WHY IS THE CANADIAN NAVAL TASK GROUP COMMANDER STILL AT SEA?
by Commander Rick Gerbrecht
Commander Rick Gerbrecht is a graduate of the Royal Military College. In 1993, he served as the Opera- tions Officer in HMCS ALGONQUIN during its participation in SHARP GUARD as the flagship to Com- mander, Standing Naval Force Atlantic (SNFL). From 1994 to 1997, as the Officer-in-Charge of the IROQUOIS-class Command and Control Systems trainer, he was responsible for training flagship com- mand teams. After serving a year as Task Group Combat Officer (Atlantic), he was appointed, in 1998, to pre-pare operations for SNFL flagship year (1999 to 2000). During that year, the NATO Force participated in ALLIED FORCE. Many of the paper’s observations concerning Canadian Task Force Group Operations are based on first-hand experience as well as gleaned through Commander Gerbrecht’s professional asso- ciations.
INTRODUCTION ada underscores the trend by navies to ac- quire a capability to influence events over A majority of Commanding Officers land. who served in NATO’s Immediate Reaction Force — Standing Naval Force Atlantic Notwithstanding the goal of the future (SNFL) — during the final days of 1999, be- fleet structure, recent Canadian naval littoral lieved that opposing navies would no longer experience has demonstrated that strict Rules confront each other in the classical Cold War of Engagement (ROE) and personal ac- open ocean scenario.1 In a world of im- count-ability for Commanders in the con- mense change, it is premature to conclude trolled ap-plication of military force are be- whether this two-year-old prediction for the coming more dependent on a continuous and future of naval strategy will stand the test of rapid exchange of information.5 In the CF time. Nonetheless, ‘blue water’ navies are document Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy turning their interests away from the high for 2020, it is ac-cepted as a reality that seas and are proceeding with initiatives to emerging technologies and evolving con- generate or enhance ‘brown water’ capabili- cepts of command and con-trol will allow ties. Germa-ny, the Netherlands and Austra- the unique capabilities of the navy to join lia have re-cently undertaken shipbuilding more effectively with the army and air projects to ac-quire either an expeditionary force.6 As Maritime Command7 is moving or an over-the-beach capability to support to broaden its sea-to-land capabilities, it is both internation-al and domestic operations fitting to examine if current command and ashore.2 Canada too is proceeding with control relationships are still relevant for plans to build a small fleet of Afloat Logis- future operations. The complexities of sup- tic Support Capability (ALSC) vessels by porting operations over land are dictating to the year 2005.3 These ships are envisioned naval commanders to adopt a closer-than- to possess a combined strategic sealift and ever working relationship with agencies an administrative over-the-beach capability ashore, regardless of ship design or capabili- in support of land oper-ations as defined in ty. Indeed, the advances in information tech- the vessel’s statement of capabilities.4 The nology and lessons learned from recent coali- shipbuilding strategy being adopted by Can- tion operations raise the question: How and
13 from where should command and control of the CTG to coordinate, by day or night, the Canadian warships be exercised? This pa- effort of the assets assigned under his tacti- per will address this question and will illus- cal control. In essence the commander man- trate, with examples from recent interna- aged risk within the task group. Given that tional and domestic operations, that the ship-to-shore communications were achieved commander of the task group (CTG) must via radio and therefore were subject to work face to face with his military and civil- ground-wave attenuation, it was a techno- ian counterparts. logical limitation that required a senior offi- cer to be at sea to make decisions, direct fu- Internationally, the small size of the ture action and, above all, manage risk in the three Canadian services results in relatively absence of direction from shore-based au- few situations where they all operate together thority. During this period the CTG carried and, consequently, the emphasis will be on out a clearly defined national responsibility 8 interoperability with US forces. Given the in a clearly identifiable national task advances in information technology and the group.11 With the end of the Cold War in need to remain interoperable with a joint-ca- 1989, there existed little reason to assess pable USN, the Canadian task group com- whether organ-izational change in command mander can no longer carry out his responsi- and control of the task group was necessary bilities without an impact on other stakehold- without first testing the waters of any future ers. This claim is also true in view of the po- operation. It would be a short wait, how- tential for the navy to carry out wider-ranging ever, before change indeed occurred. domestic operations. The very nature of naval operations in the 21st century will dic- In August of 1990, Canada dispatched tate that the commander of a Canadian Task a three-ship task group (maritime contribu- Group must direct activities from a shore- tion referred to as Op FRICTION) to join based rather than from a sea-based headquar- other forces in the Persian Gulf to counter ters. Iraqi aggression. This event would mark the first large post-Cold War military effort and THE EVOLUTION OF THE CTG introduced the new challenges to coordinat- ing a large coalition naval force.12 Aside from Historically, the CTG has deployed participation in an operation with non-tradi- to sea supported by a small staff embarked tional naval allies (eg, Argentina and India), 9 in a designated flagship. During the Cold the Persian Gulf War demonstrated the War the real-world task of Maritime Com- emerg-ing future of naval operations — that mand was that of Anti-Submarine Warfare of joint and combined operations. By the 10 (ASW). Given the technology of the day, time Canadian ships began their first patrols this operation normally required ships to in the Gulf, it had been decided by the Ca- work within line of sight of each other in or- nadian Government to complement them der to provide mutual support in case of a with a squadron of CF-18 Hornet fighters, submarine-launched torpedo attack. The which ar-rived in early October to fly pro- ability to manoeuvre in company with other tective Com-bat Air Patrols over water with ships, organic helicopters and land-based a US Marine air wing. fixed-wing aircraft was the operational stan- dard of the Atlantic and Pacific task groups To coordinate the efforts of both the as they prepared to conduct close ASW on naval and air groups, a Joint Forces Head- the open ocean. It was the responsibility of quarters was hastily conceived, where neith-
14 er the establishment nor the doctrine to sup- ing enhanced self-defence measures and the port this type of coordinated warfare was in capability to conduct extended surface-to-air place.13 The CTG in theatre was appointed and surface-to-surface engagements.16 The the Joint Force Commander. His initial as- navy advanced its weapon lethality from sessment was to set up the joint headquarters line-of-sight to one whereby a radar contact, on board the replenishment ship — HMCS identified as a law-ful target, could be en- PROTECTEUR — and remain pierside in gaged over the horizon. The application of Manamah, Bahrain. To a seagoing officer military force became measured and quanti- this proposal made sense, as it modeled the fied as a result of ever-evolving ROE and larger American command relationship be- once again called for an experienced value tween United States Central Command locat- judgement to be made in order to approve 17 ed in Riyadh and Naval Component Central the release of weapons. The intent of a Command located on board the command ‘belligerent’ had to be qualified as either ship USS BLUE RIDGE. The intent of the one which was trying to pro-voke a response CTG to remain on board PROTECTEUR, or one which was indeed the beginning at- however, was overturned by higher author- tack. ity at National Defence Headquarters Although the fidelity of ship-to- (NDHQ).14 The Chiefs of the maritime and shore communications improved signifi- air staffs both believed that it was appropri- cantly with satellite technology, the man- ate for the oper-ational decision-makers of agement of risk was again carried out by the the naval and air elements to be collocated CTG who was at sea with his force. By be- and accessible to other coalition headquar- ing at sea, the CTG also knew the strengths ters and decision-making chains. This ap- of each of his ships, and the ships knew their proach was indeed progressive for its time Commander’s phi-losophy and expecta- but it made sense giv-en the joint makeup of 18 tions. Being at sea provided the CTG visi- Canada’s contribution. bility over his force and ‘made sense’ in The requirement to form a joint head- order to control the application of force and quarters was also necessary since, for the first manage risk. time in recent memory, elements of the CF Unlike the USN, the Canadian navy would be working outside a NATO hierar- does not possess the requirement to maintain chy. The Canadian Government would need a task group ‘on station’. In fact, Maritime to authorize the military to proceed with tasks Command maintains one task group at 10–30 and operations that supported foreign policy. days’ notice to deploy, with a second task Headquarters Canadian Forces Middle East group to be available within 30–90 days’ no- was therefore set up in Bahrain in early No- tice to deploy.19 Historically, Canadian task vember. The CTG was located ashore to sup- groups have been assembled in response to port joint operations and remained ashore for preplanned requirements to fulfill either a na- the remainder of the Persian Gulf campaign.15 tional or NATO training commitment. As a With the end of the Gulf War, the result of this reality, a Canadian task group na-vy turned its energy towards the process has not, since FRICTION, demonstrated its of modernizing the fleet with the introduc- capability in a real-world event. It is interest- tion of the HALIFAX and IROQUOIS ing to note that during the last decade a CTG classes of ship. By 1993, the Canadian task has directed a majority of ship actions from group com-position included ships possess- ashore rather than from at sea. These opera-
15 tions include: litical direction and foreign policy, has never been more important. This claim is y Ocean Surveillance (the 1996 Turbo particularly true in view of the advances in War — single-ship operation on a technol-ogy and implications of joint opera- ro-tational basis); tions.
y Persistence (the 1998 crash of Swiss- THE CTG: EVOLVING TECHNOLO- air Flight 111 in national waters off GY AND JOINTNESS Nova Scotia — initially a two-ship operation which was later extended to The USN is proceeding with initia- 21 a single-ship operation on a rotation- tives to reduce the ‘fog of war’ , including al basis); the highly publicized yet widely misunder- stood concept of ‘network-centric’ war- y Semaphore (the 1999 intercept oper- fare.22 Network-centric warfare is the con- ation of four vessels carrying illegal cept of linking various platforms into a con- migrants entering national waters off nected information grid. This grid permits British Columbia — single-ship op- the rapid exchange of information between eration on a rotational basis); participants, be they operating in a ship, a vehicle, an aircraft or a remote sensor. In y Deliverance (single replenishment essence, network-centric warfare is the ship in support of land operations off mechanism for commanders to make deci- the coast of Somalia); sions and act more quickly against any po- y Megaphone (the 2000 seizure of GTS tential adversary. This project is not ear- KATIE carrying CF equipment and marked for a futuristic navy, but rather is a personnel in international waters — reality of today. single-ship operation); The basic concept of network-centric y Augmentation (the six-year opera- warfare has already been demonstrated on tion to integrate a HALIFAX-class board Canadian warships, during a recent ship into a USN Carrier Battle Group SNFL flagship deployment, with the ability 23 operating in the Northern Arabian to exchange electronic mail. A Coalition Gulf in support of the enforcement of Wide Area Network (CWAN) is also in place the US embargo against the state of in the Pacific Maritime Operations Centre rd Iraq — single-ship operation on a ro- (MOC) Esquimalt, as a result of the US 3 tation-al basis); and Fleet’s initiative to proceed with network- centric warfare during RIMPAC 2000.24 Al- 20 y Standing Naval Force Atlantic. though statistics are not available to validate the Canadian experience, the following USN As illustrated above, the recent expe- account represents a case in point and the po- rience of the CTG has rested in his ability to tential of network-centric warfare. In early direct individually displaced ships. Unlike 1997, a single aircraft carrier in the western standing NATO commitments during the Pacific sent over 54,000 electronic mail mes- Cold War, planning of naval operations can sages in a one-month period. This elec- now be done only under the most general of tronic traffic represented about half of the concepts until the actual employment of a total message traffic historically sent in the ship or ships is known. The management of Western Pacific theatre during the same risk, however, taking into consideration po-
16 time.25 What was discernible in the Cana- tion between sea, air and land forces in a dian experience was that such a capability shared battlespace. This engagement grid enabled the speed of command decision- will enable widely dispersed platforms and making to increase — questions concerning units to ‘see’ and react to events beyond operations decreased because ambiguity their own sensors’ horizon.29 In fact, Admi- decreased, staff synergy increased, and deci- ral James Ellis Jr, USN, believes that opera- sion timelines shortened significantly.26 tions in the littorals will require naval forces Although this capability may support keep- to be widely dispersed yet operate as a cohe- ing the CTG at sea, this is only half the story sive, integrated whole capable of coordinat- 30 of network-centric warfare. Importantly, ing actions to fulfil a variety of missions. there are two products of network-centric Network-centric warfare will assume increas- warfare that will force the CTG to operate ing importance since most of the information ashore together with land and air counter- and direction required to execute a mission parts — theatre ballistic missile defence, and will be found outside the integral sensor ca- cooperative engagement capabili-ty. pacity of a single task group or unit. Al- though this technical objective remains theo- In a network-centric warfare envi- retical at present, its operating potential sup- ron-ment, individual units will contribute ports the requirement for the CTG to be lo- capabil-ities to one of three grids: informa- cated where the operational decision-making tion, sensor or engagement. The capability process re-sides. of the in-dividual platform will dictate the number of grids in which a particular unit Prior to the advancement towards net- may partici-pate. In a naval context, theatre work-centric warfare and cooperative en- ballistic missile defence will become the gage-ment capability, the CTG’s assessment combined missile firing power of a force of risk has been limited in the scope of tech- and will afford protection from attack as nology available and due to the fact that well as provide se-curity to the host nation ships could and did operate in isolation. without placing weapons on its soil.27 This Lives nonetheless depended on the ability of USN defence system is expected to be in the CTG to recognize the indicators of a place and operate with or without coalition threat and coor-dinate a collective reaction participation. Commander Colin Plows, within the force. During the Cold War, the spokesman for the Chief of Ma-ritime Staff predictability of the Soviet maritime se- in Ottawa, announced on 23 March 2000 quence of attack provided a form of indica- tion and warning to prepare the defensive that Maritime Command is considering 31 equipping its warships with a theatre ballis- posture of a task group. The nature of tic missile defence capability.28 A theatre military operations in the littorals, where missile defence system would provide Cana- ships work in proximity of land, now ex- dian warships with a capability to conduct poses ships to a variety of potential weap-on engagements over both water and land. This threats and shorter warning times not nor- announcement clearly indicates the na-vy’s mally encountered on the high seas. In addi- serious intention to become more capable in tion to the changing threat, the complexities supporting operations ashore. of national ROE, joint targeting lists and con- To complement theatre ballistic mis- cepts of collateral damage and Effects War- sile defence, cooperative engagement capa- fare all serve as examples of how interdepen- dent a battlespace has become. The depend- bility will become the protocol that will in- 32 stantly share detection and targeting informa- ency on the air tasking order during
17 ALLIED FORCE further supports this state- greatly improved if the USN naval force ment. commander, Vice Admiral Mauz, had lo- cated his headquarters in Riyadh instead of Shortly after the start of the air cam- remaining afloat on the command ship in paign over Kosovo, the air tasking order, re- BLUE RIDGE.36 Although Admiral Mauz ceived on classified electronic mail, was had positioned liaison staff ashore, the ‘fog withdrawn from Allied distribution in reac- of war’ was intensified because the top na- tion to US national concerns about the securi- val commander was not integrated into the 33 ty of the information. The loss of this doc- joint ‘brain trust’.37 Pokrant was able to ument forced non-US warships to operate in confirm an incident in which the US ROE theatre without prior knowledge of daily Al- permitting the attack on Iraqi oil tankers was lied air activity. The consequence of this lost rescinded after General Schwarzkopf con- information was that force reactions to air ac- cluded a meet-ing with the US Chairman of tivity became dependent on the interpretation the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense of a US on-site commander rather than the in Riyadh. The naval liaison commander in designated force air warfare commander. Riyadh was nei-ther invited to the meeting The NATO CTG lost accountability for the nor made aware of the decision taken that ability to anticipate and order TG self- directly affected the navy. The directive not 34 defence measures. In reality, the ability of to engage Iraqi tank-ers was issued by mes- the CTG to manage a critical component of sage to the at-sea com-mander, but this or- overall risk was taken away. The loss of der was received after the navy had engaged the air tasking order demonstrated with clar- the Iraqi tanker AMURI-YAH.38 As demon- ity that, within the realm of an information strated in this incident, the ‘fog of war’ oc- dominance oper-ation, the ability to manage curred since the naval com-mander was not risk could reside outside of a task group’s located where critical opera-tional–strategic command authority. In the network-centric decisions were made. The incident also warfare environment, commanders in the illustrated that the subordinate ashore was same battlespace need to be sensitive to the considered as an additional level of bureauc- possibility that an action by one may bring racy rather than as a peer decision-maker.39 unforeseen consequences to another. This The AMURIYAH incident and the decision potential for risk, superimposed on the NATO by the commander of US naval forces not to warships, could have been mit-igated had the relocate to the joint headquarters in Riyadh, CTG been ashore to personally dispel US became the two critical reasons why General concern. This lesson calling for greater per- Schwarzkopf did not per-mit the USN to sonal command influence ashore is not iso- conduct a number of tasks it was trained for lated and has been observed previously. and capable of performing.40
In his book Desert Storm at Sea — In order to provide a meaningful con- What the Navy Really Did, Marvin Pokrant tribution to joint operations while at the same and a group of retired US senior naval offi- time managing risk, the commander of Cana- cers suggest that the USN’s lack of influ- dian naval forces must go ashore and work ence on the US Commander-in-Chief staff in face to face with his counterparts. As dem- gen-eral, and on its commander (General onstrated during DESERT STORM and AL- Schwarz-kopf) in particular, created unnec- LIED FORCE, this requirement will remain 35 essary but serious rifts in trust. Pokrant critical as the full potential of network-cen- argues that this situation would have been tric warfare is realized. The need for rapid
18 consultation will also be critical to satisfy a 45 frigate is about 100 personnel and the goal time-accelerated command decision process. of the future USN guided missile cruiser is a The challenge in an information-dominated crew of 95 sailors.44 operation clearly calls for all commanders to Canadian plans are under way to de- be collocated. The need for the CTG to car- sign a replacement ship for the ageing IRO- ry out face-to-face negotiations to satisfy the QUOIS-class command and control and area challenges of day-to-day operations can also 45 be demonstrated. air defence ship. In a network-centric war- fare environment the requirement for an en- THE CTG’S WORLD hanced sensor and missile delivery platform is validated, while the need for a command At present, a seagoing staff number- and control flagship in a geographically dis- ing up to 20 officers and non-commissioned persed information or engagement force is members supports the CTG in the planning 41 not. Regardless of the final solution, the de- and execution of tasks. A major shortfall of mands to provide the Canadian CTG with a all classes of Canadian warships is the ad hoc fully capable staff to meet the full spectrum arrangement for staff accommodation and of littoral operations could compromise the workspace. This inadequate arrangement design of the warship and undermine the de- was improved upon for the two destroyers cision to optimize crew size to support oper- that served in 1999–2000 as flagships to ations at sea. The true requirement for the Commander Standing Naval Force Atlan- CTG to be interfaced with the players ashore tic;42 however, the emergence of Operations in a littoral combat environment has been il- Other Than War is demanding an expansion lustrated. There is also a similar requirement of staff composition. These additional de- for the CTG to remain ashore in support of mands for staff equate to additional demands domestic operations. for shipboard accommodations. Recent operations involving planning On 2 September 1998, SWISSAIR of support to amphibious landings, non-com- Flight 111 crashed in the littoral waters near batant extraction, naval control of shipping, Peggy’s Cove, Nova Scotia. The emergency mine clearance operations and submarine sup- response organization that was activated in- port (all facets of naval operations critical in cluded two warships (operating nearby on in- the littorals) have demonstrated that the pre- dependent exercise) and other small water- sent Canadian flagship accommodation fit is craft. Regrettably, the violent nature of the 43 crash resulted in the entire loss of life on severely lacking. In fact, this expanding 46 staff list does not take into account the recent board the airliner. It became apparent dur- experiences of the CTG of requiring a collec- ing the initial hours of the crisis that the tion of legal, environmental, medical, techni- Search and Rescue effort would change to cal, civilian–military liaison, Non-Govern- one of salvage and evidence gathering. This ment Organization liaison and Public Rela- aviation disaster would nonetheless serve as tions staff members to assist in the overall a significant awakening for combined domes- operational effort. At a time when TG staff tic operations. In the days that followed, the requirements are increasing significantly to CF mounted PERSISTENCE, an operation that would support the coordination of sever- meet the challenges of expanding littoral op- 47 erations, many navies are moving to reduce al cross-border agencies. The knowledge, crewing and therefore accommodation of training and available workforce of the CF ships. The RN objective for their new Type permitted Transport Canada to emerge quick-
19 ly as the lead government agency.48 The those maritime areas and routes which may ven-ue that permitted this massive undertak- be challenged, such as the ice-covered North- ing was Maritime Forces Atlantic Headquar- west Passage. ters in Halifax. Specifically, inside this building was the organization of the joint David Ljunggren, a reporter for the military-Coast Guard Rescue Coordination international Environmental News Network, Centre and the Maritime Operations Centre has reported the prediction that global warm- (MOC). Both locations were fitted with the ing rates could very well make the Northwest communications, office space and personnel Passage navigable during the summer period 52 resources to more than adequately assist in within the next decade. The distance be- the coordination of the massive salvage ef- tween Europe and the Far East via the Pana- fort. Due to unique circumstances, the sen- ma cannel is approximately 12,600 nautical ior naval officer in charge of the initial miles. Should the Northwest Passage become stages of the oper-ation was the former CTG accessible, the Europe–Far East trade route of the Atlantic fleet who was preparing to would be reduced to 9,000 nautical miles. assume command of SNFL.49 The capabili- The potential for international maritime ac- ties of the CF and specifically those within tivity in this area cannot be ignored should Maritime Command permitted success the climate prediction prove true. Non-de- within a tragedy to occur — the CTG pos- fence-related challenges to Canada’s mari- sessed the oversight to provide the critical time security also include such issues as il- judgement, assessment and recommenda- legal fishing, drug importation, and illegal tions to the lead agency.50 As in DESERT migration and pollution violations. At pre- STORM, the complexities of sent, domestic law is enforced by a number PERSISTENCE demonstrated the need for of federal departments which have jurisdic- the leadership of naval assets deployed to be tion over each area of law. This environ- ashore and available for consultation and de- ment in-evitably creates overlap and dupli- cision-making with the varied group of stake- cation of services and responsibilities. Not- holders. Contingency operations, however, withstand-ing the fact that the CF and its form only a part of the domestic obligations deployable as-sets will always support a lead to which a CTG must be ready to respond. agency in do-mestic operations, the inescap- able truth re-mains that the expanding need Canada is a maritime nation with the for situational awareness in the so-called world’s longest coastline, bordering on three ‘information grid’, be it international or do- oceans encompassing some of the greatest mestic, will not per-mit the CTG to remain natural resource potentials. Global competi- at sea. In all of the examples of littoral op- tion for resources has already put pressure on erations cited in this paper, the subtle differ- the Canadian government to take measures to ence between success and the fog of war has protect and regulate the ocean exploitation re- depended on whether the CTG was or was gime.51 The vast and varied geography rep- not physically involved in the decision- resents opportunity for the operation of both making process. legitimate and illegitimate interests. There will, no doubt, be future challenges to Cana- Technology makes it possible today dian authority and the rule of law in national for the CTG to remain at sea and engage in a ocean areas, particularly in remote areas. rapid exchange of information. The CTG at There is a Canadian government imperative sea, however, represents a ‘point solution’ in to establish and maintain sovereignty over an evolving open-architecture information
20 world. A mechanical breakdown, technical ship is, however, not lost — a Canadian failure or battle damage in the flagship could warship flies a Canadian flag. The real loss jeopardize the ability of the CTG to direct ac- of national identity may arise if a situation is tion. These events could result directly in the permitted wherein a Canadian warship is loss of connectivity between the CTG and directed to carry out an action without the other significant players. This loss of infor- proper Canadian oversight. mation exchange could effectively cut out the CTG in a potentially critical decision-making Regardless of the size in naval force cycle — a single decision that could be criti- contribution, risk must still be managed. To cal to either international or domestic success this end, the manager of risk must have situ- or the reputation of Canada. The criticality ational awareness of the entire theatre of op- of this issue has already been acknowledged eration or domestic area of responsibility. during MARCOT 98 in which the Atlantic In the conduct of future network-centric war- CTG remained ashore to serve as the Mari- fare or operations with other government time Component Commander (MCC).53 In agencies, situational awareness may exist 2001, the Atlantic CTG (designate) will act within but it will not be fully exercised from as the Commander of the Joint Force during a single ship. STRONG RESOLVE 01. Faced with the Recent operational experience has same dilemma of remaining at sea or proceed- demonstrated that despite technical advances, ing ashore, the commander has indicated his the fog of war remains a worrisome constant. willingness to locate ashore for the purpose The goal of conducting future operations fast- of maintaining face-to-face interaction with 54 er than any potential adversary will introduce other commanders. new dimensions of risk. With the future ac- CONCLUSION quisition of the ALSC, the fleet will possess ships designed to operate in the littorals. The It has been the traditional position of move from blue-to brown-water operations Canada, absent a threat at home, that the con- will fundamentally alter the way Canada will tribution to international security will be ac- employ all of her naval forces. The number complished via operations overseas. To be a of varied weapons systems and sensors op- credible contribution to a multinational force, er-ating in a littoral area could be over- it is imperative that Canada’s naval forces whelming. The management of risk will be interoperable with those of our primary require a level of trust and understanding ally and be able to materially improve the between stakeholders, be they military or force combat power. Recent initiatives dem- civilian, that a course of action will not give onstrate that Canada’s naval forces are mov- rise to adverse consequences. It has been ing in the technical direction of acquiring the illustrated in both DESERT STORM and capability to operate in a network-centric ALLIED FORCE, that only by personal warfare arena. The future trend in USN op- contact can the potential for misunderstand- erations, howev-er, indicates that ships will ing be avoided. The challenge will be the operate with great-er independence within a ability to coordinate dissimilar operating geographically dis-persed area. The very cultures into one. The service that possesses nature of multination-al network-centric the greatest experience in bridging the gap warfare may not support the employment of between sea and land is the navy. It is fitting ships in an autonomous national task group. to propose, as the Canadian navy proceeds to The identity and contri-bution of a single operate closer to the shore, that the CTG be
21 located ashore to car-ry out his duties with 5The author served on the staff to Commander his counterparts. This proposal will require Standing Naval Force Atlantic during 1999–2000. The force was part of NATO’s maritime effort in rela- the strength of all three services to commit tion to operations in Kosovo in the summer of 1999. to this organizational change. During the period of operations the author was sec- onded to Headquarters Allied Naval Forces South Whether a crisis is domestic or inter- (NAVSOUTH) and was involved in the planning of national is not the issue. The capability for operations for both SNFL and Mine Counter Measures the navy to respond within the entire spec- Force North (MCMFORNORTH). trum of operations must be in place and exer- 6Ottawa, Department of National Defence, Lead- cised before the first day of a crisis. The At- mark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020 (Ottawa: Na- lantic and Pacific fleets have both operated val Board Executive Council, 2000), p 5. with the CTG remaining ashore. The nation- 7The proper name of Canada’s navy is Maritime al Maritime Operations Centres have dem- Command (MARCOM). onstrated their utility as the venue to permit 8Ottawa, Department of National Defence, Lead- the CTG to carry out his functions ashore or mark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020 (Ottawa: Na- to act as the staging point for forward deploy- val Board Executive Council, 2000), p 5. ment to another shore site. This operating 9Halifax, Department of National Defence, An practice should continue in order to foster the Instrument of National Policy: The Canadian Task Group Concept of Employment (Halifax: Canadian critical process to gain human trust and main- tain national oversight within the challenges Forces Maritime Warfare Centre, 1998), p 6. of technology-driven combined, coalition and 10The NATO strategy to interdict Soviet subma- domestic operations of the future. rine forces behind the Greenland–Iceland–United King- dom (GIUK) gap was assigned to Maritime Command. NOTES See Cease Fire, End Fire Mission, Forever? The Ca-nadian Decision to Abandon Naval Fire Support, p 1 SNFL conducted an MC 171/3 Seminar at the 47. German Naval Operations Tactical Centre during the period 29–30 November 1999 in Bremerhaven. MC 11Ibid., p 47. 171/3 is the source document which defines the con- 12Richard Gimblett and Jean Morin, The Canadi- cept of operations governing the employment of the an Forces in the Persian Gulf — Operation Friction
NATO force. In defining the changing roles of na- (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997), p 59. vies, the opinions of various Commanding Officers were sought. In general terms, most senior officers 13Richard Gimblett, “Prototype War for the 21st Century?: The Persian Gulf Revisited,” diss., U of believed that open-ocean conflict was no longer a tac- tic to be employed in future naval operations. See Calgary, 2001, p 3.
CSNFL Annual Report 1999–2000. 14Gimblett and Morin, The Canadian Forces
2See Jane’s List of Fighting Ships for countries: in… (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997), p 115. Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and 15 Australia. Although the CTG was located ashore, his dep- uty remained at sea and acted as CTG on behalf of the 3The ALSC project timeline indicates delivery CJTF. See The Canadian Forces in the Persian Gulf of hull one by the fourth quarter of 2005. See ALSC — Operation Friction. Project Management Office brief dated 4 December 16 1999. The introduction of the USN Standard Missile (SM2) and Harpoon systems elevated the navy’s capa- 4 Unlike other Canadian naval combatants in ser- bility to target and engage both air and surface con- vice, the ALSC will be capable of providing helicop- tacts. See Jane’s list of shipboard weapon systems. ters and organic watercraft to transport personnel and 17 materiel ashore under a benign threat environment. As Officer-in-Charge of the IROQUOIS-class
See ALSC Statement of Requirement, page 27. team trainer, the author was responsible to train com- mand teams in combat simulation. The training objec- tives included the team’s employment of the Standard
22
Missile, employing ROE under control of the CTG. flagship was in receipt of superior commander’s dai-
ly briefs within minutes of their completion. 18Commodore J.D. Fraser, “Why We Need Task Groups Today,” Maritime Affairs, Spring/Summer 24 RIMPAC is a recurring naval exercise conduct- 2000, p 40. ed in the Hawaiian operating area. To facilitate com- 19Halifax, Department of National Defence, An munications and command and control among the sev- Instrument of National Policy: The Canadian Task en nations participating in RIMPAC 2000 (US, Cana- Group Concept of Employment (Halifax: Canadian da, Japan, South Korea, Chile, Australia and Great
Forces Maritime Warfare Centre, 1998), p 3. Britain) the USN built the CWAN. By relying on commercial off-the-shelf technology, all participants 20Of special note is the national responsibility to achieved connectivity. This system remains in use in commit a ship to NATO’s Immediate Reaction Force the Pacific MOC for daily and future operations. See (IRF) — Standing Naval Force Atlantic (SNFL). For “RIMPAC Network to Outlast Exercise, Facilitate Fu- almost 40 years Canada has committed a destroyer or ture Coalition Operations.” frigate on rotation to participate as a member of SNFL. 25 On a rotational basis every six years, a Canadian Cebrowski and Garstka, “Network Centric…”, United States Naval Institute Proceedings, January serves as the commander to this force for a period of 12 months. During his tenure the Canadian comman- 1998, p 28. der is normally embarked in a Canadian flagship. 26The author served on staff to Commander SNFL represents the only occasion when a Canadian Standing Naval Force Atlantic and worked extensive- task group commander is employed at sea on a contin- ly with electronic mail throughout the flagship tour. uous basis. In 1993–94 and 1999–2000 a Canadian During ALLIED FORCE it was not uncommon for the officer commanded SNFL while deployed in the Ad- flagship to be in receipt of the daily brief issued to Su- riatic Sea in support of SHARP GUARD and ALLIED preme Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT) within FORCE respectively. Both were real-world events one hour of its being physically executed in the Head- and involved operations against potentially hostile quarters located at Norfolk, Virginia. forces. Both commanders performed with distinction, 27 unfortunately in a NATO rather than in a national ca- Richard H. Shultz Jr. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds., The Role of Naval Forces in 21st Century pacity. Operations (Washington: Brassey’s, 2000), p 144. 21Strategist Carl Von Clausewitz initially 28Richard Foot, “Navy Eyes US Style Missile termed those aspects of operations where events may go wrong and detract from success as ‘friction in Defence,” National Post, 23 March 2001, p A1. war’. In modern operations ‘the fog of war’ is used 29Shultz and Pfaltzgraff, The Role… (Washing- to describe events involving human error. See On ton: Brassey’s, 2000), p 144. War by Carl Von Clausewitz.
30Ibid., p 142. 22NCW derives its power from the networking of a well-informed but geographically dispersed force. 31Although hostilities were never directed The enabling elements are a high-performance in- against NATO, the ability of Soviet warships and air- formation grid, access to all appropriate information craft to locate a target required the pre-positioning of sources, weapons reach and manoeuvre with precision airborne radar aircraft to search, detect and jam the and speed of response, value-adding C2 processes — sensors of potential targets. NATO electronic devices to include high-speed automated assignment of re- are capable of intercepting the radar emissions of these sources and integrated sensor grids closely coupled jamming aircraft and therefore would eliminate the el- to shooter. See Arthur Cebrowski and John Garstka, ement of surprise on the part of the attacking forces.
“Network Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future,” 32 United States Naval Institute Proceedings, January To coordinate theatre air missions, the air task-
1998, p 28. ing order assigns tasks to individual aircraft, regard- less of their point of origin (land or sea base). The air 23In preparation for the 1999–2000 SNFL Flag- tasking order is the source document to confirm the ship, HMC Ships ATHABASKAN and IROQUOIS identification of aircraft. Unless a mission is formal- were fitted with an SHF satellite communications ly scheduled in the air tasking order the aircraft(s) will suite. This capability permitted the exchange of elec- not be permitted to fly. tronic mail including the exchange of high-resolution 33 graphics between the ship and superior national and The author served in Headquarters Naval NATO commanders. During ALLIED FORCE the Forces South during ALLIED FORCE. Although the
23 details of this claim remain classified, the USN did 45The Canadian Area Defence Replacement believe that the contents of the daily ATO were com- (CADRE) programme is designated to replace the promised. IROQUOIS-class platform. The initiative remains conceptual; therefore, the design of the ship and ca- 34Rear Admiral David Morse, “Information — pacity of the platform remain uncertain. See CADRE The Achilles Heel Of Cooperation,” diss., U of New Project Management Brief dated November 1999. Brunswick, 2000, p 4. 46Although the SAR response was relatively 35Marvin Pokrant, Desert Storm at Sea: What the quick, the debris area did not contain survivors. Crash Navy Really Did (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1999), analysis would later speculate that the orientation of p 208. the aircraft was such that the fuselage broke up and
36 sank quickly upon impact, thereby precluding escape Ibid., p 208. by passengers. See www.gov.ns.ca/cmns/ info111. 37Ibid., p 297. 47Transport Canada, National Transportation 38The AMURIYAH incident is described in de- Safety Board (US), RCMP, FBI, Emergency Prepar- tail. See Pokrant, Desert Storm…, p 65. edness Canada, Ground SAR units, municipal govern- 39 ment, Red Cross Relief, and an extensive internation- Although the liaison staff ashore was headed by a Rear-Admiral, eyewitness accounts indicate that al media corps, just to name a few. the US CinC considered the naval staff to lack author- 48The author was serving on staff to the senior of- ity to direct ships at sea. See Pokrant, Desert Storm…, ficer who was in charge of the navy’s salvage efforts. p 284. 49The officer in question was also appointed as 40General Schwarzkopf would have preferred acting Commander Maritime Forces Atlantic at the that Vice-Admiral Mauz locate in Riyadh but did not time of the air incident and therefore had tactical con- pursue the issue beyond informal dialogue. See Po- trol of ships deployed in the area of responsibility. krant, Desert Storm…, Chapter 13, “Observations on
Command and Control”, for full details. 50During the entire operation the various agen- cies within Formation Halifax provided far-reaching 41Since the publication of the following cited infrastructure, personnel and material support to the document, the CTG staff has incorporated one NATO lead agency. Grade-A fighter controller, two administration clerks and two additional communicators. The staff compo- 51The 1996 Turbot War (OCEAN SURVEIL- sition is enough to satisfy a one-in-two watch rotation. LANCE) serves as the most recent example of war- See Halifax, Department of National Defence, An In- ships operating in support of Other Government De- strument of National Policy: The Canadian Task Group partments (OGDs). The purpose of the operation Concept of Employment (Halifax: Canadian Forces was to provide both naval presence and support to Maritime Warfare Centre, 1998), p 6. Fisher-ies and Ocean Department enforcement over 42 the dis-puted claim by Spanish interests to fish freely In preparation for the deployment additional in the Canadian Exclusive Economic Zone (Grand workspaces were assigned for staff use, including Banks). one planning office complete with briefing area and one storage compartment. This initiative permitted 52See
National Report.
24