The Decline of Zulu Nationalism As a Defining Feature of Ifp Policy 1994
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THE DECLINE OF ZULU NATIONALISM AS A DEFINING FEATURE OF IFP POLICY 1994-1997 Kerri-Ann Hampton Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for a Masters Degree in the Department of Political Studies Faculty ofArts, University ofNatal, Pietermaritzburg. August 1998 Abstract This thesis provides an analysis ofchanges apparent in the ideology and style ofthe Inkatha Freedom Party'si politics since April 1994. The IFP's first three years in power under the new dispensation, as a member ofthe Government ofNational Unity and the majority party in KwaZulu-Natal, have witnessed a significant shift away from the militant Zulu nationalism and confrontational tactics that characterised the party from the mid-1980s. Zulu nationalism has been abandoned in favour ofa broader appeal, while the brinkmanship employed during negotiations in the early 1990s, the walkouts and threats of violent resistance, have been largely absent in the post-election period. Confrontation since 1994, and especially since 1996, has gradually given way to more accommodatory and cooperative relations with the political opposition, on both the national and provincial levels ofgovernment. To understand why this shift has occurred, it is necessary to examine the nature of Zulu nationalism as espoused by Inkatha. It is my assertion that Inkatha employed Zulu nationalism in an attempt to preserve its institutionalised power base in the KwaZulu-Natal region and exercise a voice on the national level. Nationalist rhetoric became increasingly prevalent as violence escalated in the late 1980s, and peaked in the uncertainty of the political transition as the IFP faced marginalisation on South Africa's emerging political stage. Zulu nationalism acted as the rallying call for party faithful to resist the challenge of the United Democratic Front!African National Congress in the 1980s, and provided justification for Inkatha's confrontational approach and demands for Zulu self-determination in the early 1990s. Indeed, Inkatha's brand of Zulu nationalism has always been about 1 advancing the party interest, rather than defending the integrity of the divided and warring ,J Zulu people. It is in this light that the post-1994 shift in ideological emphasis must be understood. The April 1994 general election ushered in a new era in South African politics, in which the IFP found its role radically altered. From playing the part of spoiler on the outskirts of formal political structures it now had to adjust to its status as the majority party in the provincial legislature, with Buthelezi in a prominent role in the national cabinet. Under these conditions, the party's interests were advanced by the establishment ofa smootWy run provincial administration, under which its regional power could be consolidated. Thus, the new political order created a space for the IFP within the democratic system in which its credibility rested on its ability to govern the province effectively. Further, under these conditions, confrontation was not only less attractive as a means of achieving party objectives, it was also less effective and feasible. This the IFP learnt the hard way, in terms of its disastrous constitution-making experience. Its boycott of negotiations at the national level merely served to deprive the IFP of a role in drawing up the country's final constitution, while a belligerent approach at the provincial level prevented the realisation of a compromise agreement. The IFP was forced to accept that its majority in the provincial legislature was insufficient to allow it to rule unilaterally in the province. The loss of ther King's political allegiance, coupled with election results which revealed strong support for the ANC among urban Zulus while the IFP's support was largely confined to traditionalist rural communities, undermined the party's claims to represent the Zulu nation. Furthermore, the gradual return oflaw and order in the province diminished the IFP's capacity to resort to militarism, thus taking some ofthe bite out ofa confrontational strategy. In brief, the IFP was both pulled and pushed into the new order, and hence to some extent, a new ideology and political style. By 1996 the Zulu nationalism and belligerence that had characterised the party since the mid-1980s had been replaced with a liberal-conservative platform that sought resonance with the urban electorate, coupled with efforts to improve cooperative relations with the political opposition in the interests ofprovincial stability. i The Inkatha Yenkululeku Yesizwe cultural movement, established by ChiefButhelezi in 1975, changed its name to the Inkatha Freedom Party shortly after the unbanning ofblack opposition political parties in 1990. ij MAP OF KWAZULU-NATAL This map is an edited version ofthe map that appears on the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Government's 'Tourism and Gambling' website (www.kzn-deat.gov.zalmap.htm) (Colours indicate wildlife/ conservation areas) Introduction In early 1994, as South Africans approached the realisation of the country's democratic transition with both expectation and trepidation, concepts such as ethnicity, nationalism and nation building received much prominence in academic and political debate. The atmosphere of uncertainty created by the transition saw the appeal of popular micro nationalisms intensify, particularly where these were linked to ethnic identities available for mobilisation by political elites. In the context of tension and violent politics thus created, the transformation of South Africa's diverse factions into 'a collective democratic entity of citizens who freely co-exist as a reconciled, developing and growing community whatever their cultural backgrounds,' was the subject of much speculation.! In specific terms one might have asked, can the militant Zulu nationalism of the IFP's transitional politics be accommodated in a multicultural democracy, allowing for gradual erosion of ethnic exclusivism, and ultimately the transcendence of Zulu identity by a broader South African national identity? Commentators on the South African political scene were divided in their prognosis. ~ Lawrence Schlemmer argued that, while ethnic identities existed among the African majority and had social and political consequences, one nonetheless found that Africans across the board tended to 'feel more or less united in protest against the common factors oftheir exclusion from parliament.' This shared sense of alienation gave rise to a sense of 'inter-ethnic political unity at the grass roots level. ,2 The HSRC similarly admitted that 'the question as to whether the plural community of South Africa is mainly an ethnic pluralism, must be answered in the negative.' Ethnic identities are not simply given, nor are they necessarily the primary basis of group affiliation.3 Indeed, many adherents of liberation ideology dismissed the notion of a strongly defined ethnic identity as a construct of apartheid formulated to create arbitrary divisions among a commonly oppressed black population, divisions that the black majority would shake / offin its triumph against authoritarianism.4 On the other hand, Kieran O'Malley argued that the dominant political trend toward 'anti-ethnic, majoritarian populism' instilled in ethnic minorities the fear of 'political and economic marginalisation and emasculation,' and thus acted as a major contributor to the country's violence and 'brewing civil war. ,5 Giliomee was equally dubious, predicting that 'ethnicity as a political factor looks set to surprise all those who view it J as a pre-modern phenomenon or as a form of social engineering aimed at perpetuating white rule.,6 Inkatha's Gavin Woods insisted that 'the global lesson could not be any clearer concerning the will and ability of group interests such as ethnicity and nationalism to resist integration and domination. Nation-building efforts that attempt to impose fundamental changes on the character of a population will invariably fail.,7 Similarly, Arend Lijhart argued that 'ethnicity and ethnic divisions are facts of life in South Africa...that cannot be wished away.,8 Clearly, there were those who saw little future for nation building projects in a South Africa cleaved by ethnic divisions. The turbulence of South Africa's transition in the early 1990's looked likely to prove such misgivings well founded. As the April 1994 general election approached, the militant nationalist rhetoric of the ethnically defined Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) became increasingly intense. The brinkmanship9 and confrontational tactics employed by the IFP during negotiations threatened to plunge the country into civil war. Until just days before polling opened, the IFP stubbornly refused to participate, on the grounds that pre-election negotiations had failed to accord due import to the sovereignty and specific interests of the Zulu nation. In an ultimatum echoing the nationalist sentiment that was tearing countries such as Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union apart, the IFP demanded self-determination for the Zulu nation, threatening provincial secession rather than allow the sovereign Zulu nation to be ruled by an African National Congress (ANC) government. lO Amidst escalating political violence, fears of civil war and even the breakup of the state seemed justified, conjuring images of tribal warfare and internecine ethnic conflict in the minds of many white South Africans. Indeed, in the uncertainty of the transition, 'the stockpiling of tinned food by thousands of timid citizens, illustrated the fears that there could