The 2016 Presidential Election and “The Impasse” the Role of the UN Evolution of a UN Strategy Sustainability
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Back from the Brink A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF UN PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY IN WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA THE GAMBIA AND GABON by Dr Rebecca Brubaker and Dirk Druet Dr Rebecca Brubaker is Senior Policy Adviser at United Nations University Centre for Policy Research and Dirk Druet is a Researcher at the Centre for International Peace and Security Studies, McGill University, and former UN official in the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. Acknowledgements The report would not have been possible without the time, insights and contributions of a number of individuals. The authors would like to particularly thank Rebecca Adda-Dontoh, Roselyn Akombe, Jean Delors Biyogue, Delphine Bost, SRSG Mohamed Ibn Chambas, Sancho Coutinho, SRSG Francois Fall, Sascha Fong, Wifaq Hadra, Maarten Halff, Steven Jackson, Craig Jenness, Djeneba Hyungjong Kim, Benedicte Dosso Epse Kouassi, Roswitha Kremser, Sébastien Lapierre, Sébastien Lawson, Ninamma Rai, Mansour Sadeghi, DRSRG Ruby Sandhu- Rojon, Arthur Sessink, Maria Solis, Qais Sultan, Manuela Torre, Cherrie-Anne Vincent, RC Seraphine Wakana and Teresa Whitfield. In addition, the authors would like to thank the UNU-CPR Team, especially Anthony Dursi, for their editorial input and support. This research was commissioned by the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. The report was prepared on the basis of research conducted as part of an evaluation commissioned by the Department of Political Affairs, during which the researchers were provided access to internal UN archives. Observations in the following study draw heavily from these archives and have been verified by rounds of internal review. All views expressed in this report reflect the authors’ personal views and not those of United Nations University or the United Nations more generally. Any errors are those of the author alone. ISBN: 978-92-808-6517-2 © United Nations University, 2020. All content (text, visualizations, graphics), except where otherwise specified or attributed, is published under a Creative Commons Attribution- Noncommercial-Share Alike IGO license (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO). Using, re-posting and citing this content is allowed without prior permission. Citation: Rebecca Brubaker and Dirk Druet, Back from the Brink: A Comparative Study of UN Preventive Diplomacy in West and Central Africa - The Gambia and Gabon (New York: United Nations University, 2020). Cover photo: UN Photo/Mark Garten Contents Introduction .................................................................2 I. The Gambia 2016-2017 ........................................4 The leadup Escalation and de-escalation: The 2016 presidential election and “The Impasse” The role of the UN Evolution of a UN strategy Sustainability II. Gabon 2016 ..........................................................16 Escalation and de-escalation The role of the UN Evolution of a UN strategy Outcome Sustainability III. Comparing UN Preventive Diplomacy Interventions in The Gambia and Gabon ..............26 Degree of integration with the regional and international community Regional norms and institutions Treatment of constitutional mandates and legal recourse The role of opposition coalitions Social media Conclusion References .................................................................34 1 Introduction hen The Gambia and Gabon held while President Bongo was convinced to exercise presidential elections in December restraint against opposition activists and the W and August 2016, respectively, both public protests, which ultimately ended with his votes were important tests for the countries’ being sworn in for his second term. entrenched political establishments. In Gabon, President Ali Bongo Ondimba was seeking a This paper seeks to identify the nature and the second term after inheriting power from his comparative impact of the UN’s contribution to father, who had ruled the country since 1967. reducing the risk of conflict-related violence in In The Gambia, President Yahya Abdul-Aziz both the short and medium terms in The Gambia Jammeh was running his fifth campaign since and Gabon, following a period where widespread seizing power in a military coup in 1992. Both violence was considered imminent. In complex elections produced fiercely contested results, settings, causality is difficult to establish because which quickly translated into street protests and many actors and factors contribute to the the potential for widespread violence. reduction or increase in violence. Moreover, the UN often plays a supportive rather than a leading As part of the international community’s response role, not only in relation to the conflict parties but to these risks, the United Nations (UN) regional also vis-a-vis other external actors engaged in offices for Central and West Africa, respectively, prevention. The challenge, therefore, is to isolate deployed preventive diplomatic engagements, the impact of the UN, both on the conflict actors supported to varying degrees by the UN Country and others, in order to build a clearer picture of Teams and the UN Department of Political Affairs the UN’s contribution.1 In so doing, the analysis (DPA). Their efforts played important roles enables the UN to assess the effectiveness of its in breaking cycles of escalating violence and strategies, identify good practices, and enhance shepherding political processes towards peaceful the effectiveness of its conflict prevention efforts settlements in both countries. In The Gambia, the in the future. combined efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), African Union To undertake this analysis, the study engaged (AU), and the UN Office for West Africa and a pilot preventive diplomacy assessment the Sahel (UNOWAS) contributed to Jammeh’s framework developed by United Nations decision to relinquish power. Adama Barrow, University.2 It was designed to help researchers the candidate of a tenuously united political better identify: a) the nature of the UN’s opposition who won the election, was installed contribution to prevention (when compared as Jammeh’s successor. In Gabon, UN-led efforts, with other actors’ contributions); b) the link complemented by discrete support from the AU between the external intervention, including and the Economic Community of Central African the UN’s contribution, and the outcome of States (ECCAS), helped encourage the parties to that intervention; c) the receptiveness of the walk back from a dangerous escalatory dynamic. environment to a mediated outcome; and d) the The opposition candidate was dissuaded from sustainability of the intervention.3 advocating violence to pursue his claim to victory, 2 © UN Photo/Gill Fickling Over a period of two weeks, in January 2019, the located in Gabon added further complexity to authors travelled to The Gambia, Senegal and the operating environment. Thus, despite the Gabon to assess the UN’s preventive diplomacy UN’s considerable efforts to de-escalate post- engagements during the 2016 electoral crises. electoral violence in this second case, and their The team met with over 60 interlocutors including short-term success, the UN’s reputation has senior politicians and political appointees suffered in certain sectors of Gabonese society. (Presidents, Vice Presidents and Ministers), The cost of stability in Gabon was the recognition opposition candidates, coalition spokespersons, of the incumbent’s hold on power despite journalists, private sector representatives, widespread reports of election tampering. This national Bar Association representatives, outcome left civil society leaders, including leaders of youth organizations, women’s groups, unions and organizations representing youth academics, various in-country and regional UN and women’s rights, almost entirely excluded actors, subregional and regional actors (ECOWAS, from the national discourse during and after the ECCAS, and AU) and bilateral diplomatic missions crisis. It also left supporters of the consensus (the European Union [EU], France and Senegal). opposition candidate feeling betrayed by the UN and therefore less likely to heed the UN’s calls to The authors concluded that the UN, which was seek change through institutions and elections, given much credit for its role in de-escalating rather than through force, in the future. tensions following the contested election in The Gambia in 2016-2017, benefited from an enabling environment in which the subregional organization (ECOWAS) was united in its embrace A comparative analysis of the two of norms against non-democratic changes in cases reveals a number of factors government — norms that its members decided that affected conflict dynamics and to defend through a credible and imminent influenced the options available to threat of force. Many national actors that the UN actors, the dilemmas they played a role in the crisis laud the UN Resident confronted and the ways in which Coordinator for establishing technical support they balanced trade-offs between programmes that empowered civil society actors, competing risks and priorities. These notably women’s groups, to play a decisive role include: in the electoral process. Gambian political elites, including President Barrow, similarly credit the • The appropriate avenue for legal Special Representative of the Secretary-General recourse on challenges to the (SRSG) and Head of the UNOWAS, Mohamed electoral process; Ibn Chambas, for his role in facilitating the • The regional and international peaceful transition in early 2017. As such, the political