Google/Fitbit)
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
July 23, 2020 the Honorable William P. Barr Attorney General United
July 23, 2020 The Honorable William P. Barr Attorney General United States Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530 Dear Attorney General Barr: We write to raise serious concerns regarding Google LLC’s (Google) proposed acquisition of Fitbit, Inc. (Fitbit).1 We are aware that the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice is investigating this transaction and has issued a Second Request to gather additional information about the acquisition’s potential effects on competition.2 Amid reports that Google is offering modest, short-term concessions to overseas enforcers to avoid a full-scale investigation of the transaction in Europe,3 we write to urge the Division to continue with its efforts to conduct a thorough and comprehensive review of this proposed merger and to take any and all enforcement action warranted by the law and the evidence. It is no exaggeration to say that Google is under intense antitrust scrutiny across the globe. As you know, the company has been under investigation for potential anticompetitive conduct across a number of product markets by the Department and numerous state attorneys general, as well as by a number of foreign competition enforcers, some of which are also reviewing the proposed Fitbit acquisition. Competition concerns about Google are widespread and bipartisan. Against this backdrop, in November 2019, Google announced its proposed acquisition of Fitbit for $2.1 billion, a staggering 71 percent premium over Fitbit’s pre-announcement stock price.4 Fitbit—which makes wearable technology devices, such as smartwatches and fitness trackers— has more than 28 million active users submitting sensitive location and health data to the company. -
Google Ad Tech
Yaletap University Thurman Arnold Project Digital Platform Theories of Harm Paper Series: 4 Report on Google’s Conduct in Advertising Technology May 2020 Lissa Kryska Patrick Monaghan I. Introduction Traditional advertisements appear in newspapers and magazines, on television and the radio, and on daily commutes through highway billboards and public transportation signage. Digital ads, while similar, are powerful because they are tailored to suit individual interests and go with us everywhere: the bookshelf you thought about buying two days ago can follow you through your favorite newspaper, social media feed, and your cousin’s recipe blog. Digital ads also display in internet search results, email inboxes, and video content, making them truly ubiquitous. Just as with a full-page magazine ad, publishers rely on the revenues generated by selling this ad space, and the advertiser relies on a portion of prospective customers clicking through to finally buy that bookshelf. Like any market, digital advertising requires the matching of buyers (advertisers) and sellers (publishers), and the intermediaries facilitating such matches have more to gain every year: A PwC report estimated that revenues for internet advertising totaled $57.9 billion for 2019 Q1 and Q2, up 17% over the same half-year period in 2018.1 Google is the dominant player among these intermediaries, estimated to have netted 73% of US search ad spending2 and 37% of total US digital ad spending3 in 2019. Such market concentration prompts reasonable questions about whether customers are losing out on some combination of price, quality, and innovation. This report will review the significant 1 PricewaterhouseCoopers for IAB (October 2019), Internet Advertising Revenue Report: 2019 First Six Months Results, p.2. -
Google-Doubleclick Acquisition Background Information September 2007
Google-DoubleClick Acquisition Background Information September 2007 On April 13, 2007, Google announced an agreement to acquire DoubleClick, a digital marketing technology and services company. DoubleClick offers online ad serving and management technology to advertisers, web publishers, and ad agencies. It helps companies place their graphical and video ads on Web sites in a highly efficient manner, allowing advertisers to target ads and improve the productivity and results of their online advertising campaigns. • Competition: Google and DoubleClick are not competitors. Google generates most of its revenue from selling space to place text ads on its own website and on small portions of partners' websites. DoubleClick does not sell ad space. Its core products offer support technology for storing, serving, and tracking display ads. In addition, the broader advertising market is highly competitive and dynamic, and thousands of companies compete in selling ad space online. • Privacy: Google has a history of being an advocate for user privacy. Our goal is to improve privacy protection and data security for all Internet users. Users will continue to benefit from our commitment to protecting user privacy following this acquisition. • What People Are Saying: Academics, analysts, legal experts, competitors, advertisers, and newspapers are saying that the acquisition should be approved, noting that Google and DoubleClick are in complementary but not identical markets; Google has a strong track record on privacy; government should allow the free market to work; and that there is minimal legal precedent for rejecting an acquisition of this kind. Benefits of Acquisition Google's goal is to make advertising on the Internet work better: better for users with less intrusive ads, better for advertisers with greater accountability and effectiveness, and better for online publishers with improved monetization and cleaner site integration. -
Digital Advertising Standards and Creative Specifications Last Revised: May 26, 2021
Bell Media - Digital Advertising Standards and Creative Specifications Last revised: May 26, 2021 Digital Advertising Standards and Creative Specifications (Last revised: May 26, 2021) To learn more about Bell Media Digital visit: http://www.bellmedia.ca/digital/ Contact [email protected] for any questions Bell Media sites are IAB Canada compliant. All Bell Media ads are served through Google’s DoubleClick for Publishers Premium ad server. Bell Media reserves the right to refuse any advertising/advertisers, make exceptions to this policy on a case-by-case basis, as well as, to make changes and add to this policy at any time. If you have any questions regarding creative submissions, please contact your Bell Media Account Representative. PLEASE NOTE: ANY ELEMENT NOT MEETING SPEC WILL BE RETURNED FOR REVISION, WHICH MAY DELAY THE EXPECTED LAUNCH DATE AND RESULT IN LOST IMPRESSIONS Page 1 of 27 Bell Media - Digital Advertising Standards and Creative Specifications Last revised: May 26, 2021 Contents Available Web Ad Placements ......................................................................................................................... 4 . ESPN Ad Sizes ................................................................................................................................................. 5 Apple News .............................................................................................................................................................. 5 SLA Creative Deadlines ..................................................................................................................................... -
GOOGLE ADVERTISING TOOLS (FORMERLY DOUBLECLICK) OVERVIEW Last Updated October 1, 2019
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
Google's 'Project Nightingale' Gathers Personal Health Data
Google's 'Project Nightingale' Gathers Personal Health Data on Millions of Americans; Search giant is amassing health records from Ascension facilities in 21 states; patients not yet informed Copeland, Rob . Wall Street Journal (Online) ; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]11 Nov 2019. ProQuest document link FULL TEXT Google is engaged with one of the U.S.'s largest health-care systems on a project to collect and crunch the detailed personal-health information of millions of people across 21 states. The initiative, code-named "Project Nightingale," appears to be the biggest effort yet by a Silicon Valley giant to gain a toehold in the health-care industry through the handling of patients' medical data. Amazon.com Inc., Apple Inc. and Microsoft Corp. are also aggressively pushing into health care, though they haven't yet struck deals of this scope. Share Your Thoughts Do you trust Google with your personal health data? Why or why not? Join the conversation below. Google began Project Nightingale in secret last year with St. Louis-based Ascension, a Catholic chain of 2,600 hospitals, doctors' offices and other facilities, with the data sharing accelerating since summer, according to internal documents. The data involved in the initiative encompasses lab results, doctor diagnoses and hospitalization records, among other categories, and amounts to a complete health history, including patient names and dates of birth. Neither patients nor doctors have been notified. At least 150 Google employees already have access to much of the data on tens of millions of patients, according to a person familiar with the matter and the documents. -
Google-Doubleclick Case
Statement of FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION Concerning Google/DoubleClick FTC File No. 071-0170 The Federal Trade Commission has voted 4-11 to close its investigation of Google’s proposed acquisition of DoubleClick after a thorough examination of the evidence bearing on the transaction. The Commission dedicated extensive resources to this investigation because of the importance of the Internet and the role advertising has come to play in the development and maintenance of this rapidly evolving medium of communication.2 Online advertising fuels the diversity and wealth of free information available on the Internet today. Our investigation focused on the impact of this transaction on competition in the online advertising marketplace. The investigation was conducted pursuant to the Commission’s statutory authority under the Clayton Act to review mergers and acquisitions. If this investigation had given the Commission reason to believe that the transaction was likely to harm competition and injure consumers, the Commission could have filed a federal court action seeking to enjoin the transaction under Section13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”) and Section 15 of the Clayton Act. The standard used by the Commission to review mergers and acquisitions is set forth in Section 7 of the Clayton Act. That statute prohibits acquisitions or mergers, the effect of which “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.” The Commission can apply Section 7 (as well as Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 5 of the FTC Act) to challenge transactions that threaten to create, enhance, or facilitate the exercise of market power. -
Google's 'Project Nightingale' Gathers Personal Health Data on Millions Of
11/14/2019 Google’s ‘Project Nightingale’ Gathers Personal Health Data on Millions of Americans - WSJ MEMBER MESSAGE How would you ix college admissions? We want your suggestions on making the process more transparent and less stressful. Share Your Story This copy is for your personal, non-commercial use only. To order presentation-ready copies for distribution to your colleagues, clients or customers visit https://www.djreprints.com. https://www.wsj.com/articles/google-s-secret-project-nightingale-gathers-personal-health-data-on-millions-of-americans-11573496790 ◆ WSJ NEWS EXCLUSIVE | TECH Google’s ‘Project Nightingale’ Gathers Personal Health Data on Millions of Americans Search giant is amassing health records from Ascension facilities in 21 states; patients not yet informed Google launched the eort last year with Ascension, the country’s second-largest health system. PHOTO: DAVID PAUL MORRISBLOOMBERG NEWS By Rob Copeland Updated Nov. 11, 2019 427 pm ET Google is engaged with one of the U.S.’s largest health-care systems on a project to collect and crunch the detailed personal-health information of millions of people across 21 states. The initiative, code-named “Project Nightingale,” appears to be the biggest effort yet by a Silicon Valley giant to gain a toehold in the health-care industry through the handling of patients’ medical data. Amazon.com Inc., AMZN 0.08% ▲ Apple Inc. AAPL -0.69% ▲ and Microsoft https://www.wsj.com/articles/google-s-secret-project-nightingale-gathers-personal-health-data-on-millions-of-americans-11573496790 1/5 11/14/2019 Google’s ‘Project Nightingale’ Gathers Personal Health Data on Millions of Americans - WSJ Corp. -
Remyeurope.Com Cookie Declaration.Pdf
Necessary Name Provider Purpose Expiry Type NEW_VISITOR remyeurope.com Used to detect if there is a new visitor on the site. 1 Day HTTP Cookie VISITOR remyeurope.com Used to detect if there is a new visitor on the site. Session HTTP Cookie Statistics Name Provider Purpose Expiry Type Registers a unique ID that is used to generate statistical _ga remyeurope.com data on how the visitor uses the website. 2 Years HTTP Cookie _gat remyeurope.com Used by Google Analytics to throttle request rate 1 Day HTTP Cookie Registers a unique ID that is used to generate statistical data _gid on how remyeurope.com the visitor uses the website. 1 Day HTTP Cookie Marketing Name Provider Purpose Expiry Type Used by Google DoubleClick to register and report the website IDE user's actions after viewing or clicking one of the advertiser's ads with the purpose of measuring the efficacy of an ad and doubleclick.net Sendto present data totargeted Google ads Analytics to the aboutuser. the visitor's device and 1 Year HTTP Cookie behavior. Tracks the visitor across devices and marketing r/collect doubleclick.net channels. Session Pixel Tracker test_cookie doubleclick.net Check if the user's browser supports cookies. 1 Day HTTP Cookie Used by Facebook to deliver a series of advertisement fr products such as facebook.com real time bidding from third party advertisers. 3 months HTTP Cookie Used by Facebook to deliver a series of advertisement tr products such as real time bidding from third party facebook.com advertisers. Session Pixel Tracker Used by Facebook to deliver a series of advertisement _fbp products such as real time bidding from third party remyeurope.com advertisers. -
Why Google Dominates Advertising Markets Competition Policy Should Lean on the Principles of Financial Market Regulation
Why Google Dominates Advertising Markets Competition Policy Should Lean on the Principles of Financial Market Regulation Dina Srinivasan* * Since leaving the industry, and authoring The Antitrust Case Against Face- book, I continue to research and write about the high-tech industry and competition, now as a fellow with Yale University’s antitrust initiative, the Thurman Arnold Pro- ject. Separately, I have advised and consulted on antitrust matters, including for news publishers whose interests are in conflict with Google’s. This Article is not squarely about antitrust, though it is about Google’s conduct in advertising markets, and the idea for writing a piece like this first germinated in 2014. At that time, Wall Street was up in arms about a book called FLASH BOYS by Wall Street chronicler Michael Lewis about speed, data, and alleged manipulation in financial markets. The controversy put high speed trading in the news, giving many of us in advertising pause to appre- ciate the parallels between our market and trading in financial markets. Since then, I have noted how problems related to speed and data can distort competition in other electronic trading markets, how lawmakers have monitored these markets for con- duct they frown upon in equities trading, but how advertising has largely remained off the same radar. This Article elaborates on these observations and curiosities. I am indebted to and thank the many journalists that painstakingly reported on industry conduct, the researchers and scholars whose work I cite, Fiona Scott Morton and Aus- tin Frerick at the Thurman Arnold Project for academic support, as well as Tom Fer- guson and the Institute for New Economic Thinking for helping to fund the research this project entailed. -
Google/ Doubleclick REGULATION (EC) No 139/2004 MERGER PROCEDURE Article 8(1)
EN This text is made available for information purposes only. A summary of this decision is published in all Community languages in the Official Journal of the European Union. Case No COMP/M.4731 – Google/ DoubleClick Only the English text is authentic. REGULATION (EC) No 139/2004 MERGER PROCEDURE Article 8(1) Date: 11-03-2008 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES Brussels, 11/03/2008 C(2008) 927 final PUBLIC VERSION COMMISSION DECISION of 11/03/2008 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No COMP/M.4731 – Google/ DoubleClick) (Only the English text is authentic) Table of contents 1 INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................4 2 THE PARTIES...........................................................................................................5 3 THE CONCENTRATION.........................................................................................6 4 COMMUNITY DIMENSION ...................................................................................6 5 MARKET DESCRIPTION......................................................................................6 6 RELEVANT MARKETS.........................................................................................17 6.1. Relevant product markets ............................................................................17 6.1.1. Provision of online advertising space.............................................17 6.1.2. Intermediation in -
Google Data Collection —NEW—
Digital Content Next January 2018 / DCN Distributed Content Revenue Benchmark Google Data Collection —NEW— August 2018 digitalcontentnext.org CONFIDENTIAL - DCN Participating Members Only 1 This research was conducted by Professor Douglas C. Schmidt, Professor of Computer Science at Vanderbilt University, and his team. DCN is grateful to support Professor Schmidt in distributing it. We offer it to the public with the permission of Professor Schmidt. Google Data Collection Professor Douglas C. Schmidt, Vanderbilt University August 15, 2018 I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. Google is the world’s largest digital advertising company.1 It also provides the #1 web browser,2 the #1 mobile platform,3 and the #1 search engine4 worldwide. Google’s video platform, email service, and map application have over 1 billion monthly active users each.5 Google utilizes the tremendous reach of its products to collect detailed information about people’s online and real-world behaviors, which it then uses to target them with paid advertising. Google’s revenues increase significantly as the targeting technology and data are refined. 2. Google collects user data in a variety of ways. The most obvious are “active,” with the user directly and consciously communicating information to Google, as for example by signing in to any of its widely used applications such as YouTube, Gmail, Search etc. Less obvious ways for Google to collect data are “passive” means, whereby an application is instrumented to gather information while it’s running, possibly without the user’s knowledge. Google’s passive data gathering methods arise from platforms (e.g. Android and Chrome), applications (e.g.