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Pleading Guilty: a Critique of Four Models*

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Pleading Guilty: a Critique of Four Models* PLEADING GUILTY: A CRITIQUE OF FOUR MODELS* H. RICHARD UVILLERt INTRODUCTION Negotiated settlement of a cause in litigation is no stranger to prevailing American notions of justice. Yet there is something less than fully gratifying about compromise, and when the high principles and great social purposes of criminal justice are set in the balance, the process sometimes seems downright unsavory. What has become of the guilty plea? Is it no longer the commend- able gesture of contrition, the honest confession and open acceptance of re- sponsibility? Is it not the first motion of the penitent, a recognition of the social ethic bespeaking a potential for redemption? Do we now consider the crafty, adversary courtroom battle a nobler course? Somehow the once pure and salubrious guilty plea has become inextricably associated with "plea bargaining,"' that baleful term connoting commercial exchange of advantage more appropriate to a Moroccan market than the halls of justice. Disposition without trial can no longer be regarded as a forthright concession coupled with a blind supplication for mercy. Courtroom realities, new or newly perceived, have engendered a more modern (read: cynical) ap- preciation of the transaction. In many jurisdictions, criminal defendants have learned that their accusation awards them a marketable service: the exclusive power to save the state the time, effort, and risk entailed in the trial of the accusation. Well employed, particularly in a stressed market, the decision of a defendant to forego trial may be traded for substantial benefits in mitigating the full force of the law's formal demand for judgment and punishment. The result of this sort of economic exchange of benefits is the plea for a price. One might pause to wonder why a society which prides itself in its com- mercial tradition finds the word "price" so shameful in this context. Surely in this, as in any other usage, the term denotes no more than that point at which the parties, taking all their common and opposing interests into account, find a mutually acceptable meeting of surrender and gain. To an economist, the application of market theory to the criminal courts carries no disgraceful con- notations. A description is a description. And the discovery that criminals * The atithor expresses appreciation to James Scott Saunders, Esq., a young member of the New York Bar, for his assistance in the preparation of the footnotes to this article. t Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. 1. For a description and criticism of plea bargaining practices in New York and Philadelphia, see White, A Proposalfor Reform of thePlea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 439 (1971). Page 102: Winter 1977] PLEADING GUILTY weigh advantages and risks in making important decisions, or that prosecutors and judges also think in "cost-benefit" terms, is not shocking. A courtroom is not, after all, a church. People do not plead guilty to save their souls by con- fession and repentance. Let us not shrink from integrating the guilty plea into the framework of all other legal decisionmaking-an event demanding only the cool, informed, and open appraisal of fair consequences, fairly supervised and enforced by judicial authority. Actually, the guilty plea-and even the "bargaining" process that precedes it-has acquired a certain degree of respectability, in legal circles at least.' Once thought of as the antithesis of litigation, hardly worthy of the services of counsel' much less the lofty attention of the guardians of the Constitution and their scholarly advisers, the guilty plea has come out of the closet. The Supreme Court (setting the mood as usual) has spoken approvingly of plea bargaining,4 a number of academic contributions have appeared, 5 and the draftsmen of model codes have included the topic on their agenda.' The ef- forts of' this latter group, unfortunately, have usually produced rather pale copy, treading as they do warily in the footsteps of the Court decisions and the products of their rivals. The modest purpose of the present endeavor is to suggest some pertinent considerations largely overlooked by the model makers, though familiar enough to the practictioner in the temple/bazaar of justice. Inspired by Boykin v. Alabama7 and Rule 1 1 of the Federal Rules of Crim- inal Procedure,8 model makers and courtroom judges lavish considerable 2. See note 4, infra. 3. Of course, one must go back more than twenty years to discover such a benighted era. See Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956). 4. Of the many decisions dealing with guilty pleas over the years, the most direct acceptance of negotiated settlements was pronounced in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) where the Chief Justice said: "The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the accused, sometimes loosely called 'plea bargaining,' is an essential component of the administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged." Id. at 260. For a rather idealistic condemnation of "plea bargaining," see Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1387 (1970). 5. No study of the pleading process is complete without careful consideration of the observa- tions and analysis of Professor Donald J. Newman in a report of an empirical study conducted under the auspices of the American Bar Foundation of the law and practice in Michigan, Wiscon- sin, and Kansas relating to guilty pleading in 1956 and 1957. The work contains valuable data and thoughtful commentary on many of the topics treated in the present paper. D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966). 6. The "models" to be examined here are four: ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1974); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (1975) [hereinafter cited as PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE]; NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, COURTS REPORT (1973) [hereinafter cited as NAC COURTS REPORT]; NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1974) [hereinafter cited as UNIFORM RULES]. 7. 395 U.S. 238 (1969). 8. (e) Plea Agreement Procedure. LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 41: No. 1 attention upon the fateful moment of pleading, taking elaborate care to pro- duce a rich record of the transaction in the official minutes. Judges labori- ously explain to the counseled defendant who has indicated his choice to plead guilt)' that by doing so he is waiving his right to stand trial, to hear and cross-examine witnesses against him, and to remain mute on the accusation if he wishes to. In the wake of Henderson v. Morgan' the litany will doubtless be expanded to inform the defendant of the legal elements of the crime to which (1) In General. The attorney for the government and the attorney for the defendant or the defendant when acting pro se may engage in discussions with a view toward reaching an agreement that, upon the entering of a plea of guihy or noo contendere to a charged offense or to a lesser or related offense, the attorney for the government will do any of the following: (A) move for dismissal of other charges; or (B) make a recommendation, or agree not to oppose the defendant's request, for a particular sentence, with the understanding that such recommendation or request shall not be binding upon the court: or (C) agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case. The court shall not participate in any such discussions. (2) Notice of Such Agreement. If a plea agreement has been reached by the parties, the court shall, on the record, require the disclosure of the agreement in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, at the time the plea is offered. Thereupon the court may accept or reject the agreement, or may defer its decision as to the acceptance or rejection until there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence report. (3) Acceptance of a Plea Agreement. If the court accepts the plea agreement, the court shall inform the defendant that it will embody in the judgment and sentence the disposi- tion provided for in the plea agreement. (4) Rejection of a Plea Agreement. If the court rejects the plea agreenment, the court shall, on the record, inform the parties of this fact, advise the defendant personally in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camerzL that the court is not bound by the plea agreement, afford the defendant the opportunity to then withdraw his plea, and advise the defendant that if he persists in his guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere the disposition of the case may be less favorable to the defendant than that contemplated b% the plea agreement. (5) Time of Plea Agreement Procedure. Except for good cause shown, notification to the court of the existence of a plea agreement shall be given at the arraignment or at such other time, prior to trial, as may be Fixed by the court. (6) Inadmissibility of Pleas, Offers of Pleas, and Related Statements. Except as other- wise provided in this paragraph, evidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of noo contendere, or of an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime charged or any other crime, or of statements made in connection with, and relevant to, any of the foregoing pleas or offers, is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who made the plea or offer. However, evidence of a statement made in connection with, and relevant to, a plea of guilty,, later withdrawn, a plea of nolo contendere, or an offer to plead guiltvy or nolo contendere to the crime charged or any other crime, is admissible in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement if the statement was made by the defendant under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel.
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