Negative Vote Buying and the Secret Ballot John Morgan Haas School of Business and Department of Economics University of California, Berkeley Felix Várdyy International Monetary Fund Washington, DC June 2008 Abstract We o¤er a model of “negative vote buying”—paying voters to abstain. While negative vote buying is feasible under the open ballot, it is never opti- mal. In contrast, a combination of positive and negative vote buying is optimal under the secret ballot: Lukewarm supporters are paid to show up at the polls, while lukewarm opponents are paid to stay home. Surprisingly, the imposition of the secret ballot increases the amount of vote buying— a greater fraction of the electorate votes insincerely than under the open ballot. Moreover, the secret ballot may reduce the costs of buying an election. JEL #s: D71, D72, D78. Keywords: Negative vote buying, lobbying, abstention, secret ballot, elec- tions. The …rst author thanks the International Monetary Fund Institute for its generous hospitality and inspiration during the …rst draft of this paper. Morgan also gratefully acknowledges the …nancial support of the National Science Foundation. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the International Monetary Fund, its Executive Board, or its Management. yCorresponding author. Email:
[email protected] 1 1 Introduction The use of voting to make collective decisions inevitably brings with it the possibility of vote buying. Thus, a crucial aspect of designing voting procedures is to ensure that election outcomes re‡ect the will of the electorate, rather than the wallets of interest groups.