ISA Global South Conference (8-10 Jan. 2015 Singapore)

Human Rights in DPRK and Rights-Based Approach to Development

Bo-hyuk Suh (Seoul National University)

Ⅰ. Introduction Ⅱ. What is RBA? Ⅲ. Why RBA for ? Ⅳ. RBA Program Proposed for North Korea Ⅴ. Conclusion ------

Ⅰ. Introduction

Starting from 2010, there has been analysis that the economic situation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) is gradually in recovery. At the least, the current economic situation in DPRK has recovered to the level before the “Arduous March” of the late 1990s. At the time this evaluation surfaced was the same time the Kim Jong-un came into power. This ignited my curiosity whether if between regime change and economic policy change there is a mutual relationship. In 2009, as it was indicated in the 1st United Nations Universal Periodic Review (UPR) during the Kim Jong Il leadership and in 2014 with the 2nd UPR completed under Kim Jong-un, North Korea has greatly placed efforts in agricultural improvement and reaped successful results.1 Despite this, however the human rights situation in North Korea has not significantly improved. With the human rights resolution for North Korea being passed in the UN General Assembly and the Human Rights Council in 2014, like in the past the concern for the dire North Korea human rights situation was expressed along with the demand for the crimes against humanity in the DPRK to be discussed at the Security Council so that it can be sent to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The resolutions sited the Report of the Commission of Inquiry (COI) on Human Rights in the DPRK indicating the crimes against humanity. In the report violations to the right to food is also included. Of course North Korea, as expected criticized the COI report and the resolutions as a threat to state sovereignty and held as double standards. It is true that North Korea is placing much effort into improving the food shortage problem as well as the economy, in which we have seen the economic market develop. However, it is difficult to see the rights of the North Korean people improve along with this economic development. In reality, it is difficult to say that the right to food has gotten better. According to the reports submitted to the UN human rights mechanism by the DPRK, the economic problem can be understood to have improved on the level of quantity and not in the

1 “National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 15 (A) of the annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” A/HRC/WG.6/6/PRK/1, 27 August 2009, Paragraphs 56; “National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 16/21: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” 30 January 2014, Paragraphs 71-75. perspective of rights. On the other hand, North Korea is displaying a political stance to the international community’s demand for human rights improvement and especially to civil and political rights. However with improving social and economic rights, in which has a lower relevance to North Korea’s political system, North Korea is listening carefully to the international community’s recommendations and actively engaging in dialogue. When taking this into consideration, it appears to be strategically reasonable for the international community to approach North Korea with a focus on social and economic rights to improve human rights. Among them, the right to food in which is the most important to the survival of the North Korean people and an aspect that the regime is making efforts to improve, there is a high possibility that there is room for negotiations on a human rights approach. As North Korea is underdeveloped and there is a chronic food shortage a human rights approach can be understood in the framework of a human rights-based approach (RBA) to development. Taking this into consideration, this paper argues that the human rights-based approach to development is appropriate for North Korea and will discuss how this can be applied. However, as development and North Korea human rights has a large scope this paper will argue on the basis of RBA being utilized to reduce in which that will improve the right to food in North Korea.

Ⅱ. What is RBA?

RBA is a conceptual policy framework for the process of human development that is normatively based on international human rights standards and operationally directed to promoting and protecting human rights. RBA seeks to analyse inequalities which lie at the heart of development problems and redress discriminatory practices and unjust distributions of power that impede development progress. Under RBA, the plans, policies and processes of development are anchored in a system of rights and corresponding obligations established by international law. This helps to promote the sustainability of development work, empowering people themselves—especially the most marginalized—to participate in policy formulation and hold accountable those who have a duty to act. Following the basic understanding of RBA, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) presented a series of essential attributes of the approach. They are as follows: ! As development policies and programs are formulated, the main objective should be to fulfill human rights. ! RBA identifies rights holders and their entitlements and corresponding duty-bearers and their obligations, and works towards strengthening the capacities of rights-holders to make their claims and of duty- bearers to meet their obligations. ! Principles and standards derived from international human rights treaties should guide all development cooperation and programming in all sectors and in all phases of the programming process.2

International community established the principles of peace and security, human rights and freedom, and sustainable development as a universal norm, and found their interdependent and mutually reinforcing relations.

2 OHCHR, Frequently Asked Questions on RBA to Development Cooperation (New York and Geneva, 2006), pp. 15-16. The relations of development and human rights are a part of it. RBA is an explicit example of interdependence. Regarding the interdependence of human rights and development, “A Statement of Common Understanding of a Human Rights-Based Approach to Development Cooperation” produced at the Second Inter-agency Workshop, Stamford, US, on 3-5 May 2003, endorsed by the UNDG Program Group specifically referred to three aspects of RBA like below. ! All programs of development cooperation, policies and technical assistance should further the realization of human rights as laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments. ! Human rights standards contained in, and principles derived from, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments guide all development cooperation and programming in all sectors and in all phases of the programming process. ! Development cooperation contributes to the development of the capacities of “duty-bearers” to meet their obligations and of “rights-holders” to claim their rights.

Many documents and papers of international organizations such as UNDP, UNICEF has explained the characters and properties of RBA in various ways. Having moral, legal, and institutional aspects, RBA is not only a blending of rights and development for human beings, but a new paradigm of the international community for a sustainable and just future. RBA focuses on the realization of the rights of the excluded and marginalized populations and takes a holistic view of its environment and sectors, emphasizing participatory process and accountability. Introducing exemplary RBA policies of various actors, Brigitte I. Hamm mentioned some common factors for realizing a successful RBA. They are ⅰ) Reference to and starting from human rights treaties; ⅱ) Non-discrimination, special focus on disadvantaged groups, explicitly women and children; ⅲ)

Participation and empowerment; and ⅳ) Good governance. She intensified her discussion in each factor. Regarding human rights as a frame of reference for development policy, for instance, Hamm argued RBA has three important implications, as follows: ! RBA is based on a broad consensus over the content of human rights. ! RBA implies a change in perspective because of the legal obligation. ! RBA influences the agents and changes the policy dialogue between donors and recipients.3

Ⅲ. Why RBA for North Korea?

Why has RBA to development been so attractive and popular in the international human rights/development community that it seems to be an alternative to the existing approaches? First of all, the perception that development is not the same economic growth spread when economic factor itself has not led to improving people's quality of life in a whole level. Instead development began to be perceived as a human development including political, social, and cultural dimensions as well as an economic one. At last, development has been redefined as freedom. Originally an economic term was transformed into a political or social term. Amartya Sen, in his famous book titled with Development as Freedom, argued that economic development entails a set of linked freedoms such as political freedom and transparency, freedom of opportunity, and economic protection

3 Brigitte I. Hamm, “A Human Rights Approach to Development,” Human Rights Quarterly 23:4 (2001), pp. 1005-1021. from abject poverty. Demonstrating a deep interrelationship between economy and politics of development, the new paradigm seemed to echo people's rising sense of human rights. During 1960-1970s, since the third countries had entered the international community after the end of the colonial period, they argued for 'right to development' as a third generation's human rights. The third world countries indicated first world countries as duty-bearers of the right due to their historical wrongdoings, while insisting themselves as right-holders. The Declaration on the Right to Development, which was adopted by the General Assembly resolution 41/128 on 4 December 1986, showed the dichotomy as below, although it mentioned "all states" to indicate the first countries. ! Sustained action is required to promote more rapid development of developing countries.(2 of article 4) ! All States should promote the establishment, maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security and, to that end, should do their utmost to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as well as to ensure that the resources released by effective disarmament measures are used for comprehensive development, in particular that of the developing countries.(Article 7)

As soon as the right to development appeared it faced criticism. First, the classification of states in the right to development into right-holders and duty-bearers did not receive support from the international human rights community, in particular Western developed countries and international law experts. The classification brought about the repulsion of Western developed countries, who thought it likely that they were obliged to give developmental aid. And, from the perspective of international law, the dichotomy logic of the right to development could not be accepted because ‘all’ states have the obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights. Furthermore, the content of the right remains unclear and its justifiability is negated. The right to development is not perceived as a right of its own, but more as the synthesis of all rights. In addition, the Declaration of 1986 offers a thought process of the 1970s and 1980s, with its development optimism and the perception of development as a worldwide quasi-linear progress. This way of thought does not take into account any limitations on development that may arise from the need for sustainability and does not question the possibility of such progress on the global level.4 Accordingly, even though the right to development was stipulated as individual human rights at the World Conference on Human Rights of 14-25 June 1993 in Vienna, the relationship of human rights and development was not deepened. Then, how does one apply RBA to the case of DPRK, whose economic and social situation has been continuously poor since the mid-1990s. Here let us discuss why RBA is useful and necessary in the worst case in terms of the food situation. Although the food situation in North Korea has improved since 2010, ordinary people are still under much difficulty suffering from dire nutritive conditions.5 Based on the Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission’s it is estimated by the FAO and WFP of total utilization needs of 5.37 million tons of cereal equivalent (rice in milled terms), the Mission estimated a cereal import requirement of 340,000 tons for the 2013/14 marketing year (November/October). Assuming the official import target of 300,000 tons of cereals is met, the Mission estimated an uncovered food deficit of 40,000 tons for the current marketing year. This food

4 Hamm, “A Human Rights Approach to Development,” p. 1009. 5 FAO and WFP, “FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” 28 November 2013, pp. 6~7. gap is the narrowest in many years, and is mainly due to the higher 2013 production level. However, despite of the continued improvement in agricultural production, the food system in DPRK remains highly vulnerable to shocks and key gaps exist particularly in the production of protein-rich foods. The majority of households in DPRK have borderline or poor food consumption. Those households that depend on the Public Distribution System (PDS) and have no access to kitchen gardens tend to be particularly vulnerable. The nutrition situation has improved in recent years, however, rates of stunting remain high and micronutrient deficiencies are of particular concern. Child dietary diversity is poor in large part reflecting the inadequacy of food provided in child institutions. Coordinated efforts between the sectors of nutrition, , food security, water, hygiene and sanitation are essential to further improve the nutrition status of women and children. The Economic Research Service of the United States Department of Agriculture, a research group of worldwide food situation and trend, assessed North Korea the most persistently food insecure country in Asia following Afghanistan, as her grain output stagnated from 1995 until 2010. Only recently has some growth been exhibited. In 2014, 70 percent of the population is estimated to be food insecure; this is projected to decline to 40 percent in 2024. Since grain production growth is projected to remain low—around 1 percent per year— during that time, the improvement is driven primarily by low projected population growth of 0.4 percent per year.6 The chronic situation of food shortage in North Korea has not only brought about the violation of the right to food itself, but also been affecting another human rights of North Koreans. While the poor situation of food in North Korea has been weakening by increasing trend of marketization since 2010s, the North Korean right to food has not improved in terms of nutrition, food availability, and food accessibility.7 The North Koreans’ right to food is seriously challenged due to the persisting shortage of grains, and the fundamental cause for this is the government that repeatedly fails to fulfill their obligations to guarantee the citizens’ right to food. In particular, children and senior citizens, who used to benefit from ration distributions based on the levels of need, are forced to suffer the most when the PDS is suspended. The right to food for these vulnerable groups is threatened as they are excluded from the ration system as the PDS operates in a distorted manner. Many North Korean escapees testified that the continuous violation of the right to food has also a bad influence on the other social and economic rights such as the right to health, the right to work, and the right to education.8 In order to improve food security and nutrition, the above Mission of the FAO and WFP also made recommendations for national and international support for: (i) Agriculture-related: sustainable farming practices, better price and market incentives for farmers, and improvement in farm mechanization. (ii) Food security-related: stimulate spring crop production and implement disaster preparedness and response programs. (iii) Nutrition-related: improve dietary diversity and feeding practices for young children and women through different strategies such as behavioural change, market reform, and encouraging livestock and fish

6 Economic Research Service USDA, “International Food Security Assessment, 2014-2024,” GFA 25, June 2014, p. 16. 7 Bo-hyuk Suh, “A Study of the Influence That Marketization Has on the Right to Food in North Korea,” A Paper for the Research Project of “the Interrelation of Marketization and the Right to Food in North Korea” by the Korea Institute of National Unification (2014). 8 Han Dong-ho, Kim Soo-Am, Lee Kyu-Chang, Lee Keum-Soon, Cho Jeong-Ah, White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2014 (Seoul: Korea Institute of National Unification), pp. 393~394. production; strengthening treatment of severe and moderate acute and improving hygiene and sanitation practices.

If social and economic development is slow and especially when the food situation is dire, is RBA necessary and possible? Like the history of authoritarian industrialization in South Korea, is it more realistic to achieve economic development through a bureaucratic means and then address improving human rights situation? In addition, when it comes to development it should not be referred to development in general rather priority should be placed on technical development for economic growth, should it not? North Korea is responsive to exchange with a portion of developed Western countries in regards to economic development. As a result, RBA seems to be difficult to apply immediately to North Korea. Rather, there should be an emphasis on the economic growth through exchange and support. This can be viewed as an appropriate intervention by North Korean government. However, as UN OHCHR emphasized officially like above, human rights standards as reflected in the international treaties, as well as principles such as participation, nondiscrimination, transparency, cooperation, and accountability, guide all stages of development programs. Human rights treaty standards are binding upon countries that have ratified them and help to define the objectives of development programs. DPRK ratified four important international human rights treaties such as International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (IESCR), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). North Korean government said officially many times that DPRK has been recognizing and respecting human rights universality, indivisibility, interdependence, and interrelatedness, meanwhile opposing politicization of human rights, double standard. North Korea has cooperated with the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) mechanism by submitting twice the regular report and joining inter-dialogue, but rejected human rights resolutions and special procedures against them at the UN charter body. At the first UPR meeting in 2009, the DPRK delegation valued the UPR mechanism, which is impartially treating all United Nations Member States with different ideologies and systems, cultures and traditions. At the same time, however, DPRK insisted that human rights resolutions toward them at the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly every year are out of purposes and motives irrelevant to genuine human rights, resulting in the adoption of the unjust resolutions. Accordingly, DPRK argued they neither recognize nor accept such resolutions, and categorically reject them as the extreme manifestation of politicization, selectivity and double standards in the area of human rights.9 North Korea continues to argue that they are facing serious challenges and obstacles in their efforts for the protection and promotion of human rights, pointing out mainly the external factors such as the US non- recognition of the DPRK and its sanctions, pressures and military threat applied to it. In spite of their rationale against international pressure, DPRK expressed that they will further accelerate the building of an economic power by taking positive and innovative measures so that people can enjoy a better and more civilized life.

9 “Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” A/HRC/13/13, 4 January 2010. Furthermore, DPRK showed their willingness at the second UPR meeting in 2014 to faithfully implement the international human rights instruments, to which it is a party, achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and do everything in its power to make the principle of impartiality and objectivity in the international field of human rights.10 Though it is not confirmed that DPRK government has a strategic purpose, they will try to promote economic growth than human development by using the rhetoric such as MDGs or RBA. But they do not oppose those international standards in principle, and seldom use the right to development. This implies that even DPRK is under the sphere of influence of the international norm, though trying to use it for pursuing national interests. Therefore, it is a point that the outside world needs to encourage North Korea to apply the RBA framework as accepting their prior issue. Of course, DPRK's behaviors are ironical in that they indeed prove the problems of a selectivist approach to the international human rights mechanism. Nonetheless, North Korea implied that they would respond positively to RBA by focusing on socio-economic sectors and recognizing technical cooperation with the international community. North Korean dual response to the international human rights mechanism and their traditional viewpoint of human rights imply for a practical RBA to North Korean development in some aspects as below. First, the RBA to North Korean development needs to apply to the socio-economic sector in the first stage, and then gradually expand into the whole areas. The North Korean government is strongly opposing the external pressure asking to improve civil and political rights, while being positive of improving economic and social rights. The international community needs to begin RBA from the socio-economic sector strategically so that North Korea would learn RBA and expand international cooperation. Second, human rights-based approach to strategy (RBA-PRS) should be a main program of the RBA to North Korean development. Although DPRK reluctantly recognized the human rights universality and indivisibility in principle, their prior concern is surely to improve the right to food seen in many North Korean government's statements. Like two former top leaders in North Korea, current Kim Jong-un also has been urging the officials to solve food problems as a key to becoming a 'strong and prosperous state'(强盛國家). Here a sophisticated strategy is necessary in order to induce North Korea to apply RBA and broaden the scope of poverty reduction strategies by recognizing the interdependence of rights. In practice, RBA-PRS will harmonize with current North Korean reform and opening economic policy in both national and local level. If the RBA-PRS would be combined with North Korean reform and opening economic policy and marketization trends, not only the North Korean right to food will be improved, but also a spill-over effect will take place crossing all sectors of human rights. Third, but not least, the RBA-PRS should focus on the combination of the improvement of right to food and human development. As the OHCHR document has been emphasizing, the objectives of a food security program can be reformulated explicitly to realize the right to adequate food under the ICESCR and CRC. Human rights standards strengthen and deepen the situation analysis. They also set certain conditions for implementing and

10 “National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” A/HRC/WG.6/19/PRK/1, 30 January 2014. monitoring the progress of development programs. The general comments of the human rights treaty bodies, as well as their country-specific recommendations, can provide more detailed guidance on what the international human rights standards mean in all phases of RBA programming. No matter how the RBA-PRS helps to improve the right to food, it should also push up human development that is a foundation for sustainable improvement of all human rights including the right to food. Of course, there were diplomatic disputes between DPRK and UN-based international community regarding the COI report and the ICC reference of the DPRK human rights issue at the UN charter bodies in 2014. Even in the dark mood, the North Korean government has been maintaining economy-related contact and exchanges with the international community, in particular Western developed countries. It is time to run the improvement of the right to food with human development. That is a key point of RBA-PRS in the case of North Korea. Then, how can one apply the RBA framework to the North Korean context, and what is the practical program of RBA-PRS?

Ⅳ. RBA-PRS Program Proposed for North Korea

World leaders at the 2005 World Summit reconfirmed their determination to ensure the timely and full realization of the MDGs, including the eradication of poverty and hunger, stressing “the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair.” Following the statement, international human rights community, including the OHCHR plunged into a work to make a RBA-PRS. Principles and Guidelines for a Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies is a good example proposed by OHCHR in 2006.11 After stipulating the significance of RBA, the OHCHR report presented "the process of formulating, implementing and monitoring a human rights-based poverty reduction strategy" and the contents of the RBA- PRS by "integrating specific human rights standards." The OHCHR presented seven guidelines of RBA-PRS programs as follows: Identification of the poor; National and international human rights framework; Equality and non-discrimination; Setting targets, benchmarks and priorities; Participation; Monitoring and accountability; International assistance and cooperation. Among those guidelines, here I would like to propose some points for making RBA-PRS for North Korea, illustrating some of the guidelines. Considering North Korean chronic violation of the right to food with lack of resources, the guideline of "setting targets, benchmarks and priorities" is more important than any other guideline. Of course, resource constraints may not affect a state’s ability to respect and protect human rights to the same extent as its ability to fulfill human rights, but the recognition of a time dimension and the need for considering trade-offs and prioritization are common features of all approaches to policy making. Here we can see the guideline is deeply related to another guideline, especially guideline of equality and non-discrimination, and participation, because setting targets and priorities is required to ensure people’s equal and non- discriminatory participation that need sufficient food but have been marginalized in decision making process.

11 OHCHR, Principles and Guidelines for a Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies (New York and Geneva, 2006). Furthermore, in cases where a right cannot be realized immediately due to resource constraints, the state must begin immediately to take steps to fulfill the rights in question as expeditiously as possible. According to a survey, the total amount of grain had increased in 2013 in DPRK and presumably the grain situation has improved, but most people are excluded from the official distribution loop and are discriminated against in the process.12 Still in the continuous situation of food shortage, the right to food is the worst among the poor. Therefore, policy priority should be put on helping the abject poor, while increasing food production and aid. It seems natural that the guideline of participation is following that of setting targets, benchmarks and priorities in the RBA-PRS program. Active and informed participation by the poor is not only consistent with but also demanded by the RBA, because the international human rights normative framework affirms the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs. Based on the principle of participation, OHCHR stipulates four stages of participation: preference revelation; policy choice; implementation; and monitoring, assessment and accountability. Here a key point is the subject and method of participation if we recognize that participation is to realize the efficiency of RBA-PRS program. Those who need sufficient food while being violated the right to food should be guaranteed of participation first. Their effective participation requires more than the practice of electoral democracy. Specific mechanisms and institutional arrangements through which people living in poverty can effectively participate at different stages of decision-making are needed. Empowerment requires simultaneous efforts to promote a range of other human rights. For example, if people living in poverty are to participate meaningfully in the conduct of public affairs, they must be free to organize without restriction (right of association), to meet without impediment (right of assembly), to say what they want to without intimidation (freedom of expression) and to know the relevant facts (right to information). North Korea has always emphasized the increased agricultural productivity. Kim Jong-un in his ‘2014 New Year Message’ had stressed “agriculture as a major thrust of our effort in the struggle for economic construction and improving the people's standard of living, and concentrate all our efforts on farming.” But since the late 1990s North Korean right to food has not been met not only by the public distribution system, but also by private sectors. The DPRK in its second UPR report in 2014 evaluated the right to food focusing on farming and production capability in which the guidelines of RBA-PRS program could not found. FAO-WFP joint Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission was not implemented based on the guidelines of RBA-PRS program, too. The both development ship and human rights ship were passing at the dark sea.13 DPRK government and international food agency need to apply those guidelines, in particular the participation guideline so that RBA-PRS program would increase its efficiency and efficacy. The term ‘accountability’ is a popular one since the discourse of ‘the right to protect’ (R2P) has been official in 2000s. The guideline of accountability in the RBA-PRS program is meaningful if accountability is extended into the sphere of development. The OHCHR categorized accountability mechanism into judicial, quasi-judicial, administrative, and political one, implying some form of remedy and reparation not necessarily punishment. Like R2P, the guideline of accountability requires not only domestic actors but global actors to be subject to

12 Han Dong-ho et al, White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2014, p. 385. 13 Philip Alston, “Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of the Human Rights and Development Debate Seen through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals,” Human Rights Quarterly 27: 3 (2005), pp. 755-829. accessible, transparent and effective monitoring and accountability procedures. According to the national human rights report released for the first time in September 2014 by the North Korean government-sponsored human rights organizations, DPRK has various kinds of organizations that have missions to contribute to human rights improvement.14 However, many reports on North Korean human rights out of DPRK point out that North Korea’s report is distant from the truth, quoting the witness and experience of the escapees from North Korea. Some organizations such as the Supreme People’s Assembly and National Defense Commission at the report above are not related with human rights. In particular, as international governmental and non-governmental organizations have criticized continuously, North Korea does not have a national human rights institution which is independent of government policy orientation and other pressure. A bigger issue is that DPRK does not recognize the interdependent relationship of human rights and development, rather thinking development is economic growth. Strongly opposing human rights resolutions at the UN charter body using the discourse of R2P, DPRK would be suspicious of the application of the guideline of accountability into their development policy. Technical cooperation between North Korean government and OHCHR, and North Korean international cooperation with advanced countries are useful for North Koreans to learn and institutionalize the guideline of accountability. To ensure accountability, the two parties, North Korea and international community, need to push for identifying specific obstacles of duty-bearers in parallel with capacity building of rights-holders, especially most disadvantaged. Building relationships between rights-holders and duty-bearers by working together is also demanded at both central and local level.

Ⅴ. Conclusion

By principle, human rights are indivisible and interdependent. This goes the same for human rights and the other universal values. To implement these fundamentals, it is necessary to understand the current reality and context of the situation and then prepare so that one makes a realistic strategy be put into place. North Korea is an underdeveloped country and a highly security threat with great human rights violations. At this time, it is necessary to implement a cooperative project with the North in an area that has a low level of tension and conflict. It is possible to combine human rights and development focused on economic and social rights, in particular the right to food. With the efforts to reduce poverty in North Korea and applying the human rights perspective, is an area where the international community and the North can cooperate on. This is why RBA- PRS is suggested for North Korea. Even if the needs of North Korea and the possibility of international cooperation is a positive one, currently there is no guarantee that the RBA-PRS will be successful in North Korea. North Korea is unfamiliar with the concept of RBA and still considers development equivalent to economic growth, they are government oriented

14 The Chosun Human Rights Research Council, “The Report of Chosun Human Rights Research Council,” 13 September 2014, Pyongyang. and weak in having a human rights perspective. In the guidelines necessary for a successful RBA-PRS, North Korea is not prepared. It is necessary to have monitoring and capacity building be parallel for civil servants of the DPRK and its citizens as well as in the central and provincial regions. In order for this to occur international organizations and the North Korean government must cooperate. Through the cooperation, a guideline for the creation of a RBA-PRS program can be negotiated. There is a high possibility for North Korea to place more weight on economic development and emphasize reform therefore RBA will increasingly become more important.