UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT of ORAL EVIDENCE to Be Published As HC 612-I

UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 612-i

HOUSE OF COMMONS

ORAL EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

DEVELOPMENTS IN UK FOREIGN POLICY

TUESDAY 18 SEPTEMBER 2012

RT HON WILLIAM HAGUE MP, DAVID QUARREY and MATTHEW RYCROFT

Evidence heard in Public Questions 1 - 99

USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT

1. This is an uncorrected transcript of evidence taken in public and reported to the House. The transcript has been placed on the internet on the authority of the Committee, and copies have been made available by the Vote Office for the use of Members and others.

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Oral Evidence

Taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee

on Tuesday 18 September 2012

Members present:

Richard Ottaway (Chair) Mr John Baron Sir Menzies Campbell Ann Clwyd Mike Gapes Mark Hendrick Sir John Stanley Rory Stewart

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Rt Hon William Hague MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, David Quarrey, Director, Middle East and North African Division, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Matthew Rycroft, Chief Operating Officer, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Q1 Chair: May I welcome members of the public to this session of the Foreign Affairs Committee, which is conducting an inquiry into developments in UK foreign policy? I am delighted to welcome the Foreign Secretary here as the key witness. It is the fifth time he has given evidence to us in this Parliament; the last time was in March of this year. May I also welcome his two colleagues, David Quarrey, who is the Director of the Middle East and North African division, and Matthew Rycroft, who is the Chief Operating Officer? Gentlemen, thank you very much for coming this morning. Foreign Secretary, as you can imagine, there is a heck of a lot that we could be going through here, and we very much want to focus on Syria, Iran and Afghanistan. We think that in light of developments during the past 24 hours in Afghanistan, we might start with Afghanistan. Can I ask the fairly central question of the extent to which you were aware of NATO’s decision to change the strategy in Afghanistan to deal with the green on blue incidents taking place? Mr Hague: There has not been any change in strategy on this. Obviously, this is primarily for the Defence Secretary to speak about, but I have been discussing it with him this morning and he spoke to the House about it—he answered an urgent question about it— yesterday. There is no change in strategy, and I think the impact of the ISAF announcement will be quite minimal on UK operations. The Defence Secretary referred yesterday to the fact that there were a number of measures to tighten things up that were under consideration, and this is one of those. ISAF are very clear that it is not a suspension of operations below what is called the kandak level—the battalion level, in Afghan terms. It is about assessing and mitigating the risks associated with conducting partnered operations. We expect any change or any impact on UK operations to be absolutely minimal, so this is not a change of strategy.

Of course, the Ministry of Defence would be aware that a number of measures were being looked at to tighten things up.

Q2 Chair: But as the Defence Secretary did not mention it in his statement to the House yesterday, one is left with the impression that he has been caught slightly by surprise on this. Mr Hague: You would have to ask the Defence Secretary about that. He said that measures would be taken to tighten things up, and I think he set out what some of them were. These decisions are properly for military commanders, of course, and in this case for COMISAF. It is entirely for them to make these decisions and announcements and not be second-guessed by any Defence or Foreign Ministers. I am sure that the Defence Secretary will be able to expand on that. It is not a change of strategy. It does not mean that the way UK troops conduct their operations with embedded Afghan units, with partnered Afghan units, is going to change. It does require the chain of command to be consulted in a different way—in this case, the regional commander, the two star general responsible. But some of the media coverage that I have seen this morning is way overstated in terms of what it means for our operations.

Q3 Sir Menzies Campbell: When did you first hear about this non-change of strategy, Foreign Secretary? Mr Hague: In my case, this morning. Reorganisation of our troops, and the ISAF rules on this, is not my area of responsibility, so I heard about that this morning.

Q4 Sir Menzies Campbell: If it is not a change in strategy, it is certainly a change in tactics, isn’t it? Mr Hague: No, it really is not. As I say, I think the impact of this on UK operations will be minimal. ISAF are quite clear about that: no change to the partnership relationship. They are now focusing on the kandak commanders and their staffs while the Afghan company-level units within the kandak conduct operations such as patrolling and manning checkpoints and outposts, so that is not going to change. So no, it is not a change of tactics. There are a number of measures that have been taken, and the Defence Secretary has spoken about them, to try to reduce the risks of green on blue attacks—of insider attacks. A number of those have been taken over the last few weeks, such as the relevant troops carrying a weapon, and greater background checks being done on the Afghans concerned. All troops engaged in embedded partnering now have access to a personal weapon at all times. Greater emphasis is being placed on the need to vet recruits. Biometric details are collected within days of joining training. Identity verification requires authentication by a district or provincial governor. This change that ISAF is talking about here in the authorisation for working with Afghan troops is another one of those measures to mitigate the risks. It is not envisaged that it will change the way in which UK troops work with the Afghans.

Q5 Sir Menzies Campbell: It is a change in practice, as you have outlined it. Mr Hague: In internal processes.

Q6 Sir Menzies Campbell: Okay. Inhibitions will be placed on the practices that have existed up until now.

Mr Hague: No, it is not a suspension of operations below the kandak level. What we are talking about here is a change in ISAF’s own processes. It is not a change in how our troops work with the Afghans.

Q7 Sir Menzies Campbell: If it is not a change, why isn’t there a change in the light of these recent events? Mr Hague: That is a different argument. So if we are clear that there isn’t a change here in the tactics or the— Sir Menzies Campbell: I am accepting your hypothesis for the moment. Mr Hague: Yes, absolutely. Why isn’t there a change? Well, because partnering with Afghans is fundamental to what we are doing, and it is very important not to be derailed from that—those were the Defence Secretary’s own words in the Commons yesterday. Afghan troops are now conducting, I think, 40% of operations on their own and more than 80% of the training. They are able to do that because of the partnering that we and our allies have done. It is neither desirable nor necessary for that to be changed. It is necessary to take the sorts of measures that I have described.

Q8 Sir Menzies Campbell: The issue of green on blue is clearly not one that falls directly within your responsibility for reasons that we all understand, but it does have an impact on the wider relationship between the United Kingdom and Afghanistan. What diplomatic efforts have been made by you or other Ministers or your Department to bring home to President Karzai the fact that these incidents, when they occur, have a considerable impact on public opinion in this country? That was reflected in some of the observations made yesterday by Members of Parliament from all parts of the House. Some were rather optimistic about bringing the troops home by Christmas. There is clearly an impact on public opinion. What representations have you made to President Karzai about that? Mr Hague: I think that is a fair point. Of course there is an impact on public opinion, and the Defence Secretary, in particular, has discussed that with President Karzai in recent days. But such attacks are not under President Karzai’s control. He is as much opposed to them as anybody, of course, and he is fully in favour of the measures that we are taking to mitigate the risks. So I think the impact on public opinion is understood in Afghanistan. That, of course, is what our opponents intend—that is what the Taliban intend—so it is important that we reaffirm what we are doing in Afghanistan, and that our objectives will not be changed and our work will not come to an end because of these attacks. We will defeat this threat as we have defeated so many threats—that is what we are doing in Afghanistan. We have set out how we will proceed. Our troops will not be engaged in combat—or in anything like the numbers they are now—in Afghanistan after the end of 2014. We have set out our commitments for the future, including how we will help to finance the Afghan security forces and lead an officer training academy. We will persist with all those things and defeat this threat, as we have defeated others.

Q9 Sir Menzies Campbell: I understand what you say about President Karzai at present, but of course he is the person who will have responsibility after our drawdown in 2014. Mr Hague: There will be a presidential election in 2014—

Q10 Sir Menzies Campbell: We have seen presidential elections in the past in Afghanistan. Mr Hague: Well, President Karzai will have reached his term limit then, so he probably would not be responsible after 2014, although I will not prejudge what will happen in Afghan politics.

Q11 Mike Gapes: Can we bet on it? Mr Hague: I am not betting on anything, but that is the constitutional position. A President of Afghanistan, whoever that might be, will of course be responsible. In my experience and that of our troops, a great majority of Afghans want us to succeed and for the long-term commitment to the future of Afghanistan to remain clear. It remains clear, and the Taliban should be very clear—I make this clear to them now—that our strategy in Afghanistan has not changed and will not change in the face of these attacks. To give any other response would, of course, increase the incentive for such attacks.

Q12 Sir John Stanley: Foreign Secretary, you said that today’s media reports overstated the significance of green on blue attacks. Having listened carefully to what you said, I wonder whether you are in danger of understating their significance. The whole thrust of our policy in Afghanistan, as you have frequently told this Committee, is that we train the Afghan national army and police to a sufficiently sophisticated standard to deal with a very determined and sophisticated enemy when they take over security responsibility from us in what is now less than two years’ time. Is it not the case that if the Taliban continue to do what they are clearly doing—targeting the physical, necessary interface between coalition forces and the Afghans—that will inevitably have a serious impact on our ability to train the Afghan security forces and conduct operations with them? Does not that policy of the Taliban place a question mark over whether we shall be able to bring the forces to a necessary level of sophistication and skill to deal with the Taliban after we have left? Mr Hague: The Taliban would like us to think so and, in the face of that, it is important that we overcome that with determination, rather than succumbing to it. It is important at all times to give our troops the maximum possible protection and for them to be able to protect themselves. That is why the MOD has taken the measures that I described and it is why ISAF is taking the measures that we are talking about now. This is an aspect of asymmetric warfare, which the Taliban pursue in many different ways, as you know, such as through improvised explosive devices and all their other ways of conducting conflict in the face of being unable to win in any conventional sense. Well, we have not given in to IEDs; we have improved our capability to deal with them. We will not be giving in to green on blue attacks; we will improve our capability to deal with them. That is what is going on now, so I do not think we should raise the spectre of a major change in our approach to Afghanistan because we need to overcome this problem now.

Q13 Sir John Stanley: Do you not therefore think that the announcement that has been made in the last 24 to 48 hours is actually going to provide an incentive and encouragement to the Taliban to pursue this course of action? Mr Hague: Well, no, when you look at what it is actually about. I read out some details of it a few minutes ago. It is a change in the level at which permission for advising and partnering Afghan forces takes place. As I have stated several times already, its impact on British forces and how they conduct what they are doing in Afghanistan is expected to be minimal, so I do not think the Taliban or anyone else would see that as a significant change.

Q14 Rory Stewart: Foreign Secretary, there has been very serious scrutiny by the coalition forces of these attacks. Of course, it is very difficult to work out exactly what is going on, but the best estimate from the people who study this is that three quarters of these attacks are not conducted by the Taliban and that the people connected with these attacks are not linked in any way to the Taliban. Why, therefore, Foreign Secretary, do you insist on characterising them as Taliban attacks? Mr Hague: Well, they are attacks the Taliban would like to see. Some of them will be organised by the Taliban. I am using that as shorthand, yes. Others will be by people who sympathise with the Taliban, so I think as shorthand it is a fair enough description.

Q15 Rory Stewart: As far as we can see, 75% of the attacks, so far as the coalition military is concerned, are by people who have no links whatsoever to the Taliban. Is that not something we should be taking on board, and is that not perhaps symptomatic of something rather more serious than an ongoing insurgency? Mr Hague: It is something we should take on board. Of course, it means that merely identifying the origins or background of the people involved is not sufficient; the forces have to have an increased ability to protect themselves. That is why one of the things that has been brought in is that all troops engaged in embedded partnering have access to a personal weapon at all times. Of course, there is an unpredictable element to this, for the reasons that you state. Of course, it is the case that not everybody who is opposed to international forces being in Afghanistan is part of the Taliban or a supporter of the Taliban—that is absolutely right— but I think the response is to say that the measures we take to mitigate the risks are the same, and they are the ones that I have set out.

Q16 Rory Stewart: Foreign Secretary, 2 years have now passed since the High Peace Council was set up, and it is 3 and a half years since officials in the Foreign Office began to speak about political negotiation with the Taliban. In your response to our 2011 Afghan report, you said: “We need to take advantage of the military and civilian gains…to make 2011 a year of reconciliation and transformation.” How successful have we been? Mr Hague: Well, we have not succeeded in that yet. That does not in any way reduce the importance of continuing with those efforts. Not all of those efforts are ones that we can give a running commentary on, of course. We do a lot of work with the Government of Pakistan and the Government of Afghanistan and, of course, we are in regular touch with the High Peace Council and its leaders to promote reconciliation. We will not be able to say everything that we do about that. We have not succeeded yet and nor has anyone succeeded in bringing about the reconciliation that would help to bring permanent peace and stability to Afghanistan, but we will continue to do that work.

Q17 Rory Stewart: Foreign Secretary, time is now getting quite short. Is there any sense of when one would need to achieve that kind of settlement in order significantly to decrease the likelihood of a civil war, following our departure? Mr Hague: To begin with, the important point to make is that this is not a process that can be conducted according to a timetable. Like any negotiation or any process of reconciliation in any situation of conflict in the world, it would not be possible to do that. The military timetable is set by the strengthening of the Afghan National Security Forces and the assessment of their ability to cope on their own, and they are coming up this October to their intended strength—352,000 in total—and they are on track to meet their intended strength. So

6 there is that timetable, but I don’t think it is possible to have a timetable or a deadline for reconciliation, which might take place in one overall settlement or might, of course, take place in a partial settlement or reconciliation or in stages or partly at a local level. It is a far more complex situation than one that you can put a particular date or deadline on. I don’t think that the chance to do so expires with the involvement of our forces in 2014, because our strong support for the Afghan state, our financial support for the Afghan National Security Forces and their own ability to perform well will continue, and will continue to increase. This may continue to be a long process.

Q18 Rory Stewart: Finally, if for whatever reason the Taliban were not prepared to engage constructively in a political settlement, do we have an alternative strategy? What would Britain and its partners do if we were unable to achieve what we wanted in terms of a political settlement with the Taliban? Mr Hague: That would be a more difficult situation in Afghanistan, but we will continue with our military plans. Our commitment to 2014 is very clear. Obviously, what we have set out to do with our allies is to ensure that the Afghan National Security Forces do have the strength and capability to operate on their own. They are already, as you know, leading in security across very large parts of Afghanistan, and their capability to do that is crucial. That is something that if there is a continued insurgency, they will have to continue to meet the consequences of and to combat, but they will do that without British forces being deployed in a combat role or in anything like the numbers that they are now.

Q19 Ann Clwyd: There is a big piece in The Times today, which you may have seen, about drone strikes, and, of course, they have proved to be very controversial. Does the UK co-operate in drone strikes? Mr Hague: That would be a question about the use of intelligence, which is not something that I ever comment on in public.

Q20 Ann Clwyd: Well, RUSI suggested in a recent report that political reconciliation might be hampered by the continuing use of drone strikes. There is no doubt that a lot of innocent civilians have been killed in those drone strikes and, allegedly, militants as well, but some 3,300 people have been killed in drone strikes, so it is a very controversial issue. This piece in The Times, which you may not have seen today, is headed, “Challenge to Britain’s spy role in drone war” so I assume that we do co-operate on intelligence, even if you cannot or are not prepared to answer that question. Mr Hague: People make a lot of assumptions about what we do with intelligence, some of which are wildly inaccurate and some are not. Of course, there are very good reasons, as the Committee understands, why Ministers do not talk about intelligence and its use. I did give a speech last year about the role of our intelligence services, which was an unusual step to take, but not about how we use or share intelligence with our partners, which is of course an important consideration for many partners as well as for us. I do not confirm or deny the use of intelligence in any context, and I am not able to change that position. People do put arguments about drone strikes and of course there are legitimate arguments for and against them. The United States Administration, as you will be aware, has put the arguments for what they do and why they do them. There are arguments—you are quoting some from the newspapers today—that can be put against them, but we do not comment on and cannot reveal how we use British intelligence.

Q21 Ann Clwyd: But do you see the continuing use of drones as possibly something that will hamper the peace talks, and is hampering the peace talks? It must be an issue that has been raised in talks with the Taliban, for example. Mr Hague: How we use British intelligence is really what you are asking about. I understand the reasons for asking it, but I am sure that you understand the reasons why I will not expand on that or go into that. That is not something that I can discuss. The use of drones, or alleged use of drones, is for the states concerned, in our view. Anything that we do ourselves in any area must always be in line with international law, but I cannot comment on whether we use our own intelligence or not.

Q22 Chair: Putting intelligence to one side, it is our policy to support the use of drones in Afghanistan. Mr Hague: That is a matter for the United States, Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is not something that the British Government decide upon. It is a matter for the states concerned.

Q23 Chair: So we are not using drones in Afghanistan? Mr Hague: These questions are all about the use of British intelligence and in relation to Pakistan, rather than Afghanistan.

Q24 Chair: My question was about Afghanistan. Mr Hague: I think it’s more for the Defence Secretary than for me to talk about our own military operations. I don’t feel that I can go into those in public either.

Q25 Mr Baron: Foreign Secretary, I suggest to you—you know where I am coming from on this—that our mission in Afghanistan has been confused almost from the start. Where we succeeded in our original mission of clearing al-Qaeda out of Afghanistan, which was relatively early, the mission has morphed into more of a nation-building exercise, and the confusion between the mission and those laudable aims of human rights and all the rest has, I think, plagued our operations in Afghanistan ever since. We saw that confusion only last week. I suggest to you that the International Development Secretary, in her statement to the House on Thursday, made it clear that nation-building was central to the strategy and yet on the very same day the Defence Secretary said in an interview when visiting troops in Afghanistan that now that al-Qaeda had been “eliminated” from the country, it was not right to ask troops to put their lives at risk for nation-building. He said: “We can only do that to protect UK vital national security interests.” What is the mission, therefore, because there is a clear contradiction here between two Secretaries of State as to what the mission is? Mr Hague: I don’t think there is a contradiction. Our objective is to protect our national security; I think we can be unequivocal about that. And if we didn’t continue with what I was talking about earlier—the military operations that we are doing now, the work to build up the Afghan National Security Forces—there would be a greater danger to our national security. But of course it is part of creating a more stable situation in Afghanistan—of being able to promote reconciliation—to also assist Afghanistan in its own social and economic development.

Q26 Mr Baron: Let us be absolutely clear about this, because there is confusion here. We had two very separate statements last week. You side with the Defence Secretary’s view that we are there to protect British national security interests and not to nation-build? The

8 importance of this distinction is that if we are there nation-building and ensuring free elections, human rights and all those laudable aims, the chances are that it probably necessitates defeat of the Taliban because they don’t necessarily sign up to all of that. But if we are there to focus on national security interests, then we don’t have to defeat the Taliban; they can be accommodated in some sort of political settlement. What exactly is the mission? Are you saying it is national security interests and nation-building? Mr Hague: I side with both Secretaries of State as a loyal colleague to both of them, as you would expect. Our objective is to protect and maintain our own national security. The mission that supports that objective of course has many different aspects. Many of them are military—what we have been discussing. But as you know from your own visits to Afghanistan, it also encompasses a great deal of other work that, yes, has included improving education in Afghanistan, creating economic opportunities—

Q27 Mr Baron: But you would accept that al-Qaeda was essentially defeated in Afghanistan many years ago, and what this mission has now morphed into is taking on the Taliban and other elements—I take the point that there is not a homogenous group, but essentially the Taliban and other elements—in a nation-building exercise. To many, the mission has morphed into something else. May I move on to something related? If we are there to protect national security interests, the Defence Secretary said something else interesting on Thursday: that we have to adopt a Northern Ireland-style approach to negotiations. Do you believe that we are doing enough to pressure the Americans to open non-conditional talks with the Taliban? The American position up until fairly recently, at least publicly, has been, “We’ll only talk to the Taliban if they lay down their arms and accept the constitution.” That will not happen. We have to get real about this and open non-conditional talks with the Taliban, bearing in mind that if national security interests are paramount to the mission, we have to accommodate some sort of settlement with the Taliban. Are we doing enough to get the Americans to change their view on this? Mr Hague: The American view, which certainly developed over the last few years, is, I think, the same as ours, in being in favour of reconciliation, in being open to having discussions with all concerned to bring about reconciliation and, indeed, promoting it.

Q28 Mr Baron: Are you therefore saying, Foreign Secretary, that the American position has changed somewhat and that the view of the Americans, now supported by the British, is now to have non-conditional talks with the Taliban, and they do not have to lay down their arms and they do not have to accept the constitution as a precursor to those talks? Mr Hague: It is the view, I think of all the nations involved, including the Afghan Government, that a settlement—a reconciliation with the Taliban must include acceptance of the Afghan constitution, forswearing violence, breaking links with al-Qaeda—

Q29 Mr Baron: You are not answering the question. Mr Hague: No, but you are asking whether those are preconditions.

Q30 Mr Baron: Reconciliation and non-conditional talks are two very different things. You are not answering the question, if you do not mind my suggesting. I am suggesting that before you get to reconciliation, you have to talk. You make peace with your enemy, not with

9 your friends. You have to talk with the various parties around the table who play a role in Afghanistan. No one can deny that the Taliban should not be excluded from that. Forget the reconciliation. We all hope there will be a reconciliation, but before we get to reconciliation, we have to have talks. Is it the American position, supported by the British, or is it the British view at the very least, that we should have non-conditional talks with the Taliban? In other words, the American view, expressed publicly fairly recently, was, “We will not talk to the Taliban”—not even negotiate with them—“until they have laid down their arms and accepted the constitution,” which they will not do. Has that now shifted? Is that the case or not? Mr Hague: The United States has the same policy that we have. There have been, of course, contacts with the Taliban; I have said that before. I am also clear that I am not going to give a running commentary on them, for obvious reasons. In fact, it would inhibit such contacts if we gave a running commentary. But there have been contacts with the Taliban, and there may be more—

Q31 Mr Baron: So we have dropped those preconditions? Mr Hague:—and those do not take place on the basis of all the conditions that I was just talking about being met, of course, because those are end-state conditions. Those would be necessary for a reconciliation or a settlement to be successful.

Q32 Mr Baron: A final question, Foreign Secretary: have we dropped those preconditions for negotiations? Mr Hague: As far as I am concerned, I have always said that there are contacts with the Taliban and that for reconciliation to succeed, these conditions must be met, but I have not said that for any talks to take place, those conditions must all be met. The United States has the same position on this as the United Kingdom.

Q33 Mike Gapes: Foreign Secretary, you said very clearly that the reconciliation process cannot be conducted to a timetable. In retrospect, given that we have announced a military withdrawal from a combat role timetable, haven’t we actually made it impossible to get an early process of negotiation and reconciliation, because we have already announced to the Taliban that we will not be in that combat role? All they need to do is undermine the building of the Afghan National Security Forces, knowing that President Obama, and subsequently our Prime Minister, came in with an artificial timetable. Mr Hague: As I was saying earlier, a military timetable is a different thing. It is an unusual thing in itself, but it is—

Q34 Mike Gapes: It is a mistake, isn’t it? Mr Hague: No. It is right in this case because the timetable for our own combat role coming to an end, and for British forces not being there in anything like the number they are now, is tailored to the growth in the capabilities and numbers of the Afghan National Security Forces. As you quite rightly say, therefore, what should the enemies of that focus on? Undermining the capabilities of those Afghan forces. They are not succeeding in doing so. These are forces that have much greater capability than a year ago or two years ago, that are growing all the time and that are on track to meet their numbers. In the end, if there is to be peace, for the Taliban or anybody else, there will have to be that reconciliation.

Q35 Mike Gapes: I put it to you that if that building of Afghan forces to the point where they are able to hold ground, as the Secretary of State for Defence said yesterday, is insufficient, and as a result the calculation is made—perhaps later this year, maybe in the middle of next year or maybe in early 2014—that the Afghan security forces will not be capable of holding the areas with majority Pashtun population, nevertheless the timetable for military withdrawal will go ahead regardless, and the consequence will follow that your strategy will have failed. Is there a plan B, to coin a phrase? Is there a possibility that the timetable might be extended to allow a longer period for the Afghan forces to be built to the necessary requirements that we have? Mr Hague: There are different rates of withdrawal and withdrawal from combat operations of the ISAF troops, which are yet to be decided, but the date at the end of 2014 is very firm.

Q36 Mike Gapes: It is firm; it is fixed; it is not going to change? Mr Hague: Yes, and the Prime Minister has been clear about that for the past two years. So have all of the rest of us in the Government, and indeed in other Governments around the world, partly because that is a key factor in the taking on of responsibility by the Afghans. They need to know that it is their responsibility. As transition has taken place they have, of course, already increasingly taken on that responsibility. If you look at a place like Lashkar Gah—you may have visited it—which transitioned some time ago to Afghan security control, our experience was that when we set the date and said, “You, the Afghans, will be responsible,” that helped to create the process and the dynamic by which they accepted responsibility and took on all the things that we need them to take on. They do need to know that that date does not change, and they must be responsible for their own—

Q37 Mike Gapes: And the Taliban also know that that date will not change, so all they need to do is to undermine the building of the Afghan forces so that at that point they are in a stronger position than they would otherwise be. Mr Hague: While that may be true, it is also true that these forces that I mentioned earlier are on track to reach their strength. Their capability is growing all the time. At 352,000 by October this year, they will be one of the largest military forces in the world, and they are on track to achieve that. That strategy and that approach are not being successfully undermined by anybody at the moment.

Q38 Ann Clwyd: Everybody acknowledges that important gains have been made for women in Afghanistan but in the talks that are proceeding, how confident are you that those gains are going to be permanent? Is that one of the conditions that, presumably, Secretary Clinton will be pushing very hard? I assume that you will be doing so as well. Mr Hague: Yes, it is something that we always push. In the end, it is Afghans, of course, who will determine what happens and how their own society is governed. That is the whole point of what we are working towards here. We are doing everything we can to make sure that the culture—the role of women and the involvement of women in society—is changed. That, of course, is a big change in Afghanistan. I have had discussions with Afghan students where the attitudes of the male students, even of young people, were still quite different from those of the female students. Some of this is long-term work but, as I think you will be aware, in parallel with many international conferences and decisions we have brought together large numbers of women leaders in Afghan civil society. So that work has gone on and will continue all the way through our remaining involvement in Afghanistan.

Q39 Chair: Is there any sign of a political surge in Afghanistan? We have all recognised the need for regional talks involving India, Pakistan, Russia and Iran—Hillary Clinton called for such talks earlier this year—yet there does not seem to be much sign of them actually happening. Is there anything in the pipeline? Mr Hague: There are many things in the pipeline. Of course, a lot of our work with the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan is to promote political reconciliation—the political surge you are talking about—but, as I was saying to Mr Stewart, we cannot say yet that that has succeeded. A lot of that work goes on.

Q40 Chair: But there is no conference planned or anything like that? Mr Hague: No. For an international conference of all parties involved, enough progress would have to be made to give that a chance of success. We are not at that point yet.

Q41 Chair: Can we turn to Syria? You said just a few weeks ago that the situation is likely to deteriorate sharply, even from its current position. What do you base that assessment on? Mr Hague: That is partly because it is deteriorating. Nothing that is on the table at the moment and that has any chance of being passed at the UN Security Council is going to change that in the near future. We are taking a whole range of measures, which I set out in my statement to the House on 3 September, to try to help the people caught up in this conflict, but we are not able to bring it to an end. In the absence of bringing it to an end, one has to expect that it is going to continue to get worse in terms of the humanitarian consequences and the flow of refugees. Clearly, the intensity of the fighting has been greater in recent months than it was six or 12 months ago, so I believe the situation, as things stand, will continue to deteriorate.

Q42 Chair: One of the concerns expressed by the Russians is that they are uncertain as to what would replace the present regime if it collapsed. Do you have any idea of what a post- Assad regime in Syria is going to look like? Mr Hague: What it should look like to begin with is what I agreed with the Russian Foreign Minister, along with the other permanent members of the Security Council and many leading Arab states, in Geneva on 30 June, which is a transitional Government that should include members of the present Government and members of the opposition on the basis of mutual consent. There were many things that we were not able to agree with Russia, as is well known. We have not been able to agree with Russia on the chapter VII UN resolutions that we have put forward. Our latest resolution in July was vetoed by Russia and China, but we agreed with Russia that a transitional Government formed by mutual consent is what the Government should look like. What we have not been able to agree on at the UN is how to ensure that that happens, which is the deep frustration of this.

Q43 Chair: What I actually said in my question was, “What do you think it is going to look like?” You said what it should look like, and I do not think anyone would disagree, but there seems to be quite a lot of evidence coming out that some fairly unacceptable forces are at work in Syria. We may end up with a regime that is even more hard-line than the present one.

Mr Hague: The longer it goes on, the greater the danger is. That is part of our argument to Russia and China. The longer this goes on, the more extremists will be able to find a foothold, the more foreign fighters will be able to travel to Syria and the less easy it will be to have any agreed transition between all the groups involved. So the longer it goes on, the worse the consequences are going to be. I do not want to hide that from anyone in any way. That is another reason why we are dealing with a deteriorating situation. On the views that Russia has expressed, the things that Russia most fears—an extremist or sectarian regime and greater instability in the region—are made more likely by the failure of the UN Security Council to pass a resolution mandating and requiring the implementation of the peace plan put forward by Kofi Annan. Russia’s diplomatic position on this is self- defeating. We will continue to work with them and to talk to them about changing that, but there has been no sign so far of a change in the Russian position. I will hold further discussions on this with the Russian Foreign Minister in New York next week.

Q44 Chair: But the transitional regime that we are talking about is a regime of a number of the existing Government, but without President Assad. Yet the Annan plan did entail leaving Assad in place. Would you not agree that there is an inconsistency between these two positions? Mr Hague: The proposal of 30 June in Geneva was built on the Annan plan. It was to agree what we would all be happy with, including Russia and China in this case: a transitional Government in Syria based on mutual consent. That is something Kofi Annan was very happy to support and to take back to Damascus. What he lacked was the full weight of the UN Security Council saying, “There will be consequences if”—we did not mean military consequences; that was not floated or suggested at all in our resolution—“this plan is not followed.” So it was built on the Annan plan.

Q45 Chair: If we are going to bridge the gap with the Russians, though—if they are prepared to compromise, are we and our allies prepared to compromise? Mr Hague: We have been ready to compromise throughout this. In fact, in framing the resolution, which we put forward on 19 July at the Security Council, that was vetoed, we were happy to accommodate all the concerns expressed in the discussions before that by Russia: that the consequences threatened would be under article 41 of the UN charter, not article 42— in other words, not military consequences—and that even implementing those would require reference back to the UN Security Council. But despite our meeting all of the Russian concerns, Russia was not prepared to support anything that was a resolution under chapter VII. Our view, and the view of the great majority of the Security Council, is that anything short of chapter VII is too weak for this situation.

Q46 Chair: Finally, if there is a collapse of the regime, what do you think the reaction of the neighbours around will be? Mr Hague: They will be very concerned, and they should be concerned. They are already receiving huge flows of refugees. I pay tribute to the people and Governments of Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon and Iraq for the hospitality that they are extending to hundreds of thousands of people. They are doing their best to cope with that flow. We are one of the leading countries in the world in the donations we give to international agencies to help those countries. We need other countries to step up to the plate more, but of course they would be very concerned. It is in their interests as well for this to be brought to an end as soon as possible, but I cannot say to Parliament that there is any sight of that at the moment.

Q47 Mark Hendrick: Foreign Secretary, you say there is no sight of this being brought to an end, but you did say in a recent statement that you felt that the Assad regime was doomed. You have also made reference to the fact that the Russian Government do not seem to take on a chapter VII-style resolution. But in a recent statement you said there was some regret in Russian Government circles that Russia abstained. Are you suggesting that there is regret in the Russian Government and that maybe they think an abstention was not right? Let us say that the Russian Government did go for a chapter VII agreement and the Chinese rode in behind that. What effect do you think that resolution would have on the Government? Do you think the resolution alone would be enough to stop the civil war, or would you want some sort of intervention on the part of the international community? Mr Hague: I think a chapter VII resolution would make an enormous difference, because then it would be clear that the world was united on this, including Russia and China, and that Russia would not block such resolutions, or indeed consequences that would follow from that. That would make a vast difference to the Assad regime in their determination to carry on oppressing and murdering their own people. I have absolutely said the Assad regime is doomed, and it is doomed. No regime that has killed so many of its own people and spilled so much blood can preside over order and stability in their country again. It is doomed, but it is a matter of time. As things stand, the situation would have to deteriorate further for that to come about, so I do not think that there is any contradiction in what I have said about that. A chapter VII resolution would make an enormous difference. I should bring in on some of these questions David Quarrey, who does an enormous amount of the work on this. David, do you want to come in on that, or on some of the later questions? David Quarrey: On the chapter VII resolution, one of the things that Kofi Annan said when he stepped down from his role was that his ability to pursue political transition in Syria had been affected by the lack of unity. The signal that a strong chapter VII resolution voted unanimously through the Security Council would send in terms of support for Mr Lakhdar Brahimi as he takes on that role will be very important because it would signal, as the Foreign Secretary said, that there was the full weight of the international community behind him as he pursues the Geneva plan or something close to it.

Q48 Mark Hendrick: Some have suggested that Russia would agree to the decapitation of the Syrian regime. By that I mean the removal of President Assad and some sort of transfer deal similar to that that took place in Yemen. What are your views on that? Mr Hague: There has been no sign of that agreement so far. As you can gather we have had long and exhaustive discussions with Russian leaders about this, including my own visit to Moscow in May. The Prime Minister met President Putin during the Olympics and had another serious discussion about this. Russia has agreed to what I was describing earlier—that there ought to be a transitional Government formed by mutual consent. In our view, mutual consent would inevitably mean that Assad would not be part of that, as it is impossible to imagine the opposition agreeing to his presence in a Government formed by mutual consent. They have agreed to that, but they have not agreed on any measures to bring that about, to require that, to enforce that, and for the United Nations to mandate that. That remains the gap between us. At the moment, there is no sign of a change in the Russian position, which is why we pursue the many other strands, which I have set out in the House, of humanitarian relief, non- lethal support for the opposition in various ways, the economic pressure and isolation of the regime, the documenting of human rights abuses and the preparing with other countries for

14 the day after Assad. We can do a lot in the absence of that, but we cannot have an internationally agreed solution to the crisis.

Q49 Mark Hendrick: Foreign Secretary, how much do you feel that the mood following the intervention in Libya has affected the P5? I know that there are disagreements within the P5 about what happened with the Libyan intervention. How much does that play into the problems with Syria at the moment in terms of getting a UN Security Council resolution? Mr Hague: It is one of the factors that is quoted by Russia and sometimes by China on this. There are many other factors at work. Of course, Russia has had a much closer relationship with the Assad regime than it has had at any stage with the Gaddafi regime. So its own position is different. Russian commercial and defence interests in Syria are much stronger than was the case with Libya. This is not the only factor. Certainly, there has been a disagreement among the P5 members about the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1973 on Libya. We remain absolutely trenchant in our view that that was necessary and that we implemented it in the correct way.

Q50 Mark Hendrick: Don’t you think that you went a lot further than was agreed in that Security Council resolution, because you talked about the protection of civilians and no- fly areas? Don’t you think that that has had an impact on members of the P5 with regard to a resolution on Syria? Mr Hague: I do not think that we went further than should have been envisaged under that resolution. We were authorised under that resolution to take all necessary measures to protect the civilian population and that is what we did, with some urgency, as you will recall. Benghazi was about to be attacked and a large part of its population slaughtered at the time. We were absolutely correct to do that. This is used as an argument, but there are other factors at work. Since you ask about how the P5 work together, it is important to stress that while we have this impasse on Syria at the moment, the UN Security Council continues to work well in many other respects. That is not always widely understood—although it is probably very well understood on this Committee. It is not always widely understood that on Somalia, Yemen, Sudan and a whole range of other subjects, the Security Council is very much living up to its responsibilities at the moment, but on Syria we are in a deadlock. Chair: It does spill over, though, in the public perception.

Q51 Rory Stewart: Foreign Secretary, in Iraq and Afghanistan there was an eventual conclusion that, notwithstanding Iran’s support for our enemies in those countries, it was important to try to include Iranians in the negotiating process. Why have we made the decision in Syria to exclude them? Mr Hague: Well, we excluded them from the Geneva talks. That does not mean they are excluded from all consultation. Kofi Annan indeed went to Tehran to consult the Iranians, and we did not object to that. Our view and that of the Americans was clearly that they should not be part of those Geneva talks, because it was phenomenally difficult in any case to arrive even at the agreement that I was just talking about on what a transitional Government should look like in Syria. In fact, we failed to agree on a whole range of other things we would have liked to agree in Geneva. The presence of Iran at that discussion would probably have made it impossible. What was difficult would have been impossible.

It was more important to have a position agreed among the permanent 5 members of the Security Council and key Arab states than to have Iran at the table. That country is actively engaged in assisting the Assad regime in the oppression of the people of Syria and the murder of many people there. The Iranians are unlikely, given that posture, to play a constructive role in the solution that we would think reasonable. I am sorry this is a long answer to the question. However, as you know, Egypt has called together a group of 4 including Iran. I discussed that with Egyptian leaders when I was in Egypt last week. We have not criticised that but we are sceptical as to whether such a group would come up with an agreement that was viable for the people of Syria.

Q52 Ann Clwyd: Could you tell me whether the UK has provided equipment or training to the Syrian National Council or the Free Syrian Army? Mr Hague: I will ask David Quarrey to expand on that. The terms under which we provide equipment and mentoring are those that I set out to the House on 3 September and in a letter of 10 August to the Chairman, which I am sure you have seen. I announced £5 million of assistance in communications equipment, water purification and some medical supplies, though they generally go through the international agencies. That is not, therefore, lethal support. It is not in support of military or violent operations. That is a more important criterion than the name of the organisation that it goes to. David, do you want to expand on that? David Quarrey: As the Foreign Secretary said, following the announcement in August, we have taken forward work in a number of areas: communications equipment, practical support such as power generation and water purification. There is also a lot of work to train human rights monitors and those who can help us ensure accountability for crimes committed in Syria. Some of that practical assistance and some of the political work we do is with the SNC, but assistance has not gone to the Free Syrian Army.

Q53 Ann Clwyd: But other countries are providing military support. Mr Hague: Certainly, the opposition groups in Syria do appear to receive arms. There is evidence over recent weeks and months that they have been increasingly well equipped, but they do not receive that from the UK or any other country in the EU. We have an arms embargo and we implement that on everyone concerned in Syria.

Q54 Chair: Do you accept that communications equipment could be used for military purposes, conveying information from one group to another? Mr Hague: We will do our utmost to monitor. Of course, there will be circumstances in which it is difficult to monitor how that is used. We feel it is important to be of assistance to people in such a dire situation. Communications equipment can also be used to warn people of impending attack and save their lives.

Q55 Chair: I am not being critical. Mr Hague: No. As I argued in the House a couple of weeks ago when I made my statement, whatever the risks involved in supplying the kind of equipment that we do supply, those risks are outweighed by the need to give assistance to people in such an appalling situation.

Q56 Sir John Stanley: Foreign Secretary, you said in your letter to the Committee that the communications equipment being supplied was to “overcome the regime’s communications blockade.” That is self-evidently anti-jamming communications equipment. It is sophisticated communications equipment. It is self-evidently equipment that is going to be useful in terms of improving the military effectiveness of the opposition groups to the Assad regime. I put it to you that the policy, as it appears to me at any rate, is being driven essentially by presentational factors. We are trying to appear to be acceptable by supplying what you described as non-lethal equipment, which none the less can contribute to the greater military efficiency of the opposition groups, but for presentational reasons alone we are not prepared to go further and supply weapons, ammunition, etc. Can we really rest this policy of giving support on a presentational distinction that does not stand up in military terms? Mr Hague: It’s really driven by human factors. We want to help save lives. That is our responsibility. It is always our responsibility. We do that through the huge amount of humanitarian aid that we give—more than £30 million so far. But this assistance is also designed to save lives. There are people who are unable to communicate the ideas of freedom and democracy that they want to communicate. There are people who are unable to communicate about the intentions of the regime. Sometimes their lives are lost as a result. We do have a responsibility to help those people. Now, of course, anything we do in this area is assessed against all our usual criteria, on which you are one of the experts, and against the law. We will always live up to our legal responsibilities, but we have a human and moral responsibility to assist people in this situation, so it is driven by those factors. I don’t see it as being driven by any presentational factor. As you can gather from what I am saying to the Committee, I don’t hide in any way the awfulness of the situation and the likelihood that it will deteriorate. Do you want to add to that, David? David Quarrey: There will always be some risk involved in this kind of work, but we have quite a careful process within Government to try to minimise that risk. First, in the Syria policy bit of the Foreign Office that I head, we draw on our contacts with the opposition and try to make an assessment of who it is that we are talking to and what their intentions are. Secondly, we work with our arms export policy people and the legal advisers in the Foreign Office. Thirdly, we work with our colleagues across Government. Fourthly, we work with our international partners. We do all that to ensure that we are sharing information and assessment with them to try to address and minimise such risks, while at the same time, as the Foreign Secretary says, trying to find ways to give practical support to those operating under intense pressure and at great personal risk to pursue political transition in Syria.

Q57 Sir John Stanley: Foreign Secretary, I do not in any way doubt your sincerity when you say that we are providing a substantial value of equipment, including sophisticated communications equipment, principally to save lives, but there is no question, certainly in my mind, that the type of equipment being supplied can be of military benefit. Is the real dividing line not that the British Government and perhaps others, for reasons that I can certainly understand, in no circumstances want to get into a position in which British-supplied weapons are used against Russian equipment? Mr Hague: That doesn’t arise. Clearly, we are not supplying weapons for a whole range of reasons. We are not supplying lethal assistance.

Q58 Sir John Stanley: I understand that, but is that not the dividing issue on policy? You wish to avoid at all costs supplying British-supplied lethal weapons or communications equipment, which could be used to improve military efficiency. You do not want to appear to

17 have a situation in which British-supplied lethal weapons could be used against Russian- supplied equipment. Is not that the driving consideration behind your decision? Mr Hague: No, I do not think so. I certainly do not think of it in those ways. We have not discussed it in that way within the Government. We are trying to help people in what is obviously a desperate situation, to which there are some risks attached, as David Quarrey and I have been saying. With the equipment that we are supplying, the balance of risk is in favour of supplying this help, for all the reasons I set out before. For lethal equipment, the balance is different. Of course, there has to be a much higher threshold in determining and worrying about how such equipment might be used. I see that as the dividing line, rather than any consideration of the nature of the equipment that it might be used against.

Q59 Mike Gapes: Isn’t the reality that we are outsourcing that supply of lethal equipment? The Qataris, the Saudis and the Turks are providing the Syrian opposition with that lethal equipment, and, therefore, our communications equipment and other assistance is complementary to an outsourcing policy that has been adopted. We are intervening, but at arm’s length. Mr Hague: No; you usually pay for what you get from outsourcing, and I can assure you that we are not paying any other country to do that.

Q60 Mike Gapes: But they are doing it. The Saudis, the Qataris and the Turks are providing military equipment. They are part of our network of friends of Syria. We are trying to distance ourselves politically, as Sir John says, but the net effect is that we have made a decision, probably the right decision, that we wish to provide a mechanism without sending lethal military equipment. Mr Hague: We wish to do what has been this country’s normal practice in all of the various conflicts in the Middle East. If we look at the Libyan conflict, on that occasion we supplied communications equipment, but not lethal weapons, to some people in the opposition group. It has never been our approach in any of the conflicts in the Middle East to supply weapons to either side. We have adopted a position on Syria that is consistent with what has been our normal practice—it is hard to speak of a normal practice in such a fast-changing situation as the last couple of years—which is in line with the principles and laws of this country. That determines it, rather than what other countries are doing, so this is not done as part of some secret strategy with other countries.

Q61 Mike Gapes: France admitted providing lethal equipment to some of the Libyan opposition, didn’t they? Mr Hague: I do not recall that admission, but whatever France did, the United Kingdom did not.

Q62 Mike Gapes: Okay. Is there not a danger— Sir Menzies Campbell: It’s a matter of principle. Mike Gapes: Is there not a danger that, by relying on undemocratic Sunni Arab regimes, we may end up assisting some groups in Syria to get weapons, which might not have been the case if we ourselves or NATO partners had taken on the role of intervening? Mr Hague: That is the argument that we would need to intervene ourselves or to send lethal weapons to prevent other people from doing so. First, I do not think that would

18 necessarily prevent anyone else doing so, whoever does that or might do that. Secondly, there are, of course, other major drawbacks to that policy. We can expand on them as much as you like, but clearly those drawbacks include that we would not necessarily know how the weapons are used and that the conflict in Syria could increasingly be defined as one in which the west is intervening—there would be major disadvantages to that, including for people in Syria. The drawbacks of such a policy, as things stand today—I do not rule out any option in the future, because we do not know how the situation will develop—outweigh the advantages.

Q63 Mike Gapes: Don’t you have concerns about the reports of some of the extremist groups, perhaps al-Qaeda linked and certainly Salafist, who are being armed through Saudi Arabia or Qatar? Mr Hague: I cannot comment on who is arming whom, and we do not in any case have precise information about that. I am concerned about extremist groups fighting in Syria and about foreign fighters going to Syria. Yes, absolutely we should be concerned about that, and everyone on the UN Security Council should be concerned about that. The longer that goes on, the harder it will be to have peace and stability in Syria in the future, so, yes, I am concerned about that.

Q64 Mike Gapes: Is there not then a case, as former Prime Minister Tony Blair has been saying this week, for us to think through the possible next phase to stop this process going in the way you are fearful of? We might need some kind of humanitarian corridors and some kind of intervention, which the Turkish Government is potentially likely to support, to establish some corridor within Syria at least to provide some respite for the civilian population. Mr Hague: Turkey has not called for such an intervention or corridor. Turkey was present at the meeting we had at the UN Security Council on 30 August, where the UN high commissioner for refugees set out very clearly the disadvantages of such a policy. I do not think that we should be dismissive about any options that people put forward because it is such a difficult situation, and we do not know what options it may be necessary to turn to in the future. As things stand today, the creation of such corridors or safe havens, which are phenomenally difficult to protect and defend, as we know from past experience, would require the readiness to mount a major military intervention in order to protect people there and in order to protect them on their way there. It would be tantamount to a major military intervention in Syria. Again, I am not excluding any options for the future, but the Committee will be well aware of what that might entail. It would require an intervention on a vastly greater scale than was the case in Libya, with no possibility at the moment of agreement on that in the UN Security Council, and it would require the full involvement of the United States.

Q65 Mike Gapes: Final question. Twenty years ago, you were in a Government that produced the no-fly zone policy to support the Iraqi Kurds and the Iraqi Shi’as. Would we require a UN resolution if there were to be some initiative of that kind, given that we did not have a specific UN resolution 20 years ago? Mr Hague: I do not think I want to set criteria for that. Clearly, we have had interventions since then where we have had a UN resolution—Libya being the obvious case

19 last year. It can be argued that under certain extreme circumstances the responsibility to protect is so essential and so imperative that under international law nations are able to act.

Q66 Mike Gapes: Article 51—is that what you are quoting? Mr Hague: Yes. That is argued. I am not taking a definitive position on that now, and I stress that we do not know what situation will arise. Nevertheless, one of the criteria for any such intervention—Sir Ming and I have discussed this before—is that it would have to be successful. Successful intervention in this case would require vastly greater military force than in Libya and could only be done with the full participation of the United States.

Q67 Sir Menzies Campbell: Overwhelming military force, I think you would agree, Secretary of State— Mr Hague: Yes. Sir Menzies Campbell: —if the proposition that was being put to you by Mr Gapes were to be entertained by the Government. If I might say so very briefly by way of comment, I agree with your references to Libya and the authority provided by the United Nations resolution in relation to that. Indeed, as you will recall, it made an enormous difference to the attitude of people in the House of Commons when the Government brought forward the proposal for that intervention. The fact that it was authorised made the argument within the House of Commons a very much easier one than it might otherwise have been. You have painted a very sombre picture in which, for the moment at least, there is no obvious step we can take beyond what one might describe as the support option, which the Government has embarked on. Can I urge you to maintain the pressure on Russia, if any urging is indeed needed, and draw to your attention that one of the important factors in the end of the defiance of Milosevic on the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo was the fact that the patron of Serbia and Milosevic—Russia—made it clear that it was no longer willing to give unequivocal support? I do not imagine in the present state of the Soviet Union and of Mr Putin’s aspirations that we might get anything quite as clear cut as that, but surely it is worth pursuing as hard as we possibly can the view that Russia holds the key to the kind of resolution to the issue that would be in Russia’s interests. Mr Hague: This is the argument. You have put that very well, and I tried to set that argument out earlier. Even from the Russian point of view, the argument should be very strong. If I am right—I think that I am right—that the longer this goes on, the worse the situation is likely to be in Syria, then the worse it will be for Russian interests in Syria, as well as for international peace and security in the whole Middle East region. So it should be in Russia’s interests, irrespective of any other considerations, to support the kind of resolution that we have put forward. Clearly that is not the view of the Russian Government, but we entirely take on board your encouragement to continue with our efforts, and we will continue with those efforts. I expect to see the Russian Foreign Minister again next week during the UN General Assembly in New York and I imagine that we will continue to discuss this in many different ways with Russia. The Prime Minister did so with President Putin. My assessment remains the same as the one I gave to the House on 3 September during my statement: a change in the Russian position is most likely to happen only with a further change in the situation on the ground in Syria.

Q68 Sir Menzies Campbell: Very briefly, just to go back to the question of intervention. Even to discuss intervention in the light of the events of the last few days in the

Middle East does not make any sense whatsoever. Any notion of the United States and the United Kingdom joining together to embark upon—putting it very gently—a military activity in the Middle East would be hardly likely to ensure an end to the instability that we have seen on the streets of so many Arab countries in recent days. Mr Hague: There are major disadvantages to such ideas, as I was setting out to Mr Gapes. It is important to stress as well that, since part of what we are discussing here is the potential collapse of the Syrian state, an even greater humanitarian crisis and disorder spilling into neighbouring countries, we should not be in the business of ruling things out. We must, however, be conscious of the serious disadvantages and always weigh those in the balance, and that is what we do today. I feel, given the reaction in the Commons to the policy that I set out on Syria on 3 September, that the policy we are pursuing commands general consent in this country and in this Parliament. We will keep Parliament fully informed of any change in our thinking. Chair: Can we turn to Iran now, Foreign Secretary?

Q69 Mr Baron: Foreign Secretary, can I just share with you some concerns and questions regarding the evidence of the Iranian decision to build a nuclear weapon? I refer you to evidence given by the US Director of National Intelligence, Mr Clapper, and the director of the CIA, General Petraeus, earlier this year to the Senate, in which they said that they had no evidence that Iran has made a decision on making a concerted push to build a weapon. They said that they “don’t believe they have actually made the decision to go ahead with a nuclear weapon.” That came as no surprise, because it is line with the national intelligence estimates of 2007 and 2010, which, as you well know, is the consensus view of America’s 16 intelligence operations. Sir John Sawers said recently, in July, that the SIS foiled Iranian attempts to build a nuclear weapon in 2008. Those two statements—we believe that Sir John Sawers thought he was speaking off the record—do not sit well together. In fact, they flatly contradict each other. Now, I don’t expect you, for the normal reasons, to comment on Sir John Sawers, so I accept that. But can I take your view as to whether the Iranians have actually decided to build a nuclear weapon? Mr Hague: I don’t think we can have absolute certainty on that, either way. And, of course, I am not able to discuss—we are coming back to the same issue raised earlier—our intelligence findings. But our current concern—let me put it this way—is over Iran’s nuclear programme, its enrichment activity and its inability to explain to the satisfaction of the international community or the IAEA board of governors that that activity is for peaceful purposes. That is our concern and that is a big enough concern in its own right, irrespective of whether a decision has been taken to manufacture a nuclear weapon.

Q70 Mr Baron: Would you accept, though—at least, some of us feel—that Iraq taught us that we have to base our foreign policy decisions on concrete evidence? This is the part of the world where status is terribly important. Why didn’t Saddam Hussein deny the existence of WMD? Perhaps it was in his interests not to do so. Do you accept that there is ambiguity here? In a way, it reflects on the ambiguity of the west’s policy. Where do you see the red lines, then? I suggest to you that the US red line is weaponisation. The Israeli red line appears to be enrichment. Where do we sit in that range, because it is not clear to many here where our view is on this? Where is our red line? Mr Hague: We want Iran to have—if Iran is to have a nuclear programme—a peaceful programme of civil nuclear energy, to have all the rights that any non-nuclear weapon state has under the non-proliferation treaty. I am not going to choose a red line among different red lines from the international community. We are trying to promote a solution to this. It is worth

21 noting that last week the IAEA board of governors voted in favour of a strong resolution on Iran—and this was Russia and China voting in favour of this, as well as the United Kingdom and the United States and our allies—stating that Iranian co-operation was essential and urgent if international confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s programme was to be restored, and expressing serious concern about continued enrichment and heavy water-related activities in Iran. That is a common concern across the international community. It is not a western invention. We are not imagining that. All of those nations believe that those activities are of serious concern.

Q71 Mr Baron: I take that point. I think you should also perhaps accept that Iran has signed the NPT, whereas other countries—nuclear powers—in the region have not, and that includes Israel, India and Pakistan. Can I bring you back to the testimony given by Mr Clapper and General Petraeus to the Senate? I take it, then, that you are not disagreeing with their assessment that Iran has not yet made a decision to build a nuclear weapon—or are you? Can you just be clear to the Committee about this? Mr Hague: I’m not disagreeing with their assessment, although I qualify that by always saying that they or we would not necessarily know. What we do know is alarming enough, and it is some of the things that I have just described.

Q72 Mr Baron: But you would accept that, before any sort of intervention, particularly by the Israelis, which I hope we are counselling against—any pre-emptive military strikes— we should stress to the Israelis the importance of concrete evidence of a decision to build a nuclear weapon, as opposed to circumstantial evidence: surely, a lesson we learned from our ill-fated invasion of Iraq. Mr Hague: Well, there’s no doubt, in the view of pretty much the whole world, that what I have just described in the IAEA resolution is going on. But our policy, as you know, and as we have debated in the House, is a twin-track policy of sanctions and negotiations, and we have been pursuing both of those vigorously this year. The E3 plus 3 have had several rounds of negotiations—not yet productive ones—with Iran. The European Union and our partners around the world have implemented a very strong set of sanctions which are having a major impact on Iran. We will be intensifying those sanctions in the coming weeks and months in the absence of successful negotiations, but our advice to Israel—on your point— has been very clear: that in these circumstances and in the pursuit of this policy we are not in favour of a military strike on Iran.

Q73 Chair: You said that diplomacy has not been productive. Have you made any assessment of how effective the sanctions are going to be? I acknowledge that the squeeze has really only just come on, but are you optimistic that this will produce results? Mr Hague: You are right, Chair, that the squeeze has just come on. The EU sanctions on importing oil, in particular, came into force on 1 July. It does appear that Iranian oil sales are dramatically lower than a year ago—some 1 million barrels a day lower than they were last year. That is a large cut in Iranian oil revenues, and of course there are other important sanctions on the financial sector and so on as well. So those sanctions are certainly having an effect, but it is not our assessment at the moment that that has led to a change in Iran’s policy. In our view this remains the best policy and our best hope of a peaceful outcome to the dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme, but it has not succeeded yet.

Q74 Chair: If the Iranians actually said, “It is our intention to build a bomb”, or that they had got one, I presume we would continue with sanctions. Mr Hague: I am sure that in those circumstances we would continue with sanctions and, indeed, intensify the sanctions that we have got. Absolutely.

Q75 Chair: How much preparation have we made for a world in which we have a nuclear-armed Iran? Mr Hague: Our work at the moment is clearly directed to preventing that coming about, because that would be a development so serious for nuclear weapons proliferation and for the Middle East as a whole that our efforts must be directed to preventing it. I think it is a mistake to move on to arguments about how we would manage or contain that situation because it creates the illusion that it would be easy or even possible to manage or contain it. The consequences are unknowable. So our efforts are directed towards preventing that and, as I said, they will be intensified. We discussed the intensification of our sanctions at the EU Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Cyprus 10 days ago.

Q76 Chair: Correct me if I am wrong, but there is no evidence that any efforts so far, either diplomatically or economically, have arrested Iran’s advance at all. Mr Hague: It would be surprising if some of the sanctions we have applied hadn’t slowed down in some respects Iran’s nuclear programme, since they have for a long time— particularly the sanctions agreed in the United Nations—been directed specifically at the nuclear programme. So it would be very surprising if they had not had that effect, but as I said a moment ago it has not led to a change in policy on Iran. I firmly believe that this, the policy that we are pursuing, is the best hope of a peaceful outcome and it is a better policy than not pursuing sanctions, which would—as I think I have argued at this Committee before— increase the likelihood of an Israeli military attack on Iran.

Q77 Chair: Thank you very much. May we now turn to Libya and North Africa? As you are aware, you have just published your response to our report on the Arab spring today but events have moved quite rapidly since that report. Can you give us an update and your reaction to the tragic death of the US ambassador in Benghazi? Do you think that that was a one-off, or is it part of a co-ordinated programme? Mr Hague: It is a tragedy, and that is the first thing to say. This was a highly respected ambassador who worked very closely with many of our staff at the British embassy in Tripoli and who was working hard in the interests not only of the United States but of the people of Libya. I called Secretary Clinton at the weekend to express our condolences and to discuss the various security measures that each of our countries has taken. I also met US Assistant Secretary of State Bill Burns in Baghdad the day after it happened last week and discussed the situation with him. The first thing to say about this is that the film which has provoked outrage was designed to provoke outrage and disorder. Although I have not seen it, it is clearly a contemptible piece of work; we should be clear in our opinion about it. At the same time, there is no excuse for violence. It must be understood across the region that diplomats working in Benghazi and other places are trying to help the people of Libya. I therefore welcome the clear condemnation of what has happened by leaders, including what are generally termed Islamist leaders across the region, by the President of Egypt, whom I visited

23 earlier on the day of these attacks, by the leaders of Tunisia and, emphatically, by Libyan leaders. It is also important to point out, so that people can see the probable true balance of opinion in Libya, the outpouring of support and the very strong reaction against the violence in Benghazi which our embassy has reported from Libya. People have taken to the streets saying “Not in our name”, and our embassy has been inundated with messages condemning the attacks. Libyan political and Government leaders have repeatedly condemned what they have called a cowardly and criminal act. I have visited Benghazi twice in the last year, and in my experience there are vast numbers of people there who want good relations with western nations—indeed, all nations— and are grateful for all the assistance we have given them. I believe we must continue our support for people in the so-called Arab spring trying to bring freedom and democracy to their countries. This is a tragic event, but we must not be disheartened by it. We must continue that support and maintain our faith in their ability to succeed.

Q78 Chair: Immediately after the incident, the US deployed a couple of warships off the coast. Do you expect the US to up their activity inside of Libya now? Mr Hague: US activity in Libya has remained diplomatic. The United States will, I am sure, look at whatever they need to do to improve their own security. I cannot comment further on what they do, but their response has been entirely diplomatic so far. So has ours. Our embassies have not been affected as directly or targeted in the same way. Our embassy in Sudan was entered by a crowd last Friday, although the main damage was done to the neighbouring German embassy, and German diplomats took refuge in our embassy. I intend to speak this afternoon to the Foreign Minister of Sudan about the protection of embassies in Khartoum. Otherwise, our embassies have not been directly targeted. I was inside our embassy in Cairo when the crowd gathered outside the American embassy next door. There was a serious failure by the security forces in allowing intruders to get into the American embassy, but no attempt was made to enter the British embassy on that occasion. We keep our security under careful review, and we have increased the training of our staff in handling what we call safety in fragile environments—SAFE training. We as Ministers are keeping on top of this every day.

Q79 Sir John Stanley: To continue your last sentence, as you know, Foreign Secretary, members of this Committee, as part of our Arab spring inquiry, visited Egypt, Libya and Tunisia earlier this year. It is self-evident that in these situations, security danger can escalate in a matter of hours, which is extraordinarily difficult to deal with. Do you have confidence that you have the capabilities and resources to provide proper physical security protection to our diplomats serving in Libya and elsewhere in the middle east, and to their families, when they have families with them? Mr Hague: I might ask David to add to this. We take necessary precautions all the time. An attempt was made on the life of our ambassador to Libya in Benghazi on 11 June, exactly three months before last week’s incidents, after which we ceased to have staff permanently stationed in Benghazi. We had already taken that precaution, and we have asked all our missions to review their security procedures. That involves constant re-evaluation of the nature of any local threats and the willingness of the host nation to protect us as set out in the Vienna convention. It is primarily the responsibility of the host nation to ensure the safety of diplomats and diplomatic missions, and whenever necessary, we remind host nations of their

24 responsibility to do that. Our approach is risk management rather than complete risk avoidance, and it is inevitably part of our work in volatile regions that there is sometimes risk. We do our best to minimise it, and we review it all the time. Have I missed anything out, David?

Q80 Sir John Stanley: You have missed out what I asked you about resources. Are you satisfied that the Foreign Office’s current resources enable you to take the necessary measures or, to put it the other way round, are your security officers advising you that in particular places x, y, z should be done as a matter of immediacy, but your finance people are saying, “Sorry Foreign Secretary, we can’t afford it”? Mr Hague: No, that doesn’t happen. The security of our staff is an absolutely prime consideration. It occupies quite a large part of our budget, but necessary measures are not constrained. Matthew Rycroft, who is our chief operating officer, has not yet had a chance to speak, and either of my officials might wish to comment. Matthew Rycroft: Just one thing. The answer is emphatically that when heads of mission request additional security measures, those measures are granted. There is never a financial reason not to grant them. As the Foreign Secretary said, we spend a significant proportion of our budget—about 17% of our running costs—on security, and it is not constrained by money, even in a very tight resource environment. We recognise that many of our staff operate in difficult security environments, and I would like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to all of them, whether they are local staff or UK-based staff, for their work in difficult circumstances. Mr Hague: And that is an important point. After the incidents in Khartoum on Friday, I was reflecting on the fact that the skill, restraint and presence of mind of our staff—locally engaged staff as well as UK-based diplomats and local security staff—are outstanding. We can have great confidence in them around the world.

Q81 Mike Gapes: You referred to your visit to Egypt. Would you like to update us on the current assessment of the country? President Obama was careful not to describe it as an ally or an enemy. Do you regard Egypt as an ally of the UK? Mr Hague: I regard Egypt as a friend of the UK. We do not have a formal alliance with Egypt. The United States has various technical terms, such as non-NATO allies. We do not need to get caught up in the same terms. Egypt is a friendly country and an important partner for us, and that was fully reflected in my visit last week. The incidents took place while I was there, but the remaining tenor of our discussions was encouraging. There is a concentration in the Egyptian leadership on the economic scene, and an understanding of how serious the economic situation is. That requires practical government, economic expansion and attraction of foreign investors. Ironically, given that the demonstration was against the American embassy, the visitors to the Prime Minister of Egypt before I arrived at his office were a large US trade delegation with the strong encouragement of the Egyptian Government. The situation is well understood, and President Morsi has made an impressive start in many ways, including in foreign policy in some respects. I found his manner, his approach, particularly to the economic challenges, and his country’s recognition of the importance of that to be more encouraging than anything I had seen in Egypt in the last few years. We must not have any complacency about that, because the challenges are immense.

Q82 Mike Gapes: Are you saying that the relationship between the UK Government and the new Egyptian Government is better than it was with the Mubarak regime? Mr Hague: I did not have much experience personally of the relationship with the Mubarak regime, but I think the relationship with Egyptian society has the potential to be much better than in those times, because we are supporting the yearning of people to have their freedom and their democracy, as well as projects under our Arab Partnership fund to support business ethics and to encourage entrepreneurship; I visited last week some of the people benefiting from those projects. That can include a very good relationship with the Government, so I think it is, as things stand today, at least as good as the relationship that this Government or past Governments had with the Mubarak regime.

Q83 Mike Gapes: Did you raise any issues of concern with President Morsi, such as treatment of gays, treatment of women or treatment of minorities? Mr Hague: Yes. This is a very important subject, as their constitution is now being debated. This is a rather unusual position for us politicians to try to imagine: the President has been elected, but the constitution is now being prepared. I met not only the President, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, but the Secretary-General of the Constituent Assembly, who is leading the drafting of the constitution, and people from across other political parties in Egypt; and part of my message was to encourage them to ensure that human rights in their full sense, covering the protection of minorities, are enshrined in their constitution.

Q84 Mike Gapes: And homosexuals and women? Not just— Mr Hague: Yes. Well, as far as I am concerned, that is an important part of human rights, but also in Egypt, of course, there is the importance of religious toleration, of the position of Coptic people—we have been through all these subjects.

Q85 Rory Stewart: Foreign Secretary, I just want to follow up on the security point. There seems to be a massive change in the kind of security threat we are now facing. Essentially, there is a shift from a threat by terrorist organisations—vehicle-borne IEDs— towards mobs, and that is a big problem. We saw it in Iran, where essentially a mob managed to get into our embassy and round up our diplomats. We have now seen it again in the US context in Benghazi, where, despite a large security presence and despite safe rooms, the US ambassador was killed. This suggests that we are moving into a world in which it is going to be more and more difficult to continue to depend on host Governments for the protection of our diplomats, because the scale of investment you are going to require, not to deal with a truck bomb but to deal with 300 or 400 people trying to crawl over an embassy wall, may have huge implications for you in terms of the number of embassies you can continue to run and the kind of security presence you would have to keep on the ground to defend against those kinds of attack. Mr Hague: It will have to remain a matter for the host Governments. I think you are right: this is an increased threat. That does not reduce the other threats. The attempt on the life of our ambassador in Benghazi that I referred to was by a rocket-propelled grenade, so it does not mean that other threats have been reduced, but there is no way of avoiding the prime responsibility being that of the host nation, and of course there are many circumstances in which host nations fully live up to these responsibilities. What we are hearing about here are the exceptions to that but, across the Middle East, host nations often do an outstanding job and their police forces often do a very good job in protecting foreign embassies. Where we think they fall down in that task—well, then we have discussions with those Governments

26 about it. That is clearly what the United States has been doing as well. But I do not think that can bring about a fundamental change. We are not going to be able to deploy our own military force to protect them in those countries. Of course, an inability to protect embassies would affect our ability to continue to deploy them in those countries and it would affect the economic future of the countries concerned. I think that is understood by the leadership and by the great majority of people in those countries.

Q86 Rory Stewart: Just to clarify, I think what we may be seeing is that the Arab spring and various other changes in the Middle East over the last 10 years mean that the assumption that we have operated under, that host countries will always protect us and always be in a position to prevent mobs from entering embassies, seems to be under threat. It was under threat in Iran, it is under threat in Libya and it might continue to be under threat. That should have implications for our security policy. Mr Hague: We will see. I think that we may find that these events are a sharp reminder to host Governments of their responsibilities. I think David wants to come in on this. David Quarrey: We have just got to be clear in differentiating between regimes like the Iranian one which was complicit in an attack on diplomatic premises and those like the Libyan authorities where I think the will was there to help but the capabilities were not. Clearly there is a big lesson for them, and our ambassador in Tripoli has made it very clear to the new authorities that they have these responsibilities—we will help them to deliver them, but theirs is the primary responsibility and I think that they want to meet those responsibilities as part of overcoming the appalling legacy they have from the Gaddafi regime. I think we need to be clear about differentiating that kind of situation from something like Tehran, where the authorities were clearly complicit. Mr Hague: And in that case we concluded that we could not operate an embassy any longer in Tehran. But in other cases we will work with the host Government to ensure that our embassies are protected.

Q87 Sir Menzies Campbell: I wonder whether in the course of your discussions with the President—without the constitution—you raised the question of Egypt’s relationship with Israel. You will recall, as we all do, that President Mubarak was notable for maintaining the peace treaty originally entered into by Sadat and Begin. In the aftermath of the fall of the Mubarak regime, there was some speculation as to whether a new Egypt would feel similarly committed to that treaty. What assessment have you made—if you can—about the attitude towards Israel, which would be a very fundamental pillar in any effort to retain stability in the Middle East? Mr Hague: The President has said that he stands by the peace treaty with Israel, and of course we welcome that. His concentration, as I mentioned earlier, is very much on building up Egypt’s own future in peace. That is absolutely the right priority. I also discussed with him and other colleagues in his Government the situation in Sinai, where clearly there have been security problems. We stand ready to work with Egypt in any way that we can to assist, in the sense of our own expertise in how to deal with such internal security issues. So that is something that it is very important that Egypt deals with, but it appears determined to do so, and so I welcome the stance that the President has taken on this.

Q88 Mike Gapes: May I take you to Tunisia? As a Committee, we were there six months ago, and we were very positive about the process—the Government response also

27 reflects that—but some concerns are being expressed. I am interested in your assessment of the current situation in Tunisia. How is it going? Mr Hague: We remain positive about it. To take this to the more general level of the Arab spring, it has the potential to be the greatest extension of human freedom since the end of the Cold War but, as I and many of you on this Committee have often said, it will throw up crises and problems along the way for many years. That will be true in each of these countries. So, yes, Tunisia faces its own challenges, but we have found for instance on foreign policy—discussing Syria, for example—that Tunisia is actively engaged in the Arab League, in working with countries like the United Kingdom and with a similar view of the way forward. We find that in economic policy Tunisia wants to expand trade, and it wants to attract British businesses and to work closely with the European Union, so if that is how the leadership will be, that is something from which we have nothing to fear. We have to work with such people and to support them in their own stability, without trying to dictate to them what to do. That is a further illustration of why I say that we must continue our support for the Arab spring and for our belief in what the great majority of the people in those countries are wanting to see. Chair: I turn to our bilateral relationship with Ecuador. Ann Clwyd will open the questions.

Q89 Ann Clwyd: The “aide memoire” that was apparently sent to the Ecuador embassy generated huge headlines all over the world. Was it a diplomatic blunder, who wrote the aide memoire, and what went wrong? Mr Hague: That is what you would call a loaded question. No, I think it was the right thing to do. We wanted the Government of Ecuador to know, before they made a decision about granting what they call, under the 1954 Caracas agreement, “diplomatic asylum”—a concept that we do not recognise—that if they did so that would not be a position that would find much favour in law in the United Kingdom. So the aide memoire set out—in addition to a wish to arrive at an agreed solution; indeed, that we worked on an agreed text with them— the legal position in the UK, which remains the legal position. It was not a threat, as I made very clear at the time and have since made clear—I met the Vice-President of Ecuador on 29 August, when he came for the Paralympics. This does not imply a threat. The United Kingdom, of course, is a strong upholder of international law, of the Vienna convention. The relevant Acts of Parliament that we have passed in this country include a commitment to international law. But we have our own legal responsibilities, our own extradition laws, and we will fulfil those responsibilities. So we wanted to make all of that clear and we continue to make that clear.

Q90 Ann Clwyd: There have been a number of very eminent critics. Tony Brenton, Britain’s former ambassador to Russia, said that the Foreign Office had “slightly overreached themselves here,” while another former ambassador, Oliver Miles, said the FCO had made a “big mistake” and was sceptical about the Government’s claims—you have repeated them now—that it had not issued a threat, stating: “If I tell you ‘I’m not threatening you but I DO have a very large stick here,’ it’s a question of semantics”. Mr Hague: Well, people have their opinions. I am not sure the word “slightly” is a particularly damning criticism, although former ambassadors, of course, have their own understated way of putting their opinions. People are entitled to their opinions. At the end of the day, we have stated our position. Ecuador then stated their position. We are in the same situation as before. Both countries are willing to negotiate about it, but the legal position is

28 different in each country. Our legal position is very clear; our responsibility to Sweden is very clear. Their concept of diplomatic asylum is, as I say, one that we do not recognise. So we have agreed to continue to talk about this. Given the different legal interpretations, there is no solution in sight at the moment, but we will continue to be available to talk to the Ecuadoreans about it.

Q91 Ann Clwyd: So you are continuing to talk; the talks have not finished on this matter. Mr Hague: Well, the particular work that is referred to in the aide memoire—there were seven meetings before this between the UK and Ecuador. In the last couple of days we have given you the aide memoire, which shows that work was going on. But of course that work would have had to lead, in our view, to Mr Assange leaving the embassy, and we have made it very clear, given our legal responsibilities, that if he does that he will be arrested. It would have had to have that result. That remains the position, so we have neither gone backwards nor forwards on this. We remain at an impasse with Ecuador, but I had an amicable meeting with the Vice- President of Ecuador. The concerns of Ecuador seem to centre around what might happen through extradition to a third country, and I have set out to him, as I have set out in public on previous occasions, all the responsibilities that the United Kingdom and Sweden have under the European convention on human rights. If Ecuador’s fear is that Mr Assange would be extradited to a third country and face the death penalty, well, actually our Home Secretary would have to be asked for permission for such extradition from Sweden to another country, and would not be able to agree to extradition if the death penalty was in prospect. So I think there are some unnecessary fears. We have tried to set minds at rest in the Government of Ecuador and clearly we will have to continue to try to do that.

Q92 Ann Clwyd: I don’t know whether you can answer this question. Why don’t the Swedes come here to interview Assange at the embassy? Mr Hague: I can answer: that would be a decision for the Swedish prosecutor. It is up to them how they wish to proceed, but they have given no sign of doing that. Their request is for extradition for serious alleged offences. I don’t want to prejudge those in any way. We will fulfil a legal obligation to extradite a person in that situation.

Q93 Chair: There are just a couple of minutes left, Foreign Secretary. Could you update us on Anglo-Russian relations at the moment? They have been a bit tetchy and tend to go up and down. Where do you feel we are at the moment? Mr Hague: Our object in this Government has been to improve our working relationship with Russia. Clearly, we have some differences. We have been discussing one of them today—Syria. There are differences on foreign policy and we sometimes have vigorous exchanges about human rights issues. So we have differences on those, as well, but it is important to have a working relationship with Russia. It is a leading nation in the world and a member of the Security Council. We have to work together every day as permanent members of the Security Council. At the personal ministerial level we have created good contacts and relationships. The visit of Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, to the UK last year was his first bilateral visit here in 7 years. I hosted him here and I have been back there this year. The Prime Minister and President Putin had a good meeting. Although they and I had a great time watching the judo at the Olympics, we did not make any breakthrough on Syria.

In the meantime, British businesses are doing well exporting to Russia; it is one of our fastest-growing export markets. We do have concerns and have seen some of them, as I say, over recent human rights issues. I think it is a better working relationship but we have not given any ground or brought about any relaxation on the measures introduced after the murder of Alexander Litvinenko. We have not received any satisfaction on that point so we have not changed any of the measures that the previous Government brought in. The ability to discuss global and bilateral issues is certainly there and we have reinforced that. I would put it that way.

Q94 Sir Menzies Campbell: Have you expressed any anxiety towards the Russian ambassador or the Foreign Minister about what seem like efforts to suppress dissidents? I am thinking in particular of the three women in what I might call a rock group. Certain members of Parliament now seem to be singled out in a way that suggests because they are dissident they are to be targeted. Do we express views about that? If so, how strongly? Mr Hague: We do express our views. The Prime Minister raised the particular issue of the punk band, Pussy Riot.

Q95 Sir Menzies Campbell: Punk band rather than rock group. I am grateful for the correction. Mr Hague: I think you must get your technical terms exactly right, Sir Menzies.

Q96 Sir Menzies Campbell: If you remember, you were able to identify George Michael for me at the closing ceremony. Mr Hague: I did assist you at the closing ceremony of the Olympics with the identity of George Michael, so I am providing a continuing service on this.

Q97 Sir Menzies Campbell: You are a Minister of Culture, as well as Foreign Secretary. Mr Hague: I am not volunteering for that. The Prime Minister raised that with President Putin, and we have a formal UK-Russia human rights dialogue. The last one was held here in London in July, where our officials raised a range of issues, including: new legislation; the north Caucusus; freedom of assembly and expression: the protection of human rights defenders and journalists; and the Magnitsky case. We do not hold back from raising issues. We sometimes have quite a vigorous argument about these things.

Q98 Ann Clwyd: There are going to be fewer of you to press those human rights matters in future. Your team is diminished again in size. You have now got two part-time Ministers, including Baroness Warsi, who has been given an extremely large brief— Afghanistan, human rights and various others—but she is only part-time. She is a new Minister. Are you confident that this is a part-time job? You have two part-timers in your Department. Mr Hague: Our team has not been reduced in size. There are six Foreign Office Ministers, plus the Trade Minister, who is half in the Foreign Office and half in the Business Department. There were only four Foreign Office Ministers in the previous Government, so the Foreign Office ministerial team is much bigger than it was in the previous Government. Baroness Warsi will be an excellent addition to the team and well able to cover these

30 responsibilities. I think that we have been described in one of the newspapers as the “happiest ministerial team in Whitehall.” It is not often that I agree with something in a newspaper, but I agree with that.

Q99 Mike Gapes: That is because the others are so unhappy. Mr Hague: No; it is because we work together so well, and that will remain the case with the new members of the team. Chair: Foreign Secretary, you have a happy Select Committee carrying out oversight of you. Thank you very much indeed for coming along today. You have been very frank and open, and it is much appreciated.