The Politics of Force Deployment and Nigeria 'S National Security
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
The Politics of Force Deployment and Nigeria Page 1 of 15 The Politics of Force Deployment and Nigeria ’s National Security By Priye S. Torulagha Odi will continue to haunt Nigeria , particularly the armed forces. When President/Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, Defence Minister Lt. Gen. Theophilus Danjuma (rtd.), Maj. Gen. Victor Malu (now rtd.) and other top leaders of the nation met secretly and established Operation Hakuri II, little did they know that they were setting a very dangerous military precedent. When they approved the decision to launch a conventional military attack against Odi, on the grounds of attempting to apprehend those who had killed 12 police officers, they set up a precedent that a whole community could be punished for the actions of the few. When they decided to regionalize the Odi operation by removing soldiers of Niger Delta origin, particularly from the Ijaw ethnic group from the units that were supposed to carry out the operation while transferring troops from other regions or zones of the country into the units that carried out the operation, they laid the golden egg for future instability of the armed forces and the country. It should be recalled that it was widely reported that before the plan to attack Odi was finalized, troops from the Niger Delta, particularly from Ijaw areas were removed from the units that were supposed to go to Odi and troops from the Non-Oil Producing regions were put in the units that were supposed to go to the town. The reason for this tactical move was to prevent soldiers indigenous to the area from sympathizing and or identifying with the aspirations and concerns of the people of Odi and the Niger Delta generally. The precaution was supposedly taken after earlier military encounters in which some soldiers from the Niger Delta actually joined armed youths to resist federal security operations. It should be recalled that during a military operation in Bayelsa State in which Okpoama youths launched attacks against security forces, a former colonel from Okpoama known as “Akono” or by the nickname of “ Oslo ” was supposedly alleged by federal authorities to have supplied arms to the youths. Likewise, two soldiers were reported to have left their units and probably joined the youths. P.M. News (1999, January 8) reported: “ According to a report circulating in high military and police quarters, the soldiers vanished last Sunday when Okpoma youths attacked a team of soldiers sent to the area. One source told P.M News that the men actually abandoned fellow soldiers, opting instead to team up with the Ijaw youths.” It should also be recalled that when troops were deployed after the launching of the Kaiama Declaration, many soldiers from the Niger Delta sympathized with the youths and tactically refused to cooperate in manhandling the youths. This being the case, the political and military higher-ups in Nigeria decided to regionalize the attack on Odi by removing troops from the area and replacing them with troops from other regions. That action, no doubt, has contributed immensely to the politicization and destabilization of the armed forces. That action will continue to haunt the nation in many ways. Senior military officers would have vehemently opposed the idea of invading a Nigerian community with a conventional military force, for the unbelievable purpose of apprehending suspects when the police could have been summoned to investigate and carry out the arrests. http://www.nigerdeltacongress.com/particles/politics_of_force_deployment_and.htm 7/18/2008 The Politics of Force Deployment and Nigeria Page 2 of 15 Why is the regionalization of soldiers-in-action a very dangerous practice? Five very strong arguments are made here. First, the tactical deployment of soldiers to fighting units based on their ethnicity or region of origin is a very destabilizing approach in solving conflicts in Nigeria since it tends to create the feelings of “we vs. them” and “you kill my people and I will kill your people” among the soldiers. Second, the excessive use of force and unnecessary killings of Nigerians by Nigeria ’s security forces during security operations to control communal uprisings are engendered by the need to retaliate for previous actions. In other words, when political and military leaders dispatch security forces to clamp down on a trouble spot and in the process, people are unnecessarily killed, the sons and daughters from that community, who are in the armed and police forces, eventually retaliate when they are sent to other communities to maintain order, as a form of payback for the destruction and killing of their own people. This accounts for the frequent excessive use of force by some soldiers, naval personnel, and police officers. Third, the argument often made by members of the security forces that they were simply “obeying orders” is merely a smokescreen for retaliatory action. Fourth, since power seems to gravitate towards the power-wielders, Nigeria ’s security forces tend to be deployed quite easily and encouraged to shoot on sight in politically powerless regions of the country while regions with great political influence rarely experience military deployment. Five, the wide margin between senior military officers and the noncommissioned officers in terms of benefits leads to frustration and the need to destroy. The following reasons explain the positions taken in the arguments. 1. The drawbacks of deploying soldiers based on their ethnicity or regions of origin: (a) Assigning soldiers to certain operations based on their ethnicity or region or community creates the impression that the armed forces are regionally and ethnically structured. It turns soldiers against their comrades based on ethnicity and or regions of origin. (b) The political and military higher-ups who approved the regionalization of soldiers-in-action policy during the Odi operation ignored the fact that such a strategy can tremendously contribute to ethnic and regional hatred. In other words, if soldiers from other parts of Nigeria are sent to the Niger Delta for security reasons and they behave brutally against the indigenes, Nigerian soldiers from the Niger Delta would most definitely pay back in kind if sent to other regions to keep the peace. Due to the short-sightedness of Operation Hakuri II against Ikenya, Opia, and Odi, it did not take long before a crisis in Benue State resulted in the deployment of Nigerian troops in the region under “Operation Mesa.” As things turned out, the crisis was in the vicinity of Maj. Gen Victor Malu’s community. Maj. Gen. Malu was the Army Chief of Staff during the Odi operation. The soldiers inflicted extensive destruction and death on his people. Surprisingly, Gen. Malu could not accept the destruction and death inflicted upon his people but tolerated the destruction and killings inflicted upon Odi people. On the Odi operation, Malu stated: “ I did a professional operation at Odi and if the occasion warrants I will do the same thing. I have no cause to apologise to the people of Odi” ( Ozi-Usman, 2002, May 28). However, on the army operation in his own community, he stated: “My conclusion on the incident is that the army had specific instructions to… destroy the whole of my village.” (Reuters, 2002, May 27). Lt. Gen Malu forgot that the troops sent to destroy Odi had revealed that they were ordered to do so by the higher-ups. It can also be recalled that Lt. Gen. Danjuma (rtd.) justified the Odi operation on the grounds of securing oil facilities. He did not regret the unnecessary lost of lives and property at Odi but regretted the Middle Belt counteraction by the Nigerian military. After the Benue attack, Danjuma reacted “The most difficult time in my life was when I was accused of masterminding the Benue State killings where scores of residents died after a bloody clash with security operatives” (Olise, 2003, May 21). Gen. Malu could not understand why his uncle, who was the chief of his place, was killed http://www.nigerdeltacongress.com/particles/politics_of_force_deployment_and.htm 7/18/2008 The Politics of Force Deployment and Nigeria Page 3 of 15 but forgot that Nigerian soldiers had killed the chiefs of Ikenya in Delta State and Kaiama in Bayelsa State , during the Nigerian military efforts to stop demonstrations in support of the Kaiama Declaration. (c) It seems that Nigeria ’s political and military leaders did not learn from the Odi and Benue fiascos. As a result, they are making the same mistakes again by regionalizing the components of forces trying to keep the peace in Delta State . Although, not authoritatively verifiable, it has been alleged that most of the soldiers sent to keep the peace in Delta State , under the Joint Task Force, Operation Restore Hope, particularly around Warri, are from other regions. Recently, Nigerian soldiers were said to have invaded Ohoro Town in the Ughelli North Local Council Area. The soldiers were alleged to have overreacted and killed about twenty people over the disappearance of some cows ( Ogefere & Olise, 2004, February 20). In Warri, in late February, 2004, two Itsekiri citizens were shot on flimsy reasons, one died while the other recuperated. The dead man, known as ‘Prince” died in the MacIver area while the other, a teenage boy, was shot at in the Polokor Market area by alleged men of the Joint Task Force, Operation Restore Hope. Itsekiri youths have vowed to retaliate against the soldiers who took the action (Okhomina, 2004, March 2). A major reason for the soldiers’ overreaction is based on the theory that most of them in “Operation Restore Hope” in the Niger Delta are from other regions of the country and they find it difficult to relate to the communities in which they are sent to maintain security.