vs. man-bites-dog. Man-bites-dog is more bizarre. Dog- bites-man usually is not news.

3.1.8 Conflict

Controversy and open clashes are newsworthy, inviting attention on their own, almost regardless of what the conflict is over. Conflict reveals underlying causes of disagreement between individuals and institutions in a society. Strife is newsworthy. War. Public anger or bitter disagreement over fundamental issues.

3.1.9 Death

According to Traquina (2002), death is a key-news value, since it breaks life normality. And, a priori, where there is rupture, there are news.

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4 EDITORIAL POLICIES

In order to participate in UFRGSMUN International Press Committee you will be representing one or more big communications companies. Each one of those has its own editorial guidelines and interests, and will be more or less inclinated to cover different subjects of our United Nations committees. We selected different newspapers, channels and agencies that you will possibly be simulating. The more you know about these vehicles, the easier will be for you to know which report will fit better their interests. Here we briefly explain how the news you will make should be edited, based on the official guidelines provided by these companies, as also the profile of the readers or viewers the news usually made for.

4.1 THE NEW YORK TIMES

One of the main newspapers of the United States, The Times was founded in New York in 1851 with the name “The New York Daily Times” and would have the title we know in 1857. At its launch, the propose of the journal was written: “we shall be ‘Conservative’, in all cases where we think Conservatism essential to the public good;—and we shall be Radical in everything which may seem to us to require radical treatment and radical reform. We do not believe that ‘everything’ in Society is either exactly right or exactly wrong;—what is good we desire to preserve and improve;—what is evil, to exterminate, or reform” (Machine 2014). The New York Times is considered a liberal newspaper which openly defends the same-sex marriage and gun control, for example (Okrent 2004). The paper had positioned itselfagainst Bush politics and the Iraq war and has a project to get proximate to their russians readers, what is notable after a publication of a letter written by Vladimir Putin, giving Russia’s point of view about Syria (Putin 2013).

4.2 THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

The largest journal in circulation in the United States, the Wall Street Journal has a special writing about business and the financial world in both American and global levels of analysis. Founded in 1889, the journal carries the name of the financial district of New York, the world’s largest stock exchange by overall average daily trading volume and by total market capitalization of its listed companies. The journal keep their primary principals: “they are united by the mantra ‘free markets and free people’, the principles, if you will, marked in the watershed year of 1776 by Thomas Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence and Adam Smith’s Wealth

574 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations of Nations. So over the past century and into the next, the Journal stands for free trade and sound money; against confiscatory taxation and the ukases of kings and other collectivists; and for individual autonomy against dictators, bullies and even the tempers of momentary majorities. If these principles sound unexceptionable in theory, applying them to current issues is often unfashionable and controversial” (Journal 2000).

4.3 BBC

The British Broadcasting Corporation, founded in 1922, is a big public service of broadcasting which reach the society by television, radio and internet. Created under a Royal Charter4, its main goal was to spread the british culture (“representing the UK, its nations, regions and communities”) reinforcing the motto “Nation shall speak peace unto Nation”.

4.4 FOLHA DE SÃO PAULO

Created in 1960, Folha de São Paulo came from a fusion of three primary “Folhas” lauched in 1921. Considered a modern newspaper by its tecnology in printing, they characterize their journalistic style as critical, non-partisan and pluralistic, with the propose to expose the news by differents point of views. However, it is know that they have a centre-right wing approach when it comes to politics and others polemical subjects.

4.5 EL CLARÍN

El Clarin is the largest Argentin newspaper. Created in 1945, it was first publicated with a national approach. Clarín group also owns radiostations and television channels, including ARTEAR producer and broadcaster of various TV channels, one with the biggest audience in the country. El Clarín is known for disputes with president Cristina Kirchner, who is trying to implement media regulation law projects, and for its right-wing approach when it comes to social and political issues.

4 Is a formal document issued by a monarch as letters patent, granting a right or power to an individual or a body corporate. 575 International Press Committee

4.6 EL PAÍS

Born in 1976, El País was created to be a liberal, independent and pro-Europe newspaper. The most influent paper in Spain, El País is conservative when it comes to economics, liberal in politics and radical when it comes to social issues. Currently, it is considered a middle-left wing newspaper and tries to have more influence in Central America.

4.7 LE MONDE

Created in 1944 thanks to the efforts of general Charles de Gaulle, who wanted France to have a big and internationally respected newspaper. The newspaper was first destinated to diplomatic circles and international organizations, but after gaining autonomy, its crictical position became a world reference in the contribution to the critique of one thought and the construction of new paradigms. Le Monde has became the largest journal in the french country. Considered a middle-left wing journal, Le Monde usually covers Africa and Middle-West issues, since France still has a cultural influence among contries of those regions. Still, it openly criticizes neoliberal globalization and its writing has the ultimate goal of bringing the analysis and reflection of the facts than the news itself (Diplomatique 2014).

4.8 ASIA TIMES

This current media vehicle is an online paper that was created after the closing of the Asia Times newspaper in 1997 due to an Asian financial crisis. Their objective is to show news about Asia in an Asian view, distinguishing from the Western vision. For that reason, they write their news in english in order to reach more people. Their readers are people of influence - investors, executives, diplomats, academics, journalists - who need to know about Asian political, economic and business affairs. The journal consider itself as a “must read” for Westerners and Asians who do business with each other (Asia Times 2014).

4.9 XINHUA

This Chinese online news provider was created in 1997 with the propose to set a good image of China abroad and report news from all around the world.

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Xinhuanet, established in 2000, is most often the first to report China’s major breaking news events (Xinhuanet 2010). The journal is the state press agency related to the Communisty Party and due to this fact the paper publishes some news in a diplomatic writing. Some news from Xinhua are published in another government media, People’s Daily, which is known by an authoritative carather that is not seen in Xinhua releases. In this context, the term “authoritative” refers only to commentary that speaks for People’s Daily as an institution and, by extension, for the party Central Committee (Godwin; Miller, 2013).

4.10 AL JAZEERA

Created in 1996 by the Royal Qatar family, the channel mixed Pan-Arabism, Islamic feelings and a liberal perspective and was a very important vehicle in the democratization of the Middle-East. Embracing the slogan “the opinion and the other opinion”, the paper intends to show both sides of the event, although the same sentence has lead them into controversy regarding the accusations in reflecting Qatar’s interests in political and economical issues (Daher 2011) Al Jazeera is the most popular Arabic television channel an independent television company supporting the people of the region in their struggle. One example of that is the Arab Spring which lead Egypt cut their transmission in the country. Yet, some countries accuse the channel of promoting Arab propaganda and supporting region groups as Al-Qaeda (Week 2011). However, the channel main goal is to emphasizing news from the developing world, without an Anglo- American world-view (Samuel-Azran 2010).

4.11 RUSSIA TODAY

Launched in 2005, Russian Today is a cable channel that reaches over one hundred countries and more than 644 millon people. RT, as it is known, has been created to change the Western views of Russia due to the permanent opinion that the country is at the same since the Cold War era.

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REFERENCES

Daher, Joseph. Where does Al Jazeera stand? Available from http://www.counterfire. org/articles/opinion/14878-where-does-al-jazeera-stand. (accessed August 21, 2014). Diplomatique, Le Monde. Quem Somos. Available from http://www.diplomatique. org.br/quem_somos.php. (accessed August 21, 2014). Godwin, Paul H.b.; Miller, Alice L. 2013. China’s Forbearance Has Limits: Chinese Threat and Retaliation Signaling and Its Implications for a Sino-American Military Confrontation. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press. Journal, The Wall Street. About Us. Available from http://online.wsj.com/news/ articles/SB126841434975761027. (accessed August 21, 2014). Lago, Claudia; Benetti, Marcia (org). 2008. Metodologia de pesquisa em jornalismo. Petrópolis, RJ: Vozes. Machine, Times. Thursday, September 18,1851. Available from http://timesmachine. nytimes.com/timesmachine/1851/09/18/issue.html. (accessed August 21, 2014). Okrent, Daniel. Is The New York Times a Liberal Newspaper?Available from http:// www.nytimes.com/2004/07/25/opinion/the-public-editor-is-the-new-york-times- a-liberal-newspaper.html. (accessed August 21, 2014). Putin, Vladimir. A Plea for Caution From Russia: What Putin Has to Say to Americans About Syria. Available from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/opinion/putin- plea-for-caution-from-russia-on-syria.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. (accessed September 24, 2014). Samuel-azran, Tal. 2010. Al-Jazeera and US War Coverage. New York: Peter Lang Publishing. Available from http://books.google.com.br/books?id=Ay8FckfL5vAC& pg=PR4&lpg=PR4&dq=SAMUEL-AZRAN,+Tal.+Al-Jazeera+and+US+War+Co verage.+New+York:+Peter+Lang+Publishing,+2010.&source=bl&ots=RTGd-_dm ae&sig=h0vyI0ZyD2bKLnFjMUjGSu7k6Jc&hl=pt-BR&sa=X&ei=yHgjVOzM IJDIgwS6yoI4&ved=0CCcQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=SAMUEL-AZRAN, Tal. Al-Jazeera and US War Coverage. New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2010.&f=false. (accessed August 21, 2014). Times, Asia. About Us. Available from http://www.atimes.com/mediakit/aboutus. html. (accessed August 21, 2014). Traquina, Nelson. 2002. O que é Jornalismo. Lisboa: Quimera Xinhuanet. Brief Introduction to Xinhuanet. Available from http://news.xinhuanet. com/english2010/special/2011-11/28/c_131274495.htm. (accessed August 21, 2014). 578 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations

Week, The Jewish.Concern Over Al Jazeera English Network Here. Available from http://www.thejewishweek.com/news/international/concern_over_al_jazeera_ english_network_here. (accessed August 21, 2014).

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