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Ukraine / Russia Sanctions

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Ukraine / Russia Sanctions FULL LIST - UKRAINE / RUSSIA SANCTIONS UKRAINE FREEZING ASSETS OF CORRUPT FOREIGN OFFICIALS (UKRAINE) REGULATIONS Entry Into Force - March 5 (Link to Regs) 1. Mykola Yanovych AZAROV 2. Oleksii Mykolayovych AZAROV 3. Raisa Vasylivna BOHATYRIOVA 4. Ihor Oleksandrovych KALININ 5. Andrii Petrovych KLIUIEV 6. Serhii Petrovych KLIUIEV 7. Serhiy Vitaliyovych KURCHENKO 8. Olena Leonidivna LUKASH 9. Andriy Volodymyrovych PORTNOV 10. Artem Viktorovych PSHONKA 11. Viktor Pavlovych PSHONKA 12. Viktor Ivanovych RATUSHNIAK 13. Dmytro Volodymyrovych TABACHNYK 14. Oleksandr Hryhorovych YAKYMENKO 15. Viktor Fedorovych YANUKOVYCH 16. Viktor Viktorovych YANUKOVYCH 17. Oleksandr Viktorovych YANUKOVYCH 18. Vitalii Yuriyovych ZAKHARCHENKO SPECIAL ECONOMIC MEASURES (UKRAINE) REGULATIONS Entry Into Force - March 17 (Link to Regs) Individuals 1. Serhiy Valeriyovich AKSYONOV 2. Volodymyr Andriyovych KONSTANTYNOV 3. Viktor Volodymyrovich MEDVEDCHUK Entry Into Force - March 19 (Link to Regs) Individuals 4. Rustam Ilmirovich TEMIRGALIEV 5. Deniz Valentinovich BEREZOVSKIY 6. Aleksei Mikhailovich CHALIY 7. Pyotr Anatoliyovych ZIMA 8. Yuriy ZHEREBTSOV 9. Sergey Pavlovych TSEKOV Entry Into Force - April 12 (Link to Regs) Individuals 10. Valery MEDVEDEV 11. Mikhail MALYSHEV Entity 1. Chornomornaftogaz Entry into Force - May 12 (Link to Regs) Individuals 12. Olga Federovna KOVATIDI 13. German PROKOPIV 14. Valeriy BOLOTOV 15. Andriy PURGIN 16. Denys PUSHYLIN 17. Sergey Gennadevich TSYPLAKOV Entry into Force - June 21 (Link to Regs) Individuals 18. Petr Grigorievich JAROSH 19. Oleg Grigorievich KOZYURA 20. Viacheslav PONOMARIOV 21. Igor Mykalaiovych BEZLER 22. Igor KAKIDZYANOV 23. Oleg TSARIOV 24. Roman LYAGIN 25. Aleksandr MALYKHIN 26. Natalia Vladimirovna POKLONSKAYA 27. Igor Sergeievich SHEVCHENKO Entity 1. Feodosia Enterprise SPECIAL ECONOMIC MEASURES Entry into Force - July 11 (Link to Regs) Individuals 1. Viktor Yuriiovych ANOSOV 2. Viacheslav Anatoliiovych APRAKSIMOV 3. Fedir Dmytrovych BEREZIN 4. Ruslan Yunirovish ILKAEV 5. Valery Vladimirovich KAUROV 6. Oleksandr Sergiyovych KHODAKOVSKYI 7. Mykola Ivanovych KOZITSYN 8. Oleksii Borysovych MOZGOVYI 9. Valerii Kostiantynovych MUSIIENKO 10. Viacheslav Mykolaiovych PETROV 11. Ihor Venedyktovych PLOTNITSKY 12. Yurii Oleksandrovych PROTSENKO 13. Oleh Anatoliiovych VASIN 14. Serhii Anatoliyovych ZDRILIUK SPECIAL ECONOMIC MEASURES (UKRAINE) Entry Into Force - July 16 (Link to Regs) Entities 1. DONETSK PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 2. LUGANSK PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC SPECIAL ECONOMIC MEASURES (UKRAINE) Entry Into Force - July 24 (Link to Regs) Individuals 1. VLADIMIR ANTYUFEYEV(aka SHEVTSOV) 2. MARAT BASHIROV 3. YURIY IVAKIN 4. ALEXANDR ALEXSANDROVICH KALYUSSKY 5. ALEKSEY KARYAKIN 6. ALEKSANDR KHRYAKOV 7. VASYL NIKITIN 8. Alexander BORODAI SPECIAL ECONOMIC MEASURES (SECTORAL) (UKRAINE) Entry Into Force - August 6 (Link to Regs) Individuals 1. Pavel GUBAREV 2. Ekaterina GUBAREVA 3. Oksana TCHIGRINA 4. Boris LITVINOV 5. Sergey ABISOV Entities 6. Federal State of Novorossiya 7. International Union of Public Associations ‘Great Don Army’ 8. Army of the Southeast 9. Lugansk Guard 10. Sobol 11. Donbass People's Militia 12. ‘Vostok battalion’ 13. State ferry enterprise ‘Kerch ferry’ 14. State enterprise Sevastopol commercial seaport 15. State enterprise ‘Kerch commercial sea port’ 16. State enterprise Universal - Avia 17. Resort ‘Nizhnyaya Oreanda’ 18. Crimean enterprise ‘Azov distillery plant’ 19. State concern ‘National Association of producers “Massandra” 20. ‘State enterprise Magarach of the national institute of wine’ 21. State enterprise ‘Factory of sparkling wine Novy Svet’ Entry into Force February 2015 Individuals Pavel Dremov Alexey Milchakov Arseny Pavlov Mikhail Tolstykh Eduard Basurin Alexandr Shubin Sergey Litvin Sergey Ignatov Ekaterina Filippova Alexandr Timofeev Evgeny Manuilov Viktor Yatsenko Olga Besedina Entities Cossack National Guard Donetsk People's Republic Free Donbass Kalmius Battalion Luhansk Economic Union Oplot Peace to Luhansk Region People's Union Prizrak Brigade Profaktor, TOV Smert aka Death Battalion Sparta Battalion The South-East Movement Zarya Battalion RUSSIA SPECIAL ECONOMIC MEASURES Entry Into Force - March 17 (Link to Regs) Individuals 1. Sergei Yuryevich GLAZYEV 2. Andrei KLISHAS 3. Valentina Ivanova MATVIYENKO 4. Yelena Borisovna MIZULINA 5. Dmitry Olegovich ROGOZIN 6. Leonid Eduardovich SLUTSKIY 7. Vladislav Yuryevich SURKOV Entry Into Force - March 19 (Link to Regs) Individuals 8. Viktor Alekseevich OZEROV 9. Vladimir Michailovich DZHABAROV 10. Nikolai Ivanovich RYZHKOV 11. Evgeni Viktorovich BUSHMIN 12. Aleksandr Borisovich TOTOONOV 13. Oleg Evgenevich PANTELEEV 14. Sergei Mikhailovich MIRONOV 15. Sergei Vladimirovich ZHELEZNYAK 16. Aleksandr Viktorovich VITKO 17. Anatoliy Alekseevich SIDOROV 18. Aleksandr GALKIN Entry Into Force - March 21 (Link to Regs) Individuals 19. Arkadii Viktorovich BAKHIN 20. Andrei Alexandrovich FURSENKO 21. Alexei GROMOV 22. Vitalii Nikitich IGNATENKO 23. Sergei IVANOV 24. Victor Petrovich IVANOV 25. Vladimir Igorevich KOZHIN 26. Yuri Valentinovich KOVALCHUK 27. Mikhail Vitalevich MARGELOV 28. Sergey Yevgenyevich NARYSHKIN 29. Vladimir PLIGIN 30. Igor Dmitrievich SERGUN 31. Gennady TIMCHENKO 32. Yury Viktorovich USHAKOV Entity 33. Bank Rossiya Entry Into Force - April 28 (Link to Regs) Individuals 1. Vyaecheslav VOLODIN 2. Dmitry KOZAK 3. Aleksey PUSHKOV 4. Oleg Evgenyevich BELAVENTSEV 5. Evgeniy Alexsevevich MOROV 6. Vladimir Volfovich ZHIRINOVSKY 7. Arkady ROTENBERG 8. Boris ROTENBERG Entities 9. ExpoBank (Excluded on September, 16) 10. RosEnergoBank (Excluded on September, 16) Entry Into Force - May 4 (Link to Regs) Entities 1. Aquanika (LLC Russkoye Vremia) 2. Avia Group LLC 3. Avia Group Nord LLC 4. CJSC Zest 5. InvestCapitalBank 6. JSB Sobinbank 7. Sakhatrans LLC 8. SMP Bank 9. Stroygazmontazh (SGM) 10. Stroytransgaz Group 11. Stroytransgaz Holding 12. Stroytransgaz LLC 13. Stroytransgaz OJSC 14. Stroytransgaz-M LLC 15. The LLC Investment Company Abros 16. Volga Group Entry into Force - May 12 (Link to Regs) Individuals 1. Valery Vasilevich GERASIMOV 2. Igor GIRKIN (aka Igor STRELKOV) 3. Sergei Ivanovich MENYAILO 4. Sergei Ivanovich NEVEROV 5. Oleg Genrikhovich SAVELYEV 6. Ludmila Ivanovna SHVETSOVA 7. Vladimir SHAMANOV SPECIAL ECONOMIC MEASURES Entry Into Force - July 16 (Link to Regs) Entities 1. VNESHECONOMBANK (VEB) 2. GAZPROMBANK GAS INDUSTRY OJSC 3. OAO NOVATEK 4. OIL COMPANY ROSNEFT SPECIAL ECONOMIC MEASURES Individuals 1. Sergey Orestovoch BESEDA 2. Igor Olegovich SHCHEGOLEV Entities 4. CONCERN RADIO-ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOG. 5. CONCERN SOZVEZDIE, JSC 6. MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION 7. CONCERN ALMAZ-ANTEY, JSC 8. KALASHNIKOV CONCERN 9. KBP INSTRUMENT DESIGN BUREAU 10. URALVAGONZAVOD OAO 11. FEDERAL STATE ENTERPRISE BAZALT SPECIAL ECONOMIC MEASURES Entry Into Force - August 6 (Link to Regs) Individuals 1. Mikhail Efimovich FRADKOV 2. Nikolai Platonovich PATRUSHEV 3. Aleksandr Vasilievich BORTNIKOV 4. Rashid Gumarovich NURGALIEV 5. Boris Vyacheslavovich GRYZLOV 6. Mikhail Vladimirovich DEGTYAREV 7. Ramzan Akhmadovich KADYROV 8. Alexander Nikolayevich TKACHYOV 9. Konstantin Valerevich MALOFEEV 10. Nikolay Terentievich SHAMALOV 11.Vladimir Georgyevich KULISHOV 12. Valerii Yuriovych TRAVKIN Entities 13. DOBROLET AIRLINES 14. RUSSIAN NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK 15. JOINT STOCK COMMERCIAL BANK OF MOSCOW 16. RUSSIAN AGRICULTURAL BANK 17. OAO VTB BANK 18. OJSC UNITED SHIPBUILDING CORPORATION SPECIAL ECONOMIC MEASURES Entry Into Force - September 12 (Link to Regs) Individuals 1. Alexander ZAKHARCHENKO 2. Vladimir KONONOV/aka ‘Tsar’ 3. Miroslav Vladimirovich RUDENKO 4. Gennadiy Nikolaiovych TSYPKALOV 5. Andrey Yurevich PINCHUK 6. Oleg BEREZA 7. Andrei Nikolaevich RODKIN 8. Aleksandr KARAMAN 9. Georgiy L'vovich MURADOV 10. Mikhail Sergeyevich SHEREMET 11. Yuri Leonidovich VOROBIOV 13. Vladimir Volfovich ZHIRINOVSKY 14. Vladimir Abdualiyevich VASILYEV 15. Viktor Petrovich VODOLATSKY 16. Leonid Ivanovich KALASHNIKOV 17. Vladimir Stepanovich NIKITIN 18. Oleg Vladimirovich LEBEDEV 19. Nikolai Vladimirovich LEVICHEV 20. Svetlana Sergeevna ZHUROVA 21. Aleksey Vasilevich NAUMETS 22. Sergey Viktorovich CHEMEZOV 23. Alexander Mikhailovich BABAKOV 24. General Dmitry Vitalievich BULGAKOV 25. Yuriy Eduardovich SADOVENKO 26. Colonel-General Nikolay BOGDANOVSKIY 27. Colonel-General Oleg Leonidovich SALYUKOV Entities 28. JSC SIRIUS 29. OJSC STANKOINSTRUMENT 30.OAO JSC CHEMCOMPOSITE 31. JSC TULA ARMS PLANT 32. NPK TECHNOLOGII MASCHINISTROJENIJA 33. OAO WYSOKOTOTSCHNYE KOMPLEKSI 34. OPK OBORONPROM 35. UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION 36. URALVAGONZAVOD 37. OJSC Dolgoprudny Research Production Enterprise 38. JSC Kalinin Machine-Building Plant 39. Mitischinskii Machine-Building Plant 40. V. Tikhomirov Scientific Research Institute of Instrument Design 41. Marine Scientific Research Institute of Radioelectronics Altair 43. Sberbank of Russia 44. OAO GAZPROM 45. OAO GAZPROM NEFT 46. OAO LUKOIL 47. OJSC SURGUTNEFTEGAS 48. ROSTEC State Corporation 49. OAO Transneft SPECIAL ECONOMIC MEASURES (SECTORAL) Entry Into Force - December 19 (Link to Regs) Individuals 50. Igor Vladimirovich LEBEDEV 51. Ivan Ivanovich MELNIKOV 52. Yuri Leonidovich VOROBYOV 53. Aleksei MOZGOVOI 54. Dmitriy Sergeyevich NEKLYUDOV 55. Petro Oleksiiovych SAVCHENKO 56. Alexander Sergeyevich ZALDOSTANOV Entities 57. MARSHALL CAPITAL 58. MOLODEZHNAYA ORGANIZATSIYA NOCHNYE VOLKI 59. NOVOROSSIYA PARTY 60. PROFAKTOR, LLC 61. YUGO-VOSTOK MOVEMENT Entry into Force - February 2015 FULL LIST - UKRAINE / RUSSIA SANCTIONS FREEZING
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