I by Erin Crandall Department of Political Science Mcgill University
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UNDERSTANDING JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS REFORM: COMPARING AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES by Erin Crandall Department of Political Science McGill University, Montreal January 2013 A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. © Erin Crandall, 2013 i ABSTRACT The appointment of a judge, regardless of the process followed, is a political act. With the global expansion of judicial power, the topic of judicial appointments has become one of growing political importance. However, comparative research on judicial appointments reform has so far been limited. This dissertation proposes and tests a theory for understanding the timing and nature of reforms to judicial appointments systems, the Judicial Politics Trigger Theory, by looking at the final courts of appeal in Canada, Australia, and the United States. Examining these three courts from their respective origins to the present day, the dissertation situates contemporary interest in judicial appointments reform within the larger framework of each court‘s institutional history. Drawing upon in-depth interviews and archival research, it finds that changes to judicial appointments systems in these cases have tended to evolve incrementally over time. In addition, the dissertation highlights the importance that institutional rules can play in structuring the opportunities for and outcomes of reform, and confirms that there is a correlation between the perception of increased judicial empowerment and calls for judicial appointments reform. Consequently, as the judicial branches in various countries continue to gain political power, interest in and attempts to reform the judicial appointments processes of these courts are likely to continue, making research of such reform all the more essential. RÉSUMÉ La nomination d'un juge, quelle que soit la procédure suivie, est un acte politique. Avec l'expansion mondiale du pouvoir judiciaire, le sujet de la sélection des juges est devenu d'une importance politique plus forte. Cependant, la recherche comparative sur la réforme des processus de nominations judiciaires a été limitée jusqu'a present. Cette thèse propose et teste une théorie pour comprendre le calendrier et la nature des réformes des systèmes de sélection des juges, la théorie du «Judicial Politics Trigger», en examinant les tribunaux de dernière instance au Canada, en Australie et aux États-Unis. En faisant l'examen de ces trois tribunaux de leurs origines respectives à aujourd'hui, la thèse situe l'intérêt contemporain pour la réforme des systemes de sélection des juges dans le cadre plus large de l'histoire institutionnelle de chaque tribunal. S'appuyant sur des entretiens avec les élites politiques et des recherches dans les archives, la thèse etablit que les changements de processus de nominations judiciaires dans ces cas ont eu tendance à évoluer progressivement au fil du temps. En outre, la thèse met en évidence l'importance que les règles institutionnelles peuvent jouer dans la structuration des possibilités et des résultats de la réforme, et confirme qu'il existe une corrélation entre la perception de l'augmentation du pouvoir judiciaire et les appels à la réforme des systemes de selection des juges. Par conséquent, parce les branches judiciaires continuent de conquérir le pouvoir politique, l'intérêt et les tentatives de réformer les processus de sélection des juges de ces tribunaux sont susceptibles de se poursuivre, ce qui rend la recherche de telles réformes d'autant plus indispensable. i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The financial costs to undertake a research project are often quite considerable. I am grateful to have received financial support for this research through a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Doctoral Fellowship, an Endeavour Research Fellowship from the Government of Australia, and an Arts Graduate Student Travel Award from McGill University. Besides being able to afford a hat, I was lucky to always have a place to hang it. In Canada, logistical support was provided by both the Institute for the Study of Canada and the Research Group on Constitutional Studies at McGill University. While in Australia, a home base was provided by the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University. I would like to especially thank Bob Goodin for being such a welcoming and supportive advisor during my time there. I benefitted greatly from the guidance of my supervisory committee. Maria Popova provided insightful comments that pushed me to clarify many components of this project. Jacob Levy offered advice and support well beyond the call of duty, including welcoming me into the activities of McGill‘s political theory community. Christopher Manfredi was, by any count, more than a student could hope for in a supervisor. He worked to simplify the complicated and opened doors that might have otherwise remained closed. My time at McGill brought me many things – good friends and wonderful memories being chief among them. By far the best of these was finding Jeff who has been my biggest source of support. While there are many things to thank him for, it must be acknowledged that he ably performed the unenviable task of unofficial proofreader. With his aid, no one should ever discover that I actually operate at a sixth-grade reading level. I will always be thankful for the continued support of my family. I have two lovely brothers who disagree on everything expect a mutual suspicion that I‘ve continued my studies to make them look bad. My parents have let us follow our own paths and have been there to cheer us on along the way. It‘s hard to measure how much I‘ve gained from them. I would like to dedicate this work to my Aunt Brenda, who was the favourite teacher to countless students and who is missed every single day. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................... I ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................................... II FIGURES ....................................................................................................................................... V INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 1 APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS REFORM ......................................... 3 JUDICIAL POLITICS TRIGGER THEORY ...................................................................................... 10 Formal Reform...................................................................................................................... 10 Informal Reform ................................................................................................................... 15 DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE PROJECT ..................................................................................... 17 Case Selection ....................................................................................................................... 17 Time Periods Chosen ............................................................................................................ 19 Methodological Approach .................................................................................................... 20 Methods for Collecting Data ................................................................................................ 21 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS AND THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF .................................................. 22 ROADMAP .................................................................................................................................. 24 THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (1875-1992) ............................................................. 27 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 28 FOUNDATIONS: CONFEDERATION AND THE FOUNDING OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (1864-1875) ............................................................................................................................... 29 Establishing the Supreme Court of Canada .......................................................................... 32 PERIOD 1: THE SUPREME COURT AS SECOND FIDDLE (1875-1949) ......................................... 34 The Supreme Court‘s Early Struggles .................................................................................. 35 The Supreme Court Act, 1949 .............................................................................................. 41 PERIOD 2: THE SUPREME COURT, FEDERALISM, AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM (1949-1992) 44 iii The Fulton-Favreau Formula (1966) .................................................................................... 47 The Victoria Charter (1968-1971) ........................................................................................ 49 Constitutional Patriation (1978-1982) .................................................................................. 52 Appointment Controversy and Informal Reform (1949-1980) ............................................. 58 The Changing Role of the Supreme Court ............................................................................ 63 Appointment Controversy and Informal Reform (1980-1988) ............................................ 64 The Meech Lake Accord (1987-1990) .................................................................................