july 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 8

Uncovering Extremist The Emergence of Militancy from Morocco’s Cold War alliances that This new wave of militancy has not placed it in the pro-Western camp of Violence in Morocco materialized from thin air and has been conservative monarchies. This meant brewing within the kingdom for many that it not only gave its blessing to By Alison Pargeter years. Indeed, in spite of the general those volunteers who wanted to go to assumption that the Moroccan state fight jihad in Afghanistan, Bosnia and long hailed as a bastion of stability only woke up to the domestic threat other battlefields, but more importantly in a region prone to radicalism, today after the Casablanca bombings of May it permitted them to return. Although Morocco is struggling hard to deal with 2003, in fact the realization that it due primarily to the limited number of the problem of Islamist militancy. The had a problem came after 9/11. This who went to Afghanistan in newspapers are filled with stories of realization coincided with the new king the 1980s, these volunteers were not arrests of terrorist suspects and of court coming to power in 1999, a development able to form a group that could seriously cases in which sentences are being that heralded a major security review challenge the monarchy. These veterans handed out to those accused of recruiting within the kingdom. It was then that were, however, able to spread their for Iraq, plotting to launch attacks in Morocco began wondering about the ideology and influence within the Morocco and abroad, or of being part various Islamist currents active in its kingdom with relative ease. Indeed, it of militant currents such as “Salafiyah- midst. was only after the attacks of 9/11 that Jihadiya.” In June 2008, for example, 29 the Moroccan state began to seek out individuals from the “Tetouan cell” were Yet, in spite of this recognition, the such individuals. convicted of belonging to a terrorist regime appears to be in a state of denial group and of recruiting for Iraq, and in about the nature of this radicalism. Furthermore, the Moroccan regime has July 2008 35 people were arrested in a Not only is it keen to hype links with always relied upon and taken refuge number of cities accused of recruiting international terrorism, blaming al- in as a means of countering its for al-Qa`ida groups in Algeria and Qa`ida for the Casablanca bombings and opponents. The ruling elite, for example, Iraq. As such, Morocco would appear to the emergence of other militant cells, bolstered the Islamist movement during be a hotbed of militancy and terrorism. it is still insisting that this new breed the 1970s and 1980s to try to weaken of radicalism has been imported from the leftists. It encouraged the Islamists For a kingdom that has long prided abroad and is alien to the country’s long to dominate university campuses and itself on the success of its containment tradition of tolerance and moderation. abolished a number of university strategy toward its Islamist opposition, Much of the blame is being pinned on courses in the humanities, such as not to mention the fact that the king’s Saudi Arabia and more specifically on philosophy, that were deemed to be the special role as “Emir al-Mumineen” . The former Moroccan bastion of the left-wing, replacing them (Commander of the Faithful) has minister of habous (religious affairs), Dr. with courses in Islamic studies. Such inferred an almost unquestionable Abdelkebir Alaoui M’daghri, recently actions may have served to weaken religious legitimacy upon the monarchy, asserted that the former Interior the left, but they also helped foster a the extent of the militancy that is now Ministry chief, Driss Basri, who was society in which religion came to play being uncovered has come as a real ousted shortly after King Mohammed an increasingly important role in the shock and has left the regime grappling came to the throne, had sponsored the public space. for solutions. It is responding with a Wahhabist movement multipronged strategy, on the one hand The monarchy has also played one trying to bolster Morocco’s traditional for specific geopolitical reasons… Islamist current off against another, school of Islam and the various and also for personal reasons thereby strengthening the king’s position Sufi tariqas that have been part of the connected to the intimate relations as “Commander of the Faithful.” During country’s complex Islamic identity for that existed between [Moroccan the 1980s and 1990s, for example, it generations, while on the other hand and Saudi] officials. This is the employed a strategy of countering its employing a zero tolerance strategy reason why Wahhabism was indigenous Islamist opposition, such of preemptive arrests to the extent sponsored in our country in every as the banned but highly popular al- that, according to one high-ranking part of the state.2 Adl wal-Ihsan movement, by promoting Moroccan official, around 4,500 the Wahhabist trend. It encouraged militants have been arrested since the It is true that the militancy evident Moroccan imams to study at Saudi 1 Casablanca attacks of 2003 alone. Yet, today has been inspired by a range of universities and gave them pride of this approach looks unlikely to stem outside influences that are far removed place when they returned to the country. the appetite for radical rejectionist from the Maliki school. Yet, while Traditional religious scholars who had ideologies within the kingdom, and these external factors are important, been trained at the Dar al-Hadith al- all the indications are that militancy one cannot discount the role that the Hassania, the main school in Morocco will continue to be a problem for the Moroccan state has played in fostering for graduating imams in the Maliki foreseeable future. the local conditions in which such tradition, were often passed over when ideologies have been able to flourish. it came to appointing teachers in Islamic These conditions have arisen in part studies in favor of those who had been trained in Saudi Arabia. Some of these 1 Personal interview, senior Moroccan official, , 2 Abdelkebir Alaoui M’daghri, Al-Houkuma al-Multahiya Saudi trained individuals, such as the April 2008. (Rabat: Dar al-Amman, 2006). radical preachers Mohamed Fizazi or july 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 8

Hassan Kettani, were ultimately to have public mosques.4 Raydi exploding himself in a cyber café, a strong influence in fostering support to Hicham Doukali blowing himself up for a rejectionist ideology that dared These bands of young militants with a gas cylinder in Meknes in 2007 to challenge the king’s religious and generally follow a similar pattern. They and only managing to injure himself. political legitimacy. As such, Morocco have tended to come from the same Indeed, none of these suicide bombers cannot argue that this new militancy has neighborhood, were often childhood left notes or videos, reflecting perhaps simply been imported from the outside. friends and in many cases comprised their limited capacity and how they siblings or members of the same family. appear to be acting out of desperation The Militants Their education levels have for the most as much as anything else. Morocco has also fostered certain socio- part been low, and they have tended to economic conditions that have proven drift from job to job as street hawkers or Solutions? ripe for radicalism. Although one cannot petty traders hardly scratching a living. In their bid to eliminate this militancy, make the direct link between poverty It is through militant Islam that these the Moroccan authorities have adopted and radicalization, these ideologies have individuals seem to have discovered a a strategy of conducting mass arrests by certainly been able to thrive in Morocco’s form of salvation and self-esteem. picking up anyone who appears to have slums and shantytowns that were left to Salafist tendencies. Many of the families fester for years without any attention It was just such a group that carried of those who have been convicted have from the authorities. According to out the Casablanca bombings in May complained that their loved ones were figures published in 2007, 4.5 million 2003. Similarly, the cell that appeared not involved with any militant group Moroccans live in indecent housing and in the spring of 2007, which included but were simply religiously “committed” there are more than 1,000 shantytowns 23-year-old Abdelfattah Raydi, who and were arrested because of those in 70 cities, as well as more than 1,250 blew himself up in a cyber café in convictions.6 One young Salafist from “arbitrary neighborhoods.”3 These Casablanca to avoid being captured by Tangiers, for example, was reportedly slums are generally home to Moroccans the police, had a similar profile. Raydi taken from outside his home and spent who migrated from impoverished rural lived with his mother and six siblings 40 days in secret detention where he areas into the margins of the cities. It in a tiny dilapidated room in the Dour underwent extreme forms of torture would seem that unlike the rural areas Sekila shantytown. He and his brother, as the authorities had considered themselves, where the population is still who was also part of the cell, both sold him suspicious because he traveled steeped in local traditions of Islam that orange juice for a living. Raydi had twice a week between Tangiers and are locked into old patronage systems, Mohamedia.7 He was later released with these shantytowns have provided a an apology. particular mentality that is open to “The Moroccan regime has more militant ideologies, so much so always relied upon and The regime is not taking any chances. that it is a common joke at the moment The profiles of the majority of those in Morocco to talk about these shanty taken refuge in Islam as who have been arrested in Morocco neighborhoods as being the Kandahar a means of countering its since the Casablanca bombings of 2003 of their respective cities. are similar to those who have conducted opponents.” attacks. For example, in a list of 204 Indeed, it was these shantytowns that prisoners arrested in Casablanca, 30% were the domain of radical preachers of those arrested had only attended such as Mohamed Fizazi during the primary school and 35% had managed 1990s and that became a natural already spent time in prison for his only the first few years of secondary recruiting ground for those seeking to alleged linkage to the 2003 bombers school.8 Most were unemployed or bring others to the cause of jihad. It was before being released under an amnesty working as street traders or in temporary out of these places that small groups in 2005. According to an individual employment. The vast majority of those of militants who created their own who knew him, Raydi was “fragile, and who have been convicted have been fiefdoms came to emerge, meting out suffered from periodic bouts of epilepsy accused of being part of “Salafiyah- punishments and even murders in the and complained of being harassed Jihadiya.” More than anything, however, bid to impose their rigid ideology upon by the police even after his release this appears to be a label put upon these their own communities. The most famous from prison.”5 Indeed, the fragile militants reflecting the fact that they do example is Yousef Fikri, who killed his and inexperienced nature of these not belong to any particular formalized uncle for “un-Islamic” behavior, but his individuals is reflected in the fact that group. As such, “Salafiyah-Jihadiya” was not an isolated case. The cell led by their attacks have for the most part been would seem to be a label invented by Abdelwahab al-Reba’ah in Meknes, for seemingly amateur or botched affairs, the Moroccan authorities to describe example, was recently accused of killing from the Casablanca bombings, where a number of people they considered some of the bombers got lost and blew 6 Personal interviews, families of those convicted on ter- kafirs because they did not wear Afghan themselves up at the wrong target, to rorism charges, Ain Sebha, Casablanca, April 2008. clothes, had married through official 7 Personal interview, Mohamed Darif, Moroccan aca- channels and because they prayed in 4 “Morocco: The Investigative Judge Listens to al-Shatbi, demic, Casablanca, April 2008. One of the Nine Escapees from al-Kenitra Prison,” al- 8 List of prisoners on terrorism charges collected by 3 “The Triangle of Fear in Morocco,” www.moheet.com, Sharq al-Awsat, May 10, 2008. Moroccan human rights group and acquired by author November 26, 2007. 5 “Le Retour de la Peur,” Telquel, March 17-23, 2007. in 2008. july 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 8 an ideological current. As the wife of seem to provide the main source of one Moroccan convicted on terrorism entertainment. charges explained, “We are so badly educated we couldn’t imagine even Moreover, all the underlying conditions coming up with such a term.”9 that fuel support for militancy are still very much present. In spite of some Although this heavy-handed approach half-hearted development attempts, might resolve the immediate threat, the poverty, lack of education, sense it is unlikely to stem the support for of alienation and social injustice will such militant thinking. If anything, it continue to feed an appetite for a is only likely to heighten resentment simplistic rejectionist ideology that and to strengthen resolve against the provides answers and a meaning to state. To make matters worse, there life. Of course, one should not overplay have been repeated reports of Moroccan the threat in Morocco, as this current prisons becoming major radicalization represents a minority of the population centers on account of the large numbers and any major Islamist uprising is of Salafist prisoners being held. unlikely. Yet, it would not be surprising Furthermore, the seemingly exaggerated if more cells appear in the future or if a numbers of arrests have given rise to bomb explodes in the heart of a tourist the suggestion that Morocco is simply center such as Marrakech. Indeed, as far doing the bidding of the United States as militant Islam is concerned, Morocco in the war on terrorism, especially in can no longer claim to be the exception the case of those arrested for recruiting to the rule in North Africa. for the Iraqi jihad—an act considered by many Moroccans as a noble cause and Alison Pargeter is a Senior Research religious duty. This, too, is only likely to Associate at the Centre of International increase frustration against the state. Studies at the University of Cambridge. She works on security issues in North Similarly, it seems difficult to imagine Africa with a particular focus on Libya how the monarchy’s current reliance and also on issues related to political upon its old strategy of trying to counter Islam in the Middle East and Europe. one religious trend by strengthening She has recently completed a major study another will have any real impact amidst of the Muslim Brotherhood and is now the desperation of the shantytowns. Its working on a project on radicalization in recent bid to train women preachers North Africa. Her book, New Frontiers of (known as the mourchidat), for example, Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe, has just who can perform all the functions of a been published by I.B. Tauris. male imam except for leading prayers, with the aim that they will go into the community and promote more traditional Maliki Islam, is unlikely to have any far reaching effect. Similarly, the push to bolster traditional Sufi tariqas is likely to have limited impact given that such tariqas are viewed even by the more moderate Islamist currents as contravening what they consider to be “true Islam” and are regarded by those of a more militant nature as completely sacrilegious. It is true that these types of initiatives may enable the state to gain greater control over mosques and public religious spaces, yet the official religious discourse will struggle hard to compete with the satellite channels such as Iqraa that have become hugely popular in the shantytowns where, in spite of the poverty, satellite dishes still dominate the neighborhoods and

9 Personal interview, wife of terrorism suspect, Ain Sebha, Casablanca, April 2008.