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Canadian Political Science Review Vol. 15, No. 1, 2021, 16-33 ISBN (online) 1911-4125 Journal homepage: https://ojs.unbc.ca/index.php/cpsr Report More than the Usual Turmoil: The 2019 Provincial Election in Newfoundland and Labrador Alex Marland Professor, Department of Political Science, Memorial University of Newfoundland – Email address: [email protected] Hannah Loder Student, Department of Political Science, Memorial University of Newfoundland – Email address: [email protected] Abstract Turmoil in the House of Assembly leading up to the 2019 general election in Newfoundland and Labrador foreshadowed an unusual result. Liberal Premier Dwight Ball, stung by public outrage over his government’s 2016 austerity budget, spent the balance of his term wary of difficult decisions while ministers and MHAs hurled accusations of bullying at each other. The Liberal government routinely evoked its The Way Forward planning document as a source of policy solutions and blamed the Progressive Conservatives for sanctioning the Muskrat Falls hydroelectric project boondoggle. Public opinion polls often put the Liberals in front, but Ball’s popularity lagged behind his party’s and occasionally that of the opposition leaders. The election produced the first minority government in nearly half a century, including the rare victory of two Independents, and the Liberal caucus soon agitated for new leadership. The province’s dire economic circumstances mean that more political turmoil is likely. Résumé Les turbulences à l’assemblée législative à l'approche des élections générales de 2019 à Terre-Neuve-et-Labrador laissent présager un résultat inhabituel. Le premier ministre libéral Dwight Ball, piqué par l'indignation de la population à propos du budget d'austérité de son gouvernement pour 2016, a passé le reste de son mandat à se méfier des décisions difficiles, tandis que les ministres et les députés se lançaient des accusations d'intimidation les uns envers les autres. Le gouvernement libéral a régulièrement évoqué son document de planification «The Way Forward» comme une source de solutions politiques et a reproché aux progressistes-conservateurs d'avoir sanctionné le gâchis du projet hydroélectrique de Muskrat Falls. Les sondages d'opinion mettent souvent les libéraux en avance, mais la popularité de Ball est à la traîne par rapport à celle de son parti et, parfois, des chefs de l'opposition. L'élection a produit le premier gouvernement minoritaire en près d'un demi- siècle, y compris la rare victoire de deux indépendants, et le caucus libéral s'est rapidement agité pour changer de leadership. La situation économique désastreuse de la province laisse présager de nouvelles turbulences politiques. Keywords: Newfoundland and Labrador, 2019 provincial election, Dwight Ball, House of Assembly, minority government Alex Marland and Hannah Loder 17 Mots-clés: Terre-Neuve-et-Labrador, élections provinciales de 2019, Dwight Ball, assemblée législative, gouvernement minoritaire Introduction Politics in Newfoundland and Labrador has been aptly described as Turmoil, as Usual (McLeod, 2016). In recent years, democratic government has been akin to a roller coaster ride whose tracks follow the rise and fall of oil prices. In the first decade of this century, the astonishing popularity of the Progressive Conservative (PC) government led by Danny Williams benefitted from the rising price of oil. However, in mid-2014 the price of Brent crude oil began a precipitous decline from over $110 US/barrel to under $30 by early January 2015. Turbulent politics resulted as politicians tried to grapple with a provincial government and an economy that had grown dependent on offshore oil (see Marland, 2016). By the time the Liberals formed government in late 2015, the price of oil had begun a bumpy ascent, yet the massive cost overruns of the Muskrat Falls hydroelectric project combined with government spending outstripping revenues placed the province in a precipitous situation. Freshly installed Premier Dwight Ball soon experienced turmoil of his own as he presided over a calamitous period in the storied history of the Newfoundland and Labrador House of Assembly. Three aspects of Ball’s leadership style came to the fore during the 48th general assembly (2015-2019). First, wherever possible blame former PC governments; second, champion the strategic thinking of the 2016 policy document The Way Forward; and third, incur self- inflicted wounds when aversion of responsibility fails to take hold. The 2016 austerity budget was a watershed moment in how the Liberals would govern under his leadership. Unwilling to endure such backlash again, the premier’s reluctance to quell controversy sometimes prolonged the negative media coverage, particularly with respect to cabinet and caucus management. An election reckoning seemed likely in 2019. Heading into the 2019 general election, public opinion polls indicated that the Liberals would be in a close race with the resurgent PCs, while the moribund New Democratic Party (NDP) would be hard-pressed to get their new leader elected. Historically, governing parties have enjoyed long periods of uninterrupted rule in Newfoundland and Labrador, alternating between Liberal governments (1949-1972, 1989-2003) and Progressive Conservative governments (1972-1989, 2003-2015). Governing parties usually win a majority of seats multiple times. Notably, when a first-time government seeks re-election, it has always increased its vote share and seat count. We would therefore have expected the Liberals to return to office with a majority of seats. Instead, the Liberals ended up eking out a minority government, the first such result in the province since the 1971 election, which overshadowed the rare feat of two Independents being elected. With an even more unstable political balance of power and no fiscal respite in view, just eight months after the election Premier Ball would announce his plans to resign, propelling the Liberal Party into a leadership race and demonstrating yet again that the politics of Newfoundland and Labrador are as predictable as the price of oil. 18 Canadian Political Science Review Dwight Ball’s First Term, 2015-2019 On November 30, 2015, the Liberals ended 12 years of Tory rule by securing a majority government with 31 of 40 seats in the House of Assembly. The opposition parties were reduced to seven PCs and two New Democrats. A slimmed-down cabinet of just 13 members, including the premier, signalled interest in fiscal belt-tightening. Leading the higher-profile members was businesswoman and former leadership contestant Cathy Bennett who was appointed minister of finance. Notable Liberal Members of the House of Assembly (MHAs) joining her were former Members of Parliament Gerry Byrne (Corner Brook) and Siobhan Coady (St. John’s West), party stalwart Eddie Joyce (Humber – Bay of Islands), former PC minister Tom Osborne (Waterford Valley), and former NDP MHAs Dale Kirby (Mount Scio) and Christopher Mitchelmore (St. Barbe – L’Anse aux Meadows). The media savvy Andrew Parsons (Burgeo – La Poile) was appointed minister of justice and government house leader. Among those left out of cabinet was Paul Lane (Mount Pearl – Southlands) who had crossed the floor from the PCs and was re-elected as a Liberal. Premier Ball immediately declared that strong financial management was his government’s top priority (CBC, 2015). Minister Bennett was tasked with the immense responsibility of mitigating the province’s deficit, which had ballooned to $1.8 billion. A provincial financial review was released just one week after the cabinet was sworn in. The Treasury Board was directed to engage in a line-by-line analysis of government budgets to identify cost savings, principally through attrition (i.e., not filling jobs as they become vacant). All nonessential travel was suspended. The ascetic April 2016 budget was the most contentious moment of Ball’s tenure. In a blatant act of breaking campaign promises, Minister Bennett unveiled a budget rife with tax increases. The budget doubled the gasoline tax, hiked income tax rates, increased government service fees and reversed a key campaign promise not to increase the Harmonized Sales Tax from 13 percent to 15 percent. Despite promising no layoffs approximately 600 jobs were cut, many of which were vacant positions. Classroom sizes were set to increase, infrastructure plans were postponed or cancelled, and student loans returned in lieu of grants (Roberts, 2016a). Especially contentious was a temporary deficit reduction levy. The levy applied to anyone earning at least $20,000 in taxable income and thus approximately 62 percent of tax filers would have to pay the new tax. Controversy also centred on news that more than half of the province’s library branches would close (Graham, 2017). None of this was what the Liberals had promised in the 2015 campaign. Public demonstrations erupted at the Confederation Building. The protests were fuelled by social media activists converging under the Twitter hashtag #NLrising and by the organizational strength of public sector unions. MHA Lane was expulsed from the Liberal caucus for saying that he intended to vote for an opposition motion to eliminate the levy. Sustained pressure forced the government to raise the levy’s minimum income threshold to $50,000, meaning that about three quarters of tax filers would be exempt from paying it— up from 38 percent exempt—whereas the rest would pay an annual levy calculated using the original scale (Canadian Press, 2016). Eventually the government would backtrack on the library closures as well. When the levy came into effect on July 1, 2016, the escalating scale meant that someone earning $55,000 would have to pay $100 annually, a resident earning $100,000 would pay a levy of $700, and so forth. The government would find other money through cost efficiency initiatives, such as digitization. Further funds would be identified Alex Marland and Hannah Loder 19 through a zero-based budgeting agenda requiring departments and government entities to justify all spending. The Liberal government estimated that the books would be balanced within five years (Barry, 2016).