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THE ZMPLEMENTATION OF INDUSTRLAL POLLUTION CONTROLS IN CHINA'S XIAMEN SPECLAL ECONOMIC ZONE, 197% 1992
David Nathan Campbell
A Thesis submitted in çonformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Political Science University of Toronto
Q Copyright by David Nathan Campbell 1997 National Library Bibliothèque nationale 1*1 of Canada du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographic Services sewices bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON KIA ON4 Ottawa ON K1A ON4 Canada Canada
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The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fiom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otheMise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. The lmplementation of Industrial Pollution Controb in China's Xiamen Seecial Economic Zone, 1979-1992
David Nathan Campbell (Pb.D.. 1997) Department of Political Science, University of Toronto
ABSTRACT
This research uses a case study method to seek answers to the following questions: How can
China's mixed record in pollution control best be explained. Has their "exploratory" approach to
policy making in this issue area been effective? How imponant is the municipal level of governent
in China's policy process? The study focuses on Xiamen in Fujian Province and primarily on efforts
to reçulate industrial water pollution.
Given the organizational structure of environmental and çovemmental authority, mayors are
in a key position to affect pollution control. However. the conditions resulting corn fiscal
decentralitation and the rapid econornic growth strategy do not provide incentives for concerted
action. Whle previous midies attribute implernentation failure largely to these factors associated with
the reform era this study argues that the Maoist legacy of environmental neglect and poor planning
also hampers current implementation efforts because of the substantial resources which mut be
diverted away from enforcement and toward clean-up efforts.
Exploratory policies sanctioned by the central govemment are ofien not true experiments; they
cm be anempts by top leaders or central depa~mentsto build suppon for particular policy directions.
Because "exploration" is ofien dictated by the centre and is not hnded sufficiently by any level of govemment. the ostensible benefits of this approach rarely emerge. This research also finds that ofien cited conditions of effiive implementation are of unequal value in assessing irnplementation failure in China. Factors which constrain key local actors. such as a lack of leadership support or the existence of other policy objectives which are at odds with the goals in question are far more important in this case than the exact content of legislation. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Thanks are due to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Sir va1 Duncan Mernorial Fund, the Ontario Govemment Scholarship Progran the University of
Toronto. and the China-Canada Scholarly Exchange Program for helping to fund this research. The author is also gatefùl to Victor Falkenheh Hong Huasheng, Zhang Luo ping, Pete Cham ber lain, the staff of the Xiamen University Environmental Science Research Center, the staff of the Xiamen EPB. and al1 the University of Toronto faculty involved in the review and approvai of this dissertation for their generous academic and logistical assistance. Of course, the author alone bears full responsibility for any errors contained in this study.
Most of ali I am indebted to my wife, Tanya, not only for the patient contribution of her keyboardinç skills to the preparation of this manuscript. but more imponantly for her firm emotional support during this entire endeavor. This dissertation is dedicared to her. TABLE OF CONTENTS
.. ABSTRACT ...... 11
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... iv
LIST OF TABLES ...... vi
LIST OF APPENDICES ...... vii
CHAPTER ONE: Irnplementation Research ...... 1 O
CHAPTER TWO: Policy Making and Environmentai Policy inchna ...... 26
CHAPTER THREE: Xiamen and Its Environmental Conditions ...... 52
CHAPTER FOUR: The Trial Law and Local Implementation ...... 78
CHAPTER FIVE: A New Law and the Politicai Process ...... 1 13
CHAPTER SIX: Local Organizational Development ...... 13 5
CHAPTER SEVEN: The Case of Yun Dang Lake ...... 163
CHAPTER EIGHT: Conclusion ...... 19 1
APPENDICES ...... 216
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 219 LIST OF TABLES
Table
3.1 A Cornparison of the Composition of Air Pollution from Various Sources in Xiamen in 1983 ...... 62
3 -2 Fujian Provincial Environmental Statistics 1981-1989 ...... 66
3.3 Fujian 1990 Annual Environmental Statistics ...... 70
3 -4 Principal Industrial Wastewater Pollution Sources ...... 74
3.5 Principal Industrial Air Pollution Sources and Pollutants ...... 75
6.1 Province of Fujian Yearly Ratio of Effluent Fees Collected to Total Provincial Industrial Output ...... 156
7.1 Results of Yearly Survey of Yun Dang Lake WaterQuality ...... 179 LIST OF APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: Map of Xiamen ...... 216
APPENDIX B: List of Acronymns ...... 217
APPENDIX C: List of Persons Interviewed ...... 2 18
vii INTRODUCTION
Twenty years ago. China like many developing countries, publicly argued that industrial pollution was largely the by-product (or at least the responsibility) of capitalism in industrialized countnes. Environmental issues. if they were considered at all. were usually discussed and dealt with in the context of consenration and efficient use of resources or crisis management. "Environmental
Policy" was not widely recognized as a discrete issue area; indeed it could be said that China had no environmental policy per sr until at least the mid- 1970s. Things have changed quite dramatically, however. in the post-Mao era.'
The People's Republic of China (PRC) has. since 1977. established a National Environmental
Protection Agency (NEPA). organized a State Council Cornmittee on Environmental Protection
(SCCEP). and entrenched the principle of state responsibility for environrnental protection in the constitution. Between 1979 and 1985 the National People's Congress (WC) adopted several environmental protection laws, beginninç with the "Environmental Protection Law of the People's
Republic of China (for trial implementation)" which was followed by more specific documents dealing with certain types of pollution (air. marine. etc.).
The allocation of resources for investment in environmental protection rose considerably during the 1980s. In 1989. China invested 10.2 billion yuan (U.S. $2 billion) towards protectinç the
1 For an overview of these developments, see Qu Gepinç. "Environmental Protection in China: A Brief History," Chinese Geocraohv and Environment, vol. 2, no. 3 (Fall 1989). 3-29. The author of this article was Director of China's National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) for the period under review. environment compared with about 2 billion yuan per annum earlier in the decade.' Beijing targeted about 83 billion yuan per year for environmental protection during the eighth Five-Year Plan ( 199 1-
95). This would represent 0.85 percent of GNP. In 199 1. the actual amount provided was only 0.7 percent of GNP. but this still represented an increase over earlier years and. given China's relative poverty. compares favourably with the 1 to 2 percent of GhP generally spent by Western countries for the sarne purposes.' The PRC has also souçht extensive international cooperation in cleaning up her environment .4
Despite the above-nored allocation of resources and legislative attention. the results of the
PRC's efforts in environmental protection are mixed. On the one hand, much progress has been made since the 1970s. The NEPA is praised by foreiçn observers for its independence and cornpetence.'
The same cannot be said for similar bodies in some other developing countrîes or other ostensibly independent reçulatory bodies in the PRC itself. More importantly. the local Environmental
Protection Bureaus (EPBs) have. in some regions. reportedly been able to essentially hold the line on environment al quality hriqci period of infime ecotrornic ,qowrh. For example. even though
China's industrial output in 1990 was 85 percent higher than in 1985, the environmental quality in many dies did not deteriorate over the same penod." high percentaçe of cities and counties now
'Beijinr! Review (BR), 29 April 199 1. 12. It should be noted that these figures likely include environmental spendinç by the NEPA md al1 ministiies; the NEPA budget alone is much srnalier.
'Sandy Hendry, "Policy Reform When It Suits," Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 October 1992. 43; and BR, 13 July 1 987, 26.
'BR. 1 May 1992. 10.
%endry. "Policy Reform When It Suits." 42.
"Xinhua, Beijing 13 Apni 199 1. in Joint Publications Research Service (hereafier IPRS), TEN-9 1 - 009. Sirnilarly. dunnç the Sixth Five-Year Plan (198 1-85) industrial output increased by sixty percent while the quantity of major industrial pollution emissions declined. See Qu. A Brief Histov. 2 1. engage in municipal planning which includes environmental considerations.' Environmental impact assessments have been ordered for al1 project proposais and are. potentially at least. vital lirnits on pollution.*
There are. however. limits to this success. Actual improwmerit of environmental conditions has been relatively rare.' Cornpliance with replations is uneven!' Environmental impact assessments are rarely applied to the smaller township enterprises which can. collectively. be prolific polluters." Atmospheric pollution fiom coal smoke is still a very serious problem in northem cities.
And. given the demands put upon China's environment by China's relative industrial and economic backwardness. the environment is still considered by some to be in a cnsis situation." In short. any success China has achieved in controlling pollution has been limited both geographically and qualitatively.
Since both the body of leçislation and the amount of matenal resources directed toward environmental problems have gown quite rapidly. how can the mixed results of these efforts best be explained? One possibility is that the çovernment's overall approach to the problem is ill-conceived.
Policy instmments may not be scientifically based or rnay be ill-suited to local conditions and thus
'Zhoneguo Huaniinp Bao (ZHB), 12 Febmary 1987, in PRS-CST-87-0 17.
"endry. "Policy Reform When It Suits." 43.
'BR 13 July 1987, 26.
'"Zhon~~woHuaniin3 Kexue (ZHK). vol. 7. no. 3 (3 Iune 1987). 59-63 translated in JPRS-CST- 88-004; ZHB. 12 February 1987.3, in JPRS-CST-87-0 17; and ZHB. 9 November 1990. 3. translated in PRS-TEN-9 1-003.
"Hendry. "Policy Reform When It Suits." 43.
"See. for example. Vaclav Smil, China's Environmental Crisis: An Inquiry into the Limits of National Develooment (Armonk. N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1993). have little effect on environmental conditions. In China for example. fines are set at fairly low levels.
Initial research on this çeneral topic. however. suçgests that overall, rnany basic policy choices have been sound." In some cases Chinese replations are said to be more strict than those of industrialized countries. Thus. poorly-crafted policy is likely only part of the problem.
Another possible explanation of the problem is that the resources devoted to environmental protection have simply been insufficient. Although the amount spent for environment-related purposes has yown tremendously. it is wonhwhile to remind ourselves that there were virtually r>o environmental expenditures until the reform penod. Ayv increase. therefore. appears large in relative
(but not necessarily absolute) terms. A late start may also rnean that more is spent on c!eaninç up than on prevention. An evaluation of how much resources are sufficient. of course. is difficult because it involves subjective evaluation both of China's developmental prionties and of what exactly constitutes a "clean" environment. Nevertheless. the question of fùndinp is obviously critical and merits examination.
The fact that results va.çeogaphicdly susgests another possible dimension of the problem.
It rnay be that extant characteristics of the natural environment and climate affect results. Is air pollution control more dificult in sub-tropical areas than in temperate ones? What about water pollution control? What effects do wind and rainfall have? These questions are perhaps best lefi to scholars in the "hard" sciences. but information about ecological processes will no doubt aid the evaluation of environmental policy.
A fourth possibility is that nationally-mandated policies have not been implemented. This may be a profitable line of inquiry because the former head of the NEPA has plainly stated that this is a
"Lester Ross. Environmental Policy in China (Indianapolis: University of Indiana Press. 1988). key problem. However. exactly how and why this is so requires specification. And how is non- irnplementation related to the other potential factors enumerated above?
This dissertation seeks answers to these broad. but cornplex, questions. The central goal is to explain China's mixed results in controlling pollution. This will be done by making reference to the content of China's environmental laws and policies and by specifiing the nature of the funding and implementation processes and stnictures. In light of these assessments. models of the Chinese policy process will be evaluated. A formal assessment of whether pollution control policies have been
"successful" by normal analytic standards will also be undertaken later in this dissertation. MI of this, in tum. wili fbnher enrich Our knowledçe of environmental politics in developinç countnes.
It will be ar~wedthat the ineffectiveness of China's pollution control laws and regulations during the period under study (19794992)was due in larse measure to the related factors of lack of k(~:nileadership on the issue and the bureaucratic weaknessi4of local EPBs. This effectively means that. in the case of China at least, debates about the corrrrrrr of fc~rmdlaws and policies are less important to explanations of poor results than has been asserted. It will fùrther be shown that although factors linked to the refom era such as decentraiization and an emphasis on quick economic yowth have been impediments to implementation, local legacies of poor planning and environmental neglect hmthe Mao era are also particularly burdensorne.
It will also be argued here that China's exploratory approach to policy makins (explained below). its advantaçes notwithstanding, has the general disadvantages of beinç slow and encouraginç delay. especially with respect to the allocation of resources. OAen exploration is not undenaken with
''This term is borrowed from Lynn Paine. "The Educational Policy Process: A Case Study of Bureaucratic Action in China" in Kenneth Lieberthal and David M. Lampton, eds.. Bureaucracv. Politics and Decision Makinp in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). 18 1-2 15. More explanation is given in later chapters of how this term applies to the case at hand. enhanced policy effectiveness in mind. Succinctly put. exploration may be a good idea, but
"exploration" dictated by the centre or "exploration" not ninded by any level of govemment. does not allow the supposed benefits of this approach to emerge. Finally. this dissertation will examine the pmicipation of mayors and local çovements in the implernentation of environmental policy in China and asserts the primacy of their role in the allocation of fünds and offenng support to the irnplernenting agency on the "front lines" of implementation. This study also makes clear distinct sirnilarities. reglatory style differences notwithstanding. in the pattern of /oca/po/itics of po//titiot~ of States which decentralize administration of pollution control.
It is asserted in this study that the political and economic conteas in which implementation takes place are crucial determinants of policy effectiveness. A key task. then. is to speciS, hoiv that context affects implementation. Arnong the more specific questions to be considered in the case study which follows are these: What fùnction does the Iaw serve in the enforcement of environmental regulations in the iocalities? Has this finction changed over tirne? How do local officials respond to centrai directives and how do central authorities respond to local initiatives? What is the pattern of the relationship between local EPB officials and local government leaders? Which institutional arrangements affect pollution control? If one of the main aims of local EPBs is to "coordinate contacts amonç al1 parties."" how does this coordination take place. who is involved. and what compromises emerge? Under what circumstances and how frequently does elite intervention occur?
How does the legacy of the past affect current implernentation effons?
Finding answers to these questions and elaboration of the arguments put forward above logically berjn with an examination of previous studies of implementation effectiveness and research
15QuGeping, "7th NPC Government Work Report" cited in ZHB. 20 Aupst 1988. translated in PRS-CST-88-023. on environrnental policies. Chapter One consists of just such an examination. First, the literature on implernentation dlbe reviewed and some questions it leaves unanswered will be raised Then some comparative studies of national environmental policies will be studied with the intention of placing
China's experience in an international context. Chapter Two examines the China-specific literature on the topics at hand and briefly outlines the organizational context of China's environmental protection ef50rts.
The core of this dissertation is an "on-the-ground" examination of the implementation of industrial air and water pollution controis in Xiamen. Fujian province. Chapter Three introduces
Xiamen as the site of the c9se study and documents the mixed results of pollution control effons there. Chapters Four and Five focus on the implementation of environmental law. Chapter Six traces the evolution of .Xamenls environmental protection oganizations and asserts that the decentralization of enforcement has contributed to a lack of implementation. Chapter Seven hiçhlights the importance of past policy decisions and lack of fùnding by relating in depth the story of Xiamen's most prominent environmental challenge: cleaninç up Yun Dang Lake. The resources consumed in this attempt constituted a major drain on the environrnental protection fùnds directed at Xiamen.
Chapter Eight first evaiuates implementation effons in China by several criteria. It then offers some conclusions about the role of local govemment (specifically, below the provincial level) in China and explores the implications of this case study for the Chinese political system generally and environmentai protection specifically. It also elaborates the lessons of this case study for students of implementation and reviews the utility of the "conditions of effective implementation" outlined by other scholars. This chapter also places the findinçs on China in a broader comparative context.
Chapter Eight thus compnses the conclusion of the dissertation. Documentary sources utilized in this study include local and national Chinese newspapers, specialized Chinese environmental periodicals and alrnanacs, translation services such as the Foreign
Broadcast Information Service and the Joint Publication Research SeMce, and World Bank reports concernin~China's environmental protection activities. This dissertation also draws from interviews and conversations held with Xiamen's Deputy Mayor responsible for environmental protection. various Xiamen EPB officiais. and a number of academics and technicians at the Xiamen University
Center for Environmental Science Research.16 Most of these discussions were held during a research visit to Xiamen conducted from September 1993 to January 1994. The year 1979 was chosen as the stan point for this study because that is when the first national Iaw on the environment was promulgated. It is also the year in which organizational activities in Xiamen were formalized. The year 1992 was chosen as the end point for the present study for practical considerations; as noted above. most of my data colIection was done during the followinç year. Significant implementation accomplishments beyond that date. regrettably. will have to be the subject of future research.
It should be noted explicitly here that many of the statistics and much of the other information gleaned from the above-mentioned documentary sources are probably incomplete or inaccurate in some respects. At the dawn of the reform era. precision data çat herinç skills were in extremely short supply in China. Aithouçh thinçs irnproved durinç the reform era and. specifically in the environmental protection field. cadres were directed to pay çreat attention to the gatherinç and compilation of data. problems remain. It is also noteworthy that environmental information is stiil very politically sensitive in China; official figures which offer stark evidence of environmental
16See Appendix C. degradation are generally not made public. News repons still tend to gioss over imponant problems. optinç instead to emphasize the sometimes minor progress which has been made.
The presentation of this selective or incomplete data in this dissertation is not. however, without value. It stili may bring certain trends in pollution control efforts to iight. Astute observation of what is made available may al1ow one to infer what has been withheld and why. The very rnanner in which environmental data is presented can offer insight into how Chinese officiais view environmental problems (see Chapter Three). The delicate politicai nature of the information also means that one can usuaily assume that conditions are worse than reponed: this fact strengthens the conclusions drawn here reçarding implementation failure in Xiamen.
Information gathered in interviews. from ir~trnrafgovernrnent documents. and from scientific reports is used to supplement official public statistics on pollution levels and environmental protection work. Even thouçh conditions for field research in China have improved yreatly in the last decade and a half. the closed nature of the political system and technological backwardness are still impediments to research on this subject. In this study I examine implementation efforts in Xiamen by consultinç as many different ryprs of sources as possible. CHAPTER ONE: IMPLEMENTATïON RESEARCH
1. The Conditions of Effective Policv Im~lementation - In the first half of the 1980s. as some scholars Iooked back to review the first decade and a half of implementation research t hey ident ified several "waves" or generations of implementation studies. Although these "generations" are not discrete and the distinctions between them are larçely a rnaner of emphasis in terms of central questions. çeneral conciusions and preferred methodologies. a bief review of them is usefùl because it chronicles the deveioprnent of the field and highliçhts some unresolved problems in studyinç implementation.
The first youp of s6dies. prompted in part by perceived failures in Arnerican Great Society progarns. was larçely in the form of case studies and offered quite pessimistic conclusions conceming govemrnents' abilities to implement policies suc~essfull~.~Irnplementation was viewed as a complicated dynamic process in which the interpretation and operationalization of central decisions had a variety of effects. both anticipated and othewise.' hnonç these studies were a number of books now considered to be ciassics in impiementation research.' The subtitle of Pressman and
Wildavsky's Imolementation -"How Great Expectations in Washington are Dashed in Oakland" - typifies the tenor of the findings of these early works. In essence. it was demonstrated that effective implementation was problematic; it could in no way be taken for granted.
1 Paul A. Sabatier. "Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches to lrnplementation Research: a Critical Analysis and Suggested Synthesis." Journal of Public Policv, vol. 6. no. 1 ( 1986). 2 1-48.
'~alcolmL. Goggin. "The 'Too Few CasedToo Many Variables' Problem in Irnplementation Research." Western Political Ouarterly, vol. 39. no. 2 (June 1986). 338.
3 Most prominent amonç these are Euçene Bardach. The Implementation Game. (Cambridge. Massachusetts: MIT Press. 1977); and Jefiey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky. Irnplementation (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1973). .4 second type of irnplementation study evennially emerçed in which the seeming inevitability of implementation failure was cast into doubt. These research efforts were more explicitly comparative and analytical in that explanations were offered regarding variations in implementation success across program types and between states.' Thus. it was discovered that, although implementation success is by no means universal, a number of factors. some controllable by policy rnakers and others not. contnbute to effective implementation.
Mazmanian and Sabatier. for example. asked the general question of why cenain policies were well implemented when others were n0t.l They identified, through the comparative study of implementation efforts. a number of conditions of effective implementation. Their six conditions include the followinç: ( 1) the enablinç legislation is founded on a solid theory relatinç changes in tarçet group behaviour to the attainment of the policy objective; (2) the basic policy decision or statute is unambiguous in its objectives; (3) the enabling legislation stmctures the implementation process by maximizinç the likelihood that officiais and target groups wiil perform as desired; (4) leadership in implementing agencies are committed to statutory goals and possess political skill; (5) the programme has support in key constituency çroups and arnonç crucial legislators; (6)priority of objectives is not undermined by other public policies or chançinç socio-econornic condition^.^
The conditions of effective implementation listed above. astute and justified by a çrowing body of literature thouçh they are. are quite çeneral. Yet. as wntten. they are not highly applicable in dl political systems, either. Sabatier and Mazmanian proclaim these as the sufficient and generally
4 Gogjn. "Too Few/Too Many," 3 28-46.
5 Paul Sabatier and Daniel Mazmanian, "The Conditions of Effective Irnplementation: A Guide to Accornplishing Policy Objectives." Policy Analysis, vol. 5 ( 1979). 48 1-504.
'Daniel Mazmanian and Paul Sabatier, eds., Effective Policy Irnplementation. (Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C . Heath and Company, 198 1). necessary conditions under which non-trivial poiicy decisions can achieve their objectives.' However.
they aiso seek to demonstrate how iegal directives can significantly affect the behaviour of various
acton in the implementation process.' Thus. the conditions focus heavily on how laws can structure the implementation process. The first three conditions are labelled as statutory. The assertion in the founh condition that agerrcy officials are the key actors in implernentation also rests implicitly upon the notion that legally prescribed roles will be played by others in the ~ystern.~Therefore, the importance of the first four conditions may diminish in developing or authoritarian States where the rule of law is weak or has shallow roots. The importance of leçal factors may also be reduced for policy areas in which there is a highly political implementation process. such as when pollution controls are first introduced.
..UthouJi it is one of Sabatier and 1Mazrnaniantsunderlying themes. it is not axiornatic that the way the law is written is of prime importance in determininç implementation success. Inducement of behaviour changes must be founded upon valid pnnciples. but those changes do not necessarily need to be induced by (and indeed may be founded upon principles much more endurinç than) laws.
Policy objectives must be clearly communicated and understood, but the law is merely one means of communicatinç ihem. Political skills are necessary. but which skills? And is it only those in the implementinç agency which need possess them?
Hill observes correctly that
7Sabatier and Mazmanian. "The Conditions."
'Mazmanian and Sabatier. Effective Policv Implementation, xii.
'Mazmanian and Sabatier, despite their emphasis on leçal structunnç, assert that the support of agency officials is "the variable most directly affecting policy outputs." See Effective Polic~ Implementation, 19. They do recognize. with much less attention and emphasis. "nonstatutory variables." [a] geai deal of governent activity occurs without any clear view existing of what policy is . . .. [Tlhe minutiae of day-to-day practice represents the main impact of government upon the environment . . . and it must be aryed that it is the cumulative nature of such action within the constraints of resources. precedents. personalities. individual or institutional energies that effectively shapes policy. regardless of what les$lation. circuiars. or Ministers say.1°
This research project assens that the implementation of China's environmental policies follows this pattern found in other countries. perhaps even to an exaçgerated degree; what implementors do is more important than what top leaders or laws Say. Put another way. targets of regdation cornply only when that option is less costly than either simple non-cornpliance or a negotiated compliance agreement." The local context in which implementors operate. moreover. determines in large measure the relative costs of these options. Thus, the cortditiurrs discussed by Mazmanian and
Sabatier rnay be crucial for effective implementation efforts. but the law is often not the shaper of those conditions. especially with respect to environmental poiicy. " In this respect. the conditions are over-specified.
In other ways. however. Sabatier and Mamianian's conditions are under-specified. or at least require spedcation under various national or local conditions. The fifth condition, that the program has suppon in key constituency çroups and amonç crucial legislators. is appropriately vague. Who
"'R. Hill. "Implementation and the Central-Local Relationship." Appendix II in Central-Local Govemment Relationship. Panel Report to the Research Initiatives Board. SSRC. 1979. cited in Kenneth Hanf. "Regdatory Structures: Enforcement as Implementation." European Joumal of Political Research, vol. 10 ( l982), 159-1 70; emphasis in the original. Policy. it must be noted. is defined in Hill's quote independently of law or reylations. See my discussion of routines below.
IlLaura Langbein and Cornelius M. Kerwin, "Implementation. Neçotiation and Cornpliance in Environmental and Safety Regdation," The Journal of Politics, vol. 47. no. 3 (Auyst 1 985). 854-80.
'*au1 B. Downing and Kenneth Hax$ eds.. International Comparisons in Implementine Pollution Laws (Boston: EUuwer-Nijhoff. 1983). Research in this volume suçgests that the standards in leçal statutes rarely play a definitive role in implementation even in countries where legal noms are relatively stronç. these groups and legislators are may Vary widely among political systems. In Mazmanian and
Sabatier's explanation of their Framework, they suggest that there must be continued suppon by the sovereigu (institutions which control one's legal and tkiancial resources) of implementing institutions.
Whiie this is no doubt a critical factor, the relative importance of these sovereigns rnight also differ yeatly between countries. This would depend upon. among other thinçs. the fiscal autonorny of the implementing açency. It also may depend upon the degree of decentralization both within government stmctures and within the açency itself Also. might not several "sovereigns" reign concurrently?
With respect to the skth condition it is arçued that sociai, economic. and technical conditions are linked to policy changes through the alteration of interests çroup and public support." This suggests the assumption of a pluraiistic. democratic system. In other systems. socio-economic changes may be brought to bear upon the policy process in other ways. For example. where orgcvrixd interest goups are absent. cornplaints and dissatisfaction of the population may be manifest through letters or other means. Alternatively. "lobbying" may take the form of geographic sub-units or groups of experts makinç their preferences known through forma1 or informal consultations with central leaders.
Mazmanian and Sabatier's discussion of fhr "statute" implies that. once passed into law. a statute and its clearly stated objectives stand firmly and unchanged if and until a major revision of the statute occurs. This characterization of the implementation process does not make clear that there may be a lot of fine nininç which çoes on without the revision of statutes. Huçh Heclo arçued some time ago that what is "needed are empirical studies of what kind of leaming mechanisms çovemments
"~azmanianand Sabatier. Effective Policv Implementation, 16. in faa are . . .."" The same can be said for other actors, officiai and othenvise. which are involved in the irnplementation process. Heclo defined policy-oriented Ieming as "relatively enduring alterations of thought or behavioural intentions which result from expenence and which are concemed with the attainrnent or revision of policy objectives."" Over time. a considerable amount of adaptatio~including what Heclo calls pathological leaniing, can alter the results of an implementation process. A perspective which views policy in terms of leaminç and adaptation Heclo noted.
"offers . . . the greatest promise for advancement in policy studies which will be both analytic and cealistic. ""
Though expressed differently, Heclo's observation was later echoed in the latter chapters of the revised editions of Pressman and Wildavsky's Implernentation. In a chapter entitled
"Implementation as Exploration," Browne and Wildavsky note that reinterpretation of centrally directed policies by local implementors does not necessarily mean irnplementation failure. They argue t hat
reimplernentation can also be the source of implementation success, defined as successful exploration. Failure as an outcome. in Our view should only mean failure to learn how to do better."
14Huçh Heclo, "Review Article," British Journal of Political Science, vol. 2 (1973). 83-108.
15 Heclo as paraphrased in Sabatier. "Top-Down and Bottom-Up," 44.
16 Heclo. "Review." 106. Two useful works which look at learning are L.S. Etheredge. "Govenunent Learning: An Overview." in S.L. Long, ed.. The Handbook of Political Behaviour. vol. 2 (New York: Plenum Press, 1981) and Evert A. Lindquist. "Public Managers and Policy Cornmunities: Learning to Meet New Challenges," Canadian Public Administration. vol. 3 5. no. 2 (Summer 1993). 137- 159.
17Ansela Browne and Aaron Wildavsky, "Implementation as Exploration," in Jefiey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky. Implementation (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1983). 249. On this point also see John Horberry, "The implementation of national environmentai policies in developing countries." in Berhard Glaeser, ed., Leamine from China? Development and Environment in Third World Countries (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987). 195-207. [t is hrther aryed that since changed relationships arnong the pmicipants is the notion behind much implementation. "the continuous adjustment of objectives is called for just as rnuch as the modification of instruments for attaining them. Irnplementation ceases being static[.]"'* As a result. the language of evolution and leaminç become more important than the commonly used vocabulary of policy "creation and completion." Because of the theoretical literature's emphasis on control. the implemento
This is the general recommendation offered to interested impiementors by pre-imminent implementation scholars after decades of research on implementation. It implies an important role, as well as reasonable fùndinç, for local implementors.
Also relevant to assessment of implementation efforts is the type of policy being implemented.
Three factors may affect the difficulty of impiernentati~n.'~A large number of policy targets. the degee to which resource allocations are involved. and the extent to which the policy newly depans from the status quo al1 may make implernentation more difficuit.
From this bief review of the conditions thouçht to be crucial for effective irnplementation, we learn that arnong the cntical questions which exist for students of implementation are these: First. how important is the original policy design (embodied in a particular statute) to implementation success? Second. and related. would the prescriptions concerning implementation as exploration,
II Brown and Wildavsky. Exploration, 234.
"'~aeHo Chung. "Studies of Central-Provincial Relations in the People's Republic of China: A Mid-Term Appraisal." The China Quarterly, no. 142 (June 1995). 487-508. if utiiized, produce more effective implementation? These broad questions will be considered more
fully in subsequent chapters of this dissertation.
In the late 1970s. a third "generation" of implernentation research emerged in response to the
perceived "top-down" bias of earlier works. That is to say. it was arçued that "second generation"
researchers put too much emphasis on the intentions of central policy makers. The new scholarship
became known as "backward mappinç" or "bottom-up" research. The overail focus of this approach
is to identiS> and analyze the "strateçic interaction among policy actors in a policy network."" To
investiçate the mutual interaction of this network of actors (and of this network with the central authorities). a certain sequence of questions must be answered. Richard Elmore's formulation of this methodology was intended as a guide for policy makers who wish to understand how they might achieve their policy objectives; the questions he asks are also usehl for social scientists wishing to analyze implementation failure in a decentralized or fragmented political system. Elmore instructs analysts to
[back] up throuçh the stmcture of implementing agencies, askinç at each lrvel two questions: What is the ability of this unit to affect the behaviour that is the tarçet . . .? What resources does this unit require [or possess] in order to have this effect?"
The answers to these questions provide a useful backdrop for the anaiysis of the ongoinç interaction of central and local participants in the policy process. In short, examination of local
"~hisapproach of identiQing local policy networks was pioneered by Benny Hjem. See Benny Hjern. "Implementation Research - the Link Gone Missing." Journal of Public Polic~,vol. 2. no. 3 ( 1982). 30 1-8; and Benny Hjem Kenneth Hanf. and David Porter, "Local Networks of Manpower Training in the Federal Republic of Gerrnany and S weden." in Kenneth Hanf and F. W. Scharpf. eds.. Interor~anizationalPolicy Makine: Limits to Coordination and Central Control (London: Sage. 1978). 303-44.
"~ichardF. Elmore. "Backward Mappinç" in Walter Williams. ed.. Stud~ineImplementation: Methodological and Administrative Issues (Chatham. New Jersey: Chatham Publishers. 1982). 21. resources is an ideal starting point for understanding implementation. While ngid adherence to the bottorn-up methodology in isolation may have certain theoretical difficulties." circumspect use of their centrai questions can be helpful in examinhg interactive central-local relations. Kenneth Hanf explains well the utility of these questions in determinhg the impact of various actors upon the implementation process:
. . . [TJhe key point is that the bottom-up perspective . . . implies no normative preference for any actor in that process. [It] simply draws centrai Cjust like al1 other) actors into the reconstmcted implementation process in terms of their empincal role in the process. If they [and the statutes they create] are the deteminant actors. . . . the method will reveal them as coming out on top."
By "decision process." Hanf means the calculations and decisions made by actors at al1 levels based on perceived interests: he is not refemng to decision makinç by central authorities alone. Thus. conscientiously asking the questions posited by "bottom-up" researchers will prove useful in assessing the relative importance of çovemrnent proçrams in solvinç problems. in tracing strateçic interaction between actors over time, and in elucidating the reciprocity between supenors and subordinates."
More importantly. it directs the researcher toward answers to a central question of this study; upon what or whom does the implementation of environmentai policy in China depend? The bottom-up perspective and the literature on irnplementation as exploration bot h suçgest t hat local implementors can be an important pan of the answer to this question.
Another unanswered question in the general implementation literature revolves around how to assess success or failure in implementation. One may either measure the conçruence between
"~eeSabatier, "Bottom-Up and Top-Down." 30-32. Resolvinç the debate between the two perspectives is beyond the scope of this research project. 1 simply use the questions posed by the "third generation" in the process of refininç Mazmanian and Sabatier's list of conditions and exploring Chinese irnplementation realities.
"Hanf. "Reçulatory Structure." 159-1 70.
:'Sabatier. "Bottom-Up and Top-Down. " 34 and Elmore, "Backward Mapping." 28. leadership intentions and outcome or merely detennine whether designated procedures were carried out? In the fint approach, the question "Whose intentions?". in light of the discussion above. must be the subject of investigation. In the second approach unmet objectives may remain even if prescribed procedures are carried out. While both of these approaches are useful in directing attention toward elements of impiementation effectiveness (and thus will be considered throughout this study). this dissertation takes the perspective that neither the complete accomplishment of objectives nor the strict adherence to procedures are the nom in many implementation situations.
Therefore. a more realisric standard of evafuation can be applied. As Goçgin explains. the
implementation process beçins with the initial choices and actions of implementing agents. When the process ends is more problematic . . .. [It is suggested that] a policy's implementation only ends [Le.; is "successful"] when the unit of government is in compliance with the law or when goals have ben accomplished. Since this rarely happens in practice. we prefer to think of implementation endinç when established routines . . . are firmly in place."
The existence and nature of such routines thus constitute both an additionai subject of inquiry and a third type of criteria for evaluatinç implernentation success in this study. It should also be noted that progre.s.s in terms of awareness. funding allocations. leçal codification. and "systemM" establishment can be evaluated distinctly from unequivocal success/failure judpements and will also be considered in this study.
"See "The Implementation Problem" in David M. Lampton, ed.. Policy Implementation in Post- Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1987) for a fuller consideration of these approaches.
"~o~~in."Too Few/Too Many." 336.
'%e Chinese now conceive of their approach to environmental policy in tenns of eight systems. See Zhonemio Huaniing Guanli Zhidu [Chinese Environmental Mana ement Systems] (Beijing: Zhongguo Huanjing Kexue Chubanshe. 199 1 ). The introduction of these systems in Xiamen is considered below. Before movinç on to a brief examination of the comparative study of environmental policies. it will be usefùl to note some special features which affect implementation in both less developed countnes and command economies. Merilee S. Grindle argues that the context of implementation is qua1 in importance (in terms of determination of the outcome) to the content (legally prescribed or otherwise) of the progam beinç pursueci. When the political. administrative. and societal contexts of an implementation effort are examined. policy becomes "an ongoing process of decision making by a variety of act~rs"'~rather than. as Heclo put it. a simple dependent output!* Grindle further posits that
[g/ivrii the coi~crrrtraîioriofpoliiiical aczivrzy (NI ihr implernarr~a~iorrprocr.s.s, it is likely that policies and progams will be even more difficult to manage and predict and even more subject to alteration in the Third World than elsewhere."
Thane Gustafson has outlined the particular obstacles faced by command economies in producinç and executinç sustained and rational policies. First. command economies are typified by the generation of false or inappropriate information which is generally placed in the wrong hands.
Second. irrational incentives and confiictinç preferences cm only be mediated by time-consuming negotiation or administrative pressures. These two features of the system mean that policy makers' objectives are likely to be distorted extensively in implementation. They aiso mean that. over rime. the irrationalities of forced industrialization become imbedded in the country's infrastructure as well.
These problems. in tum. make long-tem policy analysis difficult because of the attention which must be paid to short-term crises. Said another way. the system both prevents leaders frorn exarnininp
%ferilee S. Grindle. ed.. Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980). 5.
'"Heclo. "Review." 92.
"Grindle. Politics and Polic~,19, emphasis added. long-tem strategies and mitigates againn the positive prospects of such (rational) strategies because of the cumulative effects of past decisions; it is a vicious ~ircle.'~These factors continue to affect
Chinese decision makers despite moves toward a more market-oriented economy.
These systemic problems are especially applicable to the issue under consideration here: pollution control. A country's rnap of pollution output (like energy demand in Gustafson's study) "is essentiaily that of its inherited structure of population and econornic a~tivity."~'Thus. past decisions loom large and it is likely that pollution control in command economies will be a "localized" activity.
Consideration of the speciai features of developing countnes and command econornies is a preliminary step in unders~andinçthe context of policy implementation in China. Another way of puttinç China's pollution control experience into perspective is to directly compare Chinais efforts in that issue area with the experiences and circumstances of other countries. It is to the questions raised by the comparative literature on environmental policies that our attention is now tumed.
II. Comparative Perspectives
The analysis of pollution control policy in a comparative context is useful for severai reasons.
As an object of implrmrttintio~~research, this issue area is a practical choice because environmental pollution is physically measurable. Thus. given proper equipment and qualified personnel to detect levels. the impact of the policy upon its tarçet is relatively easy to discem. Another advantaçe of the environmental pollution problem in terms of studying implementation is that it is fairly clear what can be done to improve the situation: solutions are scientifically and technically based. Because we know
h ha ne Gustafson Crisis Amid Plenty (Princeto~New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990). 1042. what causes common foms of pollution and how it can be stopped. the implementation of solutions stands out clearly as a key problem. Another problem, of course. is bearinç the costs of the solutions. some of which are quite expensive. Nevenheless. problems in controlling pollution are. in large measure. problems of cornpliance. not science.
From a comparative perspective. environmental policies represent an issue area that. whether recognized as such by individual policy rnakers or not. is critical for lonpterm çrowth in dl societies.
In a comprehensive review of the literature on environmental policy. David Voçel argued that one of the most conspicuous shortfalis of conternporary research in this area is the small number of democratic industrial countries which have been studied. He observed that. arnonç
Western European and Nonh Amencan nations. only the U.S..France. Great Britain and Germany had been studied in any depth. It was suggested that
[gliven the large number of both dependent and independent variables that have been introduced into the literature on comparative environmental policy. we urçently need to expand the number of national cases if we are çoinç to be able to formulate and test çeneralizations about the dynamics of environmentai policy making."
This statement. while neçlecting discussion of environmental policy studies of the former Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe (see below), does rnake a cnicial point; the range of studies of national environmentai policies needs to be broadened.
Narrowly focused though it may be, the existinç literature on the West does pose some interestins questions with respect to broad patterns of environmental policy implernentation. Vogel himself compared the reçulatory "styles" of the United States and Great Britain as they initially put
"David Vogel, "The Comparative Study of Environmental Policy: A Review of the Literature." in Meinolf Dierkes, Ham N. Weiler. and Ariance Benhoin Antal, eds.. Comparative Policv Research: Leaminc from Expenence (Berlin: Gower. 1987). 1 5 7-63. into effect their respective environrnental policies. He concludes that the British approach was relatively infornial and flexible whereas the Amencan style was formai, rule-oriented. and somewhat
Iegalistic." This lads to several questions concerning China- How flexible has China been and which informal processes, if any, have had an effect on the implernentation of pollution controis? Does the
Chinese case confirm Voçel's argument that variations in style do not necessarily lead to large variations in outcorne?
An alternative fiamework for comparison of pollution policy processes draws from
Lundqvist's widely cited tortoise and hare analog. One may ask whether the policy making and implementation processes in China have resembled Lundqvist's Amencan hare in that policy making was initiaily nvift and dramatic. but later slowed down because of the dificulty of coalition building.
Or would the Swedish tortoise analogy be more apt because slow continuous movement inducing consensus and compromise has been obser~ed?~~Whatever zoological analogy is rnost appropriate. how does Lundqvist's assumption of the importance of politicai and institutional constraints apply in
China?
Interestingiy. studies which have examineci countries outside of the industrialized democracies of Western Europe and North Arnerica also point toward both political and institutional constraints on policy making concerning the environment. Barbara lancar's comparison of environrnental management in the U. S.S .Raand Yugoslavia, concludes. arnbiçuously, that "reçulation creates structure and thus modifies existinç power structures as it delegates competence and authority . . ..
J5~avidVogel. National Styles of Re lation (Ithaca, New York: Corne11 University Press. 1986).
""Lennan l. Lundqvist. The Hare and the Tortoise: Clean Air Policies in the United States and Sweden (Ann Arbour Michigan: University of Michigan Press. 1980). wowever]. althou& regdation rnay create new regulatory institutions. it cannot challenge the basic socioeconomic structure of a society, unless "the p~ce"so decides. or there is a social revo~ution."'~
The present study extends this analysis by explorhg whether, despite the fact that China has a more independent environmental regulatory body than existed in either the former Soviet Union or
Yugoslavia environmental reylation has had any effect on existing power structures. In the former
U.S. S. R.. central leaders were just as unabie to impose their e~~virc~trmrii~alpreferences upon subsystem actors as eiected officials in pluralistic systems." India has had troubles establishinç an independent environmental açency capable of strenuous enfor~ernent.'~Even in Italy. one of the most pluralistic and legalistic Wetern countries. it has been difficult to induce local actors to behave as desired with respect to environmental policy. The politicai-administrative structure of pollution control in Italy places the mayor in a crucial position with respect to ensuring enforcement. yet a vanety of factors combine to prevent ail but a few mayors fiom actuaily utiiizing their position for this purpose."' How does China compare to these countnes. and does this tell us more about the
"~arbaraJancar. Environmental Mana~ementin the Soviet Union and Yueoslavia: Structure and Replation in Federal Communist States (Durham. North Carolina: Duke University Press. 1987). 3 09.
"Reçarding the U.S.S.R.. see inter dia, John M. Kramer. "Environmentai Problems. in the U. S.S.R. : The Divergence of Theory and Practice," Journal of Politics, vol. 36. no. 4 (November 1974). 886-99. For a thorouçh review of the literature on environrnental politics in the former Soviet Union see Jancar. Environmental Management, Chapter One.
"O. P. Dwivedi and B. Kishore, "Protecting the Environment from Pollution: A Review of India's Leçal and Institutional Mehcanisms. " Asian Survey. vol. 22. no. 9 (September 1982). 894-91 1 .
U>Bruno Dente and Rudy Lewanski. "Impiementing Air Pollution Control in Itaiy: The Importance of the Political and Administrative Structure." in Paul B. Downing and Kenneth Hanf. eds-. International Cornparisons in Impiementine Pollution Control Laws (Boston: Kluwer NijhoK 1983), 107-128. nature of specific political systems or about the nature of environmentai policy itself? Some answers to these questions will be offered in Chapter Eight.
This chapter has reviewed some Literahire on the conditions of effective policy implementation and has raised severa! questions which emerge from that literature. Although the conditions of effective implementation outlined by Sabatier and Mazmanian require refinement to enhance their applicability across political system types. they are effective in raising cnticd questions about the implementation process. Therefore. that frarnework will be utilized in this study to help specifi the nature of implementation impediments in China. A theoretical consideration of the idea that implementation should be an exploratory exercise was also offered. China's approach ro policy execution in the environmental field will be considered in light of that perspective later in this study.
The comparative literature on environmental policy development, in addition to some published "country studies" of environmentai policy, has been referred to as well. This examination revealed that, broadly speaking. cenain similarities cm be expected in the political and institutional factors which affect environmental policy irnplementation locally in dissimiiar countries. This is despite the fact that the role of the law and style of implementation in these systems varies widely.
Up to this point little mention has been made of policy implementation or environmental policy in
China itself. where the rule of law is still quite tenuous. It is to these topics that we now tum our attention. CHAPTER WO:POLICY MAKING AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN CHINA
1. Introduction
The previous chapter introduced a recommendation that policy implementation should be undertaken as an exploratory activity. It further argued that the political. institutional, and economic context of implementation is extrernely important in determining implementation success or failure; the exact structure of leçal statutes and the theoretical strategies embodied therein are not so important where local implementation is a highly political process, as is usually the case with environmental policies. This chapter reviews the literature on Chinese policy implementation and some studies of Chinese environmental policy. It will be suggested that Chinese leaders have utilized an exploratory approach to policy making in environmental policy and other issue areas. It will also be shown that most research on the politics of China's environment has. to date. not sufficiently descnbed this policy process or the pollution control "implementation problem" directly or in detail.
In short. the local politicai context and the impact of past policies require funher attention. The latter sections of this chapter narrow the focus still fùrther by outlining the changing organizational framework within which this implementation effort was undertaken.
IL Implementation and Exploration in China
The study of implernentation in China is particularly usehl because the advice offered regardinç irnplementation as a tentative. exploratory exercise has been. and cunently is beinç. taken by policy makers in China. That is to Say. experimental models and evolutionary policy formulation have. both ideologically and practically, been an explicit part of China's policy process for a long tirne. Even pnor to the founding of the People's Republic. Mao Zedong conveyed some of the ideas now evident in recent implementation research when he offered the classic statement on the "rnass
line. "
In al1 practical work of our Party, al1 correct leadership is necessarily "fiom the masses, to the masses. " This means: take the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsyaematic ideas) and concentrate them (through study turn them into concentrated and systematic ideas). then go to the masses and propagate these ideas until the masses embrace them as their own, hold fast to them and translate them into action, atd tesr the correchiess of these ideas in 374ch actioti. Then once again go to the masses so that the ideas are persevered in and canied through. And so on. over UFI~ over again iti or1 r1ld1rs.sspiral. with thideas hecomirrg more correct. more vital nrrd richer rnch lime.'
While certainly no one would argue that al1 policy formulation in the PRC has followed this pattern, it is tme that the dialectical notions embodied in Mao's statement have become important in
Chinese Marxist thought. Moreover, the importance of local models as an instmment in factional wranglinç has been evident in both the Maoia and post-Mao penods. The Dazhai mode1 at the close of the Cultliral ~evolution'and the Special Economic Zones dong with other economic experiments3 under Deng have been the centre of controversy among elite groups.
it would be wrong to assume. however. that Mao's words have received no practical application or that policy making by experimentation with models is purely a political tactic. At a very practical level. the very nature of the Chinese political system requires that these principies be applied. While the diversity and enormity of both China's temtory and population suggest that
'Mao Zedong. "Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership." Selected Works, vol. 3, 119. cited in James R. Townsend and Brantly Womack. Politics: China (3rd ed.). (Boston: Little. Brown. 1986). 259. emphasis added.
'Edward Friedman. "The Politics of Local Models. Social Transformation and State Power Stmççles in the People's Republic of China," The China Quarterlv, no. 76 (December 1978). 873-90.
'Kristen Pams. "Local Initiative and National Reform: the Wenzhou Mode1 of Development." The China Quarterly, no. 134 (June 1993). 242-263. flexibility and the use of local innovations in formulating policy have aiways ben advantageous. an
incrernentd tentative policy process is particularly important (indeed unavoidable) at China's current
stage of political developrnent. Liebenhal and Oksenberg observed in their study of Chinese policy
making that the
central leadership is obviously aware of [the difficulty of irnplementing policies which involve several organizations] and many central "decisions," therefore, are quite consciously viewed as steps in a process of mobilizing bureaucratic resources in a protracted effort to tackle a problem. Thus, central decisions ofken only set forth goals or prescriptions on what should be done. They do not bear close resemblance to the types of detailed implementing and regulating documents that frequently accompany hi& level decision making in the United States. In their scope and Ianguaçe. they rnay mislead foreigners into believinç that the Central leaders in fact have more latitude on an issue than the leaders themselves know to be the case . . . Sometimes the essentially tentative nature of most "decisions" stands out in fairly bold relief.'
Thus. Chinese policy makers clearly view implementation as exploration and adaptation. The
extent to which this has paid off for them in terms of "successfùl" implementation should be of
considerable interest to students of implementation. Environmental policy is one issue area in which
PRC officiais have taken an expenmental and explicitly tentative approach; original legislation was
adopted for trial implementation (shixing)and considerable local initiative is encouraged. Extended
testing of programmes such as the pollution permit system were conducted in a number of key cities before universal implernentation was recomrnended. The merits and problems of the exploratory approach as practised in Chinese environmental policy are exarnined in this case study and are summarized in Chapter Eiçht.
'Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policv Makine in China: Leaders. Stmctures. and Processes (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1988). 27. The first group of post-Mao Chuiese policy studies with an explicitly implementation-focused research agenda are found largely in Polic~Irnplementation in Post-Mao China.' This path-braking edited volume examined the results of many of the new policy initiatives launched under Deng
Xiaoping's direciion after 1978. Two shortcornings of these early studies are relevant to the present dissertation. First. the time penods exarnined were quite short and. second. the role of municipal- level officiais was not sufficiently explored.
Many of the chapters in Lampton's book focus on periods of two years or less. Other recent examinations of policy irnplementation in China similady look at short tirne penods.' The reasons that such a short time fiame was exarnined are both practical and obvious. hitial examination of the reformist policies under Deng necessarily covered a limited tirne span, while the narrow temporal focus in studies of earlier penods was necessitated by the episodic nature of irnplementation campaigns in post- 1949 china.' Funhermore, intensive examinaiion of a policy's implementation
5 David M. Lampton. ed., Policv Imolementation in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University California Press, 198 7).
G See. for exarnple. Peter Nan-Shong Lee. "Enterprise Autonomy Policy in Post-Mao China: Case Study of Policy-making 1978-83." The China Ouarterlv. no. 105 (March 1986). 45-7 1 and. looking at an earlier penod and focusing on a single year, Alfred L. Chan. "The Carnpaign for Agicultural Development in the Great Leap Forward: A Study of Policy-Making and Implementarion in Liaoning." The China Ouarterly, no. 129 (March 1992). 52-7 1.
7 Some early studies of policy making which considered implementation questions Jid look at lonçer periods of time. See Victor Falkenheim, "Provincial Administration in Fukien, 1949- 1966" (Ph.D. Thesis. Columbia University. 1972) and David M. Lampton. The Politics of Medicine in China: the Policv Process. 1949- 1977 (Boulder: Westview, 1975). In some issue areas. developrnents were considerably less episodic than often believed. See AnElissa Lucas. Chinese Medical Modemization (New York: Praegar, 1982). This study of policy co~~tirwitycovers a period of fifiy years. Since such continuities were seemingly invisible to many analysts who looked at shorter periods. Lucas' work demonstrates in a slightly different way the value of a longitudinal approach. requires litson the amount of data which must be gathered. Exarnining a brief tirne period is one
way of imposing such limitab'rions.
Notwithstanding these practical considerations. it must be recognized that the tirne frame may
affect the conclusions reached reçarding success or failure in policy implementation.' Many of the
works noted above offer pessimistic conclusion^.^ Exarnining a shon time heprecludes the
detection of possible leaming-induced successes in implementation. This is problematic because the
Chinese approach to policy making noted above implies that even central decision makers do not
expect many initial policy decisions to be permanent or successful. Given that approximately a
decade and a haif have eiapsed since the Third Plenum (of the Eleventh Central Cornmittee). the time
is ripe for the application of longitudinal analysis to the study of policy initiatives of the post-Mao era.
Kirst and Jung commented:
We believe a longitudinal case-study approach (ten years or more) merits serious consideration. An extended tirne line of ten yean or more seems e~peciallyrtrcessary in mi irnplemetztntim corttrxt where respomibifilies and powers are shore J among federnl. store. arid focal agertcies.'O
Certainly Chinese environmental policy implementation cm be considered in this light.
Legislative and other responsibilities are delegated to lower levels. Municipal governments must
Tester M. Salamon, "The Time Dimension in Policy Evaluation: The Case of the New Deal Land-Refom Experiments." Public Poli-. vol. 27, no. 2 (Spring 1979). 180-82.
9There were some exceptions. In the Lampton volume, David Zweig attributes success in decollectivization, in part. to the self-executing nature of the policy. In David Bachman's chapter on tax policy. success is attributed to repeated campaigns against clearly illegal activities which had long been prohibited by existing policy. The Chan article (see note six) sees central control as being paramount. but, çiven the ephemeral nature of Great Leap "successes." his study unintentionally demonstrates that a longitudinal approach may also ternper pessimistic conclusions.
"'Michael Kirst and Richard Jung, "The Utility of a Longitudinal Approach in Assessing Implementation," in Walter Williams. ed.. Studying Imolementation: MethodoIo~@caiand Administrative Issues (Chatham. N.J.: Chatham ~ousei1982). 1 19; emphasis added. aüocate tùnds for enforcement and must staff' local branches of the implementing agency. Moreover. at a systemic level. the fragmented authontariankm model of Chinese policy making highlights the difise nature of power in the PRC. Kenneth Lieberthal suggested that for many purposes, the
Chinese bureaucracy is one in which
. . . no single body has authority over the others. In addition. the reforms' decentralization of budgetary authority enabled many locales and bureaucratic units to acquire funds outside those affected through the central budget. which they could use to pursue their own policy preferences. This cushion of "extrabudgetary" funds in tum permitted [them] to become less sensitive to the policy demands fiom higher le~eis.~l
The model borrows from organizational theory the notion of hierarchy "flattening." This means that both bureaucratic and territorial units at al2 leveis acquire control over resources which allow them to baqain with their supenors. They do not accept the simple chah-of-cornrnand fiom formal organizational charts." In such a system "there is apt to be widespread sabotage of national directives at rach subnational level"" and bargaining is a key feature of the policy process. One of the primary implications of this model is that the policy process is protracted, disjointed, and incremental." Thus, studying a long time frame is essentiai to capturing the full dynamics of policy implementation in China and provides opportunity to investigate the conditions affecthg implementation when an exploratory, evolutionary approach is taken."
"Kenneth G. Lieberthal. "Introduction." in Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton, eds.. Bureaucracv. Politics and Decision Makine in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). 8.
"Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Policv Making in China, 406.
"~ieberthaland Lampton, Politics. Bureaucracv and Decision Makinq, 27, emphasis added.
"Lieberthai and Oksenberg, Policy Making in China, 22.
15 Lieberthal and Oksenberg's analysis of petroleum policy development. for example, covers a period of about twenty years. For reasons noted earlier, however, longitudinal studies of The einphasis placed by the fiagmented authoritaianism model upon the building of inter-
agency consensus stems from at least two sources. Fiist, the organization of the Chinese bureaucracy involves a rnatrix of both vertical bureaucracies (tiao)and horizontal coordinating bodies of specific localities (krrai). This results in officiais in most offices having superiors in severai other offices.
Unless one of the superior bodies has a clearly superior bureaucratic rank over its "competitor(s)", it is relatively easy for bureaucratic and govementd actors to block efforts upon which there is no consensus. Contliaing and criss-crossing iines of authority, in short. rnake for a complex and clumsy policy-making system. Bureaucratic blockage is perhaps most comrnon when tangible resources are involved; thus, the fiagmented authontarianism model has thus far most mtitfully been applied to policy making in economic bureaucracies.
The other source of the model's emphasis on consensus building is its focus on the national and provincial levels. Struggles for control of resources at these levels are relatively high profile."
However. the drafiinç of implementing regulations (which can involve both provinces and municipalities) and implementation itself are also important processes.'7
A second shoncoming of the research effons in the Lampton volume, then, concems the lack of atteztion paid to the local political context in studying implementation. Admittedly, several scholars do look beyond the central perspective. For example, David Zweig traced the interaction between central and provincial decision making and noted that a convergence between policy content and context in irnplementinç agriculture reforms had developed. The deregdatory nature of the impkrnriltnrior~in the post-Mao years are largely lackinç.
'"~e~ardingcentral-provincial interaction, see Susan L. Shirk. The Political Loeic of Economic Reform in China, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), Chapter Nine.
"~urrayScot Tanner, "How a Bill Becomes Law in China: Stages and Processes." The China Quarterlv!, no. 14 1 (March 1995). 40-43. policy and consistent elite attention contnbuted to this suc ces^."'^ This focus on interaction and
policy change involving local units provides something of a mode1 for the study of the dynarnic policy
process in China.
Tyrene White documented the importance of societal and administrative contexts in fnistrating the reçime's efforts at population control. Beyond the pressures brought to bear on the
"one-child-per-couple" progam by societal values and administrative weakness, the implementation of this deremlatory policy was also hampered by deregdation in other areas.lg
But these works, dong with most others in Chinese policy making and decentralization, do not focus on politics below the provincial leve~.'~Lampton himself noted that one of the key questions not sufficiently explored in the volume he edited was this: What types of resources do sub- provincial units have to resist or shape policy?" More recently. a student of the Chinese policy process has lamented that "there are vimially no on-the-ground studies of how laws are impiemented."" Put another way, the "appropriate question is not centralisation or decentralisation,
"See Lampton. ed.. Implementation in China, Chapter Nine.
'9~ampton,ed.. lmplementation in China, 3 07.
''A few examples include: David Goodman. Centre and Province in the People's Republic of China: Sichuan and Guizhou 1955- 1 965, (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press. 1986); Stuart Schrw "Decentralization in a Unitary State: Theory and Practice, 1940- 1984" in Schram, ed., The Scope of State Power in China (London: University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies. 1985), 8 1-125; and Sen Lin, China's Decentralization and Provincial Economic Legislation, (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Calgary, 1993). Among the exceptions are Victor C. Falkenheim, "County Administration in Fukien," The China Ouarterlv, no. 59 (July-September 1974). 5 18-543; Falkenheim. "Decentralization and Central Control in Chinese Local Administration," in Daniel N. Wilson. ed., Local Politics in Communist Countries (Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press, 1986). 19 1-224; and several chapters in Gordon White. ed., The Chinese State in the Era of Economic Reform, (London: Macmillan, 199 1).
"~ampton.ed., Implementation in China, 23.
--Tanner,77 "How a Bill Becornes Law in China," 60. but the relationships among central state and enterprise as intemediated at the level of the local state.
This is why the . . . municipaiity is an important subject of st~dy."~
This void is particularly troublesorne in light of recent administrative and fiscal decentralization. As part of econornic reform across China. central leaders have allowed local budçets to become increasinçly discretionary even though they are officially still part of the national budget. They have also decentraiized power over industry, assigning local govemments and enterprises a greater role in decision making." Indeed, in Walder's words. mayors are now "the ultimate source of authority for ail decisions on investment and taxation. "" Budgetary discretion however, does not mean fiscal autonomy for local govemments. It has been suggested that "by saddling local governments with dwindling resources and growing expenditure obligations. the central governrnent [has] passed the fiscal crisis to the local level."" Municipal çovernment responsibilities are increasinçly regulatory, rather than directive." Environmentai protection enforcement is arnonç these new and costly responsibilities assigned to Iower levels.
arc Blecher. "Developmentai State. Entrepreneurial State: The Political Economy of Socialist Refonn in Xinju Municipality and Guanghan County in White, ed., The Chinese State in the Era of Economic Reforrn, 286.
"Dorothy J. Solinçer, "Industnai Reform: Decentralization, DifEerentiation, and Difficulties." Journal of International AfTairs, vol 39, no. 2 (Winter 1986). 105-20.
?hdrew G. Waider, "Local Bargainhg Relationships and Urban industnal Finance." in Lieberthal and Lampton, Bureaucracv. Politics and Decision Making, 3 17.
'"Christine P. W. Wong, "Centrai-Local Relations in an Era of Fiscal Decline: The Paradox of Fiscal Decentralization in post-Mao China," The China Ouarterlv, no. 128 (December 1993). 69 1 - 71 5.
"Vivienne Shue. "State sprawl: the regulatory state and social life in a srnall Chinese city," in Deborah S. Davis, Richard Kraus. Barry Naughton. and Elizabeth J. Peny, Urban Spaces in Conternoorarv China: The Potential for Autonomv and Cornmunitv in Post-Mao China (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, t995). 90-I 12. The results of these refom are not. as some rnight expect, an increase in pnvatization of the economy and pluralization of politics. Rather, the local, as opposed to centrai, state remains fidy entrenched in the local political economy. Extrabudgetary funds are used in unauthorized capital constmction: the state continues to be relied upon for investment as local leaders articulate the interests of their region." In many cases the local state becomes an "entrepreneurid state" whkh owns or has an interest in numerous local profit-seeking enterprises? Local çovenunents. decentralization notwithstanding, continue to take the centrai govemment's generai policy thrusts seriously-%Oand thus put heavy ernphasis on achievinç what still tums out to be state-led rapid economic growth. Indeed. gconornic growth and risinç living standards for the Iocals are involved in the political barsain between central and local officials; as long as social stability is maintained. local discretion will remain."
In a recent article on the role of the local state in China's economic growtb Jean Oi raises a nurnber of points critical to this examination of environmental implementation. First. what has developed in China is described as local state corporatism. In this situation. local govemments "are shifting from [being] regulators to advocates of their local enter prise^."^' Thus. the transition to
"~oroth~J. Solinger, "China's New Economic Policies and the Local Industrial Political Process: the Case of Wuhan. Comparative Politics, vol. 18. no. 4 (July 1986). 379-99.
%arc Blecher, "Developmentai State, Entrepreneurid State: The Political Economy of Socialist Reform in Xinju Municipality and Guanghan County" in White. ed.. The Chinese State in the Era of Economic Reform, 265-94.
"Solinçer. "China's New Econornic Policies." 396-7
3'~ennethLieberthal, Goveming China: From Revolution Through Reform (New York: Norton. 1995), 3 16.
''~ean C. Oi. "The Role of the Local State in China's Transitional Economy." The China Ouarterlv, no. 144 (December 1995)- 1 145. increased (and increasingiy selective) regulatory duties may easily confiict with a municipality's new
entrepreneurid orientation. Municipal governrnents use what capacity they possess to advance locd
industriai policy and economic growth. However. even though localities have been relied upon to
produce much of China's celebrated rapid growth, this type of growth is probably not sustainable in
the long term. Pressure to perform economically. in other words. becomes increasingly. rather than
decreasingly. intense. To the extent that economic interests and environmental ones are viewed by
local elites as mutually exclusive. this does not bode well for environmental implementation.
Oi's study also raises an imponant anaiytical point. She States:
China's experience suggests that one should disaggreçate the "state" into its component parts to distinguish between levels of çovernment and the incentives for different levels to perform. There is a need for strong state capacity, but this capacity should exist at both the locai and the central ~evels.~'
My discussion below of China's environmental protection organization suçgests that these comments
are quite applicable in the issue area comidered here. Funher discussion of the disaggregation of the
state for anaiytical purposes is taken up in the conclusion of this dissenation.
If. as has been argued. provinces have becorne semi-independent lepislators in their own
rightZ4and if. as was argued in the first chapter of this dissertation. policies are tmly shaped when
implementors meet targets. then the politics of implementation among networks of actors which
include those at the sub-provincial level in China deserves more attention."
"Lin. Decentralization and Provincial Le~islation.
"lt should be noted that. in China, local government (dijiang zhri~gjii)can refer to any level below the centre. In the political science of North Amenca, local govermnent often refers casually to municipal çovemments below the provincial or state level. As other China scholars have done. 1 adopt the broad Chinese usage and speciS. lower levels as subprovincial. municipal. city. county, etc.. as needed. III. Chinese Environmental Policy and Explanatory Models
Much of the published scholarly examination of Chinese environmental poiitics, at least as far
as the English language literature is concemed. can be found in the works of Lester Ross. His book,
Environmental Politics in China, is the most comprehensive documentation of post-Mao
environmentai policy initiatives available. He assesses the environmentai and economic consequences
of three alternative modes or strateçies of implementation: moral suasion (campaigns), plan and
regdation. and the market. The book's central theme is that market rnechanisms based on private
property and economic incentives have proven to be the most effective strategy in safeyarding
China's environment. Ross thus uses public çoods theory to explain the environmental situation in
China.36He also claims that by analysing the Chinese acadernic and bureaucratic debates over these
issues, he wili illuminate the policy process in China. By "policy process." however. Ross means the
process by which the various theoretical options for environmentai improvement arrive. and stay. on
the elites' agenda. He argues that agenda setting "isprimarily a fùnction of factional politics.""
This conclusion conceminç the Chinese policy process is not particuiarly innovative and is
based. one suspects. upon the highly controversiai views of Lucian Pye.38 The utility of the factional
model can be chailenged in several ways. First, the existence of factions prr se is difficult to prove.
Scholars who rely on the model use mmours and personai historical associations more than current
"on this abstract debate. Susan Rose-Ackerman. "Market Models for Water Pollution Control: Their Strengths and Weaknesses." Public Policv, vol. 25. no. 3 (Summer 1977). 383-406 and Lettie McSpadden Werner. "Pollution Control: Implementation Alternatives," Policy Analvsis. vol. 4. no. 1 (Winter 1978). 47-65.
"ROSS. Environmental Policv in China, 2 10- 1 1
"Sec Lucian Pye. The Dyamics of Chinese Politics (Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 198 1). direct e~idence.'~Moreover. many of the phenornena said to accompany factionalism in other
countries (cautious political strategies. for example) are not aiways observed in China. As well. in
the post-Mao penod, the factional mode1 becomes ditncult to disentangle fiom a bureaucratic politics
model since cadres now tend to rernain withir> a certain bureaucratic Stream, and formal organizations
are the framework upon which factions are developed." Finally, it is difficult to believe both that
personal power is the sole motivating factor among Chinese politicians and that factional leaders cm
always control events at the local level.
Attempts have been made recently to clarifjr or refine Nathan's original factional model."
Nathan and Tsai. for example,- emphasize the importance of institutional structure and place Chinese
factions in a comparative context with other types of groups. Categonzation is based upon bases of
association and communication patterns. Lowell Dittmer and Lucian Pye, on the other hand, each
ernphasize the uniqueness of Chinese culture (Pye more so than Diamer) and explain the various
ways in which factionalism has chançed in China dunng the reform era." Dittmer also recognizes
the limited applicability of the mode1 to studies of policy making and implementation:
Because informal bases are not mobilized for the sake of routine policy-making but rather for political reasons of persona. power. the bases nonnally have Iittle specific
"Harry Harding "Competing Models of the Chinese Policy Process: Toward a Sorting and Evaluation." Issues and Studies (February 1984). 27-28.
'*Harding. "Competing Models." 29. 32. and Andrew Nathan, "A Factionai Mode1 for Chinese Politics." The China Ouarterlv, no. 53 (January-March 1973). 34-66.
"See Andrew J. Nathan and Kellee S. Tsai. "Factionalism: A New Insitutional Restatement." The China Journal no. 34 (July 1999, 157-94. This entire issue of the journal examines the nature of C hinese politics.
?Lucian W. Pye, "Factions and the Politics of Grcat~xi:Paradoxes in Chinese Administrative and Political Behaviour." The China Journal, no. 34 (July 1995). 35-54, and Lowell Dittmer. "Chinese Informal Politics." The China Journal, no. 34 (July 1995). 1-34. This latter source contains a bnef review of the literature on Chinese factional politics. policy relevance . . .. An adept leadership. while using informal poiitics to cobble together a rnajority within the formai apparatus, will then tum to forma1 politics for public policy implernentati~n.'~
As Harding observes. it is more useful to suggest conditions under which various of the
extant models of the Chinese policy process are most appropriate than to assert the pnmacy of one
mode1 or the other? Altematively. the applicability of various models to different frvels of policy
making can be assessed. This might lead to a synthesis of two or more models. Lieberthal and
Oksenberg's recent volume merçes primarily the structural and bureaucratic models while not
neçlecting tendencies. interest groups, or co~ections(p~atrxi).'~ The present study draws fiom a
similar mix of models but notes particularly the weak bureaucratic position of EPB officials in locd bureaucratic politics and the key role played by Mayors and Deputy Mayors in presiding over such politics.
Lester Ross' choice to assert the primacy of one mode1 thus obscures more than it reveals about environmental issues and the PRC policy process in çeneral. One cm also question the validity of Rossi central theme. How can the switch to a market-exchange mode of environmental protection be said to be responsibie for improving China's bleak environmental situation when, first. real overail
"~ittmer. "Infomal Politics." 14. 17.
UHarding, "Competing Models." 14-16, 29-36. The eight models listed by Harding as comrnon in the study of the Chinese policy process are: structural. normative. Mao-in-command. factional. bureaucratic, tendency. çenerational. and interest groups.
45 One recent work which goes much farther than Lieberthal and Oksenberg in assertinç the pnmacy of stmctural variables (and thus comrnits a Ross-Iike error in a difEerent direction) is David Bachrnan, Bureaucracv. Economv and Leadershio in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 199 1). A useful critique of Bachman's book can be found in Fredenck C. Teiwes, "Leaders, Institutions and the Ongins of the Great Leap Fonvard: Review Article," Pacific Affairs, vol. 66, no. 2 (Summer 1993). 244-59. improvement has not emerged et,'^ and second, the claimed improvement was accompanied by a
notable increase in elite attention and allocation of resources?" The alleged relationship between
strategy choice and implernentation success may well be spurious. or at least mediated by some
intervening factors which oniy become clear in the actual process of implementation. Elmore notes that the "[alnalysis of policy choices matters iittle if the mechanism for implementing those choices is poorly underst~od."'~He then cites Graham Allison who estimated that oniy 10 percent of the work in the policy process is accomplished by identifjing a preferred analytic alternative: the rest lies in the dornain of implernentati~n.'~
In addition, Ross' argument stems fiom his reliance on apparent early Chinese successes in prornoting household forestry production; this is the dimension of environmental policy with which he is most familido and is also the policy area where developments most clearly support his thesis.
The picture in pollution control, he admirs, is rnuch more "mixed."" Even if Ross is correct that market style mechanisms arr more effkctive than other approaches, how can this be squared with his own earlier observation that "the effectiveness of environmental protection hinges upon the suppon
46 Srnil, China's Environmental Cnsis.
47 On the second point, see Susan L. Shirk, review of Environmental Policv in China, by Lester Ross, in Amencan Politicai Science Review, vol. 84, no. 1 (March 1990)- 341-43.
18 Elmore. "Backward Mapping," 22.
'9Graham T. Ailison. The Essence of Decision: Explainine the Cuban Missile Cnsis. (New York: Harper Collins, 197 1 ), 267.
50 See, for example, Lester Ross. Forestry Policy In China, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1 980.
"Ross, Environmental Policy in China, 172-75. In pollution control, the Chinese have Iargely relied upon reçulatory rneasures. See Eduard B. Vermeer, "Management of Environmental Pollution in China: Problems and Abatement Policies," China Information, vol. 5, no. 1 (Sumer 1990). 62. of local political authorities?"" Even in his more recent work. Ross does not discuss the local political context as a major issue and claims that "one no longer encounters . . . indifference to environmental protection among officials that used to be found in the PRC.""
This dissertation is concemed with what is )lot thoroughly investigated in Ross' work.
Although he suggests his book is about implementation and will "explain the ernpirical reality of
China"5"the ernpincal reality of environmental policy implementation (especially with respect to pollution control) remains largely unexamined. His book is not "implernentation research" in the sense that the Downing and Hanf. Williams, and Larnpton collections referred to herein use that phrase. Ross' approach emphasizes the content of the centre's policies and laws at the expense of local context and the centre's exploratory approach. The focus on abstract strategies does not allow a dynamic ernpirical reality to be fully examined.
A few midies have begun to probe that reality. Some eariy research on non-cornpliance and political context took an essentially leçalistic, statute-oriented approach and concluded, quite accurately for the penod then under examination rhat intervention by central authorities was often a prerequisite to compliance with environmental laws. Institutionai changes and a strengthened judiciary, it is argued. would bring more consistent pollution control efforts to China." The effects
ester Ross, "The Implementation of Environmentai Policy in China: A Comparative Perspective," Administration and Society vol. 15, no. 4 (Febmary l984), 506.
''Lester Ross. "The Politics of Environmental Policy in the People's Republic of China." Policv Studies Journal, vol. 20, no. 4 (1992), 628-42.
5J~oss,Environmental Policv in China, 1.
5 5 Lester Ross and Mitchell A Silk, "Post-Mao China and Environmental Protection: The Effects of Legal and Politico-Economic Reform," Pacific Basin Law Journal, vol. 4, no. 30 ( 1985). 63-89; and Baruch Boxer, "China's Environmental Prospects," Asian Swvey, vol. 24, no. 7 (My 1989). 669- 86. of subsequent changes in these and other areas upon local implementation have been outlined in a few articles which consider the country as a whole," but published studies have only recently begun to concentrate on specifics and to relate developments to explicit models and the questions of policy analysis.''
Several very recent studies have made progress in these respects. Maa's study of provincial environmental policy making correlates social and econornic factors with provincial law making efforts; poor and less industrialized provinces tend to make less effort on environmental legi~lation.'~
Maa does not investigate, however. the efforts of sub-provincial units to refine and implement the laws.
Barbara Sinkule has examined the implernentation of selected progammes in particular industries in the boominç Pearl River Delta region." Of environmental impact assessments. the pollutant discharge fee proçramrne, and the "three synchronizations" (explained below), she judges the latter to be the rnost effective in preventing pollution in the areas studied. She also observes that municipal EPBs used adaptive. even entrepreneurid. strategies to ensure their su~valand to implement regulations. Sinkule's work leaves two important questions unanswered. First, how
"Eduard B. Vermeer. "Management of Pollution Abatement by Chinese Enterprises." China Information, vol. 6. no. 1 (Summer 199 1 ), 34-45; Vermeer, "Problems and Abatement Policies". 4- 65; and Boxer. "China's Environmental Prospects", 669-86.
57 Understandably. the writings of geoçraphers and natural scientists concerning China's environment far outnumber those of social scientists, both inside and outside China. This explains why the questions of political science have not been directly addressed.
SUMaa Shaw-chanç. A Comoarative Studv of Provincial Policv in China: The Political Economv of Pollution Control Policv, Ph.D. Dissertation. The Ohio State University. 1993.
59 Barbara J. Sinkule, lmplementation of Industrial Water Pollution Control Poticies in the Pearl River Delta Rerion of China, Ph-D. Dissertation, Stanford University, 1993. typical are implernentation results in southem Guangdong of those in other parts of china.* Second, is a positive evaluation of the "three synchronizations" programme the result of heavy reliance upon official statistics on the subject?
Another dissertation began to address the tint of these concems by anaiyzing water pollution control in several inland sites where state industry pred~minates.~'Like Sinkuie. Jahiel assesses positively the ability of the environmental protection apparatus to leam and adapt to the reform setting. She suggests that the "refonn ideology" has had both positive and negative effects upon the implementation ofwater pollution regulations. On the positive side. it is cautiously noted that legal reforms have "forced EPBs to more strictly enforce policy according to the letter of the la^."^'
Overall. though. it is asserted that the emphasis on getting rich has afEected both industry and the regulators neçatively; factories evade controls and EPBs lose sight of their reai mission in their efforts to raise fbnds and collect fies. Jahiel's emphasis on the negative impact of reform, however. obscures the veiy real fact that environmental work was far weaker before reform; her work does not clearly address the question of how that neglect affects current implernentation. It aiso does not address directly the issue of where in the system leaming is most useful; adaptation on the part of the NEPA may not translate into significantly improved irnplementation at lower levels. One purpose of the
"Much scholarly work on a vanety of dimensions of environmental policy likewise focus on Guangdong province. For example, in the field of administrative law. see Carlos Wing-hung Lo, "Law and Administration in Deng's China: Legalization of the Administration of Environmental Protection," Review of Central and East European Law. no. 5 ( 1992), 453-73; and Carlos Wing-hung Lo, "Environmental Management by Law in China: The Guangzhou Experience." The Journal of Contemporan, China, no. 6 (Summer 1994). 39-58.
"Abigail R. Jahiel, Poli- Implementation Throueh Oreanizational Leaming: The Case of Water Pollution Control in China's Reforming Socialia S~stem,Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1994.
''~ahiel. Implementation Throueh Oreanizational Learning, 5 5. following case study, then, is to build on this previous research by addressing some of the issues
raised, but not sufficiently examined, by these earlier studies.
The questions of policy analysis and those raised immediately above. of course, cannot be
answered well without first outlining the organizational framework within which these
implementation efforts have taken place. The focus of this dissertation narrows markedly at this
point as the general evolution of China's environmental regdatory agencies is outlined.
IV. The Orsanization of Environrnental Protection in china6-'
Du ring the period under study ( 1979- 1 992). the organization of environmental protection
work at the national level has undergone a nurnber of changes designed to enhance the prominence
of this policy field and thus strengthen environmental protection efforts. Analogous changes often
took place concurrently or subsequently at the local level (see Chapter Six). The evolving
organizational hework of environmental control will be outlined below while some local responses
to these changes will be considered in subsequent chapters.
Forma1 organization of environmental protection work began in the early 1970s with the
establishment of a delegation to attend the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment in
Stockholm in June 1972. Following that conference. and apparently as the result of increased
awareness on the part of Chinese authonties about the importance of environmental protection work,
a State Council Environmental Protection Leading Group (SCEPLG)was formed under the direction
of the State Planning Commission (SPC). In 1974 this organizational arrangement was fomialized
and a subordinate office was created. This group was charged with responsibility for formulating
"~xce~twhere othenvise noted, this section draws corn Qu Geping. "Environmental Protection in China: A Brief Hiaory." Chinese Geo.graphv and Environment, vol. 2. no. 3 (Fall 1 989). 3 -29 and World Bank Report no. 9669-CmChina Environmental Strate- Pa~er.Apnl 1992. environrnental protection policy, formulating state environmental regulations. and organizing. coordinating and supe~singthe environmental protection work in reievmzt rleparntrents in dl regions?
At the same time. sirnilar organizations were established within provincial govemments and national ministnes as weil as. albeit very unevenly. at lower leveis. Personnel for dl these organùations were drawn fiom scientific and agicultural research organizations. transportation and industrial enterprises. and related government departments.
The national leading group was not particularly active; it met twice between 1974 and 1982.
It did. however. provide an infiuential brief on environmental protection for the Central Cornmittee in 1978 and its subordinate office did do much of the organizational groundwork which brought together individuals who would later becorne quite important as a core of environmental protection cadres. Nevertheless. a leading NEPA official has observed in retrospect that "this goup did not make the most ofits leadership position to create more positive influence."6s
In 1978 environrnental protection was established constitutionally as a state responsibiiity.
The next year the Environmental Law of the People's Republic of China (for trial implementation) was promulgated. This document promised that an environrnental protection organization would be set up and. in broad terms, outhed the duties of that body. For the most part. these duties penained to organization. policy formulation and legisiative work. The new law also ordered provinces. autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central governments control to set up environrnental protection bureaus (EPBs). Other lower levei junsdictions could organize to protect
??WB, 8 October 1992. 2.
65 Qu. Histoq, 1 1. the environment "according to their needs." One of the main fùnctions of the provincial level units was to supervise the implementation of environmental protection measures in the emrpriseP and the drpartmrr~tsunder their jurisdiction; these enterprises and departments were similady urged to organize for environmental protection "according to their needs. ""
The environmentai protection organization promiseci in the 1979 provisional law was created, in nep with other wide-ranging organizational reforms. in May 1982. In a major reorganization of the State Council, a Ministry of Urban and Rurai Construction and Environmental Protection
(MURCEP). was established. The State Council Leading Group's subordinate office was transforrned into an Environmental Protection Bureau within the new ministry. The Leading Group itself was abolished.'' Oçtensibly, this placing of responsibility for environmental concerns on a State
Council rninistry was designed to strengthen control and leadership over this issue area. However, the placement of both the reylated and the regulator within the same ministry, as had already become clear in the Soviet Union and other places. proved very unsatisfactory. Nevenheless. many locai governrnents loyally copied the central govemment organizational changes by incorporating t heir environment al protection offices. which were previously administered directly under the local governments, into the new ministry. This, in effect, meant that the newly organized local
66Most large and medium-sized factories have environmental protection divisions or committees. These assis with monitoring and the developrnent of procedures. However, they are not part of the formai environmental protection apparatus and are not examined extensively in this study. They primarily serve as a contact point between the EPB and the enterprise. See Jahiel, Policy Implementation Throueh Oreanizational Learninq. 17.
6 7 An English translation of the law may be found in Vaclav Srnil's The Bad Earth (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.. 1984). 23 1-38. The Chinese version may be found in many major Chinese newspapers published during mid-Septernber 1979. as well as in other sources.
"Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], 10 May 1982, 2 translated in JPRS 8 173 7, 23-24. environrnental protection cadres were demoted, an event descnbed by a sympathetic observer as a
" severe lashing" Cvarizhot~gchotigji). 69
Central and local authorities, recognizing this organizational error, began making adjustments less than two years la te^^" In 1984 (nearly two years after the idea was first proposed) the State
Council created an Environrnental Protection Commission (SCCEP) with the aim of strengthening unified leadership and improving inter-ministerial coordination. Li Peng was narned as Chairman.
The Commission was mandated to meet four times a year and to lead. coordinate, and organize environmental work nationwide. Towards the end of 1984, the EPB of the MURCEP was transformed into a National Environrnental Protection Bureau. The new bureau retained its leadership personnel and was designated as a state bureau under the SCCEP." This was meant to make the body rd~ivelyindependent fiom its parent ministry.
However. despite the new nomenclature and the new formai ties to a State Council body. environmental protection work still remained officially part of MURCEP until a State Council organizational reform prograrn was implemented in 1988." Only then did the national body responsible for environmental protection emerge as an administrative agency independent of (but still not equal in bureaucratie natus to) al1 line ministries. The new NEPA was to be directly subordinate
"ZHB. 8 October 1992. 2.
7%id. In a related development, a Central Cornmittee "decision" in October 1984 urged municipal çovernments to separate their political duties fiom their enterprise management responsibilities, but no detailed organizational provisions to attain that end were specified. See Qu, Histoq, 20.
"Zhongmio Huaniins Nianiian [Chinese Environmental Almanac] (Beijing: Zhonçguo Huanjing Kexue Chubanshe, 1992). 604. to the State Co~ncil.~~The former parent rninistry was then renamed the Ministry of Constmction.
By 1992, concomitant organizationai changes in the localities had stiii not been universally implernented." This was probably due in most places to the resistance of those vested interests, as documented below. who generally acted as brakes on the impiementation process: municipal economic ministries and less-than-committed mayors. Nevertheless, those provinces and municipalities which did put the separation of EPBs frorn their parent rninistry into effect did see some improvement in environrnental protection from 1988 on."
No major national reorganization of environrnental protection work directly affecting local units occurred between 1988 and 1992. In early 1992 an Environmentai Protection Advisory
Council. cornprised of sixteen scholars and other specialists hired by the NEPA was formed to advise poticy makers." But this semi-institutionalized consultation was not slated to be copied at the local level despite the fact that. to varying degrees. i»tformaI consultations were already cornmonplace at al1 levets.
As mentioned above, the NEPA in 1992 did not have full rank as a national ministry and reponed direaly to the State Council and the SCCEP. Its responsibilities included supervision and management of environrnental protection at a general level coordination of environrnental protection
'"t is ody at this point that this author will refer to the national organization as an agency (as opposed to bureau). Local units will still be referred to as bureaus. There is no such distinction in Chinese with the word jzi. usually translated as bureau. used both before and after 1988.
''ZHB. 8 October 1992. 2.
75 Ibid. With respect to Xiamen, for example. 1988 was the year that a notable increase for the fundinç of Yuan Dang Lake's clean up took place. Zhang Luoping (Assistant Research Fellow at Center for Environmental Science Research, Xiamen University). personai communication with author. January 1994. A number of other factors, of course. also contributed to this developrnent.
''Huaniine Baohu Environmental Protection]. no. 10 (October 199 1). 1S. translated in JPRS EN 92-007, 1 5 April 1992, 1O. units within rnost rninistries, and the setting of overall policies and regdations which affect provincial and municipal bureaus. In short. it was to emphasize macroscopic leadership (zhoizg hottggtar> ii~gdc~o)."Practical work was left to local govemments and the departments associated with them.
Provincial EPBs are. in theory, given responsibility for implernentation, but do not. under normal circumstances, directly involve themselves in monitoring enforcement. or levy collection.
They are authorized under national law to set poilution standards more strict than national ones for either the province at large or for specific rnunicipalities. They, too. are said to be involved in macroscopic leadership and coordination." Sub-provincial EPB officiais perceive the provincial level in the EPB network as ansxtension of the national level. The province is said to "represent the national level" (claihinogitvia) in their generalized supe~sionof environmental protection work."
Both provincial and municipal EPBs are set up under local Environmental Protection Commissions.
Like their national-level counterpans, these commissions include the heads of al1 relevant ministries at that level. and in theory at least. are supposed to resolve inter-agency disputes. Generally led at the municipal Ievel by deputy mayors, Environmental Protection Commissions act as a formal gateway to actuai implementation efforts such as standards enforcement.
It is important to note that this macroscopic leadership exercised by the provinciai EPB and the NEPA over lower level environmental protection units is in the context of a professionai relationship (zhi dau gziamz). They advise. rather than order. municipal EPBs to act. In contrast, the horizontal relationship between govemment bodies and environmental protection units is a tme leadership relationship (IrirRJao pimxi). Thus, the NEPA is under the cornmand of the state council
"2hongmio Huanjing Guardi Zhidu, 16 1.
7qbid.
79 Interview with Wu Zilin (Director, Xiamen EPB), Xiamen, 8 November 1993. whiie EPBs are subject to the People's Govements at the corresponding level. As Jahiel notes. this is cnticai because regulators must take the government's political concems seriously in the performance of their duties."
Another çateway to local implementation is the municipal budgetary process. The NEPA's budget. which has fallen steadily since the agencyts separation from its parent rninistry in 1988, is spent on national-level initiatives; in China there are r10 large r~aiiornuidemafchingjknd or mbsid-v progrnms admirristered hy the rratiot>nl agerxy. Provinces. similarly, occasionally contribute to certain crucial large-scale proje~ts.~'but do not pay directly for the staffing or operation of municipal or county bureau. These funds must be drawn fiom the coffers of sub-provincial municipal govemments /mg+ at their own initiative. Thus, although for the most part their actuai operations are quite opaque. it is clear that municipal Planning and Economic Cornmittees also play a key role in supporting or thwarting environmental protection in a given locale." In practice. the Standing
Cornmittee of the local People's Govemment, which includes the Mayor. his deputies. and a secretary. are very influential in the activities of municipal govemment committees" and thus are ultimately in control of how much money çets spent on pollution control.
This chapter has suggested that the empiricai context of the politics of China's environment has not been sufficiently explored in published examinations of China's environmentai policies; this longtudinal "on-the-gound" case study will examine that context in Xiamen. This chapter has also
'Ohhiel. Implernentation Throueh Oreanizational Leaminq, 1 5- 16.
ni Interview with Zhao Kerning (Deputy Mayor. Xiamen Municipal Government). Xiamen, 7 January 1994.
"~eeVermeer. "Problems and Abatement Policies," 52-53 on the local organizations involved in environmental protection.
"hterview with Zhao Kerning. 7 January 1994. initiated the examination of that context by briefly outlining the organizational structure of environmental protection in China. The next section of this dissertation proceeds to introduce
Xiamen as the focus of this case study and describe the mixed results of pollution control efforts t here. CEAPTER THREE: XIAMEN AND ITS ENVIRONMENTAL RECORD
1. Introduction - This chapter introduces the site of the case study and examines bnefly the ecological results of pollution control effons there. In short. the mked results of environmental protection in a Chinese coastal province's boom tom are outlined. In addition, the chapter offers some justification for the choice of Xiamen as the focus of the case study.
II. Xiamen: A Bnef Introduction
Xiamen is a coastal city- in the traditionally forestry- and fishing-focused province of Fujian. Anciently. Xiamen was one of China's early trading ports. It is located directly across the Taiwan
Strait kom Taiwan. The old city of Xiamen is found on the southwest corner of Xiamen Island and on Gulang Yu islet. but the Municipality of Xiamen (Xiamrr~Shi) now formally ixîcludes the adjacent mainland areas of Jimei, Xinçlin District and Tong'an county. The main island, less than two kilometres ffom the mainland at its closest point, borders a natural harbour just north of a delta which serves as the rnouth of several southern Fujian rivers. including the Jiulong Jiang. It is connected to the maidand by the Gaoji causeway and, since 199 1, the Xiamen bridge; Gulang Yu islet, a former foreign enclave and hem of Xiamen's tounst trade. is accessible only by ferry. The municipality has a total area of 15 16 square kilometres and a population in excess of 1.1 million, over half of whom live in the city proper (see map, Appendix A).
Xiamen shares with Fujian a subtropical, humid. monsoonal climate with heavy rains and typhoons possible from early summer to autumn. Average temperatures range From five to rhirteen degrees Celsius in January to above thirty degrees in My. Xiamen Island's physical features also mirror in miniature those of the province çeneraliy; narrow plains and farmland are found on the Coast with rugged, scenic mountains and hills further inland. Weather systems generally blow in a southeasteriy direction fiom the Pacific, across Taiwan and the Straits. toward China's southernmost provinces. In effect partially shielded by Taiwan's land mass, Xiamen rarely bears the bmnt of tropical stomwhich generally affect southem Taiwan Guangdong. or the Philippines more directly fkom their origins in the Pacific.
Located as it is on the front hes of the PRC's confrontation with the Guomindang - the island lies ody a few kilornetres fiom the Nationalist-held island of Jinmen (Quemoy) - Xiamen, like much of Fujian province. has histoncally received less than its share of developmental investment. Thus, when two and a half square kilometres of land north of the old city (in Huli) were designated as the
Xiamen Special Econornic Zone in 198 1. municipal officiais charçed with re-establishing the city's roie as a trading centre were constrained by poor infiastmcture. and an outdated, albeit firmly established, industrial base.' Harnpered also by a lack of proximity to Hong Kong - the other three
SEZs are in Guangdong - and the long-time reluctance of ROC officials to allow trade with the mainiand to expand either directly or quickly. the Xiamen SEZ was perceived, both inside and outside
China as lagging behind other booming economic expenments (particularly Shenzhen). In 1985 the
SEZ was expanded to include di of Xiamen island. and freedom to adopt some fiee port policies was introduced. Provincial-level planning (but not budgetary) authority was çranted to the city at this time as well. However. these measures did not have an immediate effect upon Xiamen's relative position among the other Zones.
Notwithstanding these problems in relative terms, Xiamen's absolute economic growth has become quite dynamic. As somr ROC restrictions were relaxed and several key infiastructural
'Elizabeth Cheng, "Waiting for Taiwan, " Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 October 1987. 107-8. problems were overcome. economic growth picked up, albeit in a different direction than planned.
In 1990 the city's total industrial and agricultural output reached 7.18 billion yuan. more than five tirnes that of 1980.' But investment fiom Taiwan came heavily in the chemical industry, not electronics as was originally planned, in part because Taiwan chemical manufacturers were wary of increasing pressure from both their government and the public to reduce pollution.'
This belated economic gowth has chedwith it funher problems which have made it difficult for the city to shed its image as a "distinct laggard"' among the SEZs. Scandals involving hiçh level bribery and corruption. a lack of provincial assistance in infrastructure development. and a conservative Mayor. are al1 said to have contributed to a snubbing by Deng Xiaoping; Xiamen was left off the itinerary during Deng's tour of economic hot spots in early 1992.' This reinforced the already-established perception that Xiamen was not as dynamic as other SUS.
As an SEZ, Xiamen's recent political history is naturally intimately tied to developments in
Beijing. As the vanguards of refom and the units most likely to press for autonomy from the Centre. the special zones bore a double burden; the Centre's expectations for çrowth and their suspicions about potential problems in the zones were both very high. Special Economic Zones, moreover. are not merely rcoi~omic experiments. They are, tacitly at least. test sites for legal reforms and experiments concerning a broad range of public policy issues. The experimental nature of SEZs means that. in theory. the Centre allows to a greater extent and even encourages exploration and
'china Dailv. 1 7 December 199 1. 1 .
'Qi Luo and Chnstopher Howe, "Direct Investment and Economic Integration in the Asia Pacific: The Case of Taiwanese Investment in Xiamen.," The China Ouarterly, no. 13 6 (December 1993). 746- 769, and BR, 27 January L992,2 1-32.
4 Car1 Goldstein, "No Venture, No Gain," Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 Aupst 1992, 25. innovation in policy making. The extent to which this translated into tme autonomy for sub- provinciai localities has been questioned? Xiamea for its part. was granted provincial-level plat~tzi~ig authority in 1989. but did not receive corresponding bridgetmy authority until 1993. These alterations in authority relations thus came later for Xiamen than for some other major municipalities and as a result had little direct impact upon the environmental implernentation story told here. A detailed history of Xiamen's developrnent and general interaction with the Centre is not offered in this study.' National-level political developments are referred to periodicdly throughout this dissertation as appropriate.
Given the description above. Xiamen itself can thus be succinctly characterized as a late blooming corporatist boom tom with an infenority complex; it grew and developed tremendously. especially during the late 1980s and early 1990s. but that growth was aimost always viewed in
Xiamen, Beijing and abroad. in terms relative to the other SEZs and other econornic experiments.'
Xiamen is very much the home of a local "entrepreneurial state" with local officials heavily involved in inf?astructure, trading. and real estate ventures. Taiwanese investment also plays a prominent role.
Xiamen was chosen as the focus of this study for several reasons. A single locality was chosen because the longitudinal approach necessitates the limiting of data in a way other than looking
"ee Paul E. Schroeder. "Temtonal Actors as Cornpetitors for Power: The Case of Hubei and Wuhan." in Lieberthal and Lampton (eds.), Bureaucracv. Politics. and Decision Makinq. 283-307.
'For more on Xiamen's developrnent, see Jude Howell, China Opens Its Doors: The Politics of Econornic Transition (Boulder, CO: Lynne Riemer. 1993); Beiiine Review. 2 February 1992, 1 7-26; and Zhong.wo Jinsii Teau w Yanhai Jingii-- Iishu Kaifa Qu Nianiian ( 1980-89) [Almanac of China's S~ecialEconomic Zones and Coastd Economic and Technolo@calZones ( 1980-8911 (Beijing: Gaige Chubanshe. n-d.).
8 On the intense competition among localities, see Gabriella Montinola, Yingyi Qian. and Barry R. Weingast. "Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China," World Politics, vol. 48, no. 1 (October 1995). 50-8 1. only at a short penod of time. Xiamen in particular was a practicai choice because. as an SEZ, the atmosphere is relatively open. Moreover, the Center for Environmentai Science Research at Xiamen
University (Fujian's only key university), because of its close and cooperative relationship with the local EPB. was an ideal source of support for a research project such as this.
The choice of location cm also be justified methodoloçically. Since SEZs are the areas in which Chinese legal reforms have been most extensive and because they were also the focus of an elite debate regarding the importance of environmentai issue^.^ they represent. in the Chinese context at least. a difficult case in terms of demonstrating this dissertation's thesis reçarding statutes and implementation. That is to Say, one would expect the law çenerally. and environmental matters specincally. to be taken seriously in SEZs. Also. because many firms located there are forript, the old Soviet problem of the reylator and regulated being in the sarne ministry tends to diminish in importance. even before the Chinese central authorities took corrective measures in this regard.
Further. Xiamen's status as an SEZ means that its relationship with the Centre is quite direct.'' Thus. althouçh the province has a role to play in environmental protection, the interaction between the initiators of the exploratory policy and the actual implerfientors can be seen more clearly in this case.
Finally. as suggested above. considerable attention has been paid to developments in Guangdong; this
lester Ross and Mitchel A. SaEnvironmental Law and Poliq in the People's Republic of China (New York: Quorum Books, 1987). 267. That national leaders were particularly concerned about pollution in SEZs was also confirmed in interviews with Xiamen EPB officiais. See also Qu Geping "Strengthening Environmental Management," Zhonemio Huaniine Kexue, vol. 5. no. 6 (December l985), 2-5, translated in PRS-CST-86-0 16-74.
IOSEZs are considered to be directly under the control of the central çovernment. but provincial governrnents have resisted total central domination of economic experiments and windfalls and have thus retained influence on SEZs within their temtory. The provincial role in environmental work is explained elsewhere in this dissertation. Economic flairs of the Xiamen SE2 were under provincial administration until 1984. See Jude Howell, "The Impact of the Open Door Policy on the Chinese State." 134, in White, ed., The Chinese State in the Era of Economic Reform. study seeks to expand the basis of cornparison of environmental implementation by examining another
location,
II Initial Conditions
Although hard data on environmentai conditions in Xiamen in the early 1980s are difficult to
corne by. initial research efforts by the research institute of the local Environmental Protection Office
(and others) did make clear the diflicult situation faced by local cadres as pollution control efforts got
under way. For example. in 1980 Professor Wang Huadong of Beijing Normal University was asked
to conduct a large-scale survey of Yun Dang Lake and pollution sources in Xiamen." This was the
first of several scientific evaluations of what was clearly a serious problem. It was reponed that more
than one hundred and forty enterprises were poliuting Yun Dang Lake on Xiamen Island and that two
thirds of the five tons of poisonous liquid waste that flowed into Xiamen harbour daily originated in
Yun Dang Lake." The seriousness of this situation caught the attention of city and provincial
officials. '' At the behest of the Xiamen Party cornmittee and the local People's Governrnent, further
analysis of the lake's water quaiity was undertaken by a çroup comprised of scientists from Xiamen
University. the municipal Science Commission, and the Fujian Marine Institute."
Other studies were also initiated around this the. The Number Three Marine Institute of the
State Marine Bureau commissioned a survey team to make a comprehensive study of Xiamen's marine
------
"Interview with Lin Hanzong (Xiamen EPB official). 6 January 1994.
"tbid. and XRB, 26 March 1980, 2. The attempt to rectify this serious situation is treated in Chapter Seven.
"Interview with Lin Hanzong. 6 January 1994.
'%RB, 1 1 June 1980, 1. environment. This major research project's completion was scheduled for 1985." The Fujian Marine
Institute began a study of Wu Tong Harboufs ecological environment whde the city's own monitoring station initiated an autumn air pollution survey. The Municipal Hygiene and Disease Prevention
Station conducted an investigation conceming the relationship between air pollution intensity and lung cancer and found a greater incidence of lung cancer deaths in the most heavily populated areas. l6
The provincial EPB was aiso very much involved in this initial survey work. In mid- 1982 they launched a survey of pollution sources in nine locations province-wide. The purpose of this undertaking was "to gain an overall understanding of the main causes of pollution in Fujian. the main pollutants. the pollution sources, the pollution system and the polluted areas"17 for the purposes of formulating the sixth FYP and for reference in pollution control. Large- and medium-sized enterprises above the county level were the primary targers. Arnong others, enterprises which had ignored the .smt~tigshi'~requirement and those which had been the source of public complaints would be çiven particular attention. The Fujian EPB was assisted in the work by experts from the
Chinese Environmental Sciences Academy and endeavoured to establish files on pollution sources.
In 1982 a work conference held in Xiamen on environrnental protection efforts examined the then-mounting evidence that Xiamen's ecological conditions were extremely poor. As well. responsibilities or goals for environmental protection for the sixth FYP ( 198 1- 1985) were. somewhat belatedly, outlined. Among the goals were to hold pollution in check sufficiently to maintain 198 1
"XRB. 13 August 1980. 1; and XRB, 4 September 1980, 1.
"Fujian Ribao [Fuiian Daily], 10 May 1992. 2 cited in PRS 8 1 73 7-0 10 1
"This term refers to the "three sychronizations" policy adhered ?O in China which asserts that environrnental concems mua be addressed in the planning, construction, and operation of enterprises. levels and to undertake the comprehensive clean-up of Yun Dang Lake in order to produce a "flower garden" (hrrayi~an)condition within ten years. No new specific measures to accomplish this latter goal were announced at this pariicular conference.lg The fact that even at this early date officiais merely sought to avoid an increase in pollution levels indicates some recognition of the seriousness of the problems.
Speaking to the conference delegates, Deputy Mayor Chen Zhihan indicated (vayely) that althouçh Xiamen had had a "çood start" (lianghao de kaidtran) to its environmentai protection efforts. there were still problems. In his view. these were due to the recent rapid development of industry and agriculture and the accompanying increase in pollution. Moreover. he mentioned that induanal construction in the past recognized insufficiently the dangers of poll~tion.'~Paradoxicdly. this official seemed to be condemning the poorly-informed decisions of the past while at the sarne time implying that increased pollution mirsr corne with economic development. His attitude thus implicitiy contlicts with the above-stated officia1 goal to maintain 198 1 pollution levels in Xiamen.
It aiso is a clear indication of early recognition of serious pollution problems in Xiamen.
IV. Mixed Results in Pollution Control
This section documents Xiamen's mixed efforts in pollution control through reference to provincial and municipal air and water qudity statistics (and other environmental indicators). Even though Xiamen was able to comply with lower level state air pollution standards, air quaiity in
Xiamen declined over the period under midy; at the same time, industrial air emissions were reduced.
Efforts to clean up Xiamen's number one water pollution problem yielded disappointing results as the
'9XRB,2 May 1983, 1.
"Ibid. number of poliuting factories rose. Nevertheless. water emissions of rnost pollutants fell in "per unit of economic output" temover the period under study. These trends. however. did not become clear until the latter part of the 1980s.
By rnid-decade officials had become less hesitant about releasing data on pollution control efforts, though they naturally tned to minirnize the seriousness of the situation when making public announcernents. Since the release of environmental data in China is still considered sensitive. official interpretations of statistics and statistical methods themselves are manipulated for maximum public relations benefit. An exarnple of optirnistic interpretation and selective presentation occurred when personnel from the Environmental Protection Commission of the Xiamen People's Governent as well as persons from the local EPB held a news conference on the day pnor to the Earth Day celebrations in 1986. This had become an annual event. Huang Jinshenç. a member of the local
Environmental Protection Commission. va yely reported that despite industrial and agricultural gowth during 1985 in excess of 40 percent. measures had been taken to ensure that Xiamen's air and water quality. etc.. were "basicaiiy under control" Orben dedao kotlgzhi).
In tems of air poliution, it was reported that eighty polluting boilers had been brought under control and that this represented 98 percent of those subject to regulation. Levels of coal dust in the air were said to be falling as a result.
Finally, Huang reported that a provincial-municipal limited period clean-up program was canied out better than sirnilar progams had been in the past. ïhe provincial EPB had issued clean-up orders to four particularly serious water polluters and three had cornpleted the work on tirne. The founh. a sugar factory. had not complied "due to fûnding problems" 0)it1zijir~ werlii). Of twenty- eight factories ordered by the city to take measures against dust or noise pollution, twenty-three had complied in time and the others were still working on it (hui zat zhili). Huang also wamed that the trend toward interisrfed pollution of the western marine district (Xiamen Harbour) must be addressed.
Optimistic public pronouncernents on Earth Day belied a gowing recognition that the environmental situation in Xiamen was not improvinç. In April of 1986. the city government held a meeting to discuss deploying an inspection of pollution sources. The imminent inspections were to be conducted because of the state's desire for a country-wide. systernatic pollution source inspection. The meeting discussed the fact that due to the irrational industrial layout of the city, incomplete planning in construction projects. and im.wrnp/efe mrm~stu irisprcr ad conrrol di.5:charge.s.the pollution situation in Xiamen had reached. in their words, historie proportiom. In other words. conditions had worsened since early in the decade. Despite the effons of every level of governrnent to take effkctive measures in the first halfof the 1980s. the pollution situation was still considered to be quite serious. Moreover. the requirements of environmentai legislation, the meeting concluded. had not been met." Similady. a discussion meeting held by local cadres in conjunction with science and technology month emphasized that even though many rules, reçulations, and laws had been passed, there was insufficient strength for enforcement (zhifa liiiang brrm) and some laws had become mere formatities vapi li~cyrtrxitlgshi)." Laws regarding maritime pollution. for example. were systematically and openly içnored."
Despite these problems. some figures on pollution levels in Xiamen and general environmental work in Fujian were made available starting in the mid- 1980s. These more clearly reveaied pollution
%RB. 10 Apnl 1986. 1.
"XRB. 1 1 July 1986. 3.
"XRB. 3 February 1986. 1. Control of polluting marine vessels requires the cooperation of many agencies; the local EPB is only a minor player in pollution control at sea. trends and levels in Xiamen. For example. a 1983 survey of air pollution sources in Xiamen showed that industrial sources were responsible for about 60 percent of Xiamen's air pollution load. It also demonstrated that the principal poiiutants included sulfur dioxide. nitrogen oxides. carbon monoxide. and srnoke (see Table 3.1). The total annual industrial pollution load was over 21.000 tomes?
TABLE 3.1
A COMPARISON OF THE COMPOSITION OF AIR POLLUTION FROM VARIOUS SOURCES IN XIAMEN IN 1983 (%)
POLLUTANT
SOURCE SU, EiO, CO HC SMOfCE DUST TOTAL 1- 1 Inciustniil 3 1 .Y4 16 55 3.36 O. 48 26.76 20.77 59.40
(Tail Ciris) O X.02 O 1 2.62 Hrw.;ehrdd 16.81 3.94 24.72 0.39 54.04 2-3.45
Trafic 1.94 30.38 57.23 17.1
CITY Tc ITAL 23-24 15.96 17.G 1 0.40 28.57 12.34 102 source: Zhuang, "Air Pollution in the Xiamen Special Zone," 17.
Several important studies of Xiamen's ecological situation referred to earlier concluded and brought fonvard their reports in this sarne period. For exarnple, a Xiarnen international airpon environmental impact assessrnent and forecast study that was initiated in 1982 was finally completed in late 1987." Similarly. a state-cornmissioned inspection of industrial pollution sources in Xiamen
"Zhuang Shijian. "Xiamen Tequ Daqi Wuran Tezheng ji Chengyin Fenxi" ["An Analysis of the Characteristics and Causes of Air Pollution in the Xiamen Special Zone"]. Fujian Huanjing [Fujian's Environment]. no. 4 (December 1985). 17.
%RB. 1 1 November 1987, 1. concluded in mid-1987 and subsequently received state approvd.'6 Nthough the perhaps disappointing results of this survey were not included in newspaper accounts. the exercise must have been a usefil information-gathering event; the inspection involved forty departments of the local governrnent, 649 units. and over 2,000 people.
Some of the reports emerging in the Iate 1980s provided longitudinal data and thus reveaied important trends. For exampie. reports on environmental quaiity durinç this period did present some evidence that air quality in Xiamen was improving." In 1984 the city estabiished a pian to create a
"smoke-free zone" (MI hriym yrr) and by 1988 had renovated about 300 of the city's boilers. about half of which were now within national standards. Through this and other varied efforts at implementing the "Methods for Preventing Atmospheric Pollution" and the later national law on the sarne subject. most regions of the city were in cornpliance with national air quality standards by 1988.
Gulaqy Islet in particular had maintained a "level one" standard. while the more industrial Xinglin
Diaria maintained lower "level two" requirernents.'8 Xiamen's coastal island çeoçraphy (descnbed earlier) and success in attracting industries not known for heavy air pollution no doubt assisted in these accomplishments. but they are notewonhy nevertheless.
Aiso notewonhy is the fact that the more vexinç water pollution problems in the city did not experience similar irnprovement. As mentioned elsewhere, Yun Dang Lake's poor situation still had not been resolved. Further. drinkinç water sources were becoming polluted fiom industrial waste water and açncultural fertilizer~.~The thiny factones in the new Xinçlin District on the mainland
"XRE3.4 June 1987. 1 ; and XRB. 29 July 1987. 1.
"XRB. 25 November 1988, 1.
'"~bid.
'gX~~.5 June 1988. 1. produced about half of al1 of Xiamen's water pollution load in 1988. In part because improved infrastructure had not yet been built by the city, damage fiom water pollution was particularly noticeable. Losses in fishing and agiculture in areas adjacent to the northern marine district were obsewed.' Economic and technological problems of the polluting enterprises were also considered
to be part of the problem.
Perhaps the biggest contnbuting factor to the poor situation in Xinglin, however. was poor
municipal planning. In response to a reporter's quenes about the quiet and apparently pnstine conditions in the Huli Industriai District (located on Xiamen island and doser to the city proper), an
EPA official and city planners explained some extensive revisions to the city's comprehensive construction plan. In consultation with foreign experts. it had been decided to place seriously polluting heavy industries in the Xinglin District on the mainland (dao waz)." As pollution levels in adjacent waters and "disputes" (iitrfrn) over Xinglin problems increased, however, representatives of the local People's Congess recogiized the effects of this decision. The situation, it was said, was one which "demanded immediate attention" (kr b11rot1ghmn). although no specific proposais were immediately put forward.
Progress wav made later towards controlling the effects of the decision to concentrate heavy polluters in the mainland Xinglin Industrial District. By mid-1989 both a feasibility study and a program for building a pollution treatment plant in Xinglin had been approved by the Municipal
Planninç Commission. The facilities were to be built in two phases (of unspecified duration) and
'", 25 Auçust 1988. 1
"ZHB, 23 Apnl 1988, 1. would, when complete, "basically solve" the area's water treatment problems for the foreseeable
fiitu~e.~'
It is not surprising that the Xinglin are& as home to a new zone specifically for Taiwanese
investors. would receive some attention at this point. This zone and another in Haicang were
established in May 1989 especially for Taiwan "cornpatriots." Provins to be much less preoccupied
with Tiananmen than Westerners, Taiwanese businessmen Aocked to the new zones and were
responsible for the vast majority of Xiamen's new investment in 1989.~~~y the end of 1990 the
number of Taiwan-invested enterprises in Xiamen reached 420, up from 300 less than a year earlier."
The total number of foreigi-fùnded enterprises now qassed 1 100. These figures are included here
to demonstrate that as efforts to control environmental pollution seemingly intensified. so too did
efforts to attract foreign investment .
Another useful indication of the difficulties experienced by officiais in maintaining water quality is their constant revision (in a downward direction) of seemingly modest water quality goals.
The provincial bureau set several general objectives in 1989 to be reached in terms of marine
environmental protection by 1992. Their basic, and rather modest, goal was to "work hard to
control" (lizht'ngkot~gzhi) the trend toward marine ecological damage and to try to maintain harbour environmental quality at 1987 levels." A more specific objective was to restore ecoloçical balance
to several polluted harbours; Xiamen harbour was among those named.36
- . -- --
%U3. 6 Auçust 1989. 1.
"'Howell, China Opens Its Doors, 162.
"PRs-CAR-91-030, 30 May 199 1, 76; and PRS-CAR-90-048. 5 July IWO, 66
"ZHB, 10 October 1989. 1.
-''1bid. TABLE 3.2 FUJIAN PROVLNCIAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATISTICS 1981-1989
TndustriYI waste wa4er cmissiartg (10000 tonnes)
Waste water emb~iorwper IO@o *oiuiu doutput (ORILQS)
Atmasphcrt emissions (IOMû mJ)
Soot (tonnes) Poilution chan-up fund (x 1~00 yuan)
Compkîed constru4oa source: Zhongmo Huajing Nianiian ( 1990). 336.
Table 3.2 shows key provincial environmental statistics for the penod 198 1 to 1989. Note especially the second row indicating emissions per unit of industrial output. Fluctuations in these numbers may be caused more by changes in output and poor gathering of statistics than by changes in EPA efforts. Howrvrr, both air and water emissiom (rows om adthrrr) ~~~~~~trafe a ciw upwmd netid The table. tellingly. does not reveal what portion of these effluents are treated. Also notewonhy is the sharp increase in the provincial pollution clean-up fùnd. This may be the result of a switch tiom gants to repayable loans as the method for drawing frorn the fund. It may also reflect a preoccupation with increased fee collection, which, Sinkule has argueci, constitutes a diversion away from the organizational goal of pollution control.
The table indicates as well that provincially. air emissions nearly doubled between 1983 and
1989. The total tonnage of water emissions. in contrast. increased by less than 50 percent over an even longer period. Trends in Xiamen were somewhat different. As described befow, industrial air emissions stabilized over time. while water emissions saw steady growth. Xiamen's water pollution problerns were directly tied to the growth of industry around Yun Dang Lake (see Chapter Seven).
Chinese officiais also cite statistics on enforcernent efforts as "evidence" of environmental progress. Wu Ziiin, Deputy Director of the Xiamen EPB in 1989. sumrned up the results and effects of a decade of laws. decrees. policies. and regulations in Xiamen." He said that al1 medium- and large-scale enterprises had made environmental impact assessments and adhered to the "three simultaneous" policy." Very few enterprises refused to pay effluent fee~.'~About 100 enterprises had cornpleted EPB-mandated limited period clean-up projects within the allotted time.
Wu reponed that by late 1989 the pollution permit systern was being implemented in Xiamen such that major polluters of Yun Dang Lake and Xiamen harbour (constituting 80 percent of the city's pollution load) were required to apply for a discharge li~ense.~'Proçress was also being made on
"Wu. "To Protect a Developing City." 9-10.
38 Actually. according to newspaper accounts. some major projects were able to circumvent this latter requirement. Nevertheless. it seems accurate to report that many projects filfilied these requirements in at least a formalistic way.
'9~snoted above. the Number Two Chemical Factory was one exception to this.
wu. "To Protect a Developing City." 9. The system was. in fact, applied in ody a very tentative and limited way. See Chapters Four and Five below. water treatment infrastructure in Huli and ~in~lin."This apparent progress on an experimental system and projects not yet cornpleted belied a continued scarcity of harsh enforcernent of current regulations. The cumulative total number of enterprises which had been fined for violation of regulations during the decade was "more than ten.""
Althouçh some air pollution indicators revealed improvement since the establishment of the
SEZ. in seneral officials reponed that they were merely able to "basicaily maintain" the environmental quality of the area over this penod. In faa, overali air quality had declined since 1988 and Yun Dang
Lake. despite slight improvement in water quality (see below). still carried an offensive odour. The main reason for this latter problern. accordinç to local news repons, was the non-stop growth of lakeside factones O?a,ihtr gotigchaj~gbu Jnar~faiha,~)."
Nevert heless. several true accomplishments in environmental quality could be observed in
Xiamen by the tum of the decade. For example. it was reported in 1990 that over 3 5 percent of the city's waste water was now treated. Within China, this was considered an advanced level? By year's end. fifiy-nine water polluting enterprises had been issued permits and thus had become. in theory. subject to control throuçh quotas. Ten electroplating factones had either stopped production. changed their product. or moved. And the coastal red tide problem so worrisome in earlier years had abat ed.
As noted with respect to air poliution above. a smoke-fke control zone progam yielded quick results. Dozens of coal-powered boiiers were renovated with the effect that air quality reached "level
"W.6 June IWO. 1. See Chapter Six.
"WU. "To Protect a Developing City." 10.
"XRB. 6 June IWO. 1.
U~bid. one" standards in severai areas. A nurnber of polluting factories were removed from Gulangyu Islet.
The smoke-free zone was expanded to cover 86 percent of Xiamen Island. The daily average of
suspendeci partinilate rnatter per square meter was now a respectable 0.082 rnilligrams. and sulphur dioxide levels averaçed 0.0 13 rnilligrams per square meter."
Despite this publicly reported progress. however. old challenges remained as the 1990s dawned and some new problems seemed to be emerging. For example. acid rain was becoming more serious and expenenced over a wider ares? DNiking water quaiity at several intake points remained extremely poor. The air in the city proper was still reasonably polluted. owing in part to small enterprises in residential diarias and the use of coai burning stoves by the city's growing population.
Provincial progress as of 1990 can also be gauged statisticaily. What was clear in Fujian's
1990 statistics was that whiie modest reductions in the arnount of air ernissions was a discernable trend. waste water emissions. in general. continued to grow. Conditions in the province thus came to mirror more closely Xiamen's own trend.
"Ibid., and Xiamen Shi Huaniing Zhiliane Baoeaoshu. 1986- 1990 [City of Xiamen Environmental Ouality Report. 1986-19901 (Xiamen: Xiamen Shi Huanjing Baohu Ju, 199 1). These levels are lower than levels for a sirnilar penod in Guangzhou. for example. See Lo, "Environmental Management by Law," 56 (Table 3). TABLE 3.3
FUJIAN PROVINCIAL INDUSTRIAL WAS'IXWATER EFFLUENT, 1988-1990
Pcrcentage Inetease fmm Unit tg89 1990 Prtviws Year I I I I Total IEndPstrid Wastewater s 1O000 tonnes 10085 1 108 129 7.22
Industriai Wastewater Efnuent in s 10000 tonna 22337 23288 2.27
source: Zhonwo Huan-iinij Nin-iian ( 199 1). 33 1.
It can be calculated fiorn the table above that the overall percermge of wastewater treated
çrew by 2.7 percent fiom 1989 to 1990. At the same time, the overall volume of effluent grew by
more than 7 percent. This suggests that the construction of new treatment facilities was just able to
keep ahead of the rather considerable çrowth in effiuent tonnage. Meanwhile, nearly every cateçory
of air pollution declined in absolute terms over the same period." The differing provincial trends
between air and water pollution reflect, in addition to ecoloçical factors. the differences in expense
and sophistication required in treating the two types of pollution. It may also reflect the fact that
water pollution is more likely to occur in the production processes of cost-sensitive joint or foreign
enterprises.
But the trend of declining air pollution emissions in Fujian also stands in contrast to overall air pollution trends in Xiamen. It was reported above that in 1989 Xiamen's air quality was within urban requirements, but had fallen in cornpanson to 1988. This decline in air quality continued into
"~hongg.~oHuanjing Nianiian ( 199 1 ), 33 1. the early 1990s. Although in 1990 the Xiamen air quality managed to maintain "level one" standards
according to nate regulations,'8 by 1991 only "level two" standards were attak~ed.'~Thus. while
Xiamen's air quality was generally good, it was not improving in step with the apparent provincial
trend. However, reported ittdzistricrl air pollution emissions declined by nearly 4 percent in 199 1.
Thus. Xiamen's worsening air quality can largely be explained by the use of coal for household
heating and cooking among the gowing population and the local EPBs relative preoccupation with
water pollution and Yun Dang Lake; growing iridt~strialair ernissions did not appear to be the
principal cause of this worrying trend.
In Xiamen water pollution was clearly the main concem of the municipal EPB. As Table 7.1
indicates. the water quality of Yun Dang Lake çenerally declined throughout the 1980s. Isolated
efforts to improve water quality can be noted. For example, a power plant responsible for over a
third of the distnct's waste water took a number of innovative measures to bring its pollution under
control. Among these seps was an initiative to provide waste coal ash to another factory for use as
raw material in briquette production. Another exarnple was continued progress on, and investment
in water treatment facilities scheduled for completion in 1993. These facilities. once finished, would
allow most of the distnct's waste water to be treated before release into the harbour.
'%amen Shi hua ni in^ Zhiliane Bao~aoshu.1991 [City of Xiamen Environmental Ouality Repon, 19911 (Xiamen: Xiamen Shi Huanjing Baohu Ju, 1992). 73; and Zhon euo Huarjine Nidian ( 1992). 394. In 199 1, some of the city's most prolific polluters, including the suçar factory and the power plant. took remediai measures. The result was, according to official NEPA sources, "a drastic reduction in the city's pollution load" (Jorlojimzshao s-ir Je wtrra~zfi~he).'O
An explanation for such a bold statement may be found in the fact that this progress was expressed in officiai statistics as a dramatic drop in waste water tonnage per 10.000 ylrm of it~&irstriu/otirpt. in 1990 the recorded waste water emissions in Xiamen amounted to 5 1.98 tonnes per ten thousand yuan of output. In 1991 this figure dropped to 27.94. Reported air ernissions dropped in similar proportions." This method of tying progress in environmental protection to statistics on economic growth figures allows quick economic growth to make environmental progress appear more dramatic than it is in fact. It was not until 199 1 that many earlier foreiçn investments bore fiuit; the figure thus reflects more an increase in industrial output than an improvement in pollution control. Indeed. it cm even be suggested that use of such statistics are indicative of a
"pollute now. pay later" rnentality because they can be used to justiQ pollution in the pursuit of economic growth. Nevertheless, such statistics also reflect the apparently growing Chinese desire to harmonize these objectives. And these specific fiyres do represent a significant achievement, given Xiamen's rapid econornic prowth.
It should be noted too that these tigpres were compiled from information gathered from just over 400 of Xiamen's Iargest enterprises. In 1991 the number of forripl-itivested enterprises operatinç in Xiamen was well over 600. At that time Xiamen had a similar number of domestic enterprises. While obviously not al1 industries pollute, certainly a large number of those which do
"~bid. This characterization of the change. given the statistic cited herein is obviously exaggerated.
''~ao~aoshu.199 1. 20; and Zhonemio Humjing Nianiian ( 1992). 326. escape official supervision and reponing procedures. Indeed. local EPB cadres conceded that there
were too many small enterprises to supervise effectively. Inspection of particular small enterprises
came only after specific public cornplaints." Similarly. while ail new large enterprises are required
to complete full-tledged environmental impact assessments. small ones need only complete an
"environmental impact form" if it is initially known that they will pollute the air or water." Thus.
given the vast number of srnall enterprises, sigruficant environmentai effects are not captured by many
recorded environmental statistics.
Among the factories which nre included in ofidstaiistics. however. the number significantly
contnbuting to Xiamen's pollution problems was quite small. Sixteen pollution sources accounted
for over 90 percent of repotted waste water emissions in 199 1. Table 3.4 profiles their pollution contributions.
"InteMew with Wu Zilin 8 November 1993. Wu also indicated that there was no fixed standard for differentiating between srna11 and large enterprises.
'-%~terviewwith Gao Chengtie (Xiamen EPB). 9 Novernber 1993. TABLE 3.4
PRINCIPAL INDUSTRIAL WASTEWATER POLLUTION SOURCES
Fuctow Nue i i i
Tin Cm Facton.
luRice Rour Mill Sew China Tea haves Roc-ing Plm
FU& Film Company
Cold Siorage Plant
Bcvmge Facton
Factorv
Peoples Lumk Slill
Candicd Fruit Ptünt source: Baopaoshu. 199 1, 22.
The situation for air pollution was even more stark. As indicated in Table 3.5. the Xiamen
Power Plant total emissions exceeded by a considerable amount the total emissions of the fourteen next most serious polluters combirrd TABLE 3.5
PRINCIPAL INDUSTFCIAL AIR POLLUTION SOURCES AND POLLUTANTS
unit: tonnedyear
SCWChina Cilÿss Fadorv
Fu& Photographie Matcrids Company Limitcd
Xiamen Teailes
Xiamen Ini. C'hrmical Company
source: Baoeaoshu, 199 1, 24. Tables 3.4 and 3.5 also shed some light on the difficulties faced by the local EPB. Although
the relatively small number of prolific polluters means that just a few plant closures may bring
dramatic improvements in air or water quality. the nature of these enterprises generally inhibits such
action because of economic and political factors. The major source of air pollution is the SU's major
source of electric power. Thus renovations. rather than closure, have been the only real option. This
is expensive given the outdated nature of the plant. Two of the top three water polluters produce
products for which (in present-day Xiamen, at least) there are no practical alternative sources. The
Hua Xia Foodstuffs factory, on the other hand, is a foreign-invested enterprise which was treated
gingerly at first but was eventually closed for a period of time (see Chapters Four and Five). Clearly.
where many big polluters are either essential industries (power. cement. or sugar, for example) or are
longsought foreign investment projects (Hua Xia and Fuda among the more notable). the leaders of the growth-oriented entrepreneurial state will be reluctant to opt for harsh enforcement measures.
At the provincial level. too, the official press reported that vigorous economic growth and the attraction of foreign investment were causing environmental problems to become "more and more prominent."" Yet official statistics reveal that in 199 1 air. water. and solid waste pollution levels. in per unit of industrial output terms, dropped in nearly every region of the province. Only solid waste pollution production in Fuzhou and Ningde District increased over 1990 level^.'^ Again, rapid industrial growth was, in a way. masking increased pollution output through these statistics.
A final caution is in order regarding the statistics cited above. Township and village enterprises have rarely been subject to environmental regulations or statistical analysis. A summary
5'~~~.18 April 199 1. 1.
55~honermoHuanjing Nianiian ( 1992). 325. of environmentai protection work in Fujian mentions that a poltution source survey for township and village enterprises was conducted in May 199 1 ." The statistics gathered through this survey indicated more about the breadth of this rural economic phenornenon than they did about pollution control. Over 17.000 induanal enterprises with a total output value of 4 billion yuan were inspected.
Local municipalities used the survey information to establish "pollution source files" on these enterprises, but no ongoing enforcement efforts or aggregate pollution output statistics were reported publicly. It is evident that efforts to curb this prominent and gowinç environmental threat (which is not captured in the general environmental statistics cited above) were at a very preliminary stage.
In sum. Xiamen's environmental conditions reveai that pollution control efforts have been rnixed: they Vary with respect to type of pollutant and over tirne. Succinctly put. despite continued pro blems with Yun Dang Lake and other water bodies. a variety of efforts on air pollution control yielded respectable levels of 0.092 mg/m3 for particulate matter and 0.014 rng/m3 for sulfur dioxide as of 1992.'' It is aiso clear from the foregoing that tremendous change in environmentai protection work had occurred since it was first established in Xiamen in the Iate 1970s. For example, air pollution was basically under control, and initiatives to control water pollution were the focus of environmental efforts by the late 1980s. However, bits to these changes were equally clear.
Declining water quality, for example, could not be hidden by computations which gauged emissions in relation to industrial output. h the early 1990s Xiamen remained under the burden of severe (and in some cases ir?crrasi,i& severe) environmental problems.
"1bid. The fi yre for particulate matter. for example, falls only marginally above the range suggestd by the World Health Organization as acceptable. See Lieberthal, Govemin~China, 277. CHAPTER FOUR: THE TRlAL LAW AND LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION
1. Introduction
This chapter and the one which foUows outhe the generai provisions and revisions of China's
environmental laws and regulations. They also descnbe how Xiamen officials responded to these
national initiatives. It will be suggested that progress was made predominantly on those aspects of
law and policy that required less organizationai and political strength to implement. Scientific
research and public relations activities were particularly conspicuous. Because of its rather generd
nature. the trial "Environmental Protection Law of the PRC" of 1 979 functioned. in effect. along with many other orders. proclamations. regulations and announcernents. as propaganda desiçned to mobilize officials (and others) to action on environmental issues. Codification in law served to reinforce or claritjl other directives on the subject. Only in the late 1980s and early 1990s did specific regulatory standards and favourable political conditions allow somr reylatory supervision and judicial action to occur. However. Chapter Five will show that enforcernent under the revised 1989 national law was still selective and was limited pnmmily by a lack of personnel and by the economic development focus ofthe local governrnent. Not only was the letter of the law violated, but its spirit was frequently ignored as well.
The present chapter also depicts how Xiamen officiais were, over time. discouraged fiom making local innovations in environmental law by the tendency of the Centre to alter their initiatives.
This was possible not only because of the extensive consultations sought in the legislative process. but also because of the ability of higher levels to issue superseding laws and regulations. This chapter also shows how public pressure contributed significantly to those enforcement eRons which did occur. II. The Trial Law and Its Afterrnath
The PRC's trial law on environrnental protection, promulgated on 13 Septernber 1979, functioned to dlow the local govemment a better, if still quite generai. understanding of how the central govemment intended for thern to approach local problems in the wake of original organizational activities. The law. which was issued without detailed regulations, technical standards, or even a specific inteçrated national network for implementation, indicated that State Council departments adlocal people's çovernments at every level must take steps to ensure environmental protection. It also stipulated that environrnental factors were to be considered and carried out in econornic development plans.
The law also stated that renovation or construction projects must have an environmental impact assessrnent repon reviewed by the department concerned before work could beçin and that environrnental considerations must be included in the design, construction, and operation phases of al1 projects. This latter provision was aimed at codifjing one of the earliest PRC poiicies in the environrnental issue area: the "three synchronizations" system (saritor~p-hizhidn).' Units already ernitting pollutants were wamed that "whoever has caused the pollution must bring it under control,"' and that effluent fees will be assessed on polluters that exceed state standards.
Finally, the trial law explained that the duties of local bureaus and other environmental orçanizations included the following:
'On the general history of this concept and its application in Chinese environmental protection. see Zhongguo Huaniine Guanli Zhidu, 34-46.
'Ross and Silk, Environmental Law and Policy, 286. check and supe~sethe implementation by various departments and units in the area under iheir jurisdiction of the state principles, policies, laws and decrees concerning environmentai protection; draft standards and desfor local environrnental protection; organize monitoring and surveyïng of the environment; have a good understanding of environmental conditions and their developing trends in their areas; formulate long- term and annual plans for environmental protection in their areas and supervise their implementation; organize scientific research on the environment and the conduct of education in this regard; actively populacize advanced experience and technolog acquired at home and abroad.'
Local government departments. large and medium-sized enterprises. and other units were charçed with orçanizing for environmental protection as they saw fit. but were reminded that. as orçans of the state, they were responsible for protecting the environment in their own systems. depmments or
units. To this end, polluting units could be criticized, wamed, fined or ordered to pay compensation. but only with the approval of the local people's government. Individual criminal responsibility could be assessed upon individuals causing injury or death through environmental damage. Unspecified cornmendations or rewards for notable achievements in environrnental protection could be offered by the State.'
Mer the approval in pnnciple of the trial law by the Standing Cornmittee of the Fifth NPC. a copy of the Conmittee's order stating that the law was now in effect, dong with the text of the law itself, appeared without cornmentary on the fiont page of the Xiamen ~aily.'Two days later an article in the same paper. based on an interview by a Xhrhiia reporter with a cadre fiom the office of the SCEPLSG. was published. The official stated that in order for environmental protection work to be done well. three things were necessary. First. leadership at dl levels must handle the relationship between economic development and environmental protection weli. Second.
- -- - .%id.
'Ibid., 290.
'XRB. 17 September 1979, 1 responsibility for environmental offenses must be strictly enforced according to the Iaw. Third, the masses mus be mobilized and public supervision of units and individuals which hmthe environment rnust be accepted!
These early musings by a national leader about the necessary conditions for successful implementation proved prophetic in a way since Xiamen's later designation as an SE2 brouçht economic development to the forefiont and a lack of confidence about the couns' attitude toward environmental protection fcoupled with a lack of technical standards) ensured that legal recourse was unthinkable in the first severai years fier the law was passed. Only the third criterion, that the public be involved, received discernable attention fiom the start.
The first way in which the public was involved in environmental protection was as the target of a campaign designed to increase awareness about the new law and environmental protection
çenerally. The office of the SCEPLSG decided in late February of 1980 to designate March of that year as "environmental protection propaganda month." The purpose of the campaign was to spread the word about the newly-enacted law and to increase recognition of the importance of environmental protection among the masses and among ieaders ut rvery Ie~el.~
The response in Xiamen was delayed, but not insignificant. When the Xiamen City
Revolutionary Committee opened a conference on environmental protection later in the spnng. it declared that starting immediately. an "environmental protection propaganda month" would begin.
It was resolved that dunng the month of Apnl five tasks should be accomplished. First, each unit should assign a member of its leadership to take charge of environmental education and propaganda.
'XRB, 19 September 1979, 1.
'~honewoHuaniing Nianjian ( 1992). 598. emphasis added. Second. each county, district. bureau and unit must evaluate their environmental situation and formulate an environmental plan. Third, in accordance with economic law, the protection of the environment must be integrated with econornic management by ensuring that the "three synchronizations" policy be followed and the "three wastes" be handled welL8 ~ourth,legal ideas must be strengthened and environmental regulations must be formulated. Fif'th. monitoring and research must also be strengthenedV9
While this was a ta11 order to be accomplished through a campaiçn in one month. the basic task - to initiate basic public awareness - seerns to have been accomplished. Moreover. the campaign set the tone for annual "Earth Day" activities which later emerged as highlights of local propaganda efforts. '"
While eariy orçanizational, propaganda, and survey activities took place, actual clean-up or enforcement efforts were usually undenaken only after public corn plaint^.^' In 1980. the number of letters to the editor of the local paper about poor environmental conditions was allowed to increase.
The appearance of such letten in the party-controlled press normally indicates both official acceptance of the problem and that help may well be on the way.
One residents' association complained of widespread health pro blerns related to waste emitted from a nearby electroplatinç factory and dust ernitted from a car factory. They said that they hoped
K The "three wastes" are liquids. gases. and solids. Earlier industrial policies in China called for effective utilization and conservation of these materials.
9XR~.18 April 1980. 1.
'%terview with Lin Hanzong, 6 January 1994.
"Interview with Gao Chengtie. 7 October 1993. cadres in relevant departments were concemed about the suffenng of the masses and would fidy implement the Environmental Protection Law that had been enacted by the State."
In response to chlorine emissions from the Xiamen Electrochemicd Factory. one letter from students at Xiamen Nurnber Nine Middle School urged action in polite. but stronç language: "We intensely request relevant departments to take measures irnmediately to stop industrial pollution which senously hamthe physical health of the masse^."'^ Clearly. the publicity concerninç the passing of the national law had either helped residents feel more justified in complaining or at least given local officialsthe courage and confidence to publish the complaints.
Factory managers. perhaps in response to urçing from the Environmental Protection Office or higher officials, did respond to some such complaints. The electrochernical facto-. for example. responded to earlier complaints by publishing a letter which explained their problems and outlined current and planned pollution control measures at the factory. They indicated that they "accept the criticism of t he masses. " IJ
City officials are also reporteci to have taken action as the result of public complaints. During an inspection of public sanitation by city officials, some citizens made complaints about plugged sewer lines and resulting pollution problems. Inspectors investigated the cause of the problem and quickly took corrective action?
That only the most severe, most noticed, most complained-about. or most easily-solved problems received attention ar this point is not surprising given the small staff and the research
'%RB. 25 June 1980.3.
"xRB, 26 October 1980. 2.
'%RB. 9 October 1980. 2.
"XRB. 7 August 1980. 1. orientation of the initial organizations. The research institute estabiished by the local Environmentai
Protection Office. in cooperation with other organizations, had become engaged in assisting the office to "have a çood understanding of environmental conditions and their developing trends in their area," as the national law had urçed them to do. Such an understanding was a cruciai first step çiven
China's history of environmentai neglect.
III. Central Decisions and Local Reactions
The broad nationai law of 1979 was not itself a document which could be directly
"implemented" as a means of controllhg pollution. It was, rather. a broad outline of policy direction which also urged local officiais to take fûnher action. both legislative and othenvise. Following the promulgation of that broad law. the centrai govemment deemed it necessary to reiterate the importance of a continuinç effort.
In early 1981 the State Council adopted the "Decision to Strengthen Environmental
Protection Dunng National Econornic Adjustment." This document indicated that an imbalance between ecological protection and economic construction had been recoçnized as an important issue in China's economic developrnent. The "Decision" demanded that environmental control and monitoring be arengthened with respect to new and existing enterprises, especially in cities. '"t dso urged that rmcrHtg environmental problems must be resolved and that there was a need to strengthen leadership in environmentai protection work?
Three months following a national conference held to discuss the implications of the State
Council "Decision." Xiamen officiais adopted regulations regarding the imposition of pollution fees
- - I Ci Qu, History, 16.
17Zhong~wo Huaniins Nianiian ( 1992). 599. and the levying of finedg This local clarification of the principles embodied in the national law would not be panicularly noteworthy except for the fact that enactinç such regulations @~iJinR)usually involveci provincial government approval.19 Unlike some later reylations on environmental rnatters for Xiamen., no mention is made of provincial approval in this case. Moreover. provincial reçulations on sirnilar rnatters had not yet been created.1° It is possible that Xiamen officiais. still insecure about their status as an SEZ. took the initiative on tfiis matter to assure conservative leaders at the provincial and national levels about the viability of the new zone. In any event. these locdly- produced regulations are also of interest because of dEerences between them and subsequent national regulations. -
The first article of the "Xiamen City People's Government Reylations Conceming Imposition of Pollution Fees on Enterprises and Units and the Imposition of Pollution Fines" stated that the document's purpose was to introduce econornic means for the strengthening of environrnental management. It also reiterated the requirement of environmental impact assessments and a plan for pollution control measures to be subrnitted before construction or renovation projects beçin.
The regulations also stipulate a whole range of fines for various degrees of exceedinç state effluent standards. Al1 fines were set at very low levels; the greatest per tonne fine - for exceeding certain types of water pollution standards, including mercury - was set a six yuan. Greater fines were allowed if no improvements occurred within two years, if a "limited-period ciean-up progarn" (xzanqi zhili ximpmn) was in place, if false reports were offered. if the "three synchronizations" poiicy was
22 June 198 1. 2.
1SnteMew with Zhao Kerning, 7 January 1994. This may have been especially true pnor to 1984 when the Fujian govemment had more control over Xiamen econornic policy.
'Olnterview with Gao Chengtie, 7 October 1993. not followd or for several other reasons. In such cases fines could be up to ten times greater. Self- reporting of levels and the reduction of fines for improvements short of the standards were also stipulated.
The third and fourth chapters of the regulations were particularly interesting. They deal with punishment and the collection of fines and fees. The types of punishment for serious offenses mirror those of the national law. These include cnticism, wamings, a limited-period clean-up program, production stoppage, fines, administrative rneasures against leaders or responsible persons. and the pursuit of econornic or crirninal responsibility through the courts. Any one of this broad range of measures could be adopted "according to the seriousness of the situation." For the initiation of legal proceedinçs. the idea must be submitted by environmental protection officials to the People's
Governrnent and the relevant department must be notified. The final decision to pursue leçal means was apparently left up to the city's top government officials.
Fies on enterprises were to be drawn 80 percent fiom production costs and 20 percent fiom the enterprise fund. If fines or fees are not paid on time, the officials may (keyi) request that the courts make a ruling. If it is decided that the money must be paid, it is taken according to regular procedures by the People's Bank.
Concerning the utilization of the fees and fines. the Xiamen regdations stipulate that 60 percent should be used by the responsible departments for environmental protection and that 40 percent çoes to the City's environmental protection organization. The use of the responsible departments' share was to be determined by that department. other departments concemed. and the city government environmental protection officials. The final article says that the City Environmental Protection Department" (not the courts) has the final authority to interpret the regulations. However. if they conflict with national or provincial documents. the regulations of the higher government level are taken as the standard."
This final provision is significant because exactly one year after the Xiamen reylations came into effect (1 July 1982). some "Provisional Measures for the Assessrnent of Effluent Fees" promulgated by the State Council became effktive." Several differences between the two documents are worth noting.
The State Council document allows ail reglar effluent fees to be paid corn production costs. but they must be paid to financial organs al the provitsid Irvel. Like the Xiamen document. the
State Council measures stipulate that paid fees should go into a special fund. The use of the fùnd, accordinç to the national provisions, was to be determined by the Environmental Protection
Department in conjunction with the Finance Department; the finance organ is not mentioned in
Xiamen's local document. Moreover. the newer provisions allowed that up to 80 percent of the effluent fëe paid by a polluting unit could be given back as a subsidy for pollution control measures.
The new document specifies that only old enterprises may do this. New enterprises must follow the
.smtoq.shi policy. The national document was also more specific about what expenses qualified for the subsidies.
"The Xiamen People's Governrnent organization for the protection of the environment is referred to in the regulations as a department (brimetr)of the govemment. rather than as an office t bar^). This nomenclature probably refl ects the growth and acceptance of its role in local governrnental affairs rather than any official organizational change. On organizational change. see Chapter Six.
'%RB. 72 June 198 1, 2.
"ROSS and Silk, Environmental Law and Policy, Appendix T, and Zhonrmo Huanjing Nianiian (1992). 601. Viewed from the perspective of the extant local Xiamen regulations - despite the fact that
"reçuiations" were ostensibly more definitive than "temporary provisions" - the new document was both centraiizing and more permissive. That is to Say. by specifjmg the involvement of the Finance
Department and provincial-level financial institutions. more accountability for the use of the environmental funds was being sought. Meanwhile. by allowing a çreater proportion of the fees paid to be used directly for an enterprises' pollution control masures, the provisions would thereby reduce the efféctive budget of the local environmental department. This. in tum, could arguably reduce their incentive. and means, to rnonitor poiiuters closely. Thus it is debatable whether ailowinç enterprises to use a çreater portion of the fees paid for their own pollution control purposes would enhance pollution control in the broad perspective. By keeping an eye on things through the handling of finances. while at the same time not forcing any hard decisions on the old enterprises, central authorities would be controlling more but accomplishing less. To this end, the Xiamen provision that polificd authonties have the final Say in enforcement was not aitered.
One final difference between the two documents is wonh noting. The Xiamen regulations were "effective" before either the national or local environmental quality standards to which they referred were issued. Indeed. the expertise to designate such standards was probably lackinç in
Xiamen at the tirne. The national meaatres, in contrast, were published before, but became effective
&er. national air. manne. and noise pollution technical standards were established." Both types of documents were necessary for effective implementation of the 1979 trial law.
NI of these differences are not significant because the documents were implemented to the letter; they were not. Rather, the difEerences and the timing of the two documents' promulgation are significant. however, because of what they indicate about local exploration and decentralization. The work of the locality emerged first. but was soon nullified and. to a degree. blunted by superseding national-level directives. This was the first of at least two instances of local governent exploratory initiatives which were scaled back by the Centre." These proved to be crucial leaming experiences for local officials because the inclination to innovate diminished as time passed.
During the first half of 1982, environmental protection work as with much else in the city at the time. seemed preoccupied with Xiamen's new role as an SEZ. In an attempt to comply with the general legal provision that environmental considerations were to be integrated into the planning process and that al1 new construction be subject to environmental impact assessment. the city government invited a number of professors and other experts from the Chinese Environmental
Engineering Society and the Environmentai Chernistry Research Institute to survey the area and comment on a draft of the "Xiamen SE2 Environmental impact Assessrnent Plan."
The goup offered suggestions concerning the nature. content. and scope of the assessment. as well as organizational matters. policy, planning, and the selection of attractive programs for environmental protection. In response to the recommendations of these experts, the Xiamen Party
Cornmittee and the govemment decided to establish a Ieading small group to oversee the SEZ's environmental impact assessment. Specialized subordinate groups were established by Xiamen
University and the Marine Institute Number Three. Professor Wang fiom Beijing would head up an advisory group. It was also decided the completion date for the major study of Yuan Danç Lake should be moved up to June of that year."
------"~heother example is outlined below.
'%RB. 17 January 1982, 1. In September of 1982. several members of the Standing Committee of the Xiamen People's
Congress. as well as persons responsible for environmental protection in relevant depmments and units. made an inspection of environmental protection work in severai factories. They praised recent improvement measures taken by the Xiamen Electrochemical Factory and noted that only when leaders give strong ernphasis to environmental work can things be irnproved. They aiso reponed that some of the units inspected continued to pollute and influence residential areas. No punishments or remedial measures were recornmended to be imposed upon the offending facto rie^.'^
This is not to suggest, however. that specific orders were mvrr given in this early period.
One such order in 1982 concemed a directive given to the island's three paper factories to clean up their sludge (hriy) probiem and halt pulp production within a limited time." Moreover, during this period Xiamen's small corps of environmental cadres were engaged in establishing a mdimentary environmental management system. Their activities included annual inspection and monitoring of the factones then polluting Yuan Dang Lake. seasonal water quality assessment, collecting some effluent fees. conduainç propaganda activities on Earth Day. and monitoring acid rain and noise le~els.~At this point strong routines with rnandated inspection schedules were not developed.
Two other national legal developrnents of this early period are noteworthy. The "PRC Marine
Environment Protection Law" was adopted by the Standing Committee of the Fifih WC on 23
August 1982. This was the first in a senes of more specific laws dealing with particular types of pollution that were enacted over the next several years. This particular law was to go into effect in
27~~~.30 September 1982. 1.
lR~nterviewwith Lin Hanzong 6 January 1994.
"g~bid.. and interview with Gao Chengtie, 7 October 1993. March of the next year. As well. the new constitution adopted in December contained a number of new stipulations regarding state responsibility for environmental protection.
Initiaily. then, central involvernent in local &airs consisted of enacting superseding leçislation and urging local leaders to follow the central organizational rnodeLJOAt the same time. Xiamen's small team of environmental cadres struggled to understand their city's precise environmental problems. Later 04 central involvement in SEZ environmental affairs (as for SEZs in çeneral) became more direct and specific. It is to a discussion of those developments that we now tum.
IV. Growing Concem at the Centre and SE2 Expansion
National politics in China in 1983-84 have been characterized as a penod during which there was an ideoloçical stmggle over reform and an eventual policy breakthrough. When Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang attempted to accelerate the timetable for reform. a "conservative coalition of party elders and propaçanda and security officiais formed against them. "" Deng Xiaoping eventually entered the debate in such a way as to strengthen considerably the reformersi hand. These developments afFected the Xiamen SE2 in a profound way; the zone was expanded to include the whole island and parts of the adjacent mainland in 1984 while conservative concems about the environmental state of SEZs (or perhaps just about the existence of the zones themselves) induced fùnher action on local legislation." Thus. in contrast to Xiamen's earlier regulations and contrary to the spirit of the trial law. the new local regulations were born of direct involvement by higher levels.
"On this latter point. see Chapter Six.
"~amnn-China and the Challenge of the Future, 64.
"In a sense. the environmentalia cause can be seen as a "conservative issue" in China. Opponents of reform may raise environmental concerns as a means of opposing pro-reform leaders. Later in this thesis 1 suçgest that environmentai issues also have the potential of becoming an important grass roots issue. See my conclusion. In the initial wake of MURCEP'S creation perhaps because of uncenainty about the refonn
process. national-level developments in environmental protection were relativeiy quiet. The State
Council issued "Provisions for the Integration of Technology Reform with Control of Industrial
Pollution" in Febmary 1983. This was basically a call for enterprises to consider environrnentd
factors in upgrading their outdated equipment and technology. A number of documents emerged
fiom MLTRCEP including "Method for Management of Environmental Standards in the PRC." which
clarifieci types of standards. laid down prgcedures for setting, changing and enforcing those standards,
and outlined a number of other related mat ter^.^^
In the spring of 1983. Xiamen held its second-ever environmental protection work meeting
and. in the process, announced a number of cornmendations of "advanced environmentai units and
collectives" for 1982. This process went toward fùlfilling the call in article thirty-one of the trial law
t O " commend and reward" significant achievements in environmental protection. although material
rewards were conspicuous by their absence in this case. Among the units which received a plaque
and their name in the paper were the following: the Electrocheinical Factory that had responded to
numerous public cornplaints and one of the paper factories that had complied with a "limited-period
clean-up" order." In the absence of routinized inspections and independent monitoring. it seems,
cornpliance with the law under duress was worthy of citation.
Beginning in the latter half of 1983, environmental issues began to receive an increasingly higher profile in national poiitics. The State Council issued a decision regarding pollution control for township and neighbourhood enterprises which once again emphasized the smtot&i requirement.
J"honemo Huaniing Nianjan (1992), 603, and XRB. 10 July 1984. 3
"XRB. 3 May 1983, 3 and XRB, 9 May 1983, 1. A similar point was ernphasized by Li Peng in his address to the Second National Conference on
Environmental Protection in early 1984." The womes of leaders in Beijing were manifest primarily through specific requests for stricter and more detailed environmental laws in the zone.'' In April of
1984 the provincial government assigned Xiamen environmental cadres to formulate such local laws."
A workins goup was organized under the local Environmentai Protection Ofice. Over the subsequent sixteen months. this group collected relevant data and examples of environmentai leçislation from China and abroad."
In an effort to reinforce national-level concem with the problem and to assist in the drafting of reçulations for special zones. a "National Conference on Protecting the Natural Environment in
SEZs. Open Coastal Zones. and Open Coastal Cities and Areas" was held in Xiamen dunng March
1 98 5. The conference emphasized the need to incorporate environmental planning into overall development plans and to stipulate environmental goals.3g
In consultation with scholars. scientists. various municipal government departrnents. and oficials fiom hiçher levels, a new Xiamen document on environmental protection (developed in
"Qu. History, 18- 19.
.''Interview with Gao Chengtie. 9 November 1993.
"There were likely some comparisons by the Centre between Xiamen and Shenzhen at work here; Shenzhen had produced management regulations in late 1982. See IPRS-CST-84-029. 137 for a translation of the Shenzhen regulations.
"WUZilin, "To Protect [a] Developing City by the Enactment of Local Laws and Regulations," (Paper prepared for the Second Sino-Arnerican Conference on Environmental Laws. Boulder Colorado. 18- 19 September 1989). 2-3. Interestingly. Xiamen's first reylations on pollution fees referred to above. are not mentioned in this paper which othenuise offers a concise summary of legislative work.
39XEU3. 18 March 1985. 1. response to the above-mentioned conference) was revised over twenty times? Evennially. the
"Regdations on Environmental Control in Xiamen City" were. after approval of the City ami
Provincial People's Congresses, promuigated on 30 August 1985. An article anqouncing the promulgation said that the reylations were based on the pnnciple that Xiamen's environmental protection goals (ml~biau)ought to be higher than elsewhere and that dl types (state-owned. joint ventures, etc. ) of enterprises should be treated the same (yi .hi iorig rrrr). The article also said that in recent years. Xiamen's water, air and noise pollution had been se ri ou^.^' Thus. the reylations seem to have been issued in response to a concem that Li Penç himself had earlier expressed publicly: the SEZs may be accepting polluting equipment or products already rejected by other states."
The new regulations were quite specific, especially concerninç offences and penalties.'"hey also required that a permit system for poliuters be introduced in Xiamen on a trial basis. This system had not yet been introduced at the national level even in trial form. In fact. the introduction of this system in Xiamen was cited by local officiais as an example of exploration in environmental policy."
The very idea of a permit system one cadre asserted. was initially raised by some Xiamen a~thorities.'~Moreover, they apparently wanted to apply it to al! enterprises for both air and water
40 Ibid.; interview with Zhao Keming, 7 Ianuary 1994; and XRB, 21 November 1984. 1.
"ZHB, 24 Septernber 1985. 1.
"XRB. 28 Iune 1985, 1. See James Reardon-Andersoa Pollution Pditics. and Foreimi Investment in Taiwan: The Lukang Rebellion, (Armonk. N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe. 1992).
'.me regulations can be found in Fujian Ribao Fujian Daily], 1 September 1985. 2. translated in JPRS-CEA-85-098, 6 November 1985, 86.
'Interviews with Gao Chengtie, 9 November. 1993 and Wu Zili. 8 November 1993. See Chapter Five for more on the permit system.
"1nteMew with Gao Chengtie. 9 November 1993. pollution but the Gate eventudy (in 199 1) rnandated that only large enterprises which polluted water in a major way were to be the initial focus of the policy? This was likely done for both technical and political rûasons, but stands as another example of the aate. through experimentation and expenence. toning down local initiative.
In spite of theu scaled-back nature, the provisions of these Central reylations provide clues about the environmental law enforcement that had gone on in Xiamen up to that point. The introduction of a permit system was an attempt to reign in polluters who had been undeterred by random inspections and occasionai reprimands. The requirement for a second environmental impact report implies that initial assessments were ignored or left undone.
The regulations read in some places like simple oru'ers fiom higher levels of govement. For example. anicle four reads:
Xiamen City shall develop stringent environrnental standards based on çeoçraphicai and environrnental charactenstics and the developmentai needs of the Xiamen SEZ. Its pollution emission standards shail be promulgated by the Fujian People's ~ovemment.47
Tt is also worthwhile to observe that the first of the standards referred to here, which were in many cases more stringent than national ones, were not promulgated until a year later? The delays in developing the documents which in fact made true implementation possible was due in part to the extensive consultation process engaged in; pleasing concemed superiors in the provincial EPB, central conservatives. and local economic ministries was no easy task.
"Interview with Wu Zilin, 8 November 1993; and XRB. 5 Au yst 1988, 1.
"~uiianEtibao Nian DaiIy]. 1 September 1985, 2. translated in PRS-CEA-85-098, 6 November 1985, 86.
'wu Zilin, "To Protect [a] Developing City," 3 and interview with Lin Hanzonç. 6 January 1994. Concems about the environmentai impact of rapid economic gowth in open areas was further addressed through national legislation and local goal-setting activity. First. the State Council approved the "Provisional Regdations for Environmental Management in Foreign Economic
Development Zones." This document, which became effective upon promulgation in March 1986. reiterated some aspects of both the original 1979 national law and the 1985 Xiamen reg~lations.'~
Beyond this. it urged al1 units to make sure that environmental provisions in contracts were both clear and in accordance with state and local la~s.'~As a set of "reçulations" (priding). it. oddly enough, largely restates what was. in facf already law in force for the SEZs. Second. the Fujian govemment singled out improvement of &men's Yuan Dang Lake as a provirlcial goal in 1985." This may well have been the result of encouragement from the national leaders.
The national legislation on environmental matters for SEZs which emerged in the mid- 1980s was designed as a signal to alert local leaders to the particular need for strict environmental protection in special zones. Although the signal was apparently received in that spirit. the irnmrdia~rlocal response to the increased concern and the plethora of emerging local and national laws was not increased fûnding for environment enforcement. but rather increased propaganda activities. While ad hoc. piecemeal enforcement rneasures continued. new initiatives were taken in education and public relations. Nevertheless. the seriousness of poor environmental conditions in Xiamen and elsewhere was increasingly recognized.
'Qhonemio Jineii Tequ -yu Hai~anIingii Jishu Kaifa Ou Nianiian [Almanac of Chinese SEZs and Open Coastal Economic and Technology Zones] (Beijing: Gaiçe Chubanshe, n.d. ). 497-98. An earlier Shenzhen law was also a primary mode1 for the document. Overlap was common in the cascade of environmental legislation then emerging in China.
50 This provision rnay have emerged in response to the Kaida decision in Shenzhen. Concerning this precedent-setting case, see Ross and Silk, Environmental Law and Policv, 259-71.
"~uiianHuaniing [Fuiian's Environment]. no. 2 ( 1985). 1. For example. in June 1986 the local EPB established three environmental protection
"reception stands" (jedai zhan). Set up in conspicuous public places. the declared purpose of the stands was to allow city residents to report dangerous pollution situations and to allow cadres to disseminate information. particularly regarding laws and re~wlations. The stands were opened in conjunction with the city's commemoration of Earth Day and did not endure as permanent operations beyond that tirne."
According to a newspaper report of the stands' activities. local EPB officiais enthusiastically listened to the public's cornpiaints. But the stands did not contribute in any direct way to enforcement efforts on senous problems. The cornplaints concemed a noisy restaurant. a chernical factory which was polluting the air. and an entrepreneur who removed duck feathers with pitch in violation of sanitation reçulations. Cornplaints about water pollution, the most critical pollution problem in
Xiamen were not reponed in the press. Moreover. the article concluded rnerely by saying that the masses demanded that the EPB intervene to control those units and individuals which were harming the environment.5"
Educational activities were not confined to Earth Day speeches and reception stands.
B eginning in the 1 985-86 academic year. Xiamen introduced environmentai issues into the middle school curriculum. This was done in the interest of heightening environmental awareness and enticing young people to consider careers in environment-related fields. The Xiamen Number One Middle
School began a specific course on the environment which involved both theoretical background and hands-on experience for students. The course caught the attention of the national environmentai
%RB. 4 June 1986, 1.
')XRB, 6 June 1986. 1. newspaper and stimulated separate discussion meetings among students." In a related developrnent. the Fujian Environmental Science Association and the Fujian Science and Technology Youth
Leadership Assistance Association jointly held an environmental essay contest for rniddle school students in the following school year?
Environmental protection efforts undenaken by provincial organs were also consistent with the role taken by provincial-level bodies throughout this early period. Like other levels of govemment. the provincial government was involved in producing replations or other documents to render the national law capable of implementation. Many of these took the form of notices
(tot~gzbi)and met hods (&a@) for irnplementation. Documents of this type were common in 198 3-8 5 and treated subjects ranging from the national law of the sea ro the strengthening environmental work for townships and village enterprises.56
Fujian authorities were dso instrumental in occasionally bringing national directives to the attention of sub-provincial leaders. Recall that in 1984. Fujian officials. acting on behalf of central authorities. encouraged Xiamen EPB cadres to formulate detailed local laws. The resuiting regulations were. afier approvai by the Provincial People's Congress (PPC). promulgated one year
(and twenty revisions) later. Even more specific legislation was approved by the Standing Cornmittee of the Fujian PPC in the latter half of 1986. These included the "Xiamen Environmentai Protection
Management Regulations" and "Xiamen City Method for Prevention of Air P~llution."~~Thus. the
54~.6 May 1986. 1 and ZHB. 2 August 1986, 3.
"ZHB. 20 December 1986. 1.
'"uanauo Difang Huanjine Baohu Fa Huibian Idiyiji) [Com~endiumof Chinese Local Environmental Law (Volume One)]. (Beijing: Zhongyo Huanjing Kexue Chubanshe. 1988). 323- 43; and Huan-iiin Gonrmo Tonwn [Environmental Work Newsletter]. no. 1 1 (1983). 13- 14. provincial government continued to take a key role in transmitting national directives and also in refining and approvinç sub-provincial regulations. - V. Enhanced Enforcement and Limited Leming
General political developments at the Centre, particularly because of Xiamen's SEZ status, had some impact on local events. Toward the end of the 1980s. conservative leaders began to put a darnper on sorne of the more daring reforms which had been pursued in 1986 and 1987, claiming that inflation, corruption, and a lack of investment in education, agriculture. and social services were the result of this latest wave of opening up. Certain SEZ privileges were withdrawn and a less radical - but more comprehensive reform plan was reintroduced. By mid- 1988 Zhao Ziyang was increasingly under attack." The trend towards liberalkation which sparked this reaction had a discernable positive impact upon Xiamen's investment attraction efforts. At the sarne tirne. however, the emphasis placed on the withdrawal of the Party from certain administrative flairs by the 13th Party Congress in
Oaober 1987 gave administrative organs such as EPBs the confidence to pursue their mandates with sornewhat more vigour. Moreover, this coincided with the long-awaited accumulation of documents necessary for implementation. The Xiamen EPB was apparently among the orçanizations which took advantage of this convergence of supportive trends.
Alt hough the national political climate and legislative framework were now more conducive to increased enforcement activity. the immediate stimulus for actual rrforcrrnmt was quite often of a local nature. In October 1987, in response to over one hundred complaints from local residents, the Xiamen EPB pursued with some vigour a number of polluting township, village. and residential district enterprises. A total of forty-nine such units were dealt with in a relatively short period. After
"Hamrin. China and the Challenge of the Future, 196-98. this inspection drive, EPB cadres explained environmentai pnnciples and relevant regulations to the offenders. Those that failed to respond to this education by solving their pollution problems were later pursued by both the EPB and related departments in a coordinated fashion "until the pollution was eliminated" (=hi dao wwan shaochir weizhi).''
Later in the year, and following the 13th Party Congress, this inspection of enterprises was resuscitated and given a new focus on Xiamen's electroplating factones. A total of thirty-eight such factories were exarnined and the decision was eventuaily made to close down no less than fifieen of the most senous polluten." The process whereby such closures were decided upon initially included the calling of a meeting to be attended by al1 cadres responsible for environmental work at the offending factories. .4t this meeting "relevant documents" (meaning laws and regulations) were studied and the requirements of a limited period clean-up program were made known. Those units that were. in the end, judged to be heavy polluters because of technological weakness were either closed down completely or asked to aop production while rectification took place. Other units were encouraçed to improve their capacity to control pollution or be dealt with according to legal regulations. Some were introduced to the then-experirnental pollution permit ~ystern.~'Deputies of the local People's Congress were also taking increased notice of environmental problems at this tirne.
In early 1988, they beçan to speak clearly and forcefuily about a lack of leadership on the Yun Danç
Lake issue and the necessity of mayoral attention."
59~HB,26 December 1987, 2.
C"'Ibid.
"XRB, 2 1 December 1987, 1.
"XRB, 12 April 1988, 1. See Chapter Seven for details. But it should be noted here that this intensification of regdatory efforts in 1987 and 1988 still touched upon only a limited number of relatively small enterprises in the inspection work. Increased fùnds were only allocated to clean up an old problem. Large state enterprises. a key part of the continuing problern for Yun Dang Lake. were not the predominant focus of this increased attention.
Taiwanese enterprises were clearly not a prime target for enforcement at this juncture either. Zhao
Keminç. the Deputy Mayor who later inherited Cai Wanghuai's environmentai responsibilities explained that one cannot greet potential investors with a list of environmental requirements; if you did. they would "run away" (paodiao)." Indeed. enforcement activities were still iimited and a convenient silence on environmentai matters seemed to protect investrnent attraction efforts. The
Deputy Mayor's comments are a clear indication of the powerful cross pressures which afFected municipal officials on a day-to-day basis.
Severai national-level developments during this period. on the other hand, demonstrated that nearly a decade of expenmentation was beginning to bear fniit and, more specificaily. that some leaming was taking place (at least at the highest levels of decision making). Several examples wiil be mentioned here.
First. in 1987 there was a noticeable upswing in the quantity of international cooperation sought by the C hinese on environmental matters. Specifically, more focused bilateral cooperation was being sought. Separate conferences were held with Gerrnan and Arnencan environmental officials. for example. and previous cooperative efforts were reviewed." NEPA officials were
- -- --
"~nterviewwith Zhao Keming. 7 January 1994.
"~hongguoHuaniine Nian-iian (1 992). 608. increasingly recognizing the usefùlness of technological and other advice from Western countries more expenenced in environmental &airs.
Other indicators of leaniing at the national level include the rejuvenation of the SCCEP, an increase in state spending for the seventh five-year plan. and the clear addressing of environmental matters by national party organizations. In addition. the Sixth NPC passed the "Law for the
Prevention of Atmospheric Pollution in the PRC."~'This was another in a series of specific laws deaiing with certain types of pollution. These laws were meant to build upon the foundation laid by the 1979 trial law. Effective from Iune 1988. this law pronounced restrictions on industrial. transportation, and construction units that produce smoke or dust and outlined major supe~sory powers for environmental management organizations. This law was both more detailed and more stria in comparison to earlier documents. Thus. central leaders mut have recoçnized the vagueness and permissiveness of previous laws. Reylations related to record keeping and file management issued in late 1988 similarly sought to improve the disorganization of the past?
Finally, in the latter haif of 1987 the SCCEP reviewed a proposal to reform the system for collection of industrial discharge fees. Recall that the earlier Xiamen and State Council documents on the subject both designated a large portion of fees and fines to be used toward the environmental protection masures of the assessed enterprises. The Commission decided to alter the way in which fees were used from a direct subsidy to a repayable loan." Althouçh at this point this reform was only to be implemented on a trial basis. it is another indication of leaming on the part of central
"'QU, History, 25, and JPRS-CST-88-001, 6 1.
?ZHB. 3 December 1988.2.
"QU. History, 25-26 and Zhonmuo Huaniine Nianiian (1992). 608. For a copy of the law. see ZHB. 8 September 1987.3. cadres. Repayment. if actuaily obtained, would boost the coffers of local EPBs and would partialiy compensate for the reluctance or inability of local çovernments to fund environmental organizations at increased Ievels.
Similar learning was taking place with respect to construction projects. Although the requirements for environmentai impact assessrnents and saritotigxh were both widely known and ostensibly followed." central authorhies now saw fit to try to improve the quality of the process. In early 1987 the SPC and SCCEP jointly issued "Regulations on Environmental Protection Plans for
Construction Project~."~~
VI. Iudicial Action and the Impact of Tiananmen
The leaminç that was occumng arnong local politicai officiais in Xiamen was of a profoundly different and practicd nature. They had now concluded that difficult. politicaily unpalitable decisions were necessary if environmental regulations were to be enforceci. Moreover. they were now prepared to periodically make such decisions. For example. in 1988 and 1989 progress was made on several fronts including funding increases. legislative codification. plant closures. judicial involvement and increased organizational autonomy. Several important aspects of pollution control work in Xiamen remained exploratory or unroutinized through this penod. These aspects include, arnong other things, the application of the pollution permit system and the differentiation between different types of enterprises for enforcement of reylations. In short. efforts were intensified in some dimensions. but
"Qu, History, 25. Qu reports that by 1987 cornpliance in ~wbmittir~greports on environmentai impact was nearly perfect and that the sa~~rut~gshirequirement was met in 96 percent of cases. The accuracy of these admttedly "incomplete" statistics may be questioned. but apparently most builders at least went through the motions.
69ZHB. 24 March 1987. 1. 3 the Nnction of environmental law rernained the same as in eadier periods; it encouraged local officiais and supported them if they chose to take action, but was not strictly enforced.
The year 1989. of course, is remembered both inside and outside China as the year in which troops of the PLA were ordered to cnish pro-democracy demonstrations at Beijing's Tiananmen
Square. This event had profound consequences includinç the imposition by foreiçn governments of various restrictions on dealing with China, Zhao Ziyang's exit fiom the leadership. and a general
(albeit temporary) lu11 in the promotion of policies related to reform and openinç up.
The impact of the politicai crisis of 1989 on Xiamen, however. was perhaps less pronounced than elsewhere. Xiamen University witnessed some marches. but was relatively calm. Production in Xiamen was linle affected; uivestment saw only a slight decline for a few months before a renewed boom in early IWO. Indeed. the dramatic events in Beijing, in conjunction with the national leadership's increasing interest in the Pudong area of Shanghai. prompted officials in Fujian and
Xiamen to take further special measures both to assure and lure interested invest~rs.'~
If the negative impact of Tiananmen upon Xiamen was muted and short-lived its direct impact upon environmental &airs was hardly discernable except that it contributed both to an environment in which perceived "anti-refom" measures were increasinçly accepted and to a local urgency to redouble investment attraction efforts. These dual (and perhaps contradictory trends) were both present. Both before and after 4 June, certain enforcement efforts in the city were raised to a new level in 1989; enforced fines for large enterprises and court action were arnong the rneans utilized.
At the provincial level, supervisory. planning, and goai-settinç activïties likewise continued apace.
------
7"~owelllChina Opens Its Doors, 160-64. Prominent among these was a joint inspection of environmental work conducted with NEPA officials.
These and other developrnents are outlined in more detail below.
Xiamen EPB officials indicated that environmental reylations have been enforced. since their initial promulgation in the mid-1980s. with increasing strictness year by year (vi ~~zmbi yi Mm ynnge)." Clearly. a gradual approach was taken in which the letter of the law was not stnctly enforced. However. interna1 recommendations by the Xiamen EPB to the çovernment which repeatedly stressed the ndto strengthen the legal qstem finally bore some fitnear the end of the decade." A number of environment-related court decisions were observed in 1989. though these did in no way dispiace milder modes of implementation.
For exarnple. in mid-year the Nurnber Two Chernical Factory was brought to court for rehsing to pay effluent charges. This factory had. frorn 1985 on, been exceedinç state effluent standards and had apparently been paying its effluent charges dutifully. But, without formally objecting to the fee assessments or lodginç an appeal with the local EPB (as was their right under the law). the factory simply stopped payinç its charges. Mer personnel fiom both the Eflluent Fee
Collection Office and the EPB had reminded them of their delinquency several times. they still refùsed to pay. So the EPB went directly to the Xingiin District Court to request forced compliance with the regulations. The result was that the court demanded payment of 10,144 yuan in effluent charge arrears and a 1.15 1 yuan late payment ~harge.'~
"Interview with Wu Zilin. 8 November 1993.
"lnterviewees indicated that appeals by the EPB to the courts for environmental enforcement assistance occurred only three or four times. Moreover. the coun's involvement and support were a matter of bargaining and consultation. Interviews with Gao Chengtie, 7 October 1993, and Lin Hanzong. 6 January 1994.
n~~~.I 1 July 1989, 1. Reports made no mention of whether more forcefùl attempts were made to have the factory cease its polluting ways. A slightly more lenient approach was taken with the Hua Xia Foodstuffs factory, one of
Xiamen's largest industries and its most prolific polluter. The factory had gone into production in violation of the m1roi1gshirequirement; proper pollution treatment equipment for their monosodium glutamate production was not installed. As a result. the factory's pollution load exceeded state standards and was the heaviest of any factory in Xiamen for several types of pollutants. The EPB initially outlined a limited penod clean-up plan for them and, within the scope of the law. requested a five-fold increase in effluent charges. But the factory still did liale to rectie their polluting ways.
A fine of 10.000 yuan was then levied on the Hua Xia Foodstuffs Company while the general manager received a persona1 fine of 100 yuan. Hua Xia was also ordered to reduce effluent levels to within state standards by a certain date or face stiffer penalties according to the law? The courts were not directly involved in this instance but the general pattern of warnings and light punishments precedinç heavier penalties (or threats thereof) was followed.
A case involving the Xiamen Sugar Factory was more dramatic in that it involved not only fuies. but compensation paid to victims for losses due to environmental pollution. In late 1986. two individuds contracted with the Xinçlin Water Authority to put 65,000 silver carp into the Xinglin Bay
Reservoir. By January 1987 a great number of the fish had died and the cause was deemed to be the sugar factory's heavy pollution output. The two individuds then sued the factory for nearly 300.000 yuan.
In 1988 the Xinglin District Court ageed that decreased oxygen content of the water caused by pollutants was indeed the source of the massive fish deaths. It further ruled that the factory should pay 77.389 yuan in compensation. The factory appealed on the çrounds that the relationship between the pollution and the fish's death could not be conclusively proven, but the decision was
upheld. Moreover, the appellate City of Xiamen Intermediate Court comrnented that payment of
effluent fees does not exempt one from further payrnents for darnaçe caused. They further ordered
the factory to pay 993 yuan in addition to the above judgment to cover court costs.
These cases did not signal a new era of uniformly strict enforcement of the law. Rather. they
highlight the results of continüed laxity in regulating and rnisjudgment in planning. Strict enforcement
of the .smto,~g.hirequirement would have prevented the Hua Xia case while the establishment of the
Xinglin District by city officials contributed directly to the carp fishing problems.
Cases involving considerable econornic consequences for exceeding effluent standards were
made even more poss~bkin 1989 for future polluters by the irnplementation of Xiamen's own emission standards. Recall that general environmental laws (either national or local) cannot be tmly implemented without accompanying detailed standards. Thus. the "State Council Provisional
Measures for the Assessrnent of Efnuent Fees" (1983) were potentially more effective when accompanying standards were published the next year. Xiamen's own local air and water emission standards (with higher requirements than previous national documents) were not put into effect until early 1989." These were formally promulgated by the provincial çovemment? This followed a four-year compilation process which involved CO nsultation wit h engineering and technical personnel from the Xiamen EPB's monitoring station and eventual approval by the Fujian EPB's own experts.
Beyond the use of the courts. in 1989 the Xiamen EPB took a rather innovative indirect step to encourage improved environmental performance by the city's factories. In the latter part of 1989.
"WU. "To Protect a Developing City." 4.
"XRB. 10 March 1989. 1. the local EPB published a hl-page public notice in the local newspaper which outlined the conditions related to about fi* factories' temporary pollution permits. Redthat Xiamen was a chosen test point for the trial implernentation of this system. In keepinç with the decision to focus on Yun Dang
Lake's pollution sources. only data on those factones' permit conditions were included. For each unit. its products and seasonai allowable discharge for air. water. and noise pollution were published. as well as their addresses and phone nurnber~.~~
The announcement explaineci that the pollution permit system was a measure taken to deepen supe~sorymanagement and to assist in the attainment of environmental goals and the establishment of comprehensive control. An editor's note included with the announcement expressed the opinion t hat this action by the local EPB would be effective in strengthening supe~sionby the masses. It also stressed that environmental departments in other locales might benefit by making reference to it." Despite apparent local govemment support for the innovative move, it should be noted that this was ail1 sornething of a preparatory action in the actual implementation of the permit system. Most permits were not actually issued until later (see below). so this may be seen as an effort to mobilize public opinion behind the idea of permits and tighter control. The rneasure's effectiveness in this regard is difficult to determine.
Despite the later investment boom and the eagemess of local officiais to attract more investment to Xiamen, the increase in conservative trends in the wake of Tiananmen did apparently have some indirect effects in Xiamen. Concerning environmental protection in particular. Xiamen passed some new regdations for foreign businesses soon after the establishment of two new
"XRB. 1 1 November 1989.4.
''~bid. invest ment zones. These specified that al1 serious polluting projects and all proMfsprohibited by the stntr would be excluded from the investment zones. That specific pronouncements regarding
Taiwanese investon were made and t hat adherence to state prohibitions was reemphasized indicates that Taiwan projects may have previously been &en breaks on environmental protection requirements as investment incentives and that central conservatives wanted to see the practice curtailed." As rnentioned above, a locai çovemment official emphasized t hat direct. privat e emphasis of environmental requirements to potential investon was not a prudent investment attraction strategy.
Thus. it is clear that public pronouncements and cadre behaviour difTered on this matter.
Despite these new developments (Le.; court action and new Taiwanese speciai investment zones). however, familiar patterns of environmental "enforcement" activities continued in Xiamen.
For example. in response to numerous public complaints. representatives of the Xiamen City's
People's Congress undertook inspection of two local factories. They directed that lower levels of
çovernment (district and county) demonstrate to the factories the economic efficiency of improved environmental controls and that they receive plans from the responsible departments for movinç the factories or changing production within three months. Wamings and directives in response to specific public cornplaints thus continued as a common mode of "enforcement" activity undertaken by the municipal govemment and EPB officials alike.
It was mentioned above that, in the wake of fiananmen, both Fujian and Xiamen officials went out of their way to reassure nervous potential investors. Indeed. an official with the Fujian
'SHB. 12 Au pst 1989, 1. The headline of this article reads: "Taiwan Investment Attracted to Xiamen Must Pass Environmental Bamiers." It is significant that the article was carried in a national (not local) newspaper.
''XRB. 13 Decernber 1989, 1. Foreign Econornic Relations and Tade Commission tried to make clear in an interview with a Hong
Kong reporter that Fujian would be unaffected by the current national rectification carnpaigs that contracts would not be cancelid and that Fujian's econornic powers would not be scaled back by the central auth~rities.~'Provincial officials. like those in Xiamen, however, did publicly punue environmental initiatives concurrently with a push to attract investrnent.
As obsewed earlier. the provincial EPB and the Fujian govemment were typicdly involved in the development and approval of municipal environmental laws. They also frequently produced their own more general legislative documents. For example. in June 1989 the Provincial People's
Congress passed a "Decisiog to Strengthen Fujian's Environmental Protection ~ork."*'Nearly al1 of the points mentioned in the document relate to the province's role in supervision, propaganda, and research. The only specific type of pollution problem alluded to was the cal1 for an irnprovement in the water quality of dnnking water ~ources.~'The document also mentioned the need to establish an environmental goal responsibility system involving the municipal govemments."
Another example of provincial legislative work was the "Temporary Regdations on the
Drawing Up of Urban Environmentai Plans." This document was the work of the Fujian Construction
Commission and the province's EPB . It was directed toward local govemments and provincial-level units. Although a few cities in the province had been establishing environrnental plans. these ofien conflicted with more general economic and industrial plans. Thus. the province felt compelled to
"~owell.China Opens Its Doors, 16 1-62.
"ZHB, 22 July 1989, 1. The text of this decision may be found in Zhongpo Huaniine Nianiian ( 1990), 582-83.
qhis system, which involves provincial supervision of municipal goal setting. is considered below in connection with the 1989 national law and subsequent efforts in Xiamen. issue regulations to aandardize and fùnher specify the pro ces^.'^ These regulations followed several
urgings and directives throughout the previous months regarding the importance of including
environmental considerations in municipal planning.B6
Another problem in the relationship between the province and lower level units was that
provincial laws sometimes confticted both with the standardization of lower level documents and with
provincial administrative regulations. Moreover. the legai supervisory responsibilities of the province
were described as ill-defined.B7
Both provincial and municipal authorities shared common characteristics in their exercise of
environmental responsibilities. however; they made proçress dunng the 1980s in severai areas of
legislative and enforcement activities, but more flexible and unroutinized methods of implementation
continued to predominate at the end of the decade.
From the promulgation of the trial law in 1979. through the emergence of numerous national
laws and local regulations in the mid-1980s. environmental law in China functioned, in essence. as
propaganda directed primarily at the local officials who were supposed to shoulder the financial
responsibilities for day-to-day supe~sionand implementation. These officials. in tum. also initially
turned to propaganda and educational activities. Exploratory activities by the EPB officials in
Xiamen. although officially encouraged. received no direct monetary, and little moral. support fiom
central officials. Environmental policy, particularly for SEZs. was directed, but not supponed
financially, fiom above. Most local legislation was produced in cooperation with, and at the behest
"ZHB. 12 October 1989, 1.
"See ZHB. 32 April 1989, 1; ZHB. 3 August 1989, 1; and ZHB. 2 1 January 1989, 1.
87 See Wang Jiwei, "Fujiansheng Huanjing Fazhi Gonguo de Tedian yu Cunzai de Wenti" ["Characteristics and Extant Problems of Fujian's Environrnental Legal System Work"], Fujian Huaniinp [Fuiian's Environment], no. 3 (June) 199 1, 9- 1 1 . O$ higher levels of government. In Xiamen, enforcement of environmental replations was selective and sporadic; legai and even economic rneans of enforcement were quite rare. Propaganda and research work occupied much of the time and energy of local EPB oficials.
These constraints and problems notwithstanding Xiamen's application of. and elaboration on, environmental law dunng the 1980s provided a base. both organizationally and in terms of the awareness of .wme local political leaders. for an increased allocation of local government funding and a general intensification of environmental efforts in 1989 and beyond. That these developments were directly linked to the better fortunes of the Xiamen SEZ in the latter half of the decade lends credence to the idea that. although perhaps not consciously. China too had succumbed to the temptation to pollute now and clean up 1atervgg
In Xiamen plant closures. court action, and increased funding for Yun Dang Lake were major changes late in the decade. However. persuasion, explanation and cnticism remained more constant as cornmon forms of "regulatory" enforcement. Learning was perhaps less evident at this level than it was at the national level because of the difficult political context faced by local leaders. Politically and econornicaily powerful poluters continued to avoid the consistent and focused attention of those ultimately responsible for enforcement.
"See footnote fifty-seven in Chapter Seven. CHAPTER FM:A NEW LAW AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS
1. The 1989 Law and Bevond - Most state-level environmental initiatives in 1989 were geared primarily toward the preparation and promulgation of the "Environmentai Protection Law of the PRC ( 1989)" by the
Standing Committee of the NPC on 26 December 1989. National meetings, experimentai incentive programs and the circulation of a revised draf? law were al1 conducted before the new Iaw officially emerçed.
China's third National Conference on Environmental Protection was held in the Spring.
Arnong the topics discussed Gas the implementation of some type of environrnental goal responsibility system.' A regime in which mayors would be directly responsible to provincial çovemors for environmentai goai anainment was discussed. Expenments along these lines had been conducted in
Shandong. Shanxi. Henaa Gansu. and elsewhere since about 1987.' Among the benefits of such arrangements (accordinç to the local officiais involved) was that municipal party secretanes and mayors were forced to take environmental matters into their own hands rather than transfer al1 such work to the local EPB.' A modified version of this atternpt to force mayors to çet more involved was later incorporated into the national law.
'ZHB. 2 May 1989. 3
'~uanjinzGongzuo Tonwn [Environmental Work Newsletter], no. 3 (1989). 25-30.
'~bid..26. In Xiamen. EPB cadres indicated that. in general. governent and party leaders left the environment work up to them; they had to contact the govemment if they desired assistance. Interview with Wu Zilin, 8 November 1993. The conference also set out a general national goal to be accomplished by the year 2000. The goal was. telingiy. simply to halt the pwîh of environmental pollution (kwgzhizhu htîm>jir>~wwan de fazhatr ).4
Another important national meeting held during the year was the Second National Conference on the Prevention of Water ~ollution.' This conference introduced "Detailed Replations for the hplementation of the Water Pollution Prevention Law of the PRC."' This gave needed substance to the country's earlier water pollution legislation. It aiso addressed organizationai rnatters. A cal1 was made for clarification of the responsibilities of various actors involved in environmental protection. Means of strengthening independent environmental protection departments were aIso discussed.' These rnatters were also subsequently addressed in the revised 1989 national law.
The L989 law itselfwas presented in draft form as a revision of the 1979 law. It was brouçht to the NPC Standing Cornmittee for discussion on 1 September 1989. more than three months before its eventual promulgation. An announcement regarding this draft of the revised law stated that the
1979 version had indeed been useful, but, due to imperfections and some content inappropriate to current development trends, revisions based on subsequent experience were necessa$
The content of the law sirnilarly revealed that it was airned at previously recognized weaknesses in China's environmental protection system. National officiais had earlier stated that
'XRB. 2 May 1 989. 1. Emphasis added.
'zHB,9 September 1989. 1.
'ZHB. 24 August 1989.3.
'zHB. 9 September 1989. 1.
%RB. 2 September 1989, 1. [tlhere is a çeneral lack of coherence at al1 levels arnong environmentai control organizations in the country today and the division of labor arnong organkations has not been well defined. This is bad for environmentai control . . .. China's environmental laws are stilI not on a completely sound footing today; sometimes legal responsibiiity is not explicitly assigned; and there are no specific policies pertaining to awards . . . Consequently, the power of environrnental laws cannot be brought to bear.
These are among the probiems the revised Iaw was meant to address. The rernainder of this section contains a review and analysis of the law in cornparison to its 1979 predecessor.1° The content of the law may be separated into severai general categories.
First, the revised law stipulates the purpose of the law and lays down the basic national environrnental policies of the PRC. These are cas in very broad terms and differ little from the earlier document. Second. the 1989 document attempts to delirnit the scope of environmental protection work in China. The very çeneral notion of the environment embraced means that things such as minin5 scenic spots. and cultural relics are included dong with air, water. land. oceans. and forests as the objects of the Law. Here, too, there is little change from the earlier version.
Third. as impiied above. the law outlines various environmental responsibilities as they fit within the organizational system. in contrast to the earlier law in which municipal govemments were merely urged to organize according to their needs and formulate local standards. the revised statute explicitly States that local governments at the county level and above are resporzsible for environrnental y~ïnlityin their jurisdictions. Indeed, it increases local government responsibility for
9Zang Yuiang, "Cursory Comments About Planning of Environmental Protection in the Seventh Five-Yeu Plan Penod." Zhoneguo Huaniine Kexue (Chinese Environmental Science) vol. 7. no. 3 (June 1987). 59-63 transiated in JPRS-CST-88-004,16.
"~hereview which follows is largely drawn from Cong Xuangong and Chen Maoyun. "Tantan Huanjing Baohu Fa de Jiben Neirong" ["A Discussion of the Basic Contents of the Environmental Protection Law"]. Huaniing Baohu ~nvironmentalProtection], no. 3 ( 1990). 1 5- 17. A full Chinese ianguaçe version of the law may be found in XRB, 30 December 1989. 3, as well as in other sources. monitoring, treatment, and propaganda." This change in emphasis reflects a deepened recognition of the key role played by local officiais in implementation.
Another change from the earlier version is that rather than refemng to standards and regulations not yet formulated. the new law asserts that ail work must be done according to the provisions of the relevant (existing) laws (jizhaoyozr fiijiu de pidi~rg).Thus, the entire body of more detailed legislation accurnulated over the decade since 1979 is reaffirmed, rather than superseded, by the new document.
Another topic covered by the revised law in a substantiaily different way is the leçal rights and responsibilities of units and individuals. The 1979 law merely stated:
The leaders of units, those directly responsible, or other citizens who pollute and harm the environment so senously as to cause people's deaths and injuries or heavy losses in agriculture, forestry. animal husbandry, sideiine production, or fishing should be investiçated for their administrative. economic, or even criminal responsibility."
In contrast. the longest chapter of the revised law is devoted specifically to legal responsibility. Borrowinç &om environmental management experience. the document touches upon administrative, civil. and criminal legal responsibility and sets out procedures for compensation for losses and appeais on levied fines. Although rather vape on the point, there is even provision for environmental management personnel to be held responsible for neglect of duty and other offences.
The same range of punitive administrative actions mentioned in the original document are outlined in this version; fines, wamings, production stoppage and plant closure are al1 mentioned.
"wang Suli. "Features of law for environmental protection " China Environment News, nos. 6 and 8 (January and March 1990). as cited in Vermeer, "Problems and Abatement Policies." 53. Also see World Bank, Repon No. 9609-CHA China Environmental Strateev- . Pa~er,April 1992, Annex 1, page 2.
"~riiclethirty-two of the 1979 law as cited in Ross and Silk, Environmental Law and Policy, 290. The administrative organizations levying the fines or other measures (presumably EPBs) may request the courts to enforce compliance when their initial orden are not canied out. Suits for compensation were similarly to be handled by administrative departments and sent to the courts only in cases of non-cornpliance with original judgments. Thus, this chapter of the law sets out a hework for the establishment of "legal" responsibility primarily through administrative, rather than judicial, enforcement. Nevertheless, this greatiy expands the vague provision in the earlier version of the law that every unit and individual have environmentai obligations and have authority to report incidents of environmental harm.
A fifth component of the revised law is closely related to the above-mentioned assignment of legal responsibility. This is the establishment, codification, or reaffirminç of a number of administrative systrms. In this regard the revised law was a little more detailed and definitely more comprehensive than its predecessor. Among the systems outlined or implied by the 1989 law. eight were later singled out for emphasis by implementing cadres.I3 These became known as the "three old" and "five new" systems for environmental management. The "three old" systems centred on the mi~ongshrequirement. environmental impact assessment, and discharge fees. Provisions for each of these systems were contained in the 1979 law.
The "five new" systems. on the other hand, had been introduced. either in experimental or more legal fashion. at various times over the last ten years. The 1989 revised law represented their national leçal codification and a signal that these were the policies and procedures that the state wished to have universally implemented. These systems were the environmental goal responsibility
"See the preface in Zhonwo Huaqiine Guanli Zhidu. The subtitle of this book is "Environmental Cadres Trial Training Materials." Another book of this type is Ganbu Juece Cankao Congshu: Wo Guo Ziyuan vu Huan.[Cadre Decision Makine Reference Collection: China's Resources and Environment] (Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe, 1988). system, comprehensive urban environmentai renovation level assessment, concentrated pollution control, the effluent report, registration and permit system, and the lirnited period pollution clean-up
Cor "date certain") system.
The application of some of these systems, as noted above. had been commonplace already.
For example. provincial and municipal EPBs had often çiven enterprises assiçnments to undertake certain renovations within a specific period. On the other hand. others of these systems had been applied only in limiteci experimental form by 1989. These include the goal responsibility system and the permit synem." As with other pans of environmental "lawt' in China, the details of these systems are outlined in other legal and administrative documents.
The final two crucial components of the revised law were generai discussions of measures available for enforcernent and means for the prevention of pollution and other types of public hm.
These broad provisions cover such things as soi1 erosion, ecoiogically sound agriculture. technoloçical utilization, and accidents. As with the 1979 law. these are more statements of principal than they are legal specifics.
As the crowninç environmental achievement of 1989. the revised law brought together and reemphasized the core of China's environmental procedures. practices and reylations. In terms of orçanization it provided a new stming point for division of responsibilities and, by codifjmg the de facto status quo, gave a pater responsibility to local govemments in terms of monitoring, treatment. and propaganda." And by providing a certain nurnber of specific systems for local EPB personnel
1The ongins, logic. organization. and procedures of each system are considered individually and in considerably more detail in Zhoneguo Huanjine Guanli Zhidu. More is said about these two part icular systems elsewhere in this dissertation.
15Vermeer, "Problems and Abatement Policies, " 53. t O concentrate on. the revised law allowed for more focused application of implementation efforts.
In short. its aim was to induce local officials to be more responsible and more focused in their environmental work." If implemented. the law would raise the level of local environmental protection work beyond that achieved up to 1989.
Wu Zilin summed up well the situation by outlininç the ongoing problems faced. and the hstration felt. by local EPB officials in late 1989:
The expenences gained in the implementation of the laws and replations in the past years indicates that it is dificult to make a law but it is still more difficult to enforce the law. [Since] in the Xiamen Special Economic Zone the environmental protection work started later than [il the other areas. . . . the environrnental administration force is weaker. the legislative units are not so farniliar with the environmental protection laws and regulations. [and] some enterprises and construction units just have a blunted sense of environrnental protection . . . or just do not understand very well the environmental protection laws and regulations and environmental administration processes. As a result. pollution cases are often concealed or failed to be reported. with the aim to escape from the environmental monito~gand management [sic]. The environmental administration units. due to shonage of hands and overload of work and innifficient monito~gequipment. ca~otdiscover and inspect the pollution cases in time. The phenornena of slack law enforcement ofien occur[s]. In addition, necessary rules and reylations are not completed and environmental capacity of various environmental elements in vanous reçions is not well understood . . .. Furthemore. . . . idcient means of surveillance and monitoring have brought some difficulties to the daiiy monitoring and administration of environrnental problems."
The deçree to which the focus and impetus provided by the revised national law. and other factors. were able to help improve this situation is the central focus of the remainder of this section.
The introduction of a revised national law in 1989 did not significantly alter previous implementation patterns in Xiamen. To the extent the new law embodied ten years of central govemment learning. its lessons did not markedly improve local implementation effons. It did.
"On the somewhat limited utility of the responsibility system in this regard, see Jahiel. Policv Implementation Throueh Organizational le am in^, 28 1-90.
17Wu. "ToProtect a Developing City." 10- 1 1. however, in conjunction with some renewed municipal efforts initiated in the late 1980s. allow a continued moderate intensification of pollution control work. It also increased the work burden of the cash-strapped EPB. Earlier funding increases and sporadic enforcement effons did not lead to quick or easy realization of the goals espoused in the 1989 law and the systems it promoted. Thus. like earlier laws. it hnctioned as a directive to local implementors; the de facto intent was for its strictures to be enforced over time. Exploration continued in several dimensions of this work and routines had not yet emerged in certain cntical aspects of environmental protection.
It is true that the introduction of the new law did coincide in Xiamen with attempts to reign in some major polluters. However. these were not new poiluters which had escaped previous EPB attention; some were perpetual poiluters with a history of law violation. For exampie. in Au yst 1990 the city's leading joint venture. the Hua Xia Foodstuffs Company. was fined 50.000 yuan. This enterprise had been designated by the EPB as the city's number one polluter. It was thefirst joint vet~tirrrin Xiamen to be fined for polluting the environment." The factory ignored a warninç made in 1989 that tougher penalties would soon follow if improvements were not made.
The factory's failure to heed the waniing was particularly distastehl to local officials at this point in time for several reasons. First. not only had they released tonnes of untreated effluent fiom
MSG production, but they also transponed polluted water to unauthorized sites in outlying areas for dumping. Second. their worst violations came at a time when Yun Dang Lake, due to its selection as a national clean-up project and increased municipal investment. was just begi~ingto show some improvement.lg The enterprise singlehandedly contibuted about 40 percent of the lake's pollution
lnZHB. 14 Auçust IWO. 1; and ZHB. 2 February 1989. 2.
19ZHB, 14 Aupst 1990, 1. See Chapter Seven. load by exceedinç state standards by nearly 400 times. Finally, the damage From both the dumping
and the effluent was being noticed outside of the policy cornmunity. Famers adversely affected by
the dumping, for example. had initiated lawsuits in local courts.
These factors induced local EPB officials to levy heavier fines. Govrrrrmerr~cadres dso took
note and began comidrrir~gan ordered production stoppage while rectification took place. It is
significant that such consideration occurred only afler repeat violations and an initial soft-handed
approach in 1989. Cenainly municipal officials must have considered at the same time how harsh
treatment of a leading joint venture would be viewed by potential investors.
Perhaps emboldened by no noticeable adverse reaction to their harsher treatment of Hua Xia.
the EPB soon took further action against that and several other joint enterprises. Four factories,
including Hua Xia, were ordered to stop production. They were requested to take corrective
measures or change location. One factory was fined and moved frorn its location in a scenic area.
Another took measures to rectifj iits noise problems. including elirnination of night shifis, and was
allowed to resurne production. An ink factory guilty of violatinç air pollution standards also resumed production after changing location. The solution for Hua Xia. the only factory of the four to pollute
Yun Dang Lake. was the topic of prolonged official discussion^.^^
In contrat to these recalcitrant or otherwise neglectful enterprises, one Xiamen enterprise stood out as a positive example. In 1987. Xiamen's Overseas Chinese Beer Factory was among the city's largest polluters. In that year. after a warning from EPB officials. they made a one-tirne 1.4 million yuan investment in pollution control equipment and allocated a fùnher 200,000 yuan per
'OZHB. 1 December 1990. 2. Eventually a decision was made to allow the factory to "temporarily" transport its emuent out to sea for "disposal." It was no longer allowed to pollute Yun Dang Lake at all. As of late 1993, officials from Shanghai had been invited to make a plan for treatment of the effluent. Interview with Wu Zilin, 8 November 1993. annum for conversion to cleaner technologies. The new equipment went into production in mid-
1988. By 1990. the factory was able to reach national effluent standards and was chosen both locally and nationally as an "advanced environrnental unit."" Their exceptional proçress. a local official ciaimeci, came not only from technological improvement. but also from çood management." By this he no doubt meant a manaçer uncommonly responsive to EPB waminçs.
Interna1 documents submitted fiom the EPB to the local govemrnent in 1990 implicitly recognized that certain long-standing procedures were not being conducted routinely. It was suggested that an environrnental plan should be formulated for incorporation into the city's general industrial plan. Scrupulous adherence to the santot~gsbirequirement for construction projects was also advocated. Both of these suggestions relate to procedures long promoted by centrai authorities and supposedly in place. But their mention in a report to the governent implies a lack of both political will and the necessary personnel for implementation. S irniiarly. the report called for impfernetrrotiotl of the plan denoted by the newly-created "Xiamen City Mayorai Environmental Goal
Responsibility C ertificate" (Xiamen Shi Shizhat~gHmnjitrg Mribiao Zmn Sm). Apparently EPB cadres already feared that this new system miçht be içnored."
II. The Permit Svstem and "Exploration"
One of the few significant new ~atiotra/environrnental protection initiatives of the early 1990s was the announcement by the NEPA that the pollution permit system was now to be universally
"m.25 Apnl 1990. 1 : and interview with Wu Zilin, 8 Novernber 19%.
"Interview with Wu Zilin, 8 November 1993.
"Ibid.. 267. Xiamen was not listed as one of the six Fujian cities which had an established environmental plan in IWO. See Zhoneeuo Huaniine Nianiian ( 1WO), 328. implemented." It was among the "systems" referred to in the revised national law. It was noted above that the "Regdations on Environmental Control in Xiamen City" issued in 1985 contained provisions for a pollution permit system and that in 1987 officials discussed this program with some electroplatinç factones. This was subsequently ernphasized in conjunction with "registration and reporting to higher levels" (sher~baodeqji). Given that Xiamen was approved as a test point for the permit syaem in mid-1988, that registration of polluting enterprises was to be the foundation (ji~hti)'~ of the permit çranting procedure, and that the EPB's Deputy Director had publicly stated that the system was in place, one might expect that registration would have already occurred by the time the revised law was promulgated. This was not the case. In fact, the general registration of polluters in
Xiamen did not beçin until afier this announcernent in late 1990."
The benefits of registration demonstrated through more than three years of exploration and experimentation in eighteen cities. as cited by national officials, were as follows: first. a permit system improves environmental quality control; second. it raises the efficiency of investments in pollution control equipment; third, it encourages enterprises to undertake measures at dl stages of the production process because it focuses on pollution sources; and finally, a permit system brinçs other management systems into channels for comprehensive pollution control.
These ostensible benefits notwithstanding, the national exploratory experience was somewhat less comprehensive and successfùl than official rhetonc would lead one to believe. In eighteen cities.
'%HB, 12 October 199 1, 1; and Huaniine Gonezuo Ton-n [Environmental Work Report] no. 1 ( l992), inside back cover.
"~honeguoHuan~ing Guanli Zhidu, 1 12.
"zHB. 18 September 1990. 1. General implementation of this system was not atternpted nationally until after 199 1. See Zhonaeuo Huanjinp Guanli Zhidu, 1 15. a total of 364 1 enterprises had been registered through the experimental phase." Of these. just over
1.000 actually received permits; and these represented from 12 to 97 percent of the waste water pollution load for the cities involved. In other words. some test sites were able in t hree years to find enterprises representing a mere fiaction of the city's pollution load worthy of permits. In part this was due to the fact that smaller enterprises were not required to obtain permits. Nevenheless. it does indicate the limited scope of the programme's application.
How was the much-delayed "experiment" undertaken in Xiamen? Local officials' lirnited application of the system through a policy Ifangzhen) of prioritization. Taking "concentration control" (trotrph kmzgzhz) as_the focal point. Yun Dang Lake and the manne areas near the Xinglin
Development Zone were chosen for initial attention. A total of 246 reçistration foms and 54 applications were completed. The end result was that 42 of the city's most prolific water polluters were yanted permits.18 These enterprises were responsible for just over half of the city's 1990 total of 2.8 million tonnes of industrial waste water effl~ent.'~Many of the permits çranted were ternporary. and there is no evidence of specific efforts to shut down or penalize non-permit holders.
As mentioned earlier, the issuing of numerous permits did not occur in Xiamen until rnid- 199 1 when NEPA officials approved (ym~shcntr)Xiamen's experimental work. The move was said to mark
Xiamen's step-by-step progress in implementing this system. But the issuing of permits in 1991
"ZHB, 12 October 1991. 1.
'*~honemioHuanjine Nianiian ( 1992). 394; and XRB, 19 May 199 1. 1
W.19 May 199 1. 1. It is wonhwhile to note that this total figure had nearly doubled in eight years. up from 1.516 million tonnes in 1982. Moreover. in 1989 fifiy-nine units representing eighty percent of Xiamen's pollution load were reported to have been give permits. Apparently the permits of some heavy polluters were withdrawn before the Xiamen expenment was approved. See Zhongwo Huaniing Nianiian (1990). 337. There is no evidence to indicate that enterprises which had permits withdrawn were penalized or forced to take remedial action. appears to have been a NEPA-supervised replication of Xiamen's previous three years of experimentation. In 1993 a Xarnen EPB officiai admitted that. despite the sanctioning of the system for general national implementation rky were still exploring with respect to which types of enterprises were subject to the programme's pro~isions.~~And since universal implementation was called for jus a few months der approvai of Xiamen's limited expenmentai work one can question the degree to which the Xiamen expenence contributed to the national decision to universalize the system. Given that some other locales were even less inclusive in their application of the system one miçht also wonder about the efficacy and purpose of the exploratory process itself. Here expenmentation seemed to function as a de facto requirement in the PRC policy process on an issue for which there was no consensus or for which there appeared to some leaders to be no urgent need.
Whether experimentation per se is really what went on at many test points is sornewhat doubtfùl.
Application of the permit syaem to air pollution, once advocated by Xiamen officials but rejected by the Centre. and application of the system to solid wastes continued in "experirnental" form in the early pan of the decade."
ProWicially. over 1.000 enterprises had been reçistered by the end of 199 1. Erprrirnerlts in issuinç permits continued in Fuzhou, Sanming Quamhou and Nanping. Thus. while NEPA approval of the "experiment" had Qven Xiamen the green light for implementing the system more completely. the work in other cities was still deemed experimental by provincial officiais. This was despite the national cal1 for universal implementation. In this case. the term "test point" (shi diarr) must be taken to mean a less complete application of the system in the cities mentioned rather than indicating a
''~nterview with Gao Chengtie. 9 November 1993.
"'ZHB. 12 October 199 1. 1 ; and XRB. 20 Febmary 1992, 1. state-sanctioned exploratory approach to policy making. Provincial officiais (or municipal cadres in other Fujian locales) were apparently proceeding with universalization no more quickly t han finances. personnel levels. and local political suppon would allow.
III. Enforcement and Leeislative Processes
Responding directly to public complaints remained an important pan of the municipal EPB's work der the promulgation of the new law. In one year they responded to over 200 verbal or knencomplaints by the public." In nearly 90 percent of these cases. it was claimed, they were able to mediate or make peace (tiaojie)with the complainants. About twenty programs were initiated in response to requests fiorn the EPB's political masters (the local People's Congress and the Standing
Conunittee of the municipal government). These boasted a 100 percent completion rate." Although these projects no doubt directed the EPB to key problems, external requests for work done also diverted EPB resources away from attempts to make vigilant supewision more routine.
The EPB made continuing efforts to move heavily polluting industries away from population centres and. in the case of water pollution, nearer planned treatrnent sites. Four industrial enterprises were thus moved in 1991. Similady. work continued on encouraging large enterprises to take measures to reduce pollution. Sorne of the city's most prolific polluters, including the sugar factory and the power plant, took remedid measures. The result was, according to official NEPA sources.
"a drastic reduction in the city's pollution load" (dadajianshao ship de wztrm~fithe).'~As indicated in Chapter Three. amal results were less impressive.
"Zhoneeuo Huaniing Nianjian (19972 394.
33~bid.
"1bid. Quite specific legislation continued to emerge under the direction of the provincial government afler the revision of the national law. As indicated above. provincial involvement in fee
coUection and administration was sanctioned by the Centre in the mid- 1980s. In 199 1 the Standing
Committee of the Provincial People's Congres approved "Fujian Methods for the Implementation
of Pollution Fee Collection."" This marked the beginning of fee collection accordinç to new local
standards. Total fees collected dunng the year amounted to 50.2 1 million yuan, an increase of over
9 million from 1990. Fees were coliected in 199 1 from over 6,000 units. up dramatically from about
2.500 in the previous year. The value of collected fees reinvested in pollution control projects was about 24 million yuan. This-marked an increase of about 30 percent over the year before.
These statistics suggest that the system whereby polluting enterprises pay into a fund from which they can, in tum. draw upon for environmental protection renovation loans was now. in conjunction with burgeoning fee collection, becominç quite useful. Recall that this progam had been initiateci a decade earlier through national and local legislation. Whether the loans were actually spent on appropriate technology (or even environmentai technology). however, is unclear. Provincial hnds allocated in non-loan form for specific projects such as relocations or water treatment fa~ilities'~were somewhat more likely to be spent as planned and thus have environmentaily beneficiaf results. In
Fujian, such hnds were drawn fi-om a special fund raised by an "ecological environment protection fee" levied on mining operations. This fund was established in 1990 and was first made available for special project funding in 199 1. The marked increase in fees collected province-wide may aiso reflect some iocal EPB's eagemess to garner funds fiom whatever sources possible. As noted above. such tendencies were clear in southem Guangdong province. Xiamen officials, however. did not indicate that any substantial proponion of their operations was financed by their share of fees collected.
While financial details remain somewhat unclear due to a lack of public information, the generai legislative and policy process for local environmental laws and reçulations had, by the early
1990s. become reasonably clear. Actual faws were a provincial responsibility in terms of final approval. although municipalities like Xiamen continued to press for this authority. Some regdations or des could be officially passed at the municipal level. but their formulation usually involved consultation with provincial authorities. Provincial authorities also played a key role in mpprrvisii~g the implementation of the santorgshi requirernent (but little role in actually implementing it). determining fines and charges (but not levying them) for enterprises not directly under the Centre. and directing limited-penod clean-up projects."
Municipal laws on environmental matters generally had their start when the Standing
Committee of the Municipal Governrnent (consisting of the Mayor, his deputies. and a secretary) decided to take action." Such decisions usually came at the urging of higher authorities. either directly or indirectly. The Deputy Mayor responsible for environmentai work then consulted with leading cadres in the local EPB. Together. they devised a recomrnended action plan. The Standing
Committee then discussed. and often revised. the EPB's recornmendations. This revised proposai was then circulated for discussion arnong a variety of municipal departments.
"~aa."A Comparative Study of Provincial Policy." 70.
Ju~~terviewwith Zhao Keming, 7 January 1994. Which departrnents were consulted depended upon the nature of the proposed legislation, but many of the twenty or so organizations represented on the municipal EPC were oflen involved. The powemil Planning Department. the Land Department. and various commercial and industrial interests were frequently brought into the pro ces^.^^ In the end, the Standing Cornmittee approved laws and sent them to the Fujian Provincial People's Congress for final approval. Before that would happen, however, the proposed law could go back and forth a few tirnes between the two le~els.~~The local legal bureau was also involved in the drafting process.
Although NEPA and other state level organizations are not officially part of this process. their statements and directives, as indicated in Chapter Three, are iduential in at least initiating thinçs.
Xiamen. as an SEZ. mua be especially sensitive to national concems. These concerns are sornetimes transrniaed through the provincial bureau. Since supervision of municipal implementation is primarily a provincial responsibility, Xiamen's special status subjects it to the watchfùl eye of at least two
"mothers-in-law " (licaigge pop^).^' These are the municipal govermnent for the kuai relationshi p and the Fujian EPB for the frao relationship. Of these, the local government is more infiuential because of its leadership authority over the EPB.
Extensive local consultations and substantial supervision fiom above also influenced less forma1 administrative decisions on Xiamen's environmental affairs. Both national laws and local regulations indicate that horizontal coordination is one of the major functions of local EPBs. The
391nterviewwith Wu Zilin. 8 November 1993
"Interview with Zhao Keming, 7 January 1994.
41 InteMew with Wu Zilin, 8 November 1993. This slang term is commonly used among officiais in China who see themselves as subjea to too much scrutiny from above and was used in this context by the Director of the local EPB during Our discussions. provincial EPB is supposeci to coordinate work brtweert m~nicipalities.'~Some provincial efforts to fÙlfi1 this fùnction have been outlined elsewhere in this dissertation.
As indicated above. concerted action against repeated. large-scale polluters occasiondly involved orders to close, stop production. combine productive facilities, change products. or move to a new location. Ail such orders had to be approved by the municipal çovernment. although the
EPB was @en some discretion in dealing with newer enterprises." In a decision to order a lirnited- period clean-up program, several factors were usually considered. The financial strength of the enterprise, the degree to which standards were violated. and the impact upon people's heaith and employment were aii regularly taken into account. None of these factors was spelled out in a precise way in regdations and standards?
Differentiation of enterprises in terms of size was also important for the implementation of particular policies. But whether an enterprise was large or small was decided upon the basis of factors not specified in legal documents; physical size. production capacity and product type were among the factors considered. Moreover, enforcement with respect to large ancl srnail enterprises each had their respective problems. According to the Director of the Xiamen EPB. big factories cannot be shut down (~ingbti liao) because of their economic importance. On the other hand, small factories are too numerous and are thus diffiailt to manage (xiuo qzjw rai dzro, gmdi y011 hrrt~~an).'~
%id. This discretion reflects the difnculties and political sensitivities involved with old factories; new enterprises were subject to the santorigshi requirement and thus could be treated a little less gngerly. at least in theory. Moreover. new factories were ofken foreign, whereas old ones were often state-mn.
"Interview with Wu Zilin, 8 November 1993. National authonties had adopted a "poffuter pays" principle a nurnber of years earlier. but the pnnciple proved difficult to apply in Xiamen. One Company in Jirnei. for example. was required to construct pipes to carry waste water away fkom the site. Even though municipal authorities asked the unit to cany the costs thernselves. they were eventually able to arrange for the city to take up the majonty of the expense?
The foregoing exarnples of local implementors hesitating to stnctly enforce legal pollution control measures reflects in large measure the overwhelrning cornmitment of the highest municipal authorities to economic development goals. Although environmental protection and econornic development are not incompatible in the long run. immediate considerations induce local leaders in historically underdeveloped areas to emphasize quick economic growth at the expense of environmental effons4' Incentives for municipal leaders to alter this emphasis are the purpose of the environmental goal responsibility system outlined in the 1989 revised law.
This syaem is "an objective administrative management system for ensunng responsibility for environmental quality from al1 levels of local people's çovements and polluting units. "*' Cadre training materials explaining the system concluded that practice had proven that environmental departments alone cannot alter worrying environmental trends in a given regi~n.'~Moreover. given
China's relative lack of financial resources, measures must be taken for better management rather than dramatically increased investment. Thus. the key is in "raising and strengthening the leadership and
461nterviewwith Zhao Keming. 7 January 1994.
47Maa "A Comparative Study of Provincial Policy." Maa makes this point regarding provincial leaders and policy making. This study assens that the same is tme. perhaps even to a more cntical deçree. for municipal leaders and irnplementation.
'uZhonemio Huaniing Guanli Zhidu, 69. emphasis piaced upon environmental protection work by senior administrative cadres at al1 levels. "'O
Toward this end, the system entails the public formai enurneration of mutual environmental goals and responsibilities between mayors and enterprises or. altematively, provincial govemors and mayors.
The system was among the newest and the least deveioped when included in the 1989 law; based on several different models. localities are given considerable leeway in application."
How had the responsibility systern developed in Xiamen by 1992? Beginning in 1988. authorities had implemented a "Mayots Environmental Protection Responsibility System" (Shizharg
Mrmh Zerw UliJir).S' This system involved the use of a mayor's responsibility certificate (xren shtr). This document outlined environmental goals. quotas. and basic intiastmcture projects to be accomplished during a calendar year. These goals were published in the local newspaper each year with the intention of making "face" a factor. However, the province could unilaterally impose changes upon mutually approved responsibility certificates." When responsibilities or goals went unfùlfilled. provincial authorities occasiondly got afier the mayor or used the certificate to force him to take action on a particular problem. Concrete punishrnent for non-fulfilment of goals was not undertaken, however.
It is worthwhile to note that other incentive prograrns were also in place. Begnning in 1989.
Xiamen beçan to offer annual token (ximigzheng)rewards, such as plaques and public recognition to individuals and orçanizations with noteworthy environmental accomplishments. These mirrored earlier established incentives offered by NEPA for things such as leadership in propaganda or impact
'Olbid.
"Ibid., Chapter Six, especidly pages 82-84.
"~nterview with Wu Zilin, 8 Novernber 1993.
'"bid. assessrnent work. The provincial govemment was actuaily involved in offenng financial rewards to municipal govements for environmental work, though exact arnounts and other details for the penod under study are una~ailable.~~
These varied atternpts to create incentives thus remained rather low-key in 1992. Clear. detailed, public personal-responsibility pledçes between the Governor and the Mayor such as those observed in Shandong and elsewhere had not been tried in Fujian. Nor had incentive systems linking mayoral responsibilities and EPB accomplishments been tried in Xiamen; this. too, had been tried in other places.5s Thus. heavy reliance upon "face" as a monitoring factor in municipal environment work had produced neither heightened consciousness on the part of mayors and their deputies nor a strong, enforceable incentive system between them and their superiors and subordinates. It is in this context. then, that municipal officials continued to prefer dissuasion (pari=) as an enforcement tactic. When this failed, orders to stop production usually only emerged after cornplaints by the public. As late as 1992, the still-rare closure of a factory in the Huli district followed this familiar progressive pattern. 56
The plethora of laws. reylations and pronouncements on environmental protection which were promulgated by various levels of government in China thus served primanly as guides and urgings for action by local government oficials in their supervision of pollution control. Indeed it would be fair to state that there was little expectation that they would be implemented according to the iaw. Attention to environmental matters intensified as time wore on. but this was, in part, a
54 In 1993. Xiamen's share of such rewards amounted to about twenty thousand yuan or twenty- five hundred US.dollars. The prograrn may have operated on a much smaller scale before 1993.
5S~nterviewwith Wu Zilin. 8 November 1993.
"XRB. 4 June 1992. 1. function of increased local prosperity rather than eievated environmental consciousness on the part of politicai leaders or intensified adherence to the law prr sr. Why this was so is better understood in the context of China's approach to the organization of environmental responsibilities. That context will be addressed in the next chapter. CEAPTER SIX: LOCAL ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
1. Introduction
As noted in Chapter Two of this dissertation. the evolution of China's national environrnental orçankations has been a rather convoluted process. It was also suggested that the geatest burden for actually implementing and enforcing pollution control laws and reptations falls to sub-provincial organs. most notably municipal governrnents and their affiliated EPBs. This chapter explores the institutional development of environmental protection organizations in Xiamen and shows how centra11y-rnandated organizational changes were bot h resisted and later accommodated at the local level.
It is also argued through reference to the Xiamen case that municipal EPBs are weak bureaucratic units in the local political context and are therefore dependent upon Mayoral attention to environmentai matters for implementation success. This chapter also specifies how provincial authorities in Fujian exercised their mac'ro~~copicenvironmental responsibilities without dramat ically affecting local developments and thus highlights how this division of responsibilities retards implementation effons.
II. Oreanizational Development in Xiamen
It has been suggested that the initial refom in China in the late 1970s were "the abandocment of Staiinism and Maoism through deregdation of the Chinese economy and of Chinese minds."' It was in this atmosphere that environrnental issues could finally become the
'Carol Lee Hamri~China and the Challenge of the Future: Chaneine Political Patterns (Boulder: Westview Press. 1990). 30. topic of tiank discus~ions.~Signs of the national govemment's increasing concem on environmental issues were quite clear by 1978. In that year. several national conferences on the topic were held. the importance of the environment was emphasized in a number of Central Directives. environmental protection was designated as a state responsibility. and severai key industrial enterprises in major cities were threatened with closure if pollution was not stopped.'
Provincial and municipal authorities in Fujian took these siçnals senously. This attitude was evident pnmarily in their organizational activities. In Auçust of 1978. the Fujian Provincial
Revolutionaiy Cornmittee approved the establishment of an Environmental Protection Office of the
Xiamen City People's Govemment. This fomalized an environmental protection small group (xiao m)that had been established a year earlier. The new administrative office had five staff members and soon established two related institutional affiliates: the Xiamen City Environmental Protection
Research lnstitute and an Environrnental Monitoring Station for the city. These units were onginally staffed with a total of about fifteen people.' Among the most important initial tasks for the fledgling office was to "energetically propagandize" regarding environmental protection work in order to increase awareness among officiais and the public on the issue.'
'Although initial liberaiiion provided the opponunity for scientific evaluation of environrnental issues. pollution control is an issue which can be promoted by reformers and conservatives alike. Insofar as reformers push for the separation of Party and govemrnent. they provide suppon for environmental enforcement and strengthen the EPBs' mandate for action. Pollution control becomes a "conservative" issue when leaders wish to highiight the pitfâlls of the open door and SE2 strategies. The prevailinç winds at the Center, therefore. can have a sigiificant impact on local enforcement activities. but do not always determine outcornes because of intervening local factors.
'ROSS, Environmental Policv in China, 139.
'Interviews with Lin Hanzong. 6 January 1994; Wu Zilin 8 November 1993; and Gao Chengtie. 7 October 1993.
'~nterviewwith Wu Zilin. 8 November 1993 While local officiais proceeded apace with propaganda, research, and initial monitoring activities. a series of meetings and conferences held by the oflice of SCEPLSG in late 1980 and early
198 1 outiined further instructions for local cadres. The importance of keeping local statistics, issuing environrnental quality reports, standardizing monitoring activities, and environrnental education were emphasized through conferences and draft regulati~ns.~
As a result of its SEZ designation, Xiamen soon initiated sorne more specific environment- related activities. During the first half of 1982. the city governrnent invited a number of professors and other experts fiom the Chinese Environmental Engineering Society and the Environmental
Chemistry Research Institute to survey the area and comment on a draf? of the "Xiamen SE2
Environmental Impact Assessrnent Plan." Mer six days of inspection, the çroup offered "many constructive suggestions" (nidziojiaiishrxiqg de yijiat~)concerning the nature. content. and scope of the assessment. as we// as orgmrizatzot~alrnatters, policy, planning. and the selection of attractive programs for environrnental protection. That their comments were numerous. not made public in any detail. and went beyond the drafl assessment itself to include institutional questions is suggestive of the poor state of environmentai protection and orçanization in Xiamen at the time.
In response to the recommendations of these experts. the Xiamen Party Cornmittee and the govemment decided to establish a leading smail group to oversee the SEZ's environmental impact assessment. Specialized subordinate çroups were established by Xiamen University and the Marine
Institute Number Three. Professor Wang fiom Beijing was assigned to head up an advisory group.
The activities of Xiamen's office and its subsidiary orçans in these early years included annual inspection and monitoring of the factories then polluting Yun Dang Lake. seasonal water quality
'Zhonemio Huaniing Nianiian ( 1992). 599. assessment, collecting some effluent fees, conducting propaganda activities on Earth Day, and
monitoring acid rain and noise levels.' These activities increased in frequency as time went 0% but
strong routines with mandated inspection schedules were not developed.
As part of wide-ranging state organizationd reform in May 1982. severai ministries related
to the constmction industry. and the office of the SCEPLSG. which still lacked any particular
bureaucratie status. were brought together to fom the Miniary of Urban and Rural Constmction and
Environmental Protection (MURCEP). The office of the national leadinç srnall goup becarne the
Environmentai Protection Bureau (Htrattjit~gBaohr Jrr) of the new ministry. Although intended to dignie environmental protoion through state ministerial status, the move effectively downgaded the bureau. reduced its staff at the central level. and put an ostensible regulator within the same ministry as those who were to be regulated. The former head of the then newly-created bureau reponed that the "practice of the central çovernrnent was dutifully copied by the subordinate units. which proceeded to move their environmental offices. which were administratively independent and directly under provincial and municipal governrnents, to become part of the new ministry."' This, by
Qu's account, was an rrr$)rrrtrmzte case of strcces~$rl implementation of orçanization reform.
In Xiamen, ho wever. t his institutional readjustment was resisted. The Xiamen Environmental
Protection Bureau (icc) was not established until 1986.9 Neither the creation of a State Council (and subsequently local) Environmental Protection Commission nor the relative independence granted the
'Ibid.. and interview with Gao Chengtie, 7 October 1993.
'QU History, 16. Renmin Ribao [People's da il^]. 10 May 1982, 2 translated in JPRS-8 173 7, 23; and Qu Geping. Zhonsmio Huaniine Gudi [Chinese Environmental Management] (Beijing: Zhongguo Huanjinç Kexue Chubanshe, I989), 327-28.
9Interview with Lin Hanzong, 6 January 1994. national EPB in 1984 sparked the creation of a btrreati in Xiamen. This is confirmed by newspaper references to the organization.'O
lhat this lack of implementation may have actually aided environmental protection efforts by, at least temporarily. reducing obstruction by industrial interests and maintaining (albeit small) staff levels. could have been quite accidental. Restmcturinç of the bureaucratic apparatus. particularly the merging of what were separate constmction ministnes. necessarily impinçes upon a variety of local interests. some of which could have been responsible for the delay. Construction stakes were particularly high in the SUSand this was a penod of considerable flux in the relationship between the Centre and special zones." It is likely that the local arms of the powerful construction ministries
(responsibility for which was fallig increasingly into the local çovemment's hands at this tirne) were resisting a rnove that seemed to invite increased consultations with a bothersome environmental goup. Nevertheless, concem about bureaucratic status and stafflevels for the local EPB were also relevant factors."
IOFor example. the word office (ban) was comrnonly used in public discussion of environmental protection work. This is a term now more commonly used for rural county environmental protection units, but was initially used for several types of newly-created environment work organs. See XRB 16 December 1984. 1. The word bureau (jzc) does not appear in reference to the local organization in the local press until rnuch later; see XRB,4 June 1986, 1.
11See Jude Howell, "The Impact of the Open Door Policy on the Chinese State." in Gordon White (ed.), The Chinese State in the Era of Econornic Reform (London: Macmillan, 199 1 ), 133- 146.
"1nteMew with Lin Hanzong, 6 knuary 1994. Lin explained that in 1982, the Fujian Provincial EPB was established as a second-level bureaucratic unit under the provincial commission and therefore was under-staffed. His comments imply that the Xiamen EPB held equal bureaucratic status vis-à-vis other local departments. Another source implies that first-level status for the Xiamen EPB was not officially established until late 1986 or early 1987 as part of an expenrnent in structural reform. See ZHB, 17 January 1987. 1. On bureaucratic status, see Oksenberg and Lieberthal. Policy Making in China, 24,144, and Susan L. Shirk, The Politicai Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). Chapter Five. In any event. it is unlikely that the local Environmental Protection Office, small as it was. was the driving force behind the resistance, though they may have been pleased that the reorçanization was delayed. Thus. from 1982 to 1986, Xiamen's environrnental protection was based on an organizational footing distinct fiom its national and provincial superiors and fiom most other municipal environmental organizations.
Interestin@y. Li Xirninç, head of the new MURCEP, did have a firm çrasp of some of the challenges faced by local EPBs at the time. He observed in a speech to EPB chiefs that
. . . because the work started late. the foundation was weak and was limited by the nation's financial and matenal resourc- many problerns accurnulated. . . In the depth and scope of the work a lot of environmental protection work has not tmly begun.I3
He also recognized the cntical role played by localities in the process:
. . . we must mainly rely on the locality to carry Our management. In this work we still do not have an adequate foundation and it is a very weak link . . . The massive and concrete environmentai management tasks are concentrated in the localities and their accomplishrnent relies upon the local environrnental protection departments. This is because environmentai protection departments. as fùnctional depariments of the local çovemments at each level perform the major duty of supervising, inspecting, oganizinç, and coordinating environrnental protection work. If the standard of the organizational system is low. it is difficult to carry out duties."
He also observed that "propaganda is intended mainly for leading cadres at each le~el."~~And. apparently aware of resistance in places Iike Xiamen. he explained with some urgency the need for establishinç EPBs in cities and counties." In this early instance, then. central involvement in local
"~uaniineBaohu [Environmental Protection], no. 8, 1982, 2-5, translated in PRS-830 10, 1-7.
I4Ibid.
I51bid.
lG1bid. organizationai affairs simply consisted of urging local leaders to follow the central organizational mode1 .
By May of 1982 yet another organizational adjustment was introduced by Beijing. A State
Council Commission on Environmental Protection (SCCEP) was formed to initiate strateçies and policies for the whole country and to fiirther speciQ planning requirernents for environmentai protection. It was also to lead, organize, and coordinate the efforts nationally. Li Peng was named as chairman and other members were drawn From rhirty other ministnes and commissions.'' Similar commissions were to be established in the localities. The establishment of such comrnissions, the intent of which was to allow environmental work to be coordinated with the activities of industrial organizations was, like the formation of EPBs. resisted at the local level. An Environmental
Protection Commission was not established in Xiamen until early 1986. Given the composition of these commissions (see below), this resistance seems a bit strange in retrospect. However, it is a clear indication of how local government officiais sought to allow local enterprises to flourish unimpeded.
Once established, the Xiamen Environmental Protection Commission became a critical nexus in the environmental implernentation process. Horizontai coordination on problems or actions which affect specific interests ofien took place within the EPC. Here, the EPB sits as one of twenty-four
"relevant" departments. Many major decisions, therefore, were negotiated in a forum where environmental interests were in a decided rninority. The Sanitation Depanment or a sympathetic deputy mayor were ofien the EPB's oniy allies in this setting. lahiel's observation that local EPBs show an adaptive capacity to work with other departrnents must be tempered by noting that this
"Qu, Histoq, 20. This Commission does not meet ofien and serves to coordinate conflicts between other Commissions and Ministries on environmental issues. Although its exact status is unclear. it is unlikely that it shares equal bureaucratic rank with, for example. the State Planning Commission or other critical govemrnent bodies. See Ross and Silk, Environmental Law and Policy. "capacity" was bom of weakness and necessity. Such adaptation did not necessarily fûrther
environmentai work.
These institutional changes indicated a recognition of the crucial role played by local leaden
in making environmental protection actually happen. This recognition was increasingly voiced at the
Center. Indeed. this recognition was part of a more general policy thnist clearly supported by Zhao
Ziyang at the 13th Party Congress in late 1987 which sought to curb party interference in routine
government work. In a theme that was to become widespread in both newspaper reports and
specialized journal articles throughout the 198Os, the initial meetings of the new SCCEP emphasized
the responsibilities of mayors. county heads. and provincial çovemors.l8 ~t the second meeting of
the SCCEP. the prrsortal itivolvernrti~of mayors in environmentai protection work was praised as
the mayors of Harbin and Luoyang shared their e~periences.'~It was also suggested that a solid legal
system should be set up for local governments t O strengthen environrnental management .'O
That the Ieading political figure in any given locality was a key element in forcing recaicitrant
economic officials to relent on some environmental and related budgetary issues was becorning quite
clear to central leaders. It is standard administrative practice in China for mayors to resolve local
bureaucratic confiicts. That even with organizational changes rnayors would necessarily have to
intervene on the side of environmental interests became apparent in practice. Thus. much of the
Centre's propaganda was aimed at raising the "environmental consciousness" of local govemment officials.
19xinhua(Beijing). 19 November 1984. translated in JPRS-CST-84-04 1. 9- 10. Also see Jahiel. 280-90. For more regarding the cntical role of Mayors. see below. Xiamen's local rwirot~me~itafcadres, in contrast, were environmentally aware but in no
position to forcefully make their concerns known in the mid-1980s. Recognizing their weak
bureaucratic position, their suggestions for improvement of environmental quality in a report to the
city government made no mention of organizational matters and recommended increased investment
oniy for what was already recognized as the city's most serious environmental problem - Yun Dang
Lake."
What local EPB officials did suggest is also indicative of their weak budgetary and
bureaucratic position. One major theme was prioritization. It was recomrnended that the most
important problems be taken care of first and that environrnental management focus on the newly
deveioped areas. This latter recommendation implies the control of less politically entrenched
enterprises and more flexibility for the established industries in which local officials had a stake. This
type of prioritization comprornised the state "decision" in 198 1 which explicitly mentions both old
and new enterprises. but was in agreement with later statements by central leaders.--7 7
Another indicator of the subordinate bureaucratic position of environmental organs is
personnel levels. Since moa environmental protection cadres are on local govemment payroll, their
numben are indicators of the level of support given the work by local governrnent and Party officials.
Specific figures for environrnental personnel in Xiamen through the mid- 1980s are not complete. In
"Xiamen Shi Huaniing Zhiliane Baoeaoshu. 198 1- 1985 [City of Xiamen Environmental Quality Repon. 198 1 - 19851 (Xiamen: Xiamen Shi Huanjing Baohu Ju. 1986).
-1nteMew17 with Lin Hanzong, 6 Januaxy 1994. Lin indicated that the emphasis on new enterprises was chosen because of increasing foreign investment in Xiamen at the time. This suggests that, as the SE2 took off. overall restrictions were actually relaxed because of limited resources for enforcement. It also indicates that new enterprises. which should have been subject to the sarirorqphi requirernent anyway. were more politically palatable targets. It is revealed elsewhere in this study. however. that the economic importance of these foreign enterprises also translated into lax enforcement. 1982. there were about thirty relatively poorly-trained officials involved in environmental protection
work. This number increased to about fifty in 1984. This figure includes research staff. By 1993 the
total had climbed to around 120." In contrast, some 1983 replations on the subject recommended
that municipal monitoring stations alone should have around 150 persons on staff2'
Perhaps one of the reasons for slow implementation. then, was a lack of personnel. Visiting
national inspectors criticized Xiamen in 1989 for low personnel levels and a lack of organization at lower levels. Some efforts were taken to rectie these problems in 1990. In October. EPBs were
established in each of the city's six districts. These would be subordinate to the respective district
çovemments. but would operate under the city EPB's leadership in professional matters. In theory.
each diaria EPB would be responsible for the implernentation of law and environmental management in the areas under their jurisdiction. They would also be responsible for pollution prevention, dispute
settlement and collecting effluent charges." How (or whether) this decentralizing measure affected overall staffing levels and administration was not imrnediately apparent. but District EPBs eventually took a leading role in propaganda
A common explanation offered by Xiamen EPB cadres for a lack of implementation is
"overload of work" and "shortage of hands."" While rnost officials correctly relate this problem ultimately to China's status as a less developed country, it was noted above that this is a reflection of
%honemto Jinai Tequ Nianjian ( 1984) [)J. (Xiang Gang: Zhongguo Jinji Tequ Nianjian Chubanshe, 1985). 380; inte~ewwith Lin Hanzong. 6 January 1994; and interview with Gao Chengtie. 7 October 1993.
"~ermeer."Problems and Abatement Policies. " 3 8.
"XRB. 13 October 1990. 1.
L"ersonal observation of anti-pollution signs by author, Xiamen, Autumn 1993
L7~~."To Protect [a] Developing City." 1 1. a recent trend in China. That is, increasingly discretionary budgets for local governments have been accompanied by both reduced resources and increased responsibilities." The delegation of environmental enforcement activities are a part of this trend. And. as implementation progressed, those activities themselves were increasingly diverse." In this context. it is not particularly surprising that locai EPBs were under-staned since the local political officiais responsible for staffing are subject to a multiplicity of demands for personnel allocation. One way in which EPB officials tried to overcorne low stafFlevels was to request univenity personnel and other extemal experts to help with monitoring and measurement .'O
Thc weakness of local EPBs related to lack of staff and the politicai backing enjoyed by industrial enterprises was well-recognized by both local and national leaders by 1986. Cadres in
Xiamen concludeci that there was insufficient strength for enforcement (zhfla liliar~gbirm) and some laws had thus become mere fonnalities vapi Iitryli xingshi)." Recognizing their own "due attention" to fomulating national laws and standards and encouraging local legislatioa central leaders likewise began to describe this in increasingly clear terms as a key problem. Qu Geping, director of the national EPB stated in late 1986:
"~ong,"Central-Local Relations. "
"On this point aiso see Sinkule, Implementation in the Pearl River Delta.
'"Sorne EPBs in other locales established semi-autonomous consulting organizations to increase their own revenue and thus hire more workers. See Ibid. This did not take place in Xiamen during the period under study.
"XRB. 11 July 1986. 3 When policies are codified into laws they cm be carried out. and they have a binding force. We have a very strenuous building job to do in this regard. . . . The backwardness of Our present environmental control is manifested primarily in feeble supervision. Environmental protection units are supeMsory units. Implementation of pertinent national environmental protection policies and regulations depends on [local] environmental protection units. When supervision is strong. policies and reçulations are carried out, thereby leadinç to effective protection and improvement of the environment. When supervision is not strong, policies and regulations becorne mere formdities. The environment cannot be effectively protected and may even detenorate fu~ther.~'
Qu later said. upon reflection on environmental work during the sixth five-year plan ( 198 1 -
85). that the main problems expenenced were two-fold. First. in the application of environmental policy hdow lheproviliciai fevrl. "hard" environmental targets were compromised to become "sofi" and uncertain." Second, investment in environmental protection was insufficient. This too, of course, was largely the responsibility of lower levels. Subsequent organizational effons were thus aimed at rectifymç these problems.
Some orçanizational initiatives in the second half of the 1980s were aimed at specific locations. For example. increased bureaucratic status for several urban local EPBs (including
Xiamen's) was endoned eariy in 1 98T3' But other more general changes also grew out of this recognition of the difficulties facing local environmental protection organizations. Recall that the oganization of MURCEP in 1982 rneant that environmental protection shared a ministry with the construction induary. Subsequent changes Iinked MURCEP'S EPB with the State Council, but failed to gant environmental protection work ministerial status. Apparently recognizing the challenges this
"~honeeuoHuanjing Kexue [Environmental Sciences in China]. no. 1 (20 February 1987). 1-3. translated in ERS-CST-87-0 1 7, 102-3.
"ZHB, 1 January 1987. 1. My discussions with local EPB officials suggest that this status may have already been held, defacto, in Xiamen at this point. organizational format created for local work expenments were initiated in late 1986 which transformed local environmental protection organizations into tme functional departments of local govemrnent~.~~Articles then appeared in the Chinese Environmental News (Zhonemio Huanjinq
-Bao) and specialized joumals explainhg the logic and necessity of these changes. These micies dso chronicled the positive experiences of several of the localities chosen as test sites.36
These activities may be viewed as preparatory to the çrantinç of separate rninisterial statu to the NEPA in 1988. The intent was for this organizational reform to be mirrored at the local level.
Aithough not ail localities were equally respon~ive,~'Xiamen followed the national lead immediately.
This stands in stark contrast to Xiamen's resistance to organizational reform in 1982. Perhaps because of that earlier experience. Xiamen was chosen by the state in late 1986 as a test point for these structural reforms. The Xiamen EPB was also çranted fieedorn to raise personnel levels according to need and other privileges at this time.38
It is unclear whether an actual btrreotr (jzi as opposed to a department. or btrmrn) was belatedly established in Xiamen in conjunction with this reform. It is aiso unclear whether that body was rvrr a part of a local MURCEP. as envisioned by the national organizational changes of 1982.
It is clear. however, that the establishment of a local bureau and Xiamen's selection as a test site for organirational refom occurred within a few months of each other. Thus. it was likely that Xiamen more or less "skipped" the nationally-mandated organizational forms of 1982-86 (in which environmentai and industrial concerns shared a ministry) even thouçh ofJial separation of the EPB
"ZHB. 29 November 1986, 1.
"For example, see Ibid.; and ZHB. 21 March 1987. 1
"ZHB, 20 October 1992. 2.
"ZHB. 17 January 1987. 1. fiom the local MüRCEP may not have happened until the refoms were promoted country-wide in
1988. In short. not al1 organizational learning taking place at the national level was successfully transmitted to the local level. Rather, as indicated above, local environmental work trod a somewhat independent path of institutional evolution.
Notwithstanding this divergence between central and local experiences. in a broad sense central leaders and local environmental workers were learning similar lessons. The SCCEP was now meeting and dealing with substantive issues on a very reçula. basis. A fiesh set of commissioners was appointed the responsibilities of the body were funher specified, and a nurnber of "decisions" were promulgated which contributed to the 1989 revision of the national law. They aiso belatedly drafted a State Environmental Plan to coincide with the seventh FYP (1986-90). State spendinç on the environment was slated to rise 50 percent (to about 25 billion yuan) compared to the sixth FYP.'~
Thus. the SCCEP began to play a key role in sifting out the key lessons of ten years of expenmentation. These national-level initiatives and the organizational refoms which preceded them indicate that national leaders recoçnized fiom SCCEP recomrnendations a need to raise the level of environmental work and, more particularly. to encourage local cadres to pay attention to that work.
But they did not advocate assigning environmental o$meme»r to a higher level in the administrative stmcture.
At the same tirne. local EPB cadres were learning fint-hand how the industrial interests of the local political elite were acting as ballasts on pollution control enforcement. This problem. which could only be remedied by altering the authority stmcnire in such a way as to make municipal
'9ZHB. 5 May 1987. 2-4 and China Daily, 24 October 1988. 1 in JPRS CST 88-004. 59. govemments subordinate in environmental flairs to some authoritative higher-level body which attached great weight to such matters. grew ever more clear to officials at the Xiamen EPB.
- Some of the recornrnendatiow made by the EPB to the local governrnent in the late 1980s are reveaiing. In contrast to more timid suggestions five years earlier (see above), EPB cadres now advocated changes which touched upon orçanizational questions and decisions within the local govemment's control. To facilitate the coordination of economic development and environmental protection. it was suggested that enforcement teams be strengthened; in short. more personnel were needed. This, it was thouçht. would ensure more effkctive irnplementation of reylations. It was also recornmended that a gove~~rnetrlalsupe~sion organization be established as soon as possible.
Better coordination between functional departments was urged.
These suggestions irnply a need for greater govemrnent involvement in pressunng unenthusiastic departments to consider environmental regulations. At the sarne time. an intemal document suçgested. the leadership of these departments and of industriai enterprises needed improved environmental education." Entrenched bureaucratic and economic interests still dominated
çovemment pollution control decisions.
These lessons learned by EPB cadres were also refiected in their goal-setting activities.
Earlier goal setting activities largely ignored the weakness of local organizations themselves. perhaps in part out of a desire not to offend other powerful municipal interests. Thus. for the local EPB to cd1 in 1987 for strengthening of the Xiamen EPC. the EPB, and research and monitoring work was a significant step which indicates some learning and increased courage on the part of EPB cadres.
But such a call by municipal authorities was consistent with the state's call for strengthening and upgrading of Xiamen's organizations as a test site for organizational reform." Local goal setting was thus guided in some measure by national directives.
The fact that the central authorities and municipal EPB cadres both look toward municipal govemment leaders for the success of environmental irnplementation is indicative of the key role played by mayors in China's administrative hierarchy. Zhao Keming, who served first as the Chief
Secretary of the Municipal Party Cornmittee in Xiamen and later as the city's Deputy Mayor stated this point directly:
Environmental protection work is extremely difficult at the present time. The economy is developing rapidly and many foreign projects are in competition everywhere to see who will give their operation hiçher profits and favorable terms. As an environmental protection department facinç this çreat tide. it is not easy to maintain stability and administer according to the law. Withot In Xiamen. environmental responsibilities were assiçned not to the rnayor but were. rather. delegated to one of his five deputies. The concem of these officials for the environmental portion of their duties varies between incumbents. Deputy Mayor Cai Wanghuai, who looked der environmental flairs in the early 1990s. was mentioned several times by interviewees as beins more interested and personally involved in environrnental work than others who had earlier served in the same position. Some Deputy Mayors were described as having a "lower level of understanding" in environmental &airs or as being "busier." Cai. in contrast, was the only one to frequently visit EPB offices to see how things were "zHB. 17 January 1987, 1. "zHB. 23 April 1988, 2. emphasis mine. In the same article other municipal officials indicated t hat Xiamen would only offer economic incentives to investors; no environrnental regulatory concessions would be made. Zhao's later interview comments noted above, however, imply that this was not aiways the case. going." While his exact role in the decision-making process is not known, local EPB cadres felt that his interest must have been helpful to their cause. Support by the municipal govemment for environmental control is aiso manifest through funding levels. Although still deemed insufficient by local EPB cadres. fundinç for the environmental protection organization in Xiamen had increased more or less in step with the city's quick economic development. Whereas in 1980 the EPB fknding (fiom the government and 20 percent of fines and fies collected) for a naoftwenty was 60,000 yuan; by 1992 the budget for a staff of more than 100 well exceeded 2 million yuan? This represents more than a thirty-fold increase over thirteen years. But these fùnds had to be spent on growing salaries. expanding equipment stores, propaganda, and research. Infiastnicture projects were paid for by the municipal govemment with substantial direct heip from the province. Domestic and foreign loans were aiso sought for major public works projects in the late 1980s and eariy 1990s. It may be useful to emphasize here. however, that while staff levels are a helpful guide to understanding govemmentai support, increased staff merely provides a foundation upon which strict enforcement may be built. The Shenzhen EPB, like the one in Xiamen, experienced significant staff increases during the 1980s; personnel totals rose from 20 to 128 over eight years in the 1980~.'~ However, the Shenzhen EPB was far more able than its Xiamen counterpart to deveiop independent sources of revenue and a cooperative relationship with other govemmentai departments. It even "Interviews with Lin Hanzong, 6 January 1994. Gao Chengtie, 9 November 1993. and Wu Zilin. 8 November 1993. Cai himself was not interviewed because at the time of my field work he was serving a prison sentence for cormption. His crimes, my informants hastened to clarify. were not related to his environmental responsibiiities. J 5 Sinkule. Implementation of Pollution Control Policies, 172. issued reçualtions by itsell: rather than with the city or other departrnent~.'~Another EPB in the Pearl River Delta, at Foshan. managed to gamer over 80 percent of its revenue from fees, contracts. and pallution charges; only 1 1 percent of revenue came from municipal govemment allocation^.^^ In Xiamen. these proportions were reversed. with the EPB remaininç highly dependent upon the govemment for resources. This suggests that an EPB determination to innovate and solicit cooperation from other departments emerçes under very special circumstances; very affIuent conditions and environmentally conscious mayors are critical. Relative to southern Guandong municipalities. Xiamen lacked these. Funding and staffing -constraints were also indicative of the supreme importance accorded to investment attraction by local officiais. Zhao Keming. the Deputy Mayor who later inhented Cai Wançhuai's environmental responsibilities explained that one cannot çreet potentiai investors with a list of environrnental requirements; if you did, they would "mn away" @~odino).~~Indeed. a convenient silence on environmental matters seemed to protect investment attraction efforts. In contrast. bureaus concemed with investment applications in Shenzhen will not approve projects without impact assessments and EPB review." The Deputy Mayor's comments are a clear indication of the powefil cross pressures which affect municipal officiais on a day-to-day basis. These pressures. moreover. were in many ways the product of the institutional context of environrnental protection and local çovemment in China. ?bid., 176. "Ibid.. 197. 4X~nterviewwith Zhao Keming, 7 Januaq 1994. '9Sinkule, lmolementation of Pollution Control Policies, 174. III. The Provincial Role in Environmental Implementation Municipal institutionai development and the key roles of mayors and their deputies in impiementhg pollution controls have been outlined above. The importance of the sub-provincial level will now be underscored by describinç the activities of provincial-level authorities in Fujian. Not only does the Fujian EPB engase primarily in training, inter-jurisdictional problem resolution and generalized campaigis (especially directed toward counties and certain industries), but the Provincial Govemment has been less active than other provinces in its attention to environmental matters. In short. the province did little to propel city authorities forward in their environmental responsibilities. even though it did perform many of its "macroscopic leadership" duties envisioned in the national law. Provincial EPB officiais were engaged in only very specific types of supervisory activities on a day-to-day basis. In particular, they surveyed certain industries and directed broad environmental activities, especially those which directly affected agriculture. Conceming the former. special attention was paid to the ship conversion industry and paper manufacturers in Fujian in 1986.~'With respect to the latter type of activities, the province allocated funds to promote a more efficient type of household coal stove." coordinated some efforts to combat the province's worst drought since 1939." and gathered statistics on a whole host of environment-related matters. Provincial-level 5 O This section does not undertake a comprehensive examination of the Fujian EPB's activities. Some specific legislative activities of the provincial govemment are mentioned in the chapter on law. The aim here is to survey activities typicaily done by Fujian authorities in order to contrast them with the enforcernent responsibilities of municipal cadres. 51~~.20 May 1986. 2; ZHB, 16 November 1986. 1 ; ZHB, 27 January 1987.2; and ZHB. 14 October 1986, 3. ''ZHB. 1 1 November 1986. 1. officials also tried to improve extant weaknesses in environmental protection capabilities in 1987 and 1988. These efforts ocnineci in major areas of provincial responsibility: inter-municipal coordination and .~pen~i.simof lower-level implementati~n.~' By 1987 Fujian province had estabiished a basic environmental monitoring network that operated on several levels and in numerous regions. However, they were relatively slow in developing this network and their overall environmental protection system (xitorig) was relatively weak in its supervisory p~wers.~'In an attempt to rectiQ this state of &airs. the provincial EPC began to put emphasis on utilizing horizontal ties to enhance monitoring work. Thus. by promoting coordination of efforts between EPB officiais and those in fields such as sanitation, çeology. hydrology, agriculture. fisheries, oceanography, military afFairs and mining, they were able to enhance their once-weak monitoring system? Coordination efforts were also extended between çeographic units. Xiamen, Zhangzhou, Quanzhou and Guangdong's Shantou collaborated in establishing an environmental assistance network. '' Beyond this the Fujian EPB also conduaed a number of specialized research projects. These included a comprehensive inspection of industrial pollution sources, a survey of coastal areas, and a study on food and water source fertilizer poll~tion.'~ 54 Interview with Wu Zilin. 8 November 1993. The Director of the Xiamen EPB cited these as the province's primary role. He also indicated that Xiamen receives direct inspections fiom NEPA officials. This may be due in part to its SEZ status and related importance in national &airs. '5~H~.14 November 1987, 1. These efforts were aimed at overcorning problerns inherent in the Chinese horizontal and vertical chains of comrnand (dapo tiaohai fer?&. "ZHB. 14 Novernber 1987, 1. "[bid.; and ZHB. 18 July 1987. 1 As indicated above, the Fujian EPB took a special interest in environmental protection in specific industries and large projects. For example, there was a provincial component to the rnoney allocated for the cleaning up of Yun Dang Lake in 1988. With respect to individual industries. the pulp and paper sector (the largest polluter in the province) continued to attract critical attention. The discovery that the paper industry's pollution load to output value ratio was nine tirnes the provincial average led to calls by the Fujian EPC for strict reform within the industryS9 Since the pollution discharge of small factories was particularly heavy relative to their econornic output. they were singled out for particular criticism. The Director of the EPC ordered relevant departments to carry out. and report on. an earlier-rnandated reform of small paper production enterprises. Govermnents at al1 levels were called upon to "vigorously and responsibly suppon environmental departments in implementing the Iaw."* Again, such urging was indicative of what was m>or happening at the municipal level. Provincial EPBs were heavily involved in the collection and compilation of statistics. Provincial environmental statistics provide an interesting window on both contrasting local and provincial trends and the art of environmental data presentation. The ratio of pollution fees collected to total value of industrial production output was considered by the Chinese a bellwether of a çovernment's ability to practice environmental management. By 1988. fiyres had been kept in Fujian on these indicators for a total of nine years. -- - '9~~.17 Septernber 1987, 1. 'O~bid. TABLE 6.1 PROVINCE OF FUJIAN YEARLY RATIO OF EFFLUENT FEES COLLECTED TO TOTAL PROVINCiAL INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT t Total Provincial Amount Colkcttd in Industrial Output Ratio of EfWent Fees Emuent Fees Value Coîiected ta Industrial (x 10,000 yuan) (x 1100,000,000 yuan) Output Vdue (%) lj2.C) 75.5 O 20 348.8 source: Fujian Huaniinq [Fu-iian's Environment], no. 5 (October 1989), 24. chart two. Note in Table 6.1 that the collection of effluent fees expanded more quickly than industrial output until 1987. when growth in fees collected values appear to drop off The declining values in the right-hand column were perhaps the result of backsliding in fee collection. This stands in contrast to Sinkule's andysis of Foshan in Guangdong where the great growth in the absolute arnount of fees collected reflected a money grab by a cash-strapped EPB. Although increased investment and economic activity in Xiamen coincided with, at a minimum. more fundinç for the clean up of Yun Danç Lake. a similar association between economic çrowth and stepped-up monitoring and enforcement does not appear to have occurred at the provincial le~el.~' Provincial statistics also reveal that a vast sector of polluters was relatively untouched by fee assessments and controis in çenerai. Althouçh in 1987 over 98 percent of enterprises in the province were classifieci as smail. nearly 55 percent of al1 fees collected for exceedinç effluent standards were fiom medium and larçe enterprises directly under city (hi)or provincial administration." Thus, it is likely that thousands of small or nirai enterprises were not being assessed for pollution violations. It is clear that even after a decade of enwonmental efforts in Fujian conditions were less than exemplary. Provincial govenunent cadres met with environmentai experts in a discussion meeting in connection with science and technology week in 1989. The comments made there regarding Fujian's environmental situation were revealing. Upon heanng various comments by scientists and engineers. a member of the Standing Conmittee of the Provincial People's Conçress commented that the general trend of environmental degradation in the province was worrisome (lit~grejr Jatlyo~t).~~ The principal reasons for this poor situation he noted. were that laws are not implemented firmiy and that environmental protection organizations are weak (-hi fa hrc yun he hvaii hao jipr de bonto). The province's Vice-Govemor thanked the experts for their input and urged them to apply pressure by beinç "mother-in-law mouths" @opmi)? He also told EPB cadres to work without fear "There are problems associated with usinç fees collection as an enforcement indicator. In an ideai world. for example, no fees would be collected because no polluted emuent would be released. 62ZhangLi. "Fujian Sheng Paiwu Shou Fei Jiben Qingkuang Fenxi" ["A Basic Analysis of Fujian's Effluent Fee Collection Situation"] Fujian Huaniinq Ifujianîs Environment] no. 5 (October 1989). 23- 26. In 1984 this figure was even higher. at about seventy percent. ''ZHB. 28 November 1989, 1. This phrase means to talk a lot or to nag. A similar request took place in Xiamen when Deputy Mayor Zhao Keming asked the director of the University's Center for Environmentai Science because the provincial çovemment was behind them. Another Vice-Govemor urged cadres to prioritize their environmental challenges and report particularly acute ones to the provincial çovemment for consideration. These requests reflected what had irot been happening regktrly up to that time; govemment officials had not been taking environrnental responsibilities seriously while EPBs were reluctant to publicize the numerous problems which faced them. Among the problems noted by this dual inspection goup was the increasing seriousness of water pollution. And a key cause in many locations was explained this way: A11 locales reported that arnong the moa acute problems was that environmental organizations and personnel [levels] were unsuited to the needs of economic development and management work? Xiamen in particular was singled out for cnticism of its low personnel levels. With oniy twenty cadres assigned specificdy to environmental maitagemetrt and no district-level environrnental orçanizations. Xiamen was particularly under-staffed and orçanizationally weak. Indeed. establishing appropriate environmental management personnel levels was among the whole province's most pressing environmental problerns (Jung wu zhi ji)? Provincial EPB officials. ketheir municipal counterparts. were thus concemed about a lack of organizational strength for implementation. And they, too. were willing to take what limited corrective action they could on these long-standing problerns. For exarnple, by the beginning of 1990 Fujian officiais had ordered corrective measures for over twenty thousand srnall village and township Research to frequently remind him of his e~rviro~~mriitalresponsibilities. Hong Huasheng, Director of Xiamen University Center for Environmental Science Research. persona1 communication with author, November 1993. ''ZHB, 2 December 1989, 1. enterprises." These efforts were taken in an atternpt to slow the explosive growth of these enterprises; Fujian was among the provinces with the greatest rates of expansion in this sector. lncluded in this work was the closing of over one hundred srnall paper factories. This was done through a joint effort of the Fujian EPB, the Township and Village Enterprise Bureau, the Labour Depanment and the Sanitation Department. The provincial EPB's preoccupation with mral enterprises reflects both the depth of the problem and the evident weakness or absence of sub- provinciai EPBs in these areas. tt is clear that attention to this duty distracts the provincial EPB fiom closer supewision of cities like Xiamen. The concem of the province regarding the oganizationai strençth of municipal EPBs was manifest in its efforts to send provinciai cadres to particular counties to help outGgIn the first part of 1990 the entire provincial EPB was mobilwd for work at lower levels oui dui~gy~iat~pa~~ti jzpi prho xin jictit~g)." Even the Deputy Director Ied a work tearn to Yongding County to help solve environmental disputes and other problems. In other locales. work centred on inspection of equipment in small- and medium-sized enterprises. While it seems that the primary goal of this exercise was to help weak environmental organizations at the county level discharge their duties - an extension of the province's supervisory role - it was also aimed at providing provincial cadres with some practical experience. A policy of rquinng provincial EPB cadres to take a y&s training at lower levels was concurrently put in place. The aim here was to dlow these officials (who were perhaps more used to statistics-çathering. "ZHB. 13 Februaq 1990, 2. "ZHB, 27 March 1990. 1. 691bid. laboratory expenments, and hands-off supervision) to "strengthen their ability to solve practical problems. "'O Some modest organizatior~alstrengthening was also apparent in tems of personnel levels. Nation-wide, it was reponed that in late 1985 more than 40,000 people were employed in environmental management, an increase of "several fold" since 1980.~'Fujian estimated in early 1986 that its total number of environmental protection personnel at the end of 1985 topped 600 individuals." Thus. since only a very srnail portion of the national total worked at the state level. Fujian's personnel represented, at best. 1.5 to 2 percent of the national total of local environmental forces. Fujian's population was less than 3 percent of the national total, but its per capita industrial and economic activity during the period in question was above the national average. So it can be estimated that Fujian. though not glaringly so, was initially less than exemplary in staffing its environmental protection organizations. Indeed. the province ranked twenty-fourt h out of twenty- eight provincial-level junsdictions in the average ratio of the number of staff to the number of enterprises fiom 198 1 to 1987.'' Fujian's average ratio was less than twenty percent of Beijing's. In 1985 Fujian began keepinç statistics on environmentai finances, personnel, and environmental projects and programmes initiated. In 1985. the province had a total of 862 persons 70Ibid. This could also have been part of a national rectification carnpaign for cadres urged by conservative leaders in the wake of events at Tiananmen. 7L~~~.18 January 1986, 2. Statistics published later indicate that staffing levels were. in fact. much higher than 600 persons. See below. "See Table 3.42 in Maa, Provincial Policy, 93 working in environmental pr~tection.~~This sharp increase over the previous year (see above) reflects, perhaps, an indication of how officiais responded to a cal1 for bener statistics; they reported higher numbers in subsequent years. By 1988. Fujian had 997 environmentai cadres. '' Later, perso~ellevels showed some improvement. The number of provincial cadres involved in environmentai work grew in 1990 by 237; nearly 200 of these were assigned within EPBs at al1 levels." These cadres, moreover, were better trained. The province conducted a number of classes for cadres regarding legd matters. These courses educated local officiais about the revised national law and a statute on law suits." Later, the Fujian EPB held a meeting for urban cadres fiom around the province to exchange experiences and views on environmental planning skil~s.'~ The provincial govemment, in conjunction with its regular broad-based planning. also set environmental quotas or targets (=hi bzao). Eighth FYP targets included eight quotas related to urban environmental quality control twenty-eight quotas relating to effluent levels and clean up, and forty- two objectives related to management and other matters were set." Environmental planning was apparently beginning to corne of age in Fujian. However, as indicated above, these quotas and targets, so bravely set at the provincial level had a tendency to become "soft" or flexible during implementation by sub-provincial units. Although 74~uiianTonGi Nianiian. 1987 [Fuiian Statistical Yearbook. 19871 (Beijing: Zhongyo Tongji Chubanshe, 1987), 404. 75~honemioToneii Nianiian. 1989 [China Statistical Yearbook 19891, 777. ''~hongguo Huanjine Nianjian ( 199 1 ), 3 3 1. "~bid.,328. "ZZHB,21 March 1991, 1. 79~hone~oHuaniine Nianiian ( 1992). 325. Fujian EPC officiais proclaimed provincial governmrtrr suppan for local-level enforcement act ivities. the Fujian People's govemment was. in reality, among the less active provinces in China in terms of addressing environmentai issues. Regarding staffing, funding* and leçislative work Fujian's performance lagged behind a rnajority of other Chinese province^.'^ This, combined with Fujian's lack of emphasis on their provincial-mayoral responsibility system (see Chapter Four). meant that city officials received no more than very occasional pressure (either direct or implied) on environmental issues from their provincial counterparts. IV. Conclusion Nationdy-mandated organizationai refoms were resisted in Xiamen. Moreover. even when implemented they had Medirect impact upon the power relationships which impinge upon the Mayor and the director of the EPB. These actors remained constrained in their administration of environmental iaw by stronç local political forces. Fujian authonties were. for their part. engaged much more in training. coordination and county work than in urban pollution control enforcement. The Je fuctro. and to an extent de jlcrr. division of responsibility between sub-provincial units and their higher-level counterparts for environmental work in China thus detracts fkom implementation effectiveness. In their "leadership" relations with EPBs. neither the Fujian nor Xiamen govrrrrrnrrrts exercised much leadership on environmental issues. Provincial EPBs. on the other hand. advised city environmental workers. but usudy concemed themselves with a substantially different subset of activities. These factors highiight the importance of institutions and organization to implementation effectiveness. '%faa. "A Comparative Study of Provincial Policy," Chapter Three. CEIAPTER SEVEN: THE CASE OF YUN DANG LAKE 1. Introduction - To this point, this dissertation has emphasized organizationd. financial, and attitudinal impediments to the irnplementation of pollution control laws in Xiamen. The bureaucratic weakness of the locai EPB is due to the interreiated factors of underfinding and the way in which other actors in the policy network view the importance of their work. And, as noted earlier, China's status as a less developed country bent on quick econornic growth as well as recent decentralization of responsibilities by the central govemment help explain why locai officials do not allocate sufficient fùnds to environmental causës. There is. however, another point to be considered in exarnining the apparent lack of funds for reçulatinç polluters. The disnibution of pollution output in a çiven region is largely a fbnction of the distribution of industrial activity. Thus, the history of industrial, econornic, and municipal planning can have a very real and costly effect upon subsequent pollution problems. This is very evident in Xiamen. This chapter demonarates how poor decisions in the past accumulate and continue to harnper current pollution control efforts. More specificaüy, it shows that efforts to make up for the past have diverted officials' attention away from preventative pollution control despite those officials' clear recoçnition of the importance of such measures. Yun Dang Lake. a former inlet closed off Eom the sea by an aborted land reclamation project in the 1970s. is widely considered to be Xiamen's number one ecological problem. The lake is encircled by many of the city's most prolific water polluters. Efforts to build water treatment facilities. dredge the lake. facilitate renewed drainage into the ocean, and to rnove or shut domwell- established adjacent industries have used up large portions of environment-related expenditures in Xiamen. [fan ounce of environmental prevention is worth a pound of cure. Xiamen is learning this lesson the hard way, and only slowly at that. This chapter also underscores a nurnber of the points made in earlier chapten, especially with respect to the pivotal role played by the local political leadership in mobilizing resources for pollution control. The next section describes briefly the history of Yun Danç Lake up to the early 1980s. It focuses on the creation of what is generaily cailed "the Yun Danç Lake problem." Section three looks at scientific studies and specific clean-up measures in the penod 1980-87. Section four examines similar factors during a more recent penod when efforts were intensified. Section five surnmarizes the results of these measures and offers some conc1usions about the legacy of the past. II. The Problem At one time Yun Dang Met @mg)was a picturesque haven for fishing boats in poor weather. It was also home to numerous small fish, prawn, and other wildlife. Its name. ylrrl Jaq. refers to the lush, taIl barnboo reeds which once çrew dong its shores. It was considered to be one of Xiamen's eight great scenic spots.' However. in Mao Zedong's eagemess for increasing the area of China's agncultural land. he once called for "planting crops in the middle of lakes and on the tops of mountains." This injunction led to widespread land reclamation projects throuçhout the country.' Enthusiasm for such activities 'ZHB. 14 December 1 99 1, 3. 'See Vaclav Srnil, The Bad Earth: Environmental Deeradation in China (Armonk. N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1 984). 62-68. apparently expanded to include coastlines and urban areas as well. It aiso continued wel1 after the feverish carnpaigns of the Great Leap Fonvard and the early Cultural Revolution. In July 1970 construction began on a dyke to essentially seal the idet off from the ocean (see map. Appendix A). The 1435 meter long dyke was completed in 197 1. Later officiai press repons referred to this as "blind dyke construction" (mangmtr to the north of the more populated portions of Xiamen Island. Water could still flow through the dyke in small amounts, but this was strictiy controlied. The intention was to make the inlet disappear and use the land for the nonhward industrial and residential expansion of the city. The inlet shnk fiom its onginal eight square kilometre size. but, for reasons which are not clear. was never allowed to entirely disappear.' At the time of the dykets constniction, 90 percent of Xiamen Island's untreated industrial waste water flowed directly into Yun Dang Lake. Although Xiamen's economic boom and quick industrial çrowth had not yet started. the condition of the lake deteriorated quickly. By 1976 a distinct stench was noticed as rotting vegetation and particulate pollutants formed a thick black sludçe (hei ye) on the lake bed. The lake was dead. A srnall water treatrnent facility was built in 1976, but was unable to eliminate the smell or keep up with the growing demand for water treatment? During the late 1970s. industrial and residentiai expansion began on land reclaimed fiom %RB. 25 August 1984, 1. 4InteMew with Wang Longfa (Senior Engineer, Xiamen University Center for Environmental Science Research), Xiamen, 29 December 1993. That the elimination of the "lake" was intended is quite clear; published maps showing the area as land, not water, were available long afier the original plan had ben abandoned. See Xiamen China (Xiamen: Huayi Publishing House. 1989). 87: and Si- ming Li and Ling-xun Zhao, "Xiamen: Regional Center and Hometown of Overseas Chinese," in Yue-man Yeung and Xu-wei Hu, eds, China's Coastal Cities: Catal~stsfor Modemizations (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992). 224. the shmnken lake. The strength of the lake's odour aiso continued to increase. causing resentment among city residents. - Thus. on the eve of the introduction of environmental protection work to Xiamen, the city faced a concentrated environmental challenge of critical proportions. Large amounts of untreated industrial waste water flowed daily into what had essentially become a cesspool of industrial gmnge with Little drainage capacity. Removing the dyke and allowing the water level to rise to original levels would flood established industries and planned residential districts. Moving the whole of what was becominç Xiamen's industrial heartland was not a feasible option either. Eliminating the lake compietely as originaily pla~cdcould rob those industries of their current convenient waste disposa1 methods. [t would also require huge infiastructural investment to allow for other disposai methods! As will be shown in the next two sections. new infrastructure was. dong with natural processes. a key part of the chosen solution; total elimination of the lake and widespread industry closures were never really considered. The full implementation of even these somewhat inadequate measures. however, proved to be a long, difficult, and expensive process. III. The Search for Solutions Recognition of the seriousness of the Yun Dang Lake problem was widespread by 1980. This is when fonhright news reports of Xiamen's most noticeable pollution problems began to appear.' The overail situation was said to be "quite serious." Concerning water pollution it was reported that every day 50.000 tonnes of waste water carxyinç, inter dia, arsenic. cyanogen, lead. mercury. and 'Exact figures for the late 1970s are not available, but by 1982 there were 113 enterprises polluting Yun Dang Lake. See ZHB, 14 December 199 1.3. 'XRB. 26 March 1980. 2. phenol flowed into various parts of the Xiamen Harbour area. Of this. two- thirds was concentrated in Yun Dang Inlet (they were not calling it a lake yet). As indicated above. description of a problem in the newspaper ofien means official recognition of the difficuities described and pending eKons at resolution. Initial measures in this case were directed toward obtaining a better understanding of the nature of the problem. In June 1980 a comprehensive monitoring survey of Yun Dang Inlet was proposed. The People's Govement and Municipal Standing Comrnittee ordered the Environmental Protection Scientific Research Institute and Monitoring Station to combine forces with nineteen other units to conduct a survey of the idet's water quality in late June and then again in late December. The Chemist~yand Biology Departrnents of Xiamen University. the Municipal Science Committee. and the Fujian Marine Research Institute were al1 involved. The purpose of this exercise was to produce scientific data and reliable information for the improvement of Yun Dang Inlet's water quality. Initial measures were not limited to scientific research and data accumulation. But other early actions exhibited a rather Maoist optimism in the solvability of the problem. In iate 1981 the provincial and city çovemments announced the establishment of a new district - the Yun Dang New District - in the heart of XiarnenaBThis area, it was claimed, would become Xiamen's administrative, trading, athletic, and recreationai centre.9 The inlet, by this time reduced to one-quarter of its original size, was now referred to in the press as a "man-made lake." Reclairned land would be used primarily for new residential developments and sport facilities. Four parks would be built around the lake. rendering it a "beautifid scenic area" (yorimei defit~@ngqu). According to municipal plans, the -- R Districts (shiqe)are administrative subdivisions of urban municipalities in China. 9XRB.10 October 198 1. 1. official local daily reported. the lake's water process would undergo a "cleansing process" to ailow t hese developments to occur.'O Although the full details of the planned "clemsing process" were not specified at that time. efforts to expand water treatment capacity beyond that of the extant small. five year-old treatment plant had already begun. 'l The Shanghai Municipal Engineering Design Institut e had assist ed Xiamen authorities in devising a plan for building two new water treatment facilities. A plant on the south shore would be constmcted first: it would be ready by 1983 if al1 went according to the pian. It would be capable of treating 37.000 tonnes of waste water a month. A plant for the nonhern shore was still in preliminary planning stages. Total investment for the two projects was onginally estimated at 20 million yuan. The proposed plants would. der treating the waste water of nearby factories. send the effluent through pipes directly into the ocean. It was believed that this. combined with the cleansing ektof mn-off from the surrounding drainage area, would allow Yun Dang Lake to "become a man- made lake of clearly coloured water."" The conversion of a smelly lake into a beautifil one. the headlines beamed, was not far off. These predictions of a quick fix were simply wrong. The ability of the lake to cleanse itself throuçh natural processes proved insufficient. The will of local officiais to quickly build treatment facilities and undertake more moderate and rational industrial growth around the lake was also lacking. The capacity of new treatment facilities was not expanded enough to keep up with a growing number of pollution sources. The overail plan for the new district. though in large measure "Ibid. "XRB, 1 November 1981, 1. ''~bid. completed by 1992, proved to be something of an embarrassrnent for the local govermnent since its centrepiece (the beautifil lake) failed to materialize." Yun Dang Lake was also orie of the focal points of the city's efforts to put together an "SE2 Environmental Impact Assessment" in 1982. This work also drew upon outside expenise, as Xiamen's capability for such comprehensive projects was still lackinç. National-level scientific bodies were involved this time. Although the experts' comments about Xiamen were not made public, it was reported that they especially concemed thernselves with water treatment plant constmction and the ability of the Xiamen marine district to cleanse itself" Moreover, acting upon the experts' recornmendations. the Municipal Party Cornmittee and People's Govemment ordered. arnonç other things. that al1 surveys and research projects directly touchhg upon Yun Dang Lake should have their completion deadlines moved up to June of that year. Initial results of some of these surveys justified this urgency. It was discovered that 113 enterprises dumped 33,000 tonnes of waste water into the lake daily. The twenty-five largest of these units were responsible for 65 percent of this effluent. Chernical and biological oxyçen demand, measures of the lake's ability to sustain life, were sufficient to render the lake devoid of dissolved oxyçen. Over a million square rnetres of sludge had settled on the banks and lake bottom; this was estimated to contain 60 tonnes of sulphur, 65 tonnes of copper, and 198 tonnes of chromium. As a result. life in the lake had been effectively eliminated (jwji)." "In a way, the establishment of a new district eventually aided clean-up efforts throuçh the embarrassrnent it created. As the administrative centre of the city, Yun Dang New District became home to Xiamen's new city hall in the late 1980s. City officiais' offices now faced the fou1 lake directly and thus the cadres had more incentive to clean it up. Hong Huasheng. conversation with author, Autumn 1 993. "ZHB, 4 December 1991.3; and XRB, 6 Januq 1983, 1. These discoveries about the condition of the lake led to funher çovernrnent pronouncements on the issue. In January 1983 the çovemment released their Environmental Protection Office's "Minutes of the Conference on the Problem of Control of Yun Dang Lake's P~llution."'~This document contained a recommendation that pollution control be incorporated into econornic and production planning. The Planning, Economic. Scientific. and Construction Committees should al1 participate in this process under the govermnent's leadership. A "Yun Dang Lake Management Office" was set up to facilitate this." The ,nutes of the conference also implied a recognition that not only should the lake be cleaned. but further pollution of it should stop; the control of pollution sources was singled out for emphasis. The san~ongshipolicy should be enforced to prevent the creation of new pollution sources. Clearly, officiais recognized by this time the dangers of continued industrial expansion in the area. Even so. initial steps taken to reduce pollution were fairly narrow in scope. Three paper factories halted production for a bief period to take pollution reduction measures." These were factones which were not (and could not be) comected to planned water treatment facilities. They soon continued production and their polluting activities. aithough siçnificant improvements were made in at least one case. The Xiamen Paper Factory was chosen as an "advanced environmentai unit" at the city's second environmental protection work conference later in the year.19 The daily pollution load of this factory had been drastically reduced. "XRE3, 6 January 1983. 1. "Interview with Lin Hanzong. 6 January 1994. "%RB, 23 January 1983. 2. '9XRB. 2 May 1983, 1. The work conference also emphasized again that Yun Dang Lake was to be the focal point of environmental work in Xiamen. It specified several goals to be accomplished within specific time &es. Within two yean the govemment wanted to control pollution and "work hard for" (li-her~g) the elirnination of the odour. Within five years they hoped to produce a major tumaround and restore the initial ecology of the lake. Finally, they hoped to tum a foul-smelling lake into a flower garden (chorr hrr b~arrcher~ghtmyuati) within ten years. Strict control of new pollution sources was again mentioned as essential to accomplishing these goals. Later in the year specific measures to accomplish the two-year goal were announced. First. there would be strict control of the twenty-five Iargest pollution sources. This would be done accordinç to the document "ldeas Conceming the Control of Yun Dang Lake's Major Pollution Sources" put out by the municipal government. This document apparently held out lirnited-period clean-up programs. production stoppages. and other measures as acceptable enforcement tactics. Second, completion of water treatment facilities was urged. The first new plant on the southern shore had not been completed on time. Rapid completion of this plant and a pipeline to carry effluent out to deep sea water were deemed necessary. If the plant was done first. waste water could be released near shore. But. it was emphasized. there should be no more polluting of Yun Dang Lake (hrr :ai wrm Yrit~drn~gh~/).'~Third the sludge on the lake bottom should be dredged and removed." And finally. ocean or rain water should be used to cause aeration. This would restore oxyçen to the lake and allow it to suppon life once again. Further debate on how these latter two sugestions might be implemented on a scientific basis was entertained at a meeting of the Fujian "'XRB. 3 December 1983, 1. "Dredging is no longer considered to be a beneficial environrnental practice in the West. Environmental Science Association in eady December." A study on Xiamen Harboufs capacity for self-cleansing by some Xiamen University professors and an analysis of rain run-off into Yun Dang Lake by some Shanghai researchers were published early the next year." The Deputy Mayor attending the mid-1983 work conference commented that the trend toward increasing pollution was corning in the wake of increased agiicultural and industrial development. He also stated that such problems were due to insufficient knowledge about pollution during a long period in the past. Environmental questions were not given appropriate consideration in the establishment of industry." Given this lack of knowledge, govemrnent cadres now tumed increasingiy to scientists for answers to the Yun Dang Lake problem. Dunnç 1984, the SE2 was expanded to include al1 Xiamen Island and some parts of the nearby mainland. In this context. the development of the Yun Dang New District took on added importance. Bids were sought for large infrastructure projects in the area." Development plans for residentiai and other construction in the district were debated and revealed in more detail. complete with scale models depictinç the district's future appearance." Concurrent with these development plans was an attempt to impiement some of the recommendations which emerged from the above-mentioned conferences and scientific studies. For "XRB. 6 December 1983. 1. ?-'Chen Cimei, Wang Longfii, and Wu Yuduan, "Xiamen Gang Tianran Jinghua Nengli de Chubu Gusuan" ["A Preliminary Estimate of Xiamen Harbour's Natural Cleansing Capacity"] Fu-iian Huaniin? [Fuiianfs Environment], no. 4 (April 1984). 10- 13; and Hu Jiajun. Zhou Shansheng, and Zhang Feijua "Yun Dang Hu Yu Hong Wenti Fenxi" ["An Analysis of Yun Dang Lake's Rain Run- off Problem"] Fujian Huaniing [Fu-iian's Environment]. no. 4 (April 1984). 15- 17. '%RB. 2 May 1983, 1. "XRB. 12 January 1984. 1. example. city officials latched on to a recommendation by the Xiamen Environmental Science Research ~nstitute." After cooperating with the Number Three Manne Institute and the city's Environmental Protection Office on a variety of studies over two years. they recommended opening flood gates on the dyke during high tides to allow polluted water to be dispersed into the ses? Relevant departrnents began implementing this action on a lirnited scale in late 1984. This method was chosen because it was thought to be a quick effective. economical way to clean the lake.lg Allowing tides to wash polluted water into the ocean, of course. was hardly a complete solution. Residents still complained about the pungent odour emitted from sludge build-up and. perhaps more cntically. numerous industries continued to pollute the laice." Action on these two problems showed some progress in the rnid- 1980s but soon encountered delays. The dredging of lakebed sludge began in the fa11 of 1984. This process involved ailowing the sulphate-rich sludge to settle at a designated site on the shore before being used as fertilizer in the city's çreenification efforts." It was originaily estimated that dredging the entire lake would take about two years to complete. By the summer of 1985 officials still hoped to be able to meet that target. but two problems had ernerged. Fint. by relying on a single dredging vessel. 170.000 cubic metres of sludge had already been removed from the floor of the eastem "inner lake." Water quality there had already improved. But since the larger "outer lake" still had several times this amount of sludge lefi to dredge. a second boat was assigned to the project. The other problem was that rnany "~hisbody later became Xiamen University's Environmental IScience Research Center. "XRB. 25 Auçust 1984. 1. Iglbid. 'O~bid. "XRB. 30 November 1984, 1. district residents and work units continued to dump al1 kinds of trash into the lake. This fùrther complicated and slowed the dredging fleet's work.)' The press reported that construction of the pipe network to carry effluent to the water treatment plant entered an intense phase (jit~zhat~gjieduati) in the latter part of 1984." The construction of the entire southem system was already a year behind schedule at this point. A criticai 3.7 kilometre stretch of this network was completed by mid- 1 Work on four accompanying pumping stations then continued so that by yeats end much industrial and household waste water was diverted fiom the lake." By early 1986 the dredging and decreased effluent combined to allow livable conditions for a limited range of wildlife; shnmp. fish and egrets returned to the lake for the first time in years." Just about the same time these positive ecological signs emerged, however. signals of other difficulties began to surface. The waste disposal pipe network had been fùnded Iargely by the state and had already cost around 40 million yuan." The next phase. expansion of southern shore treatment capacity. had just begun and already the whole project was about 100 percent over budget. Local officials felt compelled at this point to issue a warning. A meeting to be attended by Environmental Protection Office cadres. deputies of the People's Congress, and twenty-seven "XRl3. 13 July 1985. 1. "XRB. 22 September 1984, 1. "W.Il July 1985. 3. 'G~ZHB,12 April 1986, 2. "xW. 19 November 1985, 1 ; interview with Lin Hanzong, 6 January 1 994; and XRB. 5 June 1986, 3. managers of polluting factories was called. The managers were told that the situation wherein they failed to strengthen pollution treatment capacity while wantonly polluting Yun Dang Lake. forcing the state alone to bear the huçe burden of treatrnent. could not contir~ue.'~ This waming indicates two things. First. local officials already feared that the effluent from these factories would far exceed the capacity of the treatment plants even before the plants were completed. If more of these fànories did not take remedial measures. the project would be extremely obsolete before it was done. The warning du, implied recognition that. especially in post-Mao China state subsidies are neither infinite nor etemal. The burden for managinç the excess pollution load would likely eventuaily fall upon the local govement's increasinçly strained budget. In any event. concern about these heaviest polluters of Yun Dang Lake was quite justified in 1986. As foreign investment began to increase in 1985. environmental officials shifted their attention- albeit temporarily and sornewhat ineffectually, toward managing and controlling rww pollution sources." This. added to the sense of accomplishment and perhaps complacency produced through completion of the first phase of the new facilities. mua have allowed most old factories to relax with relatively little scrutiny of their pollution control efforts during this period. A few enterprises responded positively to provincially sanctioned limited-period clean-up programsa' and the Xiamen Bicycle Company chançed its production process afier six years of Environmental Protection Office criticism." But, as indicated in previous chapters, crackdowns on polluters only intensified afrrr this period. "XRB. 5 June 1986.3. '9~nteMewwith Lin Hanzong, 6 January 1994. "XRB. 5 June 1986. 1. %RB. 14 July 1986. 1. By early 1987, further progress in the construction of waste water treatment facilities was evident. The second phase (treatment plant expansion) of the southem network construction was proçressinç; completion was now expected in 1988. five years behind schedule." Three of four pumpinç stations on the south shore were already in operation." These. awaiting completion of the aforementioned treatment facilities, temporarily pumped effluent into the ocean in an attempt to avoid furt her contamination of Yun Dang Lake. At Eanh Day festivities, completion of this work was declareci a municipal environmental goal for the corning year." Work on basic pipe infrastructure for the northem treatment network was initiated in September and was scheduled for completion by year's end?' Dredging, though still slowed by insufficient equipment. continued. These developments appeared to have some effect upon the ecology of the lake. As mentioned above, some wildlife had retumed. Funher, the lake's fou1 srnell seemed to be getting better. The official press reported that the odour was "lighter" and observed "slight improvement."" Yet these modest indicators of progress belied a recognition that more difficult work lay ahead. Govemment reports in 1986 still viewed the situation as cntical since a variety of factories were ni11 polluting the lake. Many enterprises still did not have access to treatment facilities. Some municipal environmental goals enunciated regardhg Yun Dang Lake were revealing. Officiais hoped to solve the problern of insufficient capacity to channel industrial waste water; this was exactly the problem they foresaw two years earlier. They also had a goal for the corning year of putting the "XRB, 27 February 1987, 1. %RB, 9 March 1987, 1. 6 June 1987. 1. "xRB, 1 1 September 1987. 1. "xRB. 9 March 1987. 1 ; and X..9 June 1987. 1. southern shore's treatrnent plant into operation. Apparently even rhis much-delayed accomplishment was still in some doubt. Finally. govemrnent officials desired to protect the shoreline so that "beautification" of outer lake could begin." Thus. although much groundwork had been laid by 1987. senous problems remained. Harsher treatrnent of lakeside polluters was still needed. increased water flow to the lake was necessary for complete restoration, and treatment facilities would have to be completed. and. if possible. expanded. The degree to which these requisites were accomplished, and the fiscal burden of trying, are among the topics covered in the next section. - IV. The Continued Search for Solutions By mid-1988. efforts to improve Yun Dang Lake had. through the expenditure of nearly 39 million yuan of mostly provincial (but also municipal and enterprise) funds. achieved several notable results. Twelve kilometres of a waste disposal pipe network. an improved water treatrnent facility. and four pumping stations had been constructed on the south shore. The pipe network and pumps. coupled with a four-kilometre stretch of pipes on the northem shore. began divening water into the sea in 1 987. When the first phase of the southern shore treatment facility went into operation in 1988. it was capable of treating 13.5 tonnes of waste water per day.18 ~y the end of that year, "m.6 June 1987. 1. '%~.is was five years later than the date originally set for completion of this project when it began in 198 1. The exact cause of the delay is unclear, but it seems likely that some funds had been diverted to other causes. In 1988 officials argued that funds for cleaning up Yun Dang Lake should be of "çuaranteed" status, implying that this had not been the case previously. See XRB, 18 October 1988. 1. 1 10.000 cubic metres of sludge had been dredged from the lake. In addition. twenty-two major enterprises encircling the lake had undergone varying types of environmentai renovation proje~ts.'~ However. this progress in the construction of treatment facilities was not rnatched by similar proçress in the enforcement of the growing number of environmental regulations. Nor had it been matched by an effort to slow industrial expansion on the lake's shores. Whereas in 1983 1 13 enterprises released pollution into the lake, this number rose by 1988 to about 165." Over 150 of these exceeded state effluent standards in some way? It is not surprising, therefore. that several key pollution indicators revealed limited improvement or even a decline in the lake's water quality. Between 1982 and 1988 the sulphide content of the more polluted inner lake bed dropped from 1260.4 m@ç to less than 400 mgkg." This was the result of the massive dredging which took place. Nevertheless. these levels were still too high to support normal life processes on the lake bed. Even more troubling were trends toward increased oxygen demand (both chemical and biochemical) and ammonia content. As the foiiowing table demonstrates. initial dredging efforts in 1983 and 1984 apparently had a positive effect on oxygen demand. But these effects were short-lived as oxygen demand increased between 1984 and 1987. These levels are more than ten times greater than the averaçe levels in Guangdong.'' 19yun dan^ Hu Na Chao Paiwu Gaohuo Shuiti yiii dui Xi Hai Yu Yingxiang Shiyan Zoneiie Baoeao [Comprehensive Report on the Experiment in Enlivening Yun Dane Lake Throueh Tide- aided Pollution Discharee and its Effects on the Western Marine District] (Xiamen: Xiamenshi Huanjing Baohu lu, 1989). 6. '%RB, 12 April 1988, 1. ''s hiyan Zonaiie Baoeao, 4. "~eeLo, "Environmental Management by Law," 56. TABLE 7.1 Results of Yearly Survey of Yun Dang Lake Water Quality unit: mgflitre source: Shiyan Zongiie Baoeao. chart 1-4. It became increasingly clear that work on the lake itself would have to be accompanied by work on the factories which were responsible for continued pollution. This renewed realization on the part of local officials was confirmed. if not produced. when çovemment cadres and representatives of the local People's Congress visited the lake and viewed "coffee-like" effluent in person? They detemiined that the smell was actually getting worse. not better. The inadequacy of the much-delayed treatment facilities aiso became clear when these officials learned that effluent from the Hua Xia FoodstuEs monosodium glutamate production aione exceeded the capacity of the city's extant and proposed treatment plants combined. It was also learned that that factory's effluent exceeded state standards by over 100 times." Worse still, rnany other factones had ail1 not been "~d.No treatment process for this type of pollution was available domestically in China at this time. Thus. Hua Xia's effluent could not have been treated by municipal facilities in any event. conneaed to the new treatment facilities and continued to pollute the lake directly. As well. severai pipes brinçinç effluent from co~ectedfactories to the treatment facilities had become ~logged.'~ - In the meetings which foilowed the politicians' field trip, these problems were now blarned upon hvo primary causes: it was not only a lack of knowledge that was responsible. but also a lack of leadership. If these problems are not solved. one delegate to the People's Congress observed. another dozen yean will pass and Yun Dang Lake still will not see any improvement. He also noted that this problem reflects poorly upon the image of the SEZ's Ieader~hip.~'Another delegate suggested that the clean up of Yun Dang Lake should be a topic of discussion in meetings of the Mayor and the local Government- Standing Comrnittee. The Chairman of the People's Congress suggested that emphasis should be put on extending harsher legd measures toward sixty polluting factories and that a funher 10 million yuan be allocated toward Yun Dang Lake over each of the next two years. At least partially in response to these comments and perhaps also at the urging of higher oficials. Xiamen Mayor Zou Ejun called an enlarged meeting of the Govemment Standing Cornmittee to discuss Yun Dang Lake. At this meeting the fiscal cornmitment of the government was increased to 20 million per annum for each of the next three years.'8 It aiso set a new (revised) goal s8~~.8 Oaober 1988. 1. These developments lend some credence to the idea that local officials had adopted a "pollute now. pay Iater" approach and had now concluded that the time to pay had arriveci. Indeed, incoming Mayor Chen Zhihan stated that infrastructure funding for cleaning up the lake had previously run into problems, but, now that the city had money, they should spend some on environmental protection. See XRB, 18 October 1988. 1. for rectifjing the problem. The Mayor said. vaguely. that he hoped for "noticeable change" in the foul-odour problem within three year~.'~ To accomplish this. it was suggested that labour power. materiai resources. and financial support must ail be rnobilized. The Mayor also said that departments should support the EPB and ailow them authonty such that ail new, expansion, or renovation construction projects must pass their approval and take their suggestions.* These recommendations. of course. indicate a desire that the .sat~tot~gshirequirement be more strictly followed. But suggestions for utilizing labour power and supporting the EPB's authority also imply a subtle shifl in official thinking; officiais realized more than ever that ençineered solutions centred on the lake itself were not too valuable if EPB-sponsored activities were ignored. Thus. a "Decision Concenùng the Acceleration of Yun Dang Lake's Cornprehensive Renovation Work" issued in late September elaborated a comprehensive approach including such things as strengthening leadership and law enforcement and improving the quality of scientific research.'' Nevertheless, lack of progress on even the engineered solutions remained a problem. Thus, at an October work meeting on the Yun Dang Lake issue, the Mayor pledged to personally oversee the much-delayed treatment plant construction work. He also helped establish a network for scientific research on the lake under the auspices of the Yun Dang Lake leadership small group.'' A major study on the utiiity of large-scaie tide-assisted cleansing of the lake and the effects of such efforts on 59~bid. '&lbid. %RB, 28 September 1988, 1. "XRES, 18 October 1988. 1. the surrounding ocean was undertaken by this network of scientists as mandated by the above- mentioned decision. Amid this renewed flourish of govemment attention on Yun Dang Lake. some enterprises did beçin to make progess in treating their own pollution. One such unit was the Overseas Chinese Beer Factory. At the urging of the EPB and in conjunction with the expansion of their plant. this Company installed water treatment facilities capable of treating 2.000 tonnes per day. This brought their effluent within state standards for most pollutants and also brought their factory recognition as a "national environmentally advanced unit. "63 Mer this apparent re-awakening on the part of municipal officials, efforts to solve the Yun Dang Lake problern proceeded in three main areas. First. factories themselves became the subjects of increased scrutiny and forced action. For example. it was only afier 1988 that a senous attempt was made to enforce the smitot~gshirequirement on enterprises beinç established on the lakeshore."l And. as indicated in previous chapters. environment-related closures. relocations. fines. and renovations became somewhat more frequent during this latter period. Second, constnxction of municipal treatment facilities and effluent diversion networks continued. albeit still at a snaiïs pace. Dredging dso continued. Finally, scientific studies and experiments concemhg the use of natural forces to restore the lake's water quality concluded. Some of their recommendations subsequently won govemment approvd and were incorporated into ''Interview with Wu Zilin. 8 November 1993; XRB, 25 Septernber 1988. 1; XRB. 16 Decernber 1988. 1 ; XRB. 19 Auyst 1989. 1; and XRB. 25 April 1990. 1. YHB, 14 December 199 1, 3. In 1987 national officials had clarified procedures for this long- standing policy. municipal plans. These latter two efforts and their results are the focus of the remainder of this section. In 1989. the Xiamen EPB published the results of their investigation into the use of tides to accelerate the cleansing of the lake. The Xiamen University Center for Environmental Science Research, the Number Three Marine Research Institute, and several other units were involved in this project. In effect the experiment sought to determine the effects of such action upon the quality of the water and the lake bed, upon the surrounding ocem and upon life both in the waters and on the shores. Between August and November of 1988. about 688 x 1O' cubic metres of sea water was brought in while 1 0 10 x 1 O' cubic meters of the now-mixed water was purnped out of the ~ake.~' The experiment managed to reduce the average biolog'cal oxygen demand in the lake by about 50 percent. This improvement in the lake's ability to sustain life. however. was unevenly distributed. Water quality improvement on the surface and in the outer lake were far more pronounced than near the lake bed and in the hner lake? The nature of aquatic organisms in the lake changed sornewhat. but the bactena content was still far above state standards at the experiment's conclusion. Sulphide content in the lake bed was reduced. but sulphuric acid ernissions fiom the local power plant kept acidity above 1982 levels. Salt water fiom the ocean killed some small freshwater organisms. On the other hand. the overall impact of polluted lake water upon the ocean was not thought to be serious. Some surface pollution. though unsightly, would be dispersed quite q~ickly.~' The study concluded that the continued and expanded use of the West dyke's floodgates for hiçh tide water exchange would be usefùl in eniivening the outer lake. Because so many pollution "Shiyan Zoneiie Baogao, 62. MIbid.,62-63. "Ibid.. 64- sources were concentrated in the imer lake, the scientists recomrnended pumping sea water to the inner lake to flush pollutants oumard through the outer lake and then the floodgates. They expected no plant or soi1 damage of the lake's surroundings by using this method. Although this action would have some negative impact on the ocean, as the work progressed that impact would gradually diminish. Once water treatment efforts raised the water quality to the minimal "level four" state standards. there would be no danger for the surrounding marine region." Finally. the study concluded that the present practice of releasing partially treated effluent near the ocean shore and at the surface was not advisable in the long term. Initiai reception of the study was positive. The Standing Cornmittee of the local People's Congress accepted the main recommendation that water be allowed to circulate through the lake as a usefül and cost-effective method. They desired, however, that water be pumped fiom inland reseivoirs to the imer lake. Necessq construction was recommended t O the Planning Commission and completion was expected within two year~.~' Municipal plans for allowing water exchange were not as extensive as those advocated by scientists and were delayed in their irnplernentation. However, continued water exchange through the floodgates was aliowed. The construction of facilities to allow 600,000 to 800,000 cubic metres of water to flow into the lake daily began in 1991 .'O In general. effons to rejuvenate Yun Dang Lake Eom 1989 to 1992 continued to concentrate on other long-plamed infrastructure projects. Indeed. it soon became clear that the new allocation of fùnds that emerçed in this period was devoted largely "Ibid., 64-65. "XRB. 29 July 1989, 1 ; and inte~ewwith Wang Longfa. 29 December 1993. 'qntewiew with Wang Longfa. 29 December 1993; and Zhonemio Huaniinr Nianiian ( 1992). 394. to this specific purpose.7' Focus will now be shified to the completion of those initiatives and some attendant results. Construction began on yet another phase of Yun Dang Lake's water treatment facilities in early 1989. However. this was not the long-delayed water treatment plant proposed for the northem shore, but rather a facility for treating sludçe with imported equipment on the south shore. Apparently this process had to be added to the now-complete second phase to ailow for more compiete processing of the effluent? This addition emerged from the increased hnding promised a year earlier and the technical diiculties encountered in preparing the second phase for operation.73 In a meeting of the Standing Cornmittee of the local People's Congress, the Deputy Mayor reponed the city's progress in implementing its earlier documents "Concerning the Comprehensive Clean-up Plan for Yun Dang Lake" and "Implementation Plan for the Yun Danç Lake Controi Project. 1989- 1992."" in addition to the developrnents aiready descnbed herein. the report revealed that officials now planned for 2 10 factories and enterprises to be comected to the treatment facility network. Further. two pumping stations on the northem shore had been completed. The feasibility study for the treatment plant there was now done as well. A total of 150,000 cubic metres of sludge had now been dredged from the lake's bed. resulting in a 110,000 square metre total increase in surface area. Work was under way on a shore protection project which was to create barriers to further expansion of the lake. The city's goals now, according to the report. were basicaily to eliminate the smell by 1990 and to complete the entire treatment network by 1992. 7'~eeXRB. 5 June 1991. 1. '", '", 17 March 1989. 1. 7'~~~,5 June 1989. 1. 74~.29 July 1989. 1. By Iate in 1990, the first of these goals was no cioser to realization. An inspection tearn of national officiais visiting Xiamen reported that the smell was still very pungent several hundred metres away from the lake.'' The sarne officials dso rerninded local cadres that Yun Dang Lake had been designated as one of the state's new "Limited Period Controi Establishment" programs with a scheduled completion date in 1992. The state's goai in this regard was more ambitious than the vague aim stated by the mayor several months earlier: it was to achieve the minimal "level four" water quality designation for the When the lake's smell had not diminished by rnid- 1990, municipal officials explained that this was primarily due to the non-stop growth of factories surrounding the lake.77 Due in large part to this trend and, in particular, continued pollution by the Hua Xia Foodstuffs factory, the quantity of polluted water flowing into the lake continued to increase rather than decrease. In a report to government officials covering the period 1986- 1990, EPB cadres descnbed the Yun Dang Lake situation as one of Xiamen's principal environmental problems in these terms: Although there has been some improvement in the water quality of Yun Dang Lake, [the probiem of] old pollution sources still has not been solved and new pollution sources continually spring up in large numbers. The i~erlake's shoreline piping network is still incornpiete; piping and dredging work cannot be completed simultaneously. Present water treatment capacity is still not compatible with daily increases in polluted water effluent demands. Many factors could possibly become hidden troubles for deterioration of Yun Dang Lake's water quality." ''ZHB. 2 December 1989. 1. One key reason for the continued problems was that the Hua Xia Foodsniffs MSG production was stiii poiiuting the lake. Their own treatment facilities, long-delayed because of domestic technological weakness in that specific process, would not be complete for a few more years. See XRB, 25 April 1990, 1; and XRB, 6 June 1990, 1. 76 A source published later suggested that the aim of the program was to achieve a "level three" standard by 1992. See Zhonmo Huaniin Nianiian ( 199 1), 457. "XRB. 6 June 1990, 1. In his public report to the govemment on "Earth Day" in 1991, EPB Director Wu Zilin contended that the Yun Dang Lake situation had seen "breakthrough-like" progress in the past year. The goal to eliminate the smell had basically been achieved, water quality was "nearing" the "level four" standard. and over 38 percent of the city's industrial waste water was now treated (compared with about 26 percent in 1989)." By this time both phases of the south shore treatment plant were in operation, daily treating 9.3 million cubic metres of water to within state standard^.'^ This plant was comected to a pipe network of twenty kiiometres which utilized seven pumping stations. A total of 2.3 million cubic metres of sludge had now been dredçed ffom the lake bed and lakeshore resulting in a fi@ hectare expansion of water surface." This progress was indeed cornrnendable, especially considering the ever-increasinç number of factories surrounding the lake. An internai report on environmental qudity in 1991, however, sounded a somewhat less optimistic tone. It said that the development of enterprises, residential districts, and hotels around the lake added to the pollution burden and, perhaps more cmcially, regular tide reception had become impossible due to "shore protection" con~truction.~~Thus the scientists' recomrnendations concerning the tide reception were not only reduced in scope by municipal plamers. but were now delayed by the already planned. but also much delayed, barrier project on the lakeshore itself. These factors were said to be responsible for failure to achieve a "level four" water quality standard. - 79XRB,6 June 199 1, 1; and Zhonemio Huanjine Nianiian ( 1992). 394. 'OZhonemioHuaniine Nianjan ( 1992). 394. "ZHB, 14 December 1991, 1. "~aoraoshu. 199 1, 73. A sirnilar mixture of limited success and continued problems attended these effons in 1992. On the one hand, "level four" water quality was finally achieved. the "beautification" phase of laiceshore renovations was started, and construction was finally initiated on the pipes to carry treated etnuent fùrther out to sau These accomplishments earned the work on Yun Dang Lake designation as an "outstanding national and provinciai comprehensive renovation project. "" On the other hand, the rate of effluent exceeding state standards for some pollutants actuaily rose over the previous yeargs And the construction of the above-mentioned pipe network would not be complete for at Ieast three years." Meanwhiie. work on the north shore treatment plant (announced in the early 1980s) had not yet begun. V. Conclusion The anainment of a national goal and recognition of Xiamen in 1992 for its treatment of Yun Dang Lake belied the tme nature of this endeavour as it unfolded over more than a dozen years. The water quality goal attained was modes and the aiIl-incomplete treatment facilities had been approved for conaruction for weîi over a decade. The clean up of Yun Dang Lake was anything but quick and efficient. Publicly stated goals were continuaily compromised and adjusted. Tellingly. increased mayoral attention to the issue 6om 1988 on coincided with renewed financiai assistance and attention fiom other authorities. Municipal authonties' reluctance to curtail at an early date both the growth in numbers. and continued darnaging activities. of poilution sources clearly made the battle to reclairn "~aogaoshu. 1992, 1 1 ; XRB,26 November 1992, 1: and XRB, 5 June 1992, 1. '%RB, 4 June 1992, 1. "1bid. '%RB, 26 November 1992. 1. the lake more dificult than it might have been otherwise. It was not so much that enforcement and monitoring activities were not deemed important. Rather. the magnitude of the immediate Yun Dans Lake problem was simply overshadowed by other considerations. However, the most critical lesson of the Yun Dang Lake story lies in the fact that the project was expensive. time consurning, and was necessary because of poorly informed or misçuided planning decisions. mmy ofwhich wrrr i~ittin/[vmade lotrg h+rr po/lrrric~i~cotirrcd rf/ort.s wwe initiatrd 111 ('hit~a.T here is far more to implementation failure in Xiamen than the "reform ideology" of its leaders. One source indicated that the cumulative expense of cleaning up Yun Dang Lake (likeiy inclusive of ail three levels of çovement) to 199 1 was 94 million yuan." About 60 million yuan of this had been invested since 1988. An additionai 6 million had been spent by enterprises installing their own pollution control equiprnent." In cornparison, the annual budget for the local supervisory agency (the EPB) had grown by 1993 to 2.4 million yuan. In 1980 it was a mere 60.000 yuan.8g These figures rnake it ciear that had a good portion of the enormous sums spent on clean up and infiastructure been available to spend on supervision, enforcement. and environmental renovation of enterprises. Xiamen's water pollution situation would have been much better than it was in 1992. State involvement in large municipal projects like the cleaning of Yun Dang Lake makes sense. Given the circurnstances. it was essential. But had comparable funds been available as matching funds for renovating local factories or for making local EPBs more financially and. therefore. politically independent, Xiamen's environmentai progress might have been more dramatic. As was likely the case al1 over China the burden of the past weighed al1 too heavily upon pollution control efforts. R7~.21 February 1991, 1. "Ibid. g91nterviewwith Wu Zilin. 8 November 1993 Yun Dang Lake clearly presented Xiamen with much more than "hidden troubles"g0in environmental protection effons; it was a visible and olfactory reminder of where vast arnounts of environmental fùnds hud to be spent. CEIAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION 1. Implementation Assessment: Success or Failure? - The introduction to this dissertation characterized the results of China's pollution contro efforts as "mixed" and "limited." In this conclusion a more precise assessrnent of these effons is made. The moa cornmon definition of irnplementation success links the intentions of policy makers (usually as expressed in formal documents) with actual outcomes; congmence between the two indicates success while divergence signals failure. In Xiamen the apparent intentions of policy documents were compromised and lefi unfulfilled in significant ways. National and local leaders both occasionally made rnoderate and seemingiy realistic statements about what they expected to accomplish. Nthough those pronouncements moderated the intent of officiai documents. even many of these modified goals were delayed in their accomplishment; expectations were frequently attered downward. The ostensible purpose of pollution control is to elirninate poilution or at least decrease levels through reduced emissions. Chinese officials have cited goals of keeping pollution "basically under control" or "maintained" at the levels of certain base years. For example, in 1989 the Fujian EPB set a goal to maintain the environmental quality of Xiamen Harbour at 1987 levels. Similady, in 1982 Xiamen outlined a desire to maintain al1 pollution measurements at 198 1 levels. This suggests that the goals of broad legislation have been comprornised. In Xiamen, notwit hstanding a reduction of overall air quality. iridlrstrial air pollution ha>. declined in recent years. Hoirsehoïd emissions have çrown tremendously. This development highiights the dangers of both non-comprehensive control and the examination of overdl outcomes as a measure of success or failure. Failure to control industrial pollution is more evident with respect to water pollution. In the Yun Dang Lake case. serious delay in the planned construction of water treatment facilities. continued gowth in the number of factories poluting the lake. and a decline in water quafity through the 1980s (see Chart 6-A) al suggest implementation failure in terms of stated goals and documents relating to project approval. An alternative to cornparison of intentions with outcome is to take a procedural approach; if prescribed procedures are followed, the implernentation is deemed successful. Here again the evidence of failure from the case study is quite clear. In 1986 the municipal govenunent itself concluded in a meeting that the requirements of environmental leçislation had not been met. l In one daring case the Hua Xia Foodstuffs Company (a joint venture which also happened to be Xiamen's most prolific polluter) eluded both the mzto~lgshirequirement and effluent charges for several years. It was not until 1989 that it became Xiamen's first joint venture to be fined for polluting the environment and this only der considerable govenunent debate. Cases like this. coupled with clear evidence of ongoing increases in the t~rimbcrof enterprises polluting Yun Dang Lake. contradict Sinkule's assertions about the effectiveness of the smtotlgshi policy. In Xiamen, at least, the programme was of little use for major projects. If, as the Director of the Xiamen EPB stated. regdations are enforced with increasing strictness year by year, then it is not possible that procedures were followed because forma1 procedures were not altered that frequently. Indeed, it was adrnitted in 1989 that "it is difficult to 'Interview with Wu Zilin, 8 November 1993. make a law but it is still more difficult to enforce the law . . . the phenornenon of slack enforcement often occur(s]."' Officiais at several levels were led to observe that some laws "had become mere fo~malities."~The law served rather constantly as a pidelirw and as a form of exhortation to local cadres; it was not within their capacity, nor did they have the inclination, to adhere closely to the letter of the law. in mm, law served in important ways as propaganda for officiais and the populace alike. This finding serves as a caution to those who envision a slowly emerging rule of law in china.' lmplementation success or failure can also be gauged by what some believe to be a more realistic cnterion. Goggin and others have mggesteci that analysts rnerely search for the establishment of firm routines by the irnplementing agency. ' What evidence is there that the Xiamen EPB operated on the basis of well-established routines? The observation above that harsher enforcernent is emerging gradually implicitly denies the existence of such routines. Furthermore. inspections were ofien conducted in concert with organs of higher levels of governent in an episodic campaign-like manner. Some monitoring of environmental conditions in the city was done on a reylar (seasonal) basis. However. the fact that public cornplaints were often the initial impetus in EPB pursuit of factories violating the regulations indicates that routinization was not a significant elernent of reçulatory efforts. 'WU. "To Protect a Developing City," 10- 1 1 %RB. 1 1 July 1986, 3. 4Conceming the instrumental use of law, as well as its use as a legitimizer, see Edward Epstein's chapter in Pitman B. Potter, ed., Domestic Law Reforms in Post-Mao China (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1 994) 'Goggin, "Too Fewiîoo Many," 336. In short. then, it can be said that the implementation of pollution controls was. on balance. not successful by normal analytic standards! This should not be taken to suggest. however. that prqress was not made on environmental matters dunng the period under study. Some specific pollution indicators remained reasonably constant or even fell during a period of intense economic growth and industrial expansion. Environmental law was somewhat more farniliar and legitimate in the eyes of judges, reylators, and factory managers in 1992 than it was in 1979; pollution control procedures were increasingly, albeit not universally. understood (if not respected) by the tarçets of replation. Moreover, enforcement routines were brgiw~i~~gto emerge near the conclusion of the period under study. Progres3 in Xiamen had been made. but success was very Iirnited. References to Sabatier and Maimanian's conditions of effective implementation are helpful in explaining the lack of effiiveness in this case. This study finds that those factors which constrain key local actors are more critical than those relating to documents and legislation. Succinctly put. the implementation of pollution controis in the current context depends upon cornmitted political leadership at the local levei. The first of Sabatier and Mamanian's conditions was that enabling legisiation should be founded on a solid theory relating changes in the behaviour of targets to the attainrnent of policy objectives. This rather broad condition was filled in the present case. China's legislation and subsequent replations were modelled on foreign examples and certainly created. in the abstract at least, some incentive for industries to reduce emissions. It has been argued that local regulations did not offer sufficiently harsh or specific penalties for violations. but the national laws themselves were not ovenly flawed in their theoretical foundations. Clearly. sound enabling legislation is far fiom 'The more innovative suggestion that failure to try to do better is really the only failure is considered below in connection with a discussion of leaming and exploration. being a sufficient condition for implementation success. especiaiiy where the latitude for interpretation and discretion in implementation is wide. Similarly, the second condition, that the policy decision's objectives must be unambiguous, is generally fulfilled but hardly suficient in this case. The intent of China's environmental laws and regulations is quite clear. However, their clarity is impeded somewhat when local officials assert more modest goals. When this happens, some confusion among EPB officials and factory managers cm result; are they striving for vastly reduced factoiy emission levels or merely for the maintenance of aggregate pollution figures at 1987 levels? How each of these actors answered such questions (usually in the least burdensome way) had a considerable negative impact upon compliance and enforcement efforts. Sabatier and Mazmanian's third condition is that enabling legislation structures the implementation process by maitimizing the likelihood that officials and target groups will perform as desired. This conditioq as noted in Chapter One, relies heavily upon the assumption that the mle of law will be respected. In China's fiagmented political system, where judicial support is weak, aructuring of the implementation process is more difncult and must be ongoing; it cannot be dictated in statutes alone. Central leaders reorganized relevant bureaucracies (the separation of NEPA from MURCEP. for exampie) in an attempt to strengthen implernenting actors. These institutional changes, however, did not alter the essentiai socio-econornic structure of the comrnunity in which the EPB must work.' This is an example of top-level leaniing having oniy a moderate impact on local implementation efforts. Thus, in this case irnproved structunng of the process would, given the local 7 This general point about the failure to implernent environmental controls is made in Barbara Jancar, ed., Environmental Management in the Soviet Union and Yuaoslavia: Structure and Remlation in Federal States (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987). political context, have included bolstered political and economic incentives for local political actors or a çreater authoritative role for the central agency; fine-tuned enabling legislation or increased effluent charges would not have aitered the situation drastically. Very much related to this condition in China, then, is Sabatier and Maunmian's fourth condition: The leadership of implementing agencies must be cornmitted to statutory soais and possess political skill. This study has revealed little to bring into question the commitmertt of either the NEPA director or the head of Xiamen's local EPB. When the national bureau was part of MURCEP. that department's firm commitment to environmental goals was understandably less clear, but the orçanizational problern which was the root of such concerns no longer exists. The cornmitment of EPB directors is not the problem; the real difficulty lies in the fact that the political skills (and resources) required to be an effective municipal EPB director are, given the context in which they work unrealisticaily onerous and thus in shon supply. EPB heads must, in effect. be the environmental conscience of the mayor while at the same time remain loyal and subordinate to him. This latter obligation stems from the EPB director's role as the head of a finctionai municipal department. It is a position unpleasantly analogous to that of impenal-era remonstrators; in theory you are supposed to speak up. but in practice you have few resources at your disposal to defend yourselfif your persistent voice is unwelcome. If. as some have suggested, local EPB officials lose their focus. this is the result of economic necessity, not poor intentions. This Ieads to discussion of another stated condition of effective implementation: the policy progamme must have support amonç crucial legislators and in key constituency groups. This factor is very important in the case at hand. The most crucial "legislator" in a Chinese rnunicipality is, practically speaking, the mayor. Delegation of responsibilities may put a deputy mayor in an authontative, albeit somewhat less prestigious, position with respect to pollution control. Members of the local People's Congess. as noted in the chapter on Yun Danç Lake, may be influentid but normally only by exening pressure on the mayor. In part, this is because he chairs the Municipal Standing Cornmittee which, because of its budgetary authority, cm be considered the primary "sovereign" of the local EPB. Another important body in the local environmental network is the Xiamen Environmental Commission. The concems of this group are weighted, in terrns of representation and normative outlook, in favour of industrial production and economic growth. Aneaed social goups are not highly organized, though individual cornplaints do play a role in some enforcement decisions. In general, the hierarchicai organization of power within the city and the strength of industrial interests leaves the local EPB with a cornmitted mayor or central intervention as its only hope for concened action on the most critical problems. This hope was infiequently realized. As noted above, the attenuated environmental consciousness of cntical players in the policy network was a key impediment to implementation niccess in this case. However, ~heseartirzcdes werr tlor formrd in a vacrum. Indeed. institutional arrangements and the other policy objectives put fonvard by central and regional leaders have played a key role in subordinating environmental concems. Simply put, the priority of environmental objectives for local govemrnent authorities is. as Jahiei has argued. severely undermined by the general PRC policy of rapid industrial growth and related efforts to attract investment. Sabatier and Mazmanian's sixth condition is thus extremely important in this case. The statements of top local leaders demonstrate not a total lack of concem about pollution, but rather a near-obsession with investment attraction and econornic growth. This reflects a desire to maintain social stabiiity through income generation in exchange for a continued granting of relative flexibility and autonomy from the centre! Attempts to develop. impiement and enforce environmental reylations have corne, ironically. as many other economic reylations are. either in law or in practice. peeled away. In short. pollution control flies in the face of nearly every (shon- tem) policy objective sought by local officiais (especially SEZ officials) in China during the period under study. In this policy context it is. therefore. not surprising that a relatively new allocative policy airned at multiple tarçets (industrial enterprises) was poorly implemented. Perhaps what is surprising is that anythinç at al1 has been done. A question which remains, then is: Why do some localities do better at pollution control than others? Geography and the nature of local industries are obviously factors which affect pollir~zor~ kvek in a given locale. But what determines the differences between localities in effort expended on environmental issues? Why do some mayors try to make an impact on this issue area? h a single case study, this dissertation cannot definitively answer these questions. However, the fact that local leaders finally got senous about Yun Dang Lake afrr Xiamen had become relatively prosperous indicates that wealth or level of development may be an important factor. In his comparative shidy of provincial pollution control policies, Maa concluded that "the wealthier the province. the more resources they devote to pollution control."' This generalization appears to apply to municipalities as well. Maa also concludes that the education levels of the leaders in question correlate with efforts to protect the environment; well-educated leaders are more likely to emphasize environmental protection within their juiisdi~tions.'~Although more research needs to be done, this may be even 'Kenneth Lieberthal. Goveminn China, pp. 3 16. "Maa. Provincial Policy in China, 13 5. 'O~bid..1 15. more true at the municipal level. It is suggested below that more research is needed on how mayors leam about the environment. The same is txue about why they leam. Investigation of educational and career background wiIl provide a starting point for this type of study. Exactly how local wealth and educated leaders contnbute to environmental efforts needs to be funher specified. but it seems plausible that education allows leaders to better make a mental connection between environmental protection and long-term economic development; local wedth provides them the means to do something about it. One major factor which makes the progress which has been achieved in Xiamen praiseworthy is. as Chapter Six demonstrates, the legacy of environmental neglect and poor planning from the pre- reform era. The Xiamen case demonstrates that cleaning up messes and mitigating the effects of old industnalization plans constitutes a damaging diversion fiom prevmtatzve efforts. An examination of the local context thus reveals not oniy the heavy impact of what Jahiel calls the "reform ideology"; it also shows graphically that history and institutional arrangements cm contribute to current implementation failure. Further research will thus aiso be needed to explore the impact of the Maoist legacy in other municipalities. The foregoing analysis has examined the conditions of effective implementation in order of increasing importance to this case. More specifically, the first three conditions, which relate more directly to Ieps/~~fiotr,were fiilfiiled in various degrees but with limited positive effects. The absence of the latter three conditions, which relate to acniai political power and the multiple demands placed upon political actors. point more directly toward the causes of implementation failure. This both reatfirms this midy's initial assertions about the importance of the local context and undermines some previous notions put fonvard about environmental policy in China. It is to this latter topic that our attention will now be tumed. II. Policv Makina and Environmental Im~lementationin China This case study brings into question both Ross' assertion that China's choice of market mechanisms in environmental policy d lead to favourable outcomes and his belief that the factional mode1 holds the key to understanding of the PRC policy process in this issue area. It finds that central agenda setting is just the first in a long chah of decisions and non-decisions at several levels which impact upon pollution control.l1 Maa has demonstrated that provincial governments have show a wide variety of responses to Beijing's concem about the environment and that these can be linked to a variety of socio-economic factors." The present study extends similar conclusions to the sub-provincial level; the mayor's lack of attention to environmental implementation is shaped by social econornic. and political conditions in his jurisdiction (and elsewhere). Fiscal decentralization, clean-up costs, an exploratory approach (see below). and present developrnent policies afEect the exact content of policy as if is administered in fact. The inter-relationship of the municipal govemment, the local EPB. factory managers, the courts. the public. and officials at higher levels in the political system is critical to the outcome of implementation effons. Of particular interest is the relationship between municipal officials and factory managers. Althouçh this study contains no direct evidence of compt activities in investrnent attraction efforts or subsequent interaction between these parties, t here are circumstantial indicators of such problems. First. high-level corruption was a general problem with Xiamen's leadership during the 1980s. Second. cases of glaring standards violations being met with late. light punishments (such as the Hua "On this point 1 concur with Tanner. See Murray Scot Tanner, "How a Bill Becomes Law in China: Stages and Processes in Law Making," The China Ouarterlv, no. 141 (March 1995). 39-64. "~aaA Studv of Provincial Policy. Xia Food& case) could weU have been the result of bribes or other informal agreements between enterprise managers and SEZ officials. Interviews with factory officials rnuy eventually t hrow more Iight on this potentially shadowy aspect of pollution controi. At a very minimum. there was an implicit agreement between the SUand its major investors that environmental laws would not be strictly enforced. The Deputy Mayor's statements regarchg not wanting to scare investors off stands as clear evidence in this regard. That this "wariness" may have been induced by compt practices seems to be a real possibility. What mode1 or models. then. best capture al1 of these interrelationships and the dynarnics of pollution control in Xiamen? The general weaknesses of the factional mode1 have been cited above. Concerning this case it can be noted that SUstatus occasionally drew Xiamen into disputes between senior leaders. but those leaders did not participate directly in the enforcement of regdations and seemed to be in çeneral agreement that the SUSshould pay particular attention to the environment. The models of the Chinese policy process reviewed by Harding focus almost entirely on elite politics at the central level. '" More recently, the fiapented authoritarianism mode1 has emphasized the impact lower levels of govemrnent (the province in most studies) may have in the Chinese policy process. The importance of the local political context. however. should not lead one to discard the models reviewed by Harding. On the contrary. under conditions of decentralization and bureaucratie fiagmentatiio~several of the old models help hiçhlight important features of the policy procexs ot the locnl lr\tJ/. For example. fiscal decentralizatios a lack of centrally administered cost-shared programmes in the environmental field. weak provincial incentives for municipalities to attach importance to ''Harding, "Competing Modeis. " pollution control, and the EPB's status as a depanment of the locai govement al1 combine to put mayors and their deputies in positions of tremendous power (and subject to considerable cross pressures) with respect to the implementation of environmental policies. To the extent that mayon are able to establish an independent kingdom (dirli wmggm) within their junsdictioa their interest in. and handling of, pollution control is a key factor in implementation success or failure. Thus, a local rnayor-in-comrnand model analogous to the Mao-in-comrnand model once utilized for central organs of power has some analytic value. The thoughts of rnayors on the environment are reasonable indicators of what actual policy is at the locai level. In Xiamen. the mayor assigned environmental work to a deputy. The interest and effectiveness of the men assigned this task varied. Most deputies assigned this ponfolio were pre- occupied with their econornic development duties. In contrast, the national press lauded certain mayors in Shandong and elsewhere for assurning environmentai responsibilities themseives and thereby irnproving environmentai conditions in their communities. Although local leaders were obviously constrained by pressures fiom central and provincial authorities as well as codlicting local demands for resources. the support of these individuals was a prerequisite for tough enforcement actions against polluters by local EPBs. The words, attitudes, and actions of these local political masters is therefore. to repeat, very critical to pollution control work. Their will and coalition- building ski11 are essential to environmental efforts. horher cornmon model of Chinese elite politics which has applicability to the local politics of pollution control is the bureaucratic politics model. In this model, policy results fiom the pulling and hauling of various bureaucratic entities. In China, interdepartmental coordination of concrete environmental implementation issues is handled by the municipal Environmental Commission. This body seats representatives of about two dozen local govemment departments and organizations only two of which truly have environmentai protection among their central interests (the EPB and the sanitation department). Given this setting, it is easy to see how most pulling and hauling is in directions not particularly friendly to the environment. The imer workings of this crucial local environmental decision-making body were not revealed by my informmts. If sufficient interview access to key participants could be obtained, the bureaucratic politics of important environmental decisions would no doubt be revealed with greater clarity. Furthemore, the EPB's weak bureaucratic position and lack of prestige were evident in their long-time subservience to the construction depanment. in the common EPB consultations with economic and planning interests. and in the occasional boost Qven their activities by public cornplaint. These deficiencies were also reflected in the EPB's suggestions to the municipal govemment that better coordination between departments was needed; calls for more coordination rareiy corne from positions of power. This weakness stemmed from both their relative lack of history (established as independent bodies only in the middle to late 1980s) and the perception that they did not contribute to economic development.14 The latter factor was particularly acute. given Xiamen's SE2 status. The appiicability of these cornmonly used models to the local level and the generally increased importance of local administration suggest that an area of fniitfùl future research may be the development of policy-making models of local pvernme»t adpolitics in China. Crucial research questions may include: How do issues get on the local poiiticai agenda and what are the prerequisites of local legislative, judicial, and (most importantly) executive action? Perhaps in this context the 140nbureaucratic weakness. see Lynn Paine, "The Educational Policy Process: A Case Study of Bureaucratie Action in Ch''in Lieberthal and Larnpton, eds.. Bureaucracv. Politics. and Decision Makinq, 18 1-2 15. The revenues EPBs collect comparatively are smali and utilized internally. question of differences in the administration of municipalities of diffenng bureaucratic rank could be reexamined. At a very general level. this case study confirms that essential features of the fiagmented authoritarianism model are evident in the environmental policy process. With the authorities taking an explicitly exploratory approach, the processes of both policy formulation and implementation were decidedly protracted. Ten years separated the orignal trial law fiom its successor. At both the national and local levels the process was incremental. In Xiamen. the actual application of formal laws to local poiluters emerged slowly and with only very gradually escalatinç severity. Two other critical features of the model, bargaining and the disjointed nature of the policy process, were present as well. However. these features were manifest in a manner somewhat different from that described in previous studies of stnctly "econornic" policy making. That key decisions regarding the environment are made Ui a number of only loosely coordinated bodies is certainly true. Similarly. bargaining over the texms of "cornpliance" between the EPB and factories was a feature of enforcement at the municipal level. However, bargaining hrtwrrn levels over specific pollution control issues was not a cornmon occurrence. Tanner has noted that the fragrnented authontarianism model fails to capture aspects of the policy process outside of inter-agency consensus building.'' Consensus building and bargaining rake place when some kind of implementation is highly valued by at least some actors and when entities have resources desired by other actors in the system. But what happens under conditions of decentraiization when an issue is attached to an actor that lacks bureaucratic clout at lower levels of the system? Xiamen EPB cadres viewed provincial officiais as "representing" the national level with ''Tanner, "How a Bill Becomes Law in China." respect to environmental affairs. Thus. although Iegislatiu~~itself became increasingly sprcrfic as lower levels elaborated on, and complemented. the national law. policy implernrntatiori was the vietim of a filtering effect which occurred as policies moved downward through political channels. As Maa has shown. the attention shown to environmental issues t hrough personnel allocations and legislative activities varies widely from province to province.'"ujian was not exemplary in these respects. Since municipal authorities take the provincial government's lack of emphasis (as transrnitted through the Fujian EPB). as authoritative. then. given weak incent ives for environmental enforcement. municipalities are unlikely to innovate extensively or implement more vigorously than provincial authorities suggest. In short, lack of attention to environmental issues at the provincial level reinforces the tendency of municipalities to give pollution control short shrift; thus. neither the tiao nor the kmi relationships of municipal EPBs unambiguously support the bureau's mission. Sigials sent from higher levels were sometimes contradictory. Although the intervention of central elites occurred in the form of encouragement and assistance in formulating local regulations, this behaviour did not constitute a consistent observable pattern and often was related to Xiamen's SEZ statu. The state level was quite involved and authoritative in legislative matters but much less so in enforcement rnatters. The NEPA and provincial bureau did conduct inspections of environmental work at the local level; these served as a mild but temporary stimulus for increased action. However, the upper levels of govement also served indirectly as hindrances on municipal EPB actions in several ways. First. the scope of certain programmes proposed by the Xiamen EPB were scaled back by hiçher levels. Second, as mentioned above. the relatively weak emphasis placed by Fujian upon urban '"aa, A Studv of Provincial Policy. pollution control was taken by Xiamen cadres as the nom. Finally, and more broadly. the lack of direct national or provincial fùnding of local r~Iforcernrritefforts ensured that the econornic growth emphasis of the SEZ administration wodd lead, in tum, to a very under-staffed implementing agency. To use Sabatier's language. national Iaws have clear support in the implementing agency but that agency is subordinate politically and financially to a sovereign - the municipal government - whose supportiveness is far less evident. To the extent this situation is mirrored in other issue areas, this raises fiindamental questions regarding the adrnittedly difficult-to-define concept of "state capacity ." Further research needs to be done regarding both the concept itself and its application to China." Some conclusions cm also be drawn from this case study regarding the nature of the political system and the role of legislatures in China. In recent years the WC has become something more than a mbber starnp." Similariy, provincial legislators have taken on increasingly important and specialized roles.19 This study reveals that these phenornena exist at the municipal level as well. Deputies of the local People's Congress were quite open in their suggestions that the Mayor's office be more generous with respect to cleaning up Yun Dang Lake. Indeed, they publicly cited a lack of leadership on the issue as one of the key problems. Their cornplaints resulted. at least indirectly, in increased fùnding for Yun Dang Lake and the appointment of a Deputy Mayor who took an active interest in the EPB's work. Such actions by local People's Congress deputies are simiiar to the remonstrating activities undertaken on other issues by their nationai counterparts. "~ninitial attempt at applying this concept to China is found in Jia Hao and Lin Zhimin. eds., Chaneine Central-Local Relations in China: Reform and State Ca~acitv(Boulder: Westview, 1994). "See Kevin J. O'Brien. "Agents and Remonstrators: Role Accumulation by Chinese People's Congress Deputies," The China Ouarterly, no. 138 (June 1994). 3 59-80. 19Sen Lin, Decentralkation and Provincial Legislation. Reinvigorated local and national legislatures may, at sorne hture date, help facilitate movement away from an authontaian political system in China. Should this occur, environmental problems may weil be prominent among the issues raised. The fact that local enforcernent is already sornewhat responsive to public cornplaints is significant. Although not necessarily supportive of the rule of law. such responsiveness has some precedent in formerly socialist systems. Local councils under peresnoika in the USSR and later in Russia cut their teeth on environmental issues. Environrnentalists played a prominent role in recent political changes in Eastern Europe as ~ell.~~ Even though organized environmentalism is not yet a potent force in China, it is not unreasonable to expect environment-related fnistrations to be vented if the parameters of political debate are widened and pollution woes continue to mount. III. Exoloration and Leamin9 Analysts who advocate implementation as exploration emphasize that allocation of centrally disbursed funds in conjunction with reduced central coercion may result in increased exploration, innovation and ultirnately. implementation success. They aiso recognize that this poses an increased risk of policy reimplementation or deviation fiom original intentions. However. in their perspective. implernentation should be a "movhg target" involving the alteration of objectives as well as policies; failure to leam is really the only failure. ''See Charles E. Zeigler, "Environmental Politics and Policy Under Perestroika" and David R. Marples. "The Greening of Ukraine: Ecology and the Emergence of Zrlerlyi 374ii. 1986-1990" in Judith Sedatis and Jim Butterfield, eds., Perestroika From Below: Social Movements in the Soviet Union (Boulder: Westview, 199 1 ); Barbara Jancar-Webster, ed., Environmental Action in Eastern Euro~e:Resoonse to Crisis (ho* N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1993); and Anna Vari and Pal Tamas, eds., Environment and Democratic Transitions: Policv and Politics in Central and Eastern Europe (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993). 1 am indebted to John Young for information on this point. What does the present case suggest about the utility of an exploratory approach to policy implementation? Initiaily. two observations are in order to put Chinese effons in proper context. Fust. as Lieberthal and Oksenberg have suggesteâ, the tentative nature of the policy process in China is due in large masure to the rwce~iiyof such an approach; it should not be assumed that it ernerges from sorne normative or academic preference for it. From the central leadership's perspective. exploration is largely a process of building and maintaining politicai support in a fiagmented politicai system. However, in China in a new issue area such as environrnentai protection there is also a desire to leam as you go. "Exploratory policy" can, in this context, becorne an expianation of why more is not done nght now. but it alsg indicates a cenain open-mindedness about policy direction. Thus. the conditions which make exploration a necessity do not necessarily inhibit the realization of the approachs benefits. but they certainly tend to subdue them. Secondly. and related to the above point. those academics who advocate exploration are most often familiar with pluraiistic systems and policy areas which are at lem partially funded by central (usually federai) çovemments. Neither of these two conditions hold for Chinese pollution control effons. but the latter discrepancy is far more cntical than the first. Pluralism, indeed. can sometimes be blarned for thworting the assenion of governmental authority in implernentation." On the other hand. an expectation for successful exploration, if not supported financially by an ultimate central authority. is likely to be oniy rninimaily fulfilled if at dl. If the core idea behind "implementation as exploration1'is to provide a fùndd yet unconstrained, atmosphere in which local policy communities work out policy solutions compatible with both general central aims and specific local public needs. then environrnentai exploration Chinese-style is the antithesis of the concept in certain respects. "~heodoreJ. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979). 272-94. Aithough China's reformers seem to share a general outlook with "implementation as exploration" academics, in practice the benetits of the approach are stifled because central-level funding is very limited and there is little immediate incentive for local authorities to attach priority to innovation in pollution control. Other case studies have shown that the local innovation which does occur relates more to fund raising than reylation enforcement and can actually distract EPB officials from their primary objectives. The actual impact of exploration can be illustrated with respect to Xiamen in several ways. Xiamen's designation as a test point for the pollution permit system was more of a political exercise than a tme expenment. Early suggestions from local implementors that the system be more widely applied were brushed aside by centrai authonties. Similarly, early Xiamen attempts at formulating implementing regulations were ovemdden and scaled back by officials in Beijing. If any lessons were learned by Xiamen EPB officials from these early experiences it was that innovation and exploration are not rewarded. To argue that an exploratory approach was not bearing hit in the specific ways envisioned by those who advocate the concept. however, is not to suggest that Irarnhig was absent. At the centrai level graduai leamhg was demonstrated through organizational changes, international exchanges, and some legislative revisions. Xiamen EPB officials' learning occurred at a more practical level. A great ded of technological and scientific knowledge was absorbed by these cadres between 1979 and 1992. Also quite practical was the political knowledge gained; as time wore on they became more inclined to make private suggestions to the municipal govemment regarding political and bureaucratic problems which impeded pollution control." They also. no doubt. leamed -The17 author recogiizes that this increasing boldness may have also been afFected by a perception of increased tolerance of criticai voices by political authorities. However. the fact remains that these over time to build coalitions through compromise wit h more powerfùl bureaucratic interests- Whether such learning auçmented pollution control is unclear. These suggestions also imply. however. that a specific type of critical learning was not occumng at a key nexus in the policy network. Lloyd Etheredp has aryed that effective policy formulation and pvemmental learning "is a matter of attitude change, of creating common objectives and capturing imaginations."3 But this very fact means that policy communities are poor leaming environments; value conflict is inevitable." In this case the values of EPB cadres differed somewhat from those of key municipal officials; numerous quotations above serve to illustrate that the values of top municipal officials showed only limited evidence of rnovement toward increased environment consciousness. An important point. then, insufficiently emphasized in both the literature on implernentation through exploration and the literature on Chinese environmental implementation is that leaming is more productive when it takes place among those who wield ultimate political power. It is not enough for NEPA to reorganize or for EPB cadres to gain awareness of their subordinate position. The absence of leaming by the Mayor and his deputy contributed to implementation failure in this case. Future research will perhaps shed more light on how Mayors lem about the environment in China. subtle suggestions were conveyed in i~rtrnlaldocuments and the shifi in tone and content of the suggestions came long after the political atmosphere began to loosen in the post-Cultural Revolution era. 23 Et heredge. "Govemment Learning: An Overview." 84. "~indquist. "Public Managers and Policy Cornmunities. 127-59. IV. Comparative Dimensions: Some General Observations Grindle's observation that policy implementation in less developed countnes is likely to be very difficult especially when the process itself is highly political has cenainly been borne out in this case. Nothing is more politicai in China than econornic growth, stability, and job security. Pollution control was perceived to negatively affect these; thus. its implementation lacked vigour. It is not surprising, therefore. that cornparisons between pollution control policy development in China and India reveal some broad similarities. In both countries original organization for environmental protection was sparked by participation in the U.N. conference of 1972. Sirnilarly. both India and China have taken the rather unique step of entrenching environmental protection as a state responsibiiity in their respective constitutions, but have had difficulties in establishing an autonomous agency capable of rigorous enforcement." The exact sequence in which certain measures were adopted has varied; India was first to establish a specific goverment ministry for the environment while China included such things as noise pollution control and mandatory impact assessments in their legislation at an earlier date. However, the two States have followed similar paths in which a concomitant concern for econornic development was paramount and ever at the forefront of policy considerations. More recently. generai differences between China and India have emerged which are attributable to differing characteristics of the two countries. First, political pluralism and sympathetic cultural traditions have provided an environment in which public awareness and a "green movement" have emerged with considerable strength in India. The (somewhat) liberdized political atmosphere in post-Mao China and whatever respect for nature cm be observed in Taoism have not yet produced "O. P. Dwivedi and B. Kishore, "Protecting the Environment from Pollution, " 894-9 1 1 . simiiar renilts in China. This absence of pluralism and lack of an active environmentalist movement in China doubly hampers efforts to control pollution. If officiais act only when citizens speak out. then the fear of speaking out is a major problem for environmental protection efforts. In Taiwan public protes amid political liberalization forced the govemment to attack pollution problems more directly and in a more concened fashion.16 This. in turn. led to another problem for China. The expansion of environmentai regdation in Taiwan has prompted that island's investors to look elsewhere when setting up polluting industries. Generally they looked toward China. The Xiamen SEZ, thanks to historical kinship ties, was the favounte site for Taiwanese investrnent. In short. Xiamen's municipal authonties have thus been deaiing extensively with many potential investors for whom relaxed environmental controls is a major motivation in relocation. Second, adherence to the mIe of law in India means that over time the evolution of case law on environmentai protection has provided a growinç foundation upon which decisions about pollution control may be based. Moreover. the Supreme Coun is able to direct lower courts in their enforcement of environmental law. In contrast. Chinese enforcement normally involves the making of local political decisions with mere suasion corning fiom the Central level (or reliance upon local courts as a last resort). These dzerences arise not only from dissimilarities in judicial systerns. but also from the fact that India is a federal state which entrusts pollution control to central and state (not municipal) agencies. In India. States actually battle the central govemment over which level is constitutionally responsible for ceriain environmental matters. In China. everyday enforcement authority has been devolved to the lowest level solely at the central authonties' discretion. In return for the econornic '"cardon-hderson Pollution Politics and Forein Investment in Taiwan, 79-92. decision-making powers localities want, the centre has also given them responsibilities they would rather not shoulder. Pollution control is pnmary arnong these. The courts in India are çenerally involveci in solving critical jurisdictiond questions. Al1 of these factors, combined with the shock of the disaster in Bhopal in 1986. have caused India's environmental protection efforts to intensify and take on a legalistic fiavour more rapidly than China's in recent years." It is signifiant that the diFerences between India's and China's environmental policy experiences are traceable to differences in their respective political systems. Comparisons between system types reveal that diffenng stylrs of environmental reylations emerçe fiom diffenng political systems. Actual ~nîfcum~-iof implementation and the Iocd politics of pollution control. in contrast, Vary less substantially. This. Vogel argues, occurs (despite starkly contrastinç government-business relations) because ultimately "the severity of enforcement is strongly influenced by the interests of policy makers. industrial workers. and the public as a whole in keeping their nation's industries intemationally competiti~e."'~Jancar stated this a diflerent way in reference to socialist States when she observed that the basic social and economic structure of a society can rarely be changed by tinkering with regdatory institution^.'^ Thus, the dilemmas and decisions of local political leaders in China are not unusual in a broadly comparative sense. Environmental policy is not only contradicted and thwarted by the major policy emphases of local officials in China's Xiamen SU;it is also antithetical irt the shorr terni to the pnmary effons of politicai leaders and other societal elites "Har Govind. "Recent Developments in Environmental Protection in India: Pollution Control," Ambio, vol. 18, no. 8 (1989), 429-33. "~o~el.National Styles of Reemilation, 223-24. Lg~ancar,Environmental Management, 309. in a wide variety polities. Thus, even in a purportedly legalistic setting cornpliance with regdations cornes only when it is the cheapest option; negotiation is ofien a more cost effective strategy." What is in fact somewhat unique about China's environmental implernentation efforts is the degree to which such efforts have been decentralized. While certainly adaptation to local conditions is necessary, so is inter-jurisdictional coordination." The comparative literature suggests that excessive decentralization in pollution control is problematic. In Italy. for example. where mayors also play a key role in enforcement. slack enforcement has also been observed." Furthemore, analysis of Germany's organization and implementation of pollution control efforts reveals that a combination of local autonomy and limited power for on-the-ground implementors negatively affects results jua as it does in China." Though by no means a panacea because of systemic constraints on the Chinese central govement. China may do well to reconsider the devolution of environmental enforcement powers. Perhaps central or provincial intervention in environmental enforcement should be given a more regularized and authoritative organizational forrn. The hinorical development of pollution control policies in the United States and Sweden have been compared to the fabled tortoise and hue. In Amenca policy making was initially swifl and dramatic but later slowed down as coalition building became difficuit. Swedea in contrast. made slow but continua1 progress through consensus and compromise. In China. the fate of pollution control policies over the last decade and a haif of their development can best be likened unto a 'Yangbein and Kerwin. "Implementation, Negotiation. and Cornpliance. " ".fahiel. Implementation Throueh Oreanizational Leaminq. ente and Lewanski, "Air Pollution Control in Italy." 107-28. '"enate Mayntz, "Intergovernrnental Implementation of Environmental Policy" in Hanf and Sharpf. eds.. Interoreanizational Policv Making, 20 1- 14. caterpillar. Although it touches the ground (or gass roots) at multiple points, it must nevertheless "inch" dong in laborious fashion. Small sire. numerous ground-level obstacles, and vulnerability to even rather benign predators means that a caterpillar's joumey must clearly be slower than the tortoise's and wiii probably be incomplete. Coalition, consensus. and consciousness buiidinç so close to the ground in present-day China are indeed difficult for "non-economic" interests. A host of earlier poor decisions add imrneasurably to the caterpillar's burden. For these reasons. they must ofken stray from the designated race course and take an infornial path. Until the caterpillar somehow transforms itself into a rnuch more agile creanire, its fate on the forest path will always be a precarïous one. APPENDIX A: A MAP OF XMMEN source: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 1 October 1984, 98. APPENDM. B: LIST OF ACRONYMS BR ...... Beiiine Review EPB ...... Environmental Protection Bureau EPC ...... Environmental Protection Commission FBIS ...... Foreign Broadcast Information Service FRB ...... Fuiian Ribao Fuiian Dailv] FYP ...... *.. Five Year Plan PRS ...... Joint Publication Research Service MLlRCEP ...... Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction and Environmentai Protection NEPA ...... National Environmental Protection Agency NPC ...... National People's Congress PLA ...... People's Liberation Army PPC ...... Provincial People's Congress PRC ...... People's Republic of China ROC ...... Republic of China (Taiwan) SCCEP ...... State Council Commission on Environmental Protection SCEPLSG ...... State Council Environmental Protection Leading Small Group SE2 ...... Special Economic Zone SPC ...... State Planning Commission XRB ...... Xiamen Ribao [Xiamen Dailv] ZHB ...... 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