10/28/2010
Are HNS Spills More Dangerous Than Oil Spills?
Dr. Karen Purnell Managing Director ‐ ITOPF
‘AEGEAN SEA’, Spain, Image courtesy of Spanish media
What makes HNS spills more or less Chemical & Physical Properties dangerous than oil spills?
Physical data i) Chemical & Physical properties Specific gravity = 0.87 ii) Circumstances Flash point = ‐11˚C iii) Preparedness & Response Vapour pressure = 74.6 mm Hg at 20˚C
Explosion limits = 1.3% to 8%
Melting point = 5.5˚C
Physical Properties ‐ ‐ Packaging
Image courtesy of Environment Canada
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What makes HNS spills more or less Circumstances ––CargoCargo Information dangerous than oil spills?
…”it was widely assumed i) Chemical & Physical properties that an undeclared consignment of fireworks ii) Circumstances blew up, almost iii) Preparedness & Response destroying the ship.”
Although experts later thought the cause was most likely to have been calcium hypochlorite stored in the hold.
M.V. Hanjin Pennsylvania
Circumstances ––CargoCargo Information Circumstances ––RiskRisk Assessment
“The MSC Napoli was an opportunity, like none other to demonstrate the louche and careless attitude of so many people who think that as long as the doors will shut, they can stuff as much in a container as its volume will • Volumes transported accommodate. This cavalier approach to the declaration of accurate weights has rolled • Number of voyages feeder ships onto their side, and caused even larger ships to become unstable. It could cost • Environmental factors lives, and it could have been one of the contributory factors to the loss of the MSC Napoli”
Lloyds List –Viewpoint, Michael Grey, 28th April 2008
What makes HNS spills more or less Preparedness dangerous than oil spills?
OPRC Convention OPRC –HNS Protocol i) Chemical & Physical properties 102 countries ii) Circumstances ~69% world tonnage iii) Preparedness & Response OPRC‐HNS Protocol 25 countries ~36% world tonnage
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Response Response Options Chemical Manufacturers provide an important source of expertise and experience
Timing ICE Contact in Finland is FINTERC Initial Assessment Stay in place or evacuate?
MAR‐ICE ‐ a network of ‘hurry up & wait’! chemical experts called “Marine ICE" or (model / monitor) "MAR‐ICE network," which aims to strengthen information transfer on chemical substances involved in marine pollution emergencies in EU waters.
‘MAR‐ICE’ EMSA Press Release, 17 October 2008
Are HNS Spills More Dangerous Than Oil Spills? Research & Development ‐ Conclusions • Develop electronic ways to • Evaluate the potential for land‐ identify HNS on ships. based technologies & defence Risk = Frequency x Consequence • Identify practical examples industry to assist in HNS for preparedness. response. • Extend land‐based • Analysis of HNS transport modelling to spills on water. sttititatistics & riiksk assessment. • Develop real‐time • Evaluate the fate & behaviour monitoring capability. of key HNS substances. • Develop aerial surveillance • Review of waste disposal techniques for colourless methods for HNS response. HNS • Develop an HNS R&D database.
Date Name of Ship Location Cargo Type of Vessel Fate & Behaviour
HNS incidents attended: 2000-2010 31/10/2000 IEVOLI SUN France Styrene Chemical tanker Floater / Evaporator / Polymerizer Isopropyl alcohol Floater / Dissolver Methyl ethyl ketone Floater / Dissolver 10/09/2002 JOLLY RUBINO S. Africa Class 3 hazard Ro-Ro Flammable liquids 19/10/2002 ACCORD China Poly-glycol mono-methyl ether acetate Chemical tanker Floater / Evaporator / Dissolver Methyl methacrylate Floater / Evaporator / Polymerizer 31/05/2003 FU SHAN HAI Denmark Potash (KCl) Bulk carrier Sinker / Dissolver 28/02/2004 BOW MARINER USA Methyl tertiary butyl ether Chemical tanker Floater / Evaporator Crude industrial ethanol Floater / Dissolver Methanol Floater / Evaporator / Dissolver 15/11/2004 VICUNA Brazil Methanol Chemical tanker Floater / Evaporator / Dissolver 21/01/2005 KASCO Vietnam Gas oil Oil tanker Floater / Evaporator 08/04/2005 GG CHEMIST China Toluene Chemical tanker Floater / Evaporator 10/10/2005 SAMHO BROTHER Taiwan Benzene Chemical tanker Floater / Evaporator 31/01/2006 ECE France Phosphoric acid Chemical tanker Sinker / Dissolver 14/09/2006 KEW BRIDGE India LPG (Butane) LPG carrier Gas 15/01/2007 GOLDEN SKY Latvia Potash (KCl) Bulk carrier Sinker / Dissolver 18/01/2007 MSC NAPOLI UK Acrylonitrile Containership Floater / Evap. / Dissolv. / Polym. Epichlorhydrin Sinker / Evap. / Dissolv. / Polym. Phosphorus Sinker / React with air (ignite) Phosphorus pentasulfide / Toluene- Sinkers / React with water 2,4-diisocyanate (flammable & toxic gas) … 17/03/2007 HUI RONG China Urea / Sodium metabisulfite General Cargo Sinker / Dissolver 25/12/2007 EASTERN BRIGHT S. Korea Nitric Acid Chemical tanker Sinker / Dissolver 11/03/2009 PACIFIC ADVENTURER Australia Ammonium Nitrate Containership Sinker / Dissolver 07/08/2010 MSC CHITRA India Aluminium phosphide / Pesticides Containership React with air & water (toxic gas) 08/10/2010 YM URANUS France Pyrolysis Gasoline (Pygas) Chemical tanker Floater / Evaporator
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HNS Incidents attended and notified: 2000-2010 SAMHO BROTHER 10th October 2005
Benzene (3,136 MT)
Condition of vessel following sinking SAMHO BROTHER 10th October 2005
1050m3 – 10kts wind
Sea surface Stern resting on sea bed Cargo leaking from ship’s cargo IFO-180 tanks at unknown rate Gasoil Possibility of flammable atmosphere near the ship Estimated quantity of oil remaining on board: IFO‐180 <40m3 Gasoil <15m3 Benzene ‐ volume ?
SAMHO BROTHER SAMHO BROTHER 10th October 2005 10th October 2005
th GESAMP Hazard Profile 27 October 2005 Tried to sink vessel with 2 x F16 and 12 ‘Hell Fire’ missiles
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SAMHO BROTHER MSC NAPOLI Hsinchu, Taiwan Lyme Bay, UK 10th October 2005 20th January 2007
Costs Involved
Costs for air and water monitoring = ~1 million US$ Oil pollution response & damage costs = ~2.6 million US$ Claims for damage to fisheries = ~20 million US$ Costs for cargo removal = ?
SAMHO BROTHER = 3,900 gt
HNS shipowner’s limit of liability = ~ 13 million SDR (~19 million US $) HNS Fund = 250 million SDR (~366 million US$)
MSC NAPOLI: HNS cargo
HNS quoted ~375 times in ~170 containers ~76 individual substances (UN numbers) large amount of shampoo, make‐up, paints, household products including flammable, toxic & corrosive substances Triethylaluminium Acrylonitrile Epichlorohydrin Methylbromide Phosphorus & derivatives Toluene‐2,4‐diisocyanate Dichloromethane & Trichloroethylene Acids and alkali Ethanol, methanol and derivatives… perishable goods (not HNS but may lead to fermentation…)
Beached containers looted Container triage and checkout Safety concerns • Hazardous materials e.g. Corrosive, flammable… Joint UK Government/Shipowner • Fermentation response: • No PPE! Large scale triage operation Safe, Questionable, Dangerous goods
Relevant PPE
Large scale checkout of container Photo credit: DV Howells weight and contents compared to manifest
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MSC NAPOLI Lyme Bay, UK Packaged Goods 20th January 2007
Costs Involved
UK Government Claims ~ £2.8 million Claims for cargo removal / beach clearing/ wreck removal > £200 million but £93 million lodged against LLMC ‘96 Claims for fisheries damage/business interruption = ?
MSC NAPOLI= 53,409 gt
LLMC ‘96 limitation = ~£16 million
HNS shipowner’s limit of liability = ~ 96 million SDR* (~£97 million ) HNS Fund = 250 million SDR MSC CHITRA (33,113 GT), India, August 2010 (~£252 million) Various DG incl. Aluminium phosphide & pesticides *~83 million SDR prior to 2010 Protocol Health & Safety of public and responders / Pesticide toxicity
MSC CHITRA MSC CHITRA • 4,200 kgs of Aluminium Phosphide (fumigant) • Canisters lost into sea Costs Involved • Aluminium Phosphide + H2O → Phosphine gas (very toxic) 4 4 2 MSC CHITRA = 33,113 gt
LLMC ‘76 limitation = ~11.27 million SDR = ~€12.8 million
HNS shipowner’s limit of liability = ~ 57.2 million SDR* (~€65 million ) HNS Fund = 250 million SDR (~€284 million)
*Includes the 15% uplift in the HNS Protocol 2010
Are HNS Spills More Dangerous Than Oil Spills?
Dr. Karen Purnell Managing Director ‐ ITOPF
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