Colombia and Its Neighbours: Early Warning Analysis
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
writenet is a network of researchers and writers on human rights, forced migration, ethnic and political conflict WRITENET writenet is the resource base of practical management (uk) independent analysis e-mail: [email protected] COLOMBIA AND ITS NEIGHBOURS: EARLY WARNING ANALYSIS A Writenet Report by Natalia Springer commissioned by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Emergency and Security Services September 2004 Caveat: Writenet papers are prepared mainly on the basis of publicly available information, analysis and comment. The papers are not, and do not purport to be, either exhaustive with regard to conditions in the country surveyed, or conclusive as to the merits of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. The views expressed in the paper are those of the author and are not necessarily those of Writenet or Practical Management. TABLE OF CONTENTS Acronyms.............................................................................................i Executive Summary............................................................................ii 1 Historical and Political Background ............................................1 2 Review of the Political and Security Situation .............................2 2.1 Political Situation.........................................................................................2 2.2 Human Rights Situation..............................................................................5 3 Review of Early Warning Indicators and Factors........................8 3.1 Socio-economic Conditions - IDP Livelihoods..........................................8 3.2 Strength and Weakness of the State in Colombia and Its Neighbours ...9 3.3 Public Discourse, Ideological Stances ......................................................10 3.4 Effects of Guerrilla and Counter-guerrilla Activity ...............................11 3.5 Influence of External Players ....................................................................11 3.6 Possible Ameliorating Factors ..................................................................15 3.7 Likelihood of Further Displacement ........................................................16 3.8 Groups at Risk............................................................................................17 4 Conclusions ................................................................................18 4.1 Most Likely Scenarios and Possible Indicators for Development .........18 4.2 Likely Consequences for the Security Situation.....................................19 5 Bibliography...............................................................................20 Acronyms AUC Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia - United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia ELN Ejército de Liberación Nacional – National Liberation Army EU European Union FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia IDP Internally Displaced Person OAS Organization of American States SIVAM Sistema de Vigilância da Amazônia – System for Vigilance in the Amazonas UN United Nations US(A) United States (of America) USAID United States Agency for International Development VAT Value Added Tax i Executive Summary For more than 40 years, Colombia has been ravaged by internal war, making it the country in the Western hemisphere where human rights and international humanitarian law are most gravely and persistently violated. The State is confronted with three major irregular armed actors, which came into existence in response to State absence and failure: the FARC and the ELN insurgents and the right-wing AUC coalition of paramilitary factions These groups have grown dramatically over the last decade and their increasingly barbarous actions have generated more than 2 million internally displaced people, as well as more than 130,000 Colombian refugees in neighbouring countries. The State has successively lost control over large parts of the rural areas which are effectively under the sway of the illegal armies. Several efforts at peace negotiations were unsuccessful and the current government of Alvaro Uribe has initiated an offensive policy to attack the insurgents and negotiate the demobilization of the paramilitaries. Although several key indicators of political violence fell sharply last year, the policy has been criticized both as authoritarian and as short-sighted, because it neglects socio-economic root factors of the violence. Some have also doubted its effectiveness, arguing that the guerrilla has not been substantially weakened so far. Continuous low intensity warfare has brought suffering and hardship for many social groups. Civilians fall victim to mines, forced displacement, indiscriminate attacks, hostage taking and acts of terrorism perpetuated by the armed groups. Especially vulnerable are women, children and ethnic minorities. The vast majority of IDPs are women and children, and most are left with little, if any outside support. They are also frequently employed as combatants by the irregular armed actors. It is estimated that 25 per cent of illegal fighters are below eighteen years of age. Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities suffer disproportionately from the armed conflict, leading to the conclusion that illegal armed actors are conducting a systematic campaign of extermination against Colombian minorities, which is largely ignored by the government but which may lead to the irreversible destruction of these cultures. In the most likely scenario for Colombia’s future development, the dramatic social and humanitarian situation will remain unchanged. State funding for national security will continue to have priority over humanitarian concerns, because the former is seen as crucial for President Uribe’s re-election prospects. The government’s security policy will continue to put pressure on the guerrillas, but also generate a growing number of human rights violations perpetrated by State agents. The FARC may start a new military campaign in the near future, which could include some urban terrorist acts, but will mostly concentrate on consolidating its rural territories and recuperate terrain lost to the AUC. The majority of AUC blocs will negotiate demobilization agreements favourable to their interests which consolidate the warlords’ political and economic power in the regions. Other paramilitary factions will become increasingly indistinguishable from common criminals. Colombia’s neighbours, while increasingly affected, will not be capable of mounting a concerted strategy to respond to the crisis, leaving the field once again to the United States. The future of US policy will hinge on the outcome of the presidential elections in November. The security situation is bound to remain volatile, with the added risk that armed robberies, kidnappings and contract killings may increase dramatically as ex-combatants are transformed into common criminals. Massive displacement will inevitably continue, although possibly at somewhat lower levels. ii 1 Historical and Political Background For more than 40 years, Colombia has been ravaged by internal war. Historically weak, the State has lacked national integration and complete jurisdiction over its territory. A high degree of regional autonomy led to a political system where rivalling elites had to find mutual accommodation, as none was sufficiently strong to decisively defeat the other. Frequent periods of prolonged violence, among them the “War of 1,000 Days” (1899-1902), the era of “La Violencia” (1948-1965) and the current armed insurgency, can be seen as ultimately fruitless efforts to establish a unified national polity by force. In the early 1980s, the guerrilla conflict grew substantially more complex and violent with the appearance of drug trafficking cartels and counter-insurgent paramilitary groups, which started using terror tactics against the civilian population. The guerrilla conflict initially had an ideological basis and was directed against social exclusion and economic inequality, but today these political motivations appear discredited by the insurgents’ heavy involvement in various criminal activities, among them drug trafficking, arms smuggling, abduction for ransom and large- scale extortion. In spite of the armed conflict, the country has experienced long periods of economic growth and political stability. This Colombian “paradox” finally collapsed under the strain of economic crisis, the increasing importance of the drug trade and the territorial fragmentation of the conflict. In the 1990s, the government faced mounting difficulties in containing the guerrilla and lost control of large portions of the rural areas. Several administrations tried to solve the conflict by negotiation, but were only able to conclude peace agreements with some minor insurgent groups. The most serious such effort lead to the adoption of a new constitution in 1991, but the two largest guerrillas, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC – Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN – National Liberation Army), stayed outside of the process. Civil society organized massive marches and demonstrations against the ongoing violence and in favour of peace in the cities, but the failed peace processes left the humanitarian crisis even worse. During the period of negotiations, irregular armed groups had grown in size, economic resources, territorial presence and military capacity. Drug money infiltrated in ever larger quantities into the operations of these