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Spill Summaries OCS Spills 10 to 49 Barrels CY 1970

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Spill Summaries OCS Spills 10 to 49 Barrels CY 1970 SUMMARY OCS SPILLS 10 - 49 BARRELS (420 - 2,099 GALLONS), 1970 - 2013 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR SUMMARY OCS SPILLS 10 - 49 BARRELS (420 - 2,099 GALLONS), 1970 - 2013 DATE LOCATION FACILITY BARRELS SPILLED & PRODUCT NAME CAUSE SPILL SOURCE ACTIVITY Water Crude & Loss of Area Depth Miles To Refined Synthetic Base Chemical Platform / WEATHER Well Crude & Refined Development/ Date District Block (feet) Shore Facility All Products Petroleum Fluid (bbl) Product(s) Spilled Cause of Incident Rig Pipeline Vessel RELATED Hurricane Control Condensate Petroleum Activity Operation Exploration Production UNIQUE ID SP segment #1345 6" abandoned oil Development/ 1970-02-02 1 054 280 13 pipeline (500', DOT) 30 30 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 30 0 Production Pipeline TRUE 0024 seg #2358 3" bulk gas PL Development/ 1970-03-14 3 EI 120 37 25 (2,800',DOI) 20 20 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 20 0 Production Pipeline TRUE 0027 SS segment #530 6" oil pipeline Development/ 1970-05-01 2 198 106 44 (9,267', DOI), derrick barge 10 10 0 0 crude oil External Forces, Equipment Failure TRUE 10 0 Production Pipeline/Barge TRUE 0029 SP Development/ 1971-01-17 1 037 108 7 Platform B, pipeline operation 10 10 0 0 crude oil Human Error TRUE 10 0 Production Pipeline TRUE 0047 EC Development/ 1971-01-24 5 083 57 31 Platform H 20 20 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 20 0 Production Production TRUE 0057 SP Development/ 1971-02-14 1 037 140 7 Platform B 10 10 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure, Human Error TRUE 10 0 Production Production TRUE 0072 SS 18.25 bbl diesel in 25 bbl Development/ 1971-03-23 2 293 236 64 Platform B 18 18 0 0 of 75%* OBM Equipment Failure TRUE 0 18Production Drilling TRUE 0096 ST Development/ Production/Barg 1971-03-26 2 023 50 5 Unknown 25 25 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 25 0 Production e TRUE 0099 WD Platform B, seg#527 departing 12" Development/ 1971-05-01 1 071 145 23 gas & oil PL riser (6,200',DOI) 24 24 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 24 0 Production Pipeline TRUE 0132 PL Development/ Production/Barg 1971-05-10 2 023 61 15 Platform CA, barge 10 10 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 10 0 Production e TRUE 0141 SS Development/ 1971-05-16 2 208 97 34 Platform F 20 20 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 20 0 Production Production TRUE 0148 ST Development/ Completion/Wor 1971-05-16 2 023 50 5 Rig VI, Platform FF 10 10 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE TRUE 10 0 Production kover TRUE 0149 SS Development/ 1971-05-26 2 114 54 13 Platform 12 12 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 12 0 Production Production TRUE 0164 SS Development/ 1971-06-09 2 208 97 34 Platform F 25 25 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 25 0 Production Production TRUE 0175 SS Development/ 1971-06-26 2 253 165 54 Platform A 25 25 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 25 0 Production Production TRUE 0185 WD Development/ 1971-07-01 1 031 53 8 Platform L, pipeline operation 12 12 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 12 0 Production Pipeline TRUE 0187 SS Development/ 1971-07-03 2 204 100 43 Platform A 10 10 0 0 crude oil Human Error TRUE 10 0 Production Production TRUE 0189 SS Platform E, seg#7745 6" Development/ 1971-07-05 2 214 110 37 gas/condensate PL (6,300', DOI) 32 32 0 0 condensate External Forces, Equipment Failure TRUE 32 0 Production Pipeline/Barge TRUE 0190 WD Development/ 1971-07-31 1 099 194 31 Platform A, pipeline operation 10 10 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 10 0 Production Pipeline TRUE 0213 Development/ Production/Barg 1971-08-01 3 EI 032 12 6 platform or rig, barge 10 10 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 10 0 Production e TRUE 0214 SM Platform C, pipeline operation 12" Development/ 1971-09-17 3 038 96 45 Seg #1516? 11 11 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 11 0 Production Pipeline TRUE 0245 WD Platform B, pipeline operation 8" Development/ 1971-09-18 1 133 285 37 Seg #2855? 10 10 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 10 0 Production Pipeline TRUE 0247 SS Development/ 1971-09-21 2 274 210 64 Platform A 22 22 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 22 0 Production Production TRUE 0255 SS Development/ 1971-10-03 2 154 62 36 Platform I 10 10 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 10 0 Production Production TRUE 0262 SM Development/ 1971-10-16 3 023 83 37 Platform D 20 20 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 20 0 Production Production TRUE 0266 WD Platform A, segment #3621 4" oil Development/ 1971-11-15 1 058 48 13 pipeline (18,800', DOT) 10 10 0 0 crude oil External Forces, Equipment Failure TRUE 10 0 Production Pipeline TRUE 0284 PL Weather, External Forces, Equipment Development/ Production/Barg 1971-11-22 2 023 61 15 Platform CA, barge 10 10 0 0 crude oil Failure TRUE 10 0 Production e TRUE 0294 ST Development/ 1972-01-28 2 023 44 5 Platform S 10 10 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 10 0 Production Production TRUE 0327 SS Development/ 1972-02-14 2 208 97 34 Platform F 30 30 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 30 0 Production Production TRUE 0331 WD Development/ 1972-03-03 1 031 47 8 Platform F 16 16 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 16 0 Production Pipeline TRUE 0343 SS Development/ 1972-03-08 2 219 112 47 Platform B 10 10 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 10 0 Production Production TRUE 0347 Development/ 1972-03-25 3 EI 116 55 29 Platform A 12 12 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 12 0 Production Production TRUE 0360 MP segment #2841 12" oil Shell's Development/ 1972-05-11 1 290 289 34 Cobia pipeline (5,472', DOT) 35 35 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 35 0 Production Pipeline TRUE 0387 PL Weather, External Forces, Equipment Development/ Production/Barg 1972-06-14 2 023 61 15 Platform CA 10 10 0 0 crude oil Failure TRUE 10 0 Production e TRUE 0419 WD Development/ 1972-06-22 1 096 148 27 Platform R 30 30 0 0 crude oil Human Error TRUE 30 0 Production Production TRUE 0425 MP Development/ 1972-07-08 1 296 212 23 Platform A 30 30 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 30 0 Production Production TRUE 0429 SS Development/ 1972-07-09 2 198 101 44 Platform F 10 10 0 0 crude oil Human Error, Equipment Failure TRUE 10 0 Production Production TRUE 0431 WD Development/ 1972-07-09 1 045 49 12 Platform G 15 15 0 0 crude oil Human Error, Equipment Failure TRUE 15 0 Production Production TRUE 0432 ST 11.25 bbl diesel in 15 bbl 1972-07-28 2 021 38 4 Rig Ranger No. 2 11 11 0 0 of 75%* OBM Equipment Failure TRUE 0 11 Exploration Drilling TRUE 0443 SUMMARY OCS SPILLS 10 - 49 BARRELS (420 - 2,099 GALLONS), 1970 - 2013 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR SUMMARY OCS SPILLS 10 - 49 BARRELS (420 - 2,099 GALLONS), 1970 - 2013 DATE LOCATION FACILITY BARRELS SPILLED & PRODUCT NAME CAUSE SPILL SOURCE ACTIVITY Water Crude & Loss of Area Depth Miles To Refined Synthetic Base Chemical Platform / WEATHER Well Crude & Refined Development/ Date District Block (feet) Shore Facility All Products Petroleum Fluid (bbl) Product(s) Spilled Cause of Incident Rig Pipeline Vessel RELATED Hurricane Control Condensate Petroleum Activity Operation Exploration Production UNIQUE ID ST Development/ 1972-10-09 2 024 49 6 Platform CJ 25 25 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 25 0 Production Production TRUE 0481 WD Development/ 1972-10-28 1 030 39 7 Platform G 27 27 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 27 0 Production Production TRUE 0491 MP Development/ 1972-11-08 1 296 212 23 Platform A 10 10 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 10 0 Production Production TRUE 0497 SS Development/ Production/Barg 1972-11-10 2 241 140 45 Platform A 10 10 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 10 0 Production e TRUE 0498 VR Development/ 1973-01-04 5 015 30 3 Platform A 10 10 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 10 0 Production Production TRUE 0517 MP Development/ 1973-01-08 1 042 35 11 Platform L 12 12 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 12 0 Production Pipeline TRUE 0520 WD Development/ Production/Moto 1973-01-21 1 030 39 7 Platform G 15 15 0 0 diesel Human Error, Equipment Failure TRUE 0 15Production r Vessel TRUE 0523 SM Development/ 1973-02-24 3 050 100 47 Platform A 10 10 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 10 0 Production Production TRUE 0541 ST Development/ 1973-03-07 2 161 155 32 Platform A 10 10 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 10 0 Production Production TRUE 0549 EC Development/ 1973-03-15 5 272 182 79 Rig unidentified, Platform A 10 10 0 0 diesel Human Error TRUE 0 10Production Drilling TRUE 0554 SS Development/ 1973-03-21 2 158 46 26 Platform A 40 40 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 40 0 Production Production TRUE 0559 WD 11.63 bbl diesel in 15.5 Development/ 1973-04-01 1 080 140 17 Platform D 12 12 0 0 bbl of 75%* OBM Equipment Failure TRUE 0 12Production Drilling TRUE 0568 SP Development/ 1973-04-28 1 065 300 9 Platform B 12 12 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 12 0 Production Production TRUE 0583 SM Development/ 1973-05-01 3 058 172 62 Platform B 12 12 0 0 crude oil Human Error TRUE 12 0 Production Production TRUE 0585 WD Development/ 1973-05-21 1 032 57 9 Platform U 10 10 0 0 condensate Equipment Failure TRUE 10 0 Production Pipeline TRUE 0599 SS Development/ 1973-06-03 2 158 46 26 Platform A 20 20 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 20 0 Production Production TRUE 0601 SP Development/ 1973-08-02 1 060 185 4 Platform A 30 30 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 30 0 Production Pipeline TRUE 0634 Development/ 1973-08-10 3 EI 188 65 38 Platform A 10 10 0 0 crude oil Human Error, Equipment Failure TRUE 10 0 Production Pipeline TRUE 0640 Development/ 1973-08-25 3 EI 259 170 58 Platform A 12 12 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure TRUE 12 0 Production Production TRUE 0647 SS Development/ 1973-09-06 2 114 32 13 Platform B 12 12 0 0 crude oil Equipment Failure
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