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Assessing Ukraine Proposals for More Effective Governance Assessing Ukraine Proposals for more effective governance Switch to Federalism Ukraine has had a long history of political instability. While it dates further back than the dissolution of the USSR, it’s imperative to focus on executive power changes since 1991 and how these ideological shifts have also altered and emboldened certain nationalist, pro-western or pro-Russian separatist parties which are all extremely active today. Ukraine is comprised of 24 oblasts, 2 municipalities (Sevastopol, and Kyiv) and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea who’s territory has been disputed over since the annexation of 2014 by Russia- the act of which has largely been deemed by international bodies as illegitimate. It’s important to note though that the land wasn’t just annexed- the people of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea had a landslide referendum in which they agreed to secede from Ukraine’s realm of jurisdiction and join Russia. This referendum was largely successful due to the fact that the region is majority ethnic Russian (and does not culturally or ethnically feel bound to Ukraine), while Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar minorities combined comprise around 36.4% (UNPO) of the population. This divergence of ethnicity and culture is present elsewhere in Ukraine, such as in the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. With due respect, we acknowledge that a Unitary System might be an inefficient means of governing a state which holds such prevalent issues of conflicting identities. A Cooperative Federalist approach would better represent the range of geographical, political, and social interests among the states of Ukraine because decentralizing power and vesting it among the states will give each region a chance to govern in the respective interests of its people. Further, a Cooperative approach would allow for a better sense of autonomy for the regions which have heavy involvement in the separatist movement because it would give them sovereignty over a number of policy realms, while still allowing for oversight from the federal government and increased cooperation/communication between the two bodies. We feel that individual statehood brought by federalism will alleviate some of the tensions around lack of representation on political, cultural or ethnic identities. With that said, a new constitution will need to be written in order to accommodate this governmental system change, as well as instituting a supremacy clause to ensure that the federal government has the ultimate say in the case of a future conflict arising. Executive branch The Prime Minister is appointed by the President with a simple majority from Parliament. The Cabinet of Ministers is made up of five individuals, and several ministries, each with their respective functions. The cabinet possesses the power of legislative initiative, which allows them to introduce their own bills into Parliament. If the Prime Minister resigns, the entire cabinet must also leave. The President holds stronger veto power than other Presidents in similar government types. The constitutional amendments in 2004 gave more power to the Prime Minister, but left more ambiguity to where the majority of the power lies. Former President, Leonid Kuchma, implemented a system of new constitutional reforms to refine election laws. He did this to try and prevent further corruption in the Ukrainian government. These reforms allotted more power to the Parliament and in turn, brought in more checks and balances with the President. The current election process of the President is held every five years, in a two-round system. Article 8 Section 11 of the constitution allows for the President, through local commanders, to regulate the functioning media outlets, influence their programming, and close them down in case of violation of martial law requirements. Many powers that the President holds were set in place by Kuchma and are very controversial. The President acts as a foreign diplomat, and ensures that the constitution is followed closely. The Prime Minister appoints the department heads and has the constitutional power to veto or countersign any bills passed by the President. For the executive branch, we propose to keep the semi-presidential system. Our first correction addresses the National Police of Ukraine. In order to prevent the possibility of a strong hand government, we propose to reduce the power of the national police force, dividing the law enforcement power between the federal and state levels. Currently, the President has recently enacted his power to dissolve the Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) (Hnatyuk). On the topic of this power, the constitution states that the President can, “terminate(s) the authority of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, if the plenary meetings fail to commence within thirty days of one regular session.” As this is an obvious overreach of power, which could enable the president to remove anyone who does not share his political views, we will remove this ability from the President. The current impeachment process requires a two-quarter majority in the Parliament to start, and a three-quarter majority to pass. We suggest to change it to require a three-quarters majority in the House of Representatives to start, and a two-thirds majority in the Senate to pass. A vote of no confidence will require two-thirds of the votes in parliament. Currently, the resignation of the Prime Minister requires the entire Cabinet of Ministers to resign also. We will not require the resignation of the entire cabinet, only the closest advisors such as the Vice Prime Minister, and the first Vice Prime Minister, as keeping the old system will result in instability by leaving large swaths of positions vacant. The constitution allows the President to regulate and shut down ​ media outlets if they violate the requirements of martial law. We will abolish this section, as censoring the press in any form will limit a transparent government. Also, on the topic of maintaining a free and unbiased press, we will disband the National Council of Ukraine on Television and Radio Broadcasting to further distance from possible media censorship. We will adjust the power of the President in regards to the National Bank. Currently, the President appoints half the board members. We will change this to solely the appointment of the chairman of the National Bank. This will be set in place to combat the financial corruption that has played a part in Ukrainian politics throughout the years. In addition to these changes, we will implement a third-party anti-corruption agency to oversee the executive branch through the National Anticorruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU). Legislative branch The legislative branch will be structured as a bicameral system. The Senate should be stronger than the House of Representatives. A bicameral legislature will balance out the power in parliament. Under the unicameral body of the Verkhovna Rada, all the power is vested in a body that possessed virtually no checks and balances. Furthermore, a bicameral system will work better with the size and population of Ukraine. As the geographically largest country in Europe, Ukraine has both a massive amount of territory and a huge heterogeneous population. In the referendum from 2000, “the overwhelming majority of participants expressed their support for the transition to a bicameral structure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine” (Serohina). With support from the people, the transition from unicameral to bicameral makes the most sense. This will change from the current Constitution, which allows for 450 members in the Verkhovna ​ Rada. The House will now have 442 members, 17 members per region. By eliminating electoral districts and allowing for 17 members per region, elections can be held through a proportional representation system. The House will have 2 year terms, the short term will help prevent ​ corruption and prevent representatives from straying away from their constituencies desires. They will also have the power to appoint appeals court judges though simple majority vote in the House. The Senate will have 52 members, 2 per region in Ukraine. They will have 4 year terms to keep continuity and because the Senate will have the power to elect one third of the Supreme Court justices. The Supreme Court Justices will be appointed with a two thirds majority support in the Senate. Additionally, a bicameral system “implies a more complete consideration of the interests of various social, economic, cultural groups or geographical units through the expansion of representation of sub-national authorities” (Serohina). This system works because of the strong social divisions between eastern Ukraine and western Ukraine. Citizens in eastern Ukraine possess a national identity that is distinct from citizens in western Ukraine. Through a bicameral legislation, the Russian-speaking minorities in the east will be better represented. A bicameral legislation will also provide a much-needed decentralization of power, which, along with proportional representation, will “check the power of vested interests and ensure active citizen participation in the political process” (Jarabik). The legislative branch will also have the power to overturn a presidential veto with a two-thirds majority vote in the house. Parliamentary immunity will also be removed in order to prevent corruption among members of parliament. The type of electoral system that should be put in place to elect members of the House is a proportional representation system. A proportional representation system will be more
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