MIDDLE EAST REPORT
AMERICA’S IRAQ Summer 2003 ■ Number 227 MIDDLE EAST RESEARCH & INFORMATION PROJECT Summer 2003 No. 227 Vol.33 No. 2
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CONTRIBUTIONS to MERIP are tax-deductible. MERIP is a non-profit 501 (C) (3) organization. FROM THE EDITOR MIDDLE EAST REPORT wo months after the welcome demise of Saddam Hussein’s regime, it has become cus- tomary to say that the US won the war and is losing the peace in Iraq. is formulation, Editor Chris Toensing Tcoined to describe US neglect of Afghanistan following the fall of the Taliban, gives Associate Editor Ian Urbina the Bush administration too much credit. ere were never any serious plans to “win the peace” in Iraq, as is obvious from the chaotic aftermath of the large-scale combat. Media Coordinator Catherine Cook ere were no plans to keep the Iraqi economy running with minimal interruption—US Consultant Barbara Neuwirth troops watched as looters pillaged ministries, laboratories, factories and other places of Print-Web Design/Production James E. Bishara employment, leaving thousands of Iraqis without work. New US viceroy L. Paul Bremer’s Photo Editor Michelle Woodward decommissioning of the Iraqi army and overzealous de-Ba‘thification have added to the Interns Dan Denvir, Jawad Muaddi, ranks of the unemployed. ough fear of nuclear proliferation was a major justification Karin van der Tak cited for George W. Bush’s preemptive strike, US forces did not guard the nuclear facility at Proofreaders Justin Hoffman Tuwaitha, and components of possible radiological weapons have vanished. Despite much puffery in Washington about the “patrimony of the Iraqi people,” US troops stood by while Reviews Rebecca L. Stein thieves relieved the National Museum of priceless artifacts. Even some of the supposedly Printing McArdle Printing secured oilfields in the south were looted of key equipment, helping to explain why today Iraq is pumping only half the oil (between , to , barrels per day) that it was pumping in the last days before the war. Contributing Editors Lila Abu-Lughod, Mariano Unable so far to find weapons of mass destruction, the White House is retroactively Aguirre, Asef Bayat, Joel Beinin, Azmi Bishara, Dan selling the war as a “humanitarian intervention.” But there is little sign to date of serious Connell, Beshara Doumani, Kaveh Ehsani, Selima efforts to bring Iraqi war criminals to justice. US troops loitered in the vicinity while locals Ghezali, Sarah Graham-Brown, Fred Halliday, Geoff excavated a mass grave near Hilla with a hydraulic backhoe, imperiling crucial forensic evi- Hartman, Rema Hammami, Deniz Kandiyoti, Isam dence of massacres after the uprising. On May , US forces released a major suspect al-Khafaji, Ann Lesch, Zachary Lockman, Tim in these very massacres, Muhammad Jawad al-Naifus, because the interrogating officer was Mitchell, Roger Owen, Reem Saad, Mohammed el- unaware of the charges against him. Meanwhile, Saddam Hussein remains as elusive as the Sayed Said, Simona Sharoni, Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, presumed illicit arsenal in whose name Iraq was invaded. Susan Slyomovics, Salim Tamari, Graham Usher, Washington’s only serious plans for post-war Iraq have nothing to do with “humanitar- Oren Yiftachel, Sami Zubaida. ian intervention,” and everything to do with centralizing the levers of power in its own hands. After intense US campaigning, the UN Security Council passed Resolution MERIP Board of Directors Bruce Dunne, lifting economic sanctions on Iraq and placing the country’s oil revenues under the aegis Lisa Hajjar, Vickie Langohr, Karen Pfeifer, Jillian of an “Occupying Authority” composed of the US and Britain. ough it stamps a seal of Schwedler, Sandra Tamari, Chris Toensing. approval upon an occupation of indefinite duration, with scant UN involvement and no timetable for the transition to indigenous Iraqi government, UNSC does bind the Editorial Committee Raad Alkadiri, Kamran US to the legal obligations of an occupying power—a label Washington had previously Ali, Shiva Balaghi, Laleh Behbehanian, James E. shunned for fear of losing Iraqi “hearts and minds.” e resolution thus creates standards Bishara, Sheila Carapico, Elliott Colla, Hilal Elver, of accountability which the US may come to regret as it polices the cities and hands out Deborah Gerner, Lisa Hajjar, Salah D. Hassan, reconstruction contracts. e General Accounting Office will be monitoring a range of Vickie Langohr, David McMurray, Khalid Medani, occupation and reconstruction policies on behalf of Congress. Garay Menicucci, Karen Pfeifer, Shahnaz Rouse, Belatedly, media attention may hold Bush administration figures accountable for Paul Silverstein, Rebecca L. Stein, Chris Toensing, force-feeding the public a diet of hype about the “mortal threat” posed by Iraq’s weapons Ian Urbina. of mass destruction. In the long term, Iraqis will care more to hold the US accountable for the high-flown rhetoric promising that their “liberators” will bequeath to them a free, Development Committee Alfred Khoury, Jillian Schwedler, Sandra Tamari. democratic and prosperous Iraq. The pre-war fantasies, conjured by the Iraq hawks, that Ahmad Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress and other returning exiles could rapidly build Camelot on the Copyright © April–June 2003 Euphrates have evaporated. Bremer freely refers to the US presence as an “occupa- tion,” and has sidelined the seven-member “leadership council” (of which Chalabi is Middle East Research & Information Project a member) appointed by his predecessor as viceroy. At press time, this body was vow- ing to proceed with plans to convene a “national congress” to name an interim Iraqi Printed in the USA by McArdle Printing. government, despite Bremer’s intention to appoint his own set of Iraqi advisors. Two months into the US occupation of Iraq, Washington appears no more successful than www.merip.org other Middle Eastern occupiers in its attempts to manipulate indigenous politics to its union bug own advantage. is issue of Middle East Report examines some of the real-world ob- stacles blocking realization of the war party’s expansive vision for Iraq and the region. ■ UPFRONT
Basic Needs vs. Swimming Pools Water Inequality and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict Alwyn Rouyer
Palestinian farmers clear irrigation equipment for lack of water. ED KASHI/AURORA PHOTOS
Severe drought conditions, only recently ameliorated by heavy winter rains, and the current hostilities have exacerbated the fundamental inequality in division of the scarce water resources of Israel-Palestine between
Israelis and Palestinians. Water is becoming a weapon of war aimed at quelling Palestinian support for resistance to occupation. ater inequality and Israel’s use of restricted access to Water accords included in the Oslo II Interim Agreement water as a weapon of suppression have been continu- of were supposed to have established a framework and Wing components of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. institutions leading to a workable solution of the dispute. From the seizure of the West Bank and Gaza in to the Instead, Israel has continued to maintain almost complete present day, Israeli water policies have discriminated against control over the water sector in the West Bank through the Palestinians by denying them equal utilization of shared water Israeli-Palestinian Joint Water Committee (JWC) established resources. Palestinian water consumption is significantly be- under the agreement. Using its veto on the JWC, Israel has low the basic minimum recommended by the World Health blocked many new Palestinian water projects and delayed Organization and many Palestinian communities lack access others claiming infringement on its own water rights. Since to piped water, while Israelis enjoy the luxury of swimming the onset of the second intifada in September , the gov- pools, green lawns and two showers a day, and support a thriv- ernment of Israel has engaged in various forms of collective ing export agriculture through irrigation. punishment to crush resistance to settlement and occupation of Palestinian lands. Among this arsenal of measures are ef- Alwyn Rouyer teaches at the Middle East Center of the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington. forts to make it more difficult for ordinary Palestinians to
2 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 3 obtain water, not only for agriculture, but also for drinking content considered safe to drink, leading to health problems and basic human sanitation. like kidney ailments and hypertension. According to Riyad al- Khudari, a hydrologist who is president of al-Azhar University High and Dry in Gaza and former chair of the Palestinian delegation to the Israel’s water policies and actions are best understood in the Multilateral Water Working Group, existing Gaza supplies context of the region’s scarcity of water resources and persistent would be adequate if not for intensive pumping by Jewish drought over the past decade. e region shared by Israel and settlements inside Gaza and just across the border in Israel. Palestinians relies on three main sources of water: the Jordan ese charges are denied by Israeli officials. River basin, including Lake Galilee, and two major aquifers, e water shortage cannot be attributed only to the drought one extending from the mountainous central spine of the West conditions that have plagued the region for the last decade. Bank into Israel, and the other stretching along the coastal From to , Israel welcomed nearly one million Jew- plain across both Israel and the Gaza Strip. In a normal year, ish immigrants, mainly from the former Soviet Union and these three sources supply approximately , million cubic Ethiopia. At the same time, Israelis have not curtailed levels of meters (mcm) of water. Other sources, including desalina- household water consumption comparable to those in the West. tion, recycled wastewater, springs and rainwater collection But it is Israeli agriculture that consumes as much as percent supply about another mcm. In the last two years, Israel of available water—a remarkable figure given that agriculture has embarked on the development of additional desalination accounts for only percent of Israel’s gross domestic product. facilities that are expected to add another to mcm Such export crops as citrus fruits and flowers, in particular, are of potable water by . Israel has also recently contracted heavy consumers of water, leading commentators to charge to purchase about mcm of water a year from Turkey over Israel with shipping “virtual water” overseas. the next years. Israel-Palestine has suffered below average rainfall for a de- Conspicuous Gap in Consumption cade. Drought conditions drained Lake Galilee, the West Bank It is the Palestinians who suffer the most from the drought mountain aquifer and the coastal aquifer to their lowest point conditions. e distribution of shared water resources between in memory. ese three main water sources reached or crossed Jews and Arabs is fundamentally unfair. Israel does not divide their “red line”—the point beyond which sustainable yield is available water fairly according to need, in accordance with threatened with irreversible damage from contamination by international law. Palestinians receive only percent of the pollution or intrusion of saline water. Fortunately, in early mountain aquifer, and have no access to water from the Jordan heavy winter rains and snow in some higher elevations have River basin. In normal times, Palestinians per capita consume reversed the decade-long drought for the time being. only one third as much water as Israelis for household use and According to Israel’s Hydrological Service, Lake Galilee only one sixth as much for irrigation. Since the fall of , dropped to its lowest level of . meters below sea level in with the drought and the intifada, the gap in water consump- , but rebounded slightly to . this past year. e abso- tion has widened considerably. lute red line is . meters below sea level. At that point the According to a summer report by B’Tselem, an Israeli National Water Carrier, which normally transports about human rights group, Palestinian household water consumption mcm from the lake to the populated area of the coast and on has fallen by half in comparison to that of Israelis: liters to the upper Negev for irrigation, will stop working because per person per day (lpd) to lpd. Palestinian NGO sources the pumps cannot work below that level without engineering reported by the BBC put the Palestinian water consumption changes. In September , the New York Times reported in some parts of the West Bank as low as lpd. (e interna- that the lake was so depleted that one marina dock is now tional minimum standard is lpd.) As a result, Palestinians yards from the water. e marina has had to pave a road are now unable to meet many basic needs such as maintaining across the dry lakebed so trailers can carry boats to the water. personal hygiene and cleaning house. ey do not have enough At the city of Tiberias, the walled harbor is littered with debris water for the animals, vegetable gardens and crops that provide and piers for tourist boats are high and dry. a vital source of food for most households. In the words of the e coastal aquifer has been heavily pumped in both Israel B’Tselem statement, “at a time when the Israeli public debates and the Gaza Strip, and hit very hard by the decade-long whether to water their lawns or wash the car, Palestinians suffer drought. Far more has been pumped than replaced by rain- from a shortage of water to meet their most basic needs.” fall over the same period of time. In places the watershed has In the West Bank, almost half of the more than Pales- dropped four meters, allowing in the seepage of seawater that tinian villages and refugee camps are without the piped water could soon destroy the aquifer. In Gaza, the coastal aquifer that Israel readily supplies to neighboring Jewish settlements. has reached a point where percent of the potential drinking For people in these localities, the principal source of water is water is unsuitable for human consumption. Saltwater intru- rainfall collected on rooftops and stored in cisterns near the sion from the Mediterranean now extends several miles inland. house. is source generally only meets household needs dur- In some areas, Gaza’s drinking water has ten times the sodium ing the period from November to May. In the hot summer
2 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 3 Palestinian boys in Yatta, south of Hebron, in the West Bank. NIR KAFRI season, residents must collect water from nearby springs in thirds but the nearby settlement of Kiryat Arba suffered no plastic bottles or purchase water from private tanker trucks at reduction in its allotment. Kiryat Arba, with a population of very high prices. ese conditions have significantly worsened about ,, received the same amount of water as the entire as a result of the drought and the intifada. city of Hebron, with a population of ,. is level of Palestinian municipalities in the West Bank connected to inequality significantly adds to the Palestinian frustration and water pipelines suffer unequal treatment in water distribution. anger fueling the uprising. Palestinian pay more for the same amount of water than do Israeli officials deny that there is a double standard in their Israelis and the amount of their allocation is far smaller. Even water policy for the West Bank and Gaza. In their view, Pal- before the current uprising, Palestinian officials charged that estinians and their leaders are to blame for Palestinian water Israel was withholding water from West Bank towns and vil- shortages, not Israel. ey rebuke the Palestinian Authority lages. During the summer months, water is in such short sup- for failing to adopt proper environmental practices to preserve ply that it can only be provided to municipalities one or two water resources. In the words of Israeli Water Commission days a week. In some towns the water supplied has dwindled official Noga Blitz, “We allocate water according to the to one seventh of normal. Water pressure is so low that taps interim agreement…and even percent more. It is not an will not bring forth water and toilets do not flush. allocation problem; it is a Palestinian distribution problem. e discrimination against Palestinians in water consump- We do not interfere.” Before the current outbreak of violence, tion is most conspicuous when compared to Jewish settlers Israelis accused the Palestinian Authority of holding up many in the West Bank and Gaza. While Palestinian towns and vil- water and sewage projects that would benefit Palestinian towns lages run dry and fields die, neighboring Jewish settlements and villages because the same projects would benefit Jewish get all the water they need. Some Palestinian NGOs assert settlements. In their view, “sewage is sewage,” so why build that settlers receive on average times the amount of water separate treatment plants in close proximity to each other? For allocated to Palestinians. In one reported instance, in the the Palestinian Authority, agreeing to joint sanitation facilities summers of and Hebron’s water was cut by two with Jewish settlements, even though the most effective means
4 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 5 of waste disposal, would be tantamount to recognition of the e already bad Palestinian water situation has grown much right of Jewish settlements to exist on Palestinian lands. worse during the current hostilities. e Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG) has to assemble and update monthly a record of Water as a Weapon Israeli attacks on Palestinian water infrastructure. Israeli closure On January , , several months after the current hostili- of many towns, villages and refugee camps, and checkpoints ties commenced, the Israeli-Palestinian Joint Water Committee along major roads, has separated large numbers of Palestinian (JWC) met at the Erez crossing between Israel and the Gaza from their water supply. In the West Bank, between and Strip under the auspices of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian-Ameri- localities are not connected to water supply lines but depend on can Committee on Water, and issued a joint call on the general the purchase of water from private or municipal water tanker public, as well as combatants, to refrain from harming the wa- trucks. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) blockades have made it much ter infrastructure of both Israelis and Palestinians in the West more difficult for tankers to get to water supplies and to deliver Bank and Gaza. Noah Kinarty, head of the Israeli delegation them to their customers. When trucks do get through the block- to the JWC, signed for Israel and Nabil al-Sharif, chairman of ades, the time and distance traveled is often doubled or tripled, the Palestinian Water Authority, for the Palestinian Authority. increasing cost. Trucks that averaged five to ten trips a day before e declaration read in part, “e Israeli and Palestinian sides the intifada now make only two or three daily trips. In many view the water and wastewater sphere as a most important mat- places springs and other water sources have been completely cut ter and strongly oppose any damage to water and wastewater off by closure. ere have also been incidents of tankers being infrastructure.” It went on to point out that these are mostly stopped at roadblocks and forced to empty their water on the intertwined and serve both peoples. road. Truckers attempting to break into closed military zones Unfortunately, Palestinian water facilities have not been risk being shot by Israeli soldiers. spared the devastation of war. Although many Israeli ac- In the last two years, Israeli attacks have damaged or de- tions may have been taken in the heat of battle, Palestinian stroyed many Palestinian water facilities. A huge number of communities have seen much of their water infrastructure rooftop water-gathering tanks all across the West Bank have damaged or destroyed. Many Palestinians have suffered from been destroyed by Israeli gunfire either deliberately or in dehydration, diarrhea and disease, due to an inability to ob- fighting with Palestinian defenders. In the summer of , tain clean water or any water at all. Prevention of access to PHG monitoring of communities found with exten- water has become a weapon in Israel’s arsenal of measures to sive shooting of roof tanks. ere has also been destruction suppress the Palestinian uprising against continued occupa- of pipeline, pumping stations, cisterns, wells and springs. In tion and colonization. an Israeli helicopter attack in the Gaza Strip destroyed
Swimming pool in settlement of Adora, near Hebron, in the West Bank. NIR KAFRI
4 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 5 wells serving , people. Dozens of West Bank commu- the town to open the valve. Mekorot employees let days go nities have suffered from damages to their water networks. In by before turning the valve back on. Qalqilya, over kilometers of pipeline have been destroyed by Israeli gunfire since the beginning of the intifada. In the Devastation of War PHG monitoring project, of the communities with On March , , Israel launched an offensive, Operation water networks reported damage; forty others in the survey Defensive Shield, aimed at reoccupation of West Bank cities. reported destruction of wells, springs and cisterns. According to the IDF, the goal of the operation was to eradicate Jewish settlers in the West Bank have blocked water delivery the “infrastructure of terrorism” following the killing of Israeli to Palestinian communities and sabotaged water infrastruc- civilians over the previous month. As the IDF entered Ramallah, ture. A recent report by Oxfam provides evidence of settlers Bethlehem, Tulkarm, Qalqilya, Jenin and Nablus as well as smaller vandalizing water supplies from Palestinian villages and pre- towns and villages, each was declared a closed military zone, bar- venting villagers from collecting water at springs. In village ring access to the outside world. In each case, the incursions were after village, Oxfam staff reported damages to water networks preceded by cutting off water and electricity to the residents of the and storage facilities by settlers as well as the Israeli military. towns, a violation of the prohibition against collective punishment Oxfam also reported many instances of shooting at Palestin- of civilians under Article of the Fourth Geneva Convention. ian Water Authority and municipality water personnel who Over the next three months the IDF killed over Pal- attempt to make repairs. ere is the estinians, at least of them chil- case of the village of Deir Nidham dren, and destroyed large sections in the Ramallah district where the of the Palestinian towns and refugee water from the main pipeline first Palestinians suffer most camps that they reoccupied. ese goes through the Jewish settlement incursions did not spare the water of Halamish. Here settlers have shut from drought conditions. networks; indeed in some cases off the valve that brings water to the water infrastructure was deliber- village on numerous occasions and ately destroyed. In Ramallah, the four times destroyed the piping that extends from the settle- West Bank seat of the Palestinian Authority just north of ment to the village. e village’s outstanding debt for lost Jerusalem, shelling by Israeli tanks destroyed the electricity water reached almost , in May . In another in- system powering the main water pumping station, leaving stance reported by Oxfam, settlers deliberately contaminated the , people in the city and outlying villages without water sources in Asira al-Qabliyya and Madama, villages in running water. When crews from the Ramallah municipal the Nablus district. water department first attempted to repair the pumps, they Mekorot is Israel’s national water distribution company. were turned away by Israeli gunfire. On a second attempt, Along with all Jewish settlements, many Palestinian locali- after receiving permission from Israeli military authorities ties with piped water in the West Bank get the water through to venture out, they were arrested and taken into custody. Mekorot pipelines. Since the beginning of the intifada, most Under -hour curfew, cut off from the outside world and Palestinian communities receiving Mekorot water have seen a without water, residents were left to rely on whatever water dramatic reduction in the amount of water coming through the had been stored and rainwater that fortunately was in good pipelines although nearby settlements have had no reduction supply because of spring rains that week. in supply. Over percent of the localities receiving Mekorot e northern West Bank city of Jenin suffered the most casu- water in the PHG survey reported a decline in the water sup- alties and the greatest amount of destruction during Defensive ply. irty-nine communities received less than percent Shield. Army tanks and bulldozers wantonly flattened several of normal supply; four had stopped getting water from the thousand homes and water facilities alike. Water pipelines Mekorot pipeline altogether. along streets and pumping transfer stations were destroyed in When Mekorot facilities in Palestinian areas break down, large numbers during the two-week fight for control of the repairs and spare parts have been hard to come by. In an in- refugee camp and parts of the city. Residents of these areas were cident recorded in the B’Tselem report, one of the two wells left without food and water from April until the blockade operated by Mekorot in the town of Yatta (, residents) was partially lifted on April . Water shortages during the south of Hebron ceased to operate due to malfunction in the period of closure left many people with no water to drink, fall of . Mekorot refused to repair the well or provide an leading some children to drink wastewater and become sick. alternate source of water for the residents. For the last two e closure of Nablus between April - cut off the city’s wells years the people of Yatta have received water for a -hour from tanker trucks that supply surrounding villages with their period only every two weeks. From time to time, even this main source of water. meager supply is halted because Jewish settlers in the neigh- Destruction of water infrastructure, along with closures and boring settlement of P’nei Haver shut the pipeline valve. IDF roadblocks, has caused a dramatic rise in the cost of water across closure of Yatta prevents municipal employees from leaving the West Bank. Because a growing number of water networks
6 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 7 no longer function at full capacity or function at all, more and without official permits from the JWC. e fact is that the more people must rely on tanker trucks for their meager water Palestinian Water Authority has submitted over recent supply. But as distances grow due to the need to find ways around applications for new wells in the West Bank, but Israeli mem- checkpoints and blockades of main roads, supplies dwindle from bers of the JWC have vetoed all of them. Given the growing closure of springs or settler vandalism and danger from roadside Palestinian water and health emergency, and the fact that many snipers increase, the cost of water from tanker trucks has sky- Palestinians exist on only liters per day of water or less and rocketed. Truckers have reluctantly had to pass their own addi- pay exorbitant prices for that water, the charge by Eitam is tional cost on to their customers. A survey of eleven localities by another example of the inability of many Israelis to recognize Oxfam in the summer of found an average increase of the humanity of the Palestinians. Israel has made water a po- percent in the price of tanker water from the previous summer. litical issue with the Palestinians, and Israel is using water as a e average price came to about . per cubic meter of water. weapon in its efforts to suppress the Palestinian uprising and e PHG monitoring project in the summer of found the the goal of an independent Palestinian state. highest prices in the Hebron area, where the cost of water for e only solution to the water issue between Israel and the some villages reached about per cubic meter. Palestinians is equal sharing on a per capita basis of their joint Increases in the cost of water are coming at the same time water resources. Steps were taken in this direction in with that Palestinian income is plummeting from the impact of the Oslo II agreement that established the JWC. While con- the intifada and Israel’s closures. Many families can no longer flict and distrust now cloud its deliberations, the Joint Water afford the cost of water. Households have gone into debt just Committee is the only Israeli-Palestinian institution set up so they can have water. Oxfam reports cases of village fami- during the Oslo peace process that continues to meet. e lies who have had to sell their livestock because they could no only way out of the current darkness of atrocity and counter- longer afford the price of water to keep them alive. People’s atrocity is to build trust between people as they work together long-term livelihoods are being sacrificed because they do not to find solutions. is was one of the roles of the JWC before have access to reasonably priced water. intransigence and violent hostility overtook it. No movement Other household reactions to the high cost of water involve toward peace is likely as long as Likud and settler-dominated putting themselves at risk of disease by using unclean water or political parties remain in power in Israel and Islamists in cutting water consumption well below minimum standards. Palestine remain committed to the violent destruction of the Both the Palestinian Hydrology Group and Oxfam tell of state of Israel. Yet trust, coupled with monitoring of agree- people using water from irrigation canals or the bottoms of ments to ensure mutual compliance, is necessary for peace. cisterns (where bacteria accumulate) for drinking, cooking and One road in that direction is sharing of water resources under cleaning. While boiling and filtering reduces the likelihood of the auspices of joint Israeli-Palestinian institutions. ■ disease, the danger is still present. Frugal use of water for drink- Endnotes ing and cleaning below allowable standards puts people at a great health risk. In one study of rural Palestinian households, Ha’aretz, December , . New York Times, September , . one quarter reported some member suffering from diarrhea. In Interview with Riyad al-Khudari, June . about half of the cases, those affected had not had an adequate See, for example, Gershon Baskin, “e Clash Over Water: An Attempt at Demystification,” amount of water in the previous two weeks. Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture / (Summer ). B’Tselem, “Summer in the West Bank: Especially Severe Water Shortages,” (Jerusalem, August ). Finding a Solution Interview with Fadil Qawwash, deputy chairman of the Palestinian Water Authority, June . e Palestinian-Israeli conflict over water remains a long way Associated Press, August , ; B’Tselem, op cit. from a solution. Recent evidence of the distance came in a charge Interview with Abd al-Rahman Tamimi, director of the Palestinian Hydrology Group, May . made in October by then-Israeli Infrastructure Minister Statistics quoted at http://www.waternet.rug.ac.be, posted on June , . Effi Eitam, head of the far-right National Religious Party, that Quoted in the Jordan Times, July , . the Palestinian Authority was waging a “water intifada” against Palestinian Hydrology Group, Water and Sanitation Hygiene Monitoring Project, Impact of the Current Crisis Technical Report (Ramallah, August ), pp. -. See also PHG, Israel. In his statement, Eitam said that unauthorized drilling Report on the Impact of Closure on Water Supply to Palestinian Villages and Towns (Ramallah, July ), pp. -. and “pirate” connections to water pipes to Jewish settlements Oxfam International, Forgotten Villages: Struggling to Survive Under Closure in the West in areas of the West Bank under Palestinian Authority control Bank (London, ), pp. -. constituted “stealing water from the state of Israel.” He ordered PHG, Water and Sanitation Hygiene Monitoring Project, Report, p. . Amnesty International, Shielded from Scrutiny: IDF Violations in Jenin and Nablus (London, Water Commissioner Shimon Tal to stop all new drilling of November ). New York Times, April , , and personal communications with contacts in Ramallah Palestinian wells in the West Bank and to freeze the issuing of in the months following the Israeli incursion. new permits by the Joint Water Committee. He also charged Amnesty International, pp. -. Palestinians with polluting Israel’s groundwater. Oxfam International, p. . Palestinian Water Authority officials reject the charge of a PHG, Water and Sanitation Hygiene Monitoring Project, Report, p. . Health Sector Biweekly Report, al-Quds University, CARE International/ANERA, July “water intifada” against Israel’s groundwater, but acknowledge , . that Palestinian farmers and families have been drilling wells Jerusalem Post, October , .
6 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 7 Sahrawi women and children celebrating the anniversary of the POLISARIO Front in Algeria. J.C. TORDAI/PANOS PICTURES Western Saharan Deadlock Yahia H. Zoubir and Karima Benabdallah-Gambier
he Moroccan occupation since of Western Sahara, Moroccan position, the UN found a total of , eligible a former Spanish colony, is in violation of UN Security voters—a tally that corresponded closely to the final Spanish TCouncil resolutions on the right of the Sahrawi people to self- census. e Identification Commission rejected the others be- determination. e conflict remains unresolved despite the exis- cause they did not meet the agreed-upon criteria for eligibil- tence of a UN Settlement Plan () and the Houston Accords ity, and they were not Sahrawis from the designated territory. of , brokered by special UN envoy James Baker and accepted Morocco sought the inclusion of those Sahrawis who live in by both Morocco and the Sahrawis. ese accords established a the former Spanish enclaves in southern Morocco. us, facing timetable for a referendum allowing Sahrawis to choose between certain defeat, Morocco refused to hold the referendum. In independence and integration into Morocco. Pro-independence early , a royal commission headed by former opposition Sahrawis are poised to win a free and fair referendum carried leader Abraham Serfaty, who until then had strongly supported out in a timely fashion. Knowing this, Morocco has pursued the Sahrawis’ claim to independence, promoted the concept of delaying tactics, seeking to bolster Morocco’s claim on Western autonomy for “Western Saharan provinces” within the King- Sahara through outright colonization and “economic develop- dom of Morocco, taking as a model the autonomous regions ment” projects, as well as an imposing military presence. of Catalonia and Andalusia in Spain. Today, Kofi Annan and e December UN mission to identify voters in the former Secretary of State Baker, along with the US, France and prospective referendum ended in impasse. Rejecting the inclu- Great Britain, are backing the so-called “third way”—neither sion of three tribes representing , possible votes for the independence nor integration—to settlement of the Western Sahara question. e “third way,” a clear concession to Moroc- Yahia H. Zoubir teaches international studies at underbird, the American Graduate School of International Management, in Arizona. Karima Benabdallah-Gambier is a can intransigence after more than a decade of deadlock, comes doctoral student at the University of Louvain la Neuve in Belgium. at the expense of international law and UN resolutions.
8 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 9 likely. Alternatively, a negotiated agreement could produce a “Winner-Take-All Mentality” solution somewhere between those two results.” Baker’s words Following the results of voter identification, UN Secretary- seemed to endorse the Serfaty commission’s call for Sahrawi General Kofi Annan announced in March that the autonomy within Morocco. In an astonishing development, referendum would not take place before . Annan said Baker and Annan championed this “third way,” submitting it that Baker needed to further investigate the feasibility of im- to the parties as a UN “Framework Agreement on the Status plementing the Houston Accords and the specific problems of Western Sahara.” obstructing the execution of the UN Settlement Plan. After At that stage, the Security Council had only two options: a face-to-face meeting of the parties in London in May , terminate the mandate of MINURSO, the peacekeeping force Annan observed that the Moroccan and Sahrawi views on the that the UN has kept in Western Sahara since at a cost of referendum were widely divergent and suggested another way over billion, or encourage “the parties to discuss the draft “of achieving an early, durable and agreed resolution of their Framework Agreement and to negotiate any specific changes dispute over Western Sahara.” e Security Council, approv- they would like to see in this proposal.” Resolution ad- ing Annan’s report, expected that the parties would offer Baker opted the latter option, but the Council recognized implicitly “specific and concrete proposals…to resolve the multiple prob- that it could not bring the parties to agree on the results of the lems relating to the implementation of the Settlement Plan and UN voter identification. Hence the Council acknowledged the explore all ways and means to achieve an early, durable and value of the Moroccan proposal for settling the conflict, while agreed resolution to their dispute.”3 Security Council Resolu- respecting, ultimately, the principle to self-determination. e tion , confirming Baker’s new mission, generated disquiet Framework Agreement foresees that Western Sahara would be within the UN General Assembly, the majority of whose mem- a part of Morocco operated under the Moroccan constitution, bers were still supportive of the peace plan. but remaining autonomous. Morocco would have exclusive During the remainder of , further meetings in Ber- control over foreign relations, national security and external lin and Geneva highlighted the fact that neither party “had defense. e eligible voters of Western Sahara would elect shown any disposition to depart from the ‘winner-take-all’ an executive body running the country’s internal affairs, but mentality.” However, “both parties remained attached to the Morocco would appoint the judges and be responsible for Settlement Plan despite their fundamental differences and law and order during the transition. e transition would perceptions as to its correct implementation.” In an effort be limited to four years, after which a referendum would to win over Sahrawis, Morocco proposed to enter into direct decide whether Western Sahara stays Moroccan or becomes talks with the POLISARIO Front, the Sahrawis’ recognized a separate state. e most shocking aspect of this proposal is representative, to seek a political solution, “subject to stated that Moroccan settlers who had remained in Western Sahara concerns involving Morocco’s sovereignty and territorial integ- for more than a year would be eligible to vote in the refer- rity.” Baker asked the parties “whether, without abandoning endum. In other words, Morocco would allow a referendum the settlement plan, they would be interested in pursuing a on self-determination on the condition that Western Sahara subsequent discussion to find another solution that may or becomes Moroccan. may not be confirmed by referendum.” e POLISARIO If it were implemented, the Framework Agreement would stated its refusal to discuss anything outside the Settlement ignore the basic principles that have informed UN action in Plan, whereas Morocco “expressed the wish to further explore the area of decolonization, allowing a question of self-determi- other ways and means to settle the conflict.” Morocco pressed nation to be settled under the guidance of the colonial power, for an alternative to the referendum on self-determination for with the UN seal of approval. the Sahrawi people, while Baker headed off to count dimpled In his February report on Western Sahara, Annan held chads in Florida. out the possibility of expediting the appeals procedures for the voter determination carried out in . e reference to the Abandoning the Peace Plan appeals procedure was crucial because the UN itself admitted e battle was rejoined in the summer of . e POLISA- that it could act on the issue quickly, thus opening the way RIO, backed by international law and the results of the voter again to the successful conclusion of the referendum. However, identification, argued that the Settlement Plan did not envi- Annan’s report in April did not repeat the reference, refer- sion any enforcement mechanism, leading Annan to com- ring instead to Baker’s attempts to find an alternative to the plain that every time the UN proposed a solution, a new UN Settlement Plan. In reality, the idea of abandoning the difficulty arose, “requiring yet another round of protracted agreement is Annan’s. Former UN undersecretary-general consultations.” When neither party came up with the ex- Marrack Goulding recently revealed that Annan asked him in pected concrete proposals for implementing the referendum, “to go to Houston to persuade James Baker III to accept Baker said: “ere could be a negotiated agreement for full an appointment as Special Representative and try to negotiate integration of Western Sahara with Morocco, or for full inde- a deal based on enhanced autonomy for Western Sahara within pendence.” In his view, however, “neither prospect appeared the Kingdom of Morocco.”
8 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 9 France displays a position of “neutrality” on Western Sahara, Against Sahrawi Will while working through the UN to elicit support for a UN For Sahrawis, implementation of the peace plan, including resolution or initiative, such as Baker’s, which would fulfill the referendum, remains the most viable and just solution to French objectives in the region. Since Chirac’s visit to Algeria the conflict. e POLISARIO considered Baker’s promo- in early , an indisputable Franco-Algerian rapproche- tion of the Framework Agreement as a breach of the UN ment has occurred. Although France still seeks a solution Peace Plan and the Houston Accords. In January , the favorable to Morocco, French policymakers realize that they POLISARIO threatened to block the route of the Paris-Dakar cannot alter Algeria’s stance on Western Sahara, especially rally, a desert auto race, because the organizers had requested since Algeria is regaining its role on the international stage. permission to cross the Western Sahara territories only from e United States is a traditional ally and friend of Mo- the Moroccan authorities. is crisis might have led to renewed rocco, as confirmed by Baker’s nomination to be special envoy hostilities between the POLISARIO and the Moroccan army, and especially by the evolution in his positions since taking but for last-minute Algerian, UN and US intervention. the job. However, the remarkable improvement in US-Alge- Algeria, home to more than , Sahrawi refugees, has rian relations has made all-out support for Morocco implau- maintained a consistent position in support of a referendum in sible. Particularly since September , , US-Algerian Western Sahara, though ambiguities in its stance occasionally relations have improved considerably. Algeria’s impressive emerge. During an official visit to the US in November , hydrocarbon resources and large potential market make it President Abdelaziz Bouteflika held talks with Baker in which he look more and more like the preferred US ally in North Africa. allegedly stated that Algeria was not against a “third way.” is Meanwhile, Morocco’s strategic significance has declined in allegation provoked violent reactions in the independent Algerian Washington’s eyes. press, prompting the presidency to reaffirm Algeria’s commitment Congress, despite the pro-Moroccan positions of the pro- in favor of the right to self-determination of the Sahrawi people. Israel lobby, has not been as pro-Moroccan as the executive Civilian and military officials interviewed after Bouteflika’s visit branch. Sahrawis, in fact, have steadfast support among some insisted that Algeria’s position had not changed. Republican and Democratic members of Congress. In this Members of the Security Council did not endorse the environment, the Bush administration can ill afford to act in Framework Agreement and requested, again, that Baker a way that might trigger resumption of hostilities in the region, produce a plan to implement earlier accords. In Washington, as no Congressional majority exists to endorse military support Senators Edward Kennedy (D-MA), Patrick Leahy (D-VT) for Morocco. Growing US interests in the region, especially in and John Kerry (D-MA) wrote to Secretary of State Colin the Algerian hydrocarbon sector, make it doubtful that the US Powell expressing their concern that the UN would “abandon would welcome further instability in North Africa. the referendum and support a solution that proposes integrat- US administrations have been careful not to alienate Al- ing the Western Sahara into Morocco against the will of the geria. But, unlike France, the US has sought a resolution of Sahrawi people.” the Sahrawi conflict—preferably in Morocco’s favor—in order to force the process of regional economic integration. Such France, the US and the “Third Way” integration, policymakers hope, will create the conditions for France, the former colonial power in North Africa, retains a market wide enough to attract US investment. By favoring the preponderant great power role. With respect to the con- Morocco’s stance, the US has set a dangerous precedent for its flict in Western Sahara, France’s official “neutrality” is largely diplomatic standing in the region. Nonetheless, both France influenced by France’s pro-Moroccan policy, presently dem- and the US continue to support the “third way,” convinced onstrated by the friendship between President Jacques Chirac that Morocco will not accept the verdict of a referendum. and King Mohammed VI, and reinforced by France’s economic and cultural relations with Morocco. Neither conservative nor The Fourth Way or the First Way socialist political forces in France have provided support for Following Algeria and the POLISARIO’s rejection of the draft the establishment of an independent Sahrawi state. Not being Framework Agreement, Annan indicated that one option to part of the French colonial sphere of influence, an independent remedy the “bleak situation” could be to “explore with the par- Western Sahara could destabilize a fragile region that France ties one final time whether or not they would now be willing considers vital from economic, strategic and military points to discuss…a possible division of the Territory,” “following of view. France pays particular attention to political and social indications from Algeria and the POLISARIO of a willing- unrest in North Africa, especially to Islamist groups intent on ness to negotiate a possible division of Territory.” Annan also overthrowing the Algerian regime. mentioned the possibility of ending the mandate of . France aims to achieve a subtle balance on issues where After more than years, he recognized, the UN could not Algeria and Morocco disagree—trying not to alienate Algeria, solve the problem of Western Sahara “without requiring that but opposing actions potentially detrimental to the Moroc- one or the other or both of the parties do something that they can regime and the leadership of the young monarch. Hence do not wish to voluntarily agree to do.”
10 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 11 If Annan represented Algerian intentions correctly, his for the parties to respond. Algeria is very likely to challenge statement contradicted the Algerian proposal of May , legally the plan that Baker has set forth, as it did with the which Baker had rejected, to place Western Sahara under UN “third way.” Sahrawis rejected the new plan submitted by Baker administration in order to conduct the referendum, following on May , even before the Security Council had given the example of East Timor. e seeming change in Algeria’s its opinion. Sahrawi officials feel that Baker’s new proposal position is said to have been designed to serve US interests— “is keener on taking account of the Kingdom of Morocco’s because the creation or partition of a Sahrawi state would al- sovereignty than of the Sahrawis’ inalienable right to self-de- low Algeria to transport its oil to ports in the Atlantic Ocean. termination.” Furthermore, the new proposal would basi- Furthermore, the exploitation of oil reserves of the region cally guarantee Morocco’s victory in the referendum, given requires the stability of North Africa. In the era of George that under this plan all residents in the territory, including W. Bush’s war on terrorism, Algeria has become a pivotal state Moroccan settlers, would be eligible to vote. in the region for Washington, which has recently promised After years of enduring conflict, the independence Algiers the delivery of sensitive military equipment. In any of Western Sahara remains first and foremost an issue of event, Morocco reacted angrily to Annan’s suggestion, reaf- international law. Few options, except a referendum, can firming that its “sovereignty” was inalienable in “Morocco’s break the stalemate. But the successful example of decolo- southern provinces.” nization in East Timor may not be emulated in Western In January , James Baker conducted another mission Sahara. Morocco maintains its uncompromising position to the region. He submitted to Morocco and the POLISA- to preserve the rich resources of the territory and to ensure RIO, as well as to Algeria and Mauritania, a settlement plan the internal stability of the kingdom. e US, having gone that differed very little from the proposal he presented in . to war in Iraq ostensibly to enforce UN resolutions, looks e proposal is a mere reiteration of the “third way,” with on while its former Secretary of State facilitates Morocco’s slight modifications. e plan that Baker proposed—with ongoing defiance of UN resolutions in Western Sahara. ■ the probable support of the US, France and Annan—would guarantee with all certainty that Morocco, due to the over- Endnotes whelming presence of Moroccan settlers and their eligibility to vote, would win the referendum. e POLISARIO had UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara, S//, February , . already rejected the proposal before the March deadline Jean Pierre Tuquoi, “Le nouveau Maroc et le Sahara occidental,” Le Monde, January , . UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara, S//, May , . UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara, S//, July , . UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara, S//, October , . Ibid. UN Security Council S//, June , . Ibid. Ibid. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara, S//, February , . “As of January , …the total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations…amounted to ,,,.” UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara, S//, February , . UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara, S//, April , . Marrack Goulding, Peacemonger (London: John Murray, ), pp. -. Letter of Mohammed Abdelaziz, Secretary-General of the POLISARIO, to Annan, May , . Published in UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara, S//, June , , Annex IV. Le Quotidien d’Oran, November , . An Algerian journalist who accompanied Bouteflika on his visit to the US told Yahia Zoubir that the reporter from Le Quotidien d’Oran did not give an accurate account of what the president had said. Le Matin (Algiers), November , . Deputy Foreign Minister Abdelkader Messahel declared that “the framework agreement is not a proper solution.” See Jean-Pierre Tuquoi, Le dernier roi (Paris: Editions Grasset, ), pp. -. See Yahia Zoubir, “Algeria and US Interests: Containing Radical Islamism and PromotingDemocracy,” Middle East Policy / (Spring ). Interviews with high-ranking State Department officials, Washington, DC, May . UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara, S//, February , . Vicenç Fisas, “Una propuesta de paz para el Sáhara,” El Pais, April , . François Soudan, “L’ami algérien,” Jeune Afrique/L’Intelligent (January ). Abla Chérif, “Mohammed VI s’attaque à l’Algérie” Le Matin (Algiers), March , . Le Matin (Algiers), May , .
10 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 11 AMERICA’S IRAQ
Shia at prayer in the Imam Abbas mosque in Karbala. LAIF SASSE/AURORA PHOTOS The Worldly Roots of Religiosity in Post-Saddam Iraq Faleh A. Jabar
The rise of popular and organized Islam, particularly Shi‘ism, in post-war Iraq has sent out shock waves more alarming than the “shock and awe” phase of the war. Will Iraq move toward political Islam at a time when that ideology is declining elsewhere in the Arab world? Much of the future of the religious parties’ street politics depends upon the policies of the US-British occupation.
12 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 13 pril , will go down in Iraqi history as the day of the Arab center and the Shi‘i Arab south—each internally unified fall. Barely two days after the anniversary of the founding in the imagination of the instant experts who sprouted like Aof the Ba‘th party, and days after the US-led invasion mushrooms to explain Iraq to TV viewers. ose experts, in- of Iraq began, the battle Saddam Hussein dubbed the Mother cluding Bush administration officials, were especially anxious of All Decisive Battles (umm al-hawasim) was over, and the to assure their audience that the oppressed Shi‘i majority was entire material edifice of the Ba‘th regime fell apart. Much to united in its opposition to Saddam Hussein and would wel- the world’s surprise, the invaders met little resistance, largely come the invading forces as liberators. But, as the conspicuous limited to a few Republican and Special Republican Guard lack of unity among Iraqi Shi‘is after the war has shown, the units, some hard-core Ba‘th members, units from the Iraqi terms Shi‘i and Shi‘ism cannot and should not be deployed fedayeen loyal to Uday Hussein and volunteer fighters from as sociological or political categories. Using these terms to neighboring Arab countries. Arab fighters interviewed by the signify a monolithic and compact community imbued with Abu Dhabi satellite channel on April grumbled bitterly of unity of purpose and a one-dimensional political orientation being fired upon from behind rather than by the US troops is at best naive. Apart from the goal of removing the Ba‘thist advancing in front of them. e vast majority of Iraqis did not regime, now achieved, the array of formerly exiled groups rep- want to defend the Ba‘thist regime, as predicted by the war’s resenting or claiming to represent the Iraqi Shi‘a have little in proponents among Iraqi exiles and US policymakers. common. Secular Shi‘is disagree on issues of reconstruction But will the Iraqi majority opt for the post-war polity en- and governance, while Shi‘i religious parties engage in both visaged by the pro-war forces—a secular and democratic Iraq political and ecclesiastical rivalries. Tensions between exiles that, presumably, would challenge clerical rule in Iran, strict and “insiders” who endured the full force of Ba‘thist rule, three Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia and authoritarianism in Syria? It wars and international economic sanctions further complicate is too soon to tell, but the nearly immediate rise of popular, the picture. institutional and political Islam on the day of the fall, on both Secular Shi‘i liberals of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), sides of the Sunni-Shi‘i communal divide, has already sent out stand for de-Ba‘thification and full liberalization of the polity shock waves more alarming than the “shock and awe” phase and economy, including privatization of the oil sector. At the of the war. e panoramic convergence of roughly three mil- December congress of the Iraqi opposition in London, lion Shi‘i pilgrims on the shrine of Imam Hussein in Karbala the scholar Kanan Makiya, who hails from a Shi‘i family, called to commemorate the arba‘in (the -day point after the an- for the separation of state and religion in post-war Iraq. But niversary of his martyrdom) just days after the fall of Baghdad neither liberalism nor secularism is welcome to other Shi‘i-led and the scenes of Sunni worshippers hoisting aloft swords and organizations. Full dismantling of the command economy and banners as they emerged from Abu Hanifa mosque in Baghdad removal of oil revenue from state coffers are non-starters for displayed the material and symbolic force of popular religion the Iraqi National Accord, led by the former military officer in Iraq. Secular forces seem wanting. Is religiosity, particularly Iyad Allawi, a Shi‘i. Separation of state and religion is a horrible among the Shi‘a, on the rise in a nation that once boasted of scenario for all strands of Islamists, Shi‘is and Sunnis alike. Ex- its secular fabric? iled to Tehran and London, and now back inside post-war Iraq, e rise of popular religiosity has been a common feature the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) in Middle Eastern societies since the Arab defeat in the June has been the most visible of the Shi‘i Islamist groups working war. is resilience of religious piety was, in certain cases, to forestall that scenario. SCIRI’s leader Muhammad Baqir a portent of the rise of militant Islamism, the corollary of the al-Hakim is one of seven former opposition figures tapped by decline of Nasserism, the core of “Arab socialist” nationalism. the US to form the core of an eventual Iraqi “interim author- In retrospect, the case of Iraq seems to be an aberration. While ity.” However, his assertion upon his return to Najaf on May Islamism was attracting adherents across the Middle East, the that “Islam must rule Iraq” seemed at odds with repeated secular Ba‘th Party, also professing an ideological admixture of statements from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that Arab nationalism and socialism, reassumed power in Baghdad the US will not allow an Islamic state in the country. months after the June defeat. Now that the Ba‘th regime and ideology have been totally discredited, will Islamism, in The Exiles decline elsewhere in the region, step in to fill the void, proving Beginning in , the three main Shi‘i Islamist parties— Iraq to be an Arab anomaly once again? SCIRI, al-Da‘wa and Munazzamat al-Amal al-Islami—took part one way or another in the US-sponsored INC, led by the No Unity of Purpose Shi‘i liberal businessman Ahmad Chalabi. Progressively alien- In the oversimplified image propounded by the media, Iraq is ated by Chalabi’s leadership style, the Islamist groups withdrew neatly cut into three chunks—the Kurdish north, the Sunni from the INC one after the other, but eventually established ties with the US without the mediation of the liberals. Faleh A. Jabar, a lecturer at London University and research fellow at Birkbeck College, is author of e Shi‘ite Movement of Iraq (London: Saqi Books, 2003) and editor of In late , the Tehran-based SCIRI initiated regular Ayatollahs, Sufis and Ideologues (London: Saqi Books, 2002). contact with the Clinton administration via its bureau in
12 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 13 London, headed by Hamid al-Bayati, breaking an old taboo statement read al-islam masdar al-tashri‘ (“Islam is the source of on direct and active engagement with US diplomacy. e legislation”), while the English translation replaced the definite election of the reformist President Muhammad Khatami in with an indefinite article to soften the Islamist connotations. Iran in May , followed by promulgation of the Iraq Lib- Whether the English translation is a self-deceptive wish will eration Act by Congress in October , may have encour- be much debated. e Islamic fervor in the final statement aged SCIRI in its change of course. Bayati had several photo may have been an exchange of favors between the Kurds and opportunities with US officials, including former Secretary SCIRI. In return for full recognition of “federalism,” a crucial of State Madeleine Albright, and SCIRI soon became part of Kurdish demand, the Kurds endorsed Islamizing the future the expanded spectrum of Iraqi opposition forces that were constitution. If so, the compromise belies the long-standing regularly consulted and hosted by Washington in its quest to aversion in SCIRI to federalism and the equally long-stand- revive the moribund INC. SCIRI was named by the State De- ing secularism of Kurdish nationalists, who are opposed to partment as eligible for financial support under the Iraq Lib- any assimilation, Islamist or otherwise. Delegates interviewed eration Act, and participated in the Windsor gathering in December in London criticized this and other behind-the- where the INC leadership was expanded and rotated. In the scenes bargaining which led to the inclusion of ex-Ba‘thists runup to the December opposi- in the -man committee. When the tion congress held in London, SCIRI names were announced, the Ba‘thist was one of six major parties to decide names were booed. the composition of the delegates. Abd Shi‘i exiles’ dreams of Beyond the London meeting, SCIRI al-Aziz al-Hakim, the second-ranking took two further steps to pre-position leader, appeared in Washington for triumphal return were itself for a leadership role after the the deliberations of the group of six, wishful thinking. regime fell. At the Salahuddin con- though he denounced the war option ference of the opposition in February then consuming world attention. , Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim of SCIRI Through SCIRI’s patronage, Shi‘i was included in a six-man “nucleus” for delegates from other Islamist groups, such as al-Da‘wa, Munaz- a post-conflict authority. Zalmay Khalilzad, then special US zamat al-Amal al-Islami and Kawadir al-Da‘wa, and non-political envoy to “Free Iraqis,” made it clear to the assembled person- institutions such as Al al-Bayt of Sayyid Muhammad Bahr al- ages that they should stop short of declaring themselves a “gov- ‘Ulum and the rationalist-moderate al-Khoei Foundation were ernment-in-exile,” lest this measure alienate anti-regime forces included on the list invited to the London gathering. is was within Iraq. SCIRI spokesmen were vocal in their denuncia- involuntary power sharing—SCIRI could not and cannot claim tions of US plans for a post-war “military administration” with to be the sole representative of the Shi‘i Islamist groups, let alone scant Iraqi representation. To lend muscle to its politics, SCIRI the Shi‘i community at large. Al-Da‘wa, for example, officially deployed units of its armed Badr Brigade from Iran to the town boycotted the congress, though prominent individuals like the of Suleimaniya in northern Iraq. e size of the contingent is political bureau member Sami al-Askari responded positively yet unknown; it may well be symbolic, but it indicates SCIRI’s to SCIRI’s invitation. Official al-Da‘wa, a member of the leftist- drive to back its political ambitions with a military presence. nationalist anti-war alliance, directed strong criticism at SCIRI’s Its deployment on Kurdish territory signals a gesture of good claims to be “the” representative of the Iraqi Shi‘a. Still, in the will and gratitude on the part of Jalal Talabani, head of the end SCIRI ensured that approximately percent of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, toward SCIRI and its patron Iran. delegates at the London congress were Shi‘is. All of the Islamists ese units are poised to take initiatives the moment a power had been invited, endorsed or not rejected by SCIRI, which had vacuum allows for deployment and activity. SCIRI wishes to veto power. SCIRI’s men also held numerical predominance on win an early foothold, and at press time was still reportedly the Committee of Coordination and Follow-up that emerged resisting the US directive to disarm the Badr Brigade. from London gathering. Of the members, were Shi‘is. Of What political strategy underlies SCIRI’s tactical thinking? the Shi‘i Islamist members of this committee, were either For Shi‘i Islamist groups, democracy has a dual meaning—ma- SCIRI members or protégés, while four were moderates with jority rule and the emanation of power and legislation from the independent status. Only members of the committee were people. In their minds, the former translates into “automatic” secular liberals and nationalists. Shi’i majority government in Iraq, while the latter is the secular antithesis of the “Islamic” polity some groups call for. Corollar- SCIRI’s Pre-Positioning ies to democracy that the Islamists usually overlook are plural- Islamist-minded delegates in London, who were mainly Shi‘i ism, human rights and civil liberties. Given the secular regional Islamist militants, insisted upon the inclusion of two crucial role envisaged by the US for Iraq, SCIRI’s choices seem limited. points in the gathering’s final communiqué: Islam is the reli- A politics based on Shi‘i majority rule or Iranian-style clerical gion of the state of Iraq and Islam is “the” source of legislation, rule (velayat-e faqih) would trigger Sunni Islamist responses, rather than “a” source of legislation. e Arabic text of the risk a communal cleavage and threaten secularism. Spokesmen
14 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 15 have seemed to climb down from earlier statements. “We have Baghdad and, answering the call issued by SCIRI from Tehran, committed ourselves to democracy,” Hamid al-Bayati said on millions made the heavily covered pilgrimage to Karbala. e May . “Of course I dream of an Islamic state, but we now renowned civility and secularism of Iraq’s society seemed, for realize that is not an option.” Perhaps Muhammad Baqir al- the moment, a bygone myth. Hakim and his aides dreamed that SCIRI, upon returning from To foreign observers, the procession of chest-beating Shi‘is exile, would be swept into power by the tumultuous welcome of in the shantytown of west Baghdad, for years called Saddam millions, as was Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini when he arrived City but now renamed Sadr City, seemed a bizarre celebration in Tehran from France in . But SCIRI and other groups on the day Saddam Hussein’s statues crashed to the ground. In in exile seem to have been oblivious to the unpredictable and addition to the fierce chest beating, the Shi‘is held above their uncontrollable Shi‘i social forces that would be unleashed by heads date palm leaves, green banners and clay tablets—all ar- the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime. eir dream of a trium- tifacts of Shi‘i ceremonial ritualism. Chest beating is a coded phal return may have been wishful thinking. display of allegiance to Imam Hussein, as well as a display of protest and a physical statement to convey past grievances. In Power of Ritual Unleashed this ritual, pain is a medium of catharsis. It purifies the physi- Within Iraq, Shi‘i Islam has been structured in three distinct cal body and releases trapped agonies; it also holds a promise spaces: the informal hierarchy of the clerical class, the com- of happiness to come. Green palm leaves symbolize the cel- munity-based popular rituals organized by notables and, lastly, ebration of life and hysterical ecstasy. e actual palm leaves the forces of militant Islam. Under the brutal reign of Saddam used by the Baghdad throng were the dry and yellowed fronds Hussein, it was impossible to judge the balance of these ele- which poor Shi‘a store for cooking, but they now assumed a ments. Barely hours after the fall of Baghdad, however, the new function. Green banners were the symbol of Imam Ali. first contents of the Pandora’s box that is Iraqi Shi‘ism spilled His descendants donned green headwear to distinguish them- out. Chest-beating crowds surged in Baghdad on the day of selves as a noble lineage. Clay tablets known as turba are made the fall. In the succeeding days and weeks, exiled cleric Abd from the soil of Najaf and used in prayers. e forehead of the al-Majid al-Khoei was assassinated after his return to Najaf, worshipper would touch this sacred soil in honor of Najaf, the demonstrators railed against the US presence in Nasiriyya and holy burial place of the first Shi‘i imam.
Sh‘ia women at Karbala. PANOS PICTURES
14 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 15 e crowd on April in Baghdad did not utter even one political slogan. Mute cultural artifacts became a demon- Muqtada al-Sadr stration of identity, a declaration of freedom and a pro- e rising force behind the rift in Najaf is the Sadr family, nouncement of the unutterable. When the crowds finally led by Muqtada al-Sadr, a sturdy, bearded young man with broke their silence, they chanted evocations of piety: “By a melancholy mien. With an obvious mass following in Na- God, we swear never to forget Imam Hussein!” and “ere jaf, Nasiriyya and the newly dubbed Sadr City, Muqtada’s is no god but God.” emergence may have surprised senior members of the clerical leadership in Najaf equally with the outside world. Under Macabre Death in Najaf house arrest since the assassination of his father and two e tragic death of the prominent Shi‘i cleric Abd al-Majid brothers in , Muqtada has been covertly recognized by al-Khoei, , in Najaf on April was a macabre reminder his father’s followers as the legitimate “heir.” In the s, of a pernicious legacy left by Saddam Hussein—violence and his father, Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, built networks of politicized religiosity. Khoei, an optimist and a rationalist, novices and communities of emulators whom he provided rushed to Najaf the moment it with much-needed social ser- was rid of Ba‘thist forces to save vices during the sanctions pe- his home town from the poten- riod. Reinstituting the Friday tial horrors of the day after. He Ideas of monolithic Shi‘i unity prayers, a heresy or innovation had discussed these plans with have proven mythical. by the norms of Shi‘i jurispru- Iraqi dissidents, who encouraged dence, the father led millions in him, and a delegation of Iraqi ex- the weekly devotional. His fiery iles volunteered to escort Khoei in this perilous journey. US speeches became a source of solace, comfort and motiva- forces helped Khoei to reach Najaf, a fact that was misinter- tion. He was for a homegrown Arab clerical leadership. is preted to defame his courageous and constructive initiative. preference implies a rivalry with the Iranian-born Grand A group of paramilitaries was entrenched inside the shrine Ayatollah Ali Sistani, who succeeded Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, of Imam Ali, threatening all manner of unnecessary havoc. father of the murdered Abd al-Majid, as head of the Najaf Angry mobs were bent on exacting revenge upon pro-govern- clerical establishment in the s. ment clerical dignitaries. US forces in and around Najaf could Muqtada al-Sadr is seemingly launching a bid for cleri- not approach the holy shrine, let alone invade it. cal power. e demonstrations presumably staged under A pack of Najafis, presumably directed by a rival cleric his direction, in his name and by his own followers, in named Muqtada al-Sadr, attacked the office of the Custo- Najaf, Nasiriyya and Baghdad in April led some to suggest dian of the Shrine of Imam Ali a few minutes before midday that he was a new Khomeini striving for political power. prayer. In the office, Khoei was negotiating over the reopen- But Muqtada is not ideological, and he has no vision of an ing of the shrine, to signal a return to normalcy, with the Islamic state. His loyal following of clerics runs only into custodian, Haydar, who hailed from the well-known Rufai‘i the hundreds—too weak to challenge the Ba‘thist regime family. e Najafi mob entered the shrine and blocked off even at its lowest ebb. e very intellectual legacy of the the office, demanding the surrender of Haydar Rufai‘i, obvi- Sadr family upholds a vision of Shi‘i involvement in politics ously to have him lynched for past cooperation with Ba‘thist that is opposed to Khomeini’s “guardianship of the juris- rule. In response to pleas for sanity by Khoei, someone in the prudent.” Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, Muqtada’s uncle, was crowd opened fire, in what Shi‘is would consider an outra- the theorist of the “third way” between traditional quiet- geous act of desecration of the tomb of Imam Ali. Ninety ism and clerical rule, arguing for a democratic polity with minutes passed. e besieged parties raised the Qur’an and a moderate supervisory role for the clergy in judicial mat- white handkerchiefs and surrendered. e prisoners were ters. Iraqi Shi‘i Islamists, moderate Islamic dignitaries and tied and dragged by the frenzied mob to the house of their charitable institutions are not unified in this regard. Only leader, the self-appointed clerical authority Muqtada al-Sadr, few advocate Khomeinism—above all, SCIRI. reported to be as young as . e Iraqi journalist Maad us far, Muqtada aims to assert supreme clerical au- Fayyad, an eyewitness and himself a prisoner with Khoei, thority by means of street politics. His mentality may be a was whisked out of danger. A moment later, the crowd competitive response largely shaped by the fact that other stabbed their captives to death, mutilated the bodies and Najafi families, like the Hakims, have politicized Shi‘ism dragged the corpses into the streets. is tale of two factions and shifted their clerical weight from the nuances of ju- in but one Shi‘i city is a symbolic portent of a new rift in risprudence and ecclesiastical excellence to power politics. the Shi‘i clerical leadership and community. Although the e Sadr family name also carries political gravitas. e much feared and predicted Sunni-Shi‘i clash in post-war Da‘wa party held up his uncle, executed by the regime in Iraq has so far proved mythical, so has the monolithic unity May , as a modern symbol of defiance of authoritar- of the religious class in Najaf. ian rule. Upon his assassination in , Muqtada’s father
16 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 17 Pilgrims at grave of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr in Najaf. KAEL ALFORD/PANOS PICTURES
was also elevated to the status of martyrdom. e young Munazzama. By the same token, his line of confrontation Muqtada has simply treated his elders’ standing as a family against exiles has entangled Muqtada with the influential trust. Muqtada’s weakest point is his attempt to override the Khoei Foundation—a formidable, representative institu- clerical norms of seniority, such as knowledge-based rank, tion that enjoys some percent of the worldwide khums scholarly achievement and age. His rivals claim he is years (a charitable tax paid annually by devout Shi‘is)—and the old; his followers assert he is . Both are inaccurate. But Khoei family. these conflicting claims signify a war over status. Muqtada Singlehandedly, Muqtada is waging a war against what al-Sadr has already met formidable challenges. he termed as “traditional clerics,” “non-Iraqi” clerics and pro-Ba‘thist clerics, in other words against everyone but Polarization himself. After his followers killed the Custodian of Najaf e clerical class has traditionally been composed of fam- and Abd al-Majid al-Khoei, Muqtada pressured the old ily-based leadership embedded in local solidarity and supra- ayatollah Muhammad Said al-Hakim into giving allegiance national networks of emulators and novices. But the to him. His forces also besieged Sistani’s house in Najaf, Iranian Revolution caused fractures along ideological lines but Sistani’s followers rushed from nearby towns to dis- which increased the complexities of the social organization perse the mob. of the clergy. Muqtada al-Sadr is now adding a new cleavage In Najaf, as elsewhere, tensions are high between these between “authentic” Iraqis who resisted the regime from multiple factions. SCIRI, for example, occupied the of- within the country, and “alien” Shi‘is from exile. Muqtada’s fices of the Ba‘th Party in Najaf, this time with Muqtada hostility toward exile figures and institutions brings him reportedly entrenched inside the shrine by the end of April. into direct conflict with SCIRI, al-Da‘wa and Munazzamat Iraqis crossing the borders from Iran are augmenting the al-Amal al-Islami, targeting, by extension, the families of strength of the Shi‘i parties. Iran has also been sending Hakim and Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarrisi, leader of the agents and protégés. Here and there, they raise the slo-
16 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 17 gan of Islamic government. In response, the pro-Muqtada groups are shouting, “Yes to the Hawza!” A classical Ara- Prognosis bic term that can mean centers of religious learning, the e massive displays of Shi‘i religiosity—political, popular word hawza has a distinctive Najafi connotation referring and institutional—have startled Iraqi Sunnis, clerics and lay- to the clerical leadership in Najaf. Since a collegiate body men. ere is some sign of a Sunni response. Shortly after of clerical dignitaries resides in the holy city, the term the fall of Baghdad, a TV preacher named Ahmad Kubaisi, Hawza is politically ambiguous, as used by followers of known for his strong ties with the Ba‘thist regime, was Muqtada al-Sadr. flown into Baghdad from the United Arab Emirates to lead Polarization appears to be accelerating. e collegiate a ,-strong demonstration after Friday prayers. Deploy- body of clerical authority in Najaf issued a joint statement ing anti-American motifs in his incendiary oratory, Kubaisi denouncing the individuals and groups who claimed to cast himself in a patriotic role. Soon he announced the forma- represent the Hawza by raising banners and slogans in its tion of a “Patriotic Front.” Kubaisi praised what he termed name. e communiqué also said that “pro-Ba‘th security Shi‘i anti-Americanism and called for a Sunni-Shi‘i alliance. agents have put on the religious garb and began to give Muhammad Bahr al-‘Ulum and other Shi‘i dignitaries in statements before TV cameras, although they hardly speak London retorted, in editorials and statements published by proper Arabic.” e statement was signed by four grand the Shi‘i weekly al-Mustaqbal on April , that this was a trap ayatollahs: Ali Sistani, Muhammad Said al-Hakim, Sheikh to alienate them from the US and depict them as trouble- Muhammad Ishaq Fayyad and Sheikh Bashir al-Najafi. In makers. A few days later after the formation of the Patriotic London, meanwhile, Ayatollah Hussein al-Sadr categorically Front, the old Muslim Brotherhood, formerly outlawed under denounced assassination, a clear reference to his nephew’s Saddam Hussein, announced that it was reforming in Mosul. probable involvement in Khoei’s death in Najaf. According to reliable eyewitnesses in Baghdad, Mosul and Muqtada al-Sadr’s movement is significant, but not all- elsewhere, members of the defeated regime, military com- powerful. It took shape under circumstances of steep rise manders, junior officers from the Republican Guard and the in popular religiosity, in itself an apolitical phenomenon. security and intelligence services have flocked into units of the e young Sadr’s movement has three disparate, homegrown Patriotic Front and the Brotherhood, partly to resist change, components: the clerical core, formed mostly of young partly to influence its course and partly to counterbalance clergy and novices who were loyal to his father, the charity Shi‘i militancy. On April , in the small, conservative town networks built by his father, and spontaneous armed mobs, of Falluja, US troops fired upon a crowd of demonstrators, which derive much of their momentum from the security killing . Guerillas, possibly from the Patriotic Front, have vacuum after the fall of the regime. e configuration of subsequently attacked US troops in Falluja and elsewhere. these three components may not remain solid. Two factions Religion has worldly roots. It works as antidote to war and have already broken away from Muqtada, and further splits death, to crime and prostitution; it is an identity marker, a may follow. provider of charities, a source of moral support and a substitute A fourth component came from outside. Ayatollah Ka- for discredited ideologies. But focus on Islam and Islamism in zim al-Ha’iri, a close aide of Muqtada’s uncle Muhammad post-war Iraq may convey a misleading picture, and Iraq is not Baqir al-Sadr, provided the young Sadr with an unlimited necessarily a land overwhelmed by tribal chiefs and turbaned “agency authorization” (ijaza), meaning that he can act as the clerics. ese forces are prominent by default. Secular forces old ayatollah’s deputy in every capacity he deems proper. It and rational clerics supportive of secular politics are not want- turned out that Muqtada’s father, Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, ing, but they are seemingly inactive for the moment. What had recommended to his followers that, should he die, they will remain of the religious parties’ street politics if govern- should consult al-Ha’iri. erefore the ijaza, in effect, con- ment services are reintroduced to render religious charities and ferred Muhammad Sadiq’s clerical authority upon Muqtada, clerical supervision superfluous, or if, in addition, secular, civil though this authority remains contingent upon al-Ha’iri’s associations are rehabilitated? Much will depend on what the say-so. Kazim al-Ha’iri fled to Iran in the late s. ere US administration will do or be willing to do. While a strong he became the jurisprudent of the Da’wa party, but he was sense of Iraqi nationalism exists, the majority of Iraqi politi- later discharged from the party for political and ideological cal forces inside and outside the country seem to agree that reasons. He turned into a staunch proponent of Khomeinist premature withdrawal of the US-British forces may lead to a ideas endorsing clerical rule. Ha’iri lacks the mass movement power vacuum and civil war. Unless an Iraqi civil administra- the young Sadr has at his disposal, and Sadr lacks the grand tion with solid institutions of power is firmly on the ground, status of the old ayatollah. ey need each other. In addition the departure of the occupying soldiers will be impractical. e to his dire need for recognition from senior, high-ranking majority, save the remnants of the defeated regime, shares this clerics, or from the powers that be, the young Sadr is also pragmatic conclusion. An overstay, on the other hand, would under pressure from the non-ideological heritage of his own be counterproductive and humiliating. Iraqi nationalism may family and followers. in the future become a greater force to reckon with. ■
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18 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 19 Gas station on the road to Baghdad. OLIVIER VOGELSANG/AURORA PHOTOS World Oil Markets and the Invasion of Iraq Raad Alkadiri and Fareed Mohamedi
The war party in Washington has big plans for Iraqi oil—from repairing damage done by US bombs to smashing the power of OPEC and undermining oil-producing regimes. Post-war chaos may derail these plans at the outset.
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia is laying plans of its own to remain the strategic supplier of oil to the West, even after
Iraqi oil comes back on the market.
20 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 21 eorge W. Bush’s regime-changing war in Iraq is widely Until , Saudi Arabia was very concerned to protect seen as an oil war—a grab for the second-largest petro- its market share. e Saudis have bitter memories of the Gleum reserves in the world. In the minds of many, this early s, when they reduced their production to barely interpretation was confirmed when the United States pressed million barrels per day (when they could have produced for, and secured, a UN resolution giving the US-British occu- million) to keep prices low. Other OPEC members did pying authority control over expenditure of Iraq’s oil revenues. not make comparable sacrifices, and oil companies began Without a doubt, Washington does see a major role for foreign to buy proportionally less oil from the Saudis. After Iraq oil companies in the expansion of the Iraqi oil sector—a vision invaded Kuwait and the UN embargoed its oil sales, the it shares with senior officials in the Iraqi oil ministry. But calcu- Saudis drew a “line in the sand,” refusing to cut produc- lations about “controlling” Iraqi oil figured most prominently tion or their OPEC quota under million barrels per day in the strategic, rather than the merely commercial, thinking of (b/d). Part of this new share (up from the . million b/d the Bush administration about the invasion. Washington hawks it was allowed to produce before August , ) Riyadh saw a US-allied Iraq as an alternative to Saudi Arabia as the had appropriated for itself from lost Iraqi output. More- strategic supplier of oil to the United States. ey also thought over, King Fahd’s unequivocal support for US geopolitical that increased Iraqi output would create structurally lower oil interests led the Saudis to back a price range of - a prices, putting financial pressure on Saudi Arabia and other oil- barrel through . producing states of the Gulf, and forcing those states to reform at oil price range proved disastrous for OPEC finances. economically and politically to avoid internal upheavals. Iraqi oil, Saudi Arabia was virtually bankrupted by . e combi- in the hopes of the neo-conservatives and their allies who pushed nation of depleted foreign assets, partly due to payments to the war, would eventually become a weapon for undermining the US for expelling Iraq from Kuwait and subsequent arms Arab regimes and Iran, bringing “democracy” to the Middle East purchases, a rapid buildup in domestic debt and growing and making the region safer for the US and Israel. political demands required a change in course. en Crown e US invasion of Iraq does have the potential to change Prince Abdallah assumed the reins of power due to King the dynamics of the global oil market fundamentally. Given Fahd’s illness. Gradually, the Saudis’ stance at OPEC became the centrality of oil (and gas) to the political economies of Gulf more amenable to higher oil prices, though they were careful countries, it logically follows that oil market changes will radi- not to say this explicitly so as not to alarm the US. is Saudi cally alter politics in the region. at much is certain. shift from a market share policy to a price defense policy was But the exact pathway and timing of these changes are quite the basic building block of higher oil prices for OPEC. Dur- uncertain. Recent history teaches one not to underestimate the ing and , OPEC engineered a rise in prices above adaptive capacity of Gulf regimes to changes in the oil mar- a barrel to annual averages of . ket and corresponding threats to the patronage politics they have created. Cooperation between Gulf states and with other Viva Chavez OPEC members to maintain high oil prices and, therefore, suf- ree factors came to undermine OPEC’s attempts at sus- ficient revenues has proven unexpectedly resilient. e absence taining prices above per barrel as the s wore on. of effective pre-war planning for the “day after” in Iraq, and the Venezuela, a key OPEC member with the ability to influ- subsequent inability of the US and British occupying forces ence Atlantic Basin markets, and its national oil company to restore state services and local security, could throw a span- PDVSA adopted a radically new strategy under the com- ner in the works of the neo-conservatives’ grandiose strategic pany’s dynamic new president, Luis Guisti. Guisti began plans. ough the US may have delivered the intended shock buying up refineries in the US, creating “captive buyers” for to OPEC with its audacious war, the calculus of the players who Venezuelan crude. As Venezuela’s overseas refining capacity will shape the future of the world oil markets will respond to increased, it set in train plans to increase domestic crude deeper historical trends—particularly Saudi Arabia’s conscious oil capacity to feed into its downstream assets overseas. In drift away from exclusive dependency on Washington. this way, Caracas planned to become North America’s main oil exporter and shut out the competition. Guisti’s bid for The Swing Producer higher production meant he paid little attention to OPEC Saudi Arabia, home to the world’s largest petroleum reserves, quotas and even threatened to withdraw Venezuela, a found- maintains its strategic importance—especially to Washington— ing member, from the organization. by intervening in the market to ensure moderate prices for the Around the same time, Iraqi oil returned to the market world economy. is imperative must be balanced, however, under the auspices of the UN Oil for Food program. At first, with the Saudis’ other key objectives of keeping a large market exports were restricted to a dollar amount, but eventually all share for themselves and keeping prices high enough that other external constraints on Iraqi oil sales were removed. When OPEC countries will not rebel. it came on the market in the winter of , Iraqi oil added Raad Alkadiri is director in the markets and countries group and Fareed Mohamedi a further burden to world oil markets already reeling from is chief economist at PFC in Washington, DC. weakening demand.
20 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 21 e third factor, a major contributor to weaker demand, the environment for desperately needed foreign investment in was the Asian financial crisis in . Gulf producers saw Asia Iran. Possibly, warming to the Saudis might yield higher oil as their principal growth market—the market that had saved prices, which Iran also needed badly, not only to meet basic them during the grim days of the late s when non-OPEC needs but, after , to repay its large foreign debt. e Irani- crude from the Soviet Union, the North Sea and Mexico had ans feared US pressure would undermine debt renegotiations crowded them out of the Atlantic Basin. Now, with Venezuela’s with the Europeans leading to extremely onerous terms. strategy targeting North America and the Atlantic Basin, the Until the election of President Mohammad Khatami in , Gulf producers, particularly Saudi Arabia, feared the effects the Saudi-Iranian relationship remained largely in the closet, would be doubled. e threat to the Saudis was real enough due to divisions within the ruling family. By , however, for them to allow prices to fall in the Saudis became newly sensi- to single digits. Much to the tive to Iran’s precarious financial surprise of many, the oil price was standing, which reminded them allowed to bump along the bottom The Saudis want to show somewhat of their own at the until early . time. Both Iran and Saudi Ara- Two years of low oil prices Washington that there is bia wanted higher oil prices, but completely knocked the bottom only one swing producer. that was not the only basis of the out of the beleaguered Venezuelan maturing partnership. As much as economy just as elections were held Tehran wanted the Saudi seal of in late . ose elections saw the approval for consumption in the rise to power of Hugo Chavez. Under the tutelage of former West, the Saudis needed to show their own populace that the guerilla leader Ali Rodriguez, a member of the National Assem- Kingdom’s regional policy was becoming more rooted in the bly with a keen interest in the oil markets and current head of neighborhood. Growing popular anger within the Kingdom PDVSA, Chavez brought Venezuela back into the OPEC fold. toward US failure to move the Oslo “peace process” forward Higher oil prices were necessary for Chavez’s plans to acceler- and staunch US support for the UN embargo on Iraq required ate income redistribution in the country. Higher oil revenues that the Saudi royal family distance itself from Washington. An would go directly to his core constituency, the poor under- entente with Iran, under US sanctions, provided the means class of Venezuela’s main cities, who had long maintained that to achieve this makeover. e Saudi price defense strategy, Venezuela is a resource-rich country largely monopolized by a the election of Chavez and the Saudi-Iranian entente helped small circle of businessmen, bureaucrats and an “aristocracy of OPEC to defy many forecasts and keep prices around per labor.” At the March OPEC meeting, in a landmark deal barrel through . that bespoke new Saudi attitudes toward oil prices as much as those of Chavez, the Saudis agreed to cut output below their Growing Ill Will “line in the sand” of million b/d, while the Venezuelans cut At first, the US chose to ignore the changes taking place in theirs below million b/d. With other OPEC members and the Gulf in the mid-s. But with persistently high prices even non-OPEC members (including Mexico and Norway) continuing beyond the winter of into the summer of cooperating, a substantial amount of oil was removed from , mainly due to natural gas shortages, Washington began the markets. to make public comments about Saudi Arabia’s role in lower- Traders took this as a strong indication that OPEC mem- ing oil prices. e Clinton administration feared that high bers had stopped competing for market share. Supported by energy prices would exacerbate the slump in the economy, unprecedented OPEC cohesion and global economic recovery which began in . With the presidential elections from -, oil prices reached the upper s per barrel nearing, the White House and the Gore campaign panicked. by the summer of . World oil markets were giving the e economic boom—the campaign’s strong suit—looked to oil producers’ organization the best of both worlds—high oil be in jeopardy. Worse still, the Democrats suspected that the prices and higher production. Saudi ruling family’s closeness to the Bush family may have contributed to their seemingly slow response to US demands Living in the Neighborhood for higher production and lower prices. Energy Secretary Bill e blossoming relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia has Richardson, who had aspirations of becoming Gore’s running strengthened OPEC cohesion before and since the March mate, publicly berated the Kingdom. Worse still from the Saudi meeting. President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, breaking perspective, the White House ordered a small release from the sharply with Ayatollah Khomeini’s hostility to Saudi Arabia, Strategic Petroleum Reserve. perceived that a cordial relationship with his Gulf neighbor had Whether the Saudis were playing the market to favor the several advantages. A non-threatening stance toward Riyadh Bush campaign is not at all clear. Certainly, at the time, Gulf might signal the US and the West that Iran was ready to rejoin regimes—even senior Iraqi officials—believed that Bush would the world community. Greater regional stability would improve be more “pro-Arab” and less partial to Israel than the Clinton
22 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 23 administration. But Saudi interference in internal US politics, beyond insider lob- bying, seems a stretch. ere is, however, considerable evidence that the Clinton ad- ministration and Saudi Ara- bia enjoyed less then cordial relations. Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar, who enjoyed easy access to the first Bush White House, was hardly consulted in the Clinton era. e Oslo process, though wel- come in Riyadh, lacked even the minimal Arab input of the Madrid process initiated by Bush Senior. e US was rigid in its position on Iraq, despite much Arab sympa- thy for Iraqi civilians under sanctions. With the terrorist attacks on US personnel in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, relations deteriorated as each side accused the other of insufficient cooperation. The collapse of the Camp David summit in July , followed by Clinton’s public statements blaming Arafat for the failure, played into the growing mutual ill will. Riyadh saw Richardson’s public pressure as portraying the Saudis as mere economic pawns of the US, the last thing the Saudis wanted in the charged atmosphere. e oil ministry technocrats saw the strategic reserve release as an attack on their ability to man- age the market. By the end of Oil worker prays at Dawra refinery outside Baghdad, February 2003. JEROME DELAY/AP PHOTO Clinton’s term, the Saudis had abandoned King Fahd’s policy of pursuing moderate prices administration made the right public noises and private in line with Washington’s interests and clearly signaled that gestures. New Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham, an Arab- Saudi oil policy pursued distinctly different objectives than American, was dispatched to Riyadh to “privately” impress those of Washington. on the Saudis the need for an easing of prices. e Saudis, too, made the right public sounds, seeming to indicate that September 11 they were willing to reassume their old stance, at least in style Upon George W. Bush’s capture of the White House, Riyadh if not in substance. made it known that the Kingdom would increase output in e September , attacks and the discovery that the winter months as a welcoming gift to the new admin- of the hijackers were Saudi Arabian citizens had a pro- istration. In this atmosphere of initial good will, the Bush found impact on US attitudes toward Saudi Arabia and its
22 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 23 Mosul, March 2002. US introduction of dollars into Iraq has boosted the value of the Iraqi dinar. DALIA KHAMISSY strategic role as the world’s swing producer. e media and in oil production, and could raise production by a million prominent think tanks began to question the stability of b/d per annum for the foreseeable future. Higher oil prices the regime in Riyadh and its ability to carry out its duties and a strategic deal between Putin and the oligarchs were as stabilizer of oil markets. is scrutiny built on earlier responsible for this turnaround. By the deal, Putin would unease with changes in Saudi oil policy that had been sim- guarantee the oligarchs’ recent and very controversial ac- mering under the surface. Now it burst out into the open, quisition (outright theft in most cases) of the Russian oil with calls for the US to seek out new strategic partners companies. In return, the tycoons would make substantial for the maintenance of sufficient and economical supplies investments in the Russian oil sector, financed through the of energy. Pro-Israel groups within the US, who had long repatriation of their overseas assets. Putin took this idea to chafed at the need for the US to accommodate the Saudis, Washington and to Crawford, Texas. He guaranteed safe pas- exploited the ambient sense of alarm. ey contended that sage for crude oil from the expanding oil and gas sectors of the Kingdom was a hotbed of Islamic fundamentalism that the Central Asian republics. Foreign oil companies had de- could and would hold global energy supply hostage. veloped the giant Tengiz field on the Caspian in Kazakhstan In the fall of , Russian President Vladimir Putin and and built a pipeline to transport it to the Novorosissk port a number of oligarchs who had assumed control over some on the Black Sea. Russia also hinted that it would remove of Russia’s biggest oil companies stepped into the breach, roadblocks to the Baku (Azerbaijan) to Ceyhan (Turkish port arguing that Russia could be the new strategic partner to the on the Mediterranean) pipeline that would transport Azeri US. ey showed that Russia had reversed its huge decline crude into the Mediterranean.
24 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 25 Resilient Status Quo ����������������������������������������� ese dramatic gestures, as well as the crash of the stock market in the fall of and prospects of a deep recession, frightened Saudi Arabia and OPEC going into the winter months of and early . In the immediate wake of the September attacks, the Saudis had unilaterally raised output as a gesture to the US and as a means of calming market jitters. Now, with a collapse in demand looming and rising non-OPEC supplies, Riyadh and other OPEC mem- bers feared that global stocks would rise rapidly, particularly in the spring months of . ey called on Russia to cooperate with OPEC in cutting back production, but were rebuffed. Russia was playing a game of chicken with OPEC—a collapse in oil prices would not have served its economic interests either, since it had just emerged from recession and financial crisis. A large part of Russia’s economic recovery could be attributed to higher oil prices and ������ the oil sector boom, which attracted substantial sums offset- ��� ting massive capital outflows. In the short run, Russia got the ������� best of both worlds. OPEC cut supplies massively to support �������������������������������������� prices above per barrel and simultaneously made room for ������������������������������������ additional Russian supplies. �������������������������� But the world oil markets and US policymakers noted two caveats: because of its internal unity, OPEC was very much in control of the markets and had successfully managed prices in very adverse circumstances. Russia could not play this role, ei- ther by swinging production up to moderate prices or swinging ���������� down to shore up prices. Undoubtedly, Russia had added to �������� diversity of supplies—a key concept in energy security think- ����������� ing within the Beltway—but it did not have (and could not �������� have, given that the private sector runs the oil industry) the ��������� spare capacity needed to stabilize markets. ������� e resiliency of the status quo was convincingly dem- ������������ onstrated in early . Oil workers and executives of PD- ��������� VSA walked off their jobs in protest against the Chavez government in late and remained on strike into the new year. For a period, the world lost nearly million b/d of crude oil and products. At the same time, Nigeria’s oil production was disrupted, and on March , nearly mil- lion b/d of Iraqi crude production halted when the US and Britain invaded. Saudi Arabia raised output from . million b/d to . million b/d while other OPEC members raised output to their maximum levels. e Saudi move was de- ������ signed to show Washington that there was only one swing ������������ producer, one country truly willing to prevent extremely ������������������ high spikes in oil prices. In the wake of Saudi ambivalence ������������������� about Washington’s invasion of Iraq and its unwillingness ������������� to fully share bases and material with the US, Riyadh at ����������������� least bought itself some good will. ���������������������� Occupiers’ Amateur Hour If Russia cannot replace Saudi Arabia, can Iraq? Some pun- ������������������������������������������������� dits have begun to say so. But before their dreamed-of break
24 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 25 � � � � � � � � � � ������������������������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������
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with Riyadh can occur, the US will need to execute the much Gulf War, when security and services were restored quickly more mundane task of securing the post-war peace in Iraq, a after much more massive damage to local infrastructure. To much greater challenge than Washington anticipated. For all many in Baghdad and further afield, the Office of Reconstruc- its rhetoric and regional ambition, the Bush administration tion and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA)—the occupation au- failed to devise any detailed plan for running Iraq after Saddam thority—is a detached institution that appears to be genuinely Hussein was gone. Divisions within the Bush team, and the ignorant not just of the most pressing priorities, but of the intransigence of neo-conservative hawks in the Department depth of the problems faced outside the well-secured walls of of Defense and Dick Cheney’s office, prevented agreement on the former Republican Palace on the west bank of the Tigris anything more than general guidelines. e consequences of (which ORHA has taken as its command center). ORHA’s this failure are now readily apparent. overwhelming preoccupation with the political transition and Indeed, US management of post-war Iraq is beginning to creating the basis for a free market stands in stark contrast to look decidedly amateurish. Occupation forces have failed to the quotidian concerns of most Iraqis. restore more than a modicum of law and order in many parts of ORHA’s performance over the next few months will have Iraq, particularly the capital, which is suffering from an ongoing major implications for US plans for the Iraqi oil sector, and wave of armed attacks, random kidnappings and killings, and consequently the wider regional ambitions of the neo-conser- continued looting of government buildings. e vast major- vatives. In the very short term, failure to restore public secu- ity of the population has been left fearing for their personal rity will hinder Iraq’s attempts to restore pre-war production, security, day and night. Basic services like electricity, water and particularly in the south. Ongoing looting and the inability gasoline supply remain patchy, leading many Iraqis to compare of Southern Oil Company personnel to carry out appraisals of today unfavorably with the deposed regime’s response after the the local fields has severely hampered the process of bringing
26 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 27 production back online at the country’s workhorse fields of written on a number of years hence. Oil companies will want Rumaila and Zubair. Especially problematic has been the dam- to see a new, stable sovereign government in place before money, age looters have caused to the water treatment plant at Garnat technology and training—the priorities for the sector—start Ali, which has halted the water injection crucial for ramping to flow into Iraq. up production in Rumaila (which produced . million barrels At the very least, the problems of securing the peace, and per day prior to the war). A lack of electricity and fuel has also the task of political transition, is going to delay the influx of complicated operations in the south, and pushed back the time- investment. Visions of Iraq producing - million barrels per line for returning to anything day within five years, as some approaching pre-war output. formerly exiled political parties At the same time, the oil have suggested, are pure fan- ministry has been rocked by tasy. Contract negotiations for the sweeping de-Ba‘thification If Russia cannot replace Saudi Iraq’s untapped big southern measures that ORHA intro- Arabia, can Iraq? fields, which will provide the duced in mid-May. While many basis for most of the new pro- senior officials within the min- duction, will not begin until a istry were party members, the new sovereign government is in overwhelming majority reached their positions on merit, not place, and that could take - months. Actually concluding favor. e ministry stands to be robbed of some of its best and a deal to drill in the Iraqi Klondike is likely to take longer still. most experienced talent. Even if exceptions are made—as seems All of this will push back the lofty production goals that the US likely—fear of being purged has preoccupied many ministry and many Iraqis hope to achieve, assuming that Iraq’s politics staff whose attention would have been better directed toward are sufficiently stable for deals to be struck at all. more practical matters. De-Ba‘thification has encouraged a phenomenon apparent in all ministries and government in- The Coming Price War? stitutions since the war, whereby staff have insisted that their e ease with which OPEC manages Iraq’s return to the oil new democratic status gives them the right to choose their market will depend heavily on how rapidly Iraqi engineers, management far up the totem pole. In the future, difficult traders and their US overseers resuscitate the sector. Up to - management decisions in the oil ministry may be greeted by . million b/d of Iraqi output can be managed in much the industrial action and demands that the officials involved be same way that OPEC dealt with volatile Iraqi production under removed. the UN Oil for Food program. But the longer-term prospect of foreign investment in Iraq and the potential for its output Klondike Delayed rising rapidly over million b/d has already started to unnerve Given its preoccupation with other issues, ORHA may neglect the organization. Looking ahead, OPEC faces tepid increases to address security and inefficiency, leading the whole occu- in demand, much of which will be met by increases in non- pation enterprise to come apart, ambitions for the oil sector OPEC supplies from the Gulf of Mexico, West Africa, Brazil included. e occupation forces do not have the luxury of time and Central Asia, not to mention Russia. As a result, OPEC’s to get it right. Public hints that they are operating on the basis own production, after accommodating, Iraq will remain flat of trial and error, not to mention ongoing ideological battles well into the last part of this decade. within ORHA itself, are not encouraging. Anti-occupation To complicate matters further, OPEC’s own capacity has sentiment is already on the rise—not just from members of the risen substantially. A number of OPEC members, notably ancien regime. If, over the very hot summer months, the lot of Algeria, Libya and Nigeria, allowed foreign companies into average Iraqis is not noticeably improved—especially in Bagh- their nationalized oil sectors in the s to expand capacity. dad—violence against US forces may escalate, and any hopes To comply with stringent OPEC discipline, they constrained of a relatively smooth political transition will fade away. their nationalized production, allowing oil pumped by these Any such instability is sure to hamper long-term develop- companies to come online. While they benefited from higher ment of the Iraqi oil industry. While access to Iraq’s oil wealth, prices, the prospect of a large portion of their capacity going un- with its billion barrels of proven reserves and very low pro- used is exacting a burden on their sectors. ese excess-capacity duction costs, will tempt foreign oil companies, they will not countries are now arguing, sotto voce, that, given Iraq’s expected throw money down the drain. e costs involved in developing return, Saudi Arabia, which gained so much from Iraq’s exit in new output in the sector, estimated at as much as billion , should absorb a disproportionate quota reduction and over - years, mean that firms will want guarantees before provide them with room to increase their production. OPEC investing. To be sure, firms want to see the dangers of oper- is set to revisit the basic disputes that animated its meetings ating in-country mitigated. But more importantly, they will and deliberations in the late s and s. demand a predictable legal and constitutional setup ensuring Will Saudi Arabia accommodate its fellow OPEC mem- that the contracts they sign will be worth the paper they are bers or will a price war ensue? ere are a number of com-
26 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 27 Iraq Reconstruction Tracker
ar began last week,” said the New York Times on March 23, distinction between “parasitic” and “sustainable” development. “W2003. “Reconstruction starts this week.” In fact, the Bush Parasitic contractors and investors seek to extract resources and administration had been soliciting proposals to “reconstruct” war- do short-term construction that sustains the occupation of Iraq, as torn Iraq before dropping the first bomb, and before asking the UN well as buy property while the currency is in flux only to sell at a Security Council to authorize military action. Between January 31 higher price upon leaving the country. Sustainable development, and March 4, the US Agency for International Development issued on the other hand, might include industries providing permanent nine procurement actions—eight Requests for Proposals and one employment to Iraqis, agriculture and building the roads, power Request for Applications—for reconstruction work in Iraq. USAID systems, telecommunications and computer networks that would awarded its first contract, for technical expertise on reconstruction, serve these long-term goals. on February 7, two days after Secretary of State Colin Powell at- Some early signs are discouraging. In Iraq, urbanization and reli- tempted to convince the Security Council of Iraq’s evasion of weap- ance on the oil economy since the 1970s has turned Iraq from a food ons inspections. UN Security Council Resolution 1483, passed in exporter into a nation heavily reliant on imported food. USAID plans late May, confirmed that much of this work will be financed by Iraqi to award a contract for agricultural development, although a Request oil revenue, and conducted by multinational corporations chosen for Proposals has not yet been issued. However, the appointment of by the US and Britain. To date, all of the contracts, charted below, Dan Amstutz as head of agricultural reconstruction in Iraq is a less have been awarded by USAID, the US Army Corps of Engineers or than encouraging sign. Amstutz is a former senior executive of Car- the US Department of State. gill, the biggest grain exporter in the world, who served in the Reagan Most scrutiny of the Iraq reconstruction process, including administration as a trade negotiator in the Uruguay round of General the ongoing General Accounting Office inquiry ordered up by Agreement on Tariffs and Trade talks. In a statement on Amstutz’s ap- Congress, has focused on its suspicious lack of competitive bid- pointment, Secretary of Agriculture Ann Veneman said that he would ding—as exemplified by the early award to Dick Cheney’s former “help us achieve our national objective of creating a democratic and company Halliburton. Iraq’s designated rebuilders have numer- prosperous Iraq while at the same time best utilize resources of our ous other dubious associations. Bechtel, recipient of the largest farmers and good industry in the effort, both for the interim and the USAID contract to date, was involved in negotiations to build an long term.” Relief groups such as Oxfam worry this means that Iraqi oil pipeline from Iraq to the Jordanian port of Aqaba in 1983, a agriculture will be left unprotected from cut-rate US competition, and project discussed privately by Saddam Hussein and President that Amstutz will try to dump cheap US grain on the potentially lucrative Reagan’s envoy Donald Rumsfeld. Some of the Army engineers Iraqi market rather than encourage the country to rebuild the agricultural involved in emergency repairs to Baghdad International Airport sector. Kevin Watkins, policy director for Oxfam, responded to the ap- and the capital’s electricity and sanitation grids helped to choose pointment by stating: “Putting Dan Amstutz in charge of agricultural Iraqi infrastructure targets during the initial US bombardments of reconstruction in Iraq is like putting Saddam Hussein in the chair of a March. But to focus solely on the procurement process obscures human rights commission.” larger questions regarding reconstruction. The procurement pro- The US and Britain have created a reconstruction structure cess itself didn’t set US policy for post-invasion Iraq or define almost solely of foreign expertise, ignoring the Iraqis who rebuilt what reconstruction would entail. their oil industry with no international assistance under sanctions Larger questions of reconstruction are ones of definition. and the idea that local expertise may offer ingenious low-budget How does reconstruction in Iraq fit into broader US plans for strategies to outside experts. The post-World War II Marshall Plan the region? What “infrastructure” will the US consider vital for is used by US officials to foster the perception that a reprise in reconstruction? Will rebuilding concentrate on construction that Iraq will be successful. There are other ways to reconstruct and will facilitate the work of post-war occupation, or the broader work develop Iraq with foreign technical expertise and financial back- necessary for sustaining the Iraqi economy after the occupation ing. Drawing on existing local organizations and regional institu- ends? Speaking in a not-for-attribution forum, one former Clinton tions falls outside the conceptual limits of US-led reconstruction. administration official who played a major role in reconstruction Whether or not Iraqis will be able to articulate their own vision for and development activities during the 1990s termed this the the reconstruction of their country, distinct from the ventriloquism Elizabeth Rosenberg, Adam Horowitz and Anthony Alessandrini are M.A. of the occupying forces who claim that they are simply there to “let candidates in the Program in Near Eastern Studies at New York University. is the people of Iraq decide their future,” remains to be seen. ■ information is part of a larger project following the reconstruction process in Iraq. For more information, write to: [email protected] —Elizabeth Rosenberg, Adam Horowitz and Anthony Alessandrini
28 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 29 Dredge and Dock (Oak Brook, Illinois): emergency Iraqi Ministry of Health to manage the health sector, USAID Awards (Requests dredging and marine surveying of Umm Qasr port; including review and further development of health National Catering (Saudi Arabia); Olive Security policies and health system management. for Proposals) (Britain): security during initial “pre-positioning and $10 million for one year fact-finding phases” of construction work; Tamini February 7, 2003 Enterprises (Saudi Arabia): catering; Titan Maritime April 8, 2003 International Resources Group (Washington, DC) (Ft. Lauderdale, Florida): marine survey of wrecks at UNICEF Umm Qasr port; Verestar (Fairfax, Virginia): emer- Technical expertise for reconstruction Promotion of “Back to School” campaign aimed at 25 gency satellite communication. $7.1 million (initial) percent of children currently not in primary school; April 30, 2003 rapid assessments to determine the availability February 17, 2003 Abt Associates (Cambridge, Massachusetts) of school materials; establishment of temporary schools where none are functioning; training of Air Force Contract Augmentation Program Supporting a reformed Iraqi Ministry of Health; de- teachers; the establishment of accelerated learn- (US Air Force) livering health services; providing medical equip- ing programs; and the development of an education Logistical support services to USAID and contractors, ment and supplies; training and recruiting health management system for Iraq. including warehousing, customs clearance, trucking staff; providing health education and information; and provision of bottled water. and determining the specific needs of the health $1 million for one year initially, up to $7 million. $4 million (initial), up to $26 million over 12 months sector and vulnerable populations such as women and children. March 24, 2003 $10 million (initial), up to $43.8 million over 12 US Army Corps of Engineers Stevedoring Services of America (Seattle) months Assessment of Umm Qasr port for delivery of hu- Awards manitarian supplies and reconstruction materials; May 5, 2003 development of improvement plans to overcome SkyLink Air and Logistic Support (Washington, DC) March 24, 2003 port-imposed constraints; hiring of port pilots; Assessment of civilian airports and collaboration for Kellogg, Brown and Root (Houston, Texas) (Hal- cargo-handling services; and coordination of on- their timely repair; management of civilian airports for liburton subsidiary) ward transport of shipments. processing of humanitarian assistance, reconstruction Extinguish oil fires; evaluate and repair, as directed by the material and personnel. $4.8 million (initial) US government, Iraq’s petroleum infrastructure. $2.5 million (initial) April 11, 2003 Up to $7 billion over two years (estimated) Creative Associates International Expected: Kellogg, Brown and Root awarded subcontracts (Washington, DC) Bearing Point (McLean, Virginia) to: Boots and Coots Well Management (Houston, Increasing enrollment and improving quality of prima- Iraqi monetary policy and currency, as part of planned Texas): managing oil fires in southern Iraq; Wild ry and secondary education; facilitation of community Mass Privatization Program. Well Control (Harvey, Louisiana): managing oil fires involvement and other social mobilization to retain in southern Iraq. students; and development of baseline indicators. Perhaps $70 million in the first year April 1, 2003 $1 million (initial), up to $62.6 million over 12 months Pending: Washington Group International (Boise, Idaho) Award for promotion of diverse and representative April 11, 2003 citizen participation in and among communities Fluor Intercontinental (Greenville, South Research Triangle Institute (North Carolina) throughout Iraq; identification, prioritization and Carolina) Strengthening management skills and capacity of local delivery of critical reconstruction and develop- Perini Corporation (Framingham, Massachu- administrations and civic institutions to improve deliv- ment needs. setts) ery of essential municipal services; training programs No specific work identified to date, but potential ser- in communications, conflict resolution, leadership skills vices include design-build activities, construction, and and political analysis. USAID Grants short-term operations and maintenance. $7.9 million (initial), up to $167.9 million over 12 Minimum of $500,000 and maximum of $100 million months March 28, 2003 per company, over one year.
April 17, 2003 UNICEF Restoration/provision of basic health services to Bechtel (San Francisco) State Department Awards vulnerable populations, focusing on women and Emergency repair or rehabilitation of power generation children; support for primary health care services; April 18, 2003 facilities, electrical grids, municipal water systems, essential medicines, vaccines and micronutrients; sewage systems, airport facilities, dredging, repair and rapid referral and response system; and distribu- DynCorp (Reston, Virginia) (Computer Sciences upgrading of Umm Qasr seaport and reconstruction tion of health education materials and nutritional Corporation subsidiary) of hospitals, schools, ministry buildings, irrigation assessments. Advising the Iraqi government on establishment structures and transportation links. of law enforcement; DynCorp will provide up to $8 million for one year initially, up to $40 million $34.6 million (initial), up to $680 million over 18 1,000 civilian advisors to help the government of months March 28, 2003 Iraq organize civilian law enforcement, judicial and correctional agencies. Bechtel awarded subcontracts to: ArmorGroup Land World Health Organization Mines (Britain): advisory services on unexploded Identification of immediate and short-term health Up to $50 million for the first year (estimated), ordnance; Al-Bahar and Bardawil (Kuwait): con- care needs; rapid restoration of essential health ser- depending on assessments of Iraqi capabilities by struction and earth-moving equipment; Great Lakes vices; and strengthening of the capacity of a reformed initial advisors.
28 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 29 pelling arguments for a new price war. Lower oil prices will the economy. Now, Abdallah and his advisers appear to be likely knock out more expensive non-OPEC oil in the US, siding with the view that Saudi Arabia’s image and minimum Canada and the North Sea. Moreover, it will discourage new demands for investment may deter foreign investment and investment in costly projects such the tar sands development that the domestic private sector should be encouraged. e in Canada, deep offshore high-tech production and remote government may even accept the private sector’s demands for areas of Russia. Lower prices could also lead to another a greater say in policy if domestic businesses will hire more round of mergers among private companies in the West, Saudi Arabians. thereby diverting capital from new development to buying Given enormous uncertainty over US intentions and talk existing oil assets. ese losses in non-OPEC production of a “democratic” domino effect in Washington, the Saudis would then provide extra room for OPEC output. is have an interest in tinkering with “democracy.” Already, Ri- extra room could be allocated to the countries demanding yadh has matched the promulgation of a new code of law disproportionately higher quotas. For a country like Saudi and restrictions on the morals police with an invitation to Arabia, lower prices are a stick with which to beat OPEC’s Human Rights Watch to assess the prison system in the quota cheaters, given the damage their budgets and bal- Kingdom. Riyadh is also going to some lengths to convince ance of payments would sustain while they wait for a larger at least parts of the US government that it is becoming more chunk of world demand. tolerant in matters of religion. Can Saudi Arabia afford to allow prices to remain low for several years? Less than a decade ago, Saudi budgets were in Between Tehran and Washington severe disrepair. But over the last four years, Saudi Arabia Even if the home front is secured, the Saudis will have to has built up foreign assets, stabilized its domestic debt and assess Iran’s willingness to go along with lower prices. Only instituted limited structural reforms that have restored not five years ago, Iran defaulted on its foreign debt payments only macroeconomic stability but also growth. e private for the second time in a decade. In , its foreign debt was sector, fearing increased scrutiny of its foreign assets in the billion and its foreign assets were a meager billion. At West and sensing more accommodation by the ruling fam- the end of March , the end of the last fiscal year, Iran ily of its economic demands at home, is repatriating capital, had reduced its foreign debt to billion and increased its adding buoyancy to Saudi Arabian investment, stock and foreign assets to billion. is dramatic reversal came in real estate markets. If the ruling family opens infrastructure, the wake of higher oil prices, a concerted effort to pay down energy and industrial projects to the private sector, many debt as a matter of national security, increased access to for- larger companies and merchant families have argued they eign capital markets, more European project finance and would be willing to repatriate even larger sums. Another the creation of an oil stabilization fund. Economic growth period of low oil prices will force the government to incur also returned to Iran for the first time since the early s. sizable budget and external payments deficits, and may lead is time, however, it was accompanied by fiscal stability, a back to capital outflow. But a calculated move to reimpose competitive exchange rate and lower inflation. control over world oil markets through lower prices may be Iran is much better placed to take the hit of lower oil prices worth the limited depletion of some of the foreign assets built from a purely financial point of view. But one potentially up during the last few years. dangerous development for Iran is the presence of the US Politically, the ruling family has also cleared more space on all of its borders. US failure to stabilize Iraq will directly for itself. Since , with the ascension of Crown Prince and indirectly drag Iran into a confrontation with Washing- Abdallah, the ruling family has reasserted its primacy and, ton, as happens intermittently with verbal, diplomatic and to a certain extent, improved its legitimacy in the Kingdom. physical skirmishes in Afghanistan. Neo-conservative hawks, e policy drift of the early s, political agitation in the who already see Iran as the next target, will be invigorated heartland of Kingdom and calls for more accountability by by the predictable US accusations that Iran is fomenting the private sector are things of the past. Abdallah’s attempts opposition to the US occupation. ey believe Iran is ripe at better governance, limited controls on ruling family power for popular revolt if the right pressure is brought to bear on and expenditures, general fiscal probity, new economic plans the regime. If the US turns more aggressively toward Iran, it and institutions to manage them, and the reoriented and will undoubtedly start with UN sanctions and restrictions more activist foreign policy have paid dividends for the fam- on financial and trade flows. For this reason, Iran may view ily. Popular anger at the US has been deflected. lower oil prices as undermining the financial cushion it will Nonetheless, even Abdallah’s supporters within the Al Saud need for this eventuality. recognize that the guarded reforms are not enough. While e Saudis also have to take US interests into consideration they wanted to overturn earlier concessions toward more should they opt for lower prices. Under normal circumstances, representation at home, they now appear to tolerate calls for would be a perfect time to reduce oil prices, with the national and regional elections. Economic plans in the mid- world economy is in a slump. If there is one critical weakness s favored foreign investment as the engine of growth for in Bush’s reelection campaign, it is the sagging economy. But
30 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 31 today the US runs Iraq, giving Washington a keen interest in sufficient oil revenues to help restart Iraqi economic activity. A major decline in prices at this juncture would prove costly for the US budget as the US attempted to fill the spending ��������� gap in Iraq. Worse still, the US might ask the Gulf countries to shoulder portions of the rebuilding effort—a request for which no Gulf regime has an appetite. �������������� Caution and Cooperation In the late s, the expectation of lower oil prices for the Find the answer in Dollars & Sense: foreseeable future was seen as undermining the status quo ����������������������������� in the Gulf countries. To a certain extent, they did. But the ����������������������������� regimes survived, if somewhat shaken. After the Iraq war, the Gulf countries—particularly Saudi ��������������������������������� Arabia and Iran—face a much greater challenge. e removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime and US control over Iraqi re- sources will destabilize long-term oil markets. Much depends ���������� on what the US chooses to do with the Iraqi oil sector. ORHA ��������������������������������� could opt for an approach along the lines of what Saddam Hussein himself wanted to do in the early s: leave current offers a comprehensive economic analysis oil assets in the hands of the Iraqi National Oil Company and of current events worldwide. fund new development under production sharing contracts Read about the role of unions in Palestine, with foreign oil companies. A new Iraqi government would where unemployment is now over 50%: thereby gain control over timing of investment and produc- ����������������������������� tion, very much in the way that other OPEC governments ������������������� who have let foreign oil companies into their countries have ����������������������������� done. is approach would be compatible with a coopera- tive stance within OPEC, although a pro-US government in One in seven Americans lives in a “planned Baghdad may be willing to entertain Washington’s desires and community” where First Amendment needs with regard to oil prices. With the resultant concentra- protections don’t exist: tion of oil revenues in the hands of a new group of leaders, ��������������������������������� Iraq could return to being an authoritarian rentier state. ���������� Alternatively, the US could push for total privatization of ������������������������������ the oil sector. If privatization is done badly, the sector could You’ll also get in-depth features explaining wind up controlled by an oligarchy, as in Russia. If it is done how the economy works, plus our “Regulars”— well, with an eye to maximizing efficiency and competition, Active Culture, Ask Dr. Dollar, Economy in the sector would be split among many companies with little Numbers—and much more. individual monopoly or oligopoly power. Both these options would pose significant challenges for OPEC, which would lose the ability to control the speed of Iraq’s reentry into the ����������������������������������������� market. But the latter option would enhance the chances that ��������������������������������������� Iraq will emerge from US occupation with even an imperfect democracy. Direct distribution of taxes and royalties from ������������� the oil sector to the people, with the establishment of an in- come tax system, the diffusion of economic power and the ���������������������������������������������������������� ����� ���������������������������������������������������������� probability of future fiscal stability would further improve ���������������� ������������������������������������������� the odds of participatory politics in Iraq. ������������������������������������������������������� Unable to predict the outcome in Iraq, much less in Wash- ���� ������������������������������������������������������� ington, the Saudi and Iranian governments will likely choose caution and cooperation as they manage the oil markets. e ������� ����������������������������������������������������� tools of the Saudi-Iranian entente, along with greater po- �������������� ������������������������������������������������� litical and economic flexibility on their part, will likely help ���������������������������������������������������������������� both regimes cling onto power despite Washington’s new ������ strategic policy of spreading “democracy” by the sword. ■
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32 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 33 PETER BOUCKAERT/HUMAN RIGHTSWATCH An identity document found in the mass grave in Hilla. Such evidence could help reconstruct Iraq’s violent past and hold former leaders accountable. May 2003. Of Graves and Grievances Sinan Antoon
I. Graves erations.” Quickly adjusting the dial, the driver searched the I was going back home. Two weeks after the ceasefire in March stations until he found a maudlin love song. It was a sign, I , the minibuses had just returned to the streets, and I had thought, of how things had changed. Before the war, he would taken the opportunity to visit my cousin’s house to check on have thought twice before changing the station. her family. A man in his thirties boarded the minibus a few “Excuse me,” the man next to me asked in a subdued voice. minutes after I did and sat next to me. e driver turned on “Do you know where al-Amin al-aniya is?” the radio, shattering the heavy silence with blabber about “the “ere is a bridge coming up in minutes. You get off there meaning of victory” and “the example Iraq set for future gen- and once you cross it, you’ll be in al-Amin al-aniya.” “Do you live there?” he asked, as if to verify my knowledge Sinan Antoon is an Iraqi poet living in Cairo. of the area.
34 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 35 “No, I live in al-Amin al-Ula, on this side of the canal, but I howling and running in the nights of their heads and years. must get off at the bridge. I will show you how to get there.” It keeps laughing in their nightmares and smiling through Silence reigned again. e man was holding a small paper their invisible wrinkles. bag in his hands. His fingers pressed it firmly shut. He caught “Rain…rain.” e child kept on repeating the word. me looking at the bag. Many rain clouds later, we woke up to find Baghdad’s sky “I have to deliver something. I have the address, but….” covered with crowds of black clouds. Saddam had ordered He opened the paper bag and showed me its contents—an that Kuwait’s oil wells be torched. I heard on the radio that ID card with burnt corners. Almost half of the photograph in these clouds translated into billions of dollars in compensa- the upper right-hand corner had been consumed by flame. tion. As the ink of dollars crept northward, the hunger of “I didn’t know him before the war. We were together in the future generations took shape on the sooty horizon. e same trench. We survived the bombing. It was a miracle. I smoke stood still, as if watching Baghdad’s four million. En- swear to you. Everyone else in our unit died. I went to take vironmentalists and animal rights activists condemned this a leak the day we decided to flee and the spot was bombed. crime as it blackened and choked the rare birds and animals When I came back, he was burning like a tree. I tried to save of the desert. As for us, there were so many of our species. him, but I couldn’t. It was too late. I had to bury him there And we were already a bit darker. with my own hands. We’d given each other our addresses, just Bombs had muted phone lines from the beginning. So I in case. What will I tell his family?” spent that night at a friend’s house, having visited to check I had no answer. on him. I rushed home the next morning on the bike I had bought in the third week of the war. e bike business was II. Black Rain booming after the war, as the lack of fuel had paralyzed cars. Her eyes were like two green question marks. She was trying to e war had ended a few days before and there was an upris- hide a tear that had started to crystallize. But it was frozen, or ing in most of the country’s governorates. Bush Senior had delayed, by fear. It hesitated a bit, and stumbled on her eyelids, called upon Iraqis to “take matters into their own hands.” before resting on the threshold of crying. e child extended Even the mukhabarat cars usually parked in major Baghdad her hands and held on to the crease of her father’s pants. Her intersections had disappeared. Black rain started pouring as father was trying to keep his own fear invisible. I pedaled down Palestine Street. e two halves of the split “Baba, Baba, what is that noise?” blue dome of Nusb al-Shahid (Martyr’s Monument)—all He answered with an air of necessary self-assurance: that remained of the million or so who died in the eight-year “Rain. It’s just rain, sweetie.” war against Iran—looked like a screaming mouth gaping at Violently, the bombing had smashed the silence hiding in- the sky. I stopped to catch my breath and hid under one of side us and broken its windows. e windows we had closed the palm trees they’d planted along both sides of the street. to look into ourselves. e sirens howled. Waking up late and e monument was erected close to the amusement park unable to fulfill their functions, like underpaid and overworked we frequented on school trips or with our parents, taking bureaucrats. over a site for burning the city’s garbage. Millions of dol- “When will it be over, Baba?” lars and tons of marble had turned the dump into a space “Soon, sweetie, very soon. It will be OK.” where human carnage was rendered aesthetic. e child held on tightly to her father and repeated “rain… I continued my trip back home. e streets were empty, rain” as if she knew, with the wisdom of a three-year old, that except for a car rushing by every ten minutes to shower me this was a different kind of rain. One that could steal people with puddled black rain. I saw the Olympic Committee’s away from their loved ones. complex, Uday’s headquarters, to the right. ere were no e clouds, that night, had squatted in one of the corners guards whatsoever. is was my daily route to and from col- of Baghdad’s sky. ey hid behind the stars, making way for a lege and I had memorized every little detail. A sign reading different type of human-made clouds with names like “B-” “God safeguard Iraq and Saddam” adorned the entrance of and “Stealth.” ese were clouds that never tired or bothered the complex, but now someone had removed “Saddam.” He to migrate between the sky and water surfaces. Nor were they was dangling from the edge, trying to hold on. ere was interested in listening to the sun’s whispers, or being subject graffiti all over Baghdad those days in solidarity with the to the winds’ whims. All they needed was a temporary con- uprising. One of Saddam’s murals in Baghdad al-Jadida was crete nest, here or there, to refuel and continue handing out even defaced with red paint. the gifts of the New World Order. e clouds rained gifts of Immediately after the end of the war, the regime formed various sizes and shapes. Cactuses of death that would thrive a committee to identify those of His Excellency’s totems inside us for decades to come. ey diminish seasons and which needed a makeover. Saddam climbed back up to his defy almanacs. ey bury time and spread their shards on sovereign place with the help of the US, which helped him maps and in bodies. As for those on whom death does not crush the uprising by allowing him to use helicopter gun- trickle through the holes it makes in skulls, its thunder keeps ships and slaughter the thousands of brave Iraqis whose
34 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 35 Bedouin girl outside Mosul, March 2002. DALIA KHAMISSY mass graves are now being exhumed. e Iraqi Olympic I had nothing further to say. Inside, my aunt said what she Committee was one of the first public buildings to be looted always says when I’m caught in the rain. “You look like a wet and torched after the fall of the hated regime in April, part bird!” She covered me with a towel. of the catharsis. But at what cost? US occupation troops I remembered all this as the announcer on TV praised the ac- made sure the Ministries of Oil and Foreign Affairs were curacy of the beautiful birds about to approach Iraq’s skies. protected, but watched the whole infrastructure of the Iraqi My aunt and our neighbor are buried kilometers state and much of the country’s heritage be looted and east of Baghdad, in a cemetery covered with dust and the destroyed. Why not? It will only increase the profits to be tranquility of death. e sanctions probably hastened their made rebuilding. Another looting, equally devastating and departures, as they did for perhaps a million Iraqis, mostly lethal, carried out by white men in three-piece suits oceans children. Grass or wildflowers may grow beside their graves. away had started much earlier than April, but most of it is I don’t know for sure, but I will check if and when I go back off-camera. Perhaps it produces cigar smoke amidst clouds to “liberated” Iraq. As for the little child, she is one of four of that invisible kind reserved for smokescreens. Baghdad’s million Iraqis in the diaspora, but she doesn’t like rain and and Iraq’s skies, s(oil) and waters are all clear for Bechtel she is still afraid of thunder. and its partners. When I reached our house that day I was soaked with III. Mass Graves black rain, I got off the bike and opened the iron gate. e joy of witnessing Saddam’s demise was too brief to sa- Our year-old retired neighbor was trying, bowl in vor. It was a euphoria whose hangover will be measured in hand, to scoop the rain from one part of his garden and depleted uranium, cluster bombs and the heavy price Iraqis pour it on another. There, after the sanctions were im- will have to pay to liberate their country from the “libera- posed, he had planted cucumbers and tomatoes instead tors,” now that the occupation is official. of roses. Let us never forget that when the regime carried out He heard me closing the gate and stood up: “What are you do- most of its crimes, when it turned the whole of Iraq into ing out in this weather? Have you ever seen anything like it?” a giant mass grave, it was not yet on Washington’s list “I was visiting a friend. No, nothing like this before!” of “rogue states.” As for those mass graves which date “It’s the best fertilizer ever, though!” back to the uprising of , let us never forget that the
36 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 37 US stood by as Saddam’s helicopter gunships slaughtered Iraqis and did not allow Iraqi rebels to reach warehouses SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY containing the weapons and ammunition they needed to defend themselves. L. Paul Bremer, Iraq’s American governor, now visits the Vol. 16, No. 2 Summer-Fall 2002 $10.00 sites of these mass graves to express solidarity. It would be naïve to expect an apology or an admission of complicity. But, nevertheless, one must ask if the skeletons of Iraqi soldiers buried en masse by the US in will ever be THE PALESTINE QUESTION unearthed to be identified and returned to their families. Will we hear mention of the resting places of the retreating Samir Awad, Background to the "Peace Process" soldiers left to burn alive on the highway of death? In the cacophony about Iraq’s future (or lack thereof) Nadia Hijab, Limitations of the Oslo Accords and the regime’s numerous crimes, another enormous Roger Normand, Israel's Economic War in Context crime is slowly being consigned to oblivion. Whereas Saddam’s mass graves can be located and investigated, Yerach Gover, Zionism's Zero Sum Game that crime’s vast cemetery is already ringed off, beyond the reach of memory. There have been many attempts, in Moshe Behar, The Peace Process and the last years, to breach the gates and exploit gaps in Israeli Domestic Policies in the 1990s the fence, but the graveyard of victims of the sanctions Annemarie Kattan Jacir, Refugees and once again seems impenetrable to inquiry. Iraqis’ col- the Right of Return lective memory will forever be haunted by their ghosts. Perhaps the memory of those one million innocent ci- Amira Sohl, Implementing the Right of Return vilians will one day help exhume a fellow victim, also Inez Hedges, Life Under the Occupation: buried for some time now: collective responsibility. ■ Two Films
Hard-hitting. Clear-headed. Issue includes: court statements by Cuban "Miami Five" defendants, articles on shock therapy in East Germany, prospects for social revolution in Latin America, on contesting concepts of class in capitalism, and on British Marxist critics of the 1930s
Middle East Report 32 The Journal of the Research Group Get the story from the magazine on Socialism and Democracy that takes on all the players. 217 East 86 Street # 143 No exceptions. New York, NY 10028 (212) 427-5976 Don’t miss an issue! $10 for this issue Renew your subscription today. Four-issue subscription $32 www.merip.org
36 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 37 Iranian President Mohammad Khatami dismisses conservative rewriting of presidential powers bill as “unacceptable” (May 2003). AFP PHOTO High Stakes for Iran Kaveh Ehsani s neo-conservatives inside and outside the Pentagon e stakes are very high. If the democratic movement in Iran, step up their rhetoric against the Islamic Republic embodied in elected representatives as well as those outside the A of Iran, internal polarization in Iran also seems to be regime committed to non-violent reforms and national recon- reaching a breaking point. Hardliners in the Iranian regime ciliation, can resolve the current impasse, Iran has a chance to have managed effectively to block most significant attempts be a model of a radical, revolutionary Islamist state successfully at reforming governance over the past four years. e in- making the transition to an inclusive and functionally secu- ability of the elected reformers to deliver on most of their lar democracy. Washington hawks present the alternative of campaign promises, coupled with mismanagement of the overthrowing the regime through a “popular uprising”—really civic and economic spheres under their direct control (such a civil war—and restoring the Pahlavi monarchy, following a as the Tehran municipality or the oil sector), has disillu- referendum. Iranian hardliners could resort to open domestic sioned the public. With the US reportedly moving toward repression or total blockage of the reform movement. Either an explicitly confrontational posture toward Iran, different of these alternatives could engender chaos and civil strife that factions within the regime, as well as outside political forces will make the current scene in Iraq pale by comparison. and significant segments of the population, seem to have concluded that the current deadlock must be broken—one Targeting Tehran way or another. In May , the US accused Iran of harboring al-Qaeda mas- terminds of the bombing attacks in Saudi Arabia, of openly Kaveh Ehsani is an Iranian writer and researcher based in Chicago. supporting “terrorist organizations” like Hizballah in Leba-
38 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 39 non and of pursuing weapons of mass destruction, including Iran in the early summer. On July , President Mohammad nuclear weapons. To anyone who followed the buildup to the Khatami warned of “grave new developments” and an internal invasion of Iraq, this list of accusations sounds ominously fa- coup d’etat against the reform movement. Khatami was refer- miliar. e known exaggerations and outright fabrications in ring to proposals floated by conservatives to enable the Expe- the case against Iraq should encourage the press and interna- diency Council, a powerful extra-constitutional body headed tional organizations like the Security Council to demand con- by former President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, to take crete, convincing proof from the Bush administration before on added executive and legislative functions, while the con- taking these allegations against Iran seriously. servative Council of Guardians had begun opening up offices Many of Washington’s claims about Iran’s weapons of mass in electoral localities to gather information for screening can- destruction seem to have originated with the Mojahedin-e Khalq didates for the coming parliamentary elections. ese tactics (MKO), based in Iraq and formerly allied with Saddam Hus- were aimed at eroding the president’s powers for the remainder sein, and its civilian front organization, the National Council of of his term and at preventing influential reformers to stand Resistance of Iran. e MKO, whose numerous attacks killing for office. e hardliners’ measures triggered a spiral of attack Iranian civilians earned it a spot on the State Department list of and counterattack that, by the end of summer, had polarized terrorist organizations, was briefly disarmed by the US in early the Islamic Republic to an unprecedented degree. May, but has apparently been allowed to maintain its presence in Hashem Aghajari, a prominent political activist and univer- Iraq. A battle over the MKO’s future is certainly going on inside sity professor, was imprisoned and later condemned to death the administration. Pro-Israel commentators Daniel Pipes and for a controversial speech he made on the theme of Protes- Patrick Clawson, perhaps reflecting the Pentagon hawks’ point tantism in Islam. e speech was a thinly disguised attack of view, argue that it is “silly to call the MKO terrorists” because on the ideological foundation of the political system of the they attack Iranian targets, putting them on the same side as the Islamic Republic and the role it assigns the “Supreme Leader” US. Clawson and Pipes call for the MKO to be removed from as the undisputed head of the country. Conservative attacks the terrorist list, rearmed and used to intimidate the Iranian re- on Aghajari prompted protests by students and reformist or- gime, uncover Iranian infiltrators and agents in Iraq, and provide ganizations, as well as a scathing riposte from Ayatollah Jalal otherwise elusive “intelligence” on Iran. rough its front in Taheri, the highly respected Friday prayer leader in the city Washington, the MKO has obliged this confidence by charg- of Esfahan. Taheri’s open letter of resignation on July , ad- ing that , troops and , clerics in civilian clothes have dressed to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, accused infiltrated Iraq from Iran, that Iran has chemical and biological the conservatives of corruption, abuse of power and betrayal weapons and that Iran is developing nuclear capabilities in two of the moral and egalitarian ideals of the revolution. e undeclared facilities west of Tehran. Some of these claims may next day, the reformist journalist and politician Abbas Abdi be true, but to date no convincing evidence has surfaced. published an op-ed criticizing Khatami for his failed political e White House canceled a high-level review of Iran policy tactics which had led to paralysis in decision-making. Abdi scheduled for May , and it has not been rescheduled, reflecting urged Khatami to stop being indecisive and publicly name the intensity of internal debates pitting hawks in the Defense those who were sabotaging the reform program that the elector- Department against the State Department and the National ate had voted for on several occasions. Should this transparency Security Council. But the general contours of the Bush admin- fail to break the deadlock, Abdi argued, the reformers owed istration’s position on Iran emerged in July , when Bush it to people who had voted them into office not to continue spoke tersely of the “unelected people who are the real rulers of with the false illusion that further progress was possible under Iran [whose] uncompromising, destructive policies have persisted these circumstances. ey should resign and leave the con- and frustrated the desire of the population for freedom and servatives to face the wrath of the population and of external reform.” Despite his declaration of friendship for the Iranian enemies. Abdi’s article, coming in the wake of Taheri’s letter, people, Bush’s statement included no mention of the elected caused a furor among conservatives who began accusing Abdi government, hinting that the administration was dismissing the and the reformers of betrayal, using the expression khorouj reform and democracy movement as irrelevant and targeting the az nezam (leaving the system), an expression alluding to the Iranian regime as a whole. A bipartisan group of senators and seventh-century rebellion of the Kharijites against Imam Ali, congressmen, led by Sen. Sam Brownback (R-KS), joined the the fourth caliph and, to Shi‘i Muslims, the most important fray, calling for regime change in Iran. While the press reported Muslim leader after Muhammad. significant State Department unhappiness over the policy shift, Bush’s statement, issued on July , appeared to express the by the end of the summer of , the administration adopted conclusion of the administration that public criticism of Khatami a unified posture of confrontation toward Iran. by his close allies and student restlessness meant that all factions within the Islamic Republic had lost their legitimacy. Zalmay Downward Spiral Khalilzad, Bush’s point man for Afghanistan, Iraq and apparently Shifts in Washington responded to events on the ground. A Iran as well, delivered a speech at the Washington Institute for series of public protests had rocked Iran’s political scene in Near East Policy on August which identified Khatami and the
38 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 39 elected faction of the Iranian regime as “ineffective.” Khalilzad in Iran implies that the regime that cannot be defended on the spelled out the new administration consensus: “It’s a dual track basis of popular support and democratic legitimacy. policy based on moral clarity: tell the world specifically what is e second reason for the current belligerence toward destructive and unacceptable about Iran’s behavior—sponsorship Iran has to do with Iraq. e speed of the occupation of Iraq of terror, pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and repression “shocked and awed” friend and foe alike, but the Panglossian of the clearly expressed desires of the Iranian people for freedom scenario whereby the Iraqi masses would pour into the streets to and democracy—while laying out a positive vision of partnership welcome their liberators never materialized. Instead many Iraq- and support for the Iranian peo- is, brutalized and impoverished ple.” Michael Rubin, then of the for years by Saddam Hussein American Enterprise Institute but and the UN sanctions, looted now working for the Pentagon, “We trust the Iranian people to infrastructure carefully spared interpreted the speech thusly: change the regime for them- during the precision bombing, “What [Khalilzad] was saying was, under the indifferent eyes of US we are calling for regime change, selves,” said Michael Rubin, soldiers more concerned with but we trust the Iranian people to guarding oil installations. e do it for themselves. e Islamic now at the Pentagon. general chaos and the rise of Shi‘i Republic is incapable of reform- religious parties, it seems, have ing itself, and the United States led the US to fear that Iranian will stand with the people.” is openly imperialist policy was influence over the Iraqi Shi‘a may disrupt American dreams of to be disguised in the rhetoric of “public diplomacy” where you building a civilizational outpost and permanent military base “tell the people you are on their side.” in the Middle East. New US viceroy L. Paul Bremer voiced Later in the fall, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld reiter- this fear when he accused Iran of trying to replicate the model ated that the administration was counting on a popular uprising of Hizballah in Iraq by creating grassroots welfare networks, to bring about early overthrow of the Iranian regime.7 Richard and eventually arming them. Perle, then still chairman of the Defense Policy Board, goaded the Paradoxically, now that the occupation of Iraq has run into administration from without, declaring that the US was prepared trouble, the neo-conservative policy of diplomatic pressure and to attack Iran, Syria and Lebanon once Saddam Hussein had covert action for toppling the regime of Iran appears to have been deposed.8 Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon also called won the upper hand. ese ideologues have been maneuvering for the invasion of Iran “the day after Iraq is crushed.”9 to line up the former crown prince, Reza Pahlavi, as an Iranian Ahmad Chalabi who can boast of popular support within Iran. Washington Ups the Ante A coalition of Jewish groups (primarily Iranian Jews), neo-con- Despite this evidence of long-standing Bush administration servative hawks and Iranian monarchists are calling for a refer- resolve to target Iran, egged on by the neo-conservatives, the endum to be held in Iran after the regime is toppled, to allow timing of the present escalation in Tehran-bashing rhetoric is people to decide what kind of regime they want. is coalition curious. ere may be two reasons why the US has decided it has facilitated Reza’s meetings with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel is time to up the ante. At the end of February , reformist Sharon, as well as President Moshe Katzav and Shaul Mofaz, candidates suffered a setback in local elections, the first elec- the defense minister, both of the whom are of Iranian origin, tions in the post-revolutionary era when the hardliners had and energetically lobbies on Reza’s behalf with the Bush ad- little control over vetting of candidates, despite their earlier ministration.10 Michael Ledeen of the American Enterprise plans to do so. Independent and opposition candidates par- Institute, former CIA director James Woolsey, former Senator ticipated on a previously unthinkable scale. ough reformers Paul Simon, former AIPAC director Morris Amitay and others won two thirds of seats nationwide, voters in large cities stayed have set up a “Coalition for Democracy in Iran” which calls away from the polls, for the first time handing a resounding for military intervention to facilitate a referendum. defeat to the reformers, as well as other opposition figures, In late May, a proposal to allocate an initial mil- in these important districts. Only percent of eligible vot- lion for efforts to topple the regime in Iran was making ers in Tehran voted and all city council seats were won by the rounds in the Senate, with Brownback’s sponsorship, conservative candidates. e US, as well as hardliners in Iran, while Rumsfeld reportedly spearheaded efforts to commit seem to have concluded that more than half the population the administration to “regime change” for Iran. But what has become apathetic, no longer believing that supporting the exactly does “regime change” mean in Iran? What kind of reform process will lead to significant political change. For the “popular uprising” do the neo-conservatives have in mind? hardliners in Iran, who have virtually no hope of increasing e term implies, falsely, that popular discontent in Iran their set number of committed supporters (between - per- is about to spontaneously generate armed resistance to the cent of the electorate), any loss on the part of reformers is a regime. Outside intervention and agitation will certainly boon. For the Bush administration, any rise in political apathy be required to produce their “uprising.”
40 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 41 party whose members hold the greatest number of seats in Hardliners Challenged the parliament, announced at its annual congress in July Facing internal and external threats, those committed to that its aim was to make all positions of power in the non-violent and democratic reforms have worked to create Islamic Republic elected by popular vote, a direct challenge new coalitions, within and outside the regime. In the last to the unelected bastions of conservatism—the judiciary, the weeks of May, a number of open letters, some of which are Council of Guardians, the Expediency Council, radio and directly addressed to Khamenei, by parliamentary depu- television, the national security council and the Leader him- ties, political and cultural activists, student organizations, self. ough the reformers lost in the most important cities the Participation Front Party and a large group of secular in the February elections, they announced the exact results democratic republicans abroad have urged the hardliners to immediately and without any distortion and acrimony, set- take responsibility for the blockage of the political reform ting a very important precedent in Iranian politics. In the process. e most harshly worded text, signed by par- subsequent analysis of the electoral defeat, the Participation liamentarians, calls on Khamenei to “drink from the poi- Front was very forthright in its self-criticism, including its soned chalice” (Khomeini’s term for accepting the Iran-Iraq failure to redeem the trust of those who elected them. Its final ceasefire in ) while there is still time, by apologizing to assessment was that political apathy was the gravest danger the public for ignoring and subverting their votes, and by for the democracy movement. taking steps to ensure that the obstruction of the reform Other independent reformist figures have been going even movement will not continue. further. Alireza Alavitabar, in an article titled “Playing Chess ere is little chance that the hardliners will heed these chal- with a Gorilla,” claimed it is impossible to rationally deal with lenges. Indeed, they may carry out sudden wholesale repres- the conservatives, who do not understand nor respect the rules sion to completely close the relatively open public sphere, and of the political game. Power can only be countered with power, once they have consolidated their domestic gains, offer the US and the present theocratic system is unreformable. Alavitabar any number of significant compromises to ensure their own concluded that the reform movement needs to engage in a survival. e Bush administration may be hoping for such an long-term strategy to change the Islamic Republic in three outcome, since it will then face a completely delegitimized re- steps: first, to force the conservatives to become accountable gime, both internationally and domestically. But this scenario for their deeds; second, to push for a more democratic inter- may cause irrevocable harm to the democratic movement in pretation of the existing constitution by changing the balance Iran, whose greatest achievement has been developing and of political forces; and last, to press for a “complete (de facto instilling the political culture of tolerance and insisting on secular) democracy.” greater accountability of political power. Iran is engaged in an internal transition to democracy. e Increasingly, the recent open letters, written by reformers greatest threats to this difficult process are the Iranian hard- and democrats of various persuasions, religious and secular, liners and the Bush administration’s belligerence. If the Bush liberal and left, inside and outside the country, official and administration is serious about spreading democracy in the unofficial, converge upon a common set of demands and pre- Middle East, or in containing the meddling of Iranian hard- scriptions. ese positions include acceptance of the popular liners abroad, it should declare that it will not stand by and will as the ultimate and sole source of political authority, equal allow the democrats and reformers who have been elected by rights of citizenship for all, regardless of gender, sect or political the Iranian public to be persecuted, imprisoned and threat- affiliation, the importance of preserving national integrity and ened. Unequivocal support of the democrats in Iran, despite security above personal or sectarian political interests, and the their real differences of opinion with the Bush administration, call for national reconciliation. would induce quicker retreat from the hardliners than any Despite their serious shortcomings, the elected reformers number of military threats against the nation as a whole. ■ have shown commitment to democratic change on numer- Endnotes ous important occasions. e list of legislation passed by Daily Star, May , . the parliament, and rejected by the Council of Guardians, Daniel Pipes and Patrick Clawson, “A ‘Terrorist’ US Ally?” New York Post, May , . includes bills to liberalize the press, require the presence of Christian Science Monitor, May , and Guardian, May , . juries at all trials, ban torture, ban the criminalization of Washington Post, July , . Washington Times, August , . political opinion and release political prisoners, ensure equal Jackson Diehl, “Public Diplomacy to Change View of US,” Washington Post, August , rights for women in divorce courts, ensure equal rights for . recognized religious minorities in courts, allow the elected Financial Times, October , . Toronto Sun, November , . president the power to enforce the constitution, stop the vet- Guardian, November , . ting of candidates by the Council of Guardians, allow greater Forward, May , . local autonomy to elected councils, relax foreign investment Financial Times, May , . Most of these statements are accessible online in Farsi at http://www.gooya.com and rules, allow the private sector greater protection and sup- http://www.payvand.com. port and so on. e Participation Front, the main reformist Emrooz, November , . [Farsi]
40 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 41 Displaced Kurdish family now living in Diyarbakir, Turkey. ED KASHI/AURORA PHOTOS Voices from Turkey’s Southeast Marcie J. Patton
merging through the clouds at , feet, the wheat- On this particular flight, four days before the election, a colored landscape below looked bone-dry, although the contingent of AKP members, including the minister of the Eprevious week’s snow had made roads in the southeastern environment, occupied the entirety of the first-class cabin. As Turkish towns of Batman and Siirt impassable. Fortunately for soon as the plane landed they were whisked off in a convoy Turkey’s governing Justice and Development Party (AKP), an of black limos to the VIP lounge in the terminal. Two armed early taste of spring had warmed the air and mostly melted the soldiers herded the rest of the passengers across the tarmac snow, yielding favorable weather for the by-elections of March , and through a barbed-wire fence onto a waiting bus. e . at day’s results sent AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan soldiers boarded the bus escorting it to the terminal. As the to the Turkish parliament, and from there to the prime minister’s bus rattled down the rutted dirt road, a quick scan of the flat seat, ending more than four months of uncertainty over who horizon revealed Batman’s three Patriot missiles standing ready really ran the government. As March approached, foreign and in the distance. Turkish journalists poured into the area. Delegations of MPs e populace of the southeast is not accustomed to receiving from the AKP and the Republican People’s Party (CHP) flew in this kind of attention, after being embroiled for years in a from Ankara for the day to pay their respects to local dignitar- brutal civil war with the Turkish state and rendered a low gov- ies. Ten days prior to the election, Erdoğan himself dropped in ernment priority since war’s end in . e feeling of being for the day, before wrapping up his barely noticeable campaign neglected, ignored, cast to one side so permeates expectations with two quick speeches in Batman and Siirt. that it is impossible not to see the clouds of cynicism that cross
Marcie J. Patton, associate professor of politics at Fairfield University, was a Fulbright people’s faces in conversation. Southeastern Turkey is home pri- scholar at Bilkent University in Turkey in 2002-2003. marily to Kurds, but also to ethnic Arabs and Turks. Mosques
42 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 43 and a smaller number of Syriac Orthodox Christian churches met to debate passage of the agreement. “e people will halt pepper the region, the latter concentrated around Mardin and this war,” placards declaimed. “To hell with US imperialism.” Midyat. e rapid, albeit short-lived, deployment of Turkish “America get out, this is our country.” “e budget is for the military units across the Turkish border inside northern Iraq, people, not war.” e results of the parliamentary vote came soon after the American forces entered Iraq from the south, cast as a complete surprise. Not a single journalist or public fig- a shadow over residents’ shallow hopes for an end to violence ure in Turkey had predicted that the memo of understanding in the southeast. would not be passed. Turkish television cameras showed a vis- ibly shaken Prime Minister Abdullah Gül leaving Parliament No to War following the vote. Newspapers the following day reported Both the Turkish and foreign media depicted opposition among that Gül and Erdoğan were in “shock.” But when the results the Turkish public to the US-led war in Iraq as uncomplicated were announced publicly, both anti-war trends sighed in relief, and unified. e polls show, they reported, that percent of jubilant that Turkey had asserted itself against US might and the Turkish population opposed the war. Moreover, the mag- achieved a tremendous democratic victory. nitude of anti-war opposition was a key factor in convincing Parliament on March , in a to closed-session vote Voices Not Listened To (with abstentions), not to endorse a government-negotiated But what of the people of the southeast who share a border with agreement to permit the deployment of , US troops for northern Iraq? Except for demonstrations, broken up forcibly by a northern-front assault on Saddam Hussein’s regime. the Turkish military, at the Mediterranean port of Iskenderun, Banners and signs at anti-war demonstrations preceding the where weapons and heavy equipment were being offloaded from invasion, attended by tens of thousands in the major Turkish US Navy ships queued up off the coast, there was no visible cities of Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir and such smaller cities as popular reaction for the press to cover save the March elections. Iskenderun, Konya and Edirne, coupled with exhaustive me- While not a referendum on the war, the low percent turnout dia coverage, articulated two discourses about the war. Most for the election was a powerful indication of the degree of frustra- people in Turkey were comfortable with both. tion and anger of many Kurds with the Turkish state, from whose e first expressed solidarity and compassion for the innocent radar screen the Kurds disappeared after . At the urging of the Iraqi civilians, especially women and children, who would suffer Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP), founded to represent the loss of life and further diminution of livelihood in the war. ose voice of Kurds and excluded from the ballot by a court ruling, who have been staunch supporters of democracy and human percent of eligible voters boycotted the election—an indication rights in Turkey mostly spoke in this language, although their that for Kurdish voters in general, but especially for southeastern motivations were not so clear-cut. For some, defense of demo- Kurds, representative channels of participation in Turkish politics cratic rights includes cultural rights for the Kurds; for others, it are closed. As if to drive this point home, on March the Consti- means “no to war not sanctioned by the United Nations”; and for tutional Court converted into a permanent ban its earlier closure yet others, it means respect for the democratic process whereby of the pro-Kurd People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) for its al- the popular will is reflected in government policy, not only in leged assistance to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Turkey but everywhere in the world. Defenders of democracy Simultaneously, the court initiated proceedings for the closure of and human rights by no means share a harmonized view as to HADEP’s shadow successor DEHAP, formed as a backup party what democratic-human rights are. should the court have ruled the closure of HADEP before the A second kind of anti-war sentiment was based on historical general elections of November , . memory and the painful present of the economic crisis that In a sense, the Kurdish voice is locked out of the present has gripped Turkey since . No one has forgotten the severe parliament. Although there are a number of AKP deputies who economic impact of the Gulf war, when Turkey lost an are Kurdish, the party’s Islamist leanings make it hostile to par- estimated billion in revenues from trade and pipeline fees, ticularistic identities. Kurdish deputies are not encouraged to and no one has forgotten the unfulfilled promise made by the assert their Kurdishness. e only other political party which first Bush administration to help Turkey pay the costs of war. crossed the percent threshold in the November elections is After two years of adherence to the US-backed International the vehemently Kemalist CHP, self-identified as the guardian of Monetary Fund stabilization program, few have experienced Turkish ethnic nationalism. Neither the single-party majority improvement in their living standards. is discourse of eco- government nor the opposition in Parliament can or will give nomic privation argued that war would bring no economic voice to the aspirations of Turkish Kurds. gains to Turkey and that the US would not live up to any However, it is not only the Kurds who feel marginalized and agreement Turkey signed. excluded. Non-Kurds in the southeast, too, are without adequate Unified in opposition to the US-Turkish Memorandum of representation. Although the AKP won all three seats in the Understanding authorizing US troop deployment, the two dis- Siirt elections, it has no constituency whatsoever in the region. courses came together visually on March when over , Shortly after the November general elections, Fadil Akgündüz, people rallied outside Parliament in Ankara as the deputies a wealthy businessman who fled to Germany to avoid criminal
42 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 43 prosecution in Turkey, and who had run for office in order to all of their lives. ey wish to be integrated into the Turkish acquire parliamentary immunity, had his victory in Siirt over- polity while retaining their Kurdish cultural identity. If given turned on charges of ballot-box tampering. is cleared the way their cultural rights, this group is on the side of the territorial for Erdoğan’s candidacy. However, ballot-box tampering was old integrity of Turkey. hat in Siirt, and in fact Akgündüz had garnered votes and local If the Turkish army clashes with Kurds in northern Iraq, support by promising to open a local factory. this group fears, the military, not known as strong supporters With a population of ,, one third of whom are under of the Copenhagen criteria, might use the renewed hostilities the age of , and , people officially unemployed, resi- as an excuse to delay if not to sabotage Turkey’s EU candidacy. dents of Siirt viewed the promise of jobs as reason enough to By the same token, regime change in a democratic direction cast their ballot for Akgündüz. After Akgündüz’s subsequent in Iraq could help keep up the international pressure on An- arrest for election violations, he canceled plans for the factory. kara to allow cultural rights of the Kurds. is outlook tends As the Radikal newspaper quoted one heavily indebted con- toward optimism. struction worker on March : “He was going to give us jobs, A second outlook is heard from those Kurds who feel that food. If there were such a candidate now, he would get twice since the skirmishes and clashes with the PKK ceased, the Turk- as many votes.” People reasoned that if they elected Erdoğan, ish state deep-sixed the Kurdish question. In this view, nothing there was at least the possibility that he might use his influence has changed except that repression against Kurds is more legal- as prime minister to support development in the region. ized. Kurds in Turkey have been given rights on paper—the e singular concern of the inhabitants of the southeast is right to broadcast in Kurdish, the right to offer private language with the prospects for a lasting peace in the region. While there courses in Kurdish—that are disallowed in practice. Mindful are surface similarities, there are in fact quite different discourses that Turkey opposes the establishment of anything resembling heard in the southeast than in the rest of the country. More im- an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, these pessi- portantly, these discourses are not listened to in Ankara. In the mists are convinced that the post-war power vacuum in Iraq collective memory of residents of the southeast, the social, political can easily generate the circumstances that would prompt the and economic costs of the Gulf war were devastating. e Turkish army to enter northern Iraq. Fighting between Iraqi flood of half a million Iraqi Kurd refugees who crossed the border Kurds and the Turkish army will most certainly resuscitate the into Turkey triggered a resurgence of internal fighting between Kurdish guerilla movement within Turkey. In turn, this will the Turkish army and the PKK, fortified by the guerillas who lead to a revival of clashes and repression against Kurds in the entered the country among the refugees. Since the arrest of PKK southeast. An oil-rich Iraqi Kurdistan, if established, could leader Abdullah Ocalan in and the effective end of the war easily finance Kurdish militants inside Turkey. Many who hold in , ethnic Kurds, ethnic Arabs and ethnic Turks have been this view believe that human rights conditions for Kurds are struggling to reconstruct their lives and look to the future. eir already so miserable that there would be nothing to lose in overwhelming fear is that should the Turkish military decide to joining the PKK under arms. step into the fluid post-war situation in Iraq by sending its troops Ethnic Arabs and Turks in the region look at their circum- across the border, then this will lead to a return of state repression stances differently. Both of these groups believe that the biggest and emergency rule, rupturing their lives once again. problem facing the southeast is unemployment. Over the past decade, those ethnic Arabs who were not already living in ur- Southeastern Sensibilities ban areas have migrated from their villages to towns like Siirt Among southeastern Kurds, there are those who believe that and cities like Diyarbakir and Mardin. Relations between local Turkish Kurds are making progress, albeit it slowly, in estab- Arabs and Turks are neither amicable nor openly antagonistic. lishing their cultural rights. For them a democratic Kurdish Ethnic Turks in Siirt talk disparagingly about the recent mi- entity in northern Iraq, whether part of a federal state or as grants who are predominantly Arabs, but the issue underlying an independent state, will be an inspiration in the continu- their attitude is competition for jobs. ing struggle for democratic rights inside Turkey. ese Kurds When Prime Minister Gül made an impromptu campaign strongly support the commitment of the AKP government to speech in Siirt’s main square the day before the March by- meeting the Copenhagen criteria for Turkey’s accession to the elections, he addressed the crowd in carefully worded sound European Union. ese criteria include the rule of law, mi- bites emphasizing the AKP’s support for the unity of all Turkish nority rights, human rights and guaranteeing the stability of citizens. Gül declared, “In this country, whether Turk, Kurd institutions to sustain these democratic principles. or Arab, we are all brothers. Northern Iraqis and Iraqis—Arab, Although the small businessmen in this group may shy away Kurd and Turkmen—are our relatives, brothers.” Because DE- from opposing the regime to protect their modest economic HAP had urged its supporters to boycott the election, there gains, these Kurds are quite assertive in their Kurdish identity. were only two voting blocs to woo in the crowd—ethnic Arabs ey support policies to promote the cultural dimensions of and Turks. Gül was playing to the ethnic Arabs. that identity, even though they have endured the uncompro- Gül further instructed his audience that, “because of the speech mising push of the regime to homogenize identities in Turkey Erdoğan made here [drawing attention to religious allegories in
44 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 45 a nationalist poem], he was sentenced. Fate is like this. Now the nor of the province of Siirt has initiated several micro-projects, opportunity is in your hands. It is an honor and a great glory for including one to revive and restore cultivation of Siirt’s famed you to bring your representative to the Turkish National Assem- pistachio nuts, and another to train local women to produce bly.” Turkish media coverage pointed out that Gül’s message to small handicrafts and kilims. Some expressed the hope that if the crowd on March reminded the people of Siirt of their power peace returned, investors would be attracted to the tremen- to consolidate the authority of the AKP government under one dous tourist potential of the southeast, most notably to the leader, thereby leaving no doubt as to Erdoğan’s command over magnificent stone-carved ornamentation of houses and public foreign policy and the economy. Afterward, however, bystanders buildings of Mardin, the Armenian and Orthodox churches spoke of their votes in more mundane terms. Erdoğan was not and black basalt city walls of Diyarbakir, the Syriac Christian just any MP. He would be the country’s prime minister, and thus monasteries east and west of Mardin and the extensive ruins he could be counted on to reward his constituents. e day after of the twelfth-century Artukid capital at Hasankeyf, one of the election, the sentiment in Siirt was that, having done their the grandest landscapes in all of Turkey, perched overlooking duty, they expected payback. Said the owner of a local restaurant the Tigris River, and where some families still live in caves to Radikal on March , “First we want the road [fixed] and then pock-marking the canyon walls. we want jobs to combat unemployment in the region.” e non-Kurdish pleas for peace articulated anger with e basis for the southeastern economy is agriculture and the Turkish state and with the politicians in Ankara for the animal husbandry. In the calm of the past four years, the gover- past years of neglect, as well as the fear that if intervention in northern Iraq could not be averted, then establishing a stable, safe environ- ment for economic development would not be possible because intrusion of the Turkish army into Iraq would only serve to stir up the Kurdish problem and deter investment in the region. What Hero? Driving into the muddy town of Siirt in the pouring rain before the by-elections, swerving and thumping through the obstacle course of potholes that dot the semi-paved main thoroughfare, a sodden ��������� ��������� ������ ��� ����������� banner swished overhead. “Yiğit düstüğü ���������������� ���������������� yerden kalkar,” it read. “e hero will rise from where he has fallen.” e banner was � � � � � � � ���� � � � � � � ����� �� � � � � � � ���� � � � � � � � ���� � � � � � � � � � ���� ���� � � �� � � � � � � � signed by the local Chamber of Commerce
�������������������������������������������� ����� � � ���� � � � � � ���� � � � � � and Industry. Could this exhortation refer ������������������������������� to Erdoğan, whom the voters would soon ������������������������������ ���������������������������������� lift into office, the same Erdoğan who rose ���������������������������������� ������������������������������� up like a phoenix once the ban on his par- ������������������������������������ ��������������������������������� ticipation in political life was rescinded? A ������������� ������������������������������������������� vote for this “hero” could be an endorse- � �������������� ������������������������� ment of the AKP’s campaign pledges to �������������������������� improve the economy and to put into �������������������������� ������������������������������� practice democratic reforms. Or was the ��������������������������������� ������������������������������� Chamber applauding the resilience of the �������������������������������� ��������������������������������� downtrodden people of Siirt, in the face of �������������������������������� ������������������������������������� years of neglect by the central government? ������������������������������ ������������������������������������� Or could the Kurds of the area read the ��������������������� ����������������������������������� slogan as a call to action, a reminder that � ������������ � ��������������� their identity and claims upon the Turkish ������������������������������������� �������������������������������������� state cannot be suppressed? Perhaps unwit- tingly, the local merchants’ banner seemed � ������������������������� �������������� ��������������������������������� to allow the multiple sensibilities of the �������������������� ��� ���� ���� ������� ��� ����� �� ����� southeast to speak with a single voice. ■
44 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 45 REVIEW ESSAY
Baghdad Diaries, Then And Now Salah D. Hassan
Texts Reviewed
Rosemary O’Brien, ed. Gertrude Bell: e Arabian Diaries, - Paul Rich, ed. Arab War Lords and Iraqi Star Gazers: Gertrude (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, ). Bell’s e Arab of Mesopotamia (Lincoln, NE: Authors Choice Press, ). Nuha al-Radi, Baghdad Diaries (London: Saqi Books, ).
ince the Gulf war, a cottage industry publishing it. Thus they reached an impasse that neither was able little-known or out-of-print British writings about to resolve…. There would be consolation in the desert.” SIraq has developed. Two collections of writings by O’Brien herself is swept away by the romance of Bell’s Gertrude Bell, a long-time member of Britain’s Arab Bu- inexplicable wanderings among the Bedouin tribes. reau in Iraq, stand out, because they bring into focus the This epistolary version of the diary is based on Bell’s often uncritical contemporary fascination with the impe- revisions and elaborations of her more cryptic entries, in- rial cultural sensibility toward the modern Middle East. cluded in an appendix. Bell’s most revealing observations, An elegantly printed volume titled Gertrude Bell: The which concern the cultures and landscapes of the desert, Arabian Diaries, edited and introduced by Rosemary possess a pseudo-ethnographic quality that O’Brien has O’Brien, presents two versions of Bell’s travel diary from reinforced by illustrating the text with Bell’s photographs. November until May , when she journeyed south Here O’Brien presents Bell as the modern explorer of hos- from Damascus into parts of northern Arabia and then tile uncharted lands, an image she magnifies in her com- north to Baghdad and back to Damascus via Palmyra. The ments about Bell’s relations with women: first version, the “centerpiece” of the volume, consists of correspondence written to her lover Charles Doughty-Wy- Not surprisingly, given her contrary nature, she joined the lie, nephew of Charles Doughty, author of Arabia Deserta. anti-suffragette campaign in England. In Arabia, however, she In her introduction, O’Brien makes Bell’s relationship with lingered in the Bedouin harems, those special areas set aside for Doughty-Wylie as important as Bell’s representation of her females. Sensing a sympathetic ear, the women confided in her desert sojourn. She presents Bell as an intrepid woman the difficulties of their existence. ey lived constantly on the traveler, inspired in part by a masculine ideal of Edwardian move. ey ate meager diets of dates and milk (and occasionally courage and martial valor associated with Doughty-Wylie, starved during harsh winters). eir responsibilities included the who met his end at Gallipoli in . Consequently, the rugged tasks of setting up and striking the tents, filling the water edited volume privileges a narrative that expresses Bell’s skins, and preparing food. ey gathered camel dung for fires, attachment to a distant lover whose absence is replaced by and often bore the agonies of pain of mothers whose children die the mystical allure of the desert. “[Bell] wanted a commit- of disease and cold. ment,” O’Brien notes. “[Doughty-Wylie] could not give O’Brien uses Bell to portray Bedouin women as pa- Salah D. Hassan teaches English at Michigan State University. thetic victims of their conditions. If one looks elsewhere
46 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 47 in Bell’s diary, however, the Bedouin harem is depicted suggest that the conditions in Iraq have changed little in an altogether different manner. On March , , throughout the twentieth century? Bell wrote: Unlike The Arabian Diaries, this volume of Bell’s writing has little personal content. Written in as a Next day word from the Amir’s mother, Mudi, inviting me to manual for British soldiers serving in Iraq, Bell’s The Arab visit them for that evening. I went (riding solemnly through of Mesopotamia consists of a mixture of tribal histories, the silent moonlit streets of this strange place), and passed two political analysis and speculation on the future of British hours taken straight from the Arabian Nights with the women rule. In his introduction, Rich positions Bell at the center of the palace. I imagine that there are few places left wherein of imperial policy on Iraq to credit her with developing you can see the unadulterated East in its habit as it has lived a strategy that in part underwrote British rule in the for centuries and centuries—of those few Hayyil is one. There region from the end of World War I until the late s. they were, those women—wrapped in Indian brocades, hung Rich has no romantic illusions about her effectiveness as with jewels, served by slaves and there was not one single thing a policymaker: “the long-term consequences of her advice about them which betrayed the base existence of Europe and while serving as a confidant and adviser in Basra and Europeans—except me. I was the blot. Baghdad are more open to question than is her facility as a writer.” His interest in Bell stems, therefore, from These two stock Western images of Arab women—pa- her prolific production of texts—this particular piece thetic beasts of burden and languorous harem beauties— “provides a convenient focus for considering the attitude are reiterated first by Bell and then again by O’Brien. At of the unique cabal to which she belonged.” the general discursive level, these observations function Bell and the other Arabists who contributed to craft- to establish the absolute difference between Arabs and ing British Middle East policy share a confidence in Westerners. Britain’s ability to bring order to the chaos produced Although O’Brien stresses the romantic and ethno- by Arab hostility to Ottoman rule. The tyranny of the graphic character of the diary, she recognizes another Ottomans is set against the good works of the British. major thread concerning the political situation in the For example, she paraphrases a speech by Ibn Sa‘ud Arab zones under direct Ottoman authority and those in which he ostensibly “pointed out that whereas the areas on the Arab periphery of the fraying empire. After Ottoman Government had sought to dismember and arriving in Baghdad on March , , Bell wrote a long weaken the Arab nation, British policy aimed at uniting entry to Doughty-Wylie in which she claims: and strengthening their leaders, and the Chief Political Officer [Percy Cox] as he listened to words which will I’m quite right in my impression of Iraq—I hear it on every be repeated and discussed round every camp fire, must side. The country is entirely out of hand, the reins of govern- have looked back on years of patient work in the Gulf ment were all dropped during the war (nor held very firmly and seen that they were good.” before) the roads are not safe, trade unions decadent, the The idea of a unified, nominally independent Arab whole thing has gone to ruin. It is dreadful. And they all nation under the tutelage of the British was held in com- regret Nazim Pasha now, these people who hated him while mon by Bell and T. E. Lawrence. Nevertheless, the post- he was here. World War I partition of the Arab provinces exposed the British lies that were used to secure Arab support. From Despite the evident political content of the diary Bell’s perspective, securing an alliance with the Bedouin and Bell’s emerging role as a British imperial operative, was necessary to defeat the Ottoman military. Once vic- O’Brien directs the reader to other matters—Bell’s un- torious, she believed, Britain would successfully impose requited love and the representation of Bedouin women. colonial “administration” in Iraq through the ostensible This editorial approach presents the diary as strictly a reconstruction of the country: historical curiosity. In contrast, Paul Rich’s facsimile edition of The Arab Not least among the elements of persuasion are the construc- of Mesopotamia, published with the more exotic title tive works which have been undertaken, mainly for military Arab War Lords and Iraqi Star Gazers, directly addresses purposes, along both rivers. Railway, road and dike have proved the political relevance of Bell’s writings for the present. the word “government” has a new significance and already a At the end of his introduction, Rich suggests that “not- comparison is drawn between the constructive energy of the withstanding its apology for British intervention, Bell’s British and the devastation which marked Ottoman rule. “The handbook might well be distributed to policymakers of gradual progress of the railway,” says a recent report from a the present era and read profitably by them.” It is unclear district on the Euphrates, “is having a wonderfully calming how Bell’s description of Iraq in could be of use to effect.” Perhaps more than anything the advent of the line has US officials in the s. Surely Rich does not mean to quieted the tribes.
46 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 227 ■ SUMMER 2003 47 EDITOR’S PICKS
Adonis. An Introduction to Arab Poetics (London: Fleischmann, Ellen. The Nation and Its New of Powers: How Changes to US Law and Policy Saqi Books, 2003). Women: e Palestinian Women’s Movement, Since September 11 Erode Human Rights and Ali, Kamran Asdar. Planning the Family in Egypt: 1920-1948 (Berkeley, CA: University of Cali- Civil Liberties (New York, 2003). New Bodies, New Selves (Austin, TX: University fornia Press, 2003). Peirce, Leslie. Morality Tales: Law and of Texas Press, 2002). Fuller, Graham. e Future of Political Islam (New Gender in the Ottoman Court of Aintab American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Commit- York: Palgrave, 2003). (Berkeley, CA: University of California tee. Report on Hate Crimes and Discrimination George, Alan. Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom Press, 2003). Against Arab Americans: e Post-September 11 (London: Zed Books, 2003). Powell, Eve Troutt. A Different Shade of Colonial- Backlash (Washington, DC, 2003). Human Rights Watch. The Mass Graves of al- ism: Egypt, Great Britain and the Mastery of the Aruri, Naseer. Dishonest Broker: e US Role in Mahawil: The Truth Uncovered (New York, Sudan (Berkeley, CA: University of California Israel and Palestine (Cambridge, MA: South May 2003). Press, 2003). End Press, 2003). Jabar, Faleh A. e Shi‘ite Movement in Iraq (Lon- Roy, Arundhati. War Talk (Cambridge, MA: South B’Tselem. Land Grab: Israel’s Settlement Policy in don: Saqi Books, 2003). End Press, 2003). the West Bank (Jerusalem, May 2002). Kahf, Mohja. E-mails from Scheherazad (Gaines- Sifry, Micah and Christopher Cerf, eds. e Iraq Chomsky, Noam. Pirates and Emperors, Old ville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2003). War Reader (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003). and New: International Terrorism in the El-Kholy, Heba. Defiance and Compliance: Negoti- Real World (Cambridge, MA: South End ating Gender in Low-Income Cairo (New York: Sharkey, Heather. Living with Colonialism: Na- Press, 2003). Berghahn Books, 2003). tionalism and Culture in the Anglo-Egyptian Eisenstadt, Michael and Eric Mathewson, eds. Sudan (Berkeley, CA: University of California Kimmerling, Baruch. Politicide: Ariel Sharon’s Press, 2003). US Policy in Post-Saddam Iraq: Lessons from War Against the Palestinians (London: Verso, the British Experience (Washington, DC: 2003). Volpi, Frederic. Islam and Democracy: e Failure Washington Institute for Near East Policy, of Dialogue in Algeria (London: Pluto Press, 2003). Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. Imbalance 2003).
e analogies between past British US Middle East policy is a cynical relations of power that conditioned policies and present US policies are reiteration of the past. Anyone who the life of Iraqis in the s. She ex- hard to miss: first, to promise inde- reads carefully through the writings of plained to a CNN correspondent: pendence from a despotic ruler, but to Lawrence or Bell will be immediately deliver a military occupation, and then, struck by the similarities between the “ese particular sculptures are made of in the face of resistance, to rebuild ru- rhetoric of British imperialists during large coiled springs from lorries which I dimentary infrastructure whose pri- World War I and the language used to have painted to look like snakes; inside mary function is aimed at facilitating justify the US-British invasion of Iraq these coiled springs are a few stones the military occupation. in . Even if the historical analo- painted to look like animals. ese snakes Unlike defenders of the US pres- gies are not entirely convincing, the symbolize the dictatorship.” I told her ence in Iraq, who never question the rediscovery of Bell’s writings during the they swallow the people whole, not just righteousness of US might, Bell has sanctions decade highlights the ugly our dictatorship but all of them, yours certain anxieties about British colonial legacies of modern imperialism. included. “In fact,” I added, “yours is the rule. She even momentarily pursued a Nuha al-Radi’s Baghdad Diaries is biggest of all because it has swallowed up logic that might explain Arab oppo- perhaps the only contemporary Iraqi the whole world.” sition to the British presence: “True counterpoint to these writings. Al- the Turks were bad masters, but who Radi is an artist educated in Britain Al-Radi’s critique in sculpture sug- shall say that the English will in the who returned to Baghdad to pursue gests that the greater a government’s end be better?” This instant of doubt her career. Her vivid personal account power, the greater its potential to passed quickly, however. “Baghdad depicts life in Baghdad during Des- perpetrate injustice. In addition to lies in our hands as a trust and an ert Storm and under the sanctions studying Bell’s representation of Iraq opportunity, to grow, if we will, into regime of the s. The book is di- in the early twentieth century, US war a splendid example of modern Arab vided into three parts roughly corre- planners and their apologists would civilization,” she continued. Not un- sponding with the Gulf war, the have done well to read the artist’s like Bush administration rhetoric UN sanctions and finally her exile in portrait of the life-reducing impact of about transforming the Arab world, Jordan and Lebanon. Al-Radi stresses war and its aftermath on contemporary Bell articulates a civilizing mission the quotidian necessities that come to residents of Baghdad. If Bell’s writings molded to fit securely within the re- constitute her life as it is constrained provide an image of imperialism in the pressive embrace of the empire. by the suffocating effects of US-led past, al-Radi’s diary is a powerful state- e rescue of Gertrude Bell from war, sanctions and bombing. Her art, ment about the contemporary form underneath T. E. Lawrence’s shadow sculpture built from destroyed mili- of empire that began to take shape in the s makes one wonder if tary hardware, evokes the complex in the wake of Desert Storm. ■
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