The Effect of Teachers Unions on Student Performance

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The Effect of Teachers Unions on Student Performance SI Nov. Dec 11_SI new design masters 9/28/11 11:17 AM Page 34 [SCIENCE WATCH K E N N E T H W. K R A U S E Kenneth W. Krause is a contributing editor and books editor/columnist for the Human ist and a contributing editor for the SKEPTICAL INQUIRER. He may be reached at [email protected]. The Effect of Teachers Unions on Student Performance “People who do well under the status quo, hanks in part to Davis Guggen - to escape their local schools. whether it’s the unions, whether it’s the heim’s 2010 documentary, Waiting Although Guggenheim is a liberal politicians . will protect a status quo Tfor “Superman,” many Americans are private-sector union member himself, that serves their needs, even if it doesn’t aware of the demoralizing struggles stu- his movie highlights the ominous role serve the needs of students. We have to dents often face in public schools—espe- of public-sector teachers unions in pro- move to a customer-focused school system.” cially in disadvantaged districts. This tecting bad educators and their perverse —Joel Klein, former chancellor poignant film features several desperate rules. Also emphasized is their stubborn of New York City schools families that want nothing more than to opposition to charter schools and, worst (2002–2010) save their children’s lives by helping them of all, their tendency to make construc- tive change gallingly difficult. Superman also highlights the infa- mous “Rubber Rooms” of New York City. Beginning in 2009, these Tem - porary Reassignment Centers quar- tered more than seven hundred teachers considered too incompetent to re main in class. They didn’t teach, of course, but they arrived at and departed from the Rubber Rooms every day at the regular time, as if they were still earning their living. They were paid full salaries with full benefits. They had vacations and summers off. In salary and benefits alone, these defective teachers siphoned between $35 million and $65 million per year from their city’s already impoverished school budget—a lot of money that could have been spent on children. Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Chan - cellor Klein tried to detach them from the payroll, but state tenure laws, re- strictive collective bargaining contracts, and the United Federation of Teach- ers—which dared to compare its mem- bers’ Rubber Rooms to the prisons at Guantanamo—made such a common- sense solution impossible. How could this happen in a com- munity that truly values education? “The New York City school district is 34 Volume 35 Issue 6 | Skeptical Inquirer SI Nov. Dec 11_SI new design masters 9/27/11 12:43 PM Page 35 not organized to provide the best pos- when bad teachers are paid more and non-teaching duties, including lunch sible education to its children,” argues good teachers less than their actual duty and hall duty. They also give teach- Terry Moe, professor of political sci- worth? Politically powerless children, of ers time off for union purposes. ence at Stanford University and senior course. Unions love smaller class sizes, Unions may claim what’s good for fellow at the Hoover Institution (Moe too—but contrary to popular belief, teachers is good for students, but most 2011). Instead, thanks to union-influ- normal class size reductions have almost people, Moe guesses, “would be ab- enced legislation and the contemptible no impact on student learning. solutely shocked” to know what’s really rules contained in the collective bar- “The unions pursue their own inter- lurking in the collective bargaining gaining contract, “the district is literally ests,” Moe confirms, “and policies good contracts that govern their kids’ educa- organized to protect bad teachers and to for the unions are often bad for kids” tion and determine their futures. undermine the efforts of leaders to en- (Moe 2006). Let’s glance at just a few How Do Teachers Unions Affect Student sure teacher quality.” of the diktats that typically show up in Performance? Today, the National Education As - collective bargaining contracts: so ciation (NEA) and American Federa - Arguably, the most maddening rules “I find that teachers’ unions are primarily tion of Teachers (AFT) are 4.5 million require that teachers be paid on a salary rent seeking, raising school budgets and members strong and clearly the most schedule, based on years of experience school inputs but lowering student achieve - powerful interest groups in Amer ican and education—never on performance. ment by decreasing the productivity of education, perhaps in all of politics. Other rules make it nearly impossible inputs.” Union dues alone provide them with as- to dismiss teachers for poor performance —Caroline Hoxby, professor of tounding sums of cash for campaign and mandate complex, time-consuming labor economics at Harvard contributions and lobbying strategies. grievance procedures. Some require prin- University in 1996 They rank first among the top twenty- cipals to give advance warn ing to teach- five all-time donors in federal elections. ers before visiting their classrooms and The professional, peer-reviewed litera- For example, they contributed $59,354 - allow teachers, not principals, to make ture has remained frustratingly silent on ,731—95 percent of which went to De- decisions about transfers and class the issue of how unions affect student mocrats—between 1989 and 2010. assignments. performance. Fortunately, however, two During the 2010 election cycle alone, The rules also limit the number and district- and school-level studies—as op- the NEA spent $40 million, giving $2 duration of faculty meetings and parent posed to those at the state level, which million directly to Democratic candi- conferences that teachers can be re- tend to be highly aggregated and poorly dates. At the same time, the AFT quired to attend and the number of controlled—have been published in top- awarded $2.6 million to Democrats minutes teachers can be required to be quality academic journals. Each con- compared to $8,000 to Republicans. on campus. They guarantee teachers a cludes that collective bargaining for They send armies of well-trained ac- certain amount of “prep time” away teachers has a significantly negative effect tivists to every political district in the from their students and restrict teachers’ on student performance. country. At any time, they can finance highly effective media campaigns on any topic or for any candidate they like. “No other group in the politics of education,” Moe laments, “representing administra- tors, say, or school boards or disadvan- Unions fight hard for across-the-board taged kids or parents or taxpayers, even teacher pay raises, but who loses comes close to having such weaponry.” So how much of this power is ever when bad teachers are paid more converted into policies that actually benefit education? Unions do cause in- and good teachers less than their creased spending, but money per se has little if any effect on student achieve- actual worth? Politically powerless ment. While student test scores since 1970 haven’t budged, we’ve spent more children, of course. than twice as many inflation-adjusted dollars on every child. Unions fight hard for across-the- board teacher pay raises, but who loses Skeptical Inquirer | November / December 2 01 1 3 5 SI Nov. Dec 11_SI new design masters 9/27/11 12:43 PM Page 36 The first was a national study pub- ing that increasing pay parity with men Moe concluded that “collective bargain- lished by Caroline Hoxby, who set out in non-teaching occupations began to ing does indeed have negative conse- to explain three related “empirical puz- draw women out of teaching. But the quences for student achievement, and zles” (Hoxby 1996). First, and most gen- evidence proved otherwise. Instead, that the effects are concentrated on pre- erally, why did school inputs (govern- smart people were being “pulled” out of cisely those districts and schools—large ment spending) have a significant effect education because of increasing com- districts, high-minority schools—that, on student outputs (performance) prior pression of teachers’ pay. Good, bad, or over the years have been the worst per- to around 1960—when states began ugly, all teachers are essentially treated formers and most difficult to improve.” granting teachers the right to collectively alike. Why? Because unions not only So, although almost everyone suffers bargain—but not after that time? defend ineffective teachers, they rou- because of teachers unions and collec- Second, why do the data continue to tinely oppose merit pay for exceptional tive bargaining rights, minority kids show no relationship between school teachers. Unions and collective bargain- confined to big cities suffer the most. inputs and student learning, even after ing, Hoxby and Leigh discovered, de- “It follows,” Moe adds hopefully, controlling for students’ socio-eco- serve much of the blame for the dumb- “that efforts to boost achievement in nomic background? Third, why do ing-down of educators as well as their these contexts, as well as to reduce the metropolitan areas with few opportu- hapless students. achievement gap between whites and nities for competition among public But Terry Moe would publish the minorities, need to recognize that col- schools tend to show more generous in- second and most revealing study on lective bargaining may be part of the puts (for example, higher per-pupil point. Therein, he addressed the issue problem—and that it deserves to be spending, higher teacher salaries, and from an entirely new angle. Using a taken seriously as a target of reform.” lower student-to-teacher ratios) yet large, random sample of California Short of actually abolishing teacher col- poorer student performance? school districts—all engaged in collec- lective bargaining rights, he advises that Hoxby initially noted the precise tive bargaining—Moe carefully probed “reducing the restrictiveness of labor timing of legislation facilitating teacher the actual contents of the resulting contracts could have significant payoffs unionization and collective bargaining.
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