Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Electronic Filing System. http://estta.uspto.gov ESTTA Tracking number: ESTTA1041959 Filing date: 03/12/2020

IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Proceeding 91245750 Party Plaintiff Portland Mavericks Club, Inc. Correspondence FRANK J BONINI JR Address BONINI IP LAW LLC 150 N RADNOR CHESTER RD , SUITE F200 RADNOR, PA 19087 UNITED STATES [email protected] 484-382-3060

Submission Motion for Summary Judgment

Yes, the Filer previously made its initial disclosures pursuant to Trademark Rule 2.120(a); OR the motion for summary judgment is based on claim or issue pre- clusion, or lack of jurisdiction.

The deadline for pretrial disclosures for the first testimony period as originally set or reset: 03/13/2020 Filer's Name Frank J. Bonini, Jr. Filer's email [email protected] Signature /Frank j. Bonini, Jr./ Date 03/12/2020 Attachments Motion for SummaryFF031220.pdf(374941 bytes ) IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

In re Application No. 87/407047 for the mark PORTLAND MAVERICKS filed on April 11, 2017 and published on September 11, 2018; and Application No. 87/407131 for the mark PORTLAND MAVERICKS and design filed on April 11, 2017 and published on September 11, 2018

) Portland Mavericks Baseball Club, Inc., ) ) ) Opposition No. 91245750 [Parent] Opposer ) Opposition No. 91245751 ) ) Mark(s): v. ) PORTLAND MAVERICKS ) PORTLAND MAVERICKS and ) Design The National Association of ) Leagues, Inc., ) ) Applicant. ) )

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF OPPOSER PORTLAND MAVERICKS BASEBALL CLUB, INC.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES …………………………………………………………………..... ii

I. INTRODUCTION………………………………………………….………….…..……... 1

The Parties And Background………………………………....…………………………... 1

II. SUMMARY ………………………………………………………….……………..…… 4

III. FACTS…….………………………………………………………….……………..…… 4

IV. ARGUMENT .………………………………………………………….……………..…. 9

V. CONCLUSION ……………………………………………………….……………...... 12

i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986) ...... 9

M.Z. Berger & Co. v. Swatch AG, 787 F.3d 1368, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 9276, 114 USPQ2d 1892 (Fed. Cir. 2015)...... …...... 10

Swatch AG (Swatch SA) (Swatch Ltd.) v. M. Z. Berger & Co. , 2013 TTAB LEXIS 515, 108 USPQ2d 1463 (TTAB September 30, 2013) …...... ….10-11

Spirits Int'l, B.V. v. S.S. Taris Zeytin Ve Zeytinyagi Tarim Satis Kooperatifleri Birligi, 2011 TTAB LEXIS 204, 99 USPQ2d 1545 (TTAB July 6, 2011) …...... ….…...11

Universal Nutrition Corp. v. Carbolite Foods, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 526, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14021 (D.N.J. 2004) ...... 9

Statutes

Trademark Act § 1(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)...... 8, 10

Rules

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 ...... 9

Other Authorities

TMEP §1101 – Bona Fide Intention To Use the Mark In Commerce ...... 10

NYT, The Minor League Teams That Could Lose M.L.B. Ties, The New York Times (Nov. 16, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/16/sports/baseball/mlb-minor-league-proposal. html...... 2

Gabe Lacques, ‘Ripping a community apart’: Minor-league franchises on the chopping block ready to fight MLB’s proposal, USA TODAY (Dec. 10, 2019) https://www.usatoday.com /story/ sports/mlb/2019/12/10/mlb-winter-meetings-minor-league-contraction/43825180 02/...... 2

ii I . INTRODUCTION

The Parties and Background

Opposer, Portland Mavericks Baseball Club, Inc., is an Oregon corporation established on July 29, 2014 with the vision of recreating the Portland Mavericks in the same spirit as it was under the team's original founder, : a team that would, once again, play with other independent organizations, free from Professional Baseball’s (i.e., the Applicant’s) influence.

(Exhibit A hereto, PM001003833-3835, and Barnell Decl. ¶¶ 2 and 4 Barnell Ex. 1) Opposer, through its personnel, including Mr. Dwight Barnell and Ms. Trish Vames who began her work with Opposer in 2015, has organized and coordinated providing players for appearances at events, including for teams, which includes the : “Hi Trish!

My name is Kyle Lussier and I am reaching out about Mavs Mondays … I work with Peter Lee on promotions [i.e. Peter Lee of the Hillsboro Hops] .... My first question would be how many players are available and who? We would love to have Mavs players come out for our next games.… We would also love to get out to a game … [For pregame w]e could have some of the team signing up on the concourse for a few innings.… there’s still a lot of Mavs fans around.… Let me know if this sounds like something we could do!” (Exhibit B hereto,

PM001003790; and Vames Decl. ¶ 5 and Ex. 1)

The Portland Mavericks players which played (and/or coached/managed) the Portland

Mavericks team that played in the 1970's', appeared at the baseball park (where the Hillsboro

Hops play, and would set up a station with signage, and provide photo opportunities and autographs) (Exhibit C hereto, PM001003826 and Vames Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. 2). The 1970's team was famous for being "mavericks" in the true sense of the definition, as the "Portland Mavericks" team that played in the 1970's was an independent team, and not one of Applicant's minor league baseball franchises. (Exhibit D hereto, NAPBL000128-NAPBL000131, and Barnell Decl. ¶ 5

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Ex. 2). The 1970's Portland Mavericks baseball team was organized by Bing Russell, whose team was well-know as much for what it was not as for what it was, namely an unaffiliated organization independent of the constraints of minor league baseball. (Exhibit E hereto,

NAPBL000061-NAPBL000073; and Barnell Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 3).

Opposer has coordinated appearances of former Portland Mavericks Players for public events and special events, including, for example, an auction for the Hillsboro Hops. (Exhibit F hereto, PM001003794, and Vames Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. 3). Opposer also operates social media sites, which Opposer commenced in July 2015, where Opposer provides information about the

Portland Mavericks players that played in the 1970's (Exhibit G hereto, PM001003892-

PM001004045, and Vames Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. 4; Barnell Decl. ¶ 6). Opposer has been engaged in establishing a baseball league, and has undertaken stadium designs, and considerations for locations (Exhibit H hereto, **CONFIDENTIAL** PM001004196-4231; and Barnell Decl. ¶ 7,

Ex. 4)

Applicant, The National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, Inc.., is better known as Minor League Baseball. Applicant has a number of teams, and according to reports, plans to curtail the number of teams in the near future: “A proposal would drastically alter the landscape of minor league baseball, severing the major league affiliations of 42 teams in the lower levels of the minors.” (See Exhibit I hereto, New York

Times, 2019 "The Minor League Teams That Could Lose M.L.B. Ties ", Barnell Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. 5);

[The] new Professional Baseball Agreement [] would reduce by nearly 25% the number of affiliated minor-league clubs.” (See Exhibit J hereto, Lacques, "Ripping a community apart’:

Minor-league franchises on the chopping block ready to fight MLB’s proposal", Barnell Decl. ¶

9, Ex. 6). Applicant, in papers filed during this Opposition and in its Applications before the

USPTO, has asserted that the Portland Mavericks team that played in the 1970's was one of

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Applicant's professional baseball clubs from. 1973 to 1977. (See Exhibit K, Applicant’s Updated

Responses to Opposer's First Request for Admissions, Responses to Requests Nos. 49 and 50, at p. 16-17, Barnell Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. 7). Applicant seeks to recapture old names used by now defunct teams, and monetize those names through a licensing scheme, and as part of Applicant's scheme,

Applicant has even filed and supported trademark applications and registrations with specimens that do not even constitute a current use or sale by the Applicant, but rather a sale by others of a pre-owned jersey from years ago. (See Exhibit L, PM001001352-1425, in particular 1358 and

1352-1354, and Barnell Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. 8). Applicant has even undertaken to coerce others into taking a license by representing to them that Applicant owned marks, including "PORTLAND

MAVERICKS" and "", and even stating that these marks were

"Registered". (Exhibit M, Barnell Decl. ¶ 12, Ex. 9).

Although Applicant has made numerous objections to providing information, Opposer pointed out to Applicant what appear to be flagrant discovery deficiencies (including Applicant's general objections - which are improper, claims of privilege without any responsive documents being identified, as well as repetitive boilerplate objections that most, if not all, courts and the

Board would not tolerate).

In the face of requests for updates made by Opposer of Applicant, Applicant provided updated responses, in some instances changing a previously denied admission response to an admission. However, in Applicant's updated responses, Applicant confirmed that it has no documentary evidence of an intent to use the mark with the listed services, and also that

Applicant lacks personal knowledge of such documentary evidence.

Applicant has not provided documentary evidence, and has disclaimed personal knowledge of the same, and therefore cannot establish an intent to use the mark with the services.

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Opposer moves for summary judgment on its Opposition against Applicant's applications.

II. SUMMARY

Opposer makes this Motion for Summary Judgment on Count III of Opposer's Notices of

Opposition on the grounds that Applicant lacks a bona fide intent to use the mark. Opposer’s

Motion for Summary Judgement should be granted on the basis that the Applicant has failed to provide any evidence of its intent to use the mark in response to Opposer’s requests (and

Applicant’s updated responses to Opposer's), and moreover, Applicant has indicated that that there are no documents evidencing its intent to use in response to Opposer’s requests, and

Applicant has no personal knowledge. Applicant has no documentary evidence of an intent to use the applied for marks; and Applicant admits that it has no personal knowledge of the existence of any such documentary evidence.

III. FACTS

The following constitute undisputed material facts that establish that Opposer is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Opposer's opposition claims.

1. On April 11, 2017, Applicant filed a US trademark application for the registration of the mark PORTLAND MAVERICKS for “entertainment services in the nature of baseball games and exhibitions”, and also filed a US trademark application for the registration of the mark

PORTLAND MAVERICKS and design for “entertainment services in the nature of baseball games and exhibitions”. Applicant’s applications were respectively assigned Serial Nos.

87/407047 and 87/407131, and are the subjects of this consolidated opposition. (Doc-1,

Opposition Notices ¶ 1 of each, and Doc-4, Answer ¶ 1 of each)

2. On July 16, 2018, Applicant’s Applications which were originally filed pursuant to

Section 1(a), on the basis of use in commerce, were amended to Section 1(b), intent-to use. (See

July 16, 2018 amendments filed in each of Application Serial Nos. 87/407047 and 87/407131)

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3. Subsequent to and as a result of the Applicant's amendments, Applicant's applications were eventually approved by the USPTO and published for opposition. (See Application files of

Application Serial Nos. 87/407047 and 87/407131)

4. On January 9, 2019, Opposer filed a Notice of Opposition to oppose registration of the mark PORTLAND MAVERICKS for use with “entertainment services in the nature of baseball games and exhibitions”, of US Application Serial no. 87/407047 (`047 application). The `047 application was filed by Applicant on April 11, 2017, and was assigned Serial No. 87/407047.

On January 9, 2019, Opposer also filed a Notice of Opposition to oppose registration of the mark

PORTLAND MAVERICKS and design for use with “entertainment services in the nature of baseball games and exhibitions”, of US Application Serial no. 87/407131 (`131 application). The

`131 application was filed by Applicant on April 11, 2017, and was assigned Serial No.

87/407131 (the `047 and `131 applications hereinafter “Applicant’s applications”). The Board consolidated the Oppositions, now the present proceeding.

5. Opposer maintains its positions set forth in its Notices of Opposition and, more specifically, states that Applicant did not have a bona fide intent to use the mark of Applicant’s application in United States commerce on or in connection with the services that Applicant identified in its application, namely, “Entertainment services in the nature of baseball games and exhibitions,” when Applicant filed Application Nos. 87/407047 and 87/407131.

6. During the consolidated proceedings, Applicant was asked to produce evidence of an intent to use, and, neither Applicant's initial responses, nor Applicant's supplemental (updated responses) provide such information. Not only has Applicant failed to provide documentary evidencing an intent to use, but also, Applicant has disclaimed any personal knowledge of intent to use documents, a claim made bearing the signature of Applicant's counsel, the very same

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counsel that signed the declaration required to amend Applicant's applications from the original

Section 1(a) use basis to the Section 1(b) intent to use basis.

7. Applicant's discovery responses were evasive and contained improper boilerplate objections, interspersed privilege claims without reference to a document, and asserted objections but failed to point out the substance of the specific objections. In view of the

Applicant's evasive responses and its refusal to provide documents and information, including evidence of an intent to use, Opposer requested that Applicant remove the improper objections and provide proper discovery responses. (See Exhibit N hereto, Barnell Decl. ¶ 13, Ex. 10) In fact, Opposer, in its counsel's letter, specifically requested that Applicant provide evidence of

Applicant's intent to use:

“Similarly, Opposer’s Admission Request No. 16 asks Applicant [] to deny that it has any evidence that shows bona fide intent to use the marks in Applicant’s applications. Applicant fails to address the question and is clearly evasive in Applicant’s response… Applicant must provide a complete and unqualified response”

(Exhibit N, Opposer's counsel's November 14, 2019 letter to Applicant's counsel, pp. 10-11, Barnell Decl. ¶ 13, Ex. 10)

8. Applicant has had multiple chances to provide evidence of its intent to use from the time

Opposer served its discovery requests to Applicant produce such documents, which were served on September 6, 2019. (See Exhibits O, P and Q hereto, respectively, Opposer's First Requests for Admissions to Applicant, Opposer's First Requests for Production of Documents to

Applicant, and Opposer's First Interrogatories to Applicant, Barnell Decl. ¶ 14, Exs. 11, 12 and

13). Instead, after Applicant's initial refusals, and even after Applicant's updated responses,

Applicant has indicated that it has no documents, and even more conclusive is Applicant's claim that after Applicant made a reasonable inquiry, Applicant lacks "personal knowledge". (Exhibit

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R hereto, Applicant's Updated Responses to Opposer’s Document Production Requests,

Response no. 55 [sic], at p. 35, Barnell Decl. ¶ 15, Ex. 14)1

9. On January 30, 2020, Applicant provided its updated responses to Opposer’s discovery requests, but even the Applicant's updated responses still failed to provide any documents evidencing its intent to use after being requested to do so numerous times by Opposer, and once more objected explicitly stating that Applicant has a lack of personal knowledge. (Id.)

10. In Applicant’s updated response to Opposer’s Document Production Request No. 55

[sic], Applicant states that it does not possess any documents sufficient to support the denials it made in response to Admissions Requests Nos. 7 through 12 and 16, one of which requests for all documents sufficient to support the denial made by Applicant that documents evidencing intent to use do exist. (See Exhibit R, id., and see Exhibit K, Applicant's Updated Response to

Opposer's First Request for Admissions, Response to Request no. 16, at p. 16-17, Barnell Decl. ¶

10, Ex. 7). Applicant stated that it does not possess any evidence of its intent to use, as required by Trademark Act § 1(b). Moreover, Applicant has provided no objective evidence of an intent to use and Applicant therefore has no intent to use, and the Oppositions must be sustained.

Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate.

Admissions Request No. 16 and Applicant’s Updated Response (Exhibit K)

1 The Request was initially objected to by Applicant due to a numbering issue, and there was a transposition of the parties. Counsel requested via the letter of November 14, 2019 that Applicant provide a proper response, namely produce documents. (See p. 4 of counsel's November 14, 2019 letter, Exhibit N; Barnell Decl. ¶ 13, Ex. 10). Applicant responded with an update, again denying the existence of any documents. See Exhibit R hereto, Applicant's Updated Responses to Opposer’s Document Production Requests, Response no. 55 [sic], at p. 35, Barnell Decl. ¶ 15, Ex. 14.

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Document Production Request No. 55 [sic] and Applicant’s Updated Response

(Exhibit R hereto, Applicant's Updated Responses to Opposer’s Document Production

Requests, Response no. 55 [sic], p. 35, Barnell Decl. ¶ 15, Ex. 14)

In summary, Opposer, in its Notices of Opposition and now, alleges that Applicant lacked a bona fide intent to use the marks, in violation of Trademark Act § 1(b), 15 U.S.C. §1051(b).

Opposer’s Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted on Count III of each of Opposer's

Oppositions, Nos. 91245750 and 91245751, the registration of the marks should be denied, and the Oppositions sustained in favor of Opposer.

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IV. ARGUMENT

“A party seeking summary judgment must ‘show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of [] law.’ Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c) [citations omitted]. The threshold inquiry is whether there are ‘any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.’ Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 91 L. Ed.

2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986) (noting HN3 that no issue for trial exists unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict in its favor).” Universal

Nutrition Corp. v. Carbolite Foods, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 526, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14021

(D.N.J. June 7, 2004, Decided).

According to Rule 56, the party that brings forth the motion must be “awarded summary judgment on [] all properly supported issues identified in its motion, except those for which the non-moving party has provided evidence to show that a question of material fact remains.

[citations omitted]. [In other words,] once the moving party has properly supported its showing of no triable issue of fact and of an entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, for example, with affidavits, which may be 'supplemented' by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits,’ [citation omitted], 'its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.' Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n. 12; see also

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48 (‘By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion … the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.’)

(emphasis in original)”. Id.

Applicant has failed to provide documentary evidence of an intent to use the mark in commerce. There is no “triable issue of fact” in the present case because Applicant has admitted

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that it does not possess, nor does it have any personal knowledge of, any documentary evidence of Applicant’s bona fide intent to use the mark in U.S. commerce, which is required for

Applicant’s filing of a 1(b) trademark application. In Count III of each of Opposer’s Opposition

Notices, Opposer alleges that Applicant has no bona fide intent to use the mark. Applicant's discovery responses fail to demonstrate documentary evidence of an intent to use.

For these reasons that Applicant’s applications must be rejected, registration refused, and the Oppositions must be sustained.

According to TMEP §1101, and as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed in M.Z. Berger & Co. v. Swatch AG, it is appropriate for the Board to allow an inquiry of Applicant’s good faith statement of intent to use the mark, made under the requirements set forth in Section 1(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1051(b), when evidence of the record indicates the applicant does not (or did not) have the intent to use the mark in commerce. Id.,

787 F.3d 1368, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 9276, 114 USPQ2d 1892 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Moreover, the failure to provide such evidence on the applicant’s part justifies sustaining the opposition.

In Swatch AG (Swatch SA) (Swatch Ltd.) v. M. Z. Berger & Co, the Board stated the general procedure and standards:

Opposer has the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that applicant lacked a bona fide intent to use the mark on the identified goods at the time it filed its application. We note at the outset that our inquiry is not into applicant's subjective state of mind alone. Rather, evidence of circumstances bearing on intent “is ‘objective’ in the sense that it is evidence in the form of real life facts and by the actions of the applicant, not by the applicant's testimony as to its subjective [] state of mind. That is, Congress did not intend the issue to be resolved simply by an officer of applicant later testifying, ‘Yes, indeed, at the time we filed that application, I did truly intend to use the mark at some time in the future.’” [citations omitted]. Thus, as we have consistently held, our determination whether an applicant has a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce is an objective determination, based on all the circumstances. [citations omitted].(‘… Thus, an opposer may defeat a trademark application for lack of bona fide intent by proving the applicant did not actually intend to use the mark in commerce or by proving the circumstances at the time of filing did not demonstrate that intent.’). One way an opposer can establish its prima

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facie case of no bona fide intent is by proving that applicant has no documentary evidence to support its allegation in the application of its claimed bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce as of the application filing date. [citation omitted. The absence of any documentary evidence regarding an applicant's bona fide intention to use a mark in commerce is sufficient to prove that an applicant lacks the intention required by Section 1(b) of the Trademark Act, unless other facts are presented which adequately explain or outweigh applicant's failure to provide such documentary evidence. [citations omitted]. If opposer satisfies its initial burden of showing the absence of documentary [] evidence regarding applicant's bona fide intention to use the mark, the burden of production shifts to applicant to come forward with evidence adequately explaining or outweighing the failure to provide such documentary evidence. [citation omitted].

Swatch AG (Swatch SA) (Swatch Ltd.) v. M. Z. Berger & Co., 2013 TTAB LEXIS 515, *24-26, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d 1463, 1471 (TTAB September 30, 2013) (emphasis added).

Just as the Board did in Swatch AG, the Board in Spirits Int'l ruled in favor of the opposer where the applicant failed to provide documentary evidence of its intent to use, stating:

As detailed above, applicant has supplied no documentary evidence regarding its intent to use its mark on any alcoholic beverages, and has affirmatively stated that no such documents exist. Opposer's submission of these responses is sufficient for opposer to satisfy its initial burden of proving that applicant did not and does not have an intention to use its applied-for mark on or in connection with alcoholic beverages, which includes some of the goods identified in both of the opposed classes in applicant's [] application. The burden thus shifts to applicant to come forward with evidence which would adequately explain or outweigh the failure to provide such documentary evidence. As previously noted, applicant submitted no evidence whatsoever, nor did it file a brief. Therefore, applicant has failed to rebut the opposer's evidence, and the opposition on the ground that opposer lacks a bona fide intent to use its mark on all of the goods identified in the opposed classes of its application is sustained.

Spirits Int'l, B.V. v. S.S. Taris Zeytin Ve Zeytinyagi Tarim Satis Kooperatifleri Birligi, 2011 TTAB LEXIS 204, *10-11, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545, 1549 (TTAB July 6, 2011).

Opposer, in Opposer's Admission Request no. 16, requested Applicant to admit that

Applicant does not possess any documents that evidence that Applicant had a bona fide intent to use the marks of the subject Applications, to which Applicant responded “Denied”.

Admissions Request No. 16 and Applicant’s Updated Response

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(Exhibit K, Applicant's Updated Response to Opposer's First Request for Admissions, Response to Request no. 16, p. 6, Barnell Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. 7)

Applicant was also asked to produce all documents supporting any unqualified denial given by Applicant to that particular admission request. The Opposer's discovery request for production was made in document production Request no. 55[sic] which requested Applicant to support its denial to Admissions Request no. 16.

Applicant's response to that request is that “Applicant ha[s] no documents in its custody, control, or possession relevant or responsive [to the request for documents supporting any denial made in response to Admissions requests nos. 7 through 12 and 16]. (emphasis added). Applicant also further indicated it "lacked personal knowledge". (Id.)

Accordingly, the Board should rule in favor of the Opposer and sustain the Oppositions because the Applicant has failed to provide any documentary evidence demonstrating an intent to use the mark. Moreover, Applicant's updated discovery responses to Opposer’s requests (and

Opposer's deficiency correspondence to Applicant) indicates that such evidence does not exist, and that or Applicant does not possess any evidence of intent. Applicant has even disclaimed any personal knowledge of the existence of any documentary evidence that establishes intent.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, Opposer requests that the Board rule in favor of

Opposer’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Count III of each of Opposer’s Notices of

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Opposition, reject Applicant’s Applications, that registrations of the marks on behalf the

Applicant be denied, and that these consolidated Oppositions to registration of the marks be sustained, because prevailing on Count III renders the remaining counts moot and the Opposition should be sustained.

Respectfully submitted,

PORTLAND MAVERICKS BASEBALL CLUB, INC.

Dated: March 12, 2020 /Frank J. Bonini, Jr./ Frank J. Bonini, Jr. (Reg. No. 35,452) Bonini IP Law LLC 150 N. Radnor Chester Road Suite F200 Radnor, PA 19087 [email protected] Attorney for Opposer, Portland Mavericks Baseball Club, Inc.

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IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

PORTLAND MAVERICKS BASEBALL CLUB, INC., Opposition No. 91245750 [Parent] Opposer, Opposition No. 91245751

v. Mark: PORTLAND MAVERICKS THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF and design PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL LEAGUES, INC., Applicant.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the following:

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF OPPOSER PORTLAND MAVERICKS BASEBALL CLUB, INC.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE, were served on the following, via Email on March 12, 2020:

Mary Frances Love Attorney for Applicant, The National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, Inc. Aspire IP, LLC 6 N. Tejon Street, Suite 400 Colorado Springs, CO 80903 [email protected], [email protected]

Dated: March 12, 2020 /Frank J. Bonini, Jr./