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Turkey's Quest for Security and Autonomy

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Turkey's Quest for Security and Autonomy Away from NATO toward Russia? - Turkey’s Quest for Security, Autonomy and Regional Power Status Simen G. Aamodt Master’s Thesis in Political Science Department of Political Science UNIVERSITY OF OSLO Spring 2018 Word count: 34 446 II Away from NATO toward Russia? - Turkey’s Quest for Security, Autonomy and Regional Power Status III © Simen G. Aamodt 2018 Away from NATO toward Russia? Turkey’s Quest for Security, Autonomy and Regional Power Status Simen G. Aamodt http://www.duo.uio.no/ Trykk: Reprosentralen, Universitetet i Oslo IV Abstract This thesis analyzes Turkey’s security policies toward Russia, the US and NATO with a focus on two cases: Syria (2011-2018) and the Black Sea region (2014-2018). It employs Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory (1987) and Allison & Zelikow’s (1999) conceptual models Rational Choice, Organizational Behavior and Governmental Politics. The reader gains increased knowledge of alliance theory, security diversification and emerging middle power activism. Turkey’s relations with the EU, US and NATO quickly deteriorated following the failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016 against President Erdogan’s AKP government, which triggered a major reshuffling of government personnel. Conversely, Turkey increased security cooperation with Russia since mid-2016 as part of their rapprochement process (after the November 2015 fighter jet incident in Syria). Ankara agreed to purchase the Russian S-400 air defense system (incompatible with NATO’s defense architecture) and joined the Russia-led Astana peace talks to solve the Syrian conflict. Consequently, Western journalists and analysts claimed Turkey is ‘drifting’ away from NATO toward Russia and warned the West may ‘lose Turkey.’ This thesis argues that Turkey’s recent turn toward Russia is mainly due to deteriorating relations with the US in Syria and the 2016 post-coup purge, which gave rise to Russia-friendly actors at the expense of pro-Western elements. Yet, in the long term, accommodating Russia neither fulfills Ankara’s goals of security, autonomy nor regional power status. Russia’s 2014 annexation and subsequent militarization of Crimea changed the regional balance of power in the Black Sea. Crimea then emerged as a logistics hub supplying Russia’s military campaign in Syria (since September 2015), where it bolstered Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Witnessing an increased Russian military presence in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean that may challenge its sovereignty, Turkey (as a rational actor) must balance and cannot bandwagon with Russia. Therefore, it will remain anchored in NATO in the foreseeable future. V VI Acknowledgments I would like to thank the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS) in Oslo for granting me a master’s scholarship and offering me access to their resources. I am thankful to all the staff and colleagues who helped me through the process and for good discussions along the way. Thanks to the Russia group for letting me partake in their meetings. I am greatly indebted to my advisor Bjørn Olav Knutsen at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (FFI) for guiding me through this writing process. You gave me the neccesary tools, insights and advice needed to write this thesis. I would also like to thank my co-advisor Joakim Parslow in the Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages at the University of Oslo for your invaluable insights into Turkish politics. I would like to thank my contact person at IFS Lars Haugom for many interesting conversations about Turkey. Furthermore, I am grateful to the people whom I met on my field trip to Ankara and Istanbul in January 2018 who shared their views on Turkish foreign policy. Thanks to my friends and family who supported me through this time. IFS, Oslo May 15, 2018 VII VIII Table of contents 1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1 1.1 Thesis goal and research question ............................................................................... 3 1.2 Case study choice ........................................................................................................ 4 1.3 Glossary of Terms and expressions ............................................................................. 8 1.4 Literature assessment ................................................................................................. 10 1.4.1 Literature contribution ........................................................................................ 10 1.4.2 Literature review ................................................................................................ 11 1.5 Theory choice and thesis outline ............................................................................... 15 2 Theoretical framework ..................................................................................................... 17 2.1 Stephen Walt (1987) as theoretical foundation ......................................................... 17 2.1.1 Origins of Turkey’s NATO membership: Balancing the Soviet threat .............. 19 2.1.2 Application of the balancing and bandwagoning terms ..................................... 21 2.1.3 Role of ideology ................................................................................................. 22 2.1.4 Asymmetry of dependence and motivation ........................................................ 22 2.2 Allison & Zelikow (1999) as methodological framework......................................... 24 2.2.1 Relevant challenges ............................................................................................ 24 2.2.2 Rational Choice (Model 1) ................................................................................. 25 2.2.3 Organizational Behavior (Model 2) ................................................................... 25 2.2.4 Governmental Politics (Model 3) ....................................................................... 27 3 Methodological approach ................................................................................................. 29 3.1 Comparative case study ............................................................................................. 29 3.2 Congruence method and process-tracing ................................................................... 30 3.3 Document analysis ..................................................................................................... 32 3.4 Semi-structured interviews ........................................................................................ 33 4 Turkey’s involvement in Syria (2011-2018) .................................................................... 35 4.1 The argument ............................................................................................................. 35 4.2 Theoretical expectations ............................................................................................ 36 4.3 From ‘zero problems’ to major problems: Entrapment in the anti-Assad camp ....... 38 4.4 Two-front war against the YPG and IS ..................................................................... 45 4.5 Astana Peace Talks with Russia and Iran .................................................................. 49 IX 4.6 Operation Olive Branch (January- March 2018) – Growing Turkish assertiveness in Syria ………………………………………………………………………………………55 4.7 Theoretical evaluation ............................................................................................... 60 5 The Black Sea Region ...................................................................................................... 63 5.1 The argument ............................................................................................................. 63 5.2 Theoretical expectations ............................................................................................ 64 5.3 Turkey seeks regional cooperation before and after the 2008 Russia-Georgia War . 66 5.4 Political response to the Crimea Annexation ............................................................ 67 5.5 Military developments ............................................................................................... 70 5.5.1 Increased threat level .......................................................................................... 70 5.5.2 Limited NATO response preferable ................................................................... 74 5.5.3 Upgrading its national defense ........................................................................... 78 5.6 Accommodating Russia in the energy sphere ............................................................ 81 5.7 Theoretical evaluation ............................................................................................... 84 6 Implications for Turkey’s role as a Western security partner .......................................... 87 6.1 Security in sensitive neighborhoods .......................................................................... 87 6.2 NATO membership as a foundation .......................................................................... 91 6.3 Assertive at home, assertive abroad .......................................................................... 93 7 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 97 References .............................................................................................................................
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