Social Capital and Post-Disaster Response and Recovery: Cyclone Aila in Bangladesh, 2009

Sebak Kumar Saha

July 2020

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of The Australian National University

Declaration

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university. To the best of the author’s knowledge, it contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text.

Sebak Kumar Saha

July 2020

iii

Dedication

To My Father and Mother

Acknowledgements

This study would have not been possible without the encouragement and significant support I have received from many people. First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisory panel. I am especially indebted to my primary supervisor and chair of the supervisory panel Professor Helen James who passed away on 30 April 2020. She provided me with excellent guidance, invaluable comments on draft chapters and intellectual inspiration throughout my PhD journey at the Australian National University until her death. She also provided me emotional support and confidence in dealing with research-related issues. She was a great person. She was and will always be an inspiration to me. I am also indebted to Associate Professor Christopher Ballard (current primary supervisor and chair of the supervisory panel) and Professor James Pittock (supervisor) for their excellent guidance, insightful comments on draft chapters and encouragement. I am grateful to both for providing me the much-needed advice and emotional support in a situation when my primary supervisor was unable to guide me due to her health issues and the ANU moved from on-campus to remote work and study due to the COVID-19 crisis, which severely disrupted normal study life.

I am grateful to my parents who have made a lot of sacrifices in educating me and have always inspired and supported me to achieve higher academic qualifications. I am indebted to my wife Akhi Saha, my daughter Songhoti Saha and my son Souhardya Saha for their love and all the support they have provided me during this study. I am also indebted to my wife’s parents and her maternal uncle Mr Bholanath Saha, my siblings and all my close relatives for their support and encouragement.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my wonderful research assistants: Sk Azmir Hossain, Md Inzamul Haque, Ashraf Ahamed, Md Jubayer Mahmud, Rabiul Islam Robi, Rhidoy Ahmed, Shafiqul Islam Mir, Tasnim Ahmed Chowdhury, Md Ahadur Rahman and Tanvir Ahammed for their assistance during qualitative and survey data collection, data input and preparing maps and graphs. I appreciate Md Inzamul Haque for his assistance in preparing the maps and Ashraf Ahamed for his assistance during the survey and survey data input. I would also like to express my gratitude to Md Nuruzzaman, Md Asadul Islam, Shukantha Sarkar and Kamal Roy for their help during the survey. I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to the research participants and survey respondents for providing

vii useful data. I also want to extend my sincere thanks to Mrs Dipannita Gayen, Mr Mukunda Roy, Mr Sushanta Roy, Mr Kamrul Sardar and his wife Mrs Laili Begum, Mr Masud Sarkar, Mr Tapan Karmakar and Mr Abdul Gafur from the two studied villages for all sorts of support during my fieldwork. I would also like to express my gratitude to Dr Sumonkanti Das, Mr Al Amin Rabby and Dr Atiqul Islam Raja for their support, particularly for their assistance to recruit research assistants including survey data collectors.

I would like to thank Dr Tran Anh Thong who completed his PhD from ANU and my fellow PhD colleagues including Luke Corbin at the School of Culture, History and Language (CHL), ANU, for their friendship and support during my study. I would like to thank Dr Janelle Stevenson, CHL, and the academics and administrative staff at CHL for their cordial support during the study. I would also like to extend my thanks to John Mahony for proofreading most of my thesis and Mrs Candida Spence for her assistance in formatting my thesis. I am also thankful to Shahjalal University of Science and Technology (SUST), Sylhet, for granting me study leave to pursue the doctoral degree. I am also grateful to Professor Md Abdul Ghani and Professor Tulshi Kumar Das for providing me recommendation letters for my admission at ANU and Endeavour Postgraduate Scholarship application and all my school, college, and university teachers for their contribution to my life. I would like to thank the Department of Education and Training, Australian Government, for awarding me an Endeavour Postgraduate Scholarship (PhD) to undertake my doctoral study at the Australian National University, Australia. I also express my gratitude to all the case managers and program manager Monika Marzec of Scope Global Pty Ltd for their tremendous support during the scholarship tenure. Finally, I would also like to thank ANU for offering me a Postgraduate Research Scholarship for a short period of time to complete my doctoral study.

viii Abstract

This thesis explores the role of social capital at household level in the response and recovery process following Cyclone Aila in Bangladesh in 2009. The study focuses on the role of three forms of social capital – bonding, bridging and linking – in the response and in the economic, housing and psychological recovery processes of affected households. Social capital is conceptualised here as the resources available to households through social networks. Bonding social capital refers to the resources available through bonding networks (relatives); bridging social capital identifies resources available through bridging networks (neighbours, friends and acquaintances); and linking social capital covers resources available through linking networks (government and NGOs). The study is based on fieldwork in two Cyclone Aila–affected villages of Khulna District in Bangladesh.

Employing a mixed methods approach, this study shows that bonding and bridging social capital play significant roles in evacuation and search and rescue activities. Though they both contribute to survival for only a very limited period, bonding social capital contributes to a greater proportion of households than bridging social capital. However, both forms of social capital play only a limited role in the longer-term economic and housing recovery process, though they do greatly contribute to the psychological recovery process of the members of the affected households. Bonding social capital also plays a more important role than bridging social capital in the response and recovery process. Crucially, bonding networks with relatives do not weaken over time, while bridging networks with neighbours, friends and acquaintances within the village tend to become less active and often break down over time.

Affected households were unable to initiate recovery activities for a long period as their villages were subject to prolonged flooding due to breaches in the river embankment. Most households were unable to survive during this prolonged flooding period, either independently or with the material and monetary aid they received from their bonding and bridging networks. Instead, they were strongly dependent for their survival and recovery on resources accessed through linking networks with the government and NGOs.

Although poverty and shared experience of the same disaster limit the capacity of bonding and bridging networks, this study argues that bonding and bridging networks cannot generally contribute to survival over longer periods or to substantial economic and housing recovery due to poverty, even in situations where relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances are

ix not directly affected themselves. The relative wealth embedded in these networks is thus the critical factor in understanding their role in disaster response and recovery. The study concludes that households affected by cyclones in coastal areas of Bangladesh will generally require external assistance through linking social networks for their survival and economic and housing recovery.

The study shows that the effectiveness of the post-Aila response and recovery operations of the government and NGOs was undermined by a number of serious weaknesses. The findings on the weaknesses of post-Aila response and recovery operations will be helpful for policymakers and development practitioners in designing more effective post-disaster response and recovery operations in Bangladesh and elsewhere in the future. Finally, the study recommends policies that will enhance the resilience of coastal households to cyclone hazards as well as help them to adapt to the adverse impacts of sea level rise in the short- and medium-term. The study also recommends the development of plans for resettling displaced populations in other places in the long-term, as sea level rise may force a large number of coastal households in Bangladesh to relocate elsewhere.

Keywords: Social capital, Disaster response, Disaster recovery, Cyclone Aila, Government, NGOs, Coastal area of Bangladesh

x Table of Contents

Declaration ...... iii Dedication ...... v Acknowledgements ...... vii Abstract ...... ix Table of Contents ...... xi List of Tables ...... xv List of Figures ...... xvii List of Acronyms ...... xix Chapter 1: Introduction ...... 1 1.1 Cyclone Aila ...... 1 1.2 Social Capital in the Cyclone Aila Response and Recovery ...... 10 1.3 Research Objectives and Questions ...... 12 1.4 Significance of the Study ...... 13 1.5 Thesis Outline ...... 14 Chapter 2: Literature Review ...... 17 2.1 Introduction ...... 17 2.2 Disaster Recovery, and Household and Community Recovery ...... 17 2.3 Disaster Recovery and Resilience ...... 25 2.3.1 Changing Definitions of Resilience ...... 25 2.3.2 Recovery as an Opportunity for Disaster Risk Reduction and Building Resilience27 2.4 Social Capital and Disaster Recovery ...... 30 2.4.1 Social Capital: Understanding the Concept ...... 30 2.4.2 Social Capital: Levels of Application, Types, Measurement and Negative Consequences ...... 36 2.4.2.1 Social Capital: Various Levels of Application ...... 36 2.4.2.2 Social Capital: Various Types ...... 37 2.4.2.3 Social Capital: Measurement ...... 41 2.4.2.4 Social Capital: Negative Consequences ...... 42 2.4.3 Application of Social Capital to Disaster Recovery ...... 42 2.5 Conclusion ...... 53 Chapter 3: Methodology ...... 55 3.1 Introduction ...... 55 3.2 Selection of Research Areas ...... 55 3.3 Research Approach ...... 62 3.3.1 Mixed Methods Research Approach ...... 62 3.3.2 Selection of the Suitable Mixed Methods Design ...... 64 3.4 Data Collection and Recruitment of Participants and Respondents ...... 66

xi 3.4.1 Qualitative Data Collection ...... 67 3.4.1.1 Qualitative Procedure of Inquiry ...... 67 3.4.1.2 Qualitative Data Collection Methods ...... 68 3.4.1.2.1 In-depth Interview ...... 68 3.4.1.2.2 Focus Group Discussion (FGD) ...... 69 3.4.1.2.3 Observation ...... 69 3.4.1.3 Recruitment of Participants for Collecting Qualitative Data ...... 70 3.4.2 Quantitative Data Collection ...... 72 3.4.2.1 Household Survey ...... 72 3.4.2.2 Recruitment of Survey Respondents and Administration of Survey ...... 74 3.5 Qualitative and Quantitative Data Analysis ...... 75 3.6 Conclusion ...... 76 Chapter 4: Role of Bonding Social Capital in the Post-Disaster Response and Recovery ...... 77 4.1 Introduction ...... 77 4.2 Kinship in Bangladesh ...... 77 4.3 Aid Received Through Bonding Networks ...... 80 4.4 Bonding Social Capital and Post-Disaster Response and Recovery ...... 89 4.4.1 Role of Bonding Social Capital in Evacuation, Search and Rescue ...... 89 4.4.2 Role of Bonding Social Capital in Survival ...... 91 4.4.3 Role of Bonding Social Capital in Economic and Housing Recovery ...... 100 4.4.4 Role of Bonding Social Capital in Psychological Recovery ...... 104 4.5 Why Bonding Social Capital Played a Limited Role in the Survival and the Economic and Housing Recovery ...... 107 4.6 Conclusion ...... 111 Chapter 5: Role of Bridging Social Capital in the Post-Disaster Response and Recovery .... 115 5.1 Introduction ...... 115 5.2 Understanding Bridging Networks in the Research Context ...... 115 5.3 Aid Received Through Bridging Networks ...... 119 5.4 Bridging Social Capital and Post-Disaster Response and Recovery ...... 125 5.4.1 Role of Bridging Social Capital in Evacuation, Search and Rescue ...... 125 5.4.2 Role of Bridging Social Capital in Survival ...... 127 5.4.3 Role of Bridging Social Capital in Economic and Housing Recovery ...... 133 5.4.4 Role of Bridging Social Capital in Psychological Recovery ...... 137 5.5 Why Bridging Social Capital Played a Limited Role in the Survival and the Economic and Housing Recovery ...... 142 5.6 Bonding Social Capital Versus Bridging Social Capital ...... 146

xii 5.7 Conclusion ...... 156 Chapter 6: Linking Social Capital and Post-Cyclone Response and Recovery: The Role of Government and the Weaknesses of the Government’s Response and Recovery Operations ...... 159 6.1 Introduction ...... 159 6.2 Types of Aid and Non-Aid Items the Affected Households Received from the Government ...... 160 6.3 Role of the Government in the Post-Aila Response and Recovery ...... 166 6.3.1 Role of the Government in Evacuation, Search and Rescue ...... 166 6.3.2 Role of the Government in Survival ...... 168 6.3.3 Role of the Government in Economic, Housing and Psychological Recovery ..... 176 6.4 Major Weaknesses of the Post-Aila Response and Recovery Operations ...... 183 6.4.1 Lack of Aid During the Initial Period ...... 183 6.4.2 Inadequacy of Major Aid Items Compared to Need: 20 kg Rice and 20,000 Taka ...... 184 6.4.3 Problems Related to the Criteria of Aid Distribution: 20 kg Rice and 20,000 Taka ...... 185 6.4.4 Lack of Livelihood Support ...... 186 6.4.5 Absence of Psychological Support as an Intervention ...... 186 6.4.6 Lack of Coordination ...... 186 6.4.7 Exclusion of Poor Households ...... 189 6.4.8 Favouritism ...... 190 6.4.9 Less Amount of VGF Rice and Bribery ...... 192 6.5 Conclusion ...... 197 Chapter 7: The Role of Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and Their Weaknesses in the Post-Cyclone Aila Response and Recovery Operations ...... 201 7.1 Introduction ...... 201 7.2. NGOs that Participated in the Post-Aila Response and Recovery Operations...... 201 7.3 Types of Aid and Non-Aid Items the Affected Households Received from NGOs .... 202 7.4 Role of NGOs in the Post-Aila Response and Recovery ...... 215 7.4.1 Role of NGOs in Evacuation, Search and Rescue ...... 215 7.4.2 Role of NGOs in Survival ...... 216 7.4.3 Role of NGOs in Economic, Housing and Psychological Recovery ...... 223 7.5 Weaknesses of NGOs’ Post-Aila Response and Recovery Operations ...... 228 7.5.1 Failure to Start Relief Operations Immediately After the Event ...... 228 7.5.2 Quantity and Quality of the Relief Items ...... 229 7.5.3 Coordination Among NGOs and Coordination Between the NGOs and the Government/Local Government ...... 230

xiii 7.5.4 Less Livelihood Support and Houses Compared to the Needs ...... 231 7.5.5 Absence of Psychological Support as an Intervention ...... 232 7.5.6 Preference to Implement Activities that Have Visible Outcomes ...... 234 7.5.7 Lack of Consultation and Participation ...... 235 7.5.8 NGOs Addressed Remote Areas Least ...... 236 7.5.9 Places of Distribution and Exclusion of Households from Relief Items ...... 237 7.5.10 More of the Project Interventions to the Less Affected Project Areas ...... 239 7.5.11 Favouring Own Members/Borrowers and Pressuring Microcredit Borrowers for Repayment ...... 239 7.5.12 Avoidance of a Beneficiary of One NGO by Other NGOs ...... 240 7.5.13 Exclusion of Upper-Middle-Class and Some Lower-Middle-Class Households 241 7.5.14 Corruption ...... 242 7.5.15 Aid Dependency ...... 243 7.6 Conclusion ...... 244 Chapter 8: Conclusions, Policy Recommendations and Suggestions for Future Research ... 247 8.1 Introduction ...... 247 8.2 Key Findings of the Study ...... 248 8.2.1 The Role of Bonding Social Capital ...... 248 8.2.2 The Role of Bridging Social Capital ...... 250 8.2.3 Linking Social Capital: The Role of Government and the Weaknesses of the Government’s Response and Recovery Operations ...... 252 8.2.4 Linking Social Capital: The Role of NGOs and the Weaknesses of the NGOs’ Response and Recovery Operations ...... 254 8.3 Contribution to Knowledge and Policies ...... 255 8.4 Limitations of the Study ...... 258 8.5 Implications of Climate Change and Sea Level Rise ...... 259 8.6 Policy Recommendations ...... 260 8.7 Suggestions for Future Research ...... 267 References ...... 269 Appendix 1 ...... 297 Appendix 2 ...... 301 Appendix 3 ...... 303 Appendix 4 ...... 305 Appendix 5 ...... 307 Appendix 6 ...... 329

xiv List of Tables

Table 1.1 Some major cyclones in Bangladesh ...... 4 Table 1.2 Damage and loss due to Cyclone Aila (as of 11 June 2009) ...... 6 Table 1.3 Damage and loss caused by Cyclone Aila in Dacope and Koyra upazilas, Khulna .. 7

Table 3.1 Damage and loss caused by Cyclone Aila to Kamarkhola Union and Dakshin Bedkashi Union ...... 59 Table 3.2 Channirchak and Dakshin Bedkashi at a glance ...... 60 Table 3.3 Strategic reasons for using the mixed methods approach ...... 63

Table 4.1 Percentage of the households that received aid from relatives (n=250) ...... 81 Table 4.2 Six categories of aid from 16 types of aid ...... 82 Table 4.3 Total amount of money households received from their relatives (n=81) ...... 85 Table 4.4 Percentage of the households that received aid from relatives (n=250) ...... 88

Table 5.1 Percentage of the households that received aid from neighbours, friends and acquaintances (n=250)...... 119 Table 5.2 Six categories of aid from 16 types of aid ...... 121 Table 5.3 Percentage of the households that received aid from friends and acquaintances (n=250) ...... 124

Table 6.1 Types of aid the affected households received from the government (n=250) ...... 161

Table 7.1 Major NGOs that participated in the post-Aila response and recovery operations 202 Table 7.2 Types of aid the affected households received from NGOs (n=250) ...... 204

Table 8.1 Research Objectives and Questions ...... 247

List of Figures

Figure 1.1 Map of cyclone prone areas in Bangladesh ...... 3 Figure 1.2 Track of Cyclone Aila ...... 5

Figure 3.1 Study areas: Channirchak, Dacope Upazila and Dakshin Bedkashi, Koyra Upazila, Khulna District ...... 56 Figure 3.2 Map of Channirchak Village ...... 57 Figure 3.3 Map of Dakshin Bedkashi Village ...... 58

Figure 4.1 Aid received from relatives, Channirchak (n=70) ...... 83 Figure 4.2 Aid received from relatives, Dakshin Bedkashi (n=180) ...... 84 Figure 4.3 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of food and water or either received from relatives in their survival (n=177) ...... 99 Figure 4.4 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from relatives in economic, housing and psychological recovery (n=250) ...... 103

Figure 5.1 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of food and water or either received from neighbours in their survival (n=37) ...... 132 Figure 5.2 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of food and water or either received from friends and acquaintances in their survival (n=44) ...... 132 Figure 5.3 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from neighbours in economic, housing and psychological recovery (n=230) ...... 136 Figure 5.4 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from friends and acquaintances in economic, housing and psychological recovery (n=161) ...... 136 Figure 5.5 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from relatives, neighbours and friends and acquaintances in economic recovery ...... 149 Figure 5.6 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from relatives, neighbours and friends and acquaintances in housing recovery ...... 149 Figure 5.7 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from relatives, neighbours and friends and acquaintances in psychological recovery ...... 150

Figure 6.1 A house constructed after Aila in Channirchak Village (implemented by Zila Parishad Khulna) ...... 162 Figure 6.2 A house constructed after Aila in Dakshin Bedkashi Village (implemented by Zila Parishad Khulna) ...... 163 Figure 6.3 People working in a government employment program in Channirchak Village 163 Figure 6.4 Women working in a government employment program in Dakshin Bedkashi Village ...... 164 Figure 6.5 A road constructed by a government agency in Channirchak (only the brick paving part was constructed by the government while the base mud road was constructed by an NGO) ...... 164 Figure 6.6 A road constructed by a government agency in Dakshin Bedkashi (only the brick paving part was constructed by the government while the base mud road was constructed by an NGO) ...... 165 Figure 6.7 A new government primary school-cum-cyclone-shelter constructed in Channirchak Village after Aila (implementing agency: Local Government Engineering Department) ...... 165 Figure 6.8 A new government primary school building in Dakshin Bedkashi Village (implementing agency: Local Government Engineering Department) ...... 166

xvii Figure 6.9 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of food and water or either received from the government in their survival (n=222) ...... 173 Figure 6.10 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of VGF rice in meeting the daily food necessity of the households (n=229) ...... 175 Figure 6.11 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from the government in economic, housing and psychological recovery (n=248) ...... 178 Figure 6.12 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of participation in cash for work program and food for work program or any of these programs in economic, housing and psychological recovery (n=135) ...... 180

Figure 7.1 A water storing earthen pot or matka given by an NGO in Channirchak ...... 205 Figure 7.2 A water storing container given by an NGO in Dakshin Bedkashi ...... 205 Figure 7.3 A dochala (two roofed) house with a veranda constructed by an NGO named Dushtha Shasthya Kendra (DSK) in Channirchak ...... 206 Figure 7.4 A modified version of a dochala (two roofed) house constructed by Islamic Relief Bangladesh in Dakshin Bedkashi (an extra layer of fence was given outside the original bamboo fence by the recipient so that rainwater cannot enter inside) ...... 206 Figure 7.5 A chouchala (four roofed) house constructed by Islamic Relief Bangladesh in Dakshin Bedkashi ...... 207 Figure 7.6 A modified version of a UNDP house constructed by Islamic Relief Bangladesh as a vendor in Dakshin Bedkashi (without the originally included rooftop rainwater harvesting facility) ...... 207 Figure 7.7 A modified version of a UNDP house constructed by Islamic Relief Bangladesh as a vendor in Dakshin Bedkashi ...... 208 Figure 7.8 A latrine given by an NGO in Channirchak ...... 208 Figure 7.9 A latrine given with the dochala (two roofed) house constructed by Islamic Relief Bangladesh in Dakshin Bedkashi ...... 209 Figure 7.10 A latrine given with the UNDP house in Dakshin Bedkashi ...... 209 Figure 7.11 A road constructed by an NGO in Channirchak ...... 211 Figure 7.12 A road constructed by an NGO in Dakshin Bedkashi ...... 211 Figure 7.13 A school-cum-cyclone shelter constructed in 2012 by an NGO named Dushtha Shasthya Kendra (DSK) in the adjacent village of Channirchak ...... 212 Figure 7.14 A previous cyclone shelter and multipurpose community centre (constructed by Caritas in 1992) in Dakshin Bedkashi repaired by Islamic Relief Bangladesh as school-cum- cyclone shelter ...... 212 Figure 7.15 A pond sand filter (PSF) installed by an NGO in Channirchak ...... 214 Figure 7.16 A tubewell installed by an NGO in Dakshin Bedakshi ...... 214 Figure 7.17 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of food and water or either received from NGOs in their survival (n=237) ...... 219 Figure 7.18 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from NGOs in economic, housing and psychological recovery (n=249) ...... 224 Figure 7.19 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of participation in CFW/FFW/CFFW and CFT programs or any one of these programs in economic, housing and psychological recovery (n=244) ...... 226

xviii List of Acronyms

ADP Annual Development Program BWDB Bangladesh Water Development Board CBO community-based organisation CFFW cash and food-for-work CFS Child Friendly Space CFT cash-for-training CFW cash-for-work DSK Dushtha Shasthya Kendra EC European Commission EGPP Employment Generation Program for the Poorest FAO Food and Agriculture Organization FFW food-for-work FGD focus group discussion GR gratuitous relief IFRCRCS International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies IGA income-generating activities IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change NGO non-government organisation PSF pond sand filter SPSS Statistical Package for the Social Sciences TR test relief UDMC Union Disaster Management Committee UDRCG Upazila Disaster Response Coordination Group UK Aid Department for International Development, United Kingdom UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNDRR United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund UNISDR United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction UNO Upazila Nirbahi [executive] Officer UP Union Parishad USAID United States Agency for International Development UzDMC Upazila Disaster Management Committee VGD vulnerable group development VGF vulnerable group feeding WDMC Ward Disaster Management Committee WFP World Food Programme

xix

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Cyclone Aila

The coastal area of Bangladesh is extremely susceptible to deadly tropical cyclones and associated storm surges (see Figure 1.1 and Table 1.1) (MoEF 2005, 2009; MoFDM 2010a; Paul & Rashid 2017).1 Tropical cyclones form in the Bay of Bengal mostly during pre- monsoon and post-monsoon periods and strike Bangladesh mostly in the months of April, May, October, November and December (UNDP 2007, 2012). A severe tropical cyclone strikes Bangladesh every three years on average (MoEF 2009). Climate change is expected to contribute to an increase in the frequency and severity of tropical cyclones with higher storm surges and wind speed (MoEF 2009).2 Cyclones have killed more than 450,000 people in Bangladesh since 1970 (UN 2010).

Cyclone Aila, a category 1 cyclone, struck the southwest coast of Bangladesh on 25 May 2009 with a maximum wind speed of 120 km/hour (see Figure 1.2) (UN 2010; Paul & Rashid 2017).3 The cyclone struck Bangladesh during the high tide cycle, resulting in a tidal surge of up to 6.5 metres (UNDP 2012; UN 2010; ECHO 2009). Ultimately, Cyclone Aila affected 11 coastal districts and over 3.9 million people and caused 190 deaths and approximately 7,100 injuries (UNDP 2012).

Although Cyclone Aila caused a significantly fewer number of deaths than some earlier cyclones in Bangladesh, it created a humanitarian crisis in the severely affected areas of

1 The coastal area of Bangladesh includes about 30 percent of the total area of Bangladesh and has a population of 39.41 million (about 27 percent of the total population of the country) (Paul & Rashid 2017). The landward boundaries of the coastal area have been determined based on three indicators: tidal waters, salinity intrusion and cyclones/storm surges. The coastal area of Bangladesh includes 19 out of 64 districts in Bangladesh (MoWR 2005). Eleven districts are considered as exposed coast as these districts have a coastline on the Bay of Bengal. Eight districts are considered as interior coast as these districts do not have a coastline on the Bay of Bengal. The coastal area contains more than 70 islands, most of them small islands. Khulna District which includes the two villages of this study is in the exposed coast and southwest coastal region (Paul & Rashid 2017). 2 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assumes that tropical cyclone frequency is likely to decline or stay unchanged globally in the future although it is likely that global mean tropical cyclone maximum wind speed and precipitation rates will increase (IPCC 2014, p. 370). Tropical cyclone frequency in the Bay of Bengal decreased over the period of 1891 to 2007. However, the frequency of high magnitude tropical cyclones along the Bangladesh coast increased since 1960 (Paul & Rashid 2017). 3 Cyclone Rashmi in October 2008 and Cyclone Sidr in November 2007 also struck the southwest coast of Bangladesh (UN 2010; UNDP 2012). According to MoFDM (2010a) and MoDMR (2013, 2014), the maximum wind speed of Cyclone Aila was 92 km/hour. The UNDP (2012) reports that tidal surges of Cyclone Aila were up to 6 metres and ECHO (2009) reports that tidal surges of Cyclone Aila were up to 22 feet or 6.71 metres. MoDMR (2014) reports that storm surge height of Cyclone Aila was more than 3 metres and Paul and Rashid (2017) mention that storm surge height of Cyclone Aila was 2 to 3 metres.

Khulna and Satkhira districts of Bangladesh (UNDP 2012).4 This was due primarily to prolonged flooding due to waves breaking the embankments, with villages subject to daily inundation during high tides until the embankment was repaired (UN 2010; UNDP 2012; ECHO 2011). The affected households were unable to start recovery activities until the villages were dewatered, which took a long time (UN 2010; UNDP 2012); recovery following Cyclone Aila was thus much slower than that of Cyclone Sidr, even though the intensity of Cyclone Aila, as a category 1 cyclone, was much less intense than the category 4 Cyclone Sidr, and the impact in terms of the overall numbers of affected areas and households was much lower (UNDP 2012; TNH 2009).

This study attempts to understand the role of social capital in the post-disaster response and recovery process of households in Bangladesh affected by Cyclone Aila. The study addresses this objective in the context of two Cyclone Aila–affected villages of two upazilas (sub- districts), namely Dacope Upazila and Koyra Upazila of Khulna District, Bangladesh.

4 The Bhola Cyclone killed about 300,000 people in then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) on 12 November 1970 (MoDMR 2013; Paul & Rashid 2017). Some experts claim that the non-existence of an early-warning and cyclone-tracking system was the key cause for the massive loss of life caused by the Bhola Cyclone (Paul & Dutt 2010). Cyclone Gorky in April 1991 and Cyclone Sidr in November 2007, both category 4 storms, killed almost 140,000 and 3,400 people respectively (MoDMR 2013; Paul et al. 2010). Timely early warnings and evacuation of potential victims successfully, along with other reasons such as the protective Sundarbans Forest, timing of landfall, the number of surges and coastal embankment, contributed to the relatively lower number of deaths caused by Cyclone Sidr (Paul 2009; Paul & Dutt 2010; Paul et al. 2010; Saha & James 2017).

Figure 1.1 Map of cyclone prone areas in Bangladesh

Source: Climate Change Cell (CCC) (2006)

Table 1.1 Some major cyclones in Bangladesh a, b, c, d Year Date Number of Main Affected Districts Deaths 1965 11 May 19,279 Barisal 1965 15 December 873 Cox’s Bazar 1966 01 October 850 Noakhali 1970 12 November (Bhola Cyclone) 300,000 Bhola 1985 25 May 11,069 Noakhali 1988 29 November 5,708 Bagerhat, Barguna, Bhola, Jessore, Khulna, Patuakhali, Pirojpur, Satkhira 1991 29 April (Cyclone Gorky) 138,882 Chittagong, Cox’s Bazar 1997 19 May 155 Chittagong, Cox’s Bazar 2007 15 November (Cyclone Sidr) 3,363 Bagerhat, Barguna, Pirojpur, Patuakhali 2009 25 May (Cyclone Aila) 190 Khulna, Satkhira 2013 16 May (Cyclone Viyaru/Mahasen) 17 Barguna, Bhola, Patuakhali 2015 30 July (Cyclone Komen) 7 Bandarban, Bhola, Chittagong, Cox’s Bazar, Feni, Noakhali 2016 21 May (Cyclone Roanu) 27 Barguna, Bhola, Chittagong, Cox’s Bazar, Lakshmipur, Noakhali, Patuakhali 2017 30 May (Cyclone Mora) 7 Chittagong, Cox’s Bazar 2019 10 November (Cyclone Bulbul) 26 Bagerhat, Khulna, Satkhira

Notes: a Bhola Cyclone is known as ‘the killer storm of the twentieth century’ (Paul & Rashid 2017). Deaths for Bhola Cyclone numbered between 300,000–500,000 (UNDP 2012) and 500,000 (MoEF 2009; MoDMR 2014; IOM 2010a; Ali 1999; Paul & Dutt 2010). b The number of deaths for Cyclone Sidr is 4,000 (UNDP 2012). c The number of deaths for Cyclone Aila is 300 (Rashid & Paul 2014). d In addition to 7 deaths, the number of people reported to be missing due to Cyclone Komen was 38 (IFRCRCS 2015).

Source: Saha & James (2017); IFRCRCS (2017); UNDHA (1988); Ali (1999); JRA (2019); Daily Star (2019); Paul & Rashid (2017)

Figure 1.2 Track of Cyclone Aila

Source: UNDP (2012)

Aila destroyed some 243,191 houses completely and 370,587 houses partially. It also caused the deaths of some 150,000 livestock and the complete and partial destruction of nearly 324,000 acres of crop land, as well as substantial infrastructure losses (UNDP 2012) (see Table 1.2). The tidal surge of Aila damaged and washed away about 1,743 km of embankments (UNDP 2012). The estimated economic damage from Aila was US$300 million (in 2015 dollars) and the original damage estimate in 2009 was US$270 million (Paul & Rashid 2017). Aila also caused massive displacement of the affected people (IOM 2010a; UN 2010; UNDP 2012; ECHO 2009, 2011; Rashid & Paul 2014).

Table 1.2 Damage and loss due to Cyclone Aila (as of 11 June 2009) Affected districts (nos) 11 Affected upazilas (nos) 64 Affected unions (nos) 195 (completely), 334 (partially) Affected population (nos) 3,928,238 Affected households (nos) 948,621 Reported deaths (nos) 190 People injured (nos) 7,103 Damaged houses (nos) 243,191 (completely), 370,587 (partially) Damaged crops (acres) 77,486 (completely), 245,968 (partially) Livestock deaths (nos) 150,131 Damaged educational institutions (nos) 445 (completely), 4,588 (partially) Damaged roads (km) 2,233 (completely), 6,621 (partially) Damaged bridges/culverts (nos) 157 Damaged embankments (km) 1742.53

Source: UNDP (2012)

Among the 11 districts struck by Aila, two districts, namely Khulna District and Satkhira District, were the worst affected (UNDP 2012). Many of the affected areas of Khulna and Satkhira became flooded after the main protecting embankments broke (UNDP 2009, 2012). Aila affected 76 percent of households and damaged 90 to 100 percent of houses either completely or partially in the four worst affected upazilas of Khulna (Dacope and Koyra upazilas) and Satkhira (Ashasuni and Shyamnagar upazilas) districts (UN 2010), and displaced a total of 76,478 households across these two districts (IOM 2010a).

In the two worst affected upazilas in Khulna, Aila killed 16 people in Dacope (with 7 more missing) and 41 people in Koyra.5Aila affected about 296,000 people and destroyed about 49,000 houses completely and 27,000 houses partially in these two upazilas (PIOD 2009; PIOK 2009) (see Table 1.3). Aila displaced a large number of households in both upazilas (UN 2010; ECHO 2009, 2011; Saha 2017; Kumar et al. 2010). The livelihoods of the majority of households in both upazilas were dependent on agriculture, fishery, livestock, forestry, and selling labour (ECHO 2009; Kumar et al. 2010). In both upazilas, Aila caused substantial

5 Dacope consists of nine unions and one pourashava (municipality) and Koyra consists of seven unions. A union is the lowest level of the rural local government and the smallest rural administrative unit. It consists of villages. Each union has nine wards. A ward generally includes one or more villages. To varying degrees, Aila affected all nine unions and a pourashava of Dacope (PIOD 2009). The damage report (D form) from Project Implementation Office, Koyra (PIOK) (2009) identifies six unions of Koyra as affected (Bagali, Dakshin Bedkashi, Koyra Sadar, Maharajpur, Maheswaripur, and Uttar Bedkashi). The damage report does not list Amadi Union of Koyra as affected.

6 damage to, and losses in, major livelihood sectors such as agriculture and fishing (including shrimp farming) sectors (UN 2010; Kumar et al. 2010).

Table 1.3 Damage and loss caused by Cyclone Aila in Dacope and Koyra upazilas, Khulnaa Items Dacope Koyra Affected population (nos) 143,700 152,496 Affected households (nos) 29,832 41,043 Reported deaths (nos) 16 41 Houses fully damaged (nos) 25,067 23,820 Houses partially damaged (nos) 8,349 18,620 Crops fully damaged (acres) 1,680 503 Crops partially damaged (acres) 1,600 20 Loss of poultry (nos) 13,400 57,000 Loss of livestock (nos) 211 1,562 Shrimp ghers/ponds damaged 17,640 20,300 (acres) Educational and religious 266 9 educational institutions damaged (nos) b educational and institutions completely and religious 70 educational institutions institutions partially damaged; 192 partially damaged mosques/temples damaged Drinking water sources damaged 11,200 1,103 (nos) Latrines damaged (nos) 16,320 27,350 Roads damaged (km) 274 108 Embankments damaged (km) 118 80

Notes: a The damage report from Project Implementation Office, Koyra (PIOK) in 2009 inaccurately summarises the number of the losses of poultry and losses of livestock. The number of the losses of poultry in the total cell of the table for the upazila does not match with the number of the losses of poultry given within the cells against each union. The same problem also exists in the case of the losses of livestock. The data in Table 3 present the total number of the losses of poultry and the total number of the losses of livestock for Koyra Upazila based on the summation of the numbers given within the cells for each union. b It was observed during fieldwork in both upazilas that many schools and mosques/temples that were partially damaged by Aila were fully damaged later due to the prolonged inundation of the villages. Sources: PIOD (2009); PIOK (2009); UN (2010)

The situation following Aila improved quickly in the nine other affected districts. However, the situation deteriorated in the severely affected areas of Khulna and Satkhira districts as the areas were subject to regular flooding due to the delays in the repair of the broken sections of the embankments and the resultant prolonged flooding (UNDP 2012). Thus, the affected households were unable to restore their livelihoods and the displaced households could not return to their homes until the embankment was repaired. More than 201,982 displaced people in both districts were living in temporary accommodation five months after Aila (ECHO

2009). About 14,000 households were living on embankments in the 13 affected unions of four upazilas of Khulna (Dacope and Koyra) and Satkhira (Ashasuni and Shyamnagar) districts one year after Aila (UN 2010). About 8,321 households were living on embankments and about 2,585 households were living on the outside of the ring embankment in 11 severely affected unions of four upazilas of Khulna (Dacope and Koyra) and Satkhira (Ashasuni and Shyamnagar) districts almost two years after Aila (ECHO 2011).6 Moreover, in these 11 severely affected unions of the four upazilas, about 42,250 households (including households living on the embankment and outside the ring embankment and households that returned to homes) did not have adequate income for recovery; 66 percent of these households (27,885 households) were still unable to have three full meals in a day, almost two years after Aila (ECHO 2011).

Households in the severely affected unions of Dacope and Koyra were not able to restore livelihoods, mainly farming and fishing, as their agricultural fields, shrimp ghers (ponds) and sweet fishponds were subject to continuous inundation until the embankment was repaired (ECHO 2009; UN 2010; UNDP 2012). The failure to restore livelihoods limited the opportunity for income in the affected areas and caused significant increase in seasonal migration (ECHO 2009). About 18,000 people from Dacope and about 40,000 people from Koyra migrated to different places to find work by October 2009, almost five months after Aila (ECHO 2009). In addition to seasonal migration, many households migrated to other places permanently (Saha 2017; Kumar et al. 2010). A study conducted one year after Aila shows that 800 households from Dacope and 1,200 households from Koyra permanently migrated to other places (Kumar et al. 2010). Lack of income opportunities, along with other factors such as destruction of houses, and scarcity of food and water, forced them to migrate permanently to other places (UN 2010; Saha 2017).

Displaced households in Dacope and Koyra were unable to return to their homes before the repair of the breaches in the embankment (UN 2010; ECHO 2009, 2011; UNDP 2012). For instance, about 10,500 households were living on embankments in the eight affected unions of Dacope and Koyra almost one year after Aila (UN 2010).7 Likewise, 7,406 households were living on embankments and 1,447 households were living on areas outside of the ring

6 Ring embankments were constructed in many Aila-affected areas to protect villages temporarily, until the main embankment was repaired. These were constructed because the tidal river flows were so fast that they prevented repairs of the main embankment (ECHO 2011). 7 These eight unions were: Kamarkhola and Sutarkhali unions of Dacope and Bagali, Dakshin Bedkashi, Koyra Sadar, Maharajpur, Maheswaripur, and Uttar Bedkashi unions of Koyra.

8 embankment in the severely affected unions of both upazilas almost two years after Aila (ECHO 2011).8 Moreover, about 30,468 households (8,853 displaced households and 21,615 households that returned home) in the severely affected unions of these two upazilas did not have adequate income for recovery. Many of these households were unable to have three full meals in a day, almost two years after Aila (ECHO 2011). In general, households in the severely affected unions of both upazilas were living either on embankments and other places in makeshift houses or in flooded homes without having secure access to food, drinking water, sanitation, or livelihoods until these unions became dewatered (ECHO 2011; Saha 2017; UN 2010). The prolonged flooding situation after the event impeded the high levels of self-recovery usually observed in Bangladesh after floods and cyclones (UN 2010). The affected households lost confidence and became fearful about their survival in the flooded villages (ECHO 2011; UNDP 2012). The hopes of the displaced households to return to their homes faded as the breaches became wider over time due to tidal flows (UNDP 2012; UN 2010).

The inability of the Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB) to repair the breaches in a timely manner created a humanitarian crisis (UNDP 2012). In some cases, although the embankments were repaired, they did not last more than a few weeks or even days, with some collapsing several times (IOM 2010b; ECHO 2011). The sudden collapse of a repaired embankment washed away any recovery activities completed by NGOs, and thus NGOs had to undertake emergency work again (ECHO 2011). Aila damaged embankments just as the monsoon season was approaching, exacerbating the impact as many local initiatives to fix the breaches in embankments were unsuccessful due to high tides and rains (UNDP 2012; ECHO 2009). BWDB repaired all the broken sections of the embankment except for one (known as Hareskhali, in Dakshin Bedkashi Union of Koyra, Khulna) by February 2011 (ECHO 2011); the Hareskhali broken section was finally repaired by BWDB in 2012 (BWDB 2015).

The response and recovery activities undertaken had limited success due to the regular inundation of the affected areas (ECHO 2011). The affected households began full recovery activities only when the villages were dewatered. International development partners and NGOs were also unable to focus on recovery operations in the severely affected areas (except

8 ECHO (2011) presents the data relating to the number of households mentioned with reference to the upazila instead of the unions within the upazila. The report presents data for the eight unions of Dacope (Kamarkhola and Sutarkhali) and Koyra (Bagali, Dakshin Bedkashi, Koyra Sadar, Maharajpur, Maheswaripur, and Uttar Bedkashi) upazilas of Khulna District. The report also includes three unions of two other upazilas of Satkhira District.

9 some villages of Dakshin Bedkashi Union, Koyra) for almost two years after the event, even though they were engaged in emergency response operations from the beginning of the crisis (UNDP 2012). Many affected households were struggling to recover from the impacts of Aila four or more years after the event (Stefanicki 2013).

1.2 Social Capital in the Cyclone Aila Response and Recovery

This study aims to explore the role of social capital in the post–Cyclone Aila response and recovery process of the affected households. A number of scholars have researched the role of social capital in post-disaster response and recovery in the contexts of both developed and developing countries and various disasters such as cyclones, floods, and earthquakes (Aldrich 2012a; Nakagawa & Shaw 2004; James & Paton 2015; Chamlee-Wright & Storr 2009, 2011; Storr & Haeffele-Balch 2012; Yila, Weber & Neef 2013; Marín et al. 2015; Shimada 2015; Tse, Wei & Wang 2013; Islam & Walkerden 2014, 2015; Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017; Masud-All-Kamal & Hassan 2018). Many disaster scholars suggest that social capital can play an important role in post-disaster response and recovery although their studies varied in terms of conceptualisation and measurement of social capital, levels of analysis (such as household or community) and methods (Aldrich 2012a; Nakagawa & Shaw 2004; Dynes 2005; James & Paton 2015; Chamlee-Wright & Storr 2009, 2011; Storr & Haeffele-Balch 2012; Yila, Weber & Neef 2013; Marín et al. 2015; Shimada 2015; Tse, Wei & Wang 2013; Buckland & Rahman 1999; Islam & Walkerden 2014, 2015; Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017; Masud-All-Kamal & Hassan 2018). Disaster scholars also suggest that social capital can simultaneously generate both benefits and negative externalities in post-disaster contexts (Aldrich 2011a, 2012a) (see the literature review in Chapter 2 for more detailed discussion of these sources and arguments).

The definition of social capital varies among scholars (Castiglione, van Deth & Wolleb 2008b; Castiglione 2008; Paxton 1999). In this study, I follow the definition of social capital employed in Nan Lin’s network-based theory of social capital (2008). Lin (2008, p. 51) defines social capital as ‘resources embedded in one’s social networks, resources that can be accessed or mobilized through ties in the networks’. Lin argues that although actors cannot capture the embedded resources without networks, ‘equating networks with social capital is incorrect’ (2008, p. 59) as social capital denotes embedded resources in social networks. In this study, I define social capital as the resources available to households through social networks. I consider not only material and monetary resources but also non-material and non-

10 monetary resources. Conceptualisation of social capital with reference to networks instead of ‘networks, norms and trust’ is productive for both the theoretical understanding and application of the concept in empirical research (Cook 2005). When social capital is conceptualised as ‘networks, norms and trust’ (Putnam 1993, p. 167), in the words of Karen Schweers Cook as an ‘everything but the kitchen sink concept’ (Cook 2005, p. 8), it becomes difficult to distinguish which feature of social capital is contributing when we claim the importance of social capital for something such as the post-disaster economic recovery of cyclone-affected households (Cook 2005).

In this study, I distinguish between bonding, bridging and linking types of social capital instead of just bonding or bridging types (Woolcock 2001, 2002b; Szreter 2002; Szreter & Woolcock 2004; Nakagawa & Shaw 2004; Pelling & High 2005; Aldrich 2012a, James & Paton 2015). The addition of a category of linking type of social capital allows for an understanding of the role of formal institutions beyond the community (i.e. the government and external aid agencies such as NGOs) in the post-disaster response and recovery process (Woolcock 2001, 2002b; Szreter 2002; Szreter & Woolcock 2004). I define bonding networks as households’ relations with relatives, bridging networks as households’ relations with neighbours, friends and acquaintances, and linking networks as households’ relations with formal organisations (i.e. the government and NGOs). Lin (2008, p. 62) suggests that social capital does not ‘bind, bond or bridge’; ‘it is the nature of the social networks that bind, bond, or bridge’. In other words, it is the nature of the social networks that bond, bridge or link. Therefore, bonding social capital denotes resources available to the households through bonding networks amongst relatives (i.e. people who are connected to the household head or any member of the household by blood or marriage and are not members of the studied household), bridging social capital denotes resources available to the households through bridging networks, and linking social capital denotes resources available to the households through linking networks.

In this study, I identify three dimensions of household recovery, namely, economic, housing and psychological recovery, in order to understand recovery at the household level, as scholars affirm that economic recovery, housing recovery and psychological recovery are three key components of general household recovery (Lindell 2011, 2013a, 2013b; Bolin 1982). Thus, my study examines the role of social capital in the economic, housing and psychological recovery process of the Cyclone Aila–affected households. Inclusion of these

11 three dimensions of recovery provides the opportunity to understand the role of each of the three types of social capital across each of the three dimensions of recovery. In addition to the role of each of the three types of social capital in the economic, housing and psychological recovery, the research also explores the role of each of the three types of social capital in the evacuation, search and rescue operations and survival of the affected households.

This study is based on fieldwork carried out in two villages: the first is Channirchak, which is located in Kamarkhola Union of Dacope Upazila of Khulna District, and the second is Dakshin Bedkashi, which is located in Dakshin Bedkashi Union of Koyra Upazila of Khulna District. Channirchak Village was subject to regular inundation for almost 21 months while Dakshin Bedkashi Village was regularly inundated for almost 33 months following the event (BWDB 2011, 2015).9 I have employed a mixed methods research design to address my objectives as this research design provides a more in-depth understanding of the research questions than either the quantitative or qualitative approach alone (Creswell 2014, p. 4; Creswell & Clark 2007, p. 5). The mixed methods research design offers an opportunity to bring together the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative approaches, which have both strengths and limitations (Creswell 2014, p. 215; Creswell & Clark 2007, p. 18).

1.3 Research Objectives and Questions

The main objective of this study is to examine the role of social capital in the post–Cyclone Aila response and recovery process of a selection of affected households in Bangladesh. The three specific objectives of the study are to examine the role in this process of bonding, bridging and linking social capital. Accordingly, the study aims to answer the central research question through four sub-questions:

What were the contributions to the post–Cyclone Aila response and economic, housing and psychological recovery process of the affected households of:

1. Bonding social capital? 2. Bridging social capital? 3. Linking social capital (government)? 4. Linking social capital (NGOs)?

9 Channirchak was subject to saltwater inundation for one period and sweet water inundation for another period of the year while Dakshin Bedkashi was subject to saltwater inundation throughout the year (source: key informants).

12 1.4 Significance of the Study

Despite many studies on cyclone hazards in Bangladesh, the question of long-term post- disaster recovery of affected households and communities following cyclones in Bangladesh remains highly under-researched. Similarly, the role of social capital in the post-disaster response and recovery in general and in the post-cyclone response and recovery in particular is also highly under-researched. Only a few studies so far have studied the relation between social capital and disaster recovery or resilience to climate stress or adaptability to natural hazards in the context of Bangladesh. Rotberg (2010) has studied the relationship between social networks and rural adaptability to flood and river erosion based on a qualitative approach in a village of Bangladesh. Jordan (2015) has studied the link between social capital and resilience to climate stress based on a qualitative approach in two villages of Bangladesh. Islam and Walkerden (2014, 2015) and Islam, Walkerden and Amati (2017) have addressed social capital and disaster recovery based on the mixed method approach in two Cyclone Sidr–affected villages of Pathorhgata Upazila of Barguna District of Bangladesh. Finally, Masud-All-Kamal and Hassan (2018) have studied the relationship between social capital and disaster recovery based on a qualitative approach in two Aila-affected villages of Shyamnagar Upazila of Satkhira District in Bangladesh.

Although a few studies (Islam & Walkerden 2014, 2015; Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017; Masud-All-Kamal & Hassan 2018) have focused on the role of social capital in post-cyclone response and recovery in Bangladesh, no studies so far have specifically examined the role of social capital in post-cyclone economic, housing and psychological recovery processes in Bangladesh. A few studies in Bangladesh have investigated how households in affected coastal villages of Bangladesh have utilised bonding, bridging, and linking social capital during the post-cyclone survival and rebuilding, but they have not specifically considered the three dimensions of recovery (economic, housing and psychological recovery) and, thus, have not examined how social capital contributes to the economic, housing and psychological recovery process. Likewise, the relationship between a specific form of social capital and the three dimensions of the recovery (economic, housing and psychological) remains largely unexplored. Moreover, no studies, to the author’s knowledge, have explored the role of social capital in the post-disaster psychological recovery process of members of cyclone-affected households in Bangladesh.

This study fills existing knowledge gaps by exploring the role of social capital in the economic, housing and psychological recovery process of the affected households following a cyclone in Bangladesh. The study also explores the role of social capital in evacuation, search and rescue operations and survival. The study addresses an existing knowledge gap by exploring the role of each of the three types of social capital in economic, housing and psychological recovery. In addition, the study contributes to new knowledge by showing how the roles of bonding, bridging, and linking social capital differ from one another in terms of their contribution to the post-cyclone response and recovery process. Moreover, the study fills an existing lacuna by exploring the role of each of the three types of social capital in the psychological recovery process of members of the affected households. The study also contributes to existing knowledge by making a clear distinction between the bonding (households’ relationships with relatives) and bridging (households’ relationships with neighbours, friends and acquaintances) networks of the households in the context of coastal Bangladesh.

The study provides evidence-based knowledge to policymakers and development practitioners about the role of social capital in the post-disaster response and recovery process. The study also explores the major weaknesses of the government’s and NGOs’ post-Aila response and recovery operations. The findings will contribute to the strengthening of the capacity of the different forms of network and to the design of effective post-disaster response and recovery operations for future disasters in Bangladesh and other countries.

1.5 Thesis Outline

The thesis consists of seven further chapters. Chapter 2 reviews literature on key themes pertinent to the study and contains three sections. The first section discusses the meaning of disaster recovery, the relationship between household and community recovery and various dimensions of, and issues related to, household and community recovery. The second section reviews literature on the relationship between disaster recovery and resilience, while the third section presents a review of literature on the relationship between social capital and disaster recovery.

Chapter 3 discusses the methodology used in this study. The chapter first presents information related to the selection of the study areas, i.e. the two villages. The chapter then provides the rationale for the use of a mixed methods approach and selection of the suitable mixed

14 methods design. The chapter next discusses qualitative and quantitative data collection methods and the recruitment of participants and respondents for qualitative and quantitative data collection. The chapter finally discusses the qualitative and quantitative data analysis process.

Chapter 4 examines the role of bonding social capital in the post–Cyclone Aila response and recovery process of the affected households. The chapter first discusses the kinship system in Bangladesh. The chapter then discusses the types of aid or support and other non-aid items the affected households received through bonding networks, i.e. from relatives. The chapter next examines the role of bonding social capital in evacuation, search and rescue operations, survival, and economic, housing and psychological recovery. The chapter finally explains why bonding networks play a limited role in the survival, economic and housing recovery process of the affected households.

Chapter 5 examines the role of bridging social capital in the post–Cyclone Aila response and recovery process of the affected households. The chapter first provides the justification for considering households’ relationships with neighbours and friends and acquaintances as bridging instead of bonding networks. The chapter then discusses the types of aid or support and other non-aid items the affected households received from neighbours and friends and acquaintances. The chapter next examines the role of bridging social capital in evacuation, search and rescue operations, survival, and economic, housing and psychological recovery. The chapter later explains why bridging social capital plays a limited role in the survival and economic and housing recovery process of the affected households. The chapter finally presents a comparison between the role of bonding social capital and bridging social capital in the post–Cyclone Aila response and recovery process.

Chapter 6 presents how the linking social capital (government) contributes to the post– Cyclone Aila response and recovery process of the affected households. The chapter first presents the aid items and other supports not in the form of aid items the affected households received from the government. The chapter then examines the role of linking social capital in evacuation, search and rescue operations, survival, and economic, housing and psychological recovery. The chapter finally discusses the major weaknesses of the government’s post– Cyclone Aila response and recovery operations.

Chapter 7 presents how the linking social capital (NGOs) contributes to the post–Cyclone Aila response and recovery process of the affected households. The chapter first introduces those NGOs that participated in the post–Cyclone Aila response and recovery operations and the aid items and non-aid items households received from NGOs. The chapter then examines the role of NGOs in evacuation, search and rescue operations, survival, and economic, housing and psychological recovery. The chapter finally discusses the major weaknesses of NGOs’ post–Cyclone Aila response and recovery operations.

Chapter 8 first presents key findings of the study regarding the research questions. The chapter next discusses how the findings of the study contribute to the advancement of knowledge and policy in the research area. The chapter then discusses the limitations of the study, the implications of climate change and sea level rise, and finally provides policy recommendations and suggestions for potential future research.

16 Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the key concepts used in this research and tries to establish the link among the concepts based on the existing relevant studies. This review of literature is further divided into four sections. The first section briefly discusses the meaning of disaster recovery, the relationship between household and community recovery and various dimensions of, and issues related to, household and community recovery. The second section succinctly discusses the relationship between disaster recovery and resilience while the third section briefly discusses the relationship between social capital and disaster recovery. The second section is divided into two subsections as follows: changing definitions of resilience; and recovery as an opportunity for disaster risk-reduction and building resilience. The third section is divided into three subsections as follows: social capital – understanding the concept; social capital – levels of application, types, measurement and negative consequences; and application of social capital to disaster recovery. The final section presents a conclusion.

2.2 Disaster Recovery, and Household and Community Recovery

The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR)10 (2009) defines disaster as ‘a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources’ (p. 9). The EM-DAT database records an event as a disaster which meets at least one of the following criteria: ten or more people killed, 100 people or more affected, declaration of a state of emergency and a call for international assistance (CRED 2015). Disaster life cycle has four phases: mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery (IRP 2012; Mileti 1999; Arendt & Alesch 2015). Mitigation and preparedness involve activities undertaken before disaster strikes (UNISDR 2009; Mileti 1999; Arendt & Alesch 2015). Mitigation involves various strategies and actions to lessen or limit the adverse impacts of hazards and associated disasters in future (UNISDR 2009). Preparedness involves the development of knowledge and capacities required to manage emergencies effectively and achieve an orderly transition from response to sustained recovery (UNISDR 2009). The response phase involves actions that are undertaken ‘directly before, during or immediately after a disaster in order to save lives,

10 This is now known as the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR).

17 reduce health impacts, ensure public safety and meet the basic subsistence needs of the people affected’ (UNDRR 2020). This phase mostly focuses on immediate and short-term needs and is often known as ‘disaster relief’ (UNISDR 2009; UNDRR 2020). Recovery is the last phase that denotes ‘the restoration, and improvement where appropriate, of facilities, livelihoods and living conditions of disaster-affected communities, including efforts to reduce disaster risk factors’ (UNISDR 2009, p. 23). According to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRCRCS) (2012), recovery following a disaster denotes ‘a process that results in people’s lives returning to normal in such a way that they will be more resilient to future disasters’ (p. 17). Broadly speaking, the recovery process includes post- disaster reconstruction, restoration, rehabilitation, and redevelopment as parts of the process (Chang 2010; Dynes & Quarantelli 2008).

Earlier disaster recovery was considered as ‘ordered, knowable, and predictable’ (Popkin 1977; Kates 1977; Kates & Pijawka 1977). Kates and Pijawka (1977) provided a sequential model of disaster recovery activities that takes place across four overlapping periods: emergency, restoration, replacement reconstruction (reconstruction I), and the commemorative, betterment, and developmental reconstruction (reconstruction II). However, later research found that the recovery process is not as ordered and predictable as suggested by Popkin (1977), Kates (1977) and Kates and Pijawka (1977) (Chang 2010; Miles, Chang & Eeri 2006; Berke, Kartez & Wenger 1993; Rubin, Saperstein & Barbee 1985). Rather, recovery is an uncertain, complex, nonlinear, multidimensional, and conflictual process (Chang 2010). Therefore, recovery needs to be understood as a process, not as a product or end state (Rubin, Saperstein & Barbee 1985; Quarantelli 1999; Mileti 1999; Bolin 1982; Nigg 1995).

The recovery process following a disaster may be relatively quick or it may take several years (IFRCRCS 2012). The time required for recovery also varies among people and communities as some people or communities can recover more quickly than others (IFRCRCS 2012; Lindell 2013a, 2013b; Finch, Emrich & Cutter 2010; Green, Bates & Smyth 2007). The recovery process for greater Christchurch following the earthquakes is expected to take more than ten years. The timeline for the immediate recovery phase was set at September 2010 to December 2011 and the short-term recovery was anticipated to be 2012–2014, while the medium and longer-term recovery is seen as 2015 to 2020 and beyond (CERA 2012). On the other hand, the timeline for the short (rehabilitation) and medium term (reconstruction)

18 rehabilitation and reconstruction programs for Aceh following the tsunami on 26 December 2004 (also Nias that experienced an earthquake on 28 March 2005) was expected to be four years (April 2005 to April 2009) (Mardhatillah 2010; Kenny et al. 2010).11 However, unlike the recovery strategy for greater Christchurch, the master plan for rehabilitation and reconstruction programs in Aceh and Nias did not cover long-term recovery programs. The expected period of reconstruction of the physical environment and infrastructure following the impact of Hurricane Katrina was eight to 11 years (Kates et al. 2006). An assessment conducted one year after Cyclone Aila proposed early recovery interventions for two years following the assessment (UN 2010). However, findings show that the affected households and communities often do not recover within the period outlined in the plan. For instance, many tsunami-affected people in Indonesia did not recover within the period set in the master plan for the rehabilitation and reconstruction (Mardhatillah 2010; Samuels 2010).

Recovery takes place at different levels of the social unit such as individual, household and community (Frankenberg, Nobles & Sumantri 2012; Quarantelli 1999; Chang 2010; Mileti 1999; Chamlee-Wright & Storr 2011; Storr & Haeffele-Balch 2012; Wickes et al. 2015). As recovery occurs at different levels, assessment of recovery needs to state what level of social unit is being evaluated. It is important as individuals or households may recover, while communities may not, and vice versa, although the recovery of these social units is not fully independent of each other (Quarantelli 1999; Frankenberg, Nobles & Sumantri 2012).

In the context of Bangladesh, community level post-disaster recovery following Aila can be understood in terms of post-disaster recovery at the village level. It is worth noting that the term ‘community’ is one of the most elusive concepts in sociology as it lacks specific meaning (Day 2006). A community generally means an ‘area of common life’ such as a village (MacIver 1970). Parsons (1952, p. 91) defines community as a collectivity, ‘the members of which share a common territorial area as their base of operations for daily activities’. Two basic characteristics of community are locality and community sentiment (MacIver & Page 1950). A community is not a homogenous entity, and relations among members may not always be harmonious (Pelling 2007; Tierney & Oliver-Smith 2012). An individual or a group within a community can benefit at the expense of higher risk and greater vulnerability for other individuals or groups (Wisner et al. 2004; Pelling 2007; Tierney &

11 The rehabilitation and reconstruction phase in Aceh followed an emergency period that lasted three months (ended at the end of March 2005) following the tsunami (Kenny et al. 2010).

Oliver-Smith 2012). In other words, usually a community is internally divided by various factors such as unequal power and socio-economic conditions (Pelling 2007). Thus, assessing post-disaster recovery at the community level (community as a unit of analysis) can often be problematic as it may hide the fact that some groups may emerge as winners, while others may be losers in the post-disaster recovery process (Tierney & Oliver-Smith 2012). A recovery process that may be considered successful at the community level may be experienced very differently at the household level (Tierney & Oliver-Smith 2012).

Although household recovery is different from community recovery, community recovery and reconstruction activities carried out at the community level can influence household recovery (Frankenberg, Nobles & Sumantri 2012; Green, Bates & Smyth 2007; Bolin 1982, 1994; Hass et al. 1977; Trainer, Bolin & Ramos 1977; Trainer & Bolin 1976). Certain decisions at the community level may help or impede household recovery (Trainer, Bolin & Ramos 1977). If a community recovers (community functions are restored) quickly, then individual or household recovery can proceed more smoothly, while the failure of a community to recover can impair individual or household recovery (Frankenberg, Nobles & Sumantri 2012; Green, Bates & Smyth 2007). At the same time, rapid recovery of individuals or households arising from, for example, rapid recovery of mental health of community members can contribute to the rapid recovery of the community functions (Frankenberg, Nobles & Sumantri 2012). Studies show that people living in communities in which community members are more spatially scattered during the early recovery period recover more slowly than do people living in communities in which community members are less spatially scattered (Thorburn 2010). Studies also show that individuals living in communities that experience higher destruction exhibit higher post-traumatic stress reactivity (PTSR) than do individuals living in communities with less destruction (Frankenberg, Nobles & Sumantri 2012; Frankenberg et al. 2008). Mobility or displacement are also higher in communities with a high level of damage than in communities with a low level of damage (Gray et al. 2009).

These findings suggest that community issues and community recovery influence the long- term recovery of individuals and households within the community. However, the impact of community recovery on household recovery is ‘by no means strictly causative’ as evidenced by differences among households in the same community in terms of recovery (Bolin 1982). Household recovery is linked not only to community characteristics and reconstruction activities at the community level, but also linked to other elements such as characteristics of

20 the household, social support networks, aid received and the impact of the disaster on the household (Bolin 1982; Frankenberg et al. 2013; Frankenberg, Nobles & Sumantri 2012; Frankenberg et al. 2008; Lindell 2013a, 2013b).

Both household recovery and community recovery involve several dimensions. Household recovery is a complex process that involves various dimensions and various factors that are both internal and external to a household (Bolin 1976, 1982; Ericson et al. 1976; Lindell 2013a, 2013b). Moreover, perception of household recovery can also vary across cultures. For example, continuity of employment was the most important factor in the perception of household recovery in Managua, Nicaragua, while it was not important in Rapid City, South Dakota, USA (Bolin & Bolton 1983). Although dimensions of household recovery vary across studies (Bolin & Bolton 1983, 1986; Bolin 1976, 1982; Trainer, Bolin & Ramos 1977), this review suggests that household recovery has three basic dimensions: economic recovery, housing recovery, and psychological recovery (Lindell 2011, 2013a, 2013b). One dimension of recovery can also affect other dimensions of recovery (Bolin 1982; Peacock, Dash & Zhang 2009). For instance, delays in the re-establishment of housing after a disaster may cause delays in other dimensions of recovery as they limit the capacity of a household to perform normal activities (Peacock, Dash & Zhang 2009). The interrelationships among these three dimensions can be understood from a recent study on psychological impact following a disaster in Japan that suggests that damage to houses had the largest effect, home water incursion had the second largest effect and income reduction after the event had the third largest effect on the mental health of the people (Lebowitz 2016). This finding indirectly suggests that people will be able to recover psychologically if they can fix damage to their houses and recover from the reduction in income.

In the post-disaster context, re-establishment of permanent housing is one of the fundamental dimensions of overall household recovery (Peacock, Dash & Zhang 2009). It is worth noting that disaster housing is different from disaster sheltering (Quarantelli 1982, 1991, 1995; Peacock, Dash & Zhang 2009). Quarantelli (1982, 1991, 1995) has distinguished between sheltering and housing in four different terms for four different phenomena. These are: emergency sheltering, temporary sheltering, temporary housing, and permanent housing. The difference between sheltering and housing is that people do not re-establish household routines in the case of sheltering, whereas people are required to re-establish household routines in the case of housing. Temporary housing means re-establishment of household

21 routines in a location or structure which is not preferred, while permanent housing means re- establishment of household routines in a preferred location and structure (Lindell 2013a, 2013b). At a point in time, some victims may belong to the emergency sheltering phase, while other victims may move to permanent housing in a community (Quarantelli 1995; Lindell 2013b). Although the typology developed by Quarantelli (1982, 1991, 1995) is useful, it is not always clear. The transitions from emergency sheltering to temporary sheltering and from temporary housing to permanent housing are not always clear (Quarantelli 1995; Peacock, Dash & Zhang 2009; Lindell 2013b).

Like household recovery, community recovery also involves several dimensions. Mileti (1999) has mentioned five components of community recovery: residential, commercial, industrial, social, and lifelines. The recovery strategy for greater Christchurch following the Christchurch earthquakes contains six components of recovery: leadership and integration, economic recovery, social recovery (health, education, and community support services), cultural recovery, recovery of built environment (e.g. housing, infrastructure) and natural environment (CERA 2012). Rubin, Saperstein and Barbee (1985) examined long-term community recovery of 14 disaster affected communities in terms of recovery of activities in five domains of community life: residential (e.g. repair or reconstruction of houses, permanent resettlement of displaced people), business/economic (e.g. business recovery, employment to pre-disaster level), public services and facilities (e.g. schools, hospitals), general population (the return of certain social indicators to the pre-disaster level) and mitigation (measures undertaken to reduce losses to future events) (Rubin, Saperstein & Barbee 1985). The complexity of understanding community recovery can be understood by considering that Rubin, Saperstein and Barbee’s (1985) study found 44 independent variables in ten major categories which affected community recovery. It is worth noting that community recovery and reconstruction issues are subject to the influence of government policies and programs (Rubin, Saperstein & Barbee 1985).

Reconstruction and recovery are not only technical processes, but also social, economic, cultural, psychological, and political processes (Kenny & Clarke 2010; Samuels 2010; Kenny et al. 2010; Oliver-Smith 1991). However, past post-disaster experiences show that the reconstruction process mainly focuses on physical reconstruction or rebuilding of physical infrastructures and ignores non-physical dimensions of reconstruction such as psychological reconstruction (Suaedy 2010; Kenny & Clarke 2010; Kenny et al. 2010; Samuels 2010;

22 Fanany 2010a; Shaw & Guda 2004). Past post-disaster experiences also show that although many affected people consider rebuilding of livelihoods as the most necessary issue of the reconstruction, government and NGOs pay less attention to livelihood recovery programs compared to the rebuilding of infrastructure (Kenny et al. 2010; Samuels 2010; Steinberg 2010). In the post-disaster situation, the issue of livelihood recovery becomes critical when people move back to their homes and the food relief ends (Steinberg 2010; Saha 2017). Near the end of the reconstruction activities in Aceh, government and NGOs paid increased attention to livelihood recovery programs, but still with less priority compared to physical reconstruction (Samuels 2010). However, these programs excluded many people and did not provide adequate livelihood support to many recipients (Samuels 2010; Steinberg 2010). It is believed that the physical reconstruction or rebuilding of physical infrastructures is more popular than social and psychological reconstruction, because these are visible and measurable (Samuels 2010; Kenny et al. 2010; Fanany 2010b). Rebuilding of physical infrastructures helps agencies to prove easily to donors that they have done something (Kenny et al. 2010; Samuels 2010). However, although rebuilding of infrastructure and housing is certainly important, it should not be the only goal of the reconstruction (Kenny & Clarke 2010; Samuels 2010; Steinberg 2010). Other dimensions of reconstruction such as social and psychological reconstruction also need to be addressed, perhaps with more emphasis (Kenny & Clarke 2010; Paton, Jang & Liu 2016). In other words, to ensure a sustainable recovery outcome, governmental and non-governmental agencies involved in reconstruction and recovery efforts must keep in mind that ‘reconstruction is less a technical issue than it is a social matter. Reconstruction only partly involves bricks and land use codes. It mostly concerns social values and group interests’ (Dynes & Quarantelli 2008).

Disaster recovery goals of those who are assisted and those who are assisting can be different (Kenny et al. 2010; Jayasuriya & McCawley 2010; Quarantelli 1999). Sometimes there may be a clash between the goals of recovery of the affected people and the communities and agencies involved in the recovery process (Jayasuriya & McCawley 2010; Quarantelli 1999). Sometimes sources of problems in the post-disaster period are not the affected people themselves, but agencies that usually provide less assistance than they believe. They often underestimate the informal assistance victims receive from relatives and friends (Quarantelli 1999). Previous post-disaster recovery efforts show that many aid agencies compete rather than cooperate with one another (Jayasuriya & McCawley 2010). Competition and the lack of coordination among agencies involved in relief and recovery activities hinder recovery

23 processes (Jayasuriya & McCawley 2010; Lu & Xu 2014; Quarantelli 1999). Little or lack of coordination among agencies can cause duplication of recovery activities and, in worst cases, can cause conflicts among agencies. The recovery needs of the affected people may not be met as they may fall into the gap between two organisations (Quarantelli 1999). Substantial differences among various agencies in terms of their interventions in a particular community, such as the difference in the quality and size of the houses constructed by different NGOs, can ignite tensions and conflicts among members of that community (Fanany 2010b; Thorburn 2010). Moreover, reconstruction and rebuilding activities, either due to inequality in aid distribution or perceived differences, can also fuel tensions and conflicts between communities as one community may consider itself less supported and discriminated against compared to another community (Kenny 2010; Thorburn 2010; Paton, Jang & Liu 2016). Likewise, problems within an agency such as inappropriate staffing, poor management structure and poor leadership can also limit the effectiveness of interventions and thus impede recovery (Clarke & Murray 2010; Quarantelli 1999). Furthermore, mutual hostility and lack of coordination and trust between NGOs and the government agencies can also impede the recovery process (Lu & Xu 2014; Mustafa 2003).

Most government and international agencies are reluctant to ensure local participation during relief and reconstruction phases (Kenny 2010; Steinberg 2010) and many agencies do not have the required skills to do so (Steinberg 2010). Aid recipients often feel excluded and become passive observers when government and non-government aid agencies make decisions without consulting them (Kenny et al. 2010; Nadiruzzaman & Paul 2013). Post- tsunami interventions show that in most cases participation was mainly of the consultative kind and sometimes manipulative and was used only as an instrument for obtaining consent to implement interventions (Kenny 2010). Lack of consultation with the affected people and sole control of the needs assessment process by external agencies produce outcomes that are not appropriate to local needs (Kenny 2010; Nadiruzzaman & Paul 2013; Shaw & Guda 2004). For instance, many newly constructed houses in Indonesia following the 2004 tsunami and in Bangladesh following Cyclone Sidr were totally unsuitable for local needs due to the inappropriate design of the houses (Kenny 2010; Nadiruzzaman & Paul 2013). In some cases, recipients did not occupy houses built by external agencies as these houses were substandard (Fanany 2010a; Nadiruzzaman & Paul 2013). A top-down approach that failed to understand the needs of the affected people made these interventions unsuccessful (Paton, Jang & Liu 2016; Nadiruzzaman & Paul 2013). All forms of assistance during the relief and recovery

24 period can be more effective when recipients are consulted and involved in every stage of the process (Kenny & Clarke 2010; Fanany 2010b; Nadiruzzaman & Paul 2013; Oliver-Smith 1991). In other words, instead of a top-down approach, a bottom-up participatory approach, that views intervention as a partnership between affected people and communities, and government and non-government agencies, is necessary for effective recovery outcomes (Paton, Jang & Liu 2016; James & Paton 2015; Kenny 2010; Fanany 2010b; Thorburn 2010; Nadiruzzaman & Paul 2013; Lawther 2016; Shaw & Guda 2004; Shaw & Sinha 2003; Shaw, Pulhin & Pereira 2010). This approach allows the affected people to identify their actual circumstances and needs, and views people as active agents who are capable of managing their recovery, and thus they need to be supported instead of directed in their recovery process (Paton, Jang & Liu 2016; Kenny 2010). Moreover, if the government agencies, NGOs and donors can be made responsible for their reconstruction works for a period after the work is finished, then they might provide more successful interventions during the recovery period (Fanany 2010b; Kenny & Clarke 2010).

2.3 Disaster Recovery and Resilience

2.3.1 Changing Definitions of Resilience

The rapid growth in popularity of the concept of resilience in the disaster risk management literature is linked to the adoption of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 2005–2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters (UN 2005; Pelling 2014). The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 also emphasises building resilience to disasters (UNDRR 2015). Resilience generally denotes the capacity to ‘resile from’ a shock (UNISDR 2009) and can be assessed for different levels such as individual, household, community, organisation and even for a nation (Buckle 2006; Norris et al. 2008; Manyena 2006; Cutter et al. 2008; Oliver-Smith 2013; Nguyen & James 2013; IFRCRCS 2004). Adger et al. (2002, p. 358) define social resilience at the community level as ‘the ability of a community to withstand external shocks and stresses without significant upheaval’. In their view, maintaining livelihood sustainability while absorbing external shocks and stresses is the most important issue. Social resilience of communities must be understood within the wider socio-political context (Adger et al. 2002). It is worth noting that although the term resilience is often used as ‘a capability to return to a previous state’ based on the notion of ‘bouncing back’, this understanding of the term is now considered problematic as the post-disaster situation reflects a new and changed reality due to either the

25 consequences of the disaster or the recovery and reconstruction activities (Paton 2006a; Matyas & Pelling 2014). Thus, people adapt to a new and changed reality instead of the pre- disaster reality (Paton 2006a; Paton & Gow 2008). In addition, the understanding of resilience based on the notion of ‘bouncing back’ fails to include the new possibilities offered by a disaster (Paton 2006a). Thus, the notion of resilience as the capacity to return to a former state has been replaced by the approach which defines resilience as an ongoing process rather than an outcome (Norris et al. 2008). The Sendai Framework captures the notion of resilience as being able to achieve a better situation than that experienced prior to the disaster in its key phrase, ‘build back better’ (UNDRR 2015).

UNISDR (2009) defines resilience as ‘the ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions’ (p. 24). According to IFRCRCS (2016), resilience is ‘the ability of individuals, communities, organizations or countries exposed to disasters and crises and underlying vulnerabilities to anticipate, reduce the impact of, cope with, and recover from the effects of shocks and stresses without compromising their long-term prospects’ (p. 19). It is worth noting that although vulnerability and resilience are linked, they are not necessarily opposite to one another as an individual or a community can be both vulnerable and resilient at the same time (Buckle 2006; Cutter et al. 2008; Manyena 2006; Oliver-Smith 2013; Matyas & Pelling 2014).

Paton (2006b, p. 315) defines resilience as ‘the capacity of people, communities and societal institutions to adapt to and experience benefit from disaster’. At the community level, Norris et al. (2008, p. 130) define resilience as a process instead of an outcome, ‘linking a set of adaptive capacities to a positive trajectory of functioning and adaptation after a disturbance’. Norris et al. (2008) use the term ‘adaptive capacities’ to include the combination of resources available to individuals, households and communities and their dynamic characteristics (robustness – capacity to withstand stress or loss without degradation; redundancy – resource diversity; and rapidity – how quickly the resources are accessed and used). The process links adaptive capacities and access to resources to adaptation or outcomes (Norris et al. 2008, p. 130). However, some scholars consider resilience as both a process and an outcome and argue that understanding resilience solely as a process can make policy agendas and goals abstract in an unhelpful manner (Matyas & Pelling 2014).

26 Paton uses resilience as synonymous with adaptive capacity (Paton 2006a, 2006b, 2008; Paton et al. 2007). Paton argues that resilience or adaptive capacity at the community level can only be understood by identifying available resources at three interdependent levels: personal, community and institutional/social levels and the processes that link resources within and between levels to promote collective or societal action to adapt to the consequences of a hazard or disaster (Paton 2006b, 2008). Paton (2006a) suggests that four general components comprise resilience at the community level. To be a resilient community, a community needs to have: 1) resources that are safe and capable of functioning in a context created by hazard consequences, 2) the competencies for mobilising, organising and using resources to overcome the problems posed by hazard consequences and adapt to the changed reality, 3) the planning and development strategies for integrating the resources of all levels in a coherent manner to capitalise opportunities for growth and development, and 4) strategies that are designed to ensure the sustainability of resources so that resources can be used over time and in a context created by hazard activity (Paton 2006a). Cutter et al.’s (2008) disaster resilience of place (DROP) model at the community level suggests that community resilience comprises six dimensions: ecological, social, economic, institutional, infrastructure and community competence.

2.3.2 Recovery as an Opportunity for Disaster Risk Reduction and Building Resilience

An important aspect of the notion of recovery is that the recovery phase offers an opportunity to move to a better or healthier state and become more disaster resilient instead of returning to the pre-disaster level that will reproduce previous hazard exposure and vulnerability (UN 2005; UNISDR 2009; UNDRR 2015; IRP 2007, 2012; IFRCRCS 2012; James & Paton 2016; Paton 2006a; Paton & Johnston 2001, 2006; Chang 2010; Christoplos 2006; Christoplos et al. 2010; Dynes & Quarantelli 2008; Kenny & Clarke 2010; Mileti 1999; Smith & Wenger 2009; Lindell 2013a, 2013b; Horney et al. 2016; Bolin & Stanford 1998a, 1998b; Kates & Pijawka 1977; Shaw 2006, 2014a, 2014c; Shaw, Gupta & Sharma 2003). In other words, disaster is considered as a catalyst for change as it offers opportunities for future growth and development (UN 2005, UNISDR 2009, UNDRR 2015; IRP 2012; IFRCRCS 2012; James 2016; James & Paton 2016; Paton 2006a; Paton & Johnston 2001, 2006; Bolin & Stanford 1998b; Shaw 2006, 2014a, 2014c; Shaw, Gupta & Sharma 2003).

Both the Hyogo Framework for Action and its successor, the Sendai Framework, consider disaster risk-reduction as a tool for building resilience of people, communities, and countries

27 to disasters (UN 2005; UNDRR 2015). These frameworks advocate disaster risk-reduction measures to protect lives, livelihoods, health, socio-economic and cultural assets, and physical and environmental assets of people, communities, and countries more effectively, and thus strengthen the resilience of people, communities and countries to disasters. The United Nations Plan of Action on Disaster Risk Reduction for Resilience (2013) also shares the same vision (UN 2013). Disaster risk-reduction measures to strengthen resilience can be taken in two phases: pre-disaster phase (preparedness and mitigation) and post-disaster phase. In the pre-disaster phase, disaster risk-reduction is integrated into various structural and non- structural measures undertaken in various sectors such as health, education, livelihood and infrastructure so that they remain safe and operational during and after disasters (UNDRR 2015). The integration of disaster risk-reduction into various activities in all sectors protects lives, prevents and reduces losses, and facilitates effective recovery and rehabilitation (UNDRR 2015). The reduction of exposure to disaster risks during the pre-disaster phase is given priority as it is more cost-effective than primary reliance on post-disaster response and recovery (UN 2005; UNDRR 2015; IFRCRCS 2016). In light of this expectation, the Sendai Framework focuses on disaster risk management instead of disaster management (UNDRR 2015).

The post-disaster phase also offers an opportunity to reduce disaster risk by ‘building back better’ (UN 2005; UNDRR 2015). In the post-disaster phase, disaster risk-reduction measures are incorporated into recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction measures so that livelihoods and socio-economic and physical structures are rebuilt and reconstructed in a way that reduces vulnerability and increases resilience to future disaster risk (UN 2005; UNDRR 2015; IFRCRCS 2001, 2012; Christoplos et al. 2010). According to the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) (2015), the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction phase is ‘a critical opportunity to “Build Back Better”, including through integrating disaster risk reduction into development measures, making nations and communities resilient to disasters’ (p. 21). Relying on the ‘building back better’ principle, the goal of the phase is to restore basic services, infrastructure and livelihoods in a way that is better than what existed before (UN 2005; UNDRR 2015; KTRC 2013).

It is often believed that despite encouragement from international development agencies, disaster risk-reduction is not incorporated into current development policies and practices (Oliver-Smith 2013, 2016; IFRCRCS 2002). As development policies and practices prioritise

28 economic growth over social and environmental issues, they ignore disaster risk-reduction in the name of development and thus generate disaster risks (Oliver-Smith 1996, 2013, 2016; IFRCRCS 2002; Hilhorst & Bankoff 2004; Frerks & Bender 2004). In the current disaster risk management efforts, most resources are used for emergency management, preparedness, and reconstruction rather than for addressing the root causes of disaster risk through sustainable development (Oliver-Smith 2013, 2016). Thus, some scholars argue that disaster risk management policies and strategies cannot address socially embedded causes of disaster risk and vulnerability without challenging dominant values and current development practices that produce disaster risks (Matyas & Pelling 2014; Pelling 2011; Pelling & Manuel- Navarrete 2011; Pelling, O’Brien & Matyas 2015; Oliver-Smith 2013, 2016). In other words, addressing the root causes of disaster risk and vulnerability requires reorientation of current development pathways towards socially just and ecologically sustainable development, i.e. transformation as an approach for building resilience (Pelling 2011, 2014; Pelling, O’Brien & Matyas 2015; Pelling & Manuel-Navarrete 2011; Matyas & Pelling 2014; Oliver-Smith 2013, 2016; O’Brien 2012).

It is worth noting that sometimes there may be tension between the notions of ‘going back to normal’ and ‘building back better’. The post-2004 tsunami experiences in Aceh suggest that people affected by disaster often prefer to ‘go back to normal’ as early as possible and thus want prompt assistance, while governments and international agencies/donors often prefer to ‘build back better’ which requires time (Kenny & Clarke 2010; Kenny 2010; Kenny et al. 2010; Jayasuriya & McCawley 2010). However, despite the necessity of a fast recovery, a too fast recovery process that jeopardises quality should be avoided as this form of recovery may fail to produce anticipated outcomes in the long term (CERA 2012; Kenny & Clarke 2010). Although people need to achieve a new normal, this needs to be better than the previous condition (Kenny & Clarke 2010). Thus, there needs to be a balance between two approaches in a way that not only avoids ‘building back risk’ in the name of a fast recovery, but also avoids unnecessary delay in the name of ‘building back better’. Optimum level of consultation with, and participation by, the affected people in the recovery interventions of the involved agencies can play a vital role in minimising the tension between the two approaches (Kenny & Clarke 2010).

As this study explores the role of social capital in the post-disaster response and recovery, it provides an opportunity to understand how recovery measures undertaken at the household

29 and community levels contribute to strengthen their resilience to future disasters. By understanding post-disaster rebuilding of livelihoods, houses and infrastructures through the lens of disaster risk-reduction, the study can provide significant insights into how the principle of ‘building back better’ is reflected in reconstruction and recovery measures following Cyclone Aila.

2.4 Social Capital and Disaster Recovery

2.4.1 Social Capital: Understanding the Concept

Social capital is one of the most popular concepts in sociology that has been exported to other social sciences and everyday language in recent years (Portes 1998, 2000). Few concepts like social capital have become so widely disseminated within and beyond the social sciences (Esser 2008). Although the concept has been originally applied to education and theorised initially in sociology, its application to politics and economics brought it academic and popular success (Castiglione, van Deth & Wolleb 2008a, 2008b). It has been applied in numerous empirical studies in recent years to examine a range of issues in various disciplines of the social sciences (Castiglione, van Deth & Wolleb 2008b; Portes 2000). The concept has extended its influence on political and policy-making circles at local, national and international levels (Castiglione, van Deth & Wolleb 2008a).

Nevertheless, the exact meaning of the concept is hotly disputed (Castiglione, van Deth & Wolleb 2008b; Castiglione 2008; Paxton 1999). Some scholars are even critical of the term (Arrow 2000; Solow 2000). For example, Arrow (2000) advocates the abandonment of the term ‘social capital’ as it does not possess the characteristics of capital, and Solow (2000) argues that social capital research is characterised by ‘vague ideas’ and ‘causal empiricism’. Despite criticism of the concept by some scholars, it is an established concept in social science.

Some scholars believe that the success of the social capital concept is linked to its applicability to a range of research and disciplinary fields, and its conceptual openness and flexibility have benefitted empirical research (Castiglione, van Deth & Wolleb 2008b). On the other hand, other scholars believe that the application of the concept to various kinds of problems is associated with confusion about its actual meaning, and controversy about its alleged effects (Portes 2000). Although the concept of social capital has become popular in recent decades, it does not include any idea which is really new to sociologists or sociological

30 theories. Group involvement and group participation can yield positive outcomes for both individuals and communities is a major notion in sociology that can be dated to Durkheim’s discussion on group life and Marx’s separation between a class-in-itself (an atomised class) and a class-for-itself (a mobilised and effective class). Thus, the concept recaptures an insight that has been present in sociology since its very beginning as an appropriate field of philosophical examination (Portes 1998).

The conventional wisdom related to the concept is best reflected by ‘who we know’, not by ‘what we know’ (Woolcock 2001, p. 67). The basic idea that reflects the essence of the concept is that family members, close or distant friends, neighbours and other people known to an individual create an asset that can be used by an individual for achieving a material gain or coping with a crisis period (Woolcock & Narayan 2000; Woolcock 2001, 2002b). This is true not only for individuals, but also for groups (Woolcock & Narayan 2000). Communities that have a rich stock of social networks and civic associations are perceived to be able to tackle poverty and vulnerability more effectively, resolve disputes and use new opportunities advantageously. Like the presence of social ties, the absence of social ties has an equal converse impact (Woolcock & Narayan 2000; Woolcock 2001, 2002b).

The first known use of the term, and also the first known use in the sense that it is used today, can be traced back to the writing of L.J. Hanifan, then the state supervisor of rural schools in West Virginia (Hanifan 1916; Putnam 2000; Woolcock & Narayan 2000). Hanifan, in his paper entitled ‘The Rural School Community Center’ in 1916, used the term to explain the importance of community participation in the improvement of the community. Hanifan (1916) described the concept of social capital as:

tangible substances [that] count for most in the daily lives of a people, namely, goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy and social intercourse among a group of individuals and families who make up a social unit... The individual is helpless socially, if left entirely to himself… If he may come into contact with his neighbor, and they with other neighbors, there will be an accumulation of social capital, which may immediately satisfy his social needs and which may bear a social potentiality sufficient to the substantial improvement of living conditions in the whole community. The community as a whole will benefit by the cooperation of all its parts, while the individual will find in his associations the advantages of the help, the sympathy, and the fellowship of his neighbors. (Hanifan 1916, pp. 130–131)

Hanifan’s idea of social capital did not draw the attention of social scientists and disappeared for several decades without a trace (Putnam 2000; Woolcock & Narayan 2000). The idea of social capital was rediscovered by Canadian urban sociologists in the 1950s, by George Homans, an exchange theorist, and Jane Jacobs, an urbanist, in the 1960s, and by an economist, Glenn Loury (1977), in the 1970s (Putnam 2000; Loury 1977; Woolcock & Narayan 2000). However, although a number of scholars from a variety of fields used the concept earlier, the concept was not clear until Pierre Bourdieu and James S. Coleman analysed it (Paxton 1999). The French sociologist Bourdieu and American sociologist Coleman initiated the contemporary analysis of the concept (Bourdieu 1986; Coleman 1988, 1990; Portes 1998; Putnam 1993, 1995, 2000; Paxton 1999). The works of Loury (such as Loury 1977, 1987), who used the concept in economics to understand the usefulness of social resources in the development of human capital, helped Coleman to provide a refined analysis of the role of social capital in the creation of human capital (Coleman 1990; Portes 1998). It is worth noting that Coleman did not mention Loury and Bourdieu in his article published in 1988 (Coleman 1988), although he mentioned both scholars later in his 1990 book (Coleman 1990). Coleman (1988, 1990) also acknowledged the works of economist Ben-Porath and sociologists Mark Granovetter and Nan Lin among others in his analysis of the concept. The concept was developed more extensively by Robert D. Putnam (1993, 1995, 2000), Nan Lin (1999a, 1999b, 2001, 2008), Ronald S. Burt (1992, 2001), Alejandro Portes (1998, 2000, 2014), Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) and Portes and Landolt (2000).

According to Bourdieu (1986), capital has three fundamental forms: economic capital, cultural capital and social capital. Like cultural capital, social capital, which is made up of social obligations (‘connections’), can also be converted into economic capital on certain conditions. Bourdieu (1986) defines social capital as ‘the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group – which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital’ (Bourdieu, 1986, pp. 248–249). Bourdieu (1986) also argues that the volume of the possessed social capital of a given agent is dependent on the size of the network of connections that can be effectively mobilised by the agent, and on the volume of the capital (economic, cultural or symbolic) possessed by each person to whom the agent is connected.

32 Sociologist James S. Coleman (Coleman 1988, 1990) conceptualises social capital by its function and defines social capital as ‘not a single entity, but a variety of different entities having two characteristics in common: they all consist of some aspect of a social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structure’ (Coleman 1990, p. 302). Social capital is a capital which has existence in ‘the relations among persons’ (Coleman 1988). Social capital is productive like physical capital and human capital and helps to achieve certain ends that cannot be attained without its presence, or can only be attained at high cost (Coleman 1988, 1990). It is valuable for both economic and non-economic outcomes (Coleman 1988). It is a resource for an individual (Coleman 1988, 1990) and can significantly affect an individual’s ability to act and perceived quality of life (Coleman 1990, p. 317). However, a given form of social capital which is useful for certain actions can be useless or harmful for others (Coleman 1988, 1990).

Although social capital is a resource, it is ‘not the private property of any of the persons who benefit from it’ (Coleman 1990, p. 315). Unlike physical and human capital, most forms of social capital are public goods, although some forms of social capital are private goods (Coleman 1990). A greater amount of social capital is expected to be generated when people need each other more extensively for aid, while a lesser amount of social capital is expected to be generated when people require one another less due to some factors such as affluence and government support (Coleman 1990, p. 321).

Coleman’s definition of social capital was amorphous and prepared the way for including several different and even contradictory processes within the concept (Portes 1998). Coleman himself did so by including mechanisms that generate social capital (such as reciprocity expectation and enforcement of norms by a group), the consequences of possessing it (such as advantaged access to information) and the social organisation that provides the setting for both sources and effects to be materialised (Portes 1998). According to Portes, resources need to be distinguished from the ability to gain resources through membership in different social structures _ a distinction which is obscured in Coleman, but clear in Bourdieu (Portes 1998, p. 5). Thus, a systematic analysis of the concept requires the following three elements to be separated from one another: (1) those who make claims (possessors); (2) those who agree to demands (sources); and (3) the resources themselves (Portes 1998).

Social capital performs three basic functions: (1) source of social control; (2) source of family-mediated benefits; and (3) source of benefits through networks beyond the immediate

33 family (Portes 1998, 2000; Portes & Landolt 2000). The third function is the most common function of social capital and closest to the definition of social capital provided by Bourdieu (Portes 1998, 2000; Portes & Landolt 2000) who views social capital as assets attained by membership in networks. On the other hand, parental support for children’s development is related to Bourdieu’s analysis of cultural capital (Portes 1998, 2000). Coleman has given attention to the first function of social capital (Portes 1998, 2000; Portes & Landolt 2000) and his writing also has clearly influenced the second function (Portes 1998).

Robert Putnam’s 1993 book, Making Democracy Work, popularised the concept of social capital. Putnam (1993) defines social capital as ‘features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions’ (p. 167). Putnam (2000) later defines social capital as ‘connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them’ (p. 19). Putnam also argues that social capital has both individual and collective aspects and it can be both private and public good at the same time (Putnam 2000, p. 20).

Putnam identifies three essential components of social capital: trust, the norm of generalised reciprocity, and networks of civic engagement. A problematic aspect of Putnam’s (1993, 2000) definition of social capital is that it does not distinguish sources from consequences. For example, Putnam (1993, p. 171) argues that social trust arises from norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement. In this case, the norms of reciprocity and networks are sources of trust. Similarly, his later definition (2000) of social capital also includes both sources and consequences. However, the distinction between sources and consequences is necessary to avoid tautological problems (Woolcock 2001, 2002b; Woolcock & Narayan 2000).

To avoid this problem, Woolcock and Narayan (2000) define social capital as ‘the norms and networks that enable people to act collectively’ (p. 226). In a similar manner, Woolcock (2001, p. 70; 2002b, p. 25) also defines social capital as ‘the norms and networks that facilitate collective action’. Both definitions focus on sources of social capital and distinguish between sources and consequences of social capital. The definition of social capital provided by Woolcock and Narayan (2000) and Woolcock (2001, 2002b) leaves out ‘trust’ – one important element of Putnam’s definition of social capital. Woolcock (2001, 2002b) eliminates trust as he views it as an outcome of social capital. He argues that trust per se is not social capital; it can be a measure or an indicator of social capital like a test score as an

34 indicator of human capital (Woolcock 2001, p. 71). Dasgupta (2010) also views trust as a consequence of social capital as he argues that social capital serves only as a means to create trust, if directed properly, while it hinders economic development if misdirected. Likewise, unlike Putnam (1993, 1995, 2000), Lin (2008) and Cook (2005) also believe that trust is different from social capital. Lin (2008, p. 64) suggests that trust can be either antecedent or effect, but not a component of social capital. Ahn and Ostrom (2008) also consider that trust is not a form of social capital itself and serves as ‘the key link between forms of social capital and outcomes’ (Ahn & Ostrom 2008, p. 80).

Another important point is that conceptualising social capital as ‘networks, norms and trust’ poses difficulties for the theoretical understanding as well as for the application of the concept in empirical research, as we cannot identify what aspect of social capital is contributing when we claim the importance of social capital for something (Cook 2005). In Cook’s (2005) words, social capital when considered as ‘networks, norms and trust’ appears as an ‘everything but the kitchen sink concept’ (Cook 2005, p. 8). A similar argument can also be put forward for definitions provided by Woolcock and Narayan (2000) and Woolcock (2001, 2002b) who include norms in addition to networks, and Ahn and Ostrom (2008) who include institutions/rules and trustworthiness in addition to networks as basic forms of social capital.

Although most scholars agree that social capital can benefit both the individuals and the collectives, social capital as a relational asset needs to be distinguished from a collective asset such as norms, trust and culture (Lin 2001, p. 26). In other words, a collective asset should not be considered as an alternative form of social capital, although a causal proposition can be formulated that a collective asset such as trust can promote relations and networks, and can improve the utility of embedded resources, or vice versa (Lin 2001). Thus, social capital when viewed as a relational concept needs to be conceptualised in terms of social networks (Lin 2001, p. 24).

Despite disagreement, the majority of scholars who have contributed to the discussion of social capital acknowledge the general premise that social capital is network-based or networks are one of the sources from which social capital emerges (Bourdieu 1986; Coleman 1988, 1990; Putnam 1993, 1995, 2000; Lin 1982, 1999a, 1999b, 2000, 2001, 2008; Portes 1998, 2000; Portes & Landolt 2000; Burt 1992, 2001; Cook 2005; Ahn & Ostrom 2008; Esser 2008; Dasgupta 2010; Woolcock & Narayan 2000; Woolcock 2001, 2002b; Szreter & Woolcock 2004).

Along these lines, Lin (2008) defines social capital as ‘resources embedded in one’s social networks, resources that can be accessed or mobilized through ties in the networks’ (p. 51). According to Lin (2008), an actor can borrow or capture the resources of other actors through social relations or social networks. But social capital and social networks cannot be used as interchangeable terms. An actor cannot capture the embedded resources without networks. Similar to Lin, Portes (1998, p. 6) conceives social capital as ‘the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures’. Burt (1992) also views social capital as the relationships which a player has with other players. According to Burt (1992), social capital denotes an individual’s relations with friends, colleagues and general contacts through whom/which an individual receives opportunities for using his/her financial capital and physical capital. The parties involved in a relationship own social capital jointly (Burt 1992). Cook (2005), like Lin, also views social capital as resources accessed through network ties and argues that norms and trust are not the sources of social capital; networks are the sources of social capital.

Despite differences, the minimum consensus among most scholars is that social capital is network-based. This provides a foundation for a definition of social capital based on networks only. This definition does not equate social capital with norms and trust. Defining social capital by limiting it to a particular empirical referent, as Lin (2008) does, is productive for the theoretical development of the concept (Cook 2005). If social capital is treated as Lin (2008) treats it – that is, resources accessed through network ties – ‘then exchange networks are precisely the kinds of networks Putnam had in mind’ (Cook 2005, p. 8).

2.4.2 Social Capital: Levels of Application, Types, Measurement and Negative Consequences

2.4.2.1 Social Capital: Various Levels of Application

The application of the concept is also controversial at different levels or units of analysis, i.e. either it is an attribute of individuals or an attribute of collectivities (Portes 2000; Lin 2001). Bourdieu and Coleman considered individuals or small groups as the unit of analysis in their original theoretical formulations of the concept (Portes 2000; Portes & Landolt 2000). Despite some important differences, the analyses of social capital by both scholars were centred on the benefits that accrue to individuals or families because of their ties with others (Portes 2000, p. 2; Portes & Landolt 2000, p. 531). However, social capital became an attribute of the community with the application of the concept at the community level by Putnam (Portes

36 1998, 2000, Portes & Landolt 2000). For instance, Putnam (1995) argues that life in a community which has a considerable stock of social capital is more comfortable.

However, social capital as an attribute of communities, cities or nations is qualitatively different from social capital as an attribute of individuals (Portes 2000, p. 3; Portes & Landolt 2000, p. 535). There are three differences between the application of the concept at the individual level and that at the community/collective level (Portes 2000; Portes & Landolt 2000). Firstly, the use of the concept at the two levels of analysis (individual and community) is not always compatible, as individual social capital can undermine collective social capital in some instances (Portes 2000, pp. 3–4; Portes & Landolt 2000, p. 535). Even social capital within a group can have negative consequences for others outside of the group or other groups of the same community, community as a whole or larger society (Paxton 1999; Fukuyama 2001). Secondly, causes and effects of social capital when applied at the community level are not separated from one another and therein lies the basic logical circularity (Portes 2000; Portes & Landolt 2000). Thirdly, application of the concept at the community level allows little space for considering other possible causes (such as educational level of the population and geographical concentration of the population) that can affect both cause (civic behaviour which reflects social capital) and effect (governmental responsiveness) and thus can make the relationship between social capital (e.g. civic behaviour) and its effect (governmental responsiveness) spurious (Portes 2000; Portes & Landolt 2000).

Despite controversy, most scholars including Portes agree that the concept can be applied at various levels (Portes 1998; Lin 2008; Paxton 1999; Woolcock 1998; Esser 2008; Grootaert 1999; Grootaert & van Bastelaer 2002; Krishna 2008). Portes (1998), who believes that the highest theoretical potential of social capital lies at the individual level, argues that using social capital as an attribute of communities requires more theoretical improvement.

2.4.2.2 Social Capital: Various Types

Esser (2008) suggests two categories of social capital: relational (individual form) and system (collective form) social capital. Relational social capital means the valued number of resources that can be employed and used by an actor through personal relations (direct or indirect) with other actors who have control over those resources (Esser 2008). System social capital refers to ‘an emergent characteristic of an entire network’ (Esser 2008, p. 25). System

37 social capital is a by-product of relational social capital and cannot be produced by individuals or single actors (Esser 2008).

Krishna and Uphoff (1999) and Uphoff (2000) mention two forms of social capital: structural social capital and cognitive social capital. Structural social capital is associated with roles, rules, procedures, precedents and networks while cognitive social capital is associated with norms, values, attitudes, and beliefs (Uphoff 2000). Both forms of social capital are connected to one another and mutually reinforcing, although one is distinguishable from the other. Structural social capital is objective and external (can be observed and modified directly) while cognitive social capital is subjective and internal (resides within the mind and cannot be changed easily) (Krishna & Uphoff 1999). Krishna (2000) also proposes two forms of social capital: institutional and relational social capital, which are connected to Uphoff’s (2000) structural and cognitive social capital respectively.

Scholars also categorise social capital in three dimensions: bonding, bridging and linking. The distinction between bonding and bridging is the most common and popular in social capital literature and is founded on Cooley’s (1909) concept of primary group (and, by inference, secondary group) and the work of Granovetter (1973) on weak ties and strong ties (Cooley 1909; Granovetter 1973; Woolcock 2001, 2002b). Generally, bonding and bridging social capital denote connections to people who are alike and not alike respectively (Woolcock 2002b; Szreter 2002). Gittell and Vidal (1998, p. 15) suggest that bonding social capital ‘brings closer together people who already know each other’ while bridging social capital ‘brings together people or groups who previously did not know each other’. Putnam (2000) suggests that bonding social capital (exclusive) is ‘inward looking’ and strengthens ‘exclusive identities and homogenous groups’. On the other hand, bridging social capital is ‘outward looking’ and connects people from diverse backgrounds. Bridging social capital links individuals or groups to ‘external resources’ and better information, and generates ‘broader identities’ (Putnam 2000, pp. 22–23). Woolcock (2001, p. 72) defines bonding social capital as relations between ‘family members, close friends and neighbours’ and bridging social capital as relations with ‘more distant friends, associates and colleagues’.

Briggs (1998) argues that social capital as an individual good has two forms: social support and social leverage. The social support form of social capital helps an individual to ‘get by’ or cope with life’s challenges, while the social leverage form of social capital helps an individual to ‘get ahead’. Putnam (2000) like Briggs (1998) also argues that bonding social capital

38 (social support form of social capital) is associated with ‘getting by’ while bridging social capital (social leverage form of social capital) is associated with ‘getting ahead’ (Putnam 2000, p. 23). Bridging social capital is associated with ‘getting ahead’ as access to bridging social capital provides new information and resources to individuals and groups (Putnam 2000; Granovetter 1973, 1983). Other scholars also agree that bonding is related to survival or getting by, while bridging is related to mobility or getting ahead (Woolcock 2001, 2002a, 2002b; Woolcock & Narayan 2000; Pelling & High 2005). Putnam (2000) has used the notion of strong and weak ties in his conceptualisation of bonding and bridging. However, Woolcock (2002a) argues that although the former is similar to strong ties and the latter is similar to weak ties, they are not synonymous with strong and weak ties. Likewise, Pelling and High (2005, p. 311) also argue that all bonding ties may not be necessarily strong and all bridging ties may not be necessarily weak.

Woolcock (2001, 2002b) adds the concept of linking social capital to capture the vertical dimension of social capital as he considers both bonding and bridging as horizontal dimensions. In a similar manner, Aldrich (2012a) also argues that both bonding and bridging primarily involve connections among individuals who have the same status. Linking social capital denotes linkages with formal institutions beyond communities which provide resources, information, and ideas (Woolcock 2001, 2002b). This is a special type of bridging social capital which involves vertical power relations between parties or agents (Szreter 2002; Pelling & High 2005). In other words, parties involved in linking social networks are not only unalike as in the case of parties involved in the bridging social networks, but also unequal in terms of power and access to resources (Szreter 2002). The concept of linking social capital has great analytical value in understanding the context where external agencies work with poor communities (Szreter 2002). This category allows the concept of social capital to be used to evaluate relationships that form across political and social dichotomies such as state– civil society, formal–informal and rich–poor, to consider the issues related to power, and the role played by the state and government (Szreter 2002).

Different combinations of the three dimensions of social capital can produce a range of outcomes, and combinations of these three dimensions can change over time (Woolcock 2001, 2002b). Understanding distinctions between the three dimensions as well as their combinations has significant implications for understanding the plight of the poor (Woolcock 2001, 2002b). The poor may deploy a tight-knit and intensive stock of bonding social capital

39 to get by, while, unlike the non-poor, they may lack (or may have limited) access to bridging social capital to get ahead (Woolcock 2001, 2002b; Woolcock & Narayan 2000). They usually have almost no linking social capital (Woolcock 2001, 2002b). In other words, the poor may have only bonding social capital (Szreter 2002; Aldrich 2012a) and may miss individuals who act as ‘social relays’, i.e. people who can bridge or link a group to other groups and authorities (Aldrich 2012a, p. 32). Typical rural agricultural or fishing communities generally have high bonding, low bridging, and little or no linking social capital while typical urban communities generally may have low bonding, high bridging and some linking social capital. Likewise, women may be generally connected to bonding social capital, while men may be generally connected to bridging/linking social capital (Woolcock 2002a). However, this type of categorisation may not be always appropriate as the character of social capital can vary based on history and social context (Pelling & High 2005, p. 313).

Although some scholars (Woolcock 2001, 2002b; Szreter & Woolcock 2004; Aldrich 2012a) consider that bonding and bridging social capital involve horizontal relations, they may also involve vertical relations. For example, the patron–client relationship is vertical and cannot be considered as a linking relationship when defined with reference to formal agencies/institutions only, although can certainly be considered as a linking relationship when defined in terms of unequal power and access to resources without reference to formal agencies/institutions. Another important aspect of the categorisation is that although linking social capital can be easily distinguished from bonding and bridging with reference to formal authorities such as government, sustaining the distinction between bonding networks and bridging networks in empirical research can be very difficult, although the distinction is analytically clear (Szreter 2002). Besides, the distinction is crucially dependent on context as well (Szreter 2002). Although neighbours of a person share a physical community, they may live in separate social worlds (Briggs 1998). For instance, members of a community, despite sharing a place, can be internally divided by class and opposing political parties (Pelling 2007, p. 378; McCarthy 2014, p. 146).

A review of relevant studies also suggests that bonding social capital may not be helpful for a poor person to get ahead due to the homophily principle, i.e. an actor who is poor in resources is likely to have ties with other actors who are also poor in resources (Woolcock & Narayan 2000; Woolcock 2001, 2002b; Briggs 1998; Lin 2008). Although it is expected to be found true in most real cases as poor people are likely to have bonding networks with poor people, it

40 should not be assumed as a rule (Lin 2008). Three issues – the richness of embedded resources, the nature of relations and purposes of the action (expressive or instrumental) – need to be considered together to understand the role of social capital (Lin 2008). Expressive action involves maintaining and preserving existing resources and instrumental action involves gaining new or additional resources. If a poor person has bonding relations with embedded rich resources through kin, then bonding relations can be useful for achieving instrumental action or getting ahead. In other words, a poor person having a bonding relationship with rich kin may have access to the resources to get ahead. However, if a poor person has bonding relations with embedded poor resources, then bonding capital may not be useful for achieving instrumental action or getting ahead (Lin 2008). Thus, theoretically, the bonding relationship is useful for expressive action, and depending on the context, may be or may not be useful for instrumental action (Lin 2008).

2.4.2.3 Social Capital: Measurement

Scholars agree that social capital can be measured at both micro (such as individuals and households) and macro (such as communities or villages) levels (Lin 2008; Paxton 1999; Narayan 1997; Narayan & Pritchett 1999; Krishna & Uphoff 1999; Grootaert 1999). There is no consensus on how to measure social capital (Fukuyama 2001, p. 12). This lack of consensus on measurement has led to the use of questionable indicators to measure the concept in some cases (Paxton 1999). Another important issue related to the measurement of social capital is that the measure of the concept needs to be relevant to the cultural and historical context as indicators appropriate for one culture can be inappropriate for another culture (Krishna & Uphoff 1999; Krishna 2001, 2004). For example, measuring social capital using density of membership in formal organisations, as Putnam did in Italian regions, is not appropriate in Rajasthan villages, as villagers rarely set up formal organisations voluntarily (Krishna & Uphoff 1999; Krishna 2001, 2004). Informal networks instead of formal networks are relevant for measuring social capital in Rajasthan villages (Krishna & Uphoff 1999; Krishna 2001, 2004) and this may be true for many developing countries (Krishna & Uphoff 1999, p. 25). Other scholars also argue that the dimensions of social capital vary from one society to another and change over time, and thus instruments measuring social capital need to incorporate various dimensions (Woolcock & Narayan 2000). However, dimensions of social capital in different contexts can also be similar in some cases (Narayan & Cassidy 2001; Woolcock & Narayan 2000). Studies in Ghana and Uganda – two different countries – showed similarity in terms of the dimensions of social capital (Narayan & Cassidy 2001).

Lin (2008) argues that current research should measure both accessed social capital and mobilised social capital. Accessed social capital measures the degree of access to resources embedded in the social networks by an actor, or the extent to which an inventory of resources that can generate returns is available in the social networks of an actor. The expectation is that the greater the capacity of social capital, the better the return. On the other hand, mobilised social capital is defined in terms of the actual use of social capital for a particular action and the expectation is that the better the use of social capital, the better the return. In this approach, an actor selects a specific social tie and its resources from the pool and uses resources for a particular action.

2.4.2.4 Social Capital: Negative Consequences

Social capital can also have negative consequences (Portes 1998, 2014; Portes & Sensenbrenner 1993; Portes & Landolt 2000; Putnam 2000; Paxton 1999; Fukuyama 2001; Cook 2005; Ostrom 2000; Woolcock & Narayan 2000; Woolcock 1998, 2001, 2002b; Narayan 1999; Narayan & Cassidy 2001; Pelling & High 2005; Ahn & Ostrom 2008; Lowndes & Pratchett 2008; Aldrich 2011a, 2012a). It not only enables, but also constrains (Cook 2005). Portes has identified four negative consequences of social capital: exclusion of outsiders, excessive claims on group members, restrictions on individual freedoms, and downward-levelling norms (Portes 1998; Portes & Landolt 2000).

2.4.3 Application of Social Capital to Disaster Recovery

Several disaster scholars have examined the role of social capital in post-disaster recovery (Aldrich 2011a, 2011b, 2012a, 2012b; Aldrich & Meyer 2015; Nakagawa & Shaw 2004; James & Paton 2015; Chamlee-Wright & Storr 2009, 2011, Dynes 2005; Minamoto 2010; Storr & Haeffele-Balch 2012; Yila, Weber & Neef 2013; Islam & Walkerden 2014, 2015; Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017; Masud-All-Kamal & Hassan 2018; Marín et al. 2015; Shimada 2015; Tse, Wei & Wang 2013; Wickes et al. 2015; Elliott, Haney & Sams-Abiodun 2010; Murphy 2007; Pelling & High 2005; Buckland & Rahman 1999; Lu, Sato & Zhang 2008). Most of the studies examined the role of social capital either at the community level or household level, while only a few studies examined the concept at both the community and household levels. Some studies used only the qualitative method, or only the quantitative method, or both qualitative and quantitative methods. However, it is often stated that most studies on the relation between social capital and disaster recovery are qualitative rather than quantitative (Shimada 2015, p. 388). Like variations in terms of levels of analysis and

42 methods employed among studies, conceptualisation and indicators used for measurement of social capital and results are also varied. This is also true in the case of conceptualising and measuring of post-disaster recovery. Even variations in terms of indicators used for measuring both social capital and post-disaster recovery can be found within a single study. For instance, Aldrich (2012a) used different indicators for measuring social capital (which is an independent variable) and recovery (dependent variable) for different disasters and even different indicators for measuring social capital and recovery in the context of the same disaster such as the 2004 tsunami.

A review of studies shows that the positive relationship between social capital and post- disaster recovery is well documented, although it has negative effects as well. Dynes (2005, p. 7) in examining the role of social capital in disaster response suggests that social capital is ‘less damaged and less affected’ among all forms of capital and it is ‘the form of capital that serves as the primary base for a community response’ during the period of emergency. Aldrich’s (2012a) research on the role of social capital in the post-disaster recovery process following four mega-disasters (the 1923 Tokyo earthquake, the 1995 Kobe earthquake, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and Hurricane Katrina in 2005) in three countries shows that communities and households/individuals with more social capital experienced more effective recoveries. Aldrich’s (2012a) qualitative study in India in the case of the tsunami shows that villages with higher levels of both bonding and linking social capital achieved better recoveries than villages which had only bonding social capital or no bonding and linking social capital. Likewise, Aldrich’s (2012a) quantitative study in the case of the same event shows that both bonding and linking social capital were important in determining post- disaster recovery at the household/individual level.12

Nakagawa and Shaw’s (2004) study on the Kobe and Gujarat earthquakes shows that communities with higher social capital have had the speediest recovery. A study in Fiji shows that households’ use of social capital for search and rescue, information dissemination, mutual assistance and socio-commercial cooperation facilitated their post-flood response and recovery process (Yila, Weber & Neef 2013). Likewise, Shimada’s (2015) quantitative study after the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 shows that social capital (measured by proxies of bonding and bridging social capital) played a positive role in the post-disaster recovery

12 The study in the case of the tsunami in India considers only two types of social capital: bonding social capital and linking social capital.

(rate of population change) by encouraging people to stay or return to their homes in a disaster-stricken area. Similarly, a study on the Sichuan earthquake in 2008 also shows that social capital (networks–households’ interaction with other people) contributed positively to post-disaster recovery (housing reconstruction) and affected households with small social networks were vulnerable (Tse, Wei & Wang 2013).

James and Paton’s (2015) study shows that affected populations in collectivist societies such as Myanmar and Taiwan often start the recovery initiatives by themselves based on strong bonding social capital inherently present in their cultures. Likewise, Chamlee-Wright and Storr (2009) show that the bonding social capital (networks surrounding a church) facilitated a quick return of the Vietnamese-American community to the neighbourhood after Hurricane Katrina. In a similar manner but with somewhat different conceptualisation of social capital, Chamlee-Wright and Storr’s (2011) study in the context of Hurricane Katrina shows that social capital in the form of collective narratives of a community can also facilitate or retard post-disaster community recovery by shaping recovery strategies that individuals adopt. However, social capital can also facilitate disaster recovery in loosely connected communities. For instance, social capital (understood as the presence of a community-based organisation that existed before Hurricane Katrina) facilitated relatively quick and robust recovery of the heterogeneous loosely connected Broadmoor community in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina (Storr & Haeffele-Balch 2012).

Although most studies show that social capital affects disaster recovery, some studies show that social capital does not work in coping with natural disaster at the household level or has limited effect on post-disaster community resilience at the community level (Lu, Sato & Zhang 2008; Wickes et al. 2015). A study in rural China shows that social capital (measured by mutual help, civic participation, and trust) does not help households in coping with natural disaster. The study concludes that the role of social capital in risk sharing (or providing informal insurance) has decreased due to the increased level of marketisation (Lu, Sato & Zhang 2008). Likewise, a study on the role of the pre-flood neighbourhood structural conditions and social capital on the post-flood community resilience (perceived community problems) in Brisbane, Australia, shows that pre-flood/pre-disaster social capital has limited effects for reducing post-flood/post-disaster community problems (Wickes et al. 2015).

A review of studies shows that social capital is a Janus-faced resource (Aldrich 2011a; 2012a). That is, social capital not only benefits, but also costs. For example, Aldrich’s

44 (2012a) study in six coastal villages in Tamil Nadu, India, shows that an institutionalised body such as an uur panchayat that embodies strong bonding social capital and also linking social capital (had little linking social capital before disaster and performed as bridges or links to NGOs and government after disaster) provided benefits to its members that sped up their recovery but excluded outsiders and marginalised members of communities such as women, dalits (members of the lowest caste) and the elderly. The same study in the case of Hurricane Katrina also shows that communities with stronger social capital avoided unwanted temporary housing facilities (trailers and trailer parks) within their communities and pushed these unwanted facilities into the areas of communities with less social capital. Therefore, some communities improved quality of life at the expense of slowing down the overall provision of temporary housing (Aldrich 2012a). Other studies also show that people who had good relations with linking networks received more relief and recovery resources compared to people who had weak relations (Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017; Masud-All-Kamal & Hassan 2018).

Another important point is that effective utilisation of social capital particularly at the community level is dependent on the quality of leadership (Nakagawa & Shaw 2004). Nakagawa and Shaw (2004) argue that social capital alone is not sufficient for successful recovery; trusted leadership inside the community is also essential for facilitating collective actions and disaster recovery processes. Krishna’s (2001) research in villages of Rajasthan, India, also shows that a combination of high social capital and capable agency (capable agents or capacity of leaders) is necessary for high development performance, but alone is not sufficient. Other disaster scholars also suggest that leadership is a vital factor in facilitating the disaster recovery process at the community level (Paton, Jang & Liu 2016; James & Paton 2016; Thorburn 2010; Rubin, Saperstein & Barbee 1985; Rubin 1985). Thorburn (2010) suggests that good leadership is associated with better recovery outcomes, and community leaders who adopt consultative management styles are most trusted. Minamoto (2010), in the context of post-tsunami Sri Lanka, suggests that a decisive leader (instead of a leader who follows a bottom-up approach or works through consensus) can play a better role during the time of reconstruction. However, unlike Minamoto (2010), the majority of scholars suggest that a bottom-up participatory approach is more effective in facilitating effective recovery processes (James & Paton 2015; Paton, Jang & Liu 2016; Kenny 2010; Fanany 2010b; Thorburn 2010; Nadiruzzaman & Paul 2013; Lawther 2016; Shaw & Guda 2004; Shaw & Sinha 2003; Shaw, Pulhin & Pereira 2010). Although which form of community leadership is

45 better in the post-disaster recovery is a debateable issue, it is certain that the role of leadership in utilising social capital is important (Nakagawa & Shaw 2004). Another important factor in relation to leadership is that competing groups within the village leadership can hamper recovery outcomes (Thorburn 2010; Steinberg 2010).

Another important factor is that although bonding social capital plays an important role in post-disaster recovery, it may not be sufficient for effective recovery. James and Paton’s (2015) study in the context of Cyclone Nargis (2008) and the Chi-Chi (921) earthquake (1999) and Cyclone Morakot (2009) suggests that the presence of strong bonding social capital at the community level in the studied areas of Myanmar and Taiwan was not sufficient for effective recovery. Thus, an integration between bonding, bridging and linking social capital is required for effective long-term disaster recovery (James & Paton 2015; Islam & Walkerden 2014). For instance, Islam and Walkerden’s (2014) study on Cyclone Sidr– affected households in Bangladesh suggests that affected households require support from NGOs and government through linking networks for long-term recovery. Likewise, Marín et al.’s (2015) study in Chile also shows that linking social capital is a critical factor in determining post-disaster recovery trajectories (Marín et al. 2015).

However, sometimes linking social capital can also be inadequate. For example, local government and NGOs supported households during the early recovery phase and the long- term recovery phase and contributed to the reconstruction of community facilities/services following Cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh. However, livelihood and housing support during the long-term recovery phase provided by local government and NGOs was relatively less substantial compared to emergency relief support (Islam & Walkerden 2015; Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017).

Post-disaster social capital can vary between the emergency period and the reconstruction period. Minamoto’s (2010) study found that bonds with relatives and neighbours became strengthened for a period following the 2004 tsunami in Sri Lanka, while they became weaker or destroyed during reconstruction due to the unfair distribution of external resources (Minamoto 2010). Islam and Walkerden’s (2014) study in Bangladesh found that although neighbours and friends supported households during the early phase of recovery, households’ networks with neighbours and friends became less active as the time following Cyclone Sidr increased and sometimes broke down due to conflict over access to relief goods. However, networks with relatives did not break down (Islam & Walkerden 2014). Drabek and Key’s

46 (1976) study conducted three years after the 1966 Topeka tornado also shows that disaster impacts family (nuclear family) linkages with primary groups (immediate kin-parents, married children, and siblings; friends; neighbours; and voluntary associations). Compared to non-victim families, victim families’ linkages or bonds with immediate kin and friends strengthened slightly, while linkages with neighbours and voluntary associations, except for religious organisations, weakened. In addition, both high and low income victim families preferred relatives over friends, if they faced money or family problems in an emergency. Moreover, compared to non-victim families, victim families had less intense linkages with neighbours and less participation in activities that involved different types of assistance the victim families either received from or gave to neighbours, and fewer victim families indicated positive feelings towards neighbours (Drabek & Key 1976).

The difference in terms of the strength of ties of a family with kin and other families, particularly with neighbours and friends between the periods of immediate aftermath and reconstruction, can be due to the emergence of a ‘therapeutic community’ or an ‘altruistic community’ during the emergency phase (Fritz 1961; Barton 1969; Drabek & Key 1976, 1984; Ericson et al. 1976). However, as time increases, the altruistic attitudes disappear, and hostilities develop (Quarantelli 1999; Islam & Walkerden 2014; Minamoto 2010). Thus, although the recovery process is dependent on the existing social capital, the recovery process itself can also influence bonding social capital (Yila, Weber & Neef 2013). Like bonding social capital, the recovery process can also influence bridging and linking social capital. For instance, the relationships between the members of Ho-Ping village in Taiwan and local grassroots and government agencies became strong during the recovery phase following the 921 earthquake (Paton, Jang & Liu 2016; James & Paton 2015).

Although social capital plays an important role in post-disaster recovery outcomes, social capital alone does not determine post-disaster recovery outcomes. Other characteristics apart from social capital are also important in post-disaster recovery outcomes, both at the community and the household levels (Blaikie et al. 1994; Wisner et al. 2004; Tierney & Oliver-Smith 2012; Tierney 2006; Paton, Jang & Liu 2016; Frankenberg et al. 2013; Cutter et al. 2008; Finch, Emrich & Cutter 2010; Norris et al. 2008; Sherrieb, Norris & Galea 2010; Bolin 1976, 1982; IFRCRCS 2012). Scholars who have researched community resilience suggest that pre-disaster social and structural characteristics influence post-disaster recovery (Cutter 1996; Cutter et al. 2008; Cutter, Boruff & Shirley 2003; Cutter, Burton & Emrich

2010; Norris et al. 2008; Sherrieb, Norris & Galea 2010; Paton 2008). Cutter et al.’s (2008) disaster resilience of place (DROP) model at the community level shows how various factors can contribute to speed up or hinder recovery after a disaster. Likewise, Norris et al.’s (2008) community resilience model also shows that the ability of a community to recover from disasters is dependent not only on social capital, but also on other factors such as access to economic resources, and distribution and diversity of economic resources.

Some empirical research on social capital in post-disaster recovery also shows the importance of other factors. Aldrich’s (2012a) quantitative study at the village level in 62 villages in Tamil Nadu, India, shows that factors like caste, wealth and family structure may affect the period people stay in relief camps and aid access after a disaster. For example, in villages which had a higher percent of scheduled caste (official name given to the lowest caste in India) individuals, villagers stayed longer in relief camps.

Wickes et al.’s (2015) study in Brisbane, Australia, also shows that pre-flood social capital had a limited effect on reducing post-flood community problems, while pre-flood socio- structural or socio-demographic characteristics of a community had enduring and negative effects on post-flood community problems. Marín et al. (2015) also suggest that social capital, particularly linking social capital, cannot completely determine recovery outcomes as other factors such as level of damage and geographical isolation also play critical roles in determining post-disaster recovery outcomes (Marín et al. 2015). Various combinations among linking social capital (both pre-and post-disaster linking social capital) and other factors lead to various types of recovery outcomes (Marín et al. 2015).

Empirical research at the household level also reveals that other factors such as socio- economic and demographic and disaster impact characteristics are important in understanding recovery of households (Bolin 1976, 1982; Trainer, Bolin & Ramos 1977; Bolin & Bolton 1983, 1986; Drabek & Key 1984; Wang, Zou & Li 2015). Even Aldrich’s (2012a) study on social capital shows that socio-demographic factors affect recovery outcomes. Similarly, pioneering sociological disaster studies on household recovery show that household recovery outcomes are subject to many factors that fall under three categories: pre-disaster socio- economic and demographic characteristics, disaster impact, and response strategies or recovery pathways (Bolin 1976, 1982; Trainer, Bolin & Ramos 1977; Bolin & Bolton 1983, 1986; Drabek & Key 1984). A household with lower socio-economic status such as lower income and education is less likely to recover rapidly than a household with high socio-

48 economic status (Frankenberg et al. 2013; Wang, Chen & Li 2012; Elliott & Pais 2006; Paton, Jang & Liu 2016; Msilimba 2010; Stringfield 2010; Green, Bates & Smyth 2007; Tierney 2006; Finch, Emrich & Cutter 2010; Zhang & Peacock 2009; Fothergill & Peek 2004; Dash, Peacock & Morrow 1997; Bolin & Trainer 1978; Bolin & Stanford 1991; Bolin 1994). Likewise, an elderly household is less likely to recover rapidly than a younger household (Quarantelli 1999; Bolin 1976; Bolin & Klenow 1983) and a female-headed household is less likely to recover rapidly than a male-headed household (Enarson & Morrow 1997; Childers 1999; Tierney 2006; Fothergill & Peek 2004). Similarly, households that move more times into temporary shelters are expected to have delayed or prolonged recovery as they encounter more difficulties in the recovery period (Lindell 2013a, 2013b; Quarantelli 1999). In addition, socio-economic and demographic characteristics may be differentially linked to various dimensions of household recovery (Bolin 1976).

Studies also show that disaster impact influences the recovery process. Finch, Emrich and Cutter’s (2010) study at the community level shows that higher disaster impact causes slower recovery. Likewise, studies on post-disaster psychological impacts show that loss of family members, damage to assets such as house damage and water intrusion into the home, and loss of business or income influence mental health significantly (Frankenberg, Nobles & Sumantri 2012; Frankenberg et al. 2008; Lebowitz 2016; Isaranuwatchai et al. 2017). Additionally, traumatic experiences and community destruction also affect mental health significantly (Frankenberg, Nobles & Sumantri 2012; Frankenberg et al. 2008). Moreover, psychological problems also vary due to socio-economic and demographic factors. Lower-income households compared to higher income households may suffer more psychological impacts (Fothergill & Peek 2004; Lebowitz 2016). Likewise, women compared to men and older adults compared to younger adults are found to have higher post-traumatic stress reactivity (PTSR) following a disaster (Frankenberg, Nobles & Sumantri 2012; Frankenberg et al. 2008). Thus, female-headed households compared to male-headed households and elderly households compared to younger households may experience slower psychological recovery. An important finding in relation to psychological impact of disaster is that the impact of disaster on mental health declines over time (Frankenberg, Nobles & Sumantri 2012; Frankenberg et al. 2008; Frankenberg et al. 2013; Frankenberg, Laurito & Thomas 2014; Pietrzak et al. 2012; Isaranuwatchai et al. 2017).

Another important point is that although the concept of social capital has been used recently in studying disaster response (Dynes 2005), and thus has not been directly applied in earlier sociological disaster research studies, the application of the concept in the form of social networks as a source of formal and informal assistance is present in many previous sociological disaster research studies (Bolin 1976, 1982; Trainer, Bolin & Ramos 1977; Bolin & Bolton 1983, 1986; Drabek & Key 1984). All these earlier sociological studies on family recovery along with other variables included kinship embeddedness and institutional embeddedness that represent two dominant sources of aid – primary group aid and organisational aid – used by families to recover from disaster (Bolin 1976, 1982; Trainer, Bolin & Ramos 1977; Bolin & Bolton 1983, 1986; Drabek & Key 1984).13 A close review of the studies shows that the general idea behind the inclusion of primary group aid and organisational aid in understanding household recovery was based on the premise that some households receive more assistance from many sources than other households due to having more formal and informal networks (Quarantelli 1999).

Scholars have identified three recovery modes/pathways based on three corresponding sources of assistance that households use to recover from a disaster: kinship mode (relying primarily on resources from kin), institutional mode (relying primarily on resources from agencies) and the autonomous mode (relying primarily on own resource) (Hass et al. 1977; Bolin & Trainer 1978; Bolin 1982; Lindell 2013b). However, in reality a few households use only one pathway to recover from a disaster (Lindell 2013b). Assistance from primary groups (kin, friends and neighbours) plays an important role in household disaster recovery. Households receive three broad types of help from their primary groups: monetary aid, shelter, and labour power and other support services such as emotional support (Bolin 1982). However, the major helping source for the clear majority of victims in the recovery period is relatives and kin (Islam & Walkerden 2014; Quarantelli 1999). For example, Bolin’s (1982) study in the USA found that very few victims received monetary aid or shelter from neighbours. A study in Bangladesh found that relatives provide support longer than

13 For instance, Bolin’s (1982) model of household recovery includes primary group aid and organisational aid along with other variables such as variables related to demographic and socio-economic characteristics and disaster impacts. Drabek and Key’s (1984) conceptual model related to dimensions of disaster impact contains five conceptual categories of variables: demographic characteristics, household recovery capacity, disaster event qualities, recovery response and social impacts at four levels (individual, household, primary group, and community). This model included five categories of variable under the broad category of recovery process: 1. use of internal resources; 2. aid from kin; 3. aid from primary groups (neighbour and friends); 4. aid from government organisations; and 5. aid from voluntary associations or NGOs. While the first one is internal to the household, the latter four categories represent the role of bonding, bridging, and linking social networks in the post-disaster recovery process of the affected households.

50 neighbours and friends (Islam & Walkerden 2014). Nevertheless, support from kin may decline over time as they may not have enough resources to continue to support the affected households (Islam & Walkerden 2014; Mustafa 2003). Moreover, sometimes kin cannot provide support as they are also affected by the disaster (Mustafa 2003; Lindell & Prater 2003; Islam & Walkerden 2014; Morrow 1997). Although recovery based on kin is generally the most important recovery strategy, recovery of households may be also almost completely dependent on institutional assistance or completely autonomous in some cases (Quarantelli 1999). The kin support mode of recovery may be the dominant mode in poor or developing countries which lack adequate organisational capacity to support disaster affected households (Islam & Walkerden 2014; Hass et al. 1977). However, households, particularly poor households, which do not have kin or are isolated from kin, must use the autonomous mode in the absence of assistance from external agencies. In the case of the autonomous mode, generally poor households are in a more disadvantageous position compared to wealthier households in achieving desired recovery outcomes as poor households usually have fewer resources necessary for recovery (Hass et al. 1977; Lindell 2013a, 2013b).

Previous research shows that other factors such as socio-demographic and disaster impact characteristics also have impact on these three recovery modes which are also differentially related to various dimensions of household recovery. Assistance received by victims may vary due to socio-economic status such as income, age, race and caste (Aldrich 2012a; Finch, Emrich & Cutter 2010; Fothergill & Peek 2004; Tierney 2006; Bolin & Stanford 1998b; Bolin 1986; Erickson et al. 1976; Nadiruzzaman & Paul 2013). Generally, lower income families, elderly families and ethnic minority families receive less assistance from formal organisations (Drabek & Key 1984; Bolin & Stanford 1998b; Tierney 2006; Fothergill & Peek 2004; Bolin 1986; Oliver-Smith 1990) as well as from kin and primary groups such as friends (Drabek & Key 1984). Households with higher socio-economic status typically have higher affiliation with people and offices in power and thus may have more access to governmental and non- governmental disaster assistance programs than lower socio-economic status households (Nadiruzzaman & Paul 2013; Tierney 2006). In addition, higher socio-economic households typically have skills to navigate bureaucratic requirements such as procedures of application and filling out forms to access various recovery programs, while lower-socio-economic households may not (Fothergill & Peek 2004; Tierney 2006). Sometimes, eligibility requirements for receiving assistance from agencies such as legitimate ownership of land, or home ownership, or a minimum level of income as a requirement for receiving housing

51 support also disadvantage lower income households (Nadiruzzaman & Paul 2013; Fothergill & Peek 2004; Bolin & Stanford 1998b; Oliver-Smith 1990). A household is more likely to achieve housing recovery if a household utilises more institutional aid sources and is less likely to achieve housing recovery if a household is solely dependent on kin for aid (Bolin 1976; Trainer, Bolin & Ramos 1977). On the other hand, a household is more likely to recover in a perceptual and emotional sense if a household uses more aid from kin (Bolin & Bolton 1986; Bolin 1976, 1982). It suggests that, although kin may not be able to provide the needed aid for housing recovery as organisations do, they can provide useful support for psychological recovery (Islam & Walkerden 2014; Bolin & Bolton 1986; Bolin 1976, 1982; Trainer, Bolin & Ramos 1977).

A review of studies shows that religious and cultural beliefs play a key role in the post- disaster recovery outcomes (James & Paton 2015; Paton, Jang & Liu 2016; Jang & LaMendola 2006; Gillard & Paton 1999; Paton & Tang 2008; Samuels 2010; Schmuck 2000; Kenny & Clarke 2010; Fanany 2010a). Religious beliefs contribute to the acceptance of the circumstances and serve as mechanisms of coping with, adapting to, recovering and growing from the disaster. For instance, the Hakka spirit in Taiwan or the viewing of natural hazards as an act of Allah in Bangladesh and Indonesia helped affected people to recover from disaster (Schmuck 2000; Samuels 2010; James & Paton 2015; Paton, Jang & Liu 2016; Jang & LaMendola 2006; Paton & Tang 2008). Schmuck (2000) suggests that religious beliefs help people in Bangladesh to overcome post-disaster crisis as people believe that Allah not only sends the floods, but also gives the strength to survive the floods. Despite accepting fate passively, they actively employ all necessary means to overcome the crisis. The passive acceptance of fate is particularly effective for psychological recovery as it helps people not to feel lost and desperate (Schmuck 2000). However, religious beliefs sometimes can also have negative effects. For example, many people in Bangladesh do not take safe refuge after receiving cyclone warnings as they believe that the cyclone is ‘Allah’s will’ (Saha & James 2017; Paul et al. 2010; Paul & Routray 2013; Paul 2014; Haque & Blair 1992; Haque 1995; Ikeda 1995). It suggests that although the passive acceptance of fate plays a positive role in the post-disaster context, it plays negative roles during an emergency. Nevertheless, religious beliefs sometimes can also impede recovery, if the people affected by disaster consider it as a punishment as did many people in Aceh (Fanany 2010a; Samuels 2010) and other areas such as in the Philippines (Bankoff 2004). However, it is worth noting that different religious beliefs may affect psychological responses to disasters differently (Fanany 2010a; Gillard &

52 Paton 1999) and thus the influence of religion in a post-disaster context can vary among believers of different religions such as Muslims and Hindus in the context of Bangladesh.

A review of studies also shows that governmental response, capacity and policies, and governance practices, play a vital role in determining the quality of the recovery process (Paton, Jang & Liu 2016; James & Paton 2015; Tierney & Oliver-Smith 2012; Kenny 2010; Silva & Yamao 2007; Sundet & Mermelstein 1997; Dash, Peacock & Morrow 1997; Rubin, Saperstein & Barbee 1985; Rubin 1985). Lack of effective governmental response, particularly local governmental response, lack of relationships among governmental agencies at the same level and various other levels, and inappropriate government policies can slow the recovery process (Silva & Yamao 2007; Dash, Peacock & Morrow 1997; Rubin, Saperstein & Barbee 1985; Rubin 1985; Sundet & Mermelstein 1997). In addition, governance practices of the government and non-government agencies influence the quality of the recovery process. Widespread corruption in the recovery period in both developing and developed countries undermines the efficiency and equity of recovery operations (Nadiruzzaman & Paul 2013; Kenny 2010; Islam & Walkerden 2015; Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017; Quarantelli 1999; Mustafa 2003; Masud-All-Kamal & Hassan 2018). Likewise, political considerations may also seriously undermine the efficiency and equity of recovery operations as recovery assistance sometimes is only provided to the followers of the political party or political leaders in power (Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017; Mustafa 2003; Quarantelli 1999). The influence of political power in recovery activities can be more complicated in settings where the political party in power at the local level is different from the political party in power at the national level (Quarantelli 1999). Moreover, sometimes political pressure for a fast recovery can jeopardise the application of a participatory approach and the idea of ‘building back better’ in the post-disaster situation (Steinberg 2010). Studies in the context of Cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh show that corruption and favouring of political supporters by local government, and corruption and favouring of their own microcredit borrowers by NGOs among others during relief and recovery operations negatively affected the efficiency and equity of the post-disaster operations (Islam & Walkerden 2015; Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017).

2.5 Conclusion

Despite disagreement, most social capital scholars acknowledge that social capital is network- based, or networks are one of the sources from which social capital emerges. This provides a

53 foundation for defining social capital based on networks only. This definition does not include norms and trust. Defining the concept with reference to an empirical referent is also useful for the theoretical development of the concept. Thus, this study defines social capital in line with Nan Lin’s (2008) network-based theory of social capital, i.e. resources households received through networks.

Despite controversy, most scholars also agree that the concept can be applied at various levels. Moreover, although scholars categorise social capital in various ways, categorisation of social capital in bonding, bridging and linking types is a popular one. Addition of linking type to the bonding and bridging types provides a unique opportunity to understand the role of formal institutions beyond the community (i.e. the government and external aid agencies such as NGOs) in the post-disaster response and recovery process. Moreover, although linking networks from bonding and bridging networks can be easily differentiated with reference to formal authorities, it is very difficult to sustain the distinction between bonding networks and bridging networks in empirical research. Furthermore, the distinction is also crucially dependent on context.

Social capital can be measured at various levels. However, there is no consensus among scholars on how to measure social capital. Moreover, the measurement of the concept needs to be relevant to the cultural and historical context. Indicators suitable for measuring the concept for one culture may not be suitable for measuring the concept for another culture. The review also demonstrates that social capital not only benefits but also costs. The literature review shows that social capital significantly affects the post-disaster recovery process of affected households and communities. In addition to social capital, socio-economic, cultural and political contexts as well as disaster impact characteristics significantly impact on the post-disaster recovery process of affected households and communities.

54 Chapter 3: Methodology

3.1 Introduction

In this study, I have used a mixed methods approach to understand the role of social capital in the post-disaster response and recovery process of the Cyclone Aila–affected households in Bangladesh. I have carried out fieldwork in two Aila–affected villages in two upazilas (Dacope and Koyra) of Khulna District, Bangladesh. This chapter is further divided into five sections. Section 3.2 presents information related to the selection of the study areas, i.e. the two villages. Section 3.3 provides the rationale for the use of mixed methods approach and selection of the suitable mixed methods design. Section 3.4 discusses qualitative and quantitative data collection methods and the recruitment of participants and survey respondents for qualitative and quantitative data collection. Section 3.5 discusses the qualitative and quantitative data analysis process while section 3.6 offers conclusions.

3.2 Selection of Research Areas

The two research sites of the study are Channirchak Village of Kamarkhola Union of Dacope Upazila and Dakshin Bedkashi Village of Dakshin Bedkashi Union of Koyra Upazila, Khulna District, Bangladesh (See Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3).14 In Bangladesh, an upazila (sub-district) comprises several unions and a union comprises nine wards. A union has several villages and a village is the lowest rural geographic unit. A ward generally includes one village or more than one village. Channirchak village is a part of Ward 3 of Kamarkhola Union and Ward 3 consists of three villages (Channirchak, Jaliakhali, Choto Jaliakhali).15 Dakshin Bedkashi Village represents Ward 7 of Dakshin Bedkashi Union as Ward 7 includes only Dakshin Bedkashi Village. The selection of two unions from two upazilas and two villages from two unions is based on the severity of the impact of Aila. Kamarkhola Union was one of the worst affected unions of Dacope, and Dakshin Bedkashi Union was one of the worst affected unions of Koyra (see Table 3.1) (ECHO 2011; UN 2010). Channirchak was

14 The total area of Dacope is 991.56 square kilometres and Koyra is 1775.40 square kilometres. The total land area of Dacope is 286.01 square kilometres while Koyra is 260.56 square kilometres. The total population of Dacope Upazila is 152,000 and that of Koyra Upazila is 194,000. The average household size of Dacope is 4.13 and that of Koyra is 4.24. The density of population per square kilometre in Dacope is 154 and in Koyra it is 109 (BBS 2013). 15 Although local people always consider Jaliakhali and Choto Jaliakhali as two different villages, Choto (small) Jaliakhali is sometimes considered as a part of Jaliakhali instead of a separate village. Most of the area of Choto Jaliakhali (except a little cultivable land located outside the embankment now and suitable for shrimp farming only) was lost to the river both before and after Aila due to river erosion. The river devoured all houses of the village and all the households of this village are living in other places including embankments.

55 one of the worst affected villages within Kamarkhola Union and Dakshin Bedkashi was one of the worst affected villages within Dakshin Bedkashi Union (see Table 3.2).

Figure 3.1 Study areas: Channirchak, Dacope Upazila and Dakshin Bedkashi, Koyra Upazila, Khulna District

Source: Author (2017–2018)

Figure 3.2 Map of Channirchak Village

Source: Author (2017–2018)

Figure 3.3 Map of Dakshin Bedkashi Village

Source: Author (2017–2018)

58 Table 3.1 Damage and loss caused by Cyclone Aila to Kamarkhola Union and Dakshin Bedkashi Uniona Items Kamarkhola Union, Dakshin Bedkashi Dacope Union, Koyra Affected population (nos) 16,000 23,000 Affected households (nos) 3,200 5,800 Reported deaths (nos) 4 33 Houses fully damaged (nos) 4,600 3,520 Houses partially damaged (nos) 200 1,800 Crops fully damaged (acres) 280 29.68 Crops partially damaged (acres) 190 -- Loss of poultry (nos) 4,000 25,000 Loss of livestock (nos) 100 -- Shrimp ghers/ponds damaged (acres) -- 3,500 Damaged educational and religious 36 educational 4 educational institutions (nos) b and religious institutions institutions partially completely and 15 damaged educational institutions partially damaged; 40 mosques/temples damaged (not mentioned either fully or partially) Note: a -- in the table means not available. b Schools and mosques/temples that were partially damaged by Aila later were fully damaged due to flooding of the villages in both Kamarkhola Union and Dakshin Bedkashi Union over a long period.

Source: PIOD (2009); PIOK (2009)

Both unions were subject to continuous inundation for a long time following Aila as major breaches in embankments caused by Aila were not repaired or they were not possible to be repaired (UNDP 2012; UN 2010; ECHO 2011). Most of the areas of Kamarkhola Union were subject to continuous inundation for almost 21 months while most of the areas of Dakshin Bedkashi Union were subject to continuous inundation for almost 33 months. Aila also caused massive displacement in both unions. Channirchak Village was subject to regular inundation for almost 21 months following the event, as the flow of water to the village through the Jaliakhali broken section of the embankment stopped on 9 February 2011 (BWDB 2011). Dakshin Bedkashi Village was subject to regular inundation for almost 33 months following

59 the event, as the flow of water to the village through the Hareskhali broken section of the embankment stopped on 3 March 2012 (BWDB 2015).16

Table 3.2 Channirchak and Dakshin Bedkashi at a glance Items Channirchak Dakshin Bedkashi Polder number 32 14/1 Total 152 380 households (nos) Deaths due to 0 1 Aila (nos) Houses 100% (fully damaged: 78.6% 100% (fully damaged: 92.2% damaged due houses; partial but major houses; partial but major damage: to Aila (%) damage:15.7% houses; partial but 2.2% houses; partial but minor minor damage: 5.7% houses) damage: 5.6% houses)

Flooding Water flow though the broken Water flow though the broken period after section of the embankment section of the embankment stopped Aila stopped on 9 February 2011. on 3 March 2012. Major Agriculture in own land, day Day labourer, fishermen (shrimp fry occupational labourer, agriculture on rented collectors, crab catchers and groups land. fishermen and most of them are shrimp fry collectors), shrimp farming in own land, own business, shrimp farming on rented land. Use of Agriculture (mainly rice Mainly shrimp farming (year- cultivable land cultivation for one season of the round). year). Single room 80% households have single room 65.6% households have single room dwelling house house. house. Perceived Ultra-poor: 8.6%; poor: 18.6%; Ultra-poor: 2.2%; poor: 26.7%; socio- lower middle class: 68.6%; upper lower middle class: 61.1%; upper

16 Dakshin Bedkashi Union of Koyra is located within Polder No. 14/1. Many villages of Dakshin Bedkashi Union including Dakshin Bedkashi Village were subject to flooding by saltwater until the Hareskhali broken section of the embankment in Polder No. 14/1 was repaired. BWDB started to construct Hareskhali Closure (officially known as Patakhali Closure) through the contractor named Bangladesh Diesel Plant Limited on 29 January 2012 after previous failures, and finished the construction of the closure on 27 May 2012 (BWDB 2015; BDPL 2017). The flow of water into the inundated villages (including the studied village) under Dakshin Bedkashi Union through the broken section of Hareskhali stopped on 3 March 2012 (BWDB 2015). Kamarkhola Union and Sutarkhali Union of Dacope are located within Polder No. 32. BWDB started to construct both Jaliakhali Closure and Golbunia Closure through two contractors on 14 December 2010 and finished the construction of both the closures on 31 March 2011 after previous failures. The flow of water into the inundated villages through the broken section of Jaliakhali stopped on 9 February 2011 and through the broken section of Golbunia stopped on 13 February 2011 (BWDB 2011). The flow of water into Channirchak Village stopped on 9 February 2011 due to the success with the stopping of water flow through the broken section of Jaliakhali. Flow of water into the whole polder stopped on 13 February 2011 with the stopping of the flow of water through the broken section of Golbunia (key informant interview with the BWDB officer on 22 October 2017 and key informants from the village).

60 Items Channirchak Dakshin Bedkashi economic middle class: 4.3% middle class: 10% condition of the household Electricity No electricity. There was electricity before Aila. However, there was no electricity for many years after Aila. Electricity connection resumed during the second half of 2017. Roads One major road within the village One major road within the village is is still broken. Villagers used to still broken. The area of the roads use this road as the main road to under brick pavement is now less go to the Union Parishad within the village compared to pre- Headquarters and local bazaar Aila period. Road network before Aila. The area of the roads connecting the village to the upazila having brick pavement is less headquarters is still poor compared within the village compared to to pre-Aila period. pre-Aila period. Major One government primary school- Two government primary schools, infrastructures cum-cyclone-shelter and one one high school, one cyclone shelter community health clinic. (located within the high school boundary), one madrasa, Union Parishad building and Union Parishad health complex. Major natural Riverbank erosion, salinity, Riverbank erosion, salinity, cyclones hazards cyclones and storm surges and and storm surges and associated associated flooding due to breach flooding due to breach in the in the embankment. embankment.

Source: Author’s fieldwork (interviews, key informant interviews, observation, survey, BWDB 2011, 2015)

The selection of the two worst Aila affected villages of the two worst Aila affected unions as study areas provides a unique opportunity for understanding how three forms of social capital contribute to the response and recovery process of the affected households when households are under very high level of stress. Moreover, the two objectives of the study are related to the role that linking networks (i.e. the government and NGOs) play in the response and recovery processes of the affected households. As the government and NGOs usually provided more and longer–term interventions to the worst affected villages compared to the other less affected villages, the two worst affected study villages provided suitable real settings for examining the role linking social networks play in the response and recovery process of the affected households. However, Aila did not affect many areas severely. For instance, although Aila severely impacted Dacope Upazila of Khulna, Kamarkhola and Sutarkhali unions of

Dacope Upazila were severely impacted while other affected areas in Dacope Upazila were substantially less impacted. Even within the worst affected unions, for instance, within both the studied Kamarkhola and Dakshin Bedkashi unions, a small part of each union became dewatered much earlier than most of the part of the union including the two study villages. Thus, the role social capital plays in the response and recovery process in the extremely impacted villages might differ from the role played by social capital in the less impacted villages. For instance, bonding and bridging networks might play a more important role in the response and recovery process of the affected households in the less impacted villages such as the affected unflooded villages or the flooded villages that became dewatered within a very short period after Aila compared to the study villages that were subject to long–term flooding after Aila. Households’ bonding and bridging networks in the less affected villages might be able to play a relatively better role in the response and recovery process as the affected relatives, neighbours and friends and acquaintances with whom households had bonding and bridging relations are expected to be less severely affected and encounter less severe challenges for their own survival and recovery compared to the bonding and bridging networks of the households in the extremely affected villages. Likewise, households’ dependency on linking networks for survival and recovery might not be so high in the less impacted villages as the households in those villages might restore their livelihoods and start the recovery process on their own much earlier. Thus, when the findings from these severely impacted case study areas are generalised, it is important to keep in mind that the role social capital plays in disaster response and recovery might vary depending on the severity of the impacts in the affected areas.

3.3 Research Approach

3.3.1 Mixed Methods Research Approach

To achieve the objective, the study has adopted a mixed methods research approach. Mixed methods research approach is ‘an approach to inquiry involving collecting both quantitative and qualitative data, integrating the two forms of data and using distinct designs that may involve philosophical assumptions and theoretical frameworks’ (Creswell 2014, p. 4). A mixed methods research approach provides an opportunity to combine both quantitative and qualitative methods that have both strengths and limitations (Creswell 2014; Creswell & Clark 2007). This approach affords an opportunity to gain a thorough and insightful understanding of the research problems or questions (Creswell & Clark 2007, 2011; Creswell

62 2014) and research context or setting in which the participants talk (Creswell & Clark 2007, 2011). Scholars present various reasons to use the mixed methods approach to conduct a research (see Table 3.3).

The study uses the mixed methods approach as it provides a more in-depth understanding of the research questions than either the quantitative or qualitative approach alone (Creswell & Clark 2007, 2011; Creswell 2014) and research context (Creswell & Clark 2007, 2011) and provides an opportunity to answer exploratory and confirmatory research questions in the same study (Teddlie & Tashakkori 2003). The use of the mixed methods approach also provides an opportunity to check the validity of the findings as the findings of one database help to check the findings of another (Creswell 2014). The use of the mixed methods approach helps to unpack the two main concepts of this thesis, social capital and post-disaster recovery, and their relationship. Application of the mixed methods approach produces a more robust understanding of the operations of these concepts than using either the qualitative or quantitative approach alone (Creswell 2014; Creswell & Clark 2007, 2011).

Table 3.3 Strategic reasons for using the mixed methods approach Aspects Description Sources Triangulation Provides opportunity to triangulate Creswell 2014; Creswell quantitative and qualitative methods as well & Clark 2011 as findings from both methods, and thus one database helps to check the validity of the findings of the other database Offset Offsets weakness of both quantitative and Creswell 2014; Creswell qualitative approaches & Clark 2007, 2011 Completeness Provides a better understanding of research Creswell 2014; Creswell problems than either approach alone & Clark 2007, 2011 Explanation One database can be used to explain the Creswell 2014; Creswell findings of the other database & Clark 2011 Research Answers questions that cannot be answered Creswell & Clark 2007; questions by either quantitative or qualitative approach Teddlie & Tashakkori alone 2003; Leech & Onwuegbuzie 2009 Different One database can be used for different Creswell 2014; Creswell research questions than the other database & Clark 2011 questions Data collection Researchers can use all the available tools of Creswell & Clark 2007 tools data collection Process Qualitative research captures the sense of Creswell & Clark 2011 process in social life and quantitative research captures the structures in social life Comparison Provides an opportunity to compare different Creswell 2014

Aspects Description Sources perspectives drawn from different databases Theory Can generate and verify theory in the same Teddlie & Tashakkori generation and study 2003 verification Better inferences Provides better inferences Teddlie & Tashakkori 2003 Context Provides better understanding of the research Creswell & Clark 2011 context Credibility Enriches the integrity of findings Creswell & Clark 2011 Diversity of Provides the opportunity to present a greater Teddlie & Tashakkori views diversity of divergent views 2003

3.3.2 Selection of the Suitable Mixed Methods Design

Selection of an appropriate mixed methods design requires four key issues to be addressed: priority of the qualitative and quantitative strands (qualitative dominant, quantitative dominant, or equal), the timing of the strands (concurrent, sequential, and multiphase), interaction or integration between the strands (independent or interactive), and the ways of mixing the two strands (Creswell & Clark 2011).

This study uses the exploratory sequential mixed methods design. An exploratory sequential design is a two-phase sequential mixed methods design in which the researcher collects and analyses qualitative data in the first phase and then uses the qualitative exploratory findings in the second quantitative phase to test or generalise the initial qualitative exploratory findings (Creswell 2014; Creswell & Clark 2011). It is a design that provides greater emphasis on the qualitative strand of the study (Creswell et al. 2003; Creswell & Clark 2007, 2011). The primary purpose of this design is to explore a phenomenon and generalise the initial qualitative findings from a few individuals to a larger sample of population in the quantitative phase (Creswell 2014; Creswell & Clark 2007, 2011). This design is suitable when the researcher wants to explore a phenomenon in depth, to identify unknown variables, to develop an instrument that is not available, to test aspects of an emergent theory and to generalise qualitative findings to different groups (Creswell & Clark 2007, 2011).

This study uses the exploratory sequential design as it is a qualitative dominant study with an inductive theoretical lens (Creswell 2014; Morse 2003). The timing of the strands is sequential as the study collects qualitative data in the first phase and quantitative data in the second phase. Although the study employs quantitative analysis (a deductive phase) in the second phase, the overall theoretical drive of the research is inductive as the qualitative

64 method conducted first has guided the study theoretically (Morse 1991, 2003). The quantitative component in the second phase plays a secondary role (Creswell & Clark 2011), assists in the interpretation of qualitative findings (Creswell et al. 2003) and provides an opportunity for expanding and logical extension of the qualitative exploratory findings (Creswell & Clark 2011; Morse 2003).

In this study, quantitative and qualitative strands are interactive as the implementation of the quantitative strand is dependent on the findings of the qualitative strand (Creswell & Clark 2011). This study mixes qualitative and quantitative strands during data collection, data analysis and interpretation (Creswell & Clark 2011). The study mixes two strands during data collection as the qualitative findings in the first phase guides the quantitative component (Creswell & Clark 2011). The study analyses data from both strands separately at the initial level and mixes two datasets during data analysis and interpretation by relating results of one dataset to the other dataset in a way that compares and synthesises the findings of both (Creswell & Clark 2011) and shows how the qualitative findings can be generalised or not to the larger sample (Creswell 2014; Creswell & Clark 2011).

Creswell and Clark (2011, p. 87) argue that an exploratory design uses two paradigms: constructivism in the first qualitative phase and post-positivism in the second quantitative phase. Morse (2003) argues that although the quantitative component is used following the qualitative component as in the case of exploratory design, the theoretical drive remains inductive as the first qualitative phase is the core phase of the study. Likewise, Johnson, Onwuegbuzie and Turner (2007, p. 124) argue that ‘qualitative dominant mixed methods research is the type of mixed research in which one relies on a qualitative, constructivist- poststructuralist-critical view of the research process, while concurrently recognizing that the addition of quantitative data and approaches are likely to benefit most research projects’. In a similar manner, Guba and Lincoln (2005, p. 200) state that ‘within each paradigm, mixed methodologies (strategies) may make perfectly good sense’. This study investigates research problems principally from a pragmatist worldview or paradigm that considers the nature of reality as both multiple realities (as in the case of constructivist paradigm) and singular reality (as in the case of post-positivist paradigm) and allows collection, mixing and analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data (Creswell 2014; Creswell & Clark 2011). Thus, the study includes both the biased perspectives (as in the case of constructivist paradigm) and unbiased perspectives (as in the case of post-positivist paradigm) (Creswell & Clark 2011, p. 42). The

65 study uses the theory-development variant (places the emphasis on the qualitative phase) instead of the instrument development variant (places the emphasis on the quantitative phase) of the exploratory sequential design (Creswell & Clark 2011, p. 90). As the study has conducted the qualitative strand first, I have used the constructivist paradigm in the first phase (Creswell & Clark 2011, p. 87) and this has allowed me to understand the historical and cultural settings of the participants and varied and multiple meanings of the experiences of the participants constructed through their subjective views (Creswell 2013, 2014; Creswell & Clark 2011). Thus, the use of the constructivist paradigm in the first phase has provided the opportunity to understand the complexity of views among the participants and interpret the meanings the participants have about the situation and develop a pattern of meaning inductively (Creswell 2013, 2014).

3.4 Data Collection and Recruitment of Participants and Respondents

This research is based on nine months fieldwork conducted in two periods in the two Aila- affected villages: 8 months from 20 May 2017 to 19 January 2018 and one month (29 days) from 25 March 2019 to 22 April 2019. The fieldwork during the first eight months was divided into two phases. I collected qualitative data in the first phase which took almost six months. I also developed a household survey questionnaire based on the primary understanding of the qualitative data and collected quantitative data through household surveys in the second phase which took almost two months. In addition to primary data, I collected various documents and maps such as damage and loss reports, reports related to various recovery interventions, community disaster risk reports, reports related to UP budgets, maps of the two polders from local government authorities, various government agencies and an autonomous agency (BWDB), and national and international NGOs during the first fieldwork period (May 2017 to January 2018). During the second fieldwork period (March– April 2019), I collected some additional documents and interviewed some of the previous interviewees for clarification of some of the issues they shared during the interviews in the first fieldwork period (May 2017 to January 2018). In addition, I conducted two key informant interviews over the phone from Australia during October 2019. The documents I collected allowed me to understand the interventions that government and NGOs implemented in the studied villages after Aila. These documents also greatly helped me to verify the findings of the study from primary data. Documents and maps of two polders from BWDB officials enabled me to know the dates related to the repair of the embankment and to

66 understand the location of two polders such as areas located within the polder, the places of breaches in the polder and areas and rivers outside the polder.

3.4.1 Qualitative Data Collection

3.4.1.1 Qualitative Procedure of Inquiry

Given the nature of the research and the research questions, the study has employed the case study procedure of inquiry within the qualitative approach. The case study is one of the five major qualitative research designs or procedures of inquiry (narrative research, phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography, and case study) to conduct a qualitative inquiry (Creswell 2013, 2014). A case study research is a qualitative procedure of inquiry in which the researcher studies ‘a case within a real-life, contemporary context or setting’ (Creswell 2013, p. 97). This is suitable for all three types of investigation: exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory (Yin 2003, 2009). It provides an in-depth understanding of a case or cases (Creswell 2013; Flyvbjerg 2011) and a case can be an event, an activity, a process, a program, an individual, a small group, a community, a relationship, or an organisation (Creswell 2013, 2014).

Case study is suitable when the researcher asks a how or why question (Yin 2003, 2009). Moreover, this is also suitable, as Flyvbjerg (2011) suggests, when the purpose of the study is to understand what causes a phenomenon, and thus a case study approach has strength in linking causes and outcomes. It is also suitable when the study deals with both a phenomenon and its context and when the goal of the study is analytical generalisation (expanding and generalising theories) instead of statistical generalisation (enumerating frequencies) (Yin 2003, 2009). An important advantage of this procedure of inquiry is that it allows the use of both quantitative and qualitative data collection methods (Yin 2003, 2009; Punch 2005). This procedure of inquiry allows in-depth data collection from multiple sources such as observations, interviews including open-ended qualitative interviews and surveys, documents and archival records (Yin 2003, 2009; Creswell 2013).

This study focuses on the post-disaster response and recovery process of households following Aila (2009) in two affected villages. The study has employed a case study procedure of inquiry as this is suitable to cover contextual factors that are highly relevant to the post-disaster recovery process of the affected households and communities. Although the study has focused on household level, the study has also gathered data to understand

67 community-level issues. The same case study can have several units of analysis and a researcher can use different data collection techniques for each level of analysis (Yin 2003, 2009). By using the case study design, the study has been able to explore differences and similarities between two villages in terms of the issues or themes identified (Creswell 2013, p. 99).

3.4.1.2 Qualitative Data Collection Methods

In this study, I have collected qualitative data using three data collection methods: in-depth interview, focus group discussion (FGD) and observation. The following sections elaborate on these three data collection methods.

3.4.1.2.1 In-depth Interview

The interview is an important data collection tool in qualitative research (Punch 2005). A qualitative interview is a form of conversation in which the interviewer discusses a set of topics, instead of standardised questions, with the interviewee to obtain in-depth understanding of the topics being discussed (Babbie 2013). An in-depth interview is an efficient way to learn about the perspectives of the participants regarding the research topic (Mack et al. 2005). In an in-depth interview, the interviewer can understand the meaning of the participant fully by using follow-up questions and probes (Legard, Keegan & Ward 2003). An in-depth interview allows the researcher to ‘explore fully all the factors that underpin participants’ answers: reasons, feelings, opinions and beliefs’ (Legard, Keegan & Ward 2003, p. 141). During in-depth interview, the interviewer considers the participant as an expert and conducts the interview with a desire to learn about the research questions from the participant (Mack et al. 2005).

An interview can be classified as a structured, semi-structured/half-structured or unstructured interview (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree 2006; Punch 2005; Boeije 2010). Structured interviews are conducted based on questions that are planned and standardised; unstructured interviews are conducted based on questions that are not pre-planned and standardised and semi-structured interviews lie in between the standardised structured interviews and non- standardised unstructured interviews (Punch 2005). Both unstructured interviews and semi- structured interviews are qualitative interviews (Boeije 2010). In this study, I have used semi- structured in-depth interviews. These are conducted around ‘a set of predetermined open-

68 ended questions, with other questions emerging from the dialogue’ between the participant and me as an interviewer (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree 2006, p. 315).

3.4.1.2.2 Focus Group Discussion (FGD)

The focus group discussion (FGD) is an important qualitative data collection tool in which a small number of people are interviewed in an informal group discussion setting around a topic or a set of issues (Wilkinson 2004). However, FGD can also take place in a formal setting (Fontana & Frey 2003, 2005). In an FGD, the interviewer acts as a moderator for the group and facilitates group discussion based on the FGD schedule. The moderator poses the questions, keeps the discussion flowing, and enables full participation of the group members by encouraging interaction among group members (Wilkinson 2004).

A focus group usually includes 6 to 12 members (Baker 1994; Neuman 2006). However, it can also include 6 to 8 members (Finch & Lewis 2003) or 5 to 15 members (Babbie 2013). FGD as a data-gathering tool can be used alone or in conjunction with other qualitative or quantitative tools (Punch 2005). FGDs are inexpensive, flexible in format, data rich, stimulating for participants and recall aiding (Fontana & Frey 2003, 2005). A researcher generally records the FGD, transcribes the data, and then analyses data using thematic or content analysis (Wilkinson 2004).

3.4.1.2.3 Observation

Observation is one of the important tools for collecting data in qualitative research. Observation is ‘the act of noting a phenomenon in the field setting through the five senses of the observer’ (Creswell 2013, p. 166). Observation can be four types: complete participant, participant as observer, observer as participant (nonparticipant) and complete observer (Creswell 2013, 2014; Kawulich 2005; Punch 2005). The group being studied knows about the research activity in the case of both participant as observer and observer as participant (Kawulich 2005). In this study, I assumed the role of a participant as observer in observing behaviour and activities of the villagers in their daily lives and leadership and politics in the village that have implications for the post-disaster recovery process of the affected households and communities (Kawulich 2005). I assumed the role of an observer as participant at the initial period as the villagers were fully aware of my research activity and I was an outsider to them (Creswell 2013, 2014). However, I assumed the role of a participant as observer over time (Creswell 2013, p. 167). As I conducted an extended period of fieldwork in two villages,

I established rapport with local people over time and became an insider over time, engaging in interaction with the participants fully (Kawulich 2005). Thus, I have gained ‘insider views and subjective data’ that have given me better insight into how households in two villages have experienced the impact of, and recovery from, Aila (Creswell 2013, p. 167).

3.4.1.3 Recruitment of Participants for Collecting Qualitative Data

The study recruited participants for in-depth interviews, key informant interviews and FGDs based on purposeful sampling strategy during the qualitative phase as the intent of the study is to select participants who are suitable for exploring research questions (Creswell & Clark 2007). The study used maximum variation sampling for the selection of participants as this purposeful sampling procedure is suitable for choosing participants with diverse viewpoints or experiences in relation to the research problems being explored (Creswell 2013). For instance, in selecting the participants for in-depth interviews with the household-level interviewees, the study used occupation of the household head, socio-economic status, degree of the disaster impact, level of education, aged households, and female-headed households as some criteria to differentiate among households (Creswell 2013).

The study recruited household heads (including female-headed households) or the wives of household heads as the participants for in-depth interviews at the household level and for FGDs. In addition to the participants for the household-level interviews, the study also conducted in-depth interviews with the key informants. I conducted 83 in-depth semi- structured interviews with household heads (including female-headed households) and wives of the male household heads in the absence of household heads in two villages. I conducted 51 in-depth semi-structured interviews in Dakshin Bedkashi Village and 32 in-depth semi- structured interviews in Channirchak Village. I continued to conduct in-depth interviews with the household-level participants until data saturation was reached (Creswell 2014; Mason 2010; Fusch & Ness 2015; Morse 1991). Although I conducted the main interview in the first setting, I often interviewed the interviewees later if I needed to know anything from them. As I lived in the villages, I had the opportunity to meet them and listen to them if I required any additional information or further clarification. I have given only the date of my first interview throughout the thesis when I mention interview dates.

In addition, I conducted total eight FGDs in two villages and four FGDs in each village. I conducted two FGDs with male household heads or any adult male members of the

70 households in the absence of the male household heads and two FGDs with wives of male- headed households and heads of female-headed households in each village. The number of participants across eight FGDs varied from six participants to 12 participants (Baker 1994). One male FGD in Channirchak has six participants and the other male FGD in Channirchak has seven participants. One male FGD in Dakshin Bedkashi has six participants and the other male FGD in Dakshin Bedkashi has seven participants. One female FGD in Channirchak has six participants and the other female FGD in Channirchak has 11 participants. One female FGD in Dakshin Bedkashi has nine participants and the other female FGD in Dakshin Bedkashi has 12 participants. FGDs have not included participants from households whose heads or wives of the heads were the participants for in-depth interviews.

I also conducted 49 in-depth interviews with elected representatives and secretary of the local government (UP), government officials of the concerned departments at various levels including BWDB officials, national and international NGO personnel and key informants from two villages and surrounding areas including political leaders, community leaders and others such as local school teachers. To gather necessary in-depth data and divergent views to explore the research problems, I selected key informants purposively so that they hold different positions and different perspectives. I conducted 23 key informant interviews for Channirchak and 26 key informant interviews for Dakshin Bedkashi. I conducted some of the key informant interviews in Dacope Upazila Parishad Headquarters, Koyra Upazila Parishad Headquarters, Khulna City and other districts such as Gopalgonj District and Gazipur District as the BWDB and NGO staff who participated in Aila response and recovery were not employed in the study location due to transfer within the organisation or moving to another organisation. I conducted all key informant interviews in person except two. I conducted two key informant interviews with two NGO officials over the phone from Australia in October 2019 and I recorded both the interviews with their permission.

I used three separate in-depth interview guides: one in-depth interview guide for conducting interviews with the participants of the households, the other one for conducting key informant interviews with elected representatives, government officials and NGO personnel, and the other one for conducting interviews with key informants from the two villages and surrounding areas (see Appendix 1, 2 and 3). In addition, I used an FGD guide to conduct FGDs (see Appendix 4).

FGDs and key informant interviews mainly focused on the issues at the village or community level. For instance, FGDs focused on issues such as factors (socio-economic, cultural and political) that affected the economic, housing and psychological recovery in the village; the contribution of relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances, the government and NGOs in survival and recovery of the villagers, evaluation of the emergency and long-term support provided by the government and NGOs. Key informant interviews focused on issues like the contribution of the government and NGOs to the survival and recovery of the households in the village and the strengths and weaknesses of their operations, coordination between government agencies and NGOs as well as among government agencies or among NGOs; significant changes in the village compared to the pre-Aila situation, and contribution of the post-Aila measures undertaken by government and NGOs to the reduction of disaster risks. However, the study also inquired into personal household-level issues in addition to the queries for key informants in the case of key informants who were the residents of the studied villages.

I recorded all the in-depth interviews with household heads or wives of the household heads, key informant interviews and FGDs. I also took necessary notes. It is worth noting that as I lived in the villages for a long period, I met in-depth household-level interviewees and key informants from the local area (village and surrounding areas) many times in many places including bazaars, mosques, temples, and various common places within and outside the village. Thus, I often discussed with them various issues related to my research outside the interview arrangement. I took various notes based on the discussion although I did not usually record these discussions. However, I use no qualitative data in the study that was not recorded (unless stated otherwise).

3.4.2 Quantitative Data Collection

3.4.2.1 Household Survey

I conducted a household survey to collect quantitative data. The survey was conducted in the second phase and the survey questionnaire was developed based on the qualitative findings. The survey was quite comprehensive. The questionnaire used was in Bangla language and included ten sections (nine sections excluding the first section related to survey information). The survey gathered information on all household members (gender, age, relation with household head, marital status, education, religion, working status and primary and secondary occupation); various household-level information; impacts and coping strategies; contribution

72 of relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances, the government and NGOs and their role in survival and recovery; self-perceived recovery (economic, housing and psychological) status; evaluation of houses received from the government and NGOs; disaster resilience; warnings and taking refuge; and village-level information (see Appendix 5).

The questionnaire included mainly closed-ended questions, although it also included some open-ended questions. After the development of the questionnaire, the questionnaire was pilot tested to improve it further before the final administration (De Vaus 2014). Pilot testing helped to evaluate the validity (indicators measuring the concept they need to measure) and reliability (obtaining a similar result on repeated occasions) of the indicators developed for measuring the concepts (De Vaus 2002, 2014).

The unit of analysis for the survey is the household. Respondents of the survey are household heads (either male or female headed households). In the absence of household heads during the survey, wives of the household heads were interviewed. As all households of the two villages under investigation were affected by Aila, the population for the survey is the total number of households of the two villages. The total number of households in Channirchak is 152 while the total number of households in Dakshin Bedkashi is 380. Thus, the total number of households in both villages is 532. The sample size was determined using the following population proportion sample size (n) formula (Cochran 1963): n = N*X / (X + N – 1), where,

2 2 X = Zα/2 *p*(1-p) / MOE , and Zα/2 denotes the critical value of the Normal distribution at α/2 (e.g. for a confidence level of 95%, α is 0.05 and the critical value is 1.96), MOE denotes the margin of error, p denotes the sample proportion, and N denotes the population size. A Finite Population Correction has been applied to the sample size formula.

The recommended survey sample size for the population size of 532 households is 224 households with 5% margin of error, 95% confidence level, and sample proportion 50%. The recommended sample size 224 has been proportionally divided for two villages based on the number of households. The required sample size for Channirchak is 64 households

73 and for Dakshin Bedkashi it is 160 households. However, the study collected data from 250 households instead of 224 households and collected data from 70 households in Channirchak and 180 households in Dakshin Bedkashi.

3.4.2.2 Recruitment of Survey Respondents and Administration of Survey

I prepared a list of all households of the two villages. As I had the sampling frame (a list of all households of the two villages) for the population, I selected sample households using simple random sampling procedure (De Vaus 2014). I selected sample households within each village using simple random sampling technique without replacement (each household has only one chance to be selected). The households that were interviewed for in-depth interviews and households of the key informants who are residents in the studied village were excluded from the sample for the survey to avoid confounding factors (Creswell 2014). Key informants living in the village were excluded from the survey as I usually knew their own story in addition to their views on the questions asked for the key informant interviews. The study used simple random sampling procedure to select a representative sample of the population so that the findings could be generalised to a population (Creswell & Clark 2007).

Participation in the survey was voluntary and based on the informed consent of the participants. The informed consent was obtained orally because participants could refuse to participate in the survey if they were asked to sign a written form (De Vaus 2014). Moreover, many of the participants were not able to read and sign the informed consent form as they did not know how to read or write. Participants were assured that the confidentiality of their responses would be honoured (De Vaus 2014).

I recruited six research assistants from a university to assist me during survey data collection. One research assistant helped me in administering the pilot survey and finalising the survey questionnaire while five research assistants collected survey data. In addition, I employed four field assistants from the local area who helped the research assistants to reach the households and introduced them to the households and provided other logistical support. All the research assistants stayed in the villages during the survey period. I also stayed in the two villages during the survey and supervised the data collection process. I gave feedback to the data collectors each day at the beginning of the survey and at night after checking all the surveyed questionnaires. Prior to administering the survey, the research assistants were provided

74 appropriate training to familiarise them with the research objectives, the questionnaire, and the ethics protocol they needed to follow. The questionnaire was administered using face-to- face paper and pencil interview technique. The interviewer recorded answers on a paper questionnaire and answered respondent’s questions and clarified questions if the respondent asked (De Vaus 2002) (see Appendix 6 for the socio-demographic characteristics of the survey respondents).

3.5 Qualitative and Quantitative Data Analysis

Qualitative data analysis consists of three broad steps: preparation and organisation of the data, reduction of the data into themes through coding, and condensing the codes and presentation of the data (Creswell 2013). Thus, generating themes for the study through the process of coding is one of the core elements of the qualitative data analysis process. Themes in qualitative research are defined as ‘broad units of information that consist of several codes aggregated to form a common idea’ (Creswell 2013, p. 186). Thematic analysis is a foundational method for qualitative data analysis (Braun & Clarke 2006; Grbich 2007) and can be defined as ‘a method for identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) within data’ (Braun & Clarke 2006, p. 79).

Qualitative data analysis involves six interconnected steps: organising and preparing the data, reading through all data, coding the data, generating themes and a detailed description of the setting or participants for analysis, interrelating themes/descriptions and interpreting the meaning of themes/descriptions (making an interpretation of the findings) (Creswell 2014, p. 197). In line with these steps, I have transcribed interviews and sorted and arranged data based on sources. Then I have identified themes or patterns for the study. Although I have had theoretical interests and research questions in my mind when I have been reading and re- reading data, I have identified themes through a ‘bottom up’ or inductive way, i.e. through a data-driven approach (Braun & Clarke 2006). To develop themes for the study, I have first developed many categories and then I have collapsed these categories into fewer themes (Creswell 2013). Then I have looked for each theme including similarities and differences between participants in terms of a theme and interconnectedness among themes. Finally, I have compared the study findings based on the themes with the findings of the relevant existing studies or theories (Creswell 2013, 2014).

The study has used univariate analysis and suitable graphs to present data. The study presents some of the survey findings with a 5-point Likert Scale. The study has not carried out higher- level statistical analyses and has focused on qualitative understanding instead, although the initial plan was to carry out some higher-level statistical analyses to examine the relation between social capital and post-disaster recovery. The study has used Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) to analyse the survey data and prepare the necessary graphs.

3.6 Conclusion

The study has employed an exploratory sequential design that included both qualitative and quantitative approaches during data collection and data analysis and interpretation. The study has gathered qualitative data in the first phase and quantitative data in the second phase. It has gathered qualitative data through in-depth interviews (household-level participants and key informant interviews), FGDs and observation and quantitative data through household surveys. The study has selected sample households through simple random sampling procedure. The collection and analysis of the qualitative data has guided the design and conduct of the quantitative component. The quantitative component has played a secondary role and assisted in the interpretation of qualitative findings. Application of the mixed methods approach has provided a more in-depth understanding of the research questions than either the quantitative or qualitative approach alone. It has also ensured the validity of the findings as the findings of one database have provided an opportunity to check the validity of the findings of the other database. The next chapter examines the role of bonding social capital in post-Aila response and recovery processes of the Aila-affected households.

76 Chapter 4: Role of Bonding Social Capital in the Post-Disaster Response and Recovery

4.1 Introduction

This chapter investigates how bonding social capital contributes to the post-disaster response and recovery process of the Cyclone Aila–affected households in Channirchak Village of Kamarkhola Union of Dacope Upazila and Dakshin Bedkashi Village of Dakshin Bedkashi Union of Koyra Upazila, Khulna District, Bangladesh. This chapter conceptualises bonding social capital as the resources that affected households received through their bonding networks, which are the networks that extend between the affected households and their relatives. The chapter focuses on the role of the resources received as aid or support from relatives, where aid or support is defined as those resources received free of charge or without the requirement to return anything in exchange.17 Although the chapter focuses on the role of aid or support (hereafter aid) received from relatives, it also briefly discusses the role of non- aid items received from relatives where necessary.

This chapter contains six sections, including section 4.1. Section 4.2 briefly discusses the kinship system in Bangladesh. Section 4.3 presents the types of aid the affected households received through their bonding networks, i.e. from relatives. Section 4.4 examines the role of bonding social capital in the post-disaster response and recovery process of the affected households. Section 4.5 examines why bonding social capital plays a limited role in the survival and the economic and housing recovery process and section 4.6 concludes.

4.2 Kinship in Bangladesh

Kinship relations are at the centre of the rural social structure of Bangladesh (Aziz 1979; Mashreque & Amin 1993). A person’s behaviour with relatives is usually different from behaviour with non-relatives. A person gives priority to relatives first and then to fellow villagers in matters of consideration and fellowship. Relatives maintain economic connections with one another and provide economic assistance to one another. Providing economic assistance to relatives is sometimes viewed as a religious virtue. Relatives are generally preferred compared to non-related people for certain economic activities and transactions such

17 The survey questionnaire used ‘aid or support’, i.e. support as a synonym for aid items received from relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances. The term ‘support’ was used as a synonym for aid in denoting particular aid types such as psychological support and shelter support.

77 as providing the opportunity for work, gaining a job, personal loans, business partners or assistants, and sale of property. Relatives also provide free labour service to a relative in an hour of need. A wealthy relative may provide economic assistance to a needy relative, either to maintain his prestige or to gain respect from other members of society, or simply in consideration of the necessity of providing economic assistance to a needy relative as a religious virtue (Aziz 1979).

The patrilineal and patrilocal is the usual family structure in Bangladesh. Although patrilineal ties dominate, matrilineal ties are almost as important as patrilineal ties in practice (Aziz 1979). Genetic or consanguineal relatives and marriage or affinal relatives are the two most important forms of kin relationship in Bangladesh (Aziz 1979; Mashreque & Amin 1993). The marital relationships of sons and daughters are most frequently established outside the village and these marital relationships in other villages offer opportunities for economic cooperation (Aziz 1979). In addition, fictive relatives, unrelated through consanguineal or affinal relationships, are also an important form of kin relationship in Bangladesh (Aziz 1979; Mashreque & Amin 1993). The patrilineal and patrilocal family is the normal type of family within the two studied villages, although matrilineal ties are also important. The matrilocal family is rare in the two studied villages. Moreover, although marital relationships of son and daughter are most frequently established outside the village in both villages, a few marital relationships of son and daughter within the village are found in both villages.

Relatives can also be categorised as close relatives, distant relatives and most distant relatives based on the degree of closeness of the relationships (Aziz 1979). A close relationship or ghanistha samparka involves ‘a wide set of rights and obligations and endure[s] for life’ while the distant relationship or dur samparka and most distant relationship or anek dur smaparka do not have such ‘lifetime obligations’ (Aziz 1979, p. 108). The close or ghanistha relatives by blood or affinal connection play the most influential role in various matters.18 People usually turn to and rely on their close relatives at times of taking any important decisions on social and economic affairs. People normally give thoughtful consideration to something that is considered favourably by close relatives. More credibility is given to

18 Examples of closely related blood or affinal households from the standpoint of the male head of a household (ego) include the households of sons when sons live in a separate household, the households of daughters if daughters are married, household of the parents when parents live in a separate household, households of the siblings (brothers and sisters), households of the household head’s brother’s son and daughter and sister’s son and daughter, households of household head’s father’s brother and sister, households of household head’s mother’s brother and sister, household of wife’s parents, and households of wife’s siblings.

78 information on various social, economic and political matters when received from close relatives. If a person requires any loan or assistance, he/she usually asks close blood or affinal relatives within or outside the village first. If a person cannot obtain the necessary assistance from close relatives, then he/she may approach a distant relative (Aziz 1979).

To understand the contribution of relatives in the post-disaster response and recovery process of the Aila-affected households, it is necessary to separate relatives of the households into the following groups: close relatives, distant relatives, and most distant relatives. It is worth noting that the survey did not distinguish between close and distant or most distant relatives. However, it has been observed during the qualitative phase of the research that households that received material and monetary aid from relatives usually received from their close relatives.

A household is an eating unit (khana) or a hearth group (chula) and usually consists of consanguineal kin members and their married partners. According to the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (2013), related or unrelated individuals who live together and take food from the same kitchen form a household. It is the primary production and consumption unit. Each household has a functional head. Household members have very close ties among them. In addition, the head or any other member of a household is also related to the head or any member of other households either by blood or affinal connection. As household members have very close ties among them, a person’s responsibilities are first to the members of his own household or the immediate family and then to the blood or affinal relatives with the responsibilities first to the close blood or affinal relatives (Aziz 1979). In other words, as kinship is intrinsically ‘a set of mutual expectations and obligations’ (Aziz 1979, p. xiii), these expectations and obligations in Bangladeshi society in general and rural Bangladeshi villages in particular are first to the members of their own household and then to the other blood or affinal relatives with diminishing intensity based on the degree of closeness of the relationships.

This research considers patrilineally related and affinally related people as relatives and does not consider fictive relatives as relatives. This research examines the role of bonding networks, i.e. relatives at the household level, and conceptualises the household as the unit of analysis. Thus, the research defines relatives of a household as people who are connected by blood or marriage to the household head or any member of the studied household and who are not members of the studied household or the eating unit.

4.3 Aid Received Through Bonding Networks

Relatives are important sources of aid in a disaster. They play a distinct role in helping the disaster-affected people confront the post-disaster crisis by providing aid (Bolin 1982; Bolin & Bolton 1986; Bolin 1994). The affected people expect their relatives to provide them with what is needed in the aftermath of a disaster (Bolin & Bolton 1986).

The survey data presented in Table 4.1 show the 16 types of aid the surveyed households received from their relatives after Aila (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2 for aid by village). In the survey, respondents were asked to choose from the list of 16 types of aid which kinds of aid they received from relatives after Aila. These 16 types of aid were: food, water, clothes, utensils and other necessary household items, shelter support at the time of Aila, shelter support for at least a week or more, caring for livestock, informational support such as information about aid sources and work or employment opportunities, assistance to get work, monetary aid only for surviving after Aila, monetary aid for economic recovery such as for starting economic activities, monetary aid for repairing or constructing the house, housing materials for repairing or constructing the house, free labour for repairing or constructing the house, psychological support and other. The types of aid included in the quantitative survey were based on the findings of the qualitative phase. Moreover, households also received some other types of aid or support immediately before, during and immediately after the event from their relatives, although these types of aid or support were not directly included in the survey list. For instance, the qualitative findings show that, whenever required, they received assistance related to evacuation and search and rescue activities and assistance related to the relocation of the household to another place such as to the embankment. However, if any household specifically mentioned any type of aid or support, then the response was included in the category of other.

80 Table 4.1 Percentage of the households that received aid from relatives (n=250)19 Types of aid Percentage (%) Food 70.8 Water 32.4 Clothes 19.6 Utensils and other necessary household items 14.4 Shelter support at the time of Aila 10.0 Shelter support for at least a week or more 4.0 Provided caring for livestock in their house 5.2 Informational support such as information about aid sources and work or 64.4 employment opportunities Assistance to get work 33.2 Monetary aid only for surviving after Aila 31.6 Monetary aid for economic recovery such as for starting economic 5.2 activities Monetary aid for repairing or constructing house 3.2 Housing materials for repairing or constructing house 4.4 Free labour for repairing or constructing house 32.4 Psychological support 100.0 Other 6.8

Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)

An analysis of the survey data presented in Table 4.1 shows that 100 percent of the surveyed households (n=250) received at least one type of aid among the 16 types of aid from relatives. The reason for this is that all the surveyed households received psychological or emotional support from their relatives. However, there are households that did not receive anything except psychological support from their relatives. For instance, 6.4 percent of the surveyed households did not receive any aid among the 16 types except psychological support from relatives. Likewise, if only material aid and monetary aid are considered, then the percentage of households that received material and monetary aid becomes lower. Thus, aid which the

19 This was created by combining four variables: particular aid the affected households received from: a. relatives within the village, b. relatives outside the village but living within the union, c. relatives living outside the union but were affected by Aila, and d. relatives living outside the union but were not affected by Aila, i.e. from the unaffected relatives. It is worth noting that the two studied villages and the two unions within which the two studied villages are located were fully affected by Aila. A household that received a listed type of aid from relatives located in any place has been considered as a recipient of that type of aid. Thus, if a household received a listed type of aid from relatives of at least one place from amongst relatives in any of the four places, then the household was considered as a recipient of that aid. A household that did not receive a listed type of aid from relatives located in any place has been considered as a non-recipient of that aid. For instance, if a household received food from relatives of one place, or from relatives of two places, or from relatives of three places or from relatives of all the four places, then it was considered that the household received food from their relatives. If the household did not receive food from the relatives of any place, then it was considered that the household did not receive any food from relatives. Thus, it is possible that one household that received food from relatives may have received food from relatives located in more than one place and from more than one relative located in one place. In addition, a household may have received more than one type of aid. The data presented in Table 4.1 for the 15 types of aid other than food have also been presented based on the same logic.

81 affected households received from their relatives after Aila and the role the received aid played in the recovery process of the affected households can be better understood if all 16 types of aid received from relatives (presented in Table 4.1) are categorised under six categories: material aid, monetary aid, information and assistance to get work, labour, psychological support, and other (presented in Table 4.2).

Table 4.2 Six categories of aid from 16 types of aid Six categories 16 types of aid Material aid (includes seven types) Food Water Clothes Utensils and other necessary household items Shelter support for at least a week or more Provided caring for livestock in their house Housing materials for repairing or constructing house Monetary aid (includes three types) Monetary aid only for surviving after Aila Monetary aid for economic recovery such as for starting economic activities Monetary aid for repairing or constructing house Information and assistance to get Informational support such as information about aid work (includes two types) sources and work or employment opportunities Assistance to get work Labour Free labour for repairing or constructing house Psychological support Psychological support Other (includes two types) Shelter support at the time of Aila Other

The categorisation of the aid received by the survey respondents from relatives into six categories is important for analysing qualitative data properly. The analysis of the in-depth interviews conducted with the head of the household or wife of the household head reveals that the interviewees consider certain aid from relatives as a natural and part of their everyday life and expect it to be provided by their relatives. Thus, they usually do not consider the certain aid they received from relatives as aid, unless they are asked specifically. For instance, psychological support, free labour, shelter support at the time of Aila, receipt of information related to something and receipt of help to get work from relatives are some types of aid that the interviewees usually expect their relatives to provide and thus usually they do not consider these as part of the aid. They may consider these types of aid from relatives as usual and natural as they do not usually require any material and monetary resources. Thus, when they were asked to reflect on the aid they received from their relatives or other people, they usually reflected on material and monetary aid. However, they reflected on aid such as psychological

82 support, free labour, receipt of information and assistance to get work when they were asked specifically about these types of aid.

Figure 4.1 Aid received from relatives, Channirchak (n=70) (multiple response)

Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)

Figure 4.2 Aid received from relatives, Dakshin Bedkashi (n=180) (multiple response)

Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)

The analysis of the survey data shows that 76 percent of the surveyed households received material aid from their relatives.20 The survey data also show that 32.4 percent of the surveyed households received some sort of monetary aid from their relatives (see Table 4.1 and Table 4.3).21 In total, 78.4 percent of the surveyed households received material and monetary aid when both material aid and monetary aid are considered.22

20 A household received at least one type of seven types of material aid and may have received more than one type of material aid. 21 A household received at least one of three types of monetary aid and may have received more than one type of monetary aid. 22 A household received at least one of ten types of material and monetary aid and may have received more than one type of material and monetary aid.

84 Table 4.3 Total amount of money households received from their relatives (n=81) Amount Frequency Up to 500 23 501–1,000 10 1001–3,000 19 3001–5,000 8 5001–10,000 14 10001–20,000 4 More than 20,000 3 Total 81 Note: a household may have received money from more than one relative.

Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)

In addition to material and monetary aid, households received information about aid sources and work or employment opportunities and assistance to get work from relatives. The survey data show that 64.4 percent of the surveyed households received informational support such as information about aid sources and work or employment opportunities while 33.2 percent of the surveyed households received assistance from relatives to get work following Aila. The national government or local government and NGOs often distributed relief items in the places that were far away from the studied villages. They usually distributed relief items in the Union Parishad Headquarters or local bazaars or in other places such as river ghats (where people and goods are taken on and off the boat), embankments and a locally known place in the village or adjacent village or in the union.23 People came to know about the date and the place of distribution of the relief items from their relatives and often went together to that place to receive aid. Similarly, they received important information from their relatives related to work or employment opportunities within the affected areas such as cash for work and food for work programs operated by NGOs, the local government and contractors. They also received important information from their relatives related to work or employment opportunities in the unaffected areas or distant places so that they could undertake temporary migration to those places to overcome their livelihood crisis. Thus, relatives served as important sources of information after the disaster (Yila, Weber & Neef 2013; Islam & Walkerden 2014).

Assistance from relatives to get work played an important role in tackling the post-Aila crisis as the affected households in the two studied villages were not able to restore their normal

23 People of Channirchak collected relief items distributed by one NGO in the first phase from the Dacope Upazila Parishad Headquarters.

85 livelihood activities within the village for a long period following Aila due to the flooding. Channirchak was subject to continuous inundation for almost two years (around 21 months) and Dakshin Bedkashi was subject to continuous inundation for almost three years (around 33 months) following Aila (BWDB 2011, 2015). The qualitative data demonstrate that the affected households usually received two types of assistance from relatives, mainly from their relatives within the village, to get work both before and after the embankment was repaired: a) to get temporary wage labour opportunities in their villages and surrounds, and b) to undertake temporary migration to other places as many of the affected people were not able to secure their income in their villages and surrounds as before Aila. Affected households were not able to restore their normal livelihood activities even immediately after the embankment was repaired.

Relatives helped each other to find work in their villages and surrounds. Sometimes people formed groups to repair the embankment under private contractors for wages in the village or affected adjacent and distant villages. Relatives helped to include each other as members of a group. People also worked as a group in agriculture for wages or crops in the village and surrounding villages when agriculture started after the repair of the embankment. Relatives also helped each other by including them as members of a group. Moreover, some households that had a considerable amount of agricultural land permitted relatives or others to cultivate their unsuitable agricultural land for a specific period on condition that they would make this land suitable for agriculture within the specific period by levelling the agricultural land by cutting mud. The households that permitted relatives or others to cultivate their unsuitable agricultural land as sharecroppers received smaller than usual amounts of crops as rent. Likewise, relatives who used to undertake temporary migration before Aila helped the male member/s of the non-migrant related households to undertake temporary migration after Aila. In addition, relatives also helped one another to migrate to new places on a temporary basis after Aila.

Another important aid that the affected households received from relatives was free labour. The survey data show that 32.4 percent received free labour from their relatives for the repair or construction of their houses. Although many households received free labour for various purposes following Aila, the survey considered only the free labour for the repair or construction of houses. The qualitative findings suggested that it was the main form of the received free labour that households identified spontaneously. Moreover, people in the

86 studied villages consider providing free labour to their relatives when needed as a normal part of their life. Thus, if the affected households required or asked relatives to provide free labour, they usually received it. They received it mostly from relatives living within the village. Another vital aid that all the surveyed households received from their relatives after Aila was psychological support.

The category ‘other’ includes two categories: shelter support at the time of Aila and other. Ten percent of the surveyed households took shelter at the time of Aila in their relative’s houses and 6.8 percent of the surveyed households received other aid. All the households that received shelter support at the time of Aila received that support from their relatives located within the same village. Moreover, the types of aid the surveyed households mentioned in the category ‘other’ do not include any material or monetary aid. One important type that the affected households mentioned in the category ‘other’ included keeping rice or household items in the house of the unaffected relatives for a period. In addition to aid items, households mainly had access to two non-aid items, i.e. borrowing (without any interest) of food and other necessary household items and money, from their relatives. They borrowed food and other necessary household items and money from their relatives for a short period for meeting survival needs. In a few cases, they also borrowed money from their relatives for starting economic activity or repairing or constructing a house.

Table 4.4 Percentage of the households that received aid from relatives (n=250) Types of aid Affected Relatives % (n) Relatives Relatives Relatives Relatives outside the within the outside the outside the union but not village village but union but Aila Aila affected within the affected % (n) union Food 40.8 (102) 3.6 (9) 6.4 (16) 30.4 (76) Water 12.4 (31) 1.2 (3) 2.0 (5) 20.0 (50) Clothes 4.0 (10) 1.2 (3) 1.6 (4) 13.6 (34) Utensils and other 3.6 (9) 1.2 (3) 0.8 (2) 8.8 (22) necessary household items Shelter support at the time 10.0 (25) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) of Aila Shelter support for at least 0.8 (2) 0.4 (1) 0.0 (0) 2.8 (7) a week or more Provided caring for 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 5.2 (13) livestock in their house Informational support such 64.0 (160) 9.6 (24) 2.0 (5) 2.4 (6) as information about aid sources and work or employment opportunities Assistance to get work 31.2 (78) 6.4 (16) 0.4 (1) 2.4 (6) Monetary aid only for 8.4 (21) 2.0 (5) 3.6 (9) 20.4 (51) surviving after Aila Monetary aid for economic 0.4 (1) 0.0 (0) 0.8 (2) 4.4 (11) recovery such as for starting economic activities Monetary aid for repairing 0.4 (1) 0.4 (1) 0.4 (1) 2.0 (5) or constructing house Housing materials for 2.4 (6) 0.4 (1) 0.8 (2) 0.8 (2) repairing or constructing house Free labour for repairing or 27.2 (68) 2.4 (6) 1.6 (4) 4.4 (11) constructing house Psychological support 98.4 (246) 45.6 (114) 28.0 (70) 42.0 (105) Other 3.6 (9) 0.0 (0) 0.8 (2) 3.6 (9)

Note: Household may have received a particular aid from more than one relative located in one place. Household may have received more than one type of aid.

Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)

88 4.4 Bonding Social Capital and Post-Disaster Response and Recovery24

4.4.1 Role of Bonding Social Capital in Evacuation, Search and Rescue

Relatives played vital roles in evacuation and in search and rescue activities. They acted as the first responders and the first rescuers. Relatives within the village helped one another to evacuate to safer places during the event (and, in a few cases, immediately before the event). They also helped one another to save lives during the event and search for and rescue members of their households immediately after the event (Alam & Collins 2010; Shaw & Sinha 2003). Although many people moved out of the homestead to reach safer places during the event, others became trapped in their flooded houses or within and around their submerged homestead.25 Among people who left their homestead to reach safer places during the event, with a few exceptions, everyone in the two villages left their homestead only after the villages became flooded due to the breaking of the embankments caused by the storm surge associated with Aila. Thus, the majority experienced difficulties in reaching safer places in the rising waters; they waded through the flooded roads, or swam against the flow of the water. Relatives, if required and whenever possible, came forward to save their lives and helped them to reach a safe place.

A significant number of people in the two villages became trapped in their flooded houses or within and around their submerged homestead as the whole village became inundated within a short period of time. The flood waters increased continuously for some hours following the breaking of the embankments. People saved their lives by tying themselves to the trees around their homestead, staying on the roof of their damaged houses, clinging to the remnants of their houses, or staying in a boat which was usually tied to a tree. The comment of an interviewee makes it clear: ‘We clung to the branches of a tree… We went to the Union Parishad [building] by boat when the tide began to ebb [in the evening]’ (DB, 23 September 2017).

24 Kates et al. (2006) in the case of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans considered the end of the emergency period to be at six weeks, based on the point when New Orleans became dewatered due to the draining of the flood waters from the city. In the case of Aila, social and economic activities in the two studied villages did not return to a normal state before the embankment was repaired. If dewatering is considered as the end of the emergency period, then the emergency period for Channirchak would be almost 21 months while the emergency period for Dakshin Bedkashi would be almost 33 months following the event as Channirchak became dewatered in February 2011 and Dakshin Bedkashi became dewatered in March 2012 (BWDB 2011, 2015). This research defines the response period as up to one month following the event. The period after one month to the time when the embankment was repaired was a mix of response and recovery, predominantly response in nature. A mix of response and recovery was considered as there were some recovery works carried out by the NGOs and the government. The recovery activity started mainly after the embankment was repaired. 25A homestead refers to the area of land on which one or more houses belonging to a single household stand, together with the surrounding land area. A house refers solely to the dwelling structures.

Some people who were trapped in their houses had to move to another adjacent house of relatives or neighbours to save their lives during the flooding as their house collapsed, or the house was about to collapse, or they felt that they could not survive in that location due to the flood water level. Some of them moved again to another adjacent house of relatives or neighbours to survive during the flooding. Relatives within the village also played a vital role, when needed, in searching for relatives and rescuing them from the places where they had become trapped immediately after the event. The following excerpt of an interviewee depicts how relatives provided mutual assistance to one another during the event:

My younger brother brought a boat from the embankment. I put the children [mine and those of my younger brother] and my parents on the roof of the veranda of the house before my brother came with the boat. When my brother came with the boat, I put everyone on the boat. By tying the boat to a tree, all members of the two families stayed in the boat from 12 pm to 5 pm, i.e. for 5 hours. We went to the cyclone shelter by boat around 5 pm and stayed one night at the cyclone shelter. (DB, 10 July 2017)

Although close relatives living in the village played main roles in evacuating relatives to a safe place and saving lives of the relatives and in searching for relatives and rescuing trapped relatives, close relatives from the adjacent villages also came forward to search and rescue their trapped relatives. This can be clearly understood from the following excerpt:

I climbed the tamarind tree at 12 pm… My daughter was on the adjacent tree. My husband was also on that tree with my daughter… My husband tied my daughter to himself… My father came [from the neighbouring affected village] here after the evening by boat, then we got down from the trees to the boat and then my father took us to the embankment by boat. (DB, 9 July 2017)

If close relatives had not come forward to assist during the first few hours of the flooding, many children, aged people and women would have lost their lives, particularly when male members of the immediate household were not present at home. Relatives also helped one another to rescue valuable items from the inundated houses and to relocate their houses to the embankment whenever possible. They also assisted one another to prepare a muchan26 within the homestead, in case the household did not move to the embankment, or if the household

26 A platform, made out of wood and bamboo, used to live with household items during flooding. It can be elevated when floodwaters rise.

90 that moved to the embankment returned from the embankment to the homestead within a few days of the event. In a few cases, relatives from the unaffected areas also helped their affected relatives to relocate to the embankment or to prepare a muchan within the homestead.

4.4.2 Role of Bonding Social Capital in Survival

Both the qualitative and survey data show that many households did not receive any material and monetary aid from relatives at any stage after Aila. For instance, 21.6 percent of the surveyed households did not receive any material and monetary aid from relatives after Aila. Nevertheless, the majority of the interviewed as well as surveyed households received either material aid or both material and monetary aid from their relatives. The qualitative data show that among households that received only material aid, many households did not receive any material aid except food and/or water from relatives.27 The following excerpts of the interviewees show that their households did not receive any material and monetary aid except food from their relatives after Aila:

My daughter’s husband brought some rice, some vegetables and some pulse. The father-in-law of my youngest son also brought some food. No relatives gave money… No relatives except two gave any aid [son and his wife are the member of the same household]. (CC, 14 July 2017)

My father-in-law gave rice one time. No relatives except father-in-law gave any aid. (DB, 6 August 2017)

Moreover, some households that received only food from relatives did not receive any food except dry food. However, many households received food and other material aid, although did not receive any monetary aid, while many households received food and other material aid as well as monetary aid. Some affected households left the affected area after the event as they had no place to live and stayed at their relative’s house outside the affected area for a

27 The survey data also confirm this finding. For instance, 70.8 percent of households received food and 32.4 percent of households received water from relatives. In total, 70.8 percent of households received either food or both food and water from relatives as all households that received water also received food from relatives. On the other hand, 19.6 percent and 14.4 percent of the households received clothes, and utensils and other necessary household items from relatives respectively while only 4 percent, 5.2 percent and 4.4 percent of the households received shelter for a week, caring for livestock and housing materials from relatives respectively. If all seven types of material aid are considered, then the survey data show that 76 percent of the surveyed households received material aid from relatives. However, if five types of material aid except food and water are considered, then the survey data show that 34 percent of the surveyed households received material aid from relatives.

91 period and then returned to the village. They generally returned to the village with some necessary food, utensils and other household items given by relatives to start a new domestic life in the displaced location. However, in a few cases, although the affected households left their homestead as they had no place to live, they had to stay for a period with their close relatives located within the village or the affected area. They received this form of shelter support from very close unaffected relatives and affected relatives, usually from the parents’ house of the wife of the household head. Likewise, some households sent their livestock to their relatives living outside the affected areas. The following excerpts of the three female interviewees depict how relatives helped their households after Aila (households of the two interviewees of Channirchak received material and monetary aid only from the unaffected relatives, while the household of the interviewee of Dakshin Bedkashi received material aid only from the Aila-affected parents living in the adjacent village):

We [she along with husband and two daughters] went to my father’s house on the day following Aila. We lived there one month and then came to the village and started living on the embankment by constructing a temporary shelter… We came to the village with all sorts of necessary household items [that my parents and sister and sister’s husband gave]… My parents gave me money, clothes, rice and pulse, plates and cooking stuff, kantha [a light quilt] and pillow, they gave me everything required to start a new sangsar [domestic life]… My sister and sister-in-law also helped me a lot. They gave me money, rice and saree to wear. They [parents and sister and sister- in-law] were always in touch with us… They helped me first 1 to 2 months after the event… We require many things in our sangsar [domestic life], how many things would they give me? (CC, 10 June 2017)

My brother gave me some flattened rice and puffed rice and 500 Taka.28 I had 16 cows and one died due to Aila. I kept 15 cows in my brother’s daughter house located outside the affected area. I had 22 goats and 5 died. I kept the remaining 17 goats in my brother’s daughter house. (CC, 10 June 2017)

My mother had sarees, my father had lungis and shirts; they gave those clothes to my father-in-law and mother-in-law and to all of us. We all members [9 members] of the

28 One hundred Taka is equivalent to 1.72 Australian Dollars or 1.18 US Dollars (as on 30 June 2020, Bangladesh Bank).

92 family ate in my father’s house for 15 to 20 days and then started to eat separately [by our own means]. (DB, 9 July 2017)

The qualitative data suggest that, except in rare cases, households did not receive any material aid or monetary aid from their distant or most distant relatives. Almost all households received material aid or monetary aid or both from their close blood or affinal relatives. Close blood and affinal relatives of other households such as parents, son and daughter, brother and sister (sibling) and their children, father’s brother and sister (sibling) and their children, mother’s brother and sister (sibling) and their children, wife’s parents, wife’s brother and sister (sibling) and their children from the standpoint of the male household head provided material aid or monetary aid or both to the affected households. Out-marrying daughter and sister of the male household head and close relatives through in-marrying wife of the male household head (in few cases, close relatives through in-marrying son’s wife or brother’s wife of the male household head if the family of the married son or married brother belongs to the same household) played important roles. However, although households did not receive material aid or monetary aid or both from their distant or most distant relatives, they received non-material resources such as psychological support from their distant or most distant relatives, mainly from the blood connected distant relatives living in the village. The following excerpts show the role of distant or most distant relatives:

Relatives other than close relatives had made inquiries about our well-being. However, they did not give food or money. (CC, 9 June 2017)

Nobody except close relatives helped us… Distant relatives did not help us. (DB, 18 June 2017)

The qualitative data also show that relatives outside the affected areas played more significant roles compared to the affected relatives in providing material and monetary aid to the affected households after Aila. Many households did not receive any material and monetary aid from their affected relatives. Households that did receive material aid or monetary aid or both from their affected relatives usually received a small amount. Other studies also show that affected relatives cannot support others as they also experience the same situation (Mustafa 2003; Lindell & Prater 2003; Islam & Walkerden 2014; Morrow 1997). The following excerpt shows the inability of the affected relatives to provide material and monetary aid:

My brothers [living in the village] had a similar situation… How could they give? They had nothing to do without observing by their eyes and hearing by ears as they also had the same situation. (CC, 8 June 2017)

Most households in the two villages had most of their close relatives from whom they could receive material and monetary aid within the affected areas. For instance, the survey data show that 80.8 and 85.2 percent of the surveyed households had most of their close relatives within the same affected village and within the same affected union respectively. As most of their close relatives were affected, most of them were usually not able to provide material and monetary aid to one another. Moreover, many households did not have any relatives outside the affected areas.29 The following excerpts of the interviewees clearly demonstrate that all relatives of the household were also affected:

I did not receive any aid from relatives. I even did not receive meals for one time or two times or 100 or 500 Taka… All relatives were affected. (DB, 10 July 2017)

I did not receive any [material and monetary] aid from my relatives because they were also affected by Aila. (CC, 13 July 2017)

Furthermore, many households that had relatives outside the affected areas did not have close relatives outside the affected areas and thus they did not generally receive any material or monetary aid from them. Many households that did not receive any material or monetary aid from relatives at any stage after Aila were usually the households that had all relatives in the affected areas, or did not have any close relative outside the affected areas, or close relatives outside the affected areas were very poor. However, households that had close relatives outside the affected areas usually received material and monetary aid after Aila. The key informants describe the contribution of the unaffected and affected relatives in the following way:

After hearing that we were living on the embankment and we did not have a house, relatives living outside came [to see us] and brought some rice, pulse and vegetables for us. They gave us emergency support in this way. Relatives living in this area

29 An indirect survey finding also confirms this qualitative finding as the data show that 19.6 percent of the surveyed households mentioned not having any relatives outside the affected areas as one of the reasons for not receiving any monetary aid or receiving less amount of monetary aid from the unaffected relatives after Aila.

94 [village and other affected villages] had to see only, one could not support another. Even a brother could not support his brother. (DB, 31 July 2017)

Close relatives from the outside areas helped. Close relatives of this area [affected area] could not help as they were affected themselves. (CC, 9 June 2017)

The survey data also show that a higher percentage of the surveyed households received most of the types of material and monetary aid from their unaffected relatives. The survey data show that among seven types considered under material aid, a higher percentage of the surveyed households received food and housing materials from the affected relatives compared to the unaffected relatives while a higher percentage of the surveyed households received water, clothes, utensils and other necessary household items, shelter support for a week or more and caring for livestock from the unaffected relatives compared to the affected relatives (see Table 4.4). All the surveyed households that received caring for their livestock in their relative’s house received this support from the unaffected relatives. Moreover, the higher percentage of the surveyed households received all three types of monetary aid from the unaffected relatives.

The survey data by village show that 41.4 percent and 52.9 percent of the surveyed households (n=70) in Channirchak received food from the affected relatives and unaffected relatives respectively while 46.7 percent and 21.7 percent of the surveyed households (n=180) in Dakshin Bedkashi received food from the affected relatives and unaffected relatives respectively. Thus, unlike Dakshin Bedkashi, the higher percentage of the households in Channirchak received food from the unaffected relatives compared to the affected relatives. Although an overall higher percentage of the total surveyed households (n=250) received food from relatives within the village or from the affected relatives compared to the unaffected relatives, some important issues need to be kept in mind in explaining this quantitative finding in addition to the fact that many of the affected households did not have any relatives outside the affected areas, i.e. did not have unaffected relatives. The figure might be higher as the survey did not distinguish between food received from relatives within the first few days of Aila and food received from relatives later. Qualitative data show that if a relative within the village had some rice that was saved from being washed away during Aila, then the rice was shared with other affected relatives as well as other villagers during the first few days, particularly during the night of Aila and the following day. It was usually a meal for one or at best two times and mainly cooked rice without any other items or khichuri (a preparation of

95 rice and lentils together). Moreover, the affected relatives in some cases also gave food to their affected relatives from the emergency relief they received from the unaffected relatives, outside people and organisations and the government and NGOs. Another important factor is that although unaffected relatives provided a small amount of food in absolute terms in most cases, the amount they provided was usually greater compared to the food affected relatives gave to the affected households. They usually provided food for a longer period. In the case of housing materials for repairing or constructing a house, it was found that in some cases, if affected relatives had some extra housing materials either from their damaged houses or from the housing materials such as polythene, tarpaulin and bamboo they received as aid from the external agencies, then they usually gave those materials to their close relatives; for example, to the households of siblings. In a few cases, the affected relatives bought housing materials and provided them to their affected relatives to construct houses.

Relatives played noteworthy roles in meeting the basic survival needs of the majority of households, until the arrival of aid from the external agencies. The nearest affected relatives shared food with one another during the night of Aila and the following few days, if they had some that had been saved from being washed away. This is evident in the following comment by an interviewee: ‘I ate food first on the Tuesday night [day after Aila]… My brother was able to save his rice… He cooked khichuri [hotchpotch] with that rice and gave it to me’ (DB, 17 June 2017). However, the sharing of food among the affected relatives happened only in some cases as only a few households in both villages were able to save their rice or other food items from being washed away. Thus, many people ate first after receiving food either from their relatives living outside the affected areas, or from the people and organisations such as rich people, businessmen, schools, colleges from the adjacent or distant unaffected areas and the government and NGOs. Villagers started to receive emergency relief items, mostly food and water, from the outside mainly two days after Aila. Many people did not eat any food, particularly rice, before that. Moreover, food relief from the government and NGOs during the first week was little or nothing. Relatives, particularly those from unaffected areas, as well as the people and organisations from the adjacent or distant unaffected locations, played vital roles in that period by providing food, water and other emergency relief items. The relatives outside the affected areas also provided cooked food such as cooked rice, curry and lentils to their affected relatives instead of uncooked food, particularly in the first week of the event. It was not convenient to cook food in the affected villages as there was no space or wood to

96 cook. The people and organisations from the unaffected areas also provided cooked food such as khichuri in the first few days.

The qualitative data show that relatives contributed to the survival of a majority of the affected households in the response period (up to one month), mainly during the first two weeks. Relatives contributed to the survival of only some households after the response period. Most of the households that received material or monetary aid or both from their relatives received it during the first month of the event. Moreover, most of the households that received material or monetary aid or both from their relatives received it only for survival.

The following excerpts clearly show this:

Close relatives outside the affected areas helped up to the first two weeks… They helped up to 15 days in 95 percent of cases… Most households that received aid from close relatives received it within the first month. They received food and some monetary aid. (CC, 8 June 2017)

Most households received aid [food and money] from close relatives up to one to two weeks… Some households received after that time… In most cases, households received food and, in some cases, received both food and money. (CC, 23 August 2017)

Close relatives of the outside gave food [first] one to two weeks. In some cases, they gave money. (DB, 11 July 2017)

Some households received either material or monetary aid or both for survival after the first month of the event. An interviewee depicts the situation in the following way:

Relatives [two sisters and mother’s sister from outside the affected areas] helped me up to 2 or 3 months after Aila… They [three relatives] gave me money and food… I received 2000 to 3000 Taka from them in total and about one maund30 rice from them in total. (CC, 23 August 2017)

Only in rare cases did households receive either material or monetary aid or both for survival during response, mixed and recovery stages. Other studies also show that support from relatives declines over time as they do not have enough resources to continue to support the

30 One maund is equal to 37.32 kilograms.

97 affected households (Islam & Walkerden 2014; Mustafa 2003). The qualitative data reveals that many households did not require assistance for survival after a period, particularly when they started to receive 20 kg rice per month from the government in September 2009. They were able to meet the basic subsistence needs with that rice along with relief from NGOs, cash or food due to participation in cash or food for work programs (operated by the government, NGOs and contractors) and money earned from catching fish or other work in the affected areas, or working outside the affected areas as a temporary migrant. Moreover, mutual borrowing and lending of food and money among related households, particularly among related households within the village, for a short period to meet daily needs played an important role in meeting the survival needs of the affected households. However, a few households that received monetary aid for economic recovery and housing recovery from relatives received it mainly after the village became dewatered due to the repair of the embankment. Moreover, households received housing materials and free labour during the repair or construction of the temporary shelter at the initial period and permanent housing after the embankment was repaired.

Although relatives contributed to the survival of a majority of the affected households in the response period, most of the affected households were not able to survive after Aila if they were not supported by the government and NGOs. Many households did not receive any material and monetary aid from relatives for any purpose including survival. Although the majority received material and monetary aid from their relatives, the aid was only enough for survival for some days in most cases. However, Channirchak and Dakshin Bedkashi were subject to flooding for almost 21 months and 33 months after the event respectively. Most of the households in both the villages struggled to meet survival needs for a long period as they were not able to restart recovery activities and were predominantly dependent on the government and NGOs for their survival. Thus, most of the affected households were not able to survive after Aila if they did not receive aid from the government and NGOs and did not have the opportunity to participate in the cash or food for work programs operated by the government and NGOs, mainly by NGOs. Nevertheless, households were usually grateful to their relatives for the aid they provided as it played a vital role in their survival, particularly when there was no food from the government or NGOs. The survey data demonstrate that 70.8 percent (n=177) of the surveyed households received either both food and water or one of these from relatives after Aila. Among the surveyed households that received both food and water or one of these from relatives (177 out of 250), 80.2 percent of respondents

98 considered that the aid was extremely important for the survival of their households during the post-Aila period while 12.4 percent, 5.1 percent, 1.7 percent and 0.6 percent considered that the aid was very important, moderately important, slightly important and not at all important respectively for the survival of their households during the post-Aila period (see Figure 4.3).

Figure 4.3 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of food and water or either received from relatives in their survival (n=177)

Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)

The analysis of the qualitative data shows that households received psychological support from relatives and, if required, they usually received free labour, informational support, assistance to get work and other aid that did not require material and monetary resources to be invested throughout the recovery process. The qualitative data also suggest that more households received these types of aid from the affected relatives. The survey data also confirm this finding as the data show that the higher percentage of the surveyed households received six categories of aid (shelter support at the time of Aila, informational support, assistance to get work, free labour for repairing or constructing house, psychological support and others) not considered as material and monetary aid from the affected relatives compared to the unaffected relatives (see Table 4.4). Careful examination of the six types of aid shows that providing these types of aid does not require material and monetary resources. Thus, the

99 affected and poor relatives can also provide these types of aid to the affected relatives. Moreover, a higher percentage of the households might have received these six categories of aid from affected relatives as many households did not have any relatives outside the affected areas and most of the households had most of their close relatives in the affected areas.

The above discussion clearly demonstrates that relatives greatly helped their affected relatives to meet the basic subsistence needs, until the arrival of aid from the external agencies. They played significant roles for the survival of the majority of the affected households in the response phase (up to one month) and played important roles in meeting the survival needs of some of the affected households even after the response period. Thus, the findings confirm that bonding social capital contributes to the survival or ‘getting by’ of the affected households after a disaster (Briggs 1998; Putnam 2000; Woolcock 2001, 2002b; Woolcock & Narayan 2000; Pelling & High 2005). Nevertheless, most of the affected households were not able to survive after Aila if they did not receive support from the government and NGOs. Relatives did not contribute to the survival of many households and contributed to the survival of the majority of the households only for a short period, although most households had survival needs for a long period due to the nature of the event that was accompanied by prolonged flooding.

4.4.3 Role of Bonding Social Capital in Economic and Housing Recovery

Although relatives contributed greatly to the survival of the affected households during the response period and in some cases beyond the response period by providing various types of aid, they did not play any role in the economic recovery or housing recovery of most of the affected households. Moreover, if relatives played any sort of role in the economic recovery or housing recovery of the affected households, they played very limited roles in most cases.

The analysis of qualitative data reveals that few households received money from relatives for starting economic activity. Likewise, few households received money or housing materials from relatives for repair or construction of their houses, although a significant number of the households received free labour from relatives during the repair and construction of their houses. The survey data reveal that 5.2 percent of the surveyed households (n=250) received money from relatives for economic recovery. Moreover, among three types of aid directly related to housing recovery, only 3.2 percent of the surveyed households received monetary aid for repairing or constructing houses from relatives, while 4.4 percent of households

100 received housing materials and 32.4 percent of households received free labour from relatives respectively for repairing or constructing houses. The data show two characteristics. Firstly, compared to the percentage of the surveyed households that received monetary aid from relatives only for survival after the event (31.6%), a significantly lower percentage of the households received monetary aid from relatives for either economic recovery or repairing or constructing the house. Secondly, compared to the percentage of the surveyed households that received either monetary aid or housing materials from relatives for repairing or constructing houses, a significantly higher percentage of the households received free labour from relatives for this purpose. This is expected, as providing labour does not require additional resources to be invested.

The qualitative data demonstrate that relatives did not play any role in the economic and housing recovery of most of the interviewed households. Relatives played direct roles in the economic recovery process of only a few households as only a few households received any aid from relatives for the economic recovery purpose. The few households that received monetary aid from their relatives for economic recovery usually received only a part of the total amount needed to start an economic activity such as agriculture or shrimp farming. However, some households that did not receive any aid for economic recovery but received aid for survival from relatives considered that relatives played a slight role in the economic recovery. Likewise, although only a few households received monetary aid or housing materials from relatives for repair or construction of their houses, many households considered that relatives had a slight role in the housing recovery only due to the free labour they received from their relatives. The few households that received monetary aid from their relatives for repairing or constructing the house received a part of the cost needed. Similarly, the few households that received housing materials received some of these as aid from relatives. No households were found during the qualitative interviews that received either the total or most of the required cost or all or most of the required housing materials from relatives to repair or construct the house. Moreover, not a single interviewed household considered that they could achieve economic and housing recovery based on the aid they received only from relatives. This can be understood from the following excerpts of the two interviewees (the first interviewee from Channirchak Village represents one of the few interviewed households in the two studied villages that received substantial material aid and monetary aid from relatives):

101

My parents gave to me when I required something. When we did not receive rice from the Union Parishad after Aila, they constructed a temporary house [on the embankment that cost 7,000 Taka and they gave the whole amount], gave rice, shopped for necessary food and other household items required for daily consumption, gave water and money… They gave me money 8 to 10 times during Aila [when the village was subject to inundation]… They gave me almost 20,000 Taka [when the village was subject to inundation]… The monetary value of food and other household items they provided various times [when the village was subject to inundation] was also equivalent to almost 20,000 Taka. They also helped me to fix my kitchen and house for cattle [cattle shelter] after the embankment was repaired.31 We managed some money and they gave some money [to fix kitchen and cattle shelter]. They gave 2,000 to 3,000 Taka to fix the kitchen and cattle shelter. I did not receive any aid from anyone except my parents. In addition to my parents, I received aid from NGOs and the government… It was not possible to recover only with the aid I received from my parents, we had to endure more hardship [if there was no support from NGOs and the government]. (CC, 23 October 2017)

It was not possible to achieve economic and housing recovery with what we received from relatives… Aid from relatives did not play a main role, it contributed slightly. Relatives gave aid to us when we were starving and had no clothes to wear. They gave to us in the initial stage. (DB, 17 June 2017)

The survey data also show that the aid from relatives did not play any role in the economic and housing recovery for the overwhelming majority of the households (see Figure 4.4). The survey data show that among households that received any aid from relatives (n=250), respondents of the 78.8 percent of households considered that the aid received from relatives did not play any role in the economic recovery of their households while 14.4 percent, 3.2 percent, 2 percent and 1.6 percent of respondents considered that the aid received from relatives played a slightly important, moderately important, very important and extremely important role in the economic recovery of their households respectively. Among households that received any aid from relatives (n=250), 79.6 percent of respondents considered that the aid from relatives was not at all important for housing recovery, while 16.4 percent, 2.8 percent, 0.4 percent, and 0.8 percent of respondents considered that the aid from relatives was

31 She received her dwelling house from a non-government organisation.

102 slightly important, moderately important, very important and extremely important for housing recovery respectively. Thus, aid from relatives had some sort of role in the economic recovery of 21.2 percent of households and in the housing recovery of 20.4 percent of households. Although aid from relatives had some sort of role in the economic recovery of 21.2 percent of households, the qualitative data suggest that most respondents might have considered that relatives had some sort of role in the economic recovery mainly due to the material and monetary aid they received from relatives for survival. Likewise, although aid from relatives had some sort of role in the housing recovery of 20.4 percent of households, most respondents might have considered that relatives had some sort of role in the housing recovery mainly due to the free labour they received from relatives for the repair or construction of the houses. In a few cases, households borrowed money without interest from their close relatives to start an economic activity or to construct a new house or repair the damaged house. Thus, borrowing of money from close relatives for a period also played a very important role in the economic and housing recovery of the affected households.

Figure 4.4 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from relatives in economic, housing and psychological recovery (n=250)

Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)

103

4.4.4 Role of Bonding Social Capital in Psychological Recovery

Relatives played a noteworthy role in the psychological recovery process of the members of the affected households. Both qualitative and survey data show that all households received psychological support from their relatives after the disaster. The affected households received sympathy and consolation and positive hope for the future from their relatives. The affected households provided psychological support to one another, although they were usually not able to provide material and monetary aid to one another and received psychological support from their unaffected relatives. Islam and Walkerden (2014) also found that 100 percent and 94 percent of the respondents in the two coastal villages of Bangladesh received emotional support following Cyclone Sidr from family members and in-laws respectively. The following excerpts are from two interviewees. One interviewee did not receive any material or monetary aid from relatives as all of his relatives were Aila affected. The other interviewee did not receive any material or monetary aid from his unaffected married daughter. Although their relatives did not provide material or monetary aid as they did not have the capacity to do so, they did provide psychological support:

If brothers [living in the same village] wanted to help me [by providing material and monetary aid], it was not possible for them to help me. It was not also possible for me to help my brothers… Brothers provided free labour … Brothers and other relatives gave psychological support. (CC, 13 July 2017)

My eldest daughter could not give me any aid as her economic condition was not good. She did what she could do by keeping in touch with us and providing mental support. (DB, 18 June 2017)

Thus, although relatives of the affected households did not have the capacity to provide required material and monetary aid to their affected relatives, either for survival or for economic and housing recovery, they had the capacity to provide non-material resources like psychological support. The psychological support relatives provided greatly helped the affected households to recover psychologically from the shock created by Aila. The survey data also confirm it and show that, among households that received any aid from relatives (n=250), respondents of 44 percent of households considered that aid from relatives played an extremely important role in the psychological recovery of the members of the affected households, while 34.4 percent, 15.2 percent and 6.4 percent of respondents considered that

104 aid from relatives played very important, moderately important and slightly important roles in the psychological recovery of the members of the affected households. None of the respondents mentioned that aid from relatives was not at all important for psychological recovery. Another noticeable fact is that while 78.4 percent of respondents considered that aid from relatives had a very important and extremely important role in the psychological recovery of the members of the affected household, only 3.6 percent and 1.2 percent of respondents considered that aid from relatives had very important and extremely important roles in the economic and housing recovery process of the affected households respectively. Thus, although relatives of the affected households played very or extremely important roles in the economic and housing recovery of a few households, they played very or extremely important roles in the psychological recovery process of the members of most households (see Figure 4.4). This finding is consistent with the finding of Bolin and Bolton’s (1986) study, conducted in another cultural context, that show that the aid from primary groups is more important for psychological recovery compared to economic recovery.

The survey respondents were also asked to assess the importance of the psychological support they received from relatives in the psychological recovery process. The results show that 44 percent of respondents consider that psychological support received from relatives played an extremely important role in the psychological recovery process of the members of the affected households, while 37.2 percent, 13.6 percent and 5.2 percent considered that the psychological support received from relatives played a very important, moderately important and slightly important role respectively. No respondents mentioned that it was not at all important. The survey data show that there is a slight difference between the importance of aid in the psychological recovery process and the importance of psychological support in the psychological recovery process. The percentage of the respondents who considered that psychological support played an extremely important role was the same as the percentage of the respondents who considered that aid played an extremely important role. However, the percentage of the respondents who considered that psychological support played a very important role was higher than the percentage of the respondents who considered aid played a very important role. Yet, the percentage of the respondents who considered psychological support played a moderately important or slightly important role was lower than the percentage of the respondents who considered that aid played a moderately important or slightly important role. While 78.4 percent of respondents considered that aid from relatives had a very important or extremely important role in the psychological recovery of the

105 members of the respondent household, 81.2 percent considered that psychological support from relatives had a very important or extremely important role in the psychological recovery of the members of the respondent household. This slight difference may be because when they were asked about the importance of only psychological support, they did not relate it to the material and monetary aid that many households did not receive or did not receive a substantial amount if received.

The qualitative findings suggest that the psychological support the affected households received from relatives was very intense and they received psychological support from their relatives throughout the recovery process. It is worth noting that a ‘therapeutic community’ emerged in both villages after Aila, although it did not last long (Fritz 1961; Barton 1969; Drabek & Key 1976, 1984; Ericson et al. 1976). Conflict emerged in both villages after Aila due to competition for access to relief items. In a few cases, conflict also emerged due to competition for securing a place on the embankment for temporary shelter as the space on the embankment was limited compared to the number of affected people. However, these forms of conflict did not usually emerge among the related households within the village, particularly among closely related households such as households of siblings. The conflict was mainly with neighbours and in some cases with friends (particularly distant friends) and acquaintances within the village and was mainly due to competition for access to relief items.

The qualitative findings also demonstrate that a household that did not receive a relief item was silent and did not have a sense of deprivation and tense, suspicious and conflictual relations with a closely related household that did receive a relief item. However, in many cases, the household that did not receive a relief item was not silent or had a sense of deprivation, and sometimes the relationship became tense, suspicious and conflictual with an unrelated household (such as neighbour or friend and acquaintance within the village) when the unrelated household received a relief item. Moreover, on many occasions people opposed listing a household as a possible recipient of an intervention from an NGO or the government and urged the respective personnel of the providing agency and the elected leaders and village leaders to remove the selected household from the list. This was argued on the grounds that there were other vulnerable households in the village that should receive the selected intervention instead of the household being listed. A selected household usually faced this form of opposition from unrelated neighbours and villagers and usually did not face it from related households due to the strong in-group solidarity.

106 The qualitative findings also reveal that although bonding networks performed less well in terms of providing material and monetary aid as the time after the disaster increased, the affected households received continuous support, mainly psychological support along with other aid such as free labour, information and help to get work, from their bonding networks throughout the recovery process. Thus, their networks with relatives did not become weak or less active or did not break down. Islam and Walkerden (2014) also found that the affected households’ networks with relatives after Cyclone Sidr did not break down. However, the disaster itself imposed some problems on the operation of the bonding network in two ways: firstly, in some cases, related households that used to live in one homestead or in the adjacent homesteads up to the event became scattered after the event. It happened because they were not able to manage a place on the embankment to live side by side during the inundation of the villages for a long period due to the shortage of space on the embankment. Thus, in some cases and particularly in Channirchak, one household lived on one side of the embankment while the other closely related household lived on the other part of the embankment, until the village became dewatered. In a few cases, households of siblings also had the same experience. This restricted their usual interactions and mutual borrowing and lending of goods and money for a short time as it was very difficult to move from one side of the embankment to the other side due to poor road networks. Similarly, households that stayed in the homestead also experienced this problem as many of their closely related households lived on the embankment. Moreover, permanent migration of the closely related households from both the villages following Aila also weakened the bonding network. As the closest relatives of some households left the village permanently, bonding networks of some households became weak compared to the pre-disaster period. For instance, one of the interviewed households in Dakshin Bedkashi does not have any relatives in the village as his sibling household who used to live in the village migrated permanently to another place three days after Aila. Many households in both the villages experienced this problem as their relatives not only from the village but also from other affected villages left their village permanently after the event. They did not return and many of them will never return.

4.5 Why Bonding Social Capital Played a Limited Role in the Survival and the Economic and Housing Recovery

Both qualitative and survey data reveal that although relatives played a significant role in the survival of the majority of the households, they did not contribute to the survival of many households as many households did not receive any material and monetary aid from relatives

107 even for survival. Moreover, although relatives contributed to the survival of the majority of the households, they contributed only for some days in most cases. However, most of the households in both the villages required assistance for survival for a much longer period. Thus, although bonding networks played a significant role in the survival period, bonding networks lacked the capacity to provide necessary material and monetary aid for survival for a few days in many cases and for survival for a long period (as demanded by the post-Aila situation) in most cases. Both qualitative and survey data reveal that bonding networks did not play a much more significant role in the survival and did not play a significant role in the economic and housing recovery mainly because of two important factors: firstly, poverty of the relatives, and secondly, many relatives were affected. An interviewee who did not receive any material and monetary aid depicts the situation in the following way:

I did not get anything from my relatives. I did not get food and monetary assistance. Everyone is poor. Everyone is within the affected area. We all had the same situation. (DB, 3rd August 2017)

The survey findings related to the monetary aid show that 98 percent of the respondents mentioned relatives were affected, while 49.2 percent of respondents mentioned relatives were poor and 0.8 percent of respondents mentioned other as one of the reasons for not receiving any monetary aid or receiving a small amount of monetary aid from the affected relatives. Likewise, 60.8 percent of the respondents mentioned relatives outside the affected areas were poor, 30.4 percent of respondents mentioned that relatives outside the affected areas had capacity to help but did not help, 19.6 percent of respondents mentioned not having any relative outside the affected areas and 4.4 percent of respondents mentioned other reasons for not receiving any monetary aid or receiving a small amount of monetary aid from the unaffected relatives. The survey did not distinguish between close relatives and distant or most distant relatives and thus it might be possible that a substantial percentage among 30.4 percent of unaffected relatives who did not help despite being capable were not close relatives. It was found in the cases of almost all the qualitative interviews that they received aid only from their close relatives.

Both poverty and their own experience of the disaster (if relatives were affected) limited the capacity of the relatives to contribute to the survival and the economic and housing recovery. However, a critical analysis shows that relatives were not able to contribute to the survival for a long period or the economic and housing recovery due to poverty even if they were not

108 affected. If the relatives of the affected households were not affected themselves, they could have provided more material and monetary aid and thus could have contributed a little more to the survival and the economic and housing recovery of the affected relatives. Moreover, if the relatives were not affected, households that did not receive any material or monetary aid or both could have received some. However, as relatives were usually poor, they were not able to provide the aid needed for survival for the long period required in the post-Aila situation, or for the economic and housing recovery of affected relatives, even if they were not affected. This can be understood from the following excerpt from an interviewee who received only dry food from relatives after Aila:

All my relatives are poor, all are [poor] like me… All relatives are in the Aila affected area… If they were not affected by Aila, they would not be able to give substantial amount of aid, they would be able to give food for two to five days or one week as all of them live on daily physical labour. If my relatives were not affected by Aila, they did not have capacity to construct a dochala house [double roofed house] for me like an NGO gave to me. If my relatives were not affected by Aila, they did not have capacity to give me 20 kg rice per month in the way the government gave 20 kg rice per month. (DB, 9 July 2017)

Some indirect survey findings also show that most of the households do not have relatives who are capable to contribute to the survival for a long period and the economic and housing recovery. For instance, 77.6 percent of the respondents mentioned that if the household faces any crisis, then they do not have anyone from whom they can receive the money required to meet the household expenditure for at least one month as aid. Moreover, only 3.6 percent of the respondents mentioned that it was possible to receive 20,000 Taka from their relatives/neighbours/friends and acquaintances as aid to cope with the post-Aila situation while 16 percent and 23.2 percent mentioned that it was possible to borrow (without any interest) and receive as a loan (with interest) respectively. On the other hand, 7.6 percent of the respondents mentioned that they have relatives/neighbours/friends and acquaintances who are capable of providing them 20,000 Taka as aid at present while 32.8 percent and 56 percent mentioned that they have relatives/neighbours/friends and acquaintances who are capable of lending them 20,000 Taka without interest and lending them 20,000 Taka with interest respectively at present. Thus, more than 92 percent of the households do not have anyone in their social circles who is capable independently of providing 20,000 Taka as aid to the

109 households at present. These survey findings clearly denote that most of the households have bonding relations with poor relatives who are unable to contribute to the survival for a longer period and the economic and housing recovery of the affected relatives, even if they are not affected by Aila.

Thus, bonding social capital is useful for social support for a short period in most cases but not for social leverage (Briggs 1998). Although it played an important role for survival or ‘getting by’ in the case of the majority of the affected households, for a very short period in most cases, it did not play an important role for ‘getting ahead’ (Briggs 1998; Putnam 2000; Woolcock 2001, 2002b; Woolcock & Narayan 2000; Pelling & High 2005). It contributed to the survival for a very short period in most cases or did not contribute to the survival in many cases and did not play any role in the economic and housing recovery of the overwhelming majority of the households. This was because an overwhelming majority of the households had bonding relations with poor relatives and thus embedded resources among relatives were poor. Although bonding social capital does not play a useful role in the case of the instrumental actions such as economic and housing recovery, it plays a useful role in the case of expressive actions as evidenced from its important role in the psychological recovery.32 In other words, although bonding networks do not have capacity to provide material and monetary resources required for instrumental actions, they have the capacity to provide non- material resources. Bonding social capital played some role in the economic and housing recovery for only those few households that had bonding relations with relatives with relatively rich embedded resources. Thus, the research confirms that although the bonding relation may not be valuable for instrumental action based on the context, the bonding relation is valuable for expressive action (Lin 2008).

The findings suggest that bonding social capital does not contribute to survival for a long period (or to survival for a short period in many cases) and economic and household recovery due to the homophily principle.33 People with poor resources are likely to have ties with people who have poor resources due to the homophily principle (Lin 2001, 2008). As most of the households were poor and lower-middle-class households, they usually had bonding networks with poor relatives and thus did not have access to the necessary resources through

32 Instrumental actions require ‘additional or new or better resources’ while expressive actions do not require ‘additional or new resources’ (Lin 2008, p. 60–61). 33 The homophily principle denotes that ‘a contact between similar people occurs at a higher rate than among dissimilar people’ (McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook 2001, p. 416).

110 bonding networks.34 This was found to be the case for all but two of the qualitative interviewees. Two poor interviewees who had bonding relationships with a middle class or upper-middle-class relative received resources that played a significant role in the housing recovery of those two affected households. One interviewee received 48 percent of the total cost (25,000 Taka) required to construct a new small house from a relative while the other interviewee received 20 percent of the total cost (55,000 Taka) required to construct a new small house from a relative. Thus, bonding social capital in a few cases can be useful for a poor person who has bonding relations with a relatively wealthy relative (Lin 2008).

4.6 Conclusion

Relatives played important roles in evacuation and saving lives during the event and in search and rescue activities immediately after the event. They were the first responders and the first people who provided rescue assistance as well as relief to their affected relatives. Affected households received various types of aid from their relatives. They received material and monetary aid from their close blood or affinal relatives. They usually received more material and monetary aid from close relatives living outside the affected areas compared to the affected relatives.

Although many households did not receive any material and monetary aid from relatives, the relatives of the affected households played significant roles in meeting the basic subsistence needs of the majority of the affected households until the arrival of aid from the external agencies. Most of the households that received material aid and monetary aid from relatives usually received it in the first month of the event and most of them received only enough for survival for some days. Relatives contributed significantly to the survival of a majority of the affected households in the response phase (up to one month) and, in some cases, to the survival of the affected households even after the response period. However, relatives did not play any role in the economic and housing recovery for most of the households. Only some households received monetary aid for economic recovery and material and monetary aid for repairing or constructing houses, although a significant number of the affected households received free labour for repairing or constructing the house.

34 The survey data show that 4 percent and 24.4 percent of the respondents assessed their household’s present socio-economic condition as ultra-poor and poor respectively while 63.2 percent and 8.4 percent of the respondents assessed their household’s present socio-economic condition as lower-middle-class and upper- middle-class. However, none of the respondents assessed their household’s present socio-economic condition as rich.

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However, relatives played a significant role in the psychological recovery process of the members of the affected households. All the households received psychological support from their relatives throughout the recovery process, and, if required, they usually received other non-material and non-monetary aid such as free labour, information and help to get work throughout the recovery process. The psychological support relatives provided greatly helped the members of the affected households to recover psychologically following Aila. Although bonding networks did not have the capacity to provide material and monetary resources for economic and housing recovery to their affected relatives in most cases and for survival in many cases, they had the capacity to provide non-material and non-monetary aid or support such as psychological support. As the affected households received non-material and non- monetary aid from their relatives throughout the recovery process, households’ networks with relatives did not become weak or less active, and did not break down.

The findings demonstrate that bonding social capital plays a significant role in the survival of the majority of the households in the response period. Moreover, although relatives contributed to the survival of the majority, they contributed only for some days in most cases. However, most of the households in both the villages were in need of assistance for meeting basic survival needs for a long period due to the flooding. Thus, most households were not able to meet survival needs after Aila if they did not receive support from the government and NGOs. Moreover, bonding social capital did not play a significant role in ‘getting ahead’ as evidenced from the fact that bonding networks did not play any role in the economic and housing recovery of the overwhelming majority of the households. Bonding social capital did not contribute to the survival of many households at all, to the survival of the majority of households for the required longer period, or to the economic and housing recovery of most of the affected households, as their relatives were poor and the affected relatives had their own experience of disaster and recovery challenges. Although both poverty and their own experience of the disaster and recovery challenges (if relatives were affected) were important, the poverty of the relatives was the key factor that limited their capacity to contribute to the survival and to the economic and housing recovery. As most of the affected households had bonding relations with poor relatives, bonding networks did not contribute to their survival for the required long period or to the economic and housing recovery. However, bonding networks contributed to the psychological recovery as they had the capacity to provide non- material resources despite being poor and affected.

112 Thus, although bonding social capital plays an important role in post-disaster response and recovery, it is insufficient to meet basic long-term survival needs in a post-disaster situation like the post-Aila situation, or to achieve economic and housing recovery. Ensuring access to basic survival needs and achieving economic and housing recovery of most of the households requires external assistance through linking social networks such as government agencies and national and international NGOs (Islam & Walkerden 2014; James & Paton 2015).

The next chapter will investigate how bridging social capital (i.e. the aid or support the affected households received from neighbours and friends and acquaintances) contributed to the disaster response and economic, housing and psychological recovery process. The chapter will also examine how the role of bonding social capital varied from the role of bridging social capital in the post-disaster response and recovery process of the Aila-affected households.

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Chapter 5: Role of Bridging Social Capital in the Post-Disaster Response and Recovery

5.1 Introduction

This chapter investigates how bridging social capital contributed to the post-disaster response and recovery process of the Cyclone Aila–affected households in the two villages of the two upazilas of Khulna District, Bangladesh. This chapter conceptualises bridging social capital as the resources that affected households received from their bridging networks, which are the networks of the affected households with their neighbours and friends and acquaintances. The chapter focuses on the role of the resources that affected households received as aid or support from neighbours and friends and acquaintances, where aid or support (hereafter aid) means resources received free of charge or without the requirement to return anything in exchange. However, the chapter also briefly discusses the role of non-aid items the affected households received from neighbours, friends and acquaintances where necessary.

This chapter is divided into six further sections. Section 5.2 briefly discusses why neighbours and friends and acquaintances have been considered as bridging instead of bonding networks. Section 5.3 discusses the types of aid the affected households received through their bridging networks, i.e. from neighbours and friends and acquaintances. Section 5.4 examines the role of bridging social capital in the disaster response and recovery process of the affected households. Section 5.5 examines why bridging networks played a limited role in the survival, economic and housing recovery process of the affected households. Section 5.6 compares the role of bonding social capital and bridging social capital in the post-disaster response and recovery process while section 5.7 presents the conclusion.

5.2 Understanding Bridging Networks in the Research Context

The study defines bonding networks as the relationships of the studied household with relatives who are not the members of the studied household, and bridging networks as the relationships of the studied household with neighbours and friends and acquaintances. Some scholars consider relations between ’family members, close friends and neighbours’ as bonding social capital while relations with ‘more distant friends, associates and colleagues’ as bridging social capital (Woolcock 2001, p. 72). The term ‘family members’ has a broader meaning as the notion of family members includes immediate members of a particular household as well as related people or relatives who are members of other households. As a

115 household in Bangladeshi villages acts as a unit and the unit of analysis in this study is the household, the study only considers the contribution of relatives who live in other households. The study considers neighbours, friends and acquaintances as bridging social networks instead of bonding social networks that represent relatives only. The study considers neighbours, friends and acquaintances as bridging social networks based on the nature of aid households in the two villages received from relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances after Aila as well as the households’ experiences and the nature of households’ networks with relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances. The category ‘friends and acquaintances’ under bridging social capital includes not only close friends but also ‘more distant friends, associates and colleagues’. It is worth noting that Islam and Walkerden (2014) also considered neighbours and friends as bridging networks in understanding the role of social networks in the post-Sidr (2007) recovery in Bangladesh.

This study considers the household’s relationships with neighbours, friends and acquaintances as bridging because the aid the affected households received from relatives differed significantly in both qualitative and quantitative ways from the aid the affected households received from neighbours, friends and acquaintances.35 Szreter and Woolcock (2004, p. 654) argue that a bonding network needs to have ‘trusting and co-operative relations between members’. This study, based on the households’ perspectives and nature of their networks, found that households’ relations with neighbours, friends and acquaintances were not as ‘trusting and co-operative’ as were households’ relations with relatives. Moreover, households usually have expectations to receive material and monetary aid from relatives for their survival as well as for the economic and housing recovery process, if the relatives have

35 The survey did not distinguish between friends and acquaintances although friends, particularly close friends, are expected at least theoretically to contribute more than acquaintances to the response and recovery process of the affected households. However, based on the results of the qualitative phase, the survey did not distinguish between friends and acquaintances as there was no significant distinction between friends and acquaintances in terms of the importance of the role they played in the response and recovery process of the affected households, particularly in terms of providing material and monetary aid after Aila. As every household in the two villages was under water for a long time after Aila and was struggling to survive and recover, the material and monetary contribution from friends did not differ significantly from that of acquaintances. Thus, the role friends played was not significantly different from the role acquaintances played in the survival and economic and housing recovery process. However, there were differences between friends and acquaintances in some areas such as in terms of intensity of psychological support they provided and free labour for the repair or construction of the houses. For instance, members of the affected households received more intense psychological support from close friends than acquaintances. Likewise, if households received free labour from friends and acquaintances, households usually received it from close friends, not from acquaintances. Moreover, if households exchanged food and money for survival with friends and acquaintances, they mainly exchanged with close friends. The survey also did not distinguish between friends and close friends as the role friends played was not significantly different from the role close friends played in the survival and economic and housing recovery process of the affected households. However, close friends usually provided intense psychological support and free labour. Moreover, households usually had exchange of food and money for a period with close friends.

116 the capacity to do so. Households generally consider that close relatives have some sort of obligations to give material and monetary aid if they are capable. Most households have expectations to receive material and monetary aid from neighbours, friends and acquaintances, particularly from close neighbours and close friends, for their survival for a short period such as a day or a few days if they are capable. However, only a few households expect that neighbours, friends and acquaintances, particularly close neighbours and close friends, may provide them material and monetary aid for survival for a relatively long period and the economic and housing recovery process if they are capable. Moreover, unlike relatives, households generally do not consider that neighbours, friends and acquaintances have some sort of obligations to provide them material or monetary aid either for survival or the economic and housing recovery process if they are capable to do so.

In addition, Putnam (2000, p. 22) suggests that a bonding (or exclusive) network is ‘inward looking’ and strengthens ‘exclusive identities and homogenous groups’ while a bridging (or inclusive) network is ‘outward looking’ and connects people from diverse backgrounds. He also argues that bonding social capital creates ‘strong in-group loyalty’ which in turn may produce ‘strong out-group antagonism’ (p. 23). Putnam (2000, pp. 22–23) further claims that bonding social capital supports ‘specific reciprocity’ and mobilises ‘solidarity’ among members of homogenous groups and strengthens ‘narrower selves’, while bridging social capital generates ‘broader identities and reciprocity’. The nature of networks of the households in the two coastal villages shows that their networks with relatives were inward looking while their networks with neighbours, friends and acquaintances were outward looking. In addition, there was ‘strong in-group’ sentiment among related households, particularly among related households in the village. With some exceptions, neighbours, friends and acquaintances, particularly friends and acquaintances within the village, were not part of the ‘in-group’. Thus, solidarity among related households was usually very strong, while solidarity with neighbours and other villagers was usually weak and less intense compared to that with relatives. In addition, households usually prioritised relatives for mutual borrowing and lending of food and money, and in many cases they did not have any mutual borrowing and lending with neighbours, friends and acquaintances following Aila.

Moreover, all neighbours, friends and acquaintances within the villages were not from the same background and not members of a homogenous group. This is also true for friends and acquaintances the affected households had outside the village and the affected areas. Thus,

117 households had neighbours, friends and acquaintances who had diverse backgrounds. In other words, as neighbours, friends and acquaintances include ‘people across diverse social cleavages’, they represent bridging networks (Putnam 2000, p. 22). Another important fact was that although villagers shared the same place, both villages were internally divided by class and opposing political parties (Pelling 2007, p. 378; McCarthy 2014, p. 146). The villages also became more divided internally due to conflicts among villagers concerning relief items after Aila.

Lin (2008) argues that ‘social capital does not bind, or bridge. It is the nature of the social networks that bind, bond, or bridge’ (p. 62). Thus, bonding and bridging are ‘network features rather than social roles… some roles (e.g., neighbours, friends, relatives, etc.) can be either bridges, bonding, both or neither’ (email communication with Professor Nan Lin, 23 July 2018). He argues that binding and bonding relations are ‘the inner layer of relations’ and bridging relations are the outer layer of relations. The outer layer which is the community provides ‘a sense of belongingness and general social identity’. The two villages that represent the outer layer provided all villagers with a sense of belongingness and social identity mediated by the membership in the village (Lin 2008).

The study also found that households usually had strong ties with close relatives and weak ties with neighbours, friends and acquaintances. However, in a few cases where households had strained relationships with close relatives, the tie with close relatives was weak. In addition, their ties with distant or most distant relatives were also weak. In a few cases, it was also observed that households had strong ties with neighbours and close friends. So, all bonding ties are not essentially strong, and all bridging ties are not essentially weak (Pelling & High 2005). However, it is also worth noting that the weak tie component of the bonding network did not contribute, while the strong tie component of the bonding network contributed to the disaster response and recovery process of the affected households. This weak tie component of the bonding network had no obligations. In most cases, this included distant and most distant relatives, and in a few cases close relatives with whom the household had a strained relationship arising from an issue such as ownership of land. Thus, they did not provide any aid to one another and did not participate in mutual borrowing and lending of food and money, even for a short period.

118 5.3 Aid Received Through Bridging Networks

Neighbours, friends and acquaintances act as important sources of aid or support in a disaster. Aid or support from them play a vital role in the disaster response and recovery process of the affected households (Bolin 1982; Bolin & Bolton 1986; Bolin 1994).

Table 5.1 Percentage of the households that received aid from neighbours, friends and acquaintances36 (n=250) Types of aid Neighbours Friends and (%) acquaintances (%) Food 14.8 17.6 Water 6.8 10.8 Clothes 1.6 6.0 Utensils and other necessary household items 0.8 1.6 Shelter support at the time of Aila 5.2 0.8 Shelter support for at least a week or more 0.8 0.0 Provided caring for livestock in their house 0.0 0.0 Informational support such as information about aid 52.4 25.6 sources and work or employment opportunities Assistance to get work 26.4 14.8 Monetary aid only for surviving after Aila 0.4 2.0 Monetary aid for economic recovery such as for starting 0.0 0.8 economic activities Monetary aid for repairing or constructing house 0.0 0.0 Housing materials for repairing or constructing house 0.4 0.4 Free labour for repairing or constructing house 10.0 4.0 Psychological support 92.0 60.4 Other 2.4 2.0

36 Data for friends and acquaintances was created by combining four variables: particular aid the affected households received from: 1. friends and acquaintances within the village, 2. friends and acquaintances outside the village but living within the union, 3. friends and acquaintances living outside the union but were affected by Aila, 4. friends and acquaintances living outside the union but were not affected by Aila, i.e. from the unaffected friends and acquaintances. It is worth noting that the two studied villages and the two unions within which the two studied villages are located were fully affected by Aila. A household that received a listed type of aid from friends and acquaintances located in any place has been considered as a recipient of that type of aid. Thus, if a household received a listed type of aid from friends and acquaintances of at least one place out of friends and acquaintances of the four places, then the household was considered as a recipient of that aid. A household that did not receive a listed type of aid from friends and acquaintances located in any place has been considered as a non-recipient of that aid. For instance, if a household received food from friends and acquaintances of one place, or from friends and acquaintances of two places, or from friends and acquaintances of three places or from friends and acquaintances of all the four places, then it was considered that the household received food from their friends and acquaintances. If the household did not receive food from the friends and acquaintances of any place, then it was considered that the household did not receive any food from friends and acquaintances. Thus, it is possible that one household that received food from friends and acquaintances may have received food from friends and acquaintances located in more than one place and from more than one friend and acquaintance located in one place. In addition, households may have received more than one type of aid. The data presented in Table 5.1 for the 15 types of aid other than food from friends and acquaintances have also been presented based on the same logic. Data for neighbours: households may have received a particular aid from more than one neighbour, and households may have received more than one type of aid.

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Table 5.1 shows the 16 types of aid the surveyed households received from their neighbours, friends and acquaintances after Aila. Respondents were asked in the survey from a list containing 16 types of aid (including ‘other’ as a category in the list) to indicate which aid they received from their neighbours, friends and acquaintances after Aila. The types of aid included in the survey were based on the findings of the qualitative phase.

An analysis of the survey data show that 92 percent of the surveyed households (n=250) received at least one type of aid listed in Table 5.1 from neighbours. Likewise, 64.4 percent of the surveyed households (n=250) received at least one type of aid listed in Table 5.1 from friends and acquaintances. In other words, 8 percent and 35.6 percent of the surveyed households did not receive any aid listed in Table 5.1 from their neighbours, and friends and acquaintances respectively. However, among households that received aid from neighbours, friends and acquaintances, many households did not receive any aid except psychological support. If psychological support is not considered, then 65.2 percent of the surveyed households received at least one type of aid from neighbours. Likewise, if psychological support is not considered, then 39.2 percent of the surveyed households received at least one type of aid from friends and acquaintances. Similarly, among households that received aid from neighbours and friends and acquaintances, the overwhelming majority of the households did not receive any material or monetary aid from neighbours, friends and acquaintances.

Thus, aid the affected households received from their neighbours and friends and acquaintances after Aila and the role the received aid played in the response and recovery process of the affected households can be better understood if all 16 types of aid presented in Table 5.1 are listed under six categories (see Table 5.2).

120 Table 5.2 Six categories of aid from 16 types of aid Six categories 16 types of aid Material Aid (includes seven Food types) Water Clothes Utensils and other necessary household items Shelter support for at least a week or more Provided caring for livestock in their house Housing materials for repairing or constructing house Monetary Aid (includes three Monetary aid only for surviving after Aila types) Monetary aid for economic recovery such as for starting economic activities Monetary aid for repairing or constructing house Information and assistance to Informational support such as information about aid get work (includes two types) sources and work or employment opportunities Assistance to get work Labour Free labour for repairing or constructing house Psychological support Psychological support Other (includes two types) Shelter support at the time of Aila Other

The analysis of the survey data show that 16.80 percent of the surveyed households received material aid37 from neighbours and 0.4 percent of the surveyed households received any sort of monetary aid38 from neighbours. In total, 17.2 percent of the surveyed households received material and monetary aid39 from neighbours. The analysis of the survey data show that 18.40 percent of the surveyed households received material aid from friends and acquaintances and 2.4 percent of the surveyed households received any sort of monetary aid from friends and acquaintances. In total, 18.40 percent of the surveyed households received material and monetary aid from friends and acquaintances.40

In addition to the material and monetary aid, households received informational support such as information about aid sources and work or employment opportunities and assistance to get work from neighbours and friends and acquaintances. The survey data show that 52.4 percent of the surveyed households received informational support and 26.4 percent of the surveyed households received assistance from neighbours to get work following Aila. Likewise, 25.6

37 A household received at least one type of seven types of material aid and may have received more than one type of material aid. 38 A household received at least one type of three types of monetary aid and may have received more than one type of monetary aid. 39 A household received at least one type of ten types of material and monetary aid and may have received more than one type of material and monetary aid. 40 See footnotes 37, 38 and 39 for material aid, monetary aid, and material and monetary aid.

121 percent of the surveyed households received informational support and 14.8 percent of the surveyed households received assistance from friends and acquaintances to get work following Aila. As discussed in Chapter 4, like relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances served as important sources of information (Yila, Weber & Neef 2013). The affected households received information from their neighbours, friends and acquaintances about various aid sources and the date and place of the distribution of relief items by the national government or local government and various NGOs. They also obtained important information from their neighbours, friends and acquaintances related to work or employment opportunities in the affected areas as well as in the unaffected areas or distant places so that they could employ temporary migration to those places to succeed in dealing with their livelihood crisis.

The qualitative data demonstrate that neighbours, friends and acquaintances helped the affected households to get work as wage labourers in their villages or nearby and to undertake temporary migration to other places both before and after the embankment was repaired. Neighbours, friends and acquaintances helped the affected households to get work by including male members of the affected households in a group that worked to repair the embankment under private contractors for wages in the village and other affected adjacent or distant villages. Moreover, they also helped the affected households to get work by including the male member(s) of a household in a group that worked in agriculture for wages or crops in the village and surrounding villages when agriculture recommenced after repairing the embankment. Furthermore, neighbours and close friends who had a considerable amount of agricultural land permitted some of the affected households to cultivate their unsuitable agricultural land for a specific period in return for a smaller amount of crops than the usual conditions of sharecropping, so that they level the land surface by cutting mud and thus render it suitable for cultivation in future years.41 Likewise, neighbours, friends and acquaintances assisted those affected households from which member(s) did not undertake temporary migration before Aila to employ temporary migration after Aila. In addition, they also helped each other to undertake temporary migration to new places after Aila.

41 This happened in Channirchak where people use land for rice production. In Dakshin Bedkashi, people usually do not produce rice and thus use land for shrimp farming. Agricultural land became unsuitable for cultivation as it was subject to continuous inundation by saline water (part of the year) for a long period of time. The land became very high due to the sediment the tidal water brought or became very low due to erosion caused by the tidal flood water. It took many years to bring the land under agricultural production. There is still agricultural land in Channirchak which was not under cultivation as the sediment has not been removed yet.

122 Another important aid that the affected households received from neighbours, friends and acquaintances was free labour for the repair or construction of the house. Ten percent of households received free labour from neighbours, while 4 percent of households received free labour from friends and acquaintances during the repair or construction of the house. It is worth noting that many households did not consider that they were able to receive free labour from their neighbours and friends and acquaintances.

The most important aid the affected households received from neighbours and friends and acquaintances was psychological support. Ninety-two percent of the surveyed households received psychological support from their neighbours while 60.4 percent of the surveyed households received psychological support from their friends and acquaintances.

The category ‘other’ includes two types: shelter support at the time of Aila and other. Almost 5 percent and 0.8 percent of the surveyed households took shelter in their neighbours’ houses and friends and acquaintances’ houses at the time of Aila respectively. Two households that received shelter in their friends and acquaintances’ houses at the time of Aila received it from friends and acquaintances within the village. Moreover, 2.4 percent and 2 percent of the surveyed households received other aid from neighbours, and friends and acquaintances respectively. In addition to aid items, households borrowed food and other necessary household items and money from neighbours and friends and acquaintances. The survey data show that 27.6 percent (n=69) of the surveyed households borrowed money from neighbours and friends and acquaintances to cope with the post-Aila crisis. The qualitative data suggest that households usually borrowed these items for a very short period in order to meet their survival needs. Moreover, 7.6 percent (n=19) of the surveyed households took a loan (with interest) from neighbours, friends and acquaintances for various purposes including survival and starting recovery activity.

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Table 5.3 Percentage of the households that received aid from friends and acquaintances (n=250) Types of aid Affected friends and acquaintances Friends and % (n) acquaintances Within Outside the Outside the outside the union the village but union but but not Aila village within the Aila affected affected % (n) union Food 7.6 (19) 1.6 (4) 2.8 (7) 6.8 (17) Water 5.2 (13) 0.8 (2) 1.6 (4) 3.2 (8) Clothes 3.2 (8) 0.8 (2) 0.4 (1) 2.8 (7) Utensils and other 1.2 (3) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.4 (1) necessary household items Shelter support at the time 0.8 (2) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) of Aila Shelter support for at least 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) a week or more Provided caring for 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) livestock in their house Informational support such 22.4 (56) 3.2 (8) 1.6 (4) 1.2 (3) as information about aid sources and work or employment opportunities Assistance to get work 10.0 (25) 4.0 (10) 1.2 (3) 1.2 (3) Monetary aid only for 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 2.0 (5) surviving after Aila Monetary aid for 0.0 (0) 0.4 (1) 0.0 (0) 0.4 (1) economic recovery such as for starting economic activities Monetary aid for repairing 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) or constructing house Housing materials for 0.4 (1) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) repairing or constructing house Free labour for repairing 2.8 (7) 0.4 (1) 0.4 (1) 0.4 (1) or constructing house Psychological support 54.4 14.8 (37) 9.2 (23) 8.8 (22) (136) Other 2.0 (5) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0)

Note: Household may have received a particular aid from more than one friend and acquaintance located in one place. Household may have received more than one type of aid.

Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)

124 5.4 Bridging Social Capital and Post-Disaster Response and Recovery

5.4.1 Role of Bridging Social Capital in Evacuation, Search and Rescue

Neighbours, and in some cases friends and acquaintances within the village, played a vital role in helping the affected households in evacuation to the safer places during the event (in a few cases, immediately before the event), saving lives during the event and in search and rescue activities immediately after the event (Shaw & Goda 2004; Shaw & Sinha 2003; Shaw 2014b; Islam & Walkerden 2014). Many people left their homestead to reach a safe place, while many people became trapped in their flooded houses or within and around their submerged homestead. Among people who left their homestead to go to safer places in the two villages, most people42 left their homestead after the villages became flooded due to the breaking of embankments caused by the storm surge associated with Aila. Thus, the majority encountered difficulties in reaching safer places as they had to wade through the flooded roads or swim against the flow in the rising waters. Neighbours, friends and acquaintances within the village, when needed, saved their lives and assisted them to reach a safe place. The following excerpt from an interviewee, who along with her adult son was trying to go to the adjacent cyclone shelter from her house by swimming, depicts how people came forward to save lives and assist in reaching a safe place:

We could not reach the cyclone shelter by swimming. I went down below the surface of the water; my son also went down below the surface of the water. People who were in the cyclone shelter during that time [saved us and] took us to the cyclone shelter. (DB, 17 June 2017)

Among people who left their homestead, many people stayed in their own houses or within and around their homestead at the initial stage of the flooding and left their homestead later. They had to move to their neighbour’s house (or relative’s house) during the later stage of the flooding as their house had collapsed or was about to collapse, or they felt that they could not survive in their house, or within and around their homestead, as the flood water level

42 The survey data show that household members (who were present at home on the day of Aila) of 99.2 percent of the total surveyed households moved from their homestead to other places on the day of Aila (before, during and after the flooding). The data show that 89.6 percent of the total surveyed households left their homestead after both their homestead and house were inundated, 6.8 percent left their homestead after only their homestead inundated, and 0.8 percent left their homestead before their homestead inundated. Also, in the case of 2 percent of households, some members of the household moved before the homestead inundated and some members moved both after the homestead and house were inundated.

125 increased continuously for some hours. This can be understood from the following excerpt of an interviewee who left her homestead after her house had collapsed:

When the whole house collapsed, I was standing in the courtyard and the level of water was equal to the height of my chest… I left my homestead after that with my child held to my breast [to go to the nearby building of a neighbour]. I lived in that building that night. (CC, 25 October 2017)

Many of them had to move again to another adjacent house of a neighbour (or a relative) to survive during the flooding as the neighbour’s house (or relative’s house) where they moved first also collapsed. The survey data show that 5.2 percent and 0.8 percent of the surveyed households took shelter at their neighbour’s house and friends and acquaintances’ houses at the time of Aila respectively. The qualitative data suggests that people who took shelter in the adjacent house of neighbours, friends and acquaintances within the village (and relatives within the village) in most cases were not able to go to other safer places such as an embankment, cyclone shelter or school building in the rising waters.

In both the villages, a sizable number of people became trapped in their flooded houses or within and around their submerged homestead. Neighbours, friends and acquaintances within the village helped the affected households, when needed, in searching for members of these households. They also played an active role, when needed, in rescuing members of the affected households from their flooded houses or submerged homesteads or other places where they were trapped immediately after the event. The following excerpt shows how a neighbour came forward to rescue members of the household of a male interviewee who was not at home during the event:

We were all at Bazaar… They [family members] survived by clinging to the branches of a tree… All of them clung to the same tree… When the tide became stable, [a neighbour] Masud [pseudonym] bhai [brother] rescued them and took them to the union parshad. (DB, 18 June 2017)

Among neighbours, friends and acquaintances within the village, neighbours played a more important role as neighbours’ households were generally close to the affected households compared to the houses of friends and acquaintances within the village. Young people in the neighbourhood and village played vital roles in evacuation and search and rescue activities. In

126 some cases, children, aged people and women would have lost their lives if they had not been assisted by their neighbours, friends and acquaintances during the first few hours of the flooding. They also helped to rescue valuable items from inundated houses whenever possible. Moreover, they helped one another to relocate their houses to the embankment or to prepare a muchan within the homestead. Neighbours, friends and acquaintances within the village played more important roles in evacuation and saving lives during the event compared to their role in the search and rescue activities. Members of the related households within the village mainly helped one another to search for and rescue members from the trapped places immediately after the event.

5.4.2 Role of Bridging Social Capital in Survival

Although bridging social capital played an important role in evacuation and search and rescue activities, bridging social capital did not contribute to the survival of most of the affected households. An analysis of the qualitative interviews shows that most of the interviewed households did not receive any material or monetary aid from their neighbours at any stage after Aila. Some households that received material aid from neighbours usually received food and water. Except in rare cases, households did not receive clothes, utensils and other necessary household items from neighbours. Moreover, none of the interviewed households received shelter support for a week or more, or caring for livestock, or housing materials as assistance from neighbours. The qualitative data also show that no household received any sort of monetary aid from neighbours. The survey data show that 82.8 percent of the surveyed households did not receive any material or monetary aid from neighbours. The data also show that 14.8 percent, 6.8 percent, 1.6 percent and 0.8 percent of the surveyed households received food, water, clothes, utensils and other necessary household items from neighbours respectively. Moreover, 0.8 percent of households received shelter support for at least a week or more and only 0.4 percent of households received housing materials for repairing or constructing the house, while none of the surveyed households received assistance in caring for livestock from their neighbours. Furthermore, only one surveyed household received monetary aid (only 100 Taka) only for surviving the disaster from neighbours.

An analysis of the qualitative interviews shows that most of the interviewed households did not receive any material or monetary aid from their friends and acquaintances at any stage after Aila. Some households that received material aid from friends and acquaintances received food and water. In a few cases, households received clothes from their friends and

127 acquaintances. For instance, among all the qualitative in-depth interviews with the interviewees from the studied households, only two households received clothes from their friends and acquaintances. Both households received this from friends and acquaintances (from friends) of the unaffected areas and both households were from Dakshin Bedkashi. Except in rare cases, they did not receive utensils and other necessary household items from friends and acquaintances. None of the interviewed households received shelter support for a week or more, caring for livestock and housing materials from friends and acquaintances. The qualitative data also show that only two households among all the interviewed households received money from friends and acquaintances. Both households received it from friends and acquaintances of the unaffected areas and both households were from Dakshin Bedkashi. Both households received money only for surviving the disaster. One household received money (along with money to buy clothes for family members) from a friend who lives in Dhaka and another female-headed household43 received money (along with food such as flattened rice, rice and clothes) from her brother’s friends who live in Khulna City. The following statements of the interviewee who received money from his friend who lives in Dhaka depict the event clearly:

I received 10,000 Taka from a friend. He was my partner in a shrimp firm before Aila [during 1998–1999 and business was closed due to loss; the person was from Khulna and had been living in Dhaka from before Aila]. However, I had friendship with him; I also have communication with him up to now. He phoned me after hearing about Aila and gave me 10,000 Taka… Later I went to Dhaka, I worked there after Aila and met him in Dhaka. He gave me 3,000 Taka again and told me to buy clothes for children with that money. (DB, 17 June 2017)

The survey data show that 81.6 percent of the surveyed households did not receive any material or monetary aid from friends and acquaintances. The data show that 17.6 percent, 10.8 percent, 6 percent and 1.6 percent of the surveyed households received food, water, clothes, and utensils and other necessary household items from friends and acquaintances respectively. Moreover, only 0.4 percent of households received housing materials for repairing or constructing the house, while none of the surveyed households received shelter support for at least a week or more or caring for livestock from their friends and

43 All her brothers also live in the same village. Her brothers’ households also received money along with food such as flattened rice, rice and clothes from her brother’s friends.

128 acquaintances. The data also show that only 2 percent of households (n=5) received monetary aid for surviving the disaster from friends and acquaintances.44 The survey data also show that more households received material aid from the affected friends and acquaintances while more households received monetary aid from the unaffected friends and acquaintances (see Table 5.3).

An analysis of the qualitative data shows that households that received food and water from neighbours and friends and acquaintances within the village received this mainly during the night or next day of Aila.45 If a neighbour or friend and acquaintance within the village had saved some rice from being washed away during Aila, then the household shared the rice with other affected people during the night of Aila and the following day. It was typically a meal for one or at best two times and mainly cooked rice without any other items or khichuri. This was really a very small amount of food that contributed greatly to the survival. If any household had some rice among all the households that gathered in one place, such as a school building, Union Parishad building or cyclone shelter, then people cooked it and distributed it among all those present. This can be understood from the following excerpt of an interview:

We had a drum of rice. The drum was being washed away by the flooded water; I saved the drum by swimming. Rice in the drum became wet as water entered the drum. We went to the Union Parishad along with that drum of rice. People who came to the Union Parishad did not have any rice. We cooked that rice and ate it with salt that night. We gave that rice to everyone present there. All families [20 to 25 families] at the Union Parishad ate cooked rice from that rice. (DB, 17 June 2017)

The qualitative data also show that after the night or following day after Aila, households generally received material aid or monetary aid or both (mainly material aid) from neighbours, friends and acquaintances in four ways. Firstly, some households received mainly

44 The survey data show that six households received monetary aid from friends and acquaintances. Three households received from friends and three households from acquaintances. While one friend was from the affected areas (outside the village but within the union) and two friends were from outside the Aila affected areas, all three acquaintances were from outside the Aila affected areas. One household received 6,000 Taka from the affected friend for economic recovery only, one household received 1,100 Taka from a friend from the unaffected areas for survival only and another household received 12,000 Taka from a friend from the unaffected areas for both survival and economic recovery. Three households that received money from acquaintances received money only for survival (one household received 1,500 Taka and two households received 500 each). 45 The survey did not distinguish between food received from neighbours or friends and acquaintances within the first few days of Aila and food received from neighbours or friends and acquaintances later.

129 food and water from their neighbours and the affected friends and acquaintances as neighbours and the affected friends and acquaintances gave from what they received as aid from other sources such as relatives outside the affected areas. Households usually received emergency food and water for survival and, except in a few cases, households received this form of aid during the first few days of the event. This can be understood from the following excerpts:

My neighbours were affected, I was also affected. Thus, I had nothing to do. Relatives from the outside gave me something and I gave something to neighbours from that. Many people did like that. (CC, 8 June 2017, Key informant)

I did not receive anything from neighbours. I received aid sometimes from an acquaintance whom I met after Aila when I was doing BRAC’s work [cash for work program operated by BRAC, an NGO] with her. She received more vegetables and water from her relatives compared to us and she used to give me some from that aid. (CC, 25 August 2017)

Secondly, only a few households received material aid and monetary aid for survival from friends (not acquaintances) outside the affected areas due to the previous friendship. They received this within the first few weeks of the event. Thirdly, some households received material aid as one-off relief from a few neighbours and friends and acquaintances within the village and affected areas.46 Fourthly, some households received material aid as one-off relief from acquaintances of the unaffected adjacent and distant places. In the case of the third and fourth ways, households generally received a one-off relief packet from neighbours or friends and acquaintances of the affected areas or the acquaintances of the unaffected areas as part of the group distribution process, not as an individually targeted household, due to being neighbours and friends and acquaintances of the person who donated the relief. Households received mainly food, water and clothes as one-off relief. However, these types of one-off relief distributions usually covered only a section of the households of a village, not all the

46 For instance, one Aila-affected household in Channirchak distributed emergency relief items among related households within the village and households of neighbours and friends and acquaintances of a section of the village. The household that distributed relief items was also severely affected by Aila and lost income from agriculture in the village. However, the household did not experience complete loss in its usual income as two sons of the household head used to derive income from an area not affected by Aila even from the pre-Aila period. Likewise, an out-marrying woman of Dakshin Bedkashi, who was married to an area not affected by Aila, distributed almost 70 to 75 relief packets (each packet contains 2–3 kg rice and 1 kg flattened rice) via her father who lives in Dakshin Bedkashi. Moreover, two outside persons who were the owners of a shrimp farm in Dakshin Bedkashi distributed relief items among households of a section of the village.

130 households. Moreover, one person usually distributed once, and the majority distributed during the first two weeks of the event.

Neighbours and friends and acquaintances did not contribute to the survival of most of the households. They contributed to the survival of only some households. Although the aid some households received was only enough for survival for a day in most cases, they were usually grateful to their neighbours and friends and acquaintances for the aid they provided as it played vital roles for survival, particularly during the night and following day of Aila. The survey data show that 14.8 (n=37) and 17.6 (n=44) percent of the surveyed households received either both food and water or one of these two items from neighbours, and friends and acquaintances respectively after Aila.47 Among the households that received both food and water or one of these two items as aid from neighbours, 21.6 percent of respondents considered that the aid was extremely important for survival while 27 percent, 29.7 percent, 18.9 percent, and 2.7 percent of respondents considered that the aid was very important, moderately important, slightly important, and not at all important respectively for the survival of their households during the post-Aila period (see Figure 5.1). Among the households that received both food and water or one of these two items as aid from friends and acquaintances, 45.5 percent of respondents considered that the aid was extremely important for the survival of their households while 13.6 percent, 25 percent, 13.6 percent, and 2.3 percent of respondents considered that the aid was very important, moderately important, slightly important, and not at all important respectively for the survival of their households during the post-Aila period (see Figure 5.2).

47 Food and water received at any period following Aila.

131

Figure 5.1 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of food and water or either received from neighbours in their survival (n=37)

Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)

Figure 5.2 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of food and water or either received from friends and acquaintances in their survival (n=44)

Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)

The analysis of the qualitative data shows that although only some households received material aid and monetary aid from neighbours, friends and acquaintances at any stage after Aila, most households received psychological support from these sources. In addition, a

132 significant number of households received informational support and assistance to get work. Moreover, although many households mentioned that they did not receive labour from neighbours and friends and acquaintances without money, many households received free labour for the repair or construction of houses from neighbours, and friends and acquaintances, mainly from close friends. In sum, although bridging networks did not perform well in providing material and monetary aid after the first few days of the event, the affected households received resources that did not require material resources to be invested such as psychological support, informational support and help to get work for a longer period. However, many households did not even receive non-material resources from the bridging networks after a period, as their relationships with neighbours and friends and acquaintances became conflictual after a period, mainly due to the competition for relief items. For instance, neighbours and villagers on many occasions concealed information from non-related households if the information was related to any livelihood or housing intervention, as some had a belief that the amount of interventions was limited compared to the demand. In addition to the aid or support, mutual borrowing and lending of food and money among neighbours and close friends within the village and adjacent villages for a short period to meet daily needs played an important role in meeting the survival needs of the affected households, although many households did not have any mutual exchange with people other than relatives.

5.4.3 Role of Bridging Social Capital in Economic and Housing Recovery

Bridging social capital did not play an important role in the economic and housing recovery of the affected households. The qualitative data show that none of the interviewed households received monetary aid from neighbours for any purpose, while only two households received monetary aid from friends and acquaintances (received from a friend/friends) and both the households received that money for survival, not for economic and housing recovery. Moreover, none of the interviewed households received housing materials from neighbours or from friends and acquaintances. However, many households received free labour from neighbours for the repair or construction of their houses after Aila, while some households received free labour from friends and acquaintances, mainly from close friends, for the repair or construction of the houses after Aila.

The survey data show that no household received monetary aid from neighbours for economic recovery while 0.8 percent of households received monetary aid from friends and acquaintances for economic recovery. The survey data on three types of aid directly related to

133 housing recovery show that none of the surveyed households received monetary aid from neighbours for the repair or construction of their houses, while 0.4 percent of households received housing materials and 10 percent of households received free labour from neighbours for the repair or construction of their houses. Likewise, the survey data show that no household received monetary aid from friends and acquaintances for the repair or construction of their houses, while 0.4 percent of households received housing materials and 4 percent of households received free labour from friends and acquaintances for the repair or construction of their houses. Thus, both the qualitative and survey data show that no household received monetary aid for economic and housing recovery from neighbours. Moreover, the qualitative data show that no household received monetary aid for economic and housing recovery from friends and acquaintances, while the survey data show that 0.8 percent of households received monetary aid for economic recovery and no household received monetary aid for housing recovery from friends and acquaintances. Likewise, both the qualitative and survey data confirm that, except in rare cases, they did not receive housing materials for repairing or constructing their houses from neighbours and friends and acquaintances.

Analysis of the qualitative interviews shows that none of the interviewed households considered that the aid they received from neighbours and friends and acquaintances had any significant role in the economic recovery. Likewise, none of the interviewed households considered that the aid they received from neighbours and friends and acquaintances had any significant role in the housing recovery, although some households acknowledged that the free labour they received during the repair or construction of the houses was useful and thus had a slight role in the housing recovery. In sum, bridging social capital in general did not play any role in the economic recovery of the affected households. Likewise, except in a few cases, it did not play any role in the housing recovery of the affected households. It played some sort of role in the housing recovery of a few households by providing free labour during the repair or construction of the houses.

The findings of the survey also confirm these qualitative findings. Among households that received any aid from neighbours (n=230), respondents of 97.8 percent of households (225 out of 230 households) considered that the aid from neighbours was not at all important for economic recovery, while respondents of 2.2 percent of households (5 out of 230) considered that the aid was slightly important for economic recovery. No household considered that aid

134 from neighbours had either a moderately important or very important or extremely important role in the economic recovery (see Figure 5.3). Likewise, among households that received any aid from friends and acquaintances (n=161), respondents of 96.9 percent of households (156 out of 161 households) considered that the aid was not at all important for economic recovery while respondents of 1.9 percent (n=3), 0.6 percent (n=1) and 0.6 percent (n=1) of households considered that the aid was slightly important, moderately important and very important respectively. No household considered that the aid from friends and acquaintances had an extremely important role in economic recovery (see Figure 5.4).

Among households that received any aid from neighbours (n=230), respondents of 94.8 percent (218 out of 230 households) considered that the aid from neighbours was not at all important for housing recovery while 4.8 percent (11 out of 230 households) and 0.4 percent (one household) considered that the aid from neighbours was slightly important and moderately important for housing recovery respectively. No household considered that the aid from neighbours had either a very important or extremely important role in the housing recovery (see Figure 5.3). Based on the qualitative data, it can be argued that 4.8 percent out of 230 households considered that neighbours had a slight role in the housing recovery process only due to the free labour the households received from their neighbours during the repair or construction of the houses after Aila. Likewise, for households that received any aid from friends and acquaintances (n=161), 99.4 percent (160 out of 161 households) considered that the aid from friends and acquaintances was not at all important for housing recovery, while 0.6 percent (n=1) considered that the aid was very important for housing recovery (see Figure 5.4).

Thus, aid from neighbours had some sort of role in the economic recovery of 2 percent (n=5) of the total surveyed households and in the housing recovery of 4.8 percent (n=12) of the total surveyed households. Likewise, aid from friends and acquaintances had some sort of role in the economic recovery of 2 percent (n=5) of the total surveyed households and in the housing recovery of 0.4 percent (n=1) of the total surveyed households. In addition to aid, a few households took a loan with interest from neighbours and friends and acquaintances for starting economic activity such as agriculture, shrimp farming and business and repairing or constructing houses. The survey data show that among households that took a loan from neighbours, friends and acquaintances (n=19), seven households took a loan for starting economic activity while one household took a loan for repairing or constructing a house.

135

Figure 5.3 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from neighbours in economic, housing and psychological recovery (n=230)

Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)

Figure 5.4 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from friends and acquaintances in economic, housing and psychological recovery (n=161)

Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)

136 5.4.4 Role of Bridging Social Capital in Psychological Recovery

Neighbours, friends and acquaintances played an important role in the psychological recovery process of the members of the affected households. The qualitative data reveal that although most households did not receive material or monetary aid from their neighbours, friends and acquaintances, most households received psychological support. The survey data also reveal that among all types of aid that the affected households received from neighbours and friends and acquaintances, the highest percentage of the households received psychological support from neighbours as well as from friends and acquaintances (see Table 5.1). Thus, although neighbours, friends and acquaintances of the affected households did not have the capacity to provide the required material and monetary aid for survival or for economic and housing recovery, they had the capacity to provide non-material and non-monetary resources like psychological support. Neighbours and friends and acquaintances provided sympathy and consolation and positive hope for the future to the affected households. The affected households provided psychological support to one another and received psychological support from their unaffected friends and acquaintances, mainly from friends. The psychological support neighbours, friends and acquaintances provided greatly helped the affected households to recover psychologically from the shock created by Aila.

The survey data also confirm this and show that among households that received any aid from neighbours (230 of 250) after Aila, respondents of 10.9 percent (n=25) and 36.5 percent (n=84) of households considered that the aid from neighbours played an extremely important role and very important role in the psychological recovery process of the members of the affected households respectively. The data show that respondents of 27.8 percent (n=64) and 19.6 percent (n=45) of households considered that the aid from neighbours played a moderately important role and slightly important role respectively, while respondents of 5.2 percent (n=12) of households considered that the aid from neighbours did not play any role in the psychological recovery process of the members of the affected households (see Figure 5.3). Among households that received any aid from friends and acquaintances (161 of 250) after Aila, respondents of 8.1 percent (n=13) and 34.8 percent (n=56) of households considered that the aid from friends and acquaintances played an extremely important role and very important role in the psychological recovery process of the members of the affected households respectively. The data show that respondents of 37.9 percent (n=61) and 16.8 percent (n=27) of households considered that the aid from friends and acquaintances played a moderately important role and slightly important role respectively, while respondents of 2.5

137 percent (n=4) of households considered that the aid from friends and acquaintances did not play any role in the psychological recovery process of the members of the affected households (see Figure 5.4).

Another noticeable fact is that while 43.6 percent (n=109) of the total respondents (n=250) considered that aid from neighbours had a very important and extremely important role in the psychological recovery of the members of the affected household, no respondents considered that aid from neighbours had a very important and extremely important role in the economic and housing recovery process of the affected households respectively. Likewise, while 27.6 percent (n=69) of the total respondents (n=250) considered that aid from friends and acquaintances had a very important and extremely important role in the psychological recovery of the members of the affected household, 0.4 percent and 0.4 percent considered that aid from friends and acquaintances had a very important and extremely important role in the economic and housing recovery process of the affected households respectively. Thus, although neighbours, friends and acquaintances of the affected households did not play any role in the economic and housing recovery in most cases, they played a significant role in the psychological recovery process of members of the affected households (Bolin & Bolton 1986).

The survey also asked the respondents to assess the importance of the psychological support received from neighbours, friends and acquaintances in the psychological recovery process of the members of the household. Among households that received psychological support from neighbours (230 of 250) after Aila, respondents of 11.3 percent (n=26) and 37.4 percent (n=86) of households considered that psychological support from neighbours played an extremely important role and very important role respectively in the psychological recovery process of the members of the affected households. The data show that respondents of 29.6 percent (n=68) and 18.3 percent (n=42) of households considered that psychological support from neighbours played a moderately important role, and slightly important role respectively while respondents of 3.5 percent (n=8) of households considered that psychological support from neighbours did not play any role in the psychological recovery process of the members of the affected households. Among households that received psychological support from friends and acquaintances (151 of 250) after Aila, respondents of 9.3 percent (n=14), 37.1 percent (n=56), 40.4 percent (n=61) and 13.2 percent (n=20) of households considered that the psychological support they received form their friends and acquaintances had an

138 extremely important role, very important role, moderately important role and slightly important role in the psychological recovery process of the members of the affected households respectively while nobody mentioned that it had no role.

The qualitative findings suggest that the psychological support the interviewed households received from neighbours, friends and acquaintances was not so intense in many cases. Moreover, in many cases, the interviewed households did not receive psychological support from their neighbours, friends and acquaintances within the village throughout the recovery process as households’ relationships with neighbours and friends and acquaintances within the village became tense, suspicious and conflictual after a period following Aila due to the competition for access to relief items. Islam and Walkerden (2014) also found that conflict with neighbours and friends emerged due to the competition for access to relief items in the context of the post-Sidr (2007) situation in Bangladesh. In a few cases, conflict also emerged from competition for securing a place on the embankment to build a temporary shelter as the space on the embankment was limited relative to the number of people who needed to live there. However, conflict over securing a place on the embankment emerged only in a few cases and mainly during the first few days following Aila and was not as problematic as the conflict due to the competition for relief items. Thus, although a ‘therapeutic community’ emerged in both villages after Aila (Fritz 1961; Barton 1969; Drabek & Key 1976, 1984; Ericson et al. 1976), it did not last long, mainly due to the conflict from the competition for relief items. This can be understood from the following excerpts of the interviews:

Rich and poor, all were equal after Aila. There was envy and hostility before Aila. However, envy and hostility decreased after Aila. There was harmony among people after Aila… People were closer to one another after Aila compared to pre-Aila… Conflict started when the relief operation started. (DB, 18 June 2017)

As everyone was in a precarious situation due to Aila, there was solidarity among all after Aila. However, the solidarity among people started to decline when the relief assistance [from the government and NGOs] came. People became envious of one another; I would get more, my family would get more… As people became envious of one another, there was a decline in the interpersonal trust. (CC, 9 June 2017, Key informant)

139

The above-mentioned excerpts show that conflict emerged after Aila due to the competition for relief items in both villages. However, although the conflict started at the early phase of the relief operation such as when there was only emergency relief distribution, it was not so intense during this phase of the relief operation. The conflict became intense at the later phase of the relief operation when the government and NGOs started interventions related to livelihood and housing recovery. Two important interventions from the government following Aila in both the villages were: a) 20 kg rice per vulnerable group feeding (VGF) card; and b) 20,000 Taka for the repair or construction of the houses. When the government distributed 20 kg rice per VGF card from September 2009 to October 2010, the conflict was less intense as the intervention included almost all the affected households. Thus, as almost every household received it, there was a sense of equal treatment, so there was less of a problem. However, compared to the number of affected households, the number of beneficiary households for the 20,000 Taka given by the government for the repair or construction of the houses was fewer. Likewise, the number of beneficiary households for various NGO-operated programs such as livelihood and housing programs was fewer compared to the number of affected households. As the number of beneficiaries was fewer compared to the number of affected households who had actual need, the conflict started. This can be understood from the following excerpt:

People became envious of one another because if others knew [about these relief items] then I would not get it, my name would be deleted from the list… It was in my mind that if others knew, then I would not get it as the amount of the relief was limited. (CC, 7 June 2017)

Although conflict emerged after Aila due to the competition for relief items (in a few cases, for securing a place on the embankment), these forms of conflict usually emerged with neighbours or in some cases with friends and acquaintances within the village. The analysis of the qualitative data shows that if a household did not receive a relief item from an outside organisation but neighbours, friends and acquaintances within the village received this item, then, in many cases, the household that did not receive that item usually had a sense of deprivation and sometimes the relationships with neighbours, friends (particularly distant friends) and acquaintances within the village became tense, suspicious and conflictual. However, a household did not usually have a sense of deprivation or a tense, suspicious and conflictual relationship with a related household when the related household, particularly a

140 closely related household, received an item from the outside organisation while the household did not receive that item.

Analysis of the qualitative interviews reveals that on many occasions people in the villages urged the elected leaders of the local government, village leaders, and the respective personnel of the government agencies and NGOs to remove from the list some households who were listed by an NGO or the government for receiving a particular benefit/intervention (e.g. a house from an NGO). They felt that there were other more vulnerable households that should receive this benefit instead of the listed household. Households usually experienced this form of opposition from neighbours and villagers, not from relatives, particularly not from close relatives, living within the village.

Thus, a household was silent when one of the closely related households received a relief item which the household did not receive. However, in many cases, the household was not silent and had a tense, suspicious and conflictual relationship with unrelated neighbours or friends and acquaintances within the village when they received the item that the household did not receive. This tendency was observed in both villages although was more apparent in the Dakshin Bedkashi Village as, unlike Channirchak Village, there were many houses that the NGOs constructed in this village during the recovery period.

Aila itself limited the operation of the bridging networks. As the space on the embankment was insufficient for the number of displaced people, villagers became scattered after Aila. Thus, among households that used to live close together, some households lived on one side of the embankment while others lived on the other side until the waters subsided. This was a major problem for Channirchak. Although related households usually lived close to one another on the embankment, in some cases they became dispersed as they failed to secure a place to live side by side on the embankment. In some cases, households of siblings also became scattered. This happened to an even higher degree with neighbours, friends and acquaintances within the village. Thus, those who were usually neighbours were no longer so. Acquaintances from the village or acquaintances and previously unknown people from adjacent villages became neighbours when households lived on the embankment for a long period following Aila. Likewise, households of friends and acquaintances within the village also became scattered. Consequently, households living on one side of the embankment became scattered from households that lived on the other side. Moreover, households that lived on the embankment became scattered from households that stayed in the usual

141 homestead. Likewise, households that did not live on the embankment but stayed in their usual own homesteads also became scattered from one another. It was difficult to move from one side of the embankment to another or from the embankment to a household that stayed in the usual homestead or from a household that stayed in the usual homestead to another household that also stayed in the usual homestead due to regular tidal flooding of the villages for a long period. This persisted for a long period until the embankment was repaired. Thus dispersal of households restricted the usual social interactions as well as the customary borrowing and lending of essential household goods and money for a short period among neighbours, friends and acquaintances.

5.5 Why Bridging Social Capital Played a Limited Role in the Survival and the Economic and Housing Recovery

Bridging social capital did not play an important role in the survival and the economic and housing recovery process of the affected households for three main reasons: neighbours, friends and acquaintances with whom households had bridging relations were poor; neighbours and most of their friends and acquaintances were themselves affected; and most households did not have friends and acquaintances outside the affected areas who could give them material or monetary aid.

An analysis of the qualitative data shows that neighbours and the affected as well as the unaffected friends and acquaintances did not play important roles in the survival, economic and housing recovery process of the affected households as they did not have the capacity to provide the required material or monetary aid due to poverty. Moreover, neighbours and the affected friends and acquaintances were not able to play important roles in the survival, economic and housing recovery of the affected households since most households had lost their material possessions. They were not able to restore their usual livelihood activities for a long period as the villages were subject to tidal flooding (one village for almost 21 months and the other for almost 33 months). Thus, neighbours and the affected friends and acquaintances also had their own struggles for survival and their own recovery challenges. The following excerpts clearly denote this situation:

Neighbours, friends and acquaintances in the village were not able to help. Everyone had a problem; everyone had the same condition… Everyone was equal… How could

142 I ask others [for help]? Who would give? What would they give? Thus, I did not ask others for anything. (CC, 9 June 2017)

I did not receive any aid [material or money] from neighbours, friends and acquaintances. All of them were affected by Aila. All of them had problems. (DB, 10 July 2017)

Qualitative findings also suggest that friends and acquaintances outside the affected areas did not play important roles in the survival and economic and housing recovery of the affected households as a few households had any friends and acquaintances outside the affected areas from whom they could receive material or monetary aid after Aila. Households generally had their close friends and acquaintances from whom they could expect to receive material or monetary aid for survival, if not for economic and housing recovery, only within the village, the adjacent villages and the union. However, they were also affected as both the studied unions were affected. Moreover, a significant number of households did not have any friends and acquaintances outside the village or the adjacent villages or the union, i.e. outside the affected areas. The following excerpts support this:

I do not have any close person outside the village. My network is within the village, I do not have any person outside the village from whom I can get 500 to 1,000 Taka if I am in a crisis. All [friends and acquaintances] are in the village, I do not have any in other villages. (CC, 23 August 2017)

I do not have any acquaintances outside the area. All acquaintances are within the village and the adjacent villages. (CC, 9 June 2017)

I do not have friends and acquaintances outside the union… When we go outside for work, we meet some people, but this is for a short period of time. (DB, 9 July 2017)

Furthermore, except for a few households, the friends that households had outside the affected areas were not close friends. Thus, households usually did not have any expectation to receive any material or monetary aid spontaneously from those friends. They also did not expect to receive any material or monetary aid from the acquaintances outside the affected areas.

Some survey findings related to the reasons for not receiving any monetary aid or receiving a smaller amount of monetary aid from the affected neighbours, friends and acquaintances

143 show that 98 percent of the respondents mentioned neighbours were affected while 51.6 percent of the respondents mentioned neighbours were poor as one of the reasons for not receiving any monetary aid or receiving a small amount of monetary aid from neighbours. Likewise, 98.8 percent of the respondents mentioned that friends and acquaintances were affected while 52.8 percent of the respondents mentioned that friends and acquaintances were poor as one of the reasons for not receiving any monetary aid or receiving a small amount of monetary aid from the affected friends and acquaintances. Moreover, 42 percent of the respondents mentioned not having any friends and acquaintances outside the affected areas, 38.8 percent of the respondents mentioned that friends and acquaintances outside the affected areas were poor, 26.4 percent of the respondents mentioned that friends and acquaintances outside the affected areas had capacity to help but did not help, and 5.6 percent of the respondents mentioned other as one of the reasons for not receiving any monetary aid or receiving a small amount of monetary aid from the unaffected friends and acquaintances. The survey did not distinguish between close friends and friends, or between acquaintances from whom they did expect to receive some aid and acquaintances from whom they did not expect to receive any aid. Thus, it might be possible that most of the unaffected friends and acquaintances who did not provide monetary aid or provided only little despite being capable were not close friends or acquaintances from whom they had any expectation to receive monetary aid. The above survey findings point out four important reasons – own experience of disaster, poverty, not having any friends and acquaintances outside the affected areas, and friends and acquaintances outside did not help despite being capable – for not receiving monetary aid or receiving little monetary aid from neighbours, friends and acquaintances.

A critical analysis of the findings show that neighbours, friends and acquaintances were not able to contribute to the survival for a long period and the economic and housing recovery process due to poverty, even if neighbours and most of the friends and acquaintances of the households were not affected themselves. The qualitative data suggest that although most households expect that neighbours, friends and acquaintances will help them in the survival for a short period such as a day or a few days, only a few households expect that they will help them in the survival for a relatively long period such as a week or some weeks and the economic and housing recovery process even if they are capable. In other words, most households do not have any expectations that neighbours, friends and acquaintances will help them in their survival for a long period and the economic and housing recovery even if they are capable. If neighbours and most of the friends and acquaintances of the households were

144 not affected themselves, then neighbours and friends and acquaintances could have played a little better role in their survival for a short period. Likewise, they could have played a little better role in the economic and housing recovery process of the few affected households. Nevertheless, neighbours, friends and acquaintances did not have the capacity to provide the required material and monetary aid for survival for a long period as required in the post-Aila period and the economic and housing recovery of the affected households due to poverty, even if neighbours and most of the friends and acquaintances were not affected. This can be clearly understood from some of the relevant survey findings. The survey data reveal that 96.4 percent of households did not have any relatives/neighbours/friends and acquaintances from whom the household was able to receive 20,000 Taka as aid to cope with the post-Aila crisis. Likewise, 84 percent of households did not have any relatives/neighbours/friends and acquaintances from whom they were able to borrow (without interest) 20,000 Taka while 76.8 percent of households did not have any relatives/neighbours/friends and acquaintances from whom they were able to receive 20,000 Taka as a loan (with interest) to cope with the post- Aila crisis. Thus, most households were unable to receive 20,000 Taka as aid from people in their social circle to cope with the post-Aila crisis. In other words, most households did not have neighbours and friends and acquaintances who could give them 20,000 Taka as aid to cope with the post-Aila crisis.

The findings also show that neighbours, friends and acquaintances cannot contribute to the survival for a long period and the economic and housing recovery process at present due to poverty if the households face any crisis like Aila. The relevant survey findings confirm this. The survey findings reveal that 92.4 percent of households do not have any relatives/neighbours/friends and acquaintances who are capable of giving them 20,000 Taka as aid at present. Similarly, 67.2 percent of households at present do not have any relatives/neighbours/friends and acquaintances who are capable of lending them 20,000 Taka without interest and 44 percent of households at present do not have any relatives/neighbours/friends and acquaintances who are capable of lending them 20,000 Taka with interest Most households do not have anyone in their social circles who is capable of providing 20,000 Taka as aid at present. Like bonding relations with poor relatives, households have bridging relations with similarly poor neighbours and friends and acquaintances.

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Some other relevant survey findings also show that the bridging networks of the studied households are not able to contribute to survival for a long period and the economic and housing recovery following a future disastrous event like Aila. The survey data show that 77.6 percent of the total surveyed households do not have anyone from whom they can receive the money needed for the household expenditure for at least one month as aid if the household faces any crisis. The data also show that 22.4 (n=56) percent of the total surveyed households have one person, 18.4 (n=46) percent of households have two persons and 13.2 (n=33) percent of households have three persons who may give the household the money required to meet the household expenditure for at least one month as aid if the household faces any crisis. The findings show that only a few households (10 out of 250 households) may receive the money needed for meeting their household expenditure of at least one month as aid from their neighbours, friends and acquaintances if the household faces any crisis.

5.6 Bonding Social Capital Versus Bridging Social Capital

Although all households received aid from bonding networks, many households did not receive any aid from bridging networks. Moreover, although most of the households received material and monetary aid from bonding networks, only some households received material and monetary aid from bridging networks. The survey data show that while 100 percent of the total surveyed households (n=250) received at least one type of aid (listed in Table 5.1) from relatives, 8 percent and 35.6 percent of the total surveyed households (n=250) did not receive any of the aid from neighbours and friends and acquaintances respectively. Moreover, 76 percent (n=190) of the total surveyed households received material aid from their relatives while 16.80 percent (n=42) and 18.40 percent (n=46) of the total surveyed households received material aid from their neighbours and friends and acquaintances respectively. Furthermore, 32.4 percent (n=81) of the total surveyed households received any sort of monetary aid from their relatives while 0.4 percent (n=1) and 2.4 percent (n=6) of the total surveyed households received any sort of monetary aid from their neighbours, and friends and acquaintances respectively. In total, 78.4 percent (n=196) of the total surveyed households received material and monetary aid from relatives while 17.2 percent (n=43) and 18.40 percent (n=46) of the total surveyed households received material and monetary aid from neighbours, friends and acquaintances respectively. The higher percentage of households received each of the other six types of aid (shelter support at the time of Aila, information, assistance to get work, free labour, psychological support and other) from relatives compared

146 to neighbours. Likewise, the higher percentage of households received each of the other six types of aid from relatives compared to friends and acquaintances. Thus, households heavily drew on their bonding networks compared to the bridging networks.

Both bonding and bridging social capital played important roles in evacuation and search and rescue. However, although neighbours and in some cases friends and acquaintances within the village helped the affected households in evacuation and in search and rescue activities, it was mainly the relatives within the village who came forward first and who played the vital role. This was done mainly by close relatives living in the adjacent households within the village such as households of siblings or cousins of the head of the interviewed household. Moreover, neighbours and friends and acquaintances within the village had more important roles in evacuation and saving lives during the event compared to the role they played in the search and rescue activities immediately after the event. Members of the immediate studied households and members of the related households within the village played major roles in searching and rescuing the members of the studied households from where they were trapped immediately after the event.

Although bonding social capital contributed to the survival of the majority of the affected households in the response phase (up to one month) and the survival of some of the affected households even after the response period, bridging social capital contributed to the survival of some households and mainly during the night and the following day of Aila. Compared to bonding networks, a significantly lower number of households received food, water and money only for survival from bridging networks. For instance, 70.8 percent of the total surveyed households received food from relatives while 14.8 percent and 17.6 percent of the total surveyed households received food from neighbours, and friends and acquaintances respectively. Likewise, 32.4 percent of the total surveyed households received water from relatives while 6.8 percent and 10.8 percent of the total surveyed households received water from neighbours, and friends and acquaintances respectively. Similarly, 31.6 percent of the total surveyed households received money only for survival from relatives while 0.4 percent and 2 percent of the total surveyed households received money only for survival from neighbours, and friends and acquaintances respectively. The survey data show that food and water or either item they received from relatives played very important and extremely important roles in the survival of 65.6 percent of the total surveyed households. However, food and water or either item they received from neighbours played very important and

147 extremely important roles in the survival of 7.2 percent of the total surveyed households. Likewise, food and water or either item they received from friends and acquaintances played very important and extremely important roles in the survival of 10.4 percent of the total surveyed households.

Although bonding social capital played a more important role than bridging social capital in the survival, most households would not have been able to survive after Aila based on the resources they received from either bonding or bridging networks, if households did not receive aid from the government and NGOs and either food or cash from participation in the food for work or cash for work programs operated by the government and NGOs. Most of the households that received material and monetary aid for survival from bonding networks received for the survival of some days. Likewise, most of the households that received material aid for survival from bridging networks received for the survival of a day. However, most households had critical survival needs for a long period as Channirchak and Dakshin Bedkashi were subject to inundation for almost two years and three years respectively. As they were not able to commence their usual livelihood activities before the embankment was repaired, most households were not able to survive without the aid given and employment generated by the government and NGOs. Thus, government and NGOs played vital roles and acted as the main players in helping the villagers to overcome the post-disaster crisis.

Both bonding social capital and bridging social capital did not play any role in the economic and housing recovery of most of the affected households. Nevertheless, bonding social capital played a more important role than bridging social capital (see Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6). For instance, the survey data show that aid from relatives had some sort of role in the economic recovery of 21.2 percent of the total surveyed households while aid from neighbours had some sort of role in the economic recovery of 2 percent of the total surveyed households, and aid from friends and acquaintances had some sort of role in the economic recovery of 2 percent of the total surveyed households. Moreover, aid from relatives had some sort of role in the housing recovery of 20.4 percent of the total surveyed households while aid from neighbours had some sort of role in the housing recovery of 4.8 percent of the total surveyed households, and aid from friends and acquaintances had some sort of role in the housing recovery of 0.4 percent of the total surveyed households.

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Figure 5.5 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from relatives, neighbours and friends and acquaintances in economic recovery

Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)

Figure 5.6 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from relatives, neighbours and friends and acquaintances in housing recovery

Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)

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Figure 5.7 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from relatives, neighbours and friends and acquaintances in psychological recovery

Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)

Although both bonding social capital and bridging social capital had a significant contribution in the psychological recovery process of the members of the affected households, bonding social capital played a more important role compared to bridging social capital (See Figure 5.7). Although all the surveyed households (n=250) received psychological support from relatives, 8 percent of the total surveyed households (n=250) did not receive psychological support from neighbours and 39.6 percent of the total surveyed households (n=250) did not receive psychological support from their friends and acquaintances. Moreover, respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid in the psychological recovery process of the members of the households varies significantly among these three categories. The survey data show that although aid from relatives played some sort of important role in the psychological recovery process of the members of 100 percent of the total surveyed households (n=250), aid from neighbours played some sort of important role in the psychological recovery process of the members of 87.2 percent (n=218) of the total surveyed households (n=250) and aid from friends and acquaintances played some sort of important role in the psychological recovery process of the members of 62.8 percent (n=157) of the total surveyed households (n=250). Some 4.8 percent (n=12) of the total surveyed households that received aid from neighbours

150 considered that this did not play any role in the psychological recovery process. Likewise, 1.6 percent (n=4) of the total surveyed households that received aid from friends and acquaintances considered that this did not play any role in the psychological recovery process. Aid from relatives had very important and extremely important roles in the psychological recovery process of the members of 78.4 percent (n=196) of the total surveyed households (n=250). On the other hand, aid from neighbours had very important and extremely important roles in the psychological recovery process of the members of 43.6 percent (n=109) of the total surveyed households (n=250) while aid from friends and acquaintances had very important and extremely important roles in the psychological recovery of the members of 27.6 percent (n=69) of the total surveyed households (n=250).

Likewise, respondents’ assessment of the importance of psychological support in the psychological recovery process of the members of the households varies significantly among these three categories. Psychological support received from relatives played very important and extremely important roles in the psychological recovery process of the members of 81.2 percent (n=203) of the total surveyed households. On the other hand, psychological support received from neighbours played very important and extremely important roles in the psychological recovery process of the members of 44.8 percent (n=112) of the total surveyed households and psychological support received from friends and acquaintances played very important and extremely important roles in the psychological recovery process of the members of 28 percent (n=70) of the total surveyed households. None of the households that received psychological support from relatives (n=250) reported that psychological support from them was not at all important. Among households that received psychological support from neighbours (230 households out of 250 households), eight households or 3.2 percent of the total surveyed households reported that psychological support from neighbours was not at all important while none of the households that received psychological support from friends and acquaintances (n=151) reported that psychological support from friends and acquaintances was not at all important.

The psychological support the households received from relatives was very intense while the psychological support the households received from neighbours and friends and acquaintances was not so intense in many cases. Moreover, households received psychological support from their relatives throughout the recovery process. However, many households did not receive psychological support from neighbours and friends and

151 acquaintances throughout the recovery process due to the conflict from the competition for access to relief items (and in few cases, due to the competition for securing a place on the embankment for temporary shelter). The conflict due to the competition for relief items did not usually emerge among the related households within the village; it usually emerged with neighbours and in some cases with friends and acquaintances within the village. The following excerpt of an interviewee who believed that neighbours and villagers informed outside organisations not to support him by claiming that he was well off depicts the intense relationships with relatives and the hostility toward him by neighbours and friends and acquaintances:

Relatives have relations with our soul [atma’s atmiya]. As they are our soul mates, they have that affection for us. Nobody except siblings and close relatives made inquiries about our well-being during that time [crisis following Aila]… Relatives felt the pain [we had]… Neighbours and villagers were hostile to me. (CC, 8 June 2017)

As the time after the disaster increased, households’ networks with relatives did not become less active and break down, while households’ networks with neighbours and friends and acquaintances became less active and, in many cases, broke down. Bridging networks became less active due to poverty of neighbours, friends and acquaintances, and the own recovery challenges of the affected neighbours, friends and acquaintances. Bridging networks broke down due to the conflict from the competition for relief items. Although bonding networks performed less well in providing material and monetary aid as the time after the disaster increased, bonding networks provided aid that did not require additional material resources to be invested throughout the recovery process. However, bridging networks not only performed less well in providing material and monetary aid as the time after the disaster increased, in many cases they did not provide aid that did not require material resources to be invested.

An analysis of the qualitative interviews reveals that the expectation households have from their bonding networks is fundamentally different than the expectation they have from their bridging networks. Households usually expect that they would receive aid in crisis from their relatives if the relatives are capable of doing so. They usually expect and believe that their close relatives have some sort of obligations to give them material and monetary aid for survival and economic and housing recovery if their close relatives have the capacity to do so. However, they are aware that the material and monetary aid will not be so substantial and not be effective for survival for a long period as well as for economic and housing recovery as

152 their close relatives are not capable enough. Nevertheless, they believe that they will receive material and monetary aid, although small amounts, from close relatives if close relatives are capable and they will always receive aid from their close relatives that does not usually require any material resources to be invested. They consider that receipt of aid that does not usually require any material resources to be invested, such as information, psychological support, free labour from relatives, is normal and natural. Finally, they do not have expectations to receive material and monetary aid in crisis from relatives who are not capable to do so, and they consider it understandable as it is usually believed that the responsibility of a person is first toward the members of the immediate household and then toward other close relatives and so on. Due to this understanding, households did not have any expectations to receive material and monetary aid from the affected relatives after Aila as they themselves were not capable, although they received other aid except material and monetary aid.

However, except in a few cases from close neighbours and close friends, households do not usually have any expectations to receive material and monetary aid from their neighbours and friends and acquaintances for survival for a long period and the economic and housing recovery process after a crisis like Aila, even if neighbours, and friends and acquaintances are capable. Moreover, while some households do not have expectations to receive any material and monetary aid for survival, most households have expectations that, if capable, then neighbours, and friends and acquaintances, particularly close neighbours and close friends, will give them material and monetary aid needed for survival for a very short period such as of a day or a few days. However, they generally do not consider that neighbours, friends and acquaintances have obligations to help if they have capacity. The following excerpts show the expectations people have from their neighbours:

Neighbours will come forward if there is a problem. However, none of them will help me if I require monetary assistance. They will help me if I require other types of assistance… They will not give me [money] even if they are capable to give… Relatives will help me by providing money if they are capable to give. (DB, 6 August 2017)

Do not have confidence in neighbours. They will come to see if there is a problem; however, will do nothing. (CC, 23 August 2017)

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Neighbours will not give more [aid] even if they are capable. However, relatives will give more [aid] if they are capable. Neighbours will give scant amount [of aid] even if they are capable. If we borrow anything from neighbours, then it needs to be returned. If we borrow anything from relatives, it might be okay if we cannot return it to the relatives. (DB, 9 July 2017)

Neighbours do not have the mentality to assist… If I want to borrow 5,000 to 10,000 Taka from neighbours when I am in a crisis, then they will give it to me with a condition such as mortgaging of my land to them or payment of interest for the money. Otherwise they will not give it to me… Relatives will help in crisis. They will give [money] if they have it. (CC, 9 June 2017)

The affected households usually received, if they required it, free labour from relatives. However, although many affected households received free labour from neighbours as well as from friends and acquaintances, mainly from close friends, many households did not receive free labour from neighbours and friends and acquaintances.48 They received labour from neighbours and friends and acquaintances in exchange for money. The interviewees depict the situation in the following way:

Nobody except relatives gave free labour… All except relatives gave labour in exchange for money. (CC, 13 July 2017)

Brothers gave free labour; neighbours did not give free labour. If neighbours give labour, then they need to be paid. Nobody gives free labour. Only brothers give free labour. (DB, 9 July 2017)

Another interesting fact is that while households usually received information related to an upcoming benefit from the government agency or an NGO from relatives, households sometimes did not receive information related to an upcoming benefit from neighbours and friends and acquaintances as the information involved conflicts of interest. For example, in some cases, neighbours and villagers hid information related to any livelihood or housing intervention from non-related households. They hid that sort of information as they had a

48 The survey shows that 32.4 percent of the total surveyed households received free labour for the repair or construction of the houses from relatives while 10 percent and 4 percent of the total surveyed households received it from neighbours, and friends and acquaintances respectively.

154 belief that the amount of interventions was limited compared to the demand and thus they would not receive it if others knew about the intervention.

Many households did not have any mutual borrowing and lending of small amounts of food and money for a short period with people other than relatives. Nevertheless, many households had mutual borrowing and lending with not only relatives, but also with neighbours and friends and acquaintances. They usually prioritised related households in the process of mutual exchange. They first approached relatives and if they were not able to borrow from relatives, then they approached neighbours and others. The following excerpts show that households did not have mutual borrowing and lending with people other than relatives and households that had mutual exchange with relatives as well as with other prioritised relatives.

What I borrowed, I borrowed from relatives, I did not borrow from others… If I needed to borrow 1–2 kg rice, I borrowed from brothers [siblings and first cousins, i.e. father’s brother’s sons] and brothers also borrowed from me. (CC, 13 July 2017)

We borrowed and lent rice… We borrowed and lent money… However, this act of borrowing and lending always took place among brothers [siblings] only… This did not take place with neighbours… this did not take place with anyone except brothers [siblings]. (DB, 11 July 2017)

We borrowed from [and lent to] brothers and neighbours. Never borrowed from others or lent to others [except brothers and neighbours]. We borrowed mainly from brothers and lent also mainly to brothers. We firstly approached our own brothers (siblings), then other brothers and then neighbours. If it was not possible to borrow from relatives, then we went to neighbours. (DB, 9 July 2017)

The above discussion clearly shows that the aid the affected households received from bonding networks is qualitatively and quantitatively different than the aid the affected households received from bridging networks. Thus, bonding social capital helped households more in evacuation, search and rescue activities compared to bridging social capital, and bonding social capital played a more important role than bridging social capital not only in the survival but also in the economic, housing and psychological recovery process of the affected households. Moreover, the expectations households have from bonding networks are essentially different than the expectations households have from bridging networks.

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Households usually expect to receive more aid in crisis from bonding networks compared to bridging networks, if both networks have the capacity to help.

5.7 Conclusion

Neighbours and friends and acquaintances within the village played significant roles in evacuation and search and rescue activities. They acted as the first responders and helped the affected households in evacuation and search and rescue activities and provided emergency food to the affected neighbours and other households in the village, if they had something that was saved from being washed away by the flooded water.

However, bridging social capital did not contribute to the survival of most of the affected households. Most households did not receive any material and monetary aid from their bridging networks at any stage after Aila. It contributed to the survival of some of the affected households and the contribution was mainly during the first few days, particularly during the night and the following day of Aila. Households did not usually receive material aid and monetary aid after that from their neighbours and affected friends and acquaintances. However, some households later received one-off relief packets for survival from their bridging networks. The relief packets usually included food, water and clothes. Likewise, except in a few cases, bridging social capital did not play any role in the economic or housing recovery processes of the affected households. Bridging networks, mainly neighbours and friends within the village, contributed to the housing recovery of a few of the affected households by providing free labour during the repair or construction of the houses.

Although bridging social capital did not play any role in the economic and housing recovery process except for a few households, it played a significant role in the case of psychological recovery of the members of the affected households. Bridging networks were able to contribute to the psychological recovery as neighbours and friends and acquaintances had the capacity to provide non-material resources, although they were poor and affected (if friends and acquaintances were affected). The psychological support neighbours and friends and acquaintances provided greatly helped the members of the affected households to recover psychologically following Aila. Nevertheless, many households did not receive psychological support at any stage after Aila from neighbours and friends and acquaintances. Moreover, many households that received psychological support after Aila from neighbours and friends and acquaintances within the village did not receive that support from them after a period as

156 households’ relationships with them became conflictual after a period due to the competition for access to relief items.

The findings demonstrate that bridging social capital does not play any role in the survival or ‘getting by’ of most of the households. Likewise, it does not play any role in ‘getting ahead’ as evidenced from the fact that, except in a few cases, bridging networks did not play any role in the economic and housing recovery of the affected households.Thus, the findings contradict the argument that bridging social capital is helpful for getting ahead (Putnam 2000; Granovetter 1973, 1983; Briggs 1998; Woolcock 2001, 2002b; Woolcock & Narayan 2000; Lin 2008). Bridging social capital did not contribute to the survival and economic and housing recovery as neighbours and friends and acquaintances within the village and other affected areas were poor and Aila-affected themselves and thus had their own recovery challenges. They lost most of their material possessions and failed to derive a secure income and start their own recovery activities as the two villages were under water for a long period. Thus, neighbours and the affected friends and acquaintances had no resources to support other affected households in crisis. They were also in need of assistance for their survival and their own economic or housing recovery. Likewise, friends and acquaintances outside the affected areas did not play an important role in the survival and economic and housing recovery process as a few households in these two studied villages had friends and acquaintances outside the Aila-affected areas from whom they could receive material and monetary aid. Nevertheless, the findings show that neighbours, friends and acquaintances of the affected households are unable to contribute to the survival over longer periods and economic and housing recovery of the affected households due to poverty, even if their neighbours and most of their friends and acquaintances are not affected themselves. In other words, households do not have access to rich resources through bridging networks with neighbours and friends and acquaintances.

The findings show that, compared to bridging social capital, bonding social capital played a more important role in evacuation, search and rescue, and survival, as well as in the economic, housing and psychological recovery process of the affected households. Both bonding and bridging social capital played important roles in evacuation and search and rescue, although bridging networks played a more important role in evacuation compared to search and rescue activities. However, although bonding social capital played an important role in the survival of the majority of the households, bridging social capital played an

157 important role in the survival of some of the households. Moreover, although both bonding and bridging social capital did not play important roles in the economic and housing recovery of the affected households, the role bonding social capital played in the economic and housing recovery was much more important than the role played by bridging social capital. Likewise, although both bonding and bridging social capital played important roles in the psychological recovery, the role bonding social capital played was much more important.

The findings suggest that bridging social capital plays only a small role in the survival and does not play an important role in the economic and housing recovery (Islam & Walkerden 2014). Thus, linking social networks such as government agencies and national and international NGOs must provide external assistance to the affected households to enable them to survive, if the post-disaster situation is like the post-Aila situation, and to assist survivors to achieve economic and housing recovery after a disaster (Islam & Walkerden 2014; James & Paton 2015).

The next two chapters will investigate how linking social capital, i.e. the resources the affected households receive from the government and NGOs, contributes to the disaster response and economic, housing and psychological recovery process of the affected households. The next chapter will examine the role the government plays while the following chapter will examine the role NGOs play in the disaster response and recovery process of the affected households.

158 Chapter 6: Linking Social Capital and Post-Cyclone Response and Recovery: The Role of Government and the Weaknesses of the Government’s Response and Recovery Operations

6.1 Introduction

This chapter investigates the role of linking social capital (i.e. resources households received from the government) in the post–Cyclone Aila response and recovery process of the affected households, and the weaknesses of the government’s post–Cyclone Aila response and recovery operations. Both of these objectives are addressed through the government’s post– Cyclone Aila operations in two Aila-affected villages of Khulna District, Bangladesh. One village is Channirchak, which is located under Kamarkhola Union of Dacope Upazila, and another village is Dakshin Bedkashi, which is located under Dakshin Bedkashi Union of Koyra Upazila. This chapter also addresses the role of Union Parishad as part of the role of the government. This chapter defines linking social capital as the resources affected households received from the linking network, which is households’ links with the government including Union Parishad in this case. Affected households were linked to the government mainly through Union Parishad.

Union Parishad, hereafter UP, is the lowest level of the local government.49 UP is also the smallest rural administrative unit in Bangladesh. UP consists of 13 elected members: an elected chairman, nine elected members from nine wards and three elected women members from three reserved seats for them (Pandey 2019). Although UP is a local government unit, it has developed as ‘an extension of the central government’ (Panday 2019, p. 87). In addition to the grant that UP receives from the central government, UP collects fund from taxes, rates, tolls, fees and other sources allowed by the Local Government (Union Parishad) (Amendment) Act, 2010 (GoB 2010). However, the total funds UP collects (excluding the funds from the central government) are very low (Pandey 2019). UP is mainly dependent on the government funds for undertaking various activities including development activities undertaken within the union (Pandey 2019).50 Even elected representatives of UP and UP staff receive a portion of their salary from the government. The government gives resources to the UP through various ways including gratuitous relief (GR), vulnerable group feeding

49 Rural local government in Bangladesh has three hierarchical tiers: Union Parishad, Upazila Parishad, and Zila Parishad (Pandey 2019, p. 87). 50 For instance, the total annual budget of Kamarkhola Union Parishad in 2016–2017 was 12,740,647 Taka. However, the total funds Kamarkhola Union Parishad contributed to the annual budget of 2016–2017 from its own source was only 6, 68, 030 Taka (KU 2016).

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(VGF), test relief (TR), vulnerable group development (VGD), annual development program (ADP) grant, food for work, cash for work, and employment generation program for the poorest (EGPP) (KU 2016; DBU 2017).

This chapter defines a government aid item as any aid item households received from the central government, Zila Parishad, Upazila Parishad and UP through UP or field-level government agencies/offices.51 Most of the aid items the affected households received from the government received them through UP. UP usually selected the beneficiaries of the aid items that UP received from the government through field-level government offices for distribution to the affected households. However, some government aid items were not received by households directly through the UP. For instance, the Bangladesh Army prepared the list of the beneficiaries of 20,000 Taka and the beneficiaries received the money to their own bank accounts. Likewise, although UP played an important role in the selection of the beneficiaries for agricultural support, the selected households received seeds and fertiliser directly from the upazila-level office of the Department of Agricultural Extension, and not from the UP. In addition to aid, affected households participated in government employment programs; in this instance, UP selected the beneficiaries of these programs and implemented these programs.52

The chapter is further divided into five sections. The second section presents the aid items and other support not in the form of aid items that the affected households received from the government after Aila. The third section examines the role government played in the post- Aila response and recovery process of the affected households. The fourth section presents major weaknesses of the government’s post-Aila response and recovery operations, while the fifth section presents a conclusion.

6.2 Types of Aid and Non-Aid Items the Affected Households Received from the Government

The affected households in both villages received various aid items from the government after Aila (see Table 6.1). The survey data show that 88.8 percent of the surveyed households

51 Like UP, Zila Parishad and Upazila Parishad each collects funds from their own sources and receive part of their funds from the central government. 52 Government departments implemented some projects through contractors. For instance, the Local Government and Engineering Department (LGED) constructed government school-cum-cyclone-shelters using contractors. Participation of local people as workers in the projects implemented by the contractors was not considered as participation in the government employment programs.

160 received emergency food and 18.4 percent of the surveyed households received emergency water from the government.53 Moreover, 11.2 percent of the surveyed households received clothes and 39.2 percent of the surveyed households received utensils and other necessary household items from the government.54 Likewise, 15.6 percent and 3.2 percent of the surveyed households received medical assistance and water-storing support respectively. Similarly, 24.4 percent and 91.6 percent of the surveyed households received money as gratuitous relief (GR) and rice under vulnerable group feeding (VGF) respectively.55 The data also show that only 1.2 percent of the surveyed households received houses while 8.4 percent of the surveyed households received small amounts of money for the repair or construction of the house respectively (see Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2). Moreover, 71.2 percent of the surveyed households received 20,000 Taka for the repair or construction of the house while only 1.2 percent of the surveyed households received tin for houses. Furthermore, only 6.8 percent of the surveyed households received agricultural support such as paddy and vegetable seeds and fertilisers.

Table 6.1 Types of aid the affected households received from the government (n=250)56 Types of Aid Frequency Percentage (n=250) (%) Food 222 88.8 Water 46 18.4 Clothes 28 11.2 Utensils and other necessary household items 98 39.2 Medical assistance 39 15.6 Support for storing water 8 3.2 Gratuitous relief (GR) money 61 24.4 Rice under vulnerable group feeding (VGF) 229 91.6 House 3 1.2 Small amount of money for repair or construction of the house 21 8.4 20,000 Taka for the repair or construction of the house 178 71.2 Tin for house 3 1.2 Agricultural support such as seeds and fertilisers 17 6.8 Other 0 0.0

53 Any types of food including rice households received from the government except rice received under the VGF program and vulnerable group development (VGD) program. Water households received any time from the government after Aila. 54 The survey included aid items like tents and tarpaulin under utensils and other necessary household items. 55 This only includes 20 kg rice under vulnerable group feeding (VGF) program, does not include other amount of rice given under the VGF program. A household got 20 kg rice under VGF when a household received one card. A household got 40 kg rice under VGF when a household received two cards. In some cases, households with many members received two cards and thus received 40 kg rice per month per household. 56 Two households did not receive any type of aid from the government.

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In addition to aid, people also received the opportunity to participate in the government employment programs such as food for work (FFW) program or kabikha and employment generation program for the poorest (EGPP) (see Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4). These employment programs also greatly contributed to the survival and economic, housing and psychological recovery. Moreover, some households also took loans from the government sources after Aila. In addition to the distribution of various types of aid and operations of employment programs, the government also contributed to the repair and construction of community-level infrastructure. For instance, the government repaired damaged and broken parts of the embankment, repaired and constructed roads and constructed new school-cum- cyclone-shelters (see Figure 6.5, Figure 6.6, Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8).57

Figure 6.1 A house constructed after Aila in Channirchak Village (implemented by Zila Parishad Khulna)

Source: Author (2017–2018)

57 The Bangladesh Government is implementing Coastal Embankment Improvement Project, Phase I (CEIP-I). Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB) is the implementing agency (MoWR 2013a). Channirchak village is located within the Polder 32. The rehabilitation and improvement of Polder 32 under CEIP-1 is underway (source: observation; key informant interviews). Dakshin Bedkashi village is located within the Polder 14/1. CEIP-1 also includes Polder 14/1 for the rehabilitation and improvement (MoWR 2013b). However, physical work for the rehabilitation and improvement of Polder 14/1 has not started up to the fieldwork period (source: observation; key informant interviews; Sadik et al. 2018).

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Figure 6.2 A house constructed after Aila in Dakshin Bedkashi Village (implemented by Zila Parishad Khulna)

Source: Author (2017–2018)

Figure 6.3 People working in a government employment program in Channirchak Village

Source: Author (2017–2018)

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Figure 6.4 Women working in a government employment program in Dakshin Bedkashi Village

Source: Author (2017–2018)

Figure 6.5 A road constructed by a government agency in Channirchak (only the brick paving part was constructed by the government while the base mud road was constructed by an NGO)

Source: Author (2017–2018)

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Figure 6.6 A road constructed by a government agency in Dakshin Bedkashi (only the brick paving part was constructed by the government while the base mud road was constructed by an NGO)

Source: Author (2017–2018)

Figure 6.7 A new government primary school-cum-cyclone-shelter constructed in Channirchak Village after Aila (implementing agency: Local Government Engineering Department)

Source: Author (2017–2018)

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Figure 6.8 A new government primary school building in Dakshin Bedkashi Village (implementing agency: Local Government Engineering Department)

Source: Author (2019)

6.3 Role of the Government in the Post-Aila Response and Recovery

6.3.1 Role of the Government in Evacuation, Search and Rescue

The Union Parishads (UPs) did not properly disseminate the early warnings before the event. Most households did not receive early warnings from their UPs or any other sources before the event. For instance, the survey data show that 78.8 percent (n=197) of the surveyed households (n=250) did not receive early warnings before the event. The survey data also show that only one-third of the respondents (18 out of 53) who received early warnings before the event mentioned UP as one of the sources of the early warnings. The qualitative data reveal that none of the UPs disseminated early warnings in either of the studied villages through what is locally known as ‘miking’ (i.e. broadcast by loudspeaker). Thus, although some of the surveyed households received early warnings from the UP, they would have received the early warnings from the elected representatives and staff of the UPs orally. People in both villages did not hear any announcement related to early warnings from mosques and temples though miking. Some interviewees of one of the studied villages mentioned that they received the news of the breaking of the embankment through miking from other villages, mainly from mosques; that the storm surge had damaged the embankment

166 and thus water was entering the villages. Neither UP took necessary measures to evacuate people and livestock to the safe places before or during the event. The UPs did not even take measures to help the most vulnerable such as children, pregnant women, disabled and aged people to evacuate to the safe places.

The UPs played a very limited role, if any, in searching for and rescuing the members of the affected households from the trapped places immediately after the event or on the night of Aila (Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017).58 Immediate members and relatives (within the village and the adjacent villages) of a household played the most important role in searching and rescuing member/s of that household. The affected households that moved to the places such as embankments, cyclone shelters and other buildings immediately after the event or on the night usually did not receive any assistance from their UP to move to those places. Moreover, the households that moved to other places, mainly during the next few days after Aila, did not receive any logistic support services such as boats from the UP to move with their remaining household goods to the relocation places. The very limited role that UPs played in search and rescue operations is not surprising as the elected representatives of the UPs and most of the UP employees, if not all, were from the local areas and were also victims of Aila. Moreover, neither UP had the necessary logistics to conduct search and rescue operations.

Nevertheless, the UP carried out the immediate assessment of the damage and losses and reported to the higher authority, mainly to the Upazila Nirbahi [executive] Officer (UNO), hereafter UNO, who is the chief executive officer of the Upazila Parishad.59 The UP also informed the higher authority about the need for necessary aid materials and other assistance required to handle the emergency. The UP first distributed relief in both the villages a few days after the event, once the UP had received relief from the government. For instance, Dakshin Bedkashi UP first distributed relief, in the form of rice received from the government, to the studied village and other villages of Dakshin Bedkashi UP on Thursday afternoon (28 May 2009) although Aila struck during daytime on Monday (source: key informant interview with the then chairman of the union). Likewise, key informants from

58 The UP office of Dakshin Bedkashi Union, which is a building, was located within the studied Dakshin Bedkashi Village. Many people evacuated to that place during the event (in a few cases, immediately before the event). People living in the surrounding areas went to that place after the event to stay on the night of the event. Many households lived in that building for a long period after Aila. 59 UNO is a member of Bangladesh Civil Service (administration) cadre and holds the rank of Senior Assistant Secretary of the government of Bangladesh (Hassan & Mannan 2016).

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Channirchak also confirmed that the villagers received some rice as the first relief from the government through UP on Thursday.60 However, only some households in both the villages received that rice, as the amount of rice the government allocated as the first relief for both the unions was extremely small compared to the needs of the populations.

Neither UP played an effective role because they were not well prepared, given that the Khulna District was under danger signal number seven for the cyclone (DMIC 2009).61 Moreover, neither UP was prepared for a flooding situation due to broken embankments caused by the storm surge associated with Aila.

6.3.2 Role of the Government in Survival

Channirchak was mainly agriculture-based and thus most of the households in Channirchak were dependent on agriculture for their livelihood before Aila.62 In addition to agriculture, member/s (mainly the male head of the household) of a considerable percentage of the households used to participate in rural–urban migration to increase the income of the household, as the income from agriculture was not sufficient for many households to meet the required expenditure for the whole year. The survey data show that 57.1 percent of the surveyed households in Channirchak used to employ seasonal migration before Aila.

On the other hand, agriculture was not the usual economic activity in Dakshin Bedkashi before Aila. Households that had cultivable land in Dakshin Bedkashi usually used the land mainly for shrimp farming. A maximum of one to two percent of the total cultivable land in Dakshin Bedkashi was under agricultural production before Aila. This is also true for the post-Aila period. Households of Dakshin Bedkashi were dependent mainly on wage labour, shrimp farming, small business (a significant portion of the people engaged in business was engaged in buying and selling of bagda shrimp, shrimp fry and crabs) and fishing (most of them were engaged in shrimp fry collection and some were engaged in fishing and crab catching from the rivers). The survey data show that 45.6 percent of the surveyed households in Dakshin Bedkashi used to participate in seasonal migration before Aila. It is worth noting

60 A government document from Dacope Upazila Parishad office shows that the deputy commissioner of Khulna allocated gratuitous rice relief for distribution among the Aila-affected people in Dacope Upazila on 25 May 2009. Dacope Upazila Parishad office prepared the allocation letter of 3 metric tons of rice (one metric ton and two metric tons separately) for Kamarkhola Union on 26 May 2009. 61 Great danger signal numbers are eight, nine and ten and higher signal numbers denote greater danger (BMD 2014). 62 Households of Channirchak were dependent on both agriculture and saline water shrimp farming up to 2008. However, three was no shrimp farming in the village from the second half of 2008 as there was a consensus among the villagers to stop saline water shrimp farming due to its negative effect.

168 that the households that had cultivable land in Dakshin Bedkashi either farmed shrimps themselves in their own land or leased their land to other shrimp farmers of the village or outside businessmen who had shrimp enclosures in the village in exchange of a specific amount for a year, a process locally known as hari. They usually received 5,000 Taka per year for each bigha63 of cultivable land. Households that had more cultivable land generally farmed shrimps on their own land while households that had a very small amount of land generally leased the land to the shrimp farmers for a year in exchange for the money. Moreover, households that did not have land or only a little land were dependent on wage labour in the village or surrounding areas and in other distant places as seasonal migrants. They were mainly dependent on wage labour in the distant places as seasonal migrants due to the lack of work for wage labourers in the village or surrounding areas. Shrimp farming instead of agriculture or paddy cultivation in the locally available cultivable land was the main reason for the lack of work for wage labourers in the village or surrounding areas.

Almost all households lost all or part of their usual income after Aila. Most of the households in both the villages were not able to start their usual economic activities in the affected areas at least until the embankment was repaired as both the villages were subject to flooding until the embankment was repaired. Only some households had access to their usual income opportunities in the affected areas when the villages were subject to flooding. A few households in both the villages, mostly households of teachers at local primary schools, secondary schools and madrasas (Islamic educational institutions), had their regular salary although they also lost their usual income from agriculture or shrimp cultivation in the affected areas if they were engaged in agriculture or shrimp cultivation. Moreover, some households, mainly in Dakshin Bedkashi, that were engaged in fishing (catching fish, catching crabs and collecting shrimp fry) before Aila for their livelihood had access to their usual income opportunity in the affected areas if they had a net and boat or net only to do so. Likewise, a few households, mainly in Dakshin Bedkashi, that were engaged in small business before Aila had access to their usual income opportunities if Aila had not destroyed their shops. It is worth noting that although some households had access to a salary or were able to start economic activities in the affected areas before the embankment was repaired, they usually lost their houses and most of their material possessions, became displaced and lost income from agriculture or shrimp farming if they had cultivable land. In addition,

63 One bigha is equivalent to 33 decimals.

169 households that employed seasonal migration when the village was subject to flooding had some income from the unaffected areas if they employed migration.

It is worth noting that the affected households were not able to start economic activities in full phase immediately after the embankment was repaired. For instance, most of the households of Channirchak were dependent on agricultural production. They were not able to start agriculture in full phase immediately after the embankment was repaired as their agricultural land became unsuitable for agriculture due to the periodic flooding of the land by saline water for a long time. Some of the agricultural land was not suitable for agriculture even during the time of fieldwork. The affected households were also not able to start the process of the housing recovery until the embankment was repaired as the villages were subject to flooding. They mainly lived on the embankments or in their flooded houses within the homestead in a temporary arrangement until the embankment was repaired. Many households living on embankments or other places did not return to their homestead immediately after the embankment was repaired as they did not have houses to live in on their homestead or property. They moved to their homestead after constructing a house or after receiving houses from NGOs. A few households, particularly in Channirchak, had to move to new places previously owned by them as they lost the previous homestead to the rising rivers or canals. Many people still did not build their desired houses in both the villages.

Other than the opportunity to participate in various income-generating programs operated by the government, NGOs and the contractors, most households in both the villages mainly had two income opportunities until the embankment was repaired. These were catching fish in the affected areas and undertaking seasonal migration to the unaffected areas if member/s of any household wanted to employ seasonal migration. Most of the households in both the villages, whether previously engaged in fishing or not, started to catch fish after Aila for household consumption and income. This new income opportunity emerged as the villages were subject to flooding and persisted until the embankment was repaired. The survey data show that 90.8 percent (n=227) of the surveyed households caught fish for household consumption and 70 percent (n=175) of the surveyed households caught fish for selling in the market after Aila although household heads of only 11.6 percent (n=29) of the surveyed households were engaged in fishing (including fishermen, crab catchers and shrimp fry collectors) as a primary occupation before Aila struck. Households that used to employ seasonal migration when the villages were subject to flooding had some income though migration. The survey data show

170 that 48.8 percent of the surveyed households employed seasonal migration before Aila while 52.8 percent and 64.8 percent of the surveyed households employed seasonal migration before and after the embankment was repaired following Aila respectively.

As most households in both villages did not have their usual income from the affected areas and were not able to start economic activities until the embankment was repaired, they were not able to meet their basic survival needs for the required long period based on their own capacity. Thus, most households needed assistance from their bonding networks (relatives), bridging networks (neighbours, friends and acquaintances) and linking networks (government agencies and NGOs) to meet their basic survival needs for the required long period. However, many households did not receive any material and monetary aid from their bonding networks for any purpose after Aila, and most of the households that received material and monetary aid from their bonding networks received it only for the survival for some days, and received it during the response period (up to one month). Likewise, most of the households did not receive any material and monetary aid from their bridging networks for any purpose after Aila. Some households that received material and monetary aid from their bridging networks primarily received material aid, and they received it mainly in the first few days. Thus, most of the households in both the villages were unable to meet the survival needs for the required long period based on their own capacity and the material and monetary aid they received from their bonding and bridging networks. They required assistance from their linking networks, i.e. from the government and NGOs, for survival and recovery (Islam & Walkerden 2014, 2015; Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017; James & Paton 2015). Aid from the government and NGOs as well as the opportunity to participate in various income-generating programs operated by the government and NGOs contributed to their survival until the embankment was repaired. The government and NGOs, but mainly NGOs, also played an important role in survival for a period after the embankment was repaired, and in economic and housing recovery. The dependency of the affected households on the assistance from the government and NGOs for survival and recovery can be understood from the following excerpts:

It was not possible to survive [without support from government and NGOs]… It was not possible to recover. People of this area would have left the area… They would have become refugees. (an elected representative, DB, 20 September 2017)

They had to leave the area. They lived [on the embankment] for one month, two months, three months with a hope that they would return to their homestead when the

171

village would become dewatered. However, they could not return to their homestead even after the 18 months of the event. If there was no relief from the government and NGOs, then they could not survive [here]. (An NGO key informant who participated in the post-Aila response and recovery operations in Channirchak, 17 August 2017)

Many people would have left the place if they did not receive support from the government or NGOs. (a focus-group participant, DB, 22 September 2017)

It is worth mentioning that the Government of Bangladesh has a constitutional duty to assist the disaster affected people (GoB 2016; MoDMR 2015). The Disaster Management Act 2012 and National Disaster Management Policy 2015 of Bangladesh also affirm the necessity of providing humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance to the disaster affected people by the government (GoB 2012; MoDMR 2015). For instance, providing emergency humanitarian aid and conducting post-disaster rescue and rehabilitation operations more efficiently are two of the main objectives for which the Disaster Management Act 2012 has been enacted (GoB 2012). Likewise, the act states that one of the main functions of the Department of Disaster Management in Bangladesh is to conduct emergency humanitarian aid and post-disaster rescue and rehabilitation operations more efficiently. Thus, the normative expectation is that the government should be able to meet the needs of the disaster affected people. Nevertheless, the government might not be able to meet the needs of the affected people in disaster situations as the government might not have sufficient resources to undertake necessary post- disaster response and recovery operations for meeting the needs of the affected people.

The government played a vital role in the survival of the affected households in both villages. Most of the aid items the government gave to the affected households were for their survival. The aid items the affected households initially received from the government mainly included rice, flattened rice, gur (molasses), water, clothes (saree and lungi), tents, tarpaulin, water storing containers and small amounts of money as gratuitous relief (GR). The government continued to distribute some of these aid items even after the response period (up to one month following the event) as the affected villages were subject to flooding for a long period. In addition, households received medical assistance if required. The government gave rice to the affected households under two programs: rice as gratuitous relief (GR) and 20 kg rice per household under vulnerable group feeding (hereafter VGF) program. The government initially distributed rice as GR and started to give 20 kg rice under the VGF program from September 2009. The amount of aid from the government was much less before the introduction of 20 kg

172 rice under the VGF program. Except food and necessary aid items for survival, the government also gave aid items for recovery, particularly housing recovery.

Emergency food and water played a very important role in survival (see Figure 6.9). The survey data show that among the households that received either emergency food and water or one of these two items from the government (n=222), 75.2 percent (n=167) of households considered that the emergency food and water or one of these items played an extremely important role in the survival of their households while 19.4 percent (n=43), 3.6 percent (n=8), 0.9 percent (n=2) and 0.9 percent (n=2) of households considered that the emergency food and emergency water or one of these items played a very important, moderately important, slightly important and not at all important role in the survival of their households respectively.

Figure 6.9 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of food and water or either received from the government in their survival (n=222)

Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)

The government aid item that contributed most significantly to the survival of the affected households was the 20 kg rice per card per month under the VGF program. Households usually received one card per household and thus received 20 kg rice per month. A few large households received two cards and thus received 40 kg rice per month per household. The government gave 20 kg rice under the VGF program in the two studied villages and unions

173 from September 2009 to October 2010 (14 months).64 As the affected households in both the villages were not able to commence recovery activities due to the regular flooding of the village, they were unable to manage the necessary food for survival. In both villages, households that were receiving 30 kg rice under the Vulnerable Group Development (hereafter VGD) program during that time did not receive rice under the VGF program (source: key informants).65

Rice under the VGF program played a substantial role in meeting the survival needs of the affected households (see Figure 6.10). Most households would have faced food scarcity or starvation if they did not receive VGF rice as they did not have income or enough income to buy the necessary food. Many households left the villages immediately or sometime after the event as they had lost everything and were not able to survive in the area in the absence of any income. In addition to the major contribution to survival, rice under the VGF program was one of the most important aid items that played an extremely important role in reducing the migration of entire households from the studied villages to other places. The importance of rice under the VGF program in meeting the survival needs and in reducing the migration of entire households with all the members or otherwise retaining people in their villages can be understood from the following excerpts:

It was not possible to buy rice. How could we buy rice to eat as there was no income?... I had to go to another place if I did not receive 20 kg rice. Otherwise, I had to die here due to starving as there was no income. (DB, 17 June 2017)

20 kg rice was half of the food we required… The cost of other half of the food and other expenses of the family were met by the earning from catching fish and working in the embankment [for cash or food for work program]… If we did not receive 20 kg rice, we had to take a loan with interest or we had to go to another place for forever. Many families left this place. We also had to leave this place. (CC, 25 October 2017)

The survey data also show that VGF rice played a significant role in the survival of the affected households. The survey data show that among households that received VGF rice

64 In Dakshin Bedkashi Union, the number of VGF cards was 5,200 from September 2009 to June 2010 and 3,011 from July 2010 to October 2010 (source: Project Implementation Office, Koyra). In Kamarkhola Union, the number of VGF cards was 3,500 from September 2009 to October 2010 (source: Project Implementation Office, Dacope). 65 Rice support under the VGD program is a regular safety net program of the government.

174 (n=229), respondents of 93.9 percent (n=215), 5.2 percent (n=12) and 0.9 percent (n=2) of households mentioned that VGF rice played an extremely important, very important and moderately important role respectively in meeting the daily food necessity of the households while the respondents of none of the households mentioned that it played a slightly important role or no role.

Figure 6.10 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of VGF rice in meeting the daily food necessity of the households (n=229)

Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)

Households that did not receive VGF rice experienced food scarcity if they did not have the necessary income or savings to buy food.66 With a few exceptions, these households had an acute food crisis. An interviewee of a household that did not receive rice under either the VGF or VGD programs clearly describes the situation:

66 The survey data show that out of 8.4 percent (n=21) of the surveyed households (n=250) that did not receive 20 kg rice under the VGF program, only three households received rice under the VGD program after Aila. The survey only inquired if either a household received rice under the VGD program any time after Aila or not and did not inquire about the time of receiving rice under the VGD program. Rice under the VGD program is a regular safety net support of the government and thus a household can receive it any time after Aila. Thus, three households that received rice under the VGD program might not have received VGF rice as they were receiving rice under VGD. It is also possible that they might have received VGD rice during the period when the government was not operating the VGF program for the Aila-affected people. However, if the three households even received rice under the VGD program when the government operated the VGF program, 7.2 percent (n=18) of the surveyed households (n=250) did not receive rice under either the VGF or VGD program.

175

If we had received 20 kg, it would have been helpful for us. We suffered due to lack of access to food. We had scarcity of food. We were not able to buy necessary food that time with the income we had that time. (DB, 10 July 2017)

In addition to 20 kg rice, many households that received money such as a small amount of money as gratuitous relief or for house construction or repair used the money for meeting their survival needs. Likewise, many households that received 20,000 Taka for repair or constructing their houses used the money for meeting their survival needs instead of using it for the repair or construction of the house. In addition to aid, income from the government employment programs greatly contributed to the survival of the affected households. These employment opportunities helped participant households to meet survival needs both before and after the embankment was repaired.

6.3.3 Role of the Government in Economic, Housing and Psychological Recovery

The government played a substantial role in the economic and housing recovery process of the affected households (see Figure 6.11). The government did not give any aid item directly related to the economic recovery purpose. Although some households received aid items such as paddy and vegetable seeds and fertilisers as agricultural support from the government, they received these aid items as part of the regular activities undertaken for the development of agriculture by the government in Bangladesh, not due to being affected by Aila. The government gave a small amount of money for the repair or construction of the house. However, the main aid item the affected households received from the government for the repair or construction of the house was 20,000 Taka. The survey data by village show that 95.7 percent (n=67) of the surveyed households (n=70) in Channirchak and 61.6 percent (n=111) of the surveyed households (n=180) in Dakshin Bedkashi received 20,000 Taka for the repair or construction of the house.67 The money was distributed in two phases: 12,000 Taka in the first phase and 8,000 Taka in the second phase. In addition, although the government did not implement any housing project targeting Aila-affected households, a total of eight households, six households in Dakshin Bedkashi and two households in Channirchak, received houses after Aila from the government. Out of eight houses, four houses were from

67 A total of 3,011 households in Dakshin Bedkashi Union and 3,472 households in Kamarkhola Union received 20,000 Taka. A total of 140 households in Channirchak Village and 244 households in Dakshin Bedkashi Village received 20,000 Taka. It is worth noting that 365 households under Ward 3 of the Kamarkhola Union received 20,000 Taka. Out of 365, 140 households in Channirchak, which is a village under Ward 3, received 20,000 Taka (source: Project Implementation Office, Dacope & Project Implementation Office, Koyra).

176 the Zila Parishad, Khulna, and two households in each village received houses from the Zila Parishad, Khulna.

The qualitative data show that many households would have required much more time to construct or repair houses if they did not receive 20,000 Taka. Moreover, many households that were living outside their homestead due to the displacement would have required much more time to return to their homestead after the village became dewatered if they did not receive 20,000 Taka. An interviewee depicts the situation in the following way:

I constructed a [small] house with 20,000 Taka. I could not construct the house if I did not receive 20,000 Taka… As I could not construct the house, I could not come to my homestead. (DB, 17 June 2017)

Moreover, households that did not receive 20,000 Taka encountered difficulties in constructing or repairing houses and in a few cases could not still repair the damaged surviving house. An interviewee elucidates in the following way:

I could not repair the house up to now after Aila… If I would receive 20,000 Taka, then I could have repaired the house. If it rains, then water falls from above. The windows are also broken. (Aila damaged the house of the interviewee partially, DB 10 July 2017)

Among the households that received any aid from the government (n=248), the respondents of 8.1 percent (n=20), 23.8 percent (n=59), 28.6 percent (n=71) and 26.6 percent (n=66) of households considered that aid from the government played an extremely important, very important, moderately important and slightly important role in the economic recovery of their households respectively. On the other hand, the respondents of 12.9 percent (n=32) of households considered that aid from the government did not play any role in the economic recovery of their households. Among the households that received any aid from the government (n=248), the respondents of 30.6 percent (n=76), 17.3 percent (n=43), 8.9 percent (n=22) and 11.7 percent (n=29) of households considered that aid from the government played an extremely important, very important, moderately important and slightly important role in the housing recovery of their households respectively. On the other hand, the respondents of 31.5 percent (n=78) of households considered that aid from the government did not play any role in their housing recovery.

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Figure 6.11 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from the government in economic, housing and psychological recovery (n=248)

Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)

Although households received direct aid for housing recovery and did not receive direct aid for economic recovery, aid from the government played a role in the economic recovery and housing recovery of 86.4 percent (n=216) and 68 percent (n=170) of the surveyed households respectively. Aid that households received for other purposes have indirectly contributed to the economic recovery. Moreover, many households that received 20,000 Taka for the housing recovery purpose did not use the money for that purpose.

The survey data show that among the households that received 20,000 Taka (n=178), 60.7 percent (n=108) used the money for repairing or constructing the house while 39.3 percent (n=70) did not use the money for repairing or constructing the house. Among the households that received 20,000 Taka from the government (n=178), respondents of 52.2 percent (n=93), 7.3 percent (n=13), 5.1 percent (n=9) and 14.6 percent (n=26) considered that it played an extremely important, very important, moderately important and slightly important role while 20.8 percent (n=37) considered that it did not play any role in the housing recovery of their households. The survey data also show that all the recipient households that mentioned that 20,000 Taka did not play any role in the housing recovery (n=37) did not use the money for

178 the repair or construction of the houses. Moreover, among the recipient households that mentioned that 20,000 Taka played a slight role in the housing recovery (n=26), 25 households did not use the money for the repair or construction of the house.

The qualitative data suggest that households spent 20,000 Taka for various purposes instead of spending for the repair or construction of the house. For example, they spent the money for meeting survival needs, repaying the previous loan, meeting health costs, meeting educational costs, meeting the cost of marriage of the daughter, buying utensils and other necessary household items, buying homestead land and taking agricultural land in mortgage. They spent the money for one or more of these purposes. Households also used part of the money for the house and part of the money for other purposes such as for economic purposes or meeting health costs. The use of 20,000 Taka for various purposes can be understood from the following excerpts:

[People] could not use the money for [the construction or repair of] the house. People had no food at that time. They had to manage food with that, they shopped with that. They bought rice with that. (a focus group participant, DB, 10 August 2017)

I could not spend the money for the house… There was financial hardship at that time… The money had been spent for buying rice and for shopping necessary items needed to manage domestic life. (CC, 10 June 2017)

From 20,000 Taka, I repaid a previous [pre-Aila] loan of 10,000 Taka. I bought clothes, cooking pots, plates, bowls and other necessary household items with the remaining 10,000 Taka. (DB, 10 July 2017)

I spent first 12,000 Taka for the treatment of my child. With the money received later [8,000 Taka], I bought bamboo, pillars and constructed a [small] house [on the displaced location, not at the current homestead]. (CC, 25 October 2017)

Like aid, participation in various employment programs operated by the government also played a significant role in the economic and housing recovery (see Figure 6.12). These employment programs ensured access to food and income in a period when they had no income. The survey data show that among the households that participated in cash for work and food for work or any of these programs (n=135), respondents of 6.7 percent (n=9), 28.9 percent (n=39), 34.1 percent (n=46), and 23 percent (n=31) of households considered that

179 participation played extremely important, very important, moderately important and slightly important roles in the economic recovery of their households respectively, while respondents of 7.4 percent (n=10) of households considered that it played a not at all important role in the economic recovery of their households. Among the households that participated in cash for work and food for work or any of these programs (n=135), respondents of 5.9 percent (n=8), 22.2 percent (n=30), 20.0 percent (n=27), and 19.3 percent (n=26) of households considered that participation played an extremely important, very important, moderately important and slightly important role in the housing recovery of their households respectively, while respondents of 32.6 percent (n=44) of households considered that it played a not at all important role in the housing recovery of their households.

Figure 6.12 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of participation in cash for work program and food for work program or any of these programs in economic, housing and psychological recovery (n=135)

Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)

Among the households that participated in the employment program (n=135), participation played a role in the economic recovery and housing recovery of 92.6 (n=125) and 67.4 (n=91) percent of households respectively. The qualitative data suggest that households wanted to start economic activities and construct or repair the house. However, they usually preferred to start economic activities instead of constructing or repairing the house if they did not have

180 enough money for both. Thus, more households might have used the money earned from these programs for starting economic activities instead of constructing or repairing their houses. Households that mentioned that participation in the employment programs did not play any role in the economic recovery might have used all the amount for other purposes such as for meeting survival needs instead of using the money for starting the economic activity. Likewise, households that mentioned that participation in the employment programs did not play any role in the housing recovery might have used all the amount for other purposes instead of using the money for constructing or repairing their houses. Similarly, some households might have used the money for other purposes such as for meeting survival needs instead of using the money for both economic recovery and housing recovery.

The aid from the government played a significant role in the psychological recovery process of members of the affected households although the government did not provide psychological support as an intervention (see Figure 6.11). Among the households that received any aid from the government (n=248), the respondents of 50.4 percent (n=125), 33.1 percent (n=82), 10.5 percent (n=26), 5.2 percent (n=13) and 0.8 percent (n=2) of households considered that aid from the government played an extremely important, very important, moderately important, slightly important and not at all important role in the psychological recovery process of the members of their households respectively.

Like aid, participation in various government employment programs also played a significant role in the psychological recovery process of the members of the affected households (see Figure 6.12). Among the households that participated in cash for work and food for work or any of these programs (n=135), respondents of 24.4 percent (n=33), 48.9 percent (n=66), 19.3 percent (n=26), and 6.7 percent (n=9) of households considered that participation played an extremely important, very important, moderately important and slightly important role in the psychological recovery process of the members of their households respectively while the respondent of only one household considered that it did not play an important role at all in the psychological recovery process of the members of the household.

An interesting finding is that both aid from the government and participation in the government employment programs contributed to the psychological recovery of a higher percentage of the households compared to the economic and housing recovery. Aid from the government played a role in the psychological recovery of the members of 98.4 percent (n=246) of the surveyed households (n=250) while aid from the government played a role in

181 the economic and housing recovery of 86.4 percent (n=216) and 68 percent (n=170) of the surveyed households (n=250) respectively. Moreover, aid from the government played an extremely important and very important role in the psychological recovery of the members of 82.8 percent (n=207) of the surveyed households while aid from the government played an extremely important and very important role in the economic and housing recovery of 31.6 percent (n=79) and 47.6 percent (n=119) of the surveyed households respectively. Likewise, participation in cash and food for work or any of these programs played a role in the psychological recovery of 53.6 percent (n=134) of the surveyed households (n=250), and it played a role in the economic recovery of 50 percent (n=125) and housing recovery of 36.4 (n=91) of the surveyed households (n=250) respectively. Moreover, participation in cash and food for work or any of these programs played an extremely important and very important role in the psychological recovery of 39.6 percent (n=99) of the surveyed households (n=250), while it played an extremely important and very important role in the economic recovery of 19.2 percent (n=48) and 15.2 percent (n=38) of the surveyed households (n=250) respectively.

The significant contribution of aid and the government employment programs to psychological recovery in the absence of psychological support as an intervention is highly consistent with the findings of qualitative data. The qualitative data suggest that as the affected people were not able to begin recovery activities due to the villages being subject to the regular flooding, they became perplexed. They became worried about survival. They were not sure either they would be able to live in the affected village or not. There was also a belief in the initial period among the villagers in both the studied villages that the villages would not continue to exist, and they would lose everything to the rising river due to the breaches of the embankments not being repaired. Thus, they were more concerned about survival and the possibility of living in the villages in the initial period rather than commencing recovery activities although commencing recovery activities was not possible.

However, aid and work opportunities from the government as well as from NGOs in the absence of any regular income for most of the households created a sense of optimism among the affected people and helped them feel psychologically better. They got mental strength from believing that the villages would become dewatered in future and they would be able to stay in the affected villages when the government and NGOs started relief operations in full phase and created temporary employment opportunities. They got the confidence that the government and NGOs were with them and would support them not only to survive but also

182 to achieve recovery. Thus, although they did not receive direct psychological support, aid for survival, economic and housing recovery and work opportunities from the government, as well as from NGOs, greatly contributed to the psychological recovery. The following statements of an interviewee show how the aid given for other purposes contributed to psychological recovery:

The government and NGOs played the main role in the case of housing and economic recovery… As they gave support for housing and economic recovery, we became psychologically well. If housing and economic conditions would remain bad, then we would remain psychologically unwell. (DB, 17 June 2017)

In addition to aid and employment programs, some households took loans (with interest) from the government sources such as Bangladesh Krishi Bank (BKB) and the Ektee Bari Ektee Khamar (One House One Farm) project for various purposes including starting economic activities after Aila. They took loans mainly after the embankment was repaired. The survey data show only one household took a loan from the government source before the embankment was repaired and took the loan only one time in order to meet survival needs. However, 9.6 percent (n=24) of the surveyed households took a loan from the government sources after the embankment was repaired. All but one household took a loan one time while one household took a loan two times from the government sources after the embankment was repaired. Among the purposes of taking a loan after the embankment was repaired, starting economic activity was the most important purpose and meeting survival needs was the second most important purpose.

6.4 Major Weaknesses of the Post-Aila Response and Recovery Operations

6.4.1 Lack of Aid During the Initial Period

The aid from the government was less than the needs of the people in both the villages, until the government started providing 20 kg rice under the VGF program. The affected households in both the villages did not receive any aid from the government during the first few days after the event. The government gave its first aid, in the form of rice, in both the villages on the third day following the day of the event. However, only some households received that aid as the amount of aid was extremely limited compared to the needs of the households in both villages. The amount of aid was lower than the needs of the households in both the villages

183 during the first week. However, the flow of the government aid, mainly emergency aid items such as rice, dry food and water, gradually increased from the second week.

6.4.2 Inadequacy of Major Aid Items Compared to Need: 20 kg Rice and 20,000 Taka

The government stopped providing 20 kg rice under the VGF program in both villages before the embankment was repaired. The government started distributing 20 kg rice under the VGF program from September 2009. The last month for which the government provided rice under the VGF program in both the villages was October 2010. However, Channirchak became dewatered in February 2011 while Dakshin Bedkashi became dewatered in March 2012 due to the repair of the embankment. As most households did not have access to their usual income, they had survival needs before the embankment was repaired. Most households also had survival needs for a period after the embankment was repaired as they required time to revive economic activities after the embankment. For instance, households that were mainly dependent on agriculture or shrimp farming had no income until they harvested crops or shrimps, if they had no income from other sources. Thus, it was necessary to continue the provision of giving 20 kg rice under the VGF program to the affected households not only until the embankment was repaired but also up to a period after the embankment was repaired. It is worth noting that although people in both villages used to eat atap rice (rice milled from sun-dried paddy, they received shiddhya rice (rice milled from parboiled paddy) under the VGF program. Thus, many households experienced difficulty in eating unfamiliar shiddhya rice.

The number of households that received 20,000 Taka was lower than the number of households that really needed the money. The government also provided an extremely smaller number of houses in both the villages. Only eight households received houses from the government in the two villages. All of them also received 20,000 Taka (source: interviews and household survey). All the households received houses much later than they received 20,000 Taka. However, many households, including some extremely poor and poor households, particularly in Dakshin Bedkashi Village, did not receive either a house or the 20,000 Taka from the government. It would have been fair if the houses were distributed to those households that did not receive 20,000 Taka from the government.

184 6.4.3 Problems Related to the Criteria of Aid Distribution: 20 kg Rice and 20,000 Taka

A household received 20 kg rice under the VGF program for one VGF card. The elected representatives of UP gave two VGF cards per household if the household had many members. Nevertheless, some of the households that had more members received only one VGF card. Thus, the households with more members faced problems as the amount of rice was insufficient compared to the needs of the households. This sort of distribution (including the same sort of distribution by NGOs) caused the separation of the extended or joint family into more than one family in a few cases. Thus, it is necessary to consider the number of household members in distributing aid items like rice.

The government gave 20,000 Taka per household. Although large households (a household consisting of more than one nuclear unit) received two cards for 20,000 Taka (40,000 Taka) in a few cases, large households usually received one card for 20,000 Taka although the household required more than one card. Thus, extended or joint households were in a disadvantageous position due to the consideration of these households as a single household. Moreover, if a household or two households among separate households of siblings received 20,000 Taka, then the household of the other sibling or siblings often did not receive 20,000 Taka although they were poor and needy. Thus, in both villages, some poor households did not receive 20,000 Taka as a sibling or siblings of the household heads living in the separate household/s received 20,000 Taka while some rich households received 20,000 Taka.

Two issues related to the 20,000 Taka donations contributed to the non-use of money for the repair or construction of the house. Firstly, households in both the villages received the money when the villages were subject to flooding. Thus, needy households spent the money for meeting survival needs instead of saving the money to repair or construct house in the future when the village would become dewatered. Secondly, the households received the money in two instalments. The needy households spent the money or some of the money received in the first instalment for survival before they received the second instalment. Thus, they could not save the whole amount for repairing or constructing the house. The survey data also show that 76.8 percent (n=192) of the total surveyed households opined that the disbursement of the money in two instalments was a problem for the repair or construction of the house.

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6.4.4 Lack of Livelihood Support

The affected households in both the villages badly required livelihood support. Some households received agricultural support in the form of free paddy and vegetable seeds and fertilisers. However, they received these items under regular activities of the Department of Agricultural Extension, not under any livelihood support project that was particularly designed for the Aila-affected households. The lack of livelihood support from the government was one of the major weaknesses of the post-Aila recovery operations. Islam, Walkerden and Amati (2017) also found that most households did not receive livelihood support after Cyclone Sidr from UP.

6.4.5 Absence of Psychological Support as an Intervention

Some of the more severe impacts of disaster such as loss of family members, destruction of house, water incursion into the home and loss of income influence mental health significantly (Frankenberg, Nobles & Sumantri 2012; Frankenberg et al. 2008; Lebowitz 2016; Isaranuwatchai et al. 2017). Thus, psychological support after an event like Aila is extremely necessary for the affected people. However, the government did not provide psychological support to the Aila-affected people as an intervention. The absence of psychological support to assist people to recover from the shock created by Aila was one of the major weaknesses. As Aila not only impacted the physical infrastructure but also impacted the psyche of the affected people, psychological recovery was as necessary as the recovery of infrastructure (Kenny & Clarke 2010). Thus, provision of psychological support to the disaster victims should be considered as one of the most important areas of the post-disaster response and recovery programs, as a disaster always causes psychological damage as well as physical damage (Haque at al. 2012).

6.4.6 Lack of Coordination

Coordination between the government and NGOs occurred at the various levels including coordination at Upazila Parishad level and UP level. NGOs that worked within the upazila informed the UNO officially. UNO is the chief executive officer of the Upazila Parishad and representative of the central government at the upazila level (Hassan & Mannan 2016). The UNO is also vice-chairperson of the Upazila Disaster Management Committee (UzDMC) and chairperson of the Upazila Disaster Response Coordination Group (UDRCG) (MoDMR

186 2019).68 NGOs submitted the necessary documents to the UNO to implement projects within the upazila. After the approval from UNO, NGOs usually organised a project inception meeting at the upazila level and started the project activities. The elected representatives of the project area, mainly the chairman of the UP or Ups, usually attended the inception meeting at the upazila level.

In addition, NGOs informed and worked in coordination with the UP as NGOs implemented projects within the areas of a union or more unions of an upazila. The elected chairman of the UP is the head of the UP. The chairman is also the chairman of the Union Disaster Management Committee (UDMC) which is the main body for undertaking necessary actions during the warning period, disaster period and post-disaster period at the union level. The UDMC plays vital roles in coordinating the government and NGO relief activities and distributing relief items at the union level. The chairman is also the member of UzDMC (MoFDM 2010b). The chairman plays the most important role at the union level during the warning stage, disaster stage and rehabilitation stage. The chairman operates the union-level control room and has contact with the upazila-level control room operated by the UNO. The chairman coordinates and supervises relief works carried out by the government and NGOs at the union level. UP members who are also the members of UDMC also play an important role. They assist the UP chairman at every stage, playing an important role in announcing warnings and keeping the emergency volunteer team ready for various tasks including evacuation. They also participate in rescue, relief and rehabilitation operations (MoFDM 2010b).

The UNO coordinated all the NGOs that participated in the post-Aila response and recovery operations within the upazila through the monthly NGO coordination meetings. Coordination between UNO and NGOs helped to avoid overlapping of the interventions in the same area by different NGOs. The UNO sometimes invited the chairman of the respective UPs to attend the monthly NGO coordination meeting. The coordination between UNO and NGOs at the upazila level was usually better. However, the coordination between elected representatives and NGOs at the union level was sometimes problematic. The lack of coordination at the

68 The UNO earlier acted as the chairperson of the Upazila Disaster Management Committee (UzDMC) (MoFDM 2010b). Currently, the upazila chairman is the chairperson of the Upazila Disaster Management Committee (UzDMC) (MoDMR 2019).

187 union level undermined the success of the response and recovery operations (Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017, p. 374).

The coordination between UP and NGOs varied from one studied UP to another studied UP and within the same UP during the periods of the different chairmen. NGOs that worked in the union usually informed the chairman and members of the UP and other people living within the UP about the project through the arrangement of the inception meeting at the union level. NGOs are always required to work in coordination with the UP. The chairman of the UP did not arrange regular monthly coordination meetings with NGOs like UNO did. However, the chairman usually met NGO representatives working within the union when necessary. The chairman sometimes also invited the representatives of the NGOs working within the union to attend the monthly regular meeting of the UP to know about the progress of activities undertaken under various projects by NGOs or to discuss project-related issues such as the selection of the beneficiaries for a particular project.

The main problem between the UP and NGOs emerged concerning the selection of the beneficiaries for an aid item from an NGO. The problem arose mainly during the distribution of important aid items such as house and livelihood support. Different NGOs selected the list of beneficiaries in different ways. Nevertheless, NGOs usually finalised the list of the beneficiaries after consultation with the UP representatives. They often had to adjust the list of the beneficiaries by including or excluding some beneficiaries recommended by the UP representatives. However, UP representatives and NGOs sometimes were not able to reach consensus. The main reason for the disagreement was the recommendation and pressure by the UP representatives for the inclusion of the ineligible beneficiaries in the list at the cost of the exclusion of the eligible beneficiaries from the list prepared by the NGOs in consultation with the community people. UP representatives often recommended people such as relatives, friends and political supporters and the people from whom they took bribes as the beneficiaries for an aid item from NGOs. Like UP representatives, powerful village leaders including the village-level leaders of the ruling party at the national level also wanted and pressured NGO employees to include their own people and the people from whom they took bribes as the beneficiaries for an aid item. Thus, inappropriate recommendation and pressure by the UP chairman or elected representatives on NGO employees for giving an aid item to the ineligible beneficiaries based on social and political connections and the receipt of bribes from a potential beneficiary was the major source of conflict between the UP and NGOs. An

188 NGO employee who participated in the post-Aila response and recovery operations depicts the situation in the following way:

They give priority to their close people. Say, I will give sheep to 50 people. When the chairman listens, he will keep [just] 20 to 30 of the beneficiaries included in the list [created based on the community consultation]. He wants to distribute the remaining to his party people and close people… They put pressure. Many created pressure during that time… Many NGOs were compelled to give to the people they wanted. (17 August 2017)

Key informants also confirmed that the then chairman of one of the UPs physically assaulted NGO employees when they did not agree to include his preferred people in the list of beneficiaries. Moreover, NGO employees often felt scared when they worked, particularly in one of the studied villages, as the political leaders often intimidated them for not including their people in the list.

However, both the parties often resolved these sorts of disputes through discussion, with the help of other people from both the parties. An elected representative of one of the unions elucidates this in the following way:

The then chairman had turbulent relations with many NGOs during that period… Many NGOs became dissatisfied and thus decided not to work in the area. We comforted them and convinced them to start the work again. (DB, 11 August 2017)

However, if the dispute was not resolved through discussion at the UP level, then NGOs usually raised the issue in the monthly NGO coordination meeting with the UNO. The chairman of the affected unions sometimes participated in the monthly NGO coordination meeting at the invitation of UNO. The chairman also raised issues related to the problematic aspects of NGO operations such as exclusion of eligible beneficiaries by NGOs in the monthly NGO coordination meeting with the UNO. The UNO played a vital role in solving the disputes between the chairman or other elected representatives and NGOs.

6.4.7 Exclusion of Poor Households

Many poor and extremely poor households did not receive major aid items while many better- off households did. For instance, among the 51 interviewed households in Dakshin Bedkashi,

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13 households did not receive 20,000 Taka and many of them were poor or extremely poor households. On the other hand, many better-off households received 20,000 Taka. Although the better-off households that received 20,000 Taka needed the money to construct or repair their houses as Aila destroyed their houses too, the exclusion of poor and extremely poor households was unfair. A female interviewee from an extremely poor household, who lost her nine-year-old boy due to Aila (the only person killed in that village) and her husband (who had been suffering from a disease before Aila) a week after Aila, clearly depicts the situation:

I lost my son; I lost my husband… Many people living adjacent to me received money. Was it not the right thing for money to be given to me? People living adjacent to me earn better, their [economic] condition is good. They received the money, but I did not receive the money. Thus, I felt emotionally hurt. (DB, 23 September 2017)

Some of the households that did not receive 20 kg rice under the VGF program were poor households and yet they also did not receive rice under the VGD program. Thus, they had an acute food crisis. Moreover, some of the households that received houses from the government were relatively better-off households, although many poor and extremely poor households did not receive houses. It is worth noting that all the better-off households that received houses from the government also received 20,000 Taka from the government. However, many poor and extremely poor households, particularly in Dakshin Bedkashi Village, did not receive either a house or 20,000 Taka from the government.

6.4.8 Favouritism

UP representatives favoured relatives and people who were socially close to them such as friends, and supporters of their own political party or own group during the distribution of various aid items (Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017). In addition to the chairman and elected members of the UP, unelected village leaders, mainly the village-level leaders of the national- level ruling political party and some powerful village leaders, also played important roles in the distribution of the aid items. They also favoured their own people during the distribution of various aid items. Leaders of the national-level ruling political party at other broader levels such as union level also played an important role in the distribution of the aid items. They also favoured their own people during the distribution of various aid items. The qualitative data show that many households were deprived of various aid items due to the favouritism of the

190 UP representatives. The following excerpts of the interviews illustrate the favouritism being shown by the UP representatives:

The chairman-member gives more [aid] to the people whom they know and their [political] supporters. They even give to the people who do not deserve it. (CC, 16 August 2017)

I do not believe member-chairman because they gave to the people whom they liked; they did not give to the people whom they did not like. (DB, 9 July 2017)

Party politics is very important here. One needs to get in touch with the chairman or member. They recommend people to whom they want to give. (CC, 9 June 2017)

Political favouritism in the distribution of the aid items seriously undermined the equity and efficiency of aid operations (Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017; Mustafa 2003; Quarantelli 1999). UP representatives favoured supporters of their own political party or own group, reflecting their own political interests. As the supporters played important roles in electing them, they always tried to a give an aid item to the households of their supporters. They also could not ignore the demands of their supporters for aid items. They wanted to give aid to their supporters to secure their position as a leader and a win in the next election. A key informant describes this in the following way:

They need to increase their vote bank. That is why they play an active role to provide a support [aid item] to the people whom they like. (1 October 2017)

Among the supporters of the political party, people who had more connection with the UP representatives received more aid. The UP representatives sometimes excluded supporters of the opposite political party from various types of aid items due to political favouritism. Likewise, they sometimes excluded supporters of the opposite group within the same political party. Similarly, they sometimes also favoured some people who were supporters of the opposite political party but supporters of their own group in local-level politics. An interviewee describes the exclusion of the supporters of the opposite political party from various types of aid items given by the government through UP:

As we are the supporters of F and G [two national-level political parties not in power], they do not give [to] us. If there is something left after distributing among the

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supporters of E [the national-level ruling political party and the party of the UP chairman], then they give [to] us. Otherwise, they do not. (DB, 17 June 2017)

The UP representatives also favoured their relatives, close people and political supporters when they selected the households that could work in the various employment programs operated by the government. This can be understood from the following excerpt:

The chairman-member gives work opportunities to their relatives and some of their own party members. They give work opportunities to the people who are close to them. (CC, 23 August 2017)

The UP chairman favoured his areas for the distribution of some important aid items such as houses and tried to ensure more infrastructure development such as new roads in his areas. Favouritism in distributing aid items strengthened the bond between the UP representatives and those households that received benefits while it weakened the bond between the UP representatives and the other households deprived of aid items. The favouritism in distributing aid items not only excluded people belonging to the opposite political party or opposite group within the party but also created tensions within the village and thus weakened community resilience.

The receipt of unfair benefits by some households from their relationships with linking networks such as UP representatives should not be considered as an actual instance of the effective functioning of linking social networks. This represents not the anticipated functioning of social capital, but rather its dark side (Putnam 2000; Aldrich 2011a, 2012a). Favouring socially or politically close households and exclusion of many households therefore not only undermined the equity and efficiency of response and recovery operations but also undermined the welfare of the community by weakening the relationships between the UP representatives and the households deprived of aid items and creating conflicts among villagers. Other empirical studies have also observed this Janus-faced nature of social capital in post-disaster contexts (Aldrich 2011a, 2012a; Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017).

6.4.9 Less Amount of VGF Rice and Bribery

Distribution of less rice than a household was entitled to receive, and distribution of the aid items in exchange for bribes, seriously undermined the equity and efficiency of aid operations (Nadiruzzaman & Paul 2013; Islam & Walkerden 2015; Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017;

192 Masud-All-Kamal & Hassan 2018; Kenny 2010; Mustafa 2003). As discussed earlier, practices like these represent the negative consequences or dark sides of social capital (Aldrich 2011a, 2012a; Putnam 2000; Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017). A household that received a VGF card was entitled to receive 20 kg rice per card. However, many interviewees confirmed that the weight of the rice they received under the VGF program was less than 20 kg. Mahmud and Prowse (2012) also found that most of the households that received 20 kg rice under the VGF program after Aila received less rice than 20 kg. The interviewees depict the situation in the following ways:

The rice was less than 20 kg. If the UP gave 20 kg, then it used to be 18 kg. I weighed to see. The rice was not more than 18 kg. (CC, 25 August 2017)

The amount of rice was less. They gave 20 kg rice. However, the weight of the rice used to be 17 kg or 18 kg. (DB, 6 August 2017)

Distribution of the aid items in exchange for bribes was a major problem. The qualitative data reveal that elected representatives of the UP took bribes when they distributed various government aid items (Mahmud & Prowse 2012; Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017). They also took bribes from the people whom they selected for the various employment programs created by the government (Mahmud & Prowse 2012). Unelected village leaders, mainly the village- level leaders of the central-level ruling political party and some powerful village leaders close to the UP representatives, also took bribes (Mahmud & Prowse 2012; Nadiruzzaman & Paul 2013; Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017).69 They often took bribes in collusion with the elected representatives as they usually worked as the middlemen. This can be understood from the following excerpt:

Other representatives [elected members of UP] and [politically close persons] of the chairman are also involved with him. For example, a person close to the chairman took 10,000 Taka from you. He gave 8,000 Taka to the chairman and he received 2,000 Taka as he asked for the bribe or worked for it. (DB, 4 August 2017)

The government distributed 20,000 Taka to the recipients through their own bank accounts. The Bangladesh Army prepared the list of beneficiaries for 20,000 Taka. The personnel of the

69 Mahmud and Prowse (2012) found that among the households that gave bribes to receive a small amount of money distributed by the government, more households gave bribes to the middlemen than the chairman and members of UP.

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Bangladesh Army visited the villages and conducted a door-to-door survey and prepared the list in consultation with the UP representatives. Nevertheless, some household-level interviewees and key informants confirmed that UP representatives and unelected village leaders, mainly the village leaders of the ruling political party and some powerful village leaders close to the UP representatives, often took bribes from the recipients of 20,000 Taka. This can be understood from the following excerpts of the interviews:

We were told that 20,000 Taka could be given if half of the money was given [as bribes]. We gave half of the money [10,000 Taka] to the person through whom we got the card and we took half of the money. (a focus group participant, DB, 7 August 2017)

One had to give 500 Taka or 1,000 Taka to receive 20,000. Otherwise, it was not possible to receive. I also had to give money. I was not the only person who gave [1,500 Taka as bribes], everyone had to give 1,000 or 2,000. Everyone who received the money had to give 1,000 Taka, 1,500 Taka or 2,000 Taka. (He gave 1,500 Taka in two instalments to the elected member of the UP.) (DB, 6 August 2017)

[Middlemen] wanted 5,000 Taka for 20,000 Taka. If I would give 5,000 Taka, then I would receive 20,000 Taka. However, I did not give the money. I did not take part in the illegal activity. Middlemen who worked for the chairman-member asked for the money. (DB, 5 August 2017)

Elected representatives of UP and other unelected leaders also took bribes during the distribution of houses received from the government. For instance, two households in one of the studied villages received houses from Zila Parishad and both households gave bribes to the UP representatives to receive houses. One household gave 10,000 Taka and another household gave 25,000 Taka. An interviewee who gave 10,000 Taka to the UP representatives to receive a house given from Zila Parishad stated that she got the house due to her relative who was a politician and had a strong link with the chairman of Zila Parishad and a national- level political leader of the ruling political party. She mentioned that due to her connection to the higher level, she got the house by providing only 10,000 Taka to the elected representatives of the UP. Otherwise, the amount of bribe to receive the house would have been much higher. She explains her situation in the following way:

194 It was never possible to receive the house [if we had to give 50,000–60,000 Taka]. I received it by giving 10,000 Taka. We were never able to give 50,000–60,000 Taka. (CC, 25 August 2017)

Six households in another village received two types of houses from the government: four houses of the same design and two houses of the same design. The four houses of the same design were distributed based on political considerations and given to the supporters of a political party (source: interviews with the two recipients). The other two houses of the same design, given by Khulna Zila Parishad and locally known as the government building house, were distributed to the relatively better-off households. One of the recipients of these houses, who was a household-level interviewee of the study, informed that he did not give a bribe to anyone to receive the house. However, it is an open secret and there is a widely accepted belief in the village that two households received the government building house due to large bribes given to the UP representatives. An interviewee explains:

Two government building houses were given to [X and Y]. They are not poor. They have 10 to 15 bighas agricultural land. We do not have any land except the homestead. However, we did not get [the government building house]. We could not give money [like the recipients]. (DB, 4 August 2017)

A few households also mentioned that they had to give bribes to the elected leaders or unelected village leaders to get the opportunity to work in the employment programs operated by the government. An interviewee who gave a 300 Taka bribe to a local leader (he did not mention the identity of the leader) to get 40 days’ work depicts the necessity of providing a bribe to participate in the government-operated employment programs in the following way:

I do not believe [the member-chairman]. If they distribute work, then poor people do not get that work. If someone gives money [to them], then they get work. If someone does not give money [to them], then they do not get work… The other leaders [unelected village leaders] aside from the member-chairman are also the same. (DB, 3 August 2017)

UP representatives also took bribes from the people who received aid items from NGOs. UP representatives often pressured NGO personnel to provide aid items to their relatives, friends and political supporters, or to people from whom they took bribes. Moreover, unelected

195 leaders of the village were also involved in the corrupt practices either in collusion with the elected leaders or alone. Three interviewees confirmed that they gave bribes to the elected UP representatives and unelected leaders to get the houses from NGOs. Although only three interviewees acknowledged it, there is a belief among the local people and NGO key informants that elected and unelected leaders often took bribes from the potential recipients of aid items from NGOs by assuring them that they would receive an aid item if they gave a bribe. Key informants from the NGO sector stated that elected and unelected leaders often took bribes in the name of NGO staff although NGO staff were not aware of this. This can be understood from the following excerpts of an interview with an NGO employee who worked in one of the studied villages:

Alam [pseudonym] bhai [brother] cannot tell you directly. His rate is 10,000 Taka. However, I talked to him and [confirmed] it for you. You give me 8,000 Taka. Otherwise, your name would be deleted from the list. Local people, particularly the elected member [of the Union Parishad] and some other people [locally powerful people, mainly political leaders] took money secretly from people by using our name. They were poor people. They thought that we did not have a house, we might lose the house [if we did not give money]. Some gave them 5,000 Taka, some gave 7,000 Taka, some gave 3,000 Taka, and some gave 2,000 Taka. In fact, the people who were needy and eligible to receive the house received the house. Nevertheless, they had to give the money. (1 October 2017)

In a few cases, NGO staff also became involved with the elected chairman and members of UP and unelected village leaders and participated in the corrupt practices. A key informant from the NGO sector depicts it in the following way:

Our field staff sometimes became biased. Everyone did not have the same mentality… When the staff formed a collusion with the representative of the local government – for example, a member of the Union Parishad when they discharge their job duties – they became involved in corruption. The staff were sacked later, and new staff were appointed. (11 September 2017)

However, NGOs usually cautioned the villagers that they did not need to give bribes to anyone to receive an aid item. Nevertheless, the villagers gave bribes to UP representatives and other local leaders for receiving vital aid items such as houses from NGOs. They gave

196 bribes to be included or not to be excluded from the list of beneficiaries. The following statements of an NGO employee clearly illustrate this:

Do not give bribes to anyone. A [the name of an NGO] does not take any money [for the aid provided]. If you give bribes to anyone, then we will not give you a house, we will not give you a latrine [if we know about it]. Despite this warning, people gave bribes. Elected leaders such as chairman-members and local leaders took the bribes. (1 October 2017)

The survey did not inquire about corrupt practices of the elected representatives of the UP and unelected village leaders. However, it inquired about how much the respondents trust elected representatives of the UP as well as unelected village leaders in a five-point scale. The survey also inquired about respondents’ opinions regarding the honesty of the elected representatives of the UP as well as unelected village leaders in a five-point scale. The survey data show that most of the respondents trust elected representatives of the UP and unelected village leaders only to a small or very small extent, and most respondents think that they are dishonest.

The negative image of the UP representatives and unelected village leaders can also be understood from some other survey findings. Only 10.8 percent (n=27) of the survey respondents (n=250) agreed while 86.8 percent (n=217) of the survey respondents disagreed and 2.4 percent (n=6) were undecided in response to the statement that the elected leaders give priority to the welfare of the village over that of their own family, relatives and people close to them. Likewise, 16.4 percent (n=41) of the survey respondents agreed while 80.4 percent (n=201) disagreed, and 3.2 percent (n=8) were undecided in response to the statement that unelected village leaders give priority to the welfare of the village over that of their own family, relatives and people close to them.

6.5 Conclusion

Neither of the UPs disseminated the warnings effectively or took essential measures to evacuate people and livestock to the safe places. Both the UPs played a very limited role in searching for and rescuing people immediately after the event or on the night of the event. The UPs were not well prepared despite the cyclone warning signal of seven, and were not at all prepared for the flooding of the whole union due to the breaking of the embankments caused by the storm surge associated with Aila.

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The government started relief operations within a few days of the event. Although the aid that the government provided was very limited for a period following the event, the government played an extremely important role in the survival of the affected households. As the villages were subject to flooding for a long period, the affected households could not start recovery activities. Most of the affected households were not able to survive without external assistance from the government and NGOs, as households did not have income to meet their survival needs for a long period. They would have left the area as they were unable to meet their survival needs. Various government aid items such as rice, flattened rice, gur, water and clothes greatly contributed to people’s survival. Rice under the VGF played a vital role in meeting the survival needs of the people. It also played an extremely important role in reducing permanent migration of households from the studied villages. In addition to aid, participation in the government employment programs helped households greatly to meet their survival needs. The case of the post-Aila situation shows that survival of the households was not possible without aid and non-aid employment assistance from linking networks, i.e. government and NGOs.

The government also played a significant role in the economic, housing and psychological recovery. However, the livelihood support was much less than the needs in both the villages. The distribution of 20,000 Taka for repair or construction was a great support for housing recovery. However, many households did not use the money for the repair or construction of the house. Nevertheless, households used the money for other necessary purposes including meeting survival needs and many other purposes. Although the government did not provide psychological support as an intervention, aid and work opportunities from the government (along with the aid and work opportunities from NGOs) created a sense of optimism among the affected people and gave them mental strength and confidence and thus contributed to the psychological recovery process of the members of the affected households. In addition to aid, participation in the government employment programs also greatly contributed to the economic, housing and psychological recovery. Moreover, loans from the government sources after the embankment was repaired also aided some households in undertaking recovery initiatives.

The government’s post-Aila response and recovery operations had some serious weaknesses. It did not start the relief operation immediately after the event. The amount of relief was extremely low compared to needs during the first week and was very limited up to the point

198 when the government started the VGF program. The government gave VGF rice for a lesser period than was needed and gave locally unsuitable rice. Moreover, the government gave 20,000 Taka to a smaller number of households than required. Lack of livelihood support and an absence of psychological support as an intervention were two major weaknesses of the government response and recovery operations. Lack of coordination between UP and NGOs, exclusion of poor households, and favouritism and bribery of the UP representatives in discharging aid items seriously undermined the fairness and effectiveness of the distributed aid items.

Finally, the post-Aila situation shows that the affected households are not usually able to survive and recover without aid and non-aid support from the government. The government acted as a source of resilience. The government should address these weaknesses in order to play a better role in future response and recovery operations. The government should ensure the supply of necessary survival aid items during the initial period. The government should provide necessary livelihood support as economic recovery is one of the most important components of the post-disaster recovery process. Moreover, the government should provide psychosocial support as one of the core areas of the future disaster response and recovery operations. The next chapter will investigate how linking social capital, i.e. the resources the affected households received from NGOs, contributes to the disaster response and the economic, housing and psychological recovery process.

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Chapter 7: The Role of Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and Their Weaknesses in the Post-Cyclone Aila Response and Recovery Operations

7.1 Introduction

This chapter investigates the role of non-government organisations (NGOs) in the post– Cyclone Aila response and recovery process of the affected households, and the weaknesses of NGOs’ post–Cyclone Aila response and recovery operations. This chapter investigates both objectives based on NGOs’ post-Aila operations in Channirchak Village of Kamarkhola Union of Dacope Upazila and Dakshin Bedkashi Village of Dakshin Bedkashi Union of Koyra Upazila, Khulna District, Bangladesh. This chapter has six sections including the introduction in section 7.1. Section 7.2 briefly outlines the NGOs that participated in the post- Aila response and recovery operations in the two studied villages. Section 7.3 presents the types of aid and non-aid items the affected households received from NGOs, i.e. through their linking networks. Section 7.4 examines the role of NGOs in the post-Aila response and recovery process of the affected households. Section 7.5 examines weaknesses of NGOs’ post-Aila response and recovery operations. Section 7.6 presents the conclusion.

7.2. NGOs that Participated in the Post-Aila Response and Recovery Operations

Various national and international NGOs participated in the post-Aila response and recovery operations (see Table 7.1). However, most of the NGOs that implemented projects in the two studied villages were national NGOs. International NGOs such as ActionAid, Cristian Aid, DanChurchAid, Oxfam, Save the Children and WaterAid either supported or funded the projects implemented by national NGOs. Moreover, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, UK Aid (the Department for International Development, United Kingdom), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the European Commission (EC) and United Nation agencies such as United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) either supported or funded the projects implemented by national NGOs. It is worth noting that Islamic Relief Bangladesh, an international NGO, directly implemented some projects in Dakshin Bedkashi Union including the studied Dakshin Bedkashi Village.

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Table 7.1 Major NGOs that participated in the post-Aila response and recovery operations70 Channirchak Dakshin Bedkashi Banchte Shekha BRAC BRAC Caritas Bangladesh Dushtha Shasthya Kendra Islamic Relief Bangladesh Heed Bangladesh Nowabenki Gonomukhi Foundation Jagrata Juba Shangha Rupantar Rupantar Sheba Manab Kallyan Kendra Sheba Manab Kallyan Kendra Shushilan Shushilan Uttaran Ulashi Sreejony Sangha Uttaran

Source: Household-level interviews, Key informants, FGDs

7.3 Types of Aid and Non-Aid Items the Affected Households Received from NGOs

The affected households received various types of aid from NGOs.71 The survey data show that 99.6 percent (n=249) of the surveyed households (n=250) received aid from NGOs.72 One surveyed household that did not receive any aid from NGOs was from Dakshin Bedkashi and the household participated in two cash-for-work programs and one food-for-work program operated by NGOs. The survey data also show that 21.2 percent (n=53) of the surveyed households received aid from three or fewer NGOs while 43.6 percent (n=109) and 34.8 (n=87) percent of the surveyed households received aid from four to six NGOs and more

70 Key informants and interviewees confirmed that Bangladesh Red Crescent Society, World Vision, Nabolok, and Prodipan distributed emergency relief items in Channirchak. Key informants and interviewees confirmed that Bangladesh Red Crescent Society distributed emergency relief items and Shishu Sasthya Foundation provided three houses and some water filters in Dakshin Bedkashi. It is worth noting that Shishu Sasthya Foundation did not implement the project in Dakshin Bedkashi. It implemented the project in Shyamnagar Upazila of Satkhira District. However, an employee of the project who hailed from Dakshin Bedkashi provided some project support, with permission from the higher authority, to Dakshin Bedkashi (personal communication with the employee who hailed from Dakshin Bedkashi). 71 The UNDP Early Recovery Facility through three vendors provided 265 disaster-resilient core family shelters in four villages of Dakshin Bedkashi Union. Each shelter was equipped with a pit latrine and rooftop rainwater harvesting facility. Thirty-five households in Dakshin Bedkashi Village received a disaster-resilient core family shelter, locally know as a ‘UNDP house’. These shelters were constructed with financial assistance from UK Aid and support from UNDP. Islamic Relief Bangladesh as a vendor constructed 35 core family shelters in Dakshin Bedkashi Village. It also constructed core family shelters in another village of Dakshin Bedkashi Union. It did not have any involvement in the beneficiary selection of the project. It worked only as a vendor, not as a typical partner. Nevertheless, the research has included 35 houses and 35 latrines constructed by Islamic Relief Bangladesh as a vendor as interventions of Islamic Relief Bangladesh instead of UNDP. 72 During qualitative interviews with the heads or representatives of the households in both villages, it was found that only one household did not receive any aid from NGOs. The household was the richest household or one of the richest households in Channirchak. Although the household did not receive any aid from NGOs, the household participated in a cash for work program operated by an NGO named BRAC.

202 than six NGOs respectively. It is worth noting that a few NGOs implemented more than one project in the same village. For example, Dushtha Shasthya Kendra (DSK) and Shushilan implemented more than one project in Channirchak whereas Islamic relief Bangladesh and Shushilan implemented more than one project in Dakshin Bedkashi. Thus, households received aid from various projects of the same NGO.

The survey data show that 94.8 percent of the surveyed households (n=250) received emergency food from NGOs, while 53.2 percent and 40.4 percent of the surveyed households received emergency water and clothes from NGOs respectively (see Table 7.2).73 The survey data also show that 84.4 percent of the surveyed households received utensils and other necessary household items while 29.6 percent and 52.4 percent of the surveyed households received medical assistance and support for storing water respectively (see Figure 7.1 and 7.2). It is worth noting that the survey included the recipients of emergency shelter items such as plastic sheets, tarpaulins, ropes and bamboo as the recipients of utensils and other necessary household items. The survey data also reveal that 35.2 percent of the surveyed households received long-term food aid from NGOs. Almost 12 percent of the surveyed households received a boat and net and 22 percent of the surveyed households received cash for income-generating activities (IGA) such as for agricultural production, fish farming, crab farming, chicken rearing, duck rearing, homestead vegetable gardening, starting small businesses and buying a sewing machine. Moreover, 17.6 of the surveyed households received poultry such as chickens or ducks and/or livestock such as goats, sheep, calves and cows for income-generating activities and 6 percent of the surveyed households received goods for business.74 The data also demonstrate that 29.2 percent of the surveyed households received houses from NGOs while 10.8 percent and 4.8 percent of the surveyed households received raised plinths for houses and raised homesteads, respectively (see Figures 7.3 to

73 Emergency food and emergency water are not related to any time period. Emergency food means food excluding long-term food aid households received from NGOs any time after Aila. Emergency water means water households received from NGOs any time after Aila. Emergency food aid is different from long-term food aid. If a household received food per month for several months from the same NGO, then the household was considered as the recipient of the long-term food aid. If a household received food from any NGO (one NGO or more NGOs) any time after Aila but did not receive food from the same NGO per month for several months, then the household was considered as the recipient of the emergency food aid. A household can be the recipient of both emergency food aid and long-term food aid. Emergency food and water were distributed even after the response period (up to one month of the event) and thus the term ‘emergency’ is not interchangeable with response period. 74 The survey included households that received sewing machines or a professional tool set such as masonry tools as recipients of goods for business.

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7.7).75 It is worth noting that most of the households that received houses from NGOs also received latrines with the house. A few households received houses without latrines while a few households received only latrines (see Figure 7.8, Figure 7.9 and Figure 7.10). The data further show that 67.6 percent of the surveyed households received agricultural support such as seeds and fertilisers.76 Moreover, 3.2 percent of the surveyed households received other types of aid from NGOs.

Table 7.2 Types of aid the affected households received from NGOs (n=250) Types of Aid Frequency Percentage (n=250) (%) Food 237 94.8 Water 133 53.2 Clothes 101 40.4 Utensils and other necessary household items 211 84.4 Medical assistance 74 29.6 Support for storing water 131 52.4 Long-term food aid (received several times from the same NGO) 88 35.2 Fishing net and boat 29 11.6 Cash for income-generating activities 55 22.0 Poultry/livestock for income-generating activities 44 17.6 Goods for business 15 6.0 House 73 29.2 Raising plinth of the house 27 10.8 Homestead raising 12 4.8 Agricultural support such as seeds and fertilisers 169 67.6 Other 8 3.2

75 Out of 29.2 percent (n=73), 25.6 percent (n=64) of the surveyed households that received houses from NGOs are from Dakshin Bedkashi and 3.6 percent (n=9) of the surveyed households that received houses from NGOs are from Channirchak. Out of 64 households in Dakshin Bedkashi, 16 households received houses from UNDP. 76 The survey included households that received inputs such as vegetable seeds and fertilisers for homestead gardening and fruit saplings and wood saplings from NGOs as the recipients of the agricultural support while the survey included households that received cash grants for agriculture from NGOs as the recipients of cash for income-generating activities. Moreover, the survey included households that received fish species and fish food for fish cultivation from NGOs as the recipients of the agricultural support while the survey included households that received cash grants for fish farming from NGOs as the recipients of cash for income-generating activities.

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Figure 7.1 A water storing earthen pot or matka given by an NGO in Channirchak

Source: Author (2017–2018)

Figure 7.2 A water storing container given by an NGO in Dakshin Bedkashi

Source: Author (2017–2018)

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Figure 7.3 A dochala (two roofed) house with a veranda constructed by an NGO named Dushtha Shasthya Kendra (DSK) in Channirchak

Source: Author (2017–2018)

Figure 7.4 A modified version of a dochala (two roofed) house constructed by Islamic Relief Bangladesh in Dakshin Bedkashi (an extra layer of fence was given outside the original bamboo fence by the recipient so that rainwater cannot enter inside)

Source: Author (2017–2018)

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Figure 7.5 A chouchala (four roofed) house constructed by Islamic Relief Bangladesh in Dakshin Bedkashi

Source: Author (2017–2018)

Figure 7.6 A modified version of a UNDP house constructed by Islamic Relief Bangladesh as a vendor in Dakshin Bedkashi (without the originally included rooftop rainwater harvesting facility)

Source: Author (2017–2018)

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Figure 7.7 A modified version of a UNDP house constructed by Islamic Relief Bangladesh as a vendor in Dakshin Bedkashi

Source: Author (2017–2018)

Figure 7.8 A latrine given by an NGO in Channirchak

Source: Author (2017–2018)

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Figure 7.9 A latrine given with the dochala (two roofed) house constructed by Islamic Relief Bangladesh in Dakshin Bedkashi

Source: Author (2017–2018)

Figure 7.10 A latrine given with the UNDP house in Dakshin Bedkashi

Source: Author (2017–2018)

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In addition to providing various types of aid, NGOs also operated various temporary employment-creation programs such as cash-for-work (CFW) program, food-for-work (FFW) program, or cash and food-for-work (CFFW) program.77 For instance, various NGOs such as BRAC, Shushilan and Ulashi Sreejony Sangha in Channirchak and BRAC, Islamic Relief Bangladesh and Shushilan in Dakshin Bedkashi operated CFW/FFW/CFFW programs. In addition to aid and various temporary employment-creation programs, NGOs also operated the cash-for-training (CFT) program. NGOs such as Ulashi Sreejony Sangha in Channirchak and Islamic Relief Bangladesh in Dakshin Bedkashi operated the CFT program. NGOs through CFT created awareness on water, sanitation and hygiene practices, and personal health practices. CFT also increased knowledge and skills about various income-generating activities and awareness and knowledge on disaster risk-reduction and climate change. The cash received from the participation in CFT also helped the households in meeting survival and recovery needs. Moreover, NGOs, mainly micro-credit operating NGOs, also gave loans to the affected households in both the studied villages to cope with and to commence recovery processes such as starting economic activities like agricultural production and constructing a house.

It is worth noting that the study has not considered the cash or food or both cash and food the households received due to participation in CFW/FFW/CFFW programs and CFT program as aid, as the recipient households did not receive the cash or food or both cash and food as aid. Likewise, the study has not considered the loan households took for any purpose after Aila from NGOs as aid. However, the study has investigated the contribution of CFW/FFW/CFFW programs and CFT program in the survival and recovery process of the affected households, particularly in the economic, housing and psychological recovery process to understand the contribution of NGOs fully. Likewise, the study has collected relevant data related to the loans from NGOs and other sources both before and after the embankment was repaired to understand the role of loans in the response and recovery processes of the Aila-affected households.

In addition to the distribution of various types of aid, creation of employment programs, operations of training programs and operations of micro-credit programs, NGOs greatly

77 Among three types of employment-creation programs, NGOs mainly operated cash-for-work (CFW) programs in both the studied villages. Only one NGO operated food-for-work (FFW) programs in one of the studied villages and it operated the food-for-work (FFW) program before the embankment was repaired while only one NGO operated both cash and food-for-work (CFFW) programs in both the studied villages after the embankment was repaired.

210 contributed to the repair and construction of the community-level infrastructure. NGOs repaired the embankment, constructed ring embankments, and repaired or constructed (mainly constructed) earthen roads, link roads and approach roads (see Figure 7.11 and Figure 7.12). NGOs also raised school grounds, repaired old cyclone shelters and constructed new cyclone shelters. For instance, a local NGO named DSK built a school-cum-cyclone shelter in a village adjacent to Channirchak while Islamic Relief Bangladesh repaired a cyclone shelter in Dakshin Bedkashi (see Figure 7.13 and Figure 7.14).

Figure 7.11 A road constructed by an NGO in Channirchak

Source: Author (2017–2018)

Figure 7.12 A road constructed by an NGO in Dakshin Bedkashi

Source: Author (2017–2018)

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Figure 7.13 A school-cum-cyclone shelter constructed in 2012 by an NGO named Dushtha Shasthya Kendra (DSK) in the adjacent village of Channirchak

Source: Author (2017–2018)

Figure 7.14 A previous cyclone shelter and multipurpose community centre (constructed by Caritas in 1992) in Dakshin Bedkashi repaired by Islamic Relief Bangladesh as school-cum-cyclone shelter

Source: Author (2017–2018)

212 NGOs also greatly contributed to the improvement of water supply systems in the studied villages. For instance, they excavated and re-excavated ponds, repaired tube wells, raised the platform of tube wells, installed tube wells, installed pond sand filters (PSF) and supported rooftop rainwater harvesting systems (see Figure 7.15 and Figure 7.16). They also played a noteworthy role in ensuring the affected children’s access to education when the villages were subject to flooding. They constructed temporary schools for children in suitable places such as on the embankment before the embankment was repaired. They also constructed temporary schools again after the embankment was repaired in the previous school area or new area if the previous school boundary was lost to the rising rivers. NGOs through the setting up of the Child Friendly Space (CFS) provided the affected children the opportunity to participate in recreational activities such as playing, singing, dancing, drama and psychosocial care. They also provided children two meals a day (morning snacks and lunch) through the Child Friendly Space. Likewise, NGOs also provided nutritious food as relief, particularly for children.

NGOs also greatly contributed to disaster awareness, preparedness and governance. They contributed to the formation of Ward Disaster Management Committees (WDMCs) and community-based organisations (CBOs). They also contributed to the formulation of hazard maps, conduct of community risk assessment and preparation of a disaster risk-reduction action plan. NGOs’ household-level training on disaster risk-reduction and climate change adaptation increased household and community-level awareness and knowledge on disaster risk-reduction, climate change and climate change adaptation strategies. These trainings particularly increased household and community-level awareness and knowledge on cyclone warning signals and various precautionary measures households need to undertake before the event. NGOs trained the members of CBOs and volunteer groups on disseminating warnings and provided necessary equipment for disseminating warnings. CBOs created by NGOs disseminate warnings through hoisting flags so that people can easily understand cyclone warning signals. NGOs also provided trainings to their CBO members and volunteer groups on first aid, search and rescue, and fire safety, and provided necessary equipment for first aid and search and rescue. They provided training to the members of the Union Disaster Management Committee (UDMC) on disaster risk-reduction, standing orders on disaster, shelter management and climate change to build their capacity in dealing with disastrous situations and climate change related problems. NGOs also created mass awareness on

213 disasters and emergency response through billboards/signs/banners. They also undertook tree planting at the community level.

Figure 7.15 A pond sand filter (PSF) installed by an NGO in Channirchak

Source: Author (2017–2018)

Figure 7.16 A tubewell installed by an NGO in Dakshin Bedakshi

Source: Author (2017–2018)

214 7.4 Role of NGOs in the Post-Aila Response and Recovery

7.4.1 Role of NGOs in Evacuation, Search and Rescue

NGOs did not play any role in evacuation and search and rescue operations. People within the village played main roles in evacuation and search and rescue operations. They helped one another to evacuate to the safe places during the event and in a few cases immediately before the event. Likewise, they helped one another to save lives during the event and to search for and rescue members of their households from the trapped places immediately after the event. The search and rescue phase lasted up to the next day evening after the event. Affected households’ relatives within the village, neighbours and in some cases friends and acquaintances within the village played important roles in helping the affected households in evacuation, saving lives of the members of the households and in search and rescue operations. However, affected households’ relatives within the village, particularly close relatives, played main roles in evacuation, saving lives and searching for and rescuing the members of the affected households from the trapped places immediately after the event. Moreover, close relatives from the adjacent villages also played important roles in searching for and rescuing their relatives from the trapped places immediately after the event. It is worth mentioning that neighbours compared to friends and acquaintances generally played a more important role in evacuation and search and rescue operations as neighbours’ households were households that were adjacent to the affected households. Moreover, neighbours, friends and acquaintances within the village played relatively less important roles in the search and rescue operations immediately after the event compared to the role they played in evacuation and saving lives during the event. Members of the immediate studied households, members of the related households within the village and close relatives from the adjacent villages played major roles in searching for and rescuing the members of the affected households from the trapped places immediately after the event.

Untrained and non-professional people within the village, particularly young males, spontaneously and successfully participated in evacuation and search and rescue operations. They played vital roles in safeguarding lives of many people, particularly children, aged people and women. However, although NGOs did not participate in evacuation and search and rescue operations, they helped local people in cleaning debris, ponds and roads and in ensuring access to water and sanitation facilities. They provided this sort of service mainly from the third week of the event.

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7.4.2 Role of NGOs in Survival

The affected households in both the villages needed relief immediately after the event for survival. They needed food, drinking water, clothes and shelter. Moreover, members of the households with severe injury needed emergency medical treatment. However, the affected households in both the villages did not receive relief from NGOs immediately after the event. Nevertheless, they received food, water and other non-food items mainly from their close relatives from the unaffected areas and from people and organisations such as rich people, businessmen, schools and colleges from the adjacent or distant unaffected areas. They received relief items such as food and water from the outside mainly after two days following Aila. Many people were not able to eat any food, particularly rice, before they received food from relatives in the unaffected areas and people and organisations of nearby or distant unaffected areas. It is worth noting that the affected households in both the villages shared food with one another in some cases if they saved some food from being washed away. However, a few households were able to save some food and shared that food with other affected households mainly during the night or next day of Aila. Thus, relatives from the unaffected areas and spontaneous distribution of relief by the people and organisations of the nearby and distant unaffected areas played remarkable roles in meeting the basic survival needs of the affected households, until the arrival of aid from NGOs and government agencies.

Relief from NGOs was absent or very little if any during the first week and very little during the second week. The then chairman of the Dakshin Bedkashi Union noted that the first NGO that provided relief in Dakshin Bedkashi provided relief after one week following Aila.78 Roy et al. (2009) also reached the same finding during initial assessment of Aila (p. 22). Likewise, many key informants in Channirchak noted that NGOs did not provide relief during the first week. A key informant from Channirchak depicted the situation in the following way:

NGO came after one week… Wealthy people and relatives from the nearby unaffected areas mainly helped us by giving food and water during the first week. (CC, 23 August 2017)

78 The then member of Dakshin Bedkashi Village informed me that the first NGO that provided relief in Dakshin Bedkashi provided relief 4–5 days after the event.

216 Only one or two NGOs provided relief within the first two weeks of the event. As the relief was insufficient compared to the needs, many households did not receive relief from NGOs during the first two weeks. NGOs started relief operations mainly from the third week of the event. Nevertheless, the qualitative data show that many households received relief first from NGOs after 15 to 20 days. However, NGOs started relief operations in full phase one and a half or two months after the event. Key informants from both the villages confirmed that NGOs assessed the needs of the community first and then prepared a list of the affected households and then started the relief operations in full phase. The key informants depicted the situation in the following ways:

NGOs gave slight dry food after 15 days… They gave nothing in the first 15 days… They started relief operations in full phase after one and half months of the event. (CC, 9 June 2017)

Although the remaining NGOs79 started to serve people after two months following Aila, they came here some days ago to assess the situation first. However, they did not provide anything to people. They visited the area and then prepared a list. They started to serve people after two months of the event. (the then chairman and current chairman of the Dakshin Bedkashi Union, 1 August 2017)

Although NGOs did not start relief operations immediately after the event, NGOs played a vital role in the survival and recovery process. The affected households in both the villages started recovery activities mainly after the embankment was repaired as both the villages and their adjacent villages were subject to regular flooding before the embankment was repaired. Almost all households lost all or part of their previous regular income after Aila. Except employment opportunities created by the government, NGOs and the contractors, catching fish in the affected areas and employing seasonal migration to the unaffected areas were the two main income opportunities that were available to most of the households in both the villages until the embankment was repaired.

As most households could not start their usual economic activities in the affected areas until the embankment was repaired, they did not have the capacity to survive for the required long period based on their own capacity. They were also not able to survive for the required long

79 Except two or three NGOs that came in the area within a month of the event and distributed some emergency relief and/or contributed to cleaning debris and improving access to water and sanitation facilities.

217 period with the help of the resources they received from their bonding and bridging networks. Many of them did not receive any material and monetary aid from their bonding networks while most of them did not receive any material and monetary aid from their bridging networks. Most of the households that received any material and monetary aid from their bonding networks received it only for survival for some days and received it during the first month of the event. Likewise, most of the households that received material or monetary aid, mainly material aid, from their bridging networks received it only for survival for a few days and received it during the first week of the event. As most households did not have their own capacity to survive for the required long period and as they did not receive the necessary material and monetary aid for survival for the required long period from their bonding and bridging networks, they were mainly dependent on the government and NGOs for their survival until the embankment was repaired. They also required assistance from the government and NGOs for survival for a period after the embankment was repaired and economic and housing recovery. The following statements are from an interviewee who considered that his household received equivalent to 225,000 to 230,000 Taka from NGOs if all aid items including a house and benefits from four employment programs and one cash for training program his household participated in were converted into money. This illustrates limitations of people’s own capacity, bonding and bridging networks, and the dependency on NGOs:

I received minimum 225,000 to 230,000 Taka from NGOs… If NGOs did not give to us, we were never able to manage that amount… How could we get so much money? From whom could we get so much money? We were poor. We lived hand to mouth. It was not possible to manage such amount. We could have received total 2,000 Taka from all relatives after Aila if relatives were not affected themselves [his household did not receive anything from relatives]… If I face a problem now, then I will get maximum total of 2,000 Taka from all my relatives, will not get more. I will get the money from close relatives only. (10 July 2017)

NGOs provided various types of aid such as food, water, clothes, utensils, livelihood support and houses that played vital roles in the survival as well as in the economic, housing and psychological recovery processes of the affected households. NGOs provided some emergency aid items such as food and water for a long period, i.e. after the response period

218 (up to one month).80 The survey data show that 94.8 percent (n=237) of the affected households received both emergency food and emergency water or either of these two items from NGOs after Aila. Among the recipients, respondents of 88.6 percent of households (n=210) considered that both emergency food and water or either they received played an extremely important role in the survival of their household while 9.7 percent (n=23), 1.3 percent (n=3) and 0.4 percent (n=1) considered that both emergency food and water or either they received played very important, moderately important and slightly important roles in the survival of their household. None of the respondents of the recipient households suggested that it played no role (see Figure 7.17).

Figure 7.17 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of food and water or either received from NGOs in their survival (n=237)

Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)

NGOs distributed food aid in both the villages, even in the second year following the event. For instance, an NGO gave long-term food aid in both Channirchak and Dakshin Bedkashi in the second year following the event. It gave 30 kg rice, 5 kg pulse and 3 kg oil per month six times to each of the selected beneficiary households of Channirchak during the period between 3/9/2010 and 20/03/2011 and Dakshin Bedkashi during the period between 21/9/2010 to 3/4/2011 respectively. The distribution of long-term food aid by NGOs greatly

80 Response period and relief period are different and not interchangeable as the affected households received relief after the response period (up to one month). The research defines response period up to one month following the event to analyse qualitative data in a better way.

219 helped households to avoid food scarcity. It can be understood from the following excerpt of an interview:

They gave us rice, pulse and oil. We did not have food scarcity due to that… If we did not receive it, then we were not able to have the required food with the income we had. (CC, 25 October 2017)

In addition to various types of aid, employment-creation programs greatly contributed to the survival. NGOs operated CFW/FFW/CFFW programs both before and after the embankment was repaired. These programs played vital roles in ensuring access of the affected households to food and income to meet basic survival needs before the embankment was repaired as most households did not have access to employment opportunities before the embankment was repaired. These programs also played vital roles in the survival of many households for a period after the embankment was repaired as households required time to start their usual economic activities such as agriculture even after the embankment was repaired. The importance of the NGO operated employment-creation programs in survival can be understood from the following excerpts:

If NGOs did not provide opportunities to work [in cash or food for work programs], then our food intake and survival would have been difficult. We would have eaten one time in a day while had to starve for two times a day. (a focus group participant, DB, 22 September 2017)

Catching fish was not possible, agriculture was also not possible [after the embankment was repaired]. We survived on NGOs’ work. If NGOs did not give work, then it was not possible to get by. (CC, 25 August 2017)

In addition to employment-creation programs, the CFT program also contributed to the survival of many households as many households used the money received from training for meeting the survival needs in the absence of regular income. The following excerpt of a key informant from Dakshin Bedkashi depicts the contribution of NGOs in survival and the monetary value of NGO contribution (aid including house and money from the employment and cash for training programs) in the case of households that received a house from NGOs:

If NGOs did not come, nobody in our area could survive… There was no item that NGOs did not give us… A household that received a UNDP house received a total

220 minimum amount equivalent to 225,000–250,000 Taka from NGOs including aid and the money from the participation in employment [cash/food/cash and food for work] and training [cash for training] programs. A household that received a Chouchala [four roofed] house from Islamic Relief received a total minimum amount equivalent to 175,000–200,000 Taka from NGOs including aid and the money from the participation in employment and training programs. A household that received a Dochala [double roofed] house from Islamic Relief received a total minimum amount equivalent to 150,000–175,000 Taka from NGOs including aid and the money from the participation in employment and training programs. (DB, 17 September 2017)

Moreover, loans from NGOs also greatly contributed to the survival of the affected households. The qualitative data suggest that more households took loans from NGOs and other sources for survival after the embankment was repaired compared to the number of households that took loans from NGOs and other sources for survival before the embankment was repaired. The survey data also confirm the qualitative findings. The survey data show that 25.6 percent (n=64) of the surveyed households took loans from NGOs and other sources for survival after the embankment was repaired while 10.8 percent (n=27) of the surveyed households took loans from NGOs and other sources for survival before the embankment was repaired.81 The lower percentage of households took loans from NGOs and other sources for survival before the embankment was repaired because households were mainly dependent on relief and employment-creation programs for meeting their survival needs before the embankment was repaired. However, they struggled to meet their survival needs after the embankment was repaired as NGOs stopped providing relief and NGO operated employment- creation programs were ended within a year or two after the embankment was repaired, even though many households did not restore usual economic activities to maintain the required cost of their households. Thus, they had to meet their survival needs from the loans taken from NGOs and other sources. Although they took loans from NGOs and other sources, NGOs were the most important sources of loans taken for survival.

NGOs acted as one of the major sources of resilience. Most households were dependent on NGOs for survival. If households did not receive aid along with the opportunity to participate in employment-creation programs and paid training programs and take loans from NGOs,

81 The survey included the post-Aila loan history (purpose, source, amount taken, amount needing to be paid now) of a household up to three times before the embankment was repaired and up to three times after the embankment was repaired.

221 then the households were not able to survive, and most households would have left the area. The following excerpts of the interviews and an FGD show the importance of the NGO aid and support (nobody considered the role of loans when they depicted the role of NGOs):

People in that area survived based on the support they received from NGOs [local and international NGOs]… If they did not receive aid and other support [opportunity to participate in employment-creation programs and cash for training programs] from NGOs, they would have been involved in stealing, robbery and would have left the area. For instance, they would have left the area like the Rohingya refugees left their country… Women could have been on the wrong track. As male members were not able to manage food for themselves, how could they feed wife and children… They could have become prostitutes. We noticed these sorts of incidences in few cases… [If NGOs did not contribute], they could not recover [either economic, housing or psychological recovery]. How would they recover? There were no income sources there. (a key informant who worked for an international NGO in Dakshin Bedkashi Village, 1 October 2017)

If there was no support from NGOs after Aila, then our area would have been at least 30 years back from the present time despite the support we received from the government. (DB, 11 August 2017)

If NGOs did not support us, then it was not possible for us to live here. For instance, I was the only earning member [in the family]. I had to provide food for 4 to 5 persons. If we lived here, how could we manage food for living [as there was no income]? NGOs helped a lot. (a focus group participant of an FGD with male, CC, 24 August 2017)

It was not possible to survive without the help of NGOs. NGOs kept us alive during Aila [flooded period]. They kept all alive… They helped everyone. (CC, 24 October 2017)

People were not able to live [remain alive] if various NGOs did not provide support. People had to abandon this area. (CC, 9 June 2017)

222 7.4.3 Role of NGOs in Economic, Housing and Psychological Recovery

NGOs played a significant role in the economic and housing recovery process (see Figure 7.18). Various types of livelihood support from NGOs contributed directly to the economic recovery while houses from NGOs contributed directly to the housing recovery. In addition, various aid items excluding livelihood support might have contributed indirectly to the economic recovery. Likewise, various aid items excluding houses might have contributed indirectly to the housing recovery. The survey data show that 99.6 percent (n=249) of the surveyed households received at least one of the types of aid mentioned in Table 7.2. Among the households that received aid from NGOs (n=249), 24.1 percent (n=60) of households considered that the aid from NGOs played an extremely important role in the economic recovery process of their households, while 20.1 percent (n=50), 19.3 percent (n=48), 17.3 percent (n=43) and 19.3 percent (n=48) of households considered that aid from NGOs played a very important role, moderately important role, slightly important role and not at all important role in the economic recovery of their households respectively. In other words, aid from NGOs played a role in the economic recovery of 80.4 percent (n=201) of the surveyed households and it played an extremely important and very important role in the economic recovery of 44 percent (n=110) of the surveyed households. The data show that among the households that received aid from NGOs (n=249), respondents of 31.7 percent (n=79) of households considered that the aid from NGOs played extremely important role in the housing recovery process of their households, while 8.4 percent (n=21), 11.6 percent (n=29), 18.9 percent (n=47) and 29.3 percent (n=73) considered that the aid from NGOs played a very important role, moderately important role, slightly important role and not at all important role in the housing recovery of their households respectively. In other words, aid from NGOs played a role in the housing recovery of 70.4 percent (n=176) of the surveyed households and it played extremely important and very important roles in the housing recovery of 40 percent (n=100) of the surveyed households.

223

Figure 7.18 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of aid received from NGOs in economic, housing and psychological recovery (n=249)

Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)

NGOs also played a significant role in the psychological recovery process (see Figure 7.18). NGOs did not provide psychological support to the affected people other than children as part of their project interventions. NGOs provided psychosocial support to the children through the operation of the Child Friendly Space (CFS). Nevertheless, aid provided by NGOs during the post-Aila response and recovery period greatly contributed to the psychological recovery of the affected people. People were grateful to NGOs because they not only helped them to survive but also to stay in their ancestral place after the event. Many households migrated immediately after the event, most of the households were not able to survive and there was a common belief that they would not be able to reside in those villages if the embankment was not repaired. In general, they were worried not only about commencing recovery, which was a distant goal, but also about short-term survival and the practicality of living in the villages. However, when NGOs came to the villages and started interventions, villagers gradually gained confidence. The presence of NGOs gave them mental strength and hope to live.

The survey data show that among the households that received aid from NGOs (n=249), respondents of 61.4 percent (n=153) of households considered that aid from NGOs played an extremely important role in the psychological recovery process of the members of their households while 22.9 percent (n=57), 9.6 percent (n=24), 5.2 (n=13) and 0.8 percent (n=2)

224 considered that aid from NGOs played a very important role, moderately important role, slightly important role and not at all important role in the psychological recovery process of the members of their households. An interesting as well as surprising aspect of the data is that while aid from NGOs played role in the economic recovery and housing recovery of 80.4 percent (n=201) and 70.4 percent (n=176) of the surveyed households (n=250), aid from NGOs played a role in the psychological recovery process of the members of 98.8 percent (n=247) of the surveyed households. Moreover, while aid from NGOs played an extremely important role in the economic recovery and housing recovery of 24 percent (n=60) and 31.6 percent (n=79) of the surveyed households (n=250) respectively, aid from NGOs played an extremely important role in the psychological recovery process of the members of 61.2 percent (n=153) of the total surveyed households.

Like aid, employment-creation programs also greatly contributed to the economic, housing and psychological recovery process of the affected households (see Figure 7.19). The qualitative data reveal that participation in CFW/FFW/CFFW programs not only helped the households to survive but also helped many households to save money to start economic activities and to construct or repair houses. A few households also used the money for other purposes such as for repaying loans taken before Aila or for meeting the cost of a daughter’s marriage. The CFW/FFW/CFFW programs, by ensuring access to food and income, created a sense of optimism among the people and helped them to feel psychologically better. Likewise, CFT program also contributed to the economic, housing and psychological recovery (see Figure 7.19). The money participant households received for training not only contributed to the survival but also contributed to the economic, housing and psychological recovery of many participant households. Moreover, these training programs contributed greatly to the psychological recovery as the trainers usually provided consolation and mental support and encouragement to the participants during the training sessions.

The survey data show that 97.6 percent (n=244) of the surveyed households participated in CFW/FFW/CFFW programs and CFT programs (at least one of these programs and at least one time in one of these programs). Among the households that participated in at least one or more of these programs (n=244), 55.3 percent of households (n=135), 23.4 percent of households (n=57), 13.5 percent of households (n=33) and 5.7 percent of households (n=14) considered that participation played extremely important, very important, moderately important and slightly important roles in the economic recovery process of their households

225 respectively. Respondents of 2 percent of households (n=5) considered that participation did not play an important role in the economic recovery process of their households. The data also show that among the households that participated in at least one or more of these programs (n=244), respondents of 34 percent of households (n=83), 13.1 percent of households (n=32), 10.7 percent of households (n=26) and 22.5 (n=55) percent of households considered that participation played an extremely important, very important, moderately important and slightly important role in the housing recovery process of their households respectively. Respondents of 19.7 percent of households (n=48) considered that participation played a not at all important role in the housing recovery process of their households.

The data further show that among the households that participated in at least one or more of these programs (n=244), respondents of 75 percent of households (n=183), 17.2 percent of households (n=42), 5.7 percent of households (n=14) and 2 percent of households (n=5) considered that participation played an extremely important, very important, moderately important and slightly important role in the psychological recovery process of the members of the affected households. None of the respondents considered that the role participation played was not important.

Figure 7.19 Respondents’ assessment of the importance of participation in CFW/FFW/CFFW and CFT programs or any one of these programs in economic, housing and psychological recovery (n=244)

Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)

226 While participation in at least one or more of these programs played an extremely important role in the economic and housing recovery process of 54 percent (n=135) and 33.2 (n=83) percent of the surveyed households (n=250) respectively, it played an extremely important role in the psychological recovery process of the members of 73.2 percent (n=183) of the total surveyed households. Participation in these programs played a role in the economic and housing recovery process of 95.6 percent (n=239) and 78.4 percent (n=196) of the surveyed households (n=250) respectively. Participation in these programs contributed to the economic recovery of a higher percentage of households compared to the housing recovery of the households. The qualitative data suggest that although people wanted both the revival of economic activity and construction or repair of houses after Aila, revival of economic activity was the most important need for their survival. Thus, if they had any money, they generally used it first for starting economic activity such as for starting agriculture or shrimp farming or other small businesses to secure income for their survival. Many households that did not receive houses from NGOs initially constructed a normal temporary-type house in their homestead after the village became dewatered. They constructed their desired houses later when they managed the required amount. Many households still did not construct their desired houses although many of them were saving or trying to save money from their regular income to construct their desired house later. Respondents who mentioned that participation played no role in the economic recovery of their households might have spent all the amount for survival and/or other purposes such as for constructing the house or meeting education or health costs or the cost of marrying daughter, providing a dowry and repaying the previous loan. Likewise, respondents who mentioned that participation played no role in the housing recovery of their households might have used all the amount for survival and/or other purposes.

In addition to aid and employment and training programs, NGOs provided loans (with interest) during the response and recovery period. Households took loans (with interest) from NGOs and other sources for survival and starting the recovery process. The survey data show that 72.8 percent (n=182) of the surveyed households took loans from NGOs and other sources after Aila. Moreover, 24.8 percent (n=62) of the surveyed households took loans from NGOs and other sources before the embankment was repaired and 66.4 percent (n=166) of the surveyed households took loans from NGOs and other sources after the embankment was repaired. Many households took loans several times from NGOs and other sources after Aila. The survey data show that 17.6 percent (n=44), 4.8 percent (n=12) and 2.4 percent (n=6) of

227 the surveyed households (n=250) took loans one time, two times and three times respectively from NGOs and other sources for various purposes before the embankment was repaired. However, 28.8 percent (n=72), 21.2 percent (n=53) and 16.4 percent (n=41) of the surveyed households (n=250) took loans one time, two times and three times from NGOs and other sources for various purposes after the embankment was repaired. Although households took loans from NGOs and other sources, NGOs were the main sources of loans.

Households took loans for various purposes including meeting survival needs, starting economic activities, constructing houses and meeting the cost of education of the children and healthcare. Among households that took a first time loan from NGOs and other sources before the embankment was repaired (n=62), 37.1 percent (n=23) took it for survival, 33.9 percent (n=21) took it for starting economic activities, 11.3 percent (n=7) took it for house construction or repair, 9.7 percent (n=6) took it for meeting the educational cost of the children and 8.1 percent (n=5) took it for meeting the health cost. Likewise, among households that took a first time loan after the embankment was repaired (n=166), 25.3 percent (n=42) took it for survival, 42.8 percent (n=71) took it for starting economic activities, 12 percent (n=20) took it for house construction or repair, 6 percent (n=10) took it for meeting educational costs of the children, 7.8 percent (n=13) took it for meeting health costs and 6 percent (n=10) took it for other purposes.

7.5 Weaknesses of NGOs’ Post-Aila Response and Recovery Operations

7.5.1 Failure to Start Relief Operations Immediately After the Event

NGOs did not start relief operations immediately after the event. The affected households in both the villages encountered a severe situation during the first two weeks after the event. Relief from NGOs was absent or extremely little compared to the needs during the first week and very little compared to the needs during the second week. Many households received relief for the first time from NGOs 15 to 20 days after the event. One of the reasons for the failure to start relief operations immediately after the event was that NGOs did not have their own funds to start relief operations. As they were dependent on donors for the funds to start the relief operations, they required more time. A key informant who participated in the Aila response and recovery operations of an NGO depicts the situation in the following way:

They [affected people] encountered a severe situation up to the first 10 to 15 days as all NGOs required some time to organise and start the relief operations. They suffered

228 a lot during that period. They had serious problems during the first one to two weeks, mainly due to the lack of drinking water, sanitation facilities and food… We would have felt happy if we could have provided the relief a little earlier, within a week… We did not have the ability to start the relief operation… We received funds [from donors] within 15 days and started the relief operation within 15 to 20 days. (17 August 2017)

7.5.2 Quantity and Quality of the Relief Items

Relief packets given by NGOs varied from one NGO to another in terms of quantity. While one NGO gave a relief packet that included a large amount of rice that was enough for a typical household to meet food needs for the whole month, another NGO gave a relief packet that was only enough for a typical household to meet food needs for some days as the relief packet included a small amount of rice. The households that received small size relief packets searched for relief packets from other NGOs for survival. Relief packets given by NGOs also varied from one NGO to another in terms of the items included and the standard of the items included.

An important problem of NGO operations was that NGOs did not consider the number of the household members in distributing relief items, particularly food. When an NGO distributed food relief, the NGO provided each household of a village the same amount of food although the number of the household members varied from one household to another. As a result, often a relief item was insufficient for a household with a higher number of members. Thus, NGOs must avoid the notion that ‘one size fits’ all and must consider the number of the household members in providing relief items such as food. Another important problem was that NGOs distributed rice that was unsuitable for the affected people in both the studied villages. People in the studied villages generally used to eat atap rice (rice milled from sun- dried paddy) traditionally. However, NGOs gave them shiddhya rice (rice milled from parboiled paddy). As they were not used to eating shiddhya rice, many people found it difficult to consume the donated rice.

NGOs should harmonise the content of relief packets in terms of quantity, the items included, and the standard of the items included to ensure fair and equal distribution of the relief items. They must consider the number of household members when they distribute relief items like food and should distribute locally suitable food. Introduction of a standard relief packet will

229 be helpful for ensuring fair and equal distribution of the relief items. The packet should be different in terms of the quantity of the items based on the number of the household members. Moreover, a household-level relief card should be introduced to ensure relief distribution in a fairer and coordinated way. This card will help the government agencies and NGOs to know which household received what and which household needs to be provided further support.

7.5.3 Coordination Among NGOs and Coordination Between the NGOs and the Government/Local Government

Coordination among NGOs is a key factor for the successful delivery of aid and avoiding overlapping or duplication of the work. Key informants confirmed that coordination among NGOs was not good during the initial period. There was a lack of coordination among NGOs in the first 2–3 months following the event. Many organisations distributed relief items in a random and uncoordinated manner (UNDP 2012; Cook, Shrestha & Htet 2018). This resulted in unequal distribution of relief items. Many households did not get any emergency relief while others got emergency relief several times from several NGOs. Moreover, many households received some items several times while they did not receive some necessary items at all. However, coordination among various NGOs gradually improved in the course of time. Although coordination among NGOs certainly improved in the later stage, there were also cases that a household received aid such as livelihood support from more than one NGO, while others did not receive that aid from anyone. Nevertheless, improved coordination among NGOs in the later stage played a vital role to avoid overlapping or duplication of the activities and implementation of the similar projects in the same geographical location (UNDP 2012). A key informant who participated in the post-Aila response and recovery operations as an NGO employee in Channirchak depicts the situation in the following way:

There was a lack of coordination among NGOs during the distribution of the emergency relief… Many NGOs distributed relief items haphazardly. It continued up to 2–3 months… Long-term support [the support given after the embankment was repaired] was provided in a bit more coordinated manner. There was less overlapping during providing long-term support. (17 August 2017)

Coordination between the NGOs and the government/local government is a key factor for the successful delivery of aid items and other interventions such as employment programs during the response and recovery stage. Coordination between the NGOs and the government/local government has two important aspects. The coordination between the NGOs and the UNO

230 Office was generally better than the coordination between the NGOs and the local government which is Union Parishad. NGOs faced more challenges coordinating with the local government representatives (elected chairman and members) during the implementation of the projects. The issues related to the coordination between the NGOs and the government/local government have been discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

7.5.4 Less Livelihood Support and Houses Compared to the Needs

Livelihood and housing support were the aid items that the affected households in both the villages most required after Aila. However, NGOs provided much less livelihood support and houses compared to the needs of the studied villages. Many households did not receive any livelihood support although they required the support badly. Likewise, many households did not receive a house although Aila destroyed their houses. Islam and Walkerden (2015) in the post-Sidr recovery context in Bangladesh also found that NGOs provided less livelihood support and houses compared to the needs. A key informant from the NGO sector describes the post-Aila livelihood support by NGOs in the following way:

They required the livelihood support most. However, the livelihood support we provided was very weak [much less than required]. The livelihood support we provided was too little. (1 October 2017)

Households that received livelihood support received less than they required. Thus, they were not able to utilise that support for deriving any economic benefit. For instance, many households received some ducks or chickens or a cow, but these were not enough to restore livelihood. Two key informants from the NGO sector depict the inadequacy of livelihood support in the following ways:

It would have been good if a family could have been given livelihood support under a complete package. However, the livelihood support was given in a scattered way. I gave ducks, others gave cows, another gave sheep. As a result, none of the interventions were productive/sustainable. Someone ate it, someone sold it because it was very insufficient compared to the need… Livelihood intervention would sustain if the livelihood intervention is given to the family as a package. (17 August 2017)

It would have been better if the amount provided for the IGA support was more than the given amount. The given amount was not enough. If the amount would have been

231

20,000 Taka or 25,000 Taka or 30,000 Taka instead of 12,000 Taka, then people could have earned more [from that investment/money]… When the amount is provided for IGA support, a poor amount is provided for that support. (11 September 2017)

In a few cases, people received livelihood support that did not match with the previous occupational background of the recipient and thus the support was not productive. It was also observed that some households received livelihood support from more than one NGO, while many households did not receive any livelihood support.

In addition to providing a smaller number of houses compared to the needs, NGOs in some cases distributed low-quality houses to the most vulnerable households and better-quality houses to the less vulnerable households. For instance, Islamic Relief Bangladesh provided two types of houses to the affected households in Dakshin Bedkashi under two different projects. ISR Bangladesh firstly provided dochala or double roofed houses to the affected households under one project and later provided chouchala or four roofed houses under another project. The quality of the chouchala houses was much better than dochala houses. The cost of the chouchala houses was also more than dochala houses. However, most vulnerable households received dochala houses while relatively less vulnerable households (compared to the recipients of dochala houses) received chouchala houses. As the provision of providing dochala houses was the first housing intervention by an NGO in the village, the recipients of the dochala were the most vulnerable households. As houses provided by the same NGO differed in terms of quality and cost, households that received dochala houses felt deprived as they received low-quality houses while relatively less vulnerable households received better quality houses. The significant differences in terms of quality and cost of the houses provided by the same NGO under two projects also created tension among the recipients (Fanany 2010b).

7.5.5 Absence of Psychological Support as an Intervention

NGOs did not provide psychological support to the disaster victims other than children. As people generally became traumatised by Aila, they required the psychological support to recover from the psychological trauma. A key informant who worked for an international NGO in Dakshin Bedkashi depicts the necessity of providing psychological support to the Aila-affected people by NGOs:

232 They lost everything or most of their possessions… Many suffered from psychological disorder, many became perplexed as they lost many things. They were at a loss. They necessitated to be provided psychological support. There was no provision of psychological support in our project. (11 September 2017)

Although it is not clear why NGOs did not provide psychological support to the affected people, one of the possible reasons for this might be that psychological support as an intervention is not able to be easily evaluated (Fanany 2010b). Thus, psychological support does not allow NGOs to prepare rigorous report for donors (Kenny & Clarke 2010). It is worth noting that many NGO staff personally or as part of their own initiatives provided consolation and mental support to the affected people when they interacted with the affected people during the project implementation period. For instance, they personally gave consolation and mental support during training sessions. This helped the affected adult people to recover from the psychological trauma. The following excerpts of the two key informants depict the situation:

Affected people need psychological support… if someone becomes psychologically normal, then he/she can take initiatives to start work. Thus, he/she needs to be fit mentally first… However, I personally gave psychological support. I discussed with them some psychological issues, particularly during Friday Prayer [Jumu’ah] in the mosque… I gave psychological support as part of my personal initiative; I did not give it as an intervention of the project of the Islamic Relief. (A key informant from the NGO sector, 1 October 2017)

We are with you… You do not need to be scared. We could not be able to return you what you lost. However, we would try our best to compensate your loss… They gave us mental strength. They gave mental encouragement by saying that you would get more than what you lost. (CC, 9 June 2017)

Local people appreciated the psychosocial support NGOs provided to the children through the setting up of the Child Friendly Space (CFS). This psychosocial support helped the children to recover from the psychological trauma. Although providing psychosocial support to the children was an important and expected intervention, NGOs should also provide psychosocial support to the affected adults. NGOs must need to understand that psychological reconstruction is also necessary as the disaster impacts not only the physical infrastructure but

233 also on the psyche of the affected people (Kenny & Clarke 2010; Haque et al. 2012). Thus, recovery of the psyche is as important as, if not more, than the recovery of the physical infrastructure (Kenny & Clarke 2010).

7.5.6 Preference to Implement Activities that Have Visible Outcomes

NGOs focused on and implemented activities that had visible outcomes. They emphasised the construction of physical infrastructures such as roads, houses, and latrines. They appeared to consider the recovery process mainly as a technical process of building physical infrastructures (Samuels 2010). They might have emphasised construction of physical infrastructures as these were easily visible, measurable and results of these activities were achievable within a short time (Samuels 2010). NGOs can easily include visible outcomes in the evaluation report and can prepare rigorous reports for the donors (Samuels 2010; Kenny et al. 2010). Key informants from the sector confirmed that NGOs had preferences for spending in areas that are visible because it provides an easy way to prove to donors that they have done something (Kenny et al. 2010; Kenny 2010). On the other hand, activities that do not have visible outcomes such as psychological rehabilitation are not subject to evaluation in a straightforward way (Fanany 2010b, p. 119). They also informed that donors also had preferences for the activities that have visible outcomes as they were able to see and measure these outcomes easily. The following excerpts of the interviews with two key informants from the NGO sector clearly show the preferences of NGOs and donors for the implementation of activities that have visible outcomes:

There was a preference for the hardware support or the support that was visible. Software support cannot be seen… But hardware support, for instance a house constructed by 100,000 Taka, can be seen. It is visible that people have really received that sort of support from NGOs. (11 September 2017)

Structural measures are given priority… Visible works are given priority. Donors also want that… It is not possible to have photos of the mind [non-structural things]. The donor [private donor of his project] wants to understand the project outcomes or changes that happened due to the project by seeing the photos. (22 August 2017)

Local people also value visible projects. When they were asked about NGO interventions after Aila in the village, usually they first shared visible outcomes such as houses and latrines provided by NGOs. When they do mention about training provided by various NGOs, they

234 consider those activities as a subsidiary contribution to the construction of the physical infrastructures such as roads, houses, and latrines. Thus, NGOs prefer to implement activities that have visible outcomes as the public regard these as successful.

7.5.7 Lack of Consultation and Participation

NGOs generally implemented their projects in the studied villages following a top-down approach instead of a bottom-up approach (UNDP 2012). The qualitative data show that NGOs implemented projects without any form of consultation with the aid recipients in many cases. When they consulted with the recipients, the consultation was usually tokenistic as the objective of the consultation was only to inform the recipients about the potential interventions of the externally designed projects (Kenny 2010). In a few cases, they involved the recipients or members of the community in the implementation of the intervention/s of the externally designed project. For instance, they created project implementation committees consisting of the members of community to implement the intervention/s of the externally designed project effectively. Nevertheless, they generally did not consult with the aid recipients to include their feedback to design or modify their interventions. Although information-sharing or consultation is a must for participation, it does not equate with participation as participation involves the recipients’ influence and control over the project decisions and resources (World Bank 1996; ADB 2001). As NGOs did not consult with the recipients to include their suggestions in their operations, the recipients felt a lack of participation and became passive recipients.

The evidence suggests that NGOs delivered inappropriate aid items or less successful interventions due to the lack of consultation with the recipients (Kenny 2010). Many problems associated with the post-Aila NGO interventions could have been avoided if NGOs consulted with the affected people and included their advice in planning and implementing activities. For example, one NGO that gave two types of houses under two projects in Dakshin Bedkashi did not consult with local people. The NGO constructed both types of houses based on its own design. These houses had lots of problems that could have been avoided if NGOs developed the design based on consultation with local people. The affected people also wanted to participate in the process. They had choices for materials and design of the houses. They informed the NGO that the houses would have certain problems if the NGO constructed the houses based on the design and with the materials the NGO selected.

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However, the NGO ignored their suggestions and constructed houses following their own design and materials. As a result, the houses constructed had lots of problems.

Effective NGO–recipient interaction, that requires the participation of the recipients in the aid delivery process, is a key element to distribute aid successfully. The involvement of the recipients in every stage of the aid provision will make the aid more effective as the involvement will allow NGOs to know the preferences and requirements of the recipients (Fanany 2010b; Kenny & Clarke 2010). NGOs should interact with the recipients in a way so that the recipients feel that their ideas and comments are important to NGOs (Fanany 2010b). They should appreciate the strengths of the affected recipients and should take inputs from recipients and, if inputs are valid, then they should take or modify decisions based on these inputs. They should empower the recipients through ensuring their participation.

A bottom-up participatory approach instead of a top-down approach is needed to ensure the participation of the affected people in the planning and implementation of the response and recovery activities. Participation of the affected people would bring more success to NGO activities as participation will help NGOs to find out pre-existing vulnerabilities, address key needs and minimise loopholes of the implemented projects. It will also empower people and make them more resilient to future disasters (UNDP 2012). Lastly, if possible, NGOs should be made more inclined to participation by ensuring that they take a continuing responsibility for their work including houses for a period after the completion of the project (Fanany 2010b; Kenny & Clarke 2010).

7.5.8 NGOs Addressed Remote Areas Least

NGOs worked in the remote affected areas least during the initial period. More NGOs worked in areas that were easy to access (UNDP 2012). For instance, the studied Dakshin Bedkashi Village under Dakshin Bedkashi Union and the Dakshin Bedkashi Union itself are in the very remote areas of Koyra Upazila. Interviews with the key informants from the area show that as Dakshin Bedkashi Union was in the remote areas, many NGOs did not work in Dakshin Bedkashi Union, at least during the first months, due to the lack of communication facilities. In some cases, if they came to the union or a village of the union, then they only came to the places that were easily reachable. This can be understood from the following statements of a key informant:

236 Many NGOs did not come as the area [Dakshin Bedkashi Union] was remote… Many NGOs worked in Uttar Bedkashi Union [adjacent union]. However, many of them did not enter our Dakshin Bedkashi Union. They did not enter due to the lack of communication facilities… If they came, then they came to Jorsing and then returned.82 They did not enter inside to understand the situation of this area. (elected member and panel chairman of the Dakshin Bedkashi Union Parishad, DB, 11 August 2017)

One of the important lessons from the post-Aila response and recovery experience is NGOs that work in the disaster response and recovery operations in Bangladesh must have staff who can work in the remote areas and logistic support to reach remote areas very quickly.

7.5.9 Places of Distribution and Exclusion of Households from Relief Items

NGOs distributed relief items during the period when the villages were subject to flooding in the places where they were able to reach easily. They preferred to distribute relief items in the easy to go areas of a village or a Union Parishad (UNDP 2012). They usually distributed relief items in the Union Parishad Headquarters, bazaars, river ghats, places on the embankment, and other locally known places within the union. However, sometimes people were not able to reach the places of distribution due to the lack of communication facilities. For instance, people living within the village often had difficulty to reach Union Parishad headquarters, bazaars, river ghats and places on the embankment. As a result, many households received less relief during the period when the villages were subject to flooding.

NGOs did not often enter villages due to very poor communication facilities when the villages were subject to inundation. They distributed most emergency aid items such as once-off relief packets, emergency shelter materials, utensils, temporary shelters and bathrooms to the people living on the embankments located on the outer side of a village or many villages (UNDP 2012). Thus, the households that did not move to the embankment after Aila and lived on their flooded houses often received less relief compared to the households that lived on the embankments during the period when the villages were subject to flooding. This can be understood from the following excerpt of an interview:

82 Jorsing is a village of the Dakshin Bedkashi Union that is on the bank of a river and easily accessible by the river road. One of the two bazaars or marketplaces within the union is in Jorsing.

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I received much less relief [from NGOs]. People who lived on the embankments received more relief from NGOs. As we lived inside the village, the village became full of water during high tide. Thus, NGOs had to face problems to come inside; communication was very bad. As a result, many households living inside the village were deprived of relief items. (CC, 13 July 2017)

Further, a key informant from the NGO sector reported that they had to distribute the equivalent of a single day’s relief over two or even three days, as there were no places to store relief items at the union level during the initial period. NGOs also distributed relief items in the initial period from the upazila headquarters due to the lack of suitable places at the union level to store relief. For instance, one NGO in Dacope distributed relief packets to the affected households of Channirchak and other villages from the Dacope Upazila Parishad Headquarters that was far away from Channirchak. Many households struggled to reach the upazila headquarters as the transportation system from Channirchak to the upazila headquarters was very bad and they spent a lot on travel which was an additional burden for them. Households suffered when they did not have young male or physically capable members who could carry the relief packets from the upazila headquarters to the village. They were often dependent on other people for carrying these items.

The two studied unions were in the remote areas and communication facilities were extremely poor. It was difficult for the NGO staff to move even inside each of the studied villages. The difficulty of working in the studied villages can be understood from the following statement of a key informant who worked for an NGO in Dakshin Bedkashi Union and lived in the Dakshin Bedkashi Village:

It was difficult to work in those areas [due to remoteness]. I think people [NGO staff] who are mentally and physically weak are not suitable for working in those areas. (1 October 2017)

Although it was difficult to reach the remote studied villages and places inside the studied villages, NGO staff could have better served in many cases if they were professionally trained to work in the remote areas and had the mentality to serve people in need in the remote areas. A key informant from the NGO sector depicts the situation in the following way:

238 NGOs usually distributed relief in areas where there were gatherings of more people. It was necessary to go to the remote areas… They [NGO staff] did not go to the remote areas as it was difficult to go there. They also had lack of mentality [to go to the remote areas]. There was enough allocation for the local transport [to go to the remote areas]. (22 August 2017)

7.5.10 More of the Project Interventions to the Less Affected Project Areas

The qualitative data show that, in a few cases, NGOs spent more of the allocated funds in the less affected areas compared to the severely affected areas in order to spend the allocated money within the project time period. For instance, key informants from Channirchak and a key informant from an NGO that worked in Channirchak confirmed that the funds allocated for constructing houses in Channirchak were used to construct houses in other adjacent less affected villages, as Channirchak was still subject to inundation. A key informant from the village described it in the following way:

When they [NGOs] gave houses, our village was subject to flooding. There was no suitable place to construct houses in our village. They transferred all those houses to Kamarkhola [an adjacent affected village that became dewatered much earlier]. (CC, 9 June 2017)

The specific NGO that transferred houses to the other less affected villages did not later implement any project in Channirchak that provided houses. Thus, despite being severely affected, the affected households of Channirchak were deprived of housing assistance due to the pressure NGOs felt to spend money within the project time period.

7.5.11 Favouring Own Members/Borrowers and Pressuring Microcredit Borrowers for Repayment

Microcredit operating NGOs generally favoured their own microcredit borrowers. For instance, one local NGO that operated a microcredit program before Aila in Dakshin Bedkashi organised a cash for work program after Aila. The NGO selected all the participants of the cash for work program from among the members of the NGO. Likewise, one microcredit-operating NGO distributed some water storage tanks without taking money in Channirchak but only among members of the organisation. Like microcredit-operating NGOs, NGOs that formed a CBO after Aila, particularly in the recovery period, gave houses,

239 livelihood support and free house plinth raising and homestead raising services only to their CBO members.

NGOs that operated microcredit programs had a poor reputation for putting pressure on borrowers to repay loans taken before Aila. Moreover, a national NGO that operated a microcredit program took the instalment of the loan taken before Aila from the wage borrowers earned as a participant in the cash for work program operated by that NGO. The NGO paid a small part of the wage and kept most of the wage from the participants who took loans from that NGO before Aila as instalments for the previous loan. An interviewee who took 15,000 Taka as a loan from a prominent national NGO portrays the situation in the following way:

I had loan from N [pseudonym]… It did not take instalment for the loan until it operated a cash for work program. When it operated the cash for work program, it took money from the wage I received from the cash for work program. It cut from everyone who took loans from it… It gave only a small part of the daily income and kept most part of the earning from the cash for work program. (DB, 10 July 2017)

In some cases, NGOs did not again give loans to the borrowers who did not repay a loan taken before Aila as they became incapable due to the loss of income and material possessions.

7.5.12 Avoidance of a Beneficiary of One NGO by Other NGOs

If one NGO supported one household, then other NGOs did not support that household in many cases. Some NGOs created CBOs. Members of a CBO of an NGO often did not receive support from other NGOs. Other NGOs excluded them from support even though they did not receive that support from the CBO to which they were members. The following statements of a key informant from the NGO sector depict it clearly:

A person received a house from DSK [as the person was the member of a CBO of DSK]. He became known as the beneficiary of DSK. As a result, other NGOs did not give him anything. He needed various things. DSK did not give him everything… The important issue of consideration [before excluding him from another support by another NGO] was to consider what he received from DSK. (17 August 2017)

240 7.5.13 Exclusion of Upper-Middle-Class and Some Lower-Middle-Class Households

NGOs selected beneficiaries based on their own criteria. They prioritised the poor, ultra-poor, woman-headed households and households with disabled and elderly members in the beneficiary selection process. Although NGOs sometimes excluded marginalised households that deserved to be included as beneficiaries and included less vulnerable households as beneficiaries, overall NGOs tried hard to include the marginalised households. However, NGOs usually provided less aid and work opportunity to those households belonging to the middle-class categories, particularly upper-middle-class households and those lower-middle- class households that had a little more agricultural land compared to the majority. Although this might have been good practice in a typical post-disaster setting, it was an extremely bad practice in the post-Aila setting.

Most of the middle-class households in both villages were dependent on land for income.83 Most of them in Channirchak were dependent on agriculture (one crop in a year) while most of them in Dakshin Bedkashi were dependent on shrimp farming. Almost all of them had no income before the embankment was repaired and even for some time after the embankment was repaired, as starting economic activities such as agriculture and shrimp farming in full phase required time after the village became dewatered. Moreover, most of them generally did not have enough savings to survive for a long period following Aila. Thus, they badly required aid and non-aid support such as work opportunities from external agencies. The following excerpt from a key informant interview describes the necessity of external support for all:

There was no division between rich and poor after Aila… One who was the owner of 20 bighas was not capable and one who was the owner of five decimals was also not capable. We lived here for a long time with the help of the relief items [and other support, given by the government and NGOs]. (current elected member, Dakshin Bedkashi Union Parishad, DB, 20 September 2017)

However, upper-middle-class households and some lower-middle-class households had severe hardship and food scarcity as they received less aid and work opportunity from NGOs.

83 At present, most households that belong to the middle-class category in both the villages belong to the lower- middle-class category and some households belong to the upper-middle-class category. Only two to three households in total in both the villages have a distinct better position within the upper-middle-class category, if they do not belong to the rich category considering the village context. The situation was almost same before the Aila also.

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Some upper-middle-class households received very little aid and at best one paid work opportunity. Some of the upper-middle-class and lower-middle-class households had more hardship and food scarcity compared to many of the affected poor households as they had no income or little income along with less aid and work opportunity.

This teaches the need to consider the uniqueness of each disaster as well as the socio- economic setting of the affected areas. If the villages were not subject to the regular flooding for a long time, then providing less relief to the upper-middle and some lower-middle households might not be so disastrous as they might have been able to meet their needs. Likewise, if the upper-middle-class or lower-middle-class households would not be dependent on land for income or would have income from the non-agricultural sectors such as from jobs, then they might have been able to meet their needs based on their own capacity. It is worth noting that some middle-class households, particularly upper-middle-households, felt ashamed to seek relief from the aid agencies, especially in the beginning, due to their existing social status within the village.

Although upper-middle-class households and some lower-middle-class households usually received less aid and work opportunity from NGOs, some upper-middle-class and lower- middle-class households received more aid and work opportunities. They appropriated more aid and work opportunities because of their close political links to the chairman and member of the Union Parishad. On the other hand, the poor received less aid and work opportunities in some cases due to their lack of political links.

7.5.14 Corruption

None of the interviewees from the interviewed households during the qualitative phase mentioned that they bribed NGO personnel to receive any aid including houses or to participate in employment or training programs. However, three interviewees who received UNDP houses in Dakshin Bedkashi mentioned that they had to bribe the elected leaders or local leaders to receive their houses. One of these three households bribed the then elected chairman of the Union Parishad to retain the name of the household in the recipient list. The household was told that the household would be deleted from the recipient list if the household did not bribe the chairman.

Key informants including NGO informants confirmed that local people took bribes in the name of NGO staff who were not aware of this deception. However, NGO staff undertook

242 corrupt practices in a few cases, either alone or in collusion with the chairman and members of the local government and other powerful people of the locality. For instance, two key informants from the NGO sector confirmed that a few employees lost their job due to corrupt practices in one of the studied villages. They lost jobs because they became involved in the corrupt practices in collusion with the elected and unelected leaders in the beneficiary selection process. It was possible to take bribes during the process of beneficiary selection as the resources available were limited while the number of the affected households that really needed support was very high (UNDP 2012). Finally, both the qualitative and survey data show that most people trust NGO staff and consider that they are honest. For instance, the survey data show that 71.6 percent (n=179) of the survey respondents trust NGO staff to a very great or great extent, while 16 percent trust NGO staff to a very small extent or small extent and 12.6 percent trust NGO staff neither to a great nor to a small extent. Similarly, 68.4 percent (n=171) of the survey respondents considered that NGO staff are very honest or honest, while 14.8 percent considered that NGO staff are very dishonest or dishonest and 16.8 percent considered that NGO staff are neither honest nor dishonest.

7.5.15 Aid Dependency

Disaster affected people become aid dependent and stop working when they receive massive aid or aid over a long period (Samuels 2010; Islam & Walkerden 2015). The survey data show that 92.8 percent of the respondents think that villagers have become very much dependent on outside relief following Aila. The qualitative data also show that many households still expect certain types of aid such as houses or livelihood support from NGOs. The desire of the affected households to receive something from NGOs can be understood from the following statements of a key informant:

If an NGO representative enters the area, then everyone runs behind him… Everyone tries the best to go to him first, to talk to him to include the name into the list. (elected member and panel chairman of Dakshin Bedkashi Union, DB, 11 August 2017)

Nevertheless, not everyone runs after aid. Some people focus on their own activity. This is evident from the following statements of a key informant from the NGO sector:

There are two types of people. There are some people who think what they would receive when they meet a person from an NGO. There are some people who want to

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be self-dependent. They do not run after relief. They want to live on their own labour. (11 September 2017)

Households do not want to get more aid from NGOs to avoid work. They do hard work, and additional to their hard work they want to receive some aid from NGOs to achieve better economic and housing conditions. One of the reasons for their desire for the additional aid was the less livelihood and housing support NGOs provided compared to their needs. Many households did not receive any livelihood and housing support. If they would receive livelihood and housing support, they might not have expected more aid. It was also found during the qualitative phase that a few households expected to receive more aid from NGOs although they had received both livelihood support and houses. Although they tried to extract as much as they could from NGOs, they did not avoid work. They wanted to achieve a better position motived by selfishness. However, attitudes of these few households do not represent most people in the villages. Moreover, the majority of the households in both the studied villages do not have access to the income opportunities throughout the year. The lack of income opportunities might have acted as a factor for their desire for more aid. Households want employment opportunities, not aid. The eagerness of the people to do hard work if they get work opportunities also does not support the idea that they want aid because they do not want to work (Samuels 2010). A key informant describes this in the following way:

People do not want relief now. They want employment opportunities now; they want to live on what they earn from their own labour… They want to work. (CC, 9 June 2017)

7.6 Conclusion

NGOs did not play any role in evacuation and search and rescue operations. Villagers helped one another during evacuation and search and rescue operations. NGOs also failed to start the relief operations immediately after the event although the affected households in both the villages badly needed relief immediately after the event. As the relief was absent or extremely little during the first week and very little during the second week, people experienced severe suffering.

Despite the failure to start relief operations immediately after the event, NGOs played a vital role in the survival and recovery process. Most of the households were dependent on external

244 assistance from the government and NGOs for their survival and recovery. Most of the households were not able to survive if they did not receive aid and non-aid support such as the opportunity to participate in employment programs as households did not have income required to survive for a long period. NGOs also greatly contributed to the economic, housing and psychological recovery of the households by providing various livelihood supports and houses. However, livelihood support and housing support were much less compared to the needs of the community. Likewise, CFW/FFW/CFFW and CFT programs greatly contributed to the economic, housing and psychological recovery of the households. Microcredit from NGOs also helped households to take recovery initiatives, mainly after the embankment was repaired. Although NGOs did not provide direct psychological interventions, various aid and employment and training programs operated by NGOs gave them mental strength and contributed to the psychological recovery of the members of the affected households.

NGOs had some serious weaknesses that undermined the effectiveness of their post-Aila response and recovery operations. They failed to start relief operations immediately after the event. They distributed relief packets that varied from one NGO to another NGO in terms of quantity as well as the items included, and the standard of the items included. They also did not consider the number of the household members in providing relief. They also distributed locally unsuitable rice. The lack of proper coordination among them caused overlapping of the interventions and resulted in unequal distribution of relief items.

They did not provide enough livelihood and housing support. Moreover, the livelihood support they provided was not sustainable as it was very small compared to the needs of a household. They also provided low quality houses to the most vulnerable households while provided high quality houses to the relatively less vulnerable households. They did not provide psychosocial support to the affected people. They mainly focused on the activities that have visible outcomes and ignored activities related to the non-physical needs.

NGOs implemented projects following the top-down approach. They did not consult with the recipients in many cases and did tokenistic consultation in the form of information sharing about the interventions of the externally designed projects in most cases when they consulted with the recipients. Thus, they did not ensure recipients’ participation. Lack of consultation in designing or modifying their interventions made the recipients passive observers and caused the delivery of inappropriate items.

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They served least in the remote areas in the initial period. They distributed relief items in places where they could go easily and thus many households living in the remote areas or inside the flooded villages did not receive many relief items during the period when the villages were subject to flooding. In a few cases, they provided more interventions to the relatively less affected areas to spend the project money within the project time period.

They favoured their own CBO members and own microcredit recipients. However, microcredit-providing NGOs put pressure for paying the instalments although people were not capable to meet basic survival needs. NGOs sometimes excluded the households that received support from other NGOs. They also excluded upper-middle-class households and some lower-middle-class households from relief and other support although they badly required those as they did not have income. In a few cases, NGO staff were also involved in corrupt practices.

Finally, NGOs should avoid these weaknesses in the future response and recovery operations. They should reach the affected area immediately after the event. In addition to survival, they need to ensure necessary livelihood and housing interventions as these two are the critical sectors in the recovery process. They should consider the psychosocial support program as one of the core areas of their post-disaster response and recovery programs. They should focus on consultation instead of tokenistic consultation and participation of the recipients. Consultation with and participation of the recipients will help NGOs to overcome many problems.

246 Chapter 8: Conclusions, Policy Recommendations and Suggestions for Future Research

8.1 Introduction

The general objective of this study has been to examine the role of social capital in the post– Cyclone Aila response and recovery process of the affected households in Bangladesh. This study has examined three specific research objectives and addressed them by framing four related research questions (Table 8.1).

Table 8.1 Research Objectives and Questions Research Objectives Research Questions Understanding the role of bonding How did bonding social capital contribute to the social capital in the post–Cyclone Aila post–Cyclone Aila response and economic, response and recovery process of the housing and psychological recovery process of the affected households. affected households? Understanding the role of bridging How did bridging social capital contribute to the social capital in the post–Cyclone Aila post–Cyclone Aila response and economic, response and recovery process of the housing and psychological recovery process of the affected households. affected households? Understanding the role of linking How did linking social capital (government) social capital in the post–Cyclone Aila contribute to the post–Cyclone Aila response and response and recovery process of the economic, housing and psychological recovery affected households. process of the affected households? How did linking social capital (NGOs) contribute to the post–Cyclone Aila response and economic, housing and psychological recovery process of the affected households?

The key findings of the study, in answer to the four research questions listed above, are presented first (section 8.2). I then consider how these findings might contribute to knowledge and policy (section 8.3), before reviewing some of limitations of the study (section 8.4). The implications of climate change and sea level rise for coastal Bangladesh are addressed (section 8.5) as necessary background to the framing of policy recommendations (section 8.6). Finally, I present some possible directions for future research (section 8.7).

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8.2 Key Findings of the Study

8.2.1 The Role of Bonding Social Capital

The first research question concerns how bonding social capital contributed to the post– Cyclone Aila response and the economic, housing and psychological recovery process of the affected households. This study has conceptualised bonding social networks as the network of the affected households with their relatives and bonding social capital as the resources affected households received through their bonding networks, i.e. from their relatives.

Bonding social capital played a significant role in evacuation and search and rescue during and after Cyclone Aila. Relatives were the first responders and the first rescuers. Relatives within the village helped the members of the related households to evacuate to safer places during the event. They played a vital role in saving the lives of members of related households during the event and in searching for and rescuing the members of related households from the trapped places immediately after the event. Likewise, close relatives living in the adjacent affected villages played vital roles in searching for and rescuing members of related households from trapped places. Relatives within the village assisted one another to rescue valuable items from being washed away and to move to relocated sites or to prepare muchan within the homestead if the household did not move to other places or the household returned from the other places to the homestead within a few days after the event. Relatives from the unaffected areas also assisted affected households in a few cases to relocate to the embankment and other places or to prepare muchan within the homestead.

The study shows that although the majority of households received either material aid or both material and monetary aid from their relatives, many households did not receive any material and monetary aid from relatives at any stage after Aila. Households usually received material or monetary aid or both from their close blood or affinal relatives. Except in rare cases, households did not receive any material or monetary aid from their distant relatives. Moreover, relatives outside the affected areas played more important roles compared to the affected relatives in giving material and monetary aid to the affected households.

Bonding social capital played the most important role in the survival of the majority of the affected households until the arrival of aid from the external agencies. It contributed significantly to the survival of the majority of the affected households during the response period (up to one month) and to the survival of some of the affected households beyond the

248 response period. Most of the households that received material and monetary aid from relatives usually did so in the first month after the event. Although some households received material and monetary aid from their relatives after the response period, only in rare instances did households receive either material or monetary aid or both for survival during the response, mixed and recovery stages. Moreover, bonding social capital did not even contribute to the survival of many households as they did not receive any material and monetary aid from relatives at any stage after Aila.

Most of the households that received material or monetary aid or both from their relatives received only enough for survival and in most cases only sufficient for several days. However, most of the households in both the villages required assistance for survival for a long period as both the villages were subject to flooding for a long period. Thus, most of the households were not able to meet survival needs after Aila if they did not receive support from the government and NGOs.

Bonding social capital also played no role in the economic and housing recovery process of most households. Very few households received monetary aid for economic recovery, and material or monetary aid for repairing or constructing houses, although a considerable number of the affected households received free labour from their relatives when repairing or constructing their houses.

However, bonding social capital did play an immensely important role in the psychological recovery processes of the members of the affected households. All households received psychological support from their relatives throughout the recovery process. Households also generally received, if needed, other non-material and non-monetary aid items such as free labour, information and help to get work from their relatives throughout the recovery process. Thus, bonding networks have the capacity to give non-material and non-monetary aid items although they do not have the capacity to give material and monetary resources for economic and housing recovery. As relatives provided non-material and non-monetary aid to the affected households throughout the recovery process, household networks with relatives did not become weak or less active and did not break down.

Bonding social capital did not contribute to the survival of many households at all or to the survival of the majority of households over the required longer period and the economic and housing recovery of most of the affected households, mainly because most of the affected

249 households had bonding networks with poor relatives. The recovery challenges confronting the affected relatives also limited the capacity of bonding social capital to contribute to the survival and the economic and housing recovery of the affected households. However, the poverty of relatives is the main factor that limits the capacity of the bonding networks. Due to their own poverty, relatives cannot provide the necessary aid for survival and economic and housing recovery even if they are not themselves affected by an event like Aila.

8.2.2 The Role of Bridging Social Capital

The second research question concerns how bridging social capital contributed to the post– Cyclone Aila response and economic, housing and psychological recovery process of the affected households. The study has conceptualised bridging social networks as the network of the affected households with their neighbours and friends and acquaintances, and bridging social capital as the resources affected households received through their bridging networks, i.e. from their neighbours and friends and acquaintances.

Bridging social capital played an important role in evacuation and search and rescue activities. Neighbours, and friends and acquaintances within the village, played more important roles in evacuation and saving lives during the event compared to the role they played in the search and rescue activities immediately after the even. Most households received no material or monetary aid for any purpose after Aila from bridging networks. Only some households received material and monetary aid, mainly material aid, from bridging networks. Thus, bridging social capital did play a role in the survival of some households. Households that received aid from the bridging networks mainly received it in the first few days of the event, particularly during the night and the following day of the cyclone. In most cases, the aid some households received from the bridging networks was only enough for survival for one day. However, the affected households needed aid for survival for a longer period as the villages were subject to extended flooding.

Bridging social capital played no role in the economic or housing recovery processes of the affected households, except in a few cases. Bridging networks, particularly neighbours and friends within the village, contributed to the housing recovery process mainly by providing free labour during the repair or construction of the houses.

The psychological support from neighbours, friends and acquaintances greatly helped members of the affected households to recover psychologically following Aila. Thus,

250 although neighbours, friends and acquaintances do not have the capacity to provide the required material and monetary aid for survival and economic and housing recovery, they have the capacity to provide nonmaterial and non-monetary resources such as psychological support. Nevertheless, many households have not received psychological support or other non-material and non-monetary resources such as labour. Moreover, households’ relationships with neighbours, friends and acquaintances within the village became tense, suspicious and conflictual and, in many cases, broke down after a period due to the competition for access to relief items.

Bridging social capital played no role in the survival and the economic and housing recovery process of most of the affected households, due mainly to the poverty of neighbours, friends and acquaintances. In addition to poverty, bridging social capital did not play an important role for two important reasons: neighbours and most of the friends and acquaintances were themselves affected and thus had their own recovery challenges; and most households had no friends and acquaintances outside the affected areas from whom they could seek material or monetary aid. However, neighbours, friends and acquaintances of the affected households could not contribute to the survival for a long period, or the economic and housing recovery processes, due to poverty, even if they were not affected themselves.

Bonding social capital played a more important role than bridging social capital in the evacuation, search and rescue, and survival phases, as well as in the economic, housing and psychological recovery process of the affected households. The study also shows that over time after the disaster, household networks with neighbours and friends and acquaintances became less active and, in many cases, broke down. However, households’ networks with relatives did not become less active or break down. Both bonding and bridging networks performed poorly in providing material and monetary aid as time increased after the disaster. Nevertheless, throughout the recovery process, households received non-material and non- monetary aid from their bonding networks, though many received none from their bridging networks. The study also shows that the expectation households have of their bonding networks is fundamentally different than the expectation they have of their bridging networks. Households usually expect and believe that, if close relatives are capable, close relatives have some sort of obligation to provide material and monetary aid for survival and recovery purposes after a disaster. However, they generally do not consider that neighbours, friends and acquaintances have any such obligation, even if they are capable.

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This study suggests that the affected households usually have bonding relations with poor relatives and bridging relations with poor neighbours and friends and acquaintances. Thus, the affected households require external assistance through linking social networks such as government agencies and national and international NGOs for survival as well as for economic and housing recovery in a post-disaster situation.

8.2.3 Linking Social Capital: The Role of Government and the Weaknesses of the Government’s Response and Recovery Operations

The third research question is related to the contribution of linking social capital (government) to the post–Cyclone Aila response and economic, housing and psychological recovery process of the affected households. This study has shown that neither of the Union Parishads (UPs) disseminated warnings successfully, or took the necessary measures for evacuating people and livestock to safe places, because the early cyclone warning was not high enough. Both UPs also played an extremely limited role, if any, in search and rescue operations as most elected representatives of UP and most UP employees were also affected by Aila as they were from the same affected unions, and the UPs did not have the necessary logistics support for carrying out search and rescue operations. Moreover, neither of the UPs made the necessary preparations for a flood of the whole union, which resulted in a poor level of response, including search and rescue operations, in the initial period.

The government played a significant role in the survival of the affected households. Most households in the two villages did not have access to their usual income from the affected areas as they were unable to start economic activities until the embankment was repaired. They were unable to meet their own survival needs relying either on their own capacity or on the material and monetary aid they received through their bonding and bridging networks. Instead they required additional assistance from their linking networks, i.e. from the government and NGOs, for both survival and recovery. Government aid and employment programs, along with aid and non-aid support from NGOs, greatly contributed to the survival of the affected households over the long term.

Although various government aid items greatly contributed to survival, rice under the VGF program played a vital role in meeting the survival needs of the affected households. If the government did not provide VGF rice, most households would have experienced food scarcity or starved as they did not have enough income to buy the necessary food. VGF rice also played an extremely important role in reducing permanent migration of households from the

252 studied villages. In addition to aid, income from the government employment programs helped participant households to meet survival needs both before and after the embankment was repaired.

The government also played a substantial role in the processes of economic, housing and psychological recovery. However, the government provided livelihood support to a relatively small number of households and did not provide psychological support to the affected people as an intervention. The government mainly provided aid items for survival and for the repair or construction of houses. Nonetheless, aid items from the government contributed overall to economic and psychological recovery. Various aid items and employment opportunities from the government (and from NGOs) gave the affected people a degree of mental strength and confidence by creating a sense of optimism among them; this played a significant role in their psychological recovery process. In addition to the various aid items, participation in the government employment programs also played a significant role in economic, housing and psychological recovery. Moreover, loans from government sources also assisted some households to undertake recovery initiatives, once the village was dewatered. Overall, the post-Aila situation shows that most households require both aid and non-aid forms of support from the government for survival and recovery. In this way, the government acts as a source of resilience.

The post-Aila response and recovery operations had some serious weaknesses. The government was unable to launch the relief operation immediately after the event. Households in both villages received their first relief items from the government only after a few days. The government provided much less relief than was needed in both villages during the first week and before the introduction of the VGF program from September 2009. The VGF rice was provided for a shorter period than needed and the rice distributed was locally unsuitable. Moreover, although the government gave 20,000 Taka for the repair or construction of houses, the number of households that received 20,000 Taka was lower than the number of households that needed the money to repair or construct their houses. Furthermore, the government did not provide much-needed livelihood support. Although some households received seeds and fertilisers, they did so as part of regular government programs for agricultural development. Lack of livelihood support and absence of psychological support as an intervention were the two key weaknesses of the government response and recovery operations. Lack of coordination between UP and NGOs, exclusion of poor households, and

253 favouritism and bribery of the UP representatives in discharging aid items seriously undermined the fairness and effectiveness of the aid operations.

8.2.4 Linking Social Capital: The Role of NGOs and the Weaknesses of the NGOs’ Response and Recovery Operations

The fourth research question is related to the contribution of linking social capital (NGOs) to the post–Cyclone Aila response and economic, housing and psychological recovery process of the affected households. The study showed that NGOs played no role in evacuation and search and rescue operations. However, NGOs did play a significant role in the survival and recovery processes of the affected households. Most households did not have the necessary income for survival for a long period as they were unable to start their usual economic activities due to the ongoing flooding. Thus, most households were dependent on external assistance from the government and NGOs for survival and recovery as they were unable to survive for long periods based just on their own means or the material and monetary aid they received through their bonding and bridging social networks. Aid as well as employment programs from NGOs thus greatly contributed to the survival of households.

In addition to playing significant roles in survival, NGOs also played a substantial role in the economic, housing and psychological recovery processes of the affected households. Various aid items including livelihood support and houses from NGOs proved important. The CFW/FFW/CFFW and CFT programs operated by NGOs have greatly contributed to the recovery process, and NGOs have also assisted recovery initiatives though microcredit operations. Although NGOs have not provided psychological support to the affected households as an intervention, their distribution of various aid items and the operation of employment and training programs have significantly contributed to the psychological recovery process. The post-Aila experience shows that aid and non-aid support from NGOs are crucial not only for survival but also for recovery. Most of the households in both the villages might have left the area if they had not received aid and non-aid support from NGOs as well as from the government. Thus, NGOs acted as one of the major sources of resilience in the post-Aila situation.

NGOs’ post-Aila response and recovery operations had some serious weaknesses that undermined the effectiveness of their response and recovery operations. NGOs failed to start aid operations immediately after the event. Relief packages from different NGOs varied in terms of quantity, the items included, and the standard of the items included. NGOs gave

254 locally unsuitable rice. The lack of coordination among different NGOs led to the overlapping of the interventions and caused unequal distribution of relief items.

NGOs provided limited livelihood support and housing support relative to needs. The livelihood support that NGOs provided was not sustainable as it was too limited relative to the needs of each recipient household. They also distributed low-quality houses among the most vulnerable households and high-quality houses among the relatively less vulnerable households. The absence of psychosocial support to the affected people from NGOs as an intervention and the preference of NGOs to implement activities that have visible outcomes were also major weaknesses.

NGOs implemented projects through a top-down approach. They did not consult with the recipients in many cases. Moreover, when NGOs consulted with the recipients, they carried out tokenistic consultation in most cases in the form of information sharing about the interventions of the externally designed project. Thus, they did not ensure participation of the recipients. The inability of the aid recipients to design and modify NGO interventions made the recipients passive observers and resulted in the delivery of inappropriate aid items or the implementation of the interventions in a less successful manner.

NGOs worked least in the remote affected areas in the initial period. They gave relief items in accessible places when the villages were subject to flooding and thus many households did not receive relief items. In a few cases, NGOs intervened more frequently and substantially to the relatively less affected areas in order to use up project funding within the duration of the project. They also favoured their own CBO members and microcredit borrowers. NGOs that operated microcredit programs before the event put pressure on the borrowers to pay back an instalment of loans taken before Aila, but at a time when the borrowers did not have the capacity to meet their survival needs. Likewise, the exclusion of households that received aid from other NGOs, and of upper-middle-class and some lower-middle-class households from aid and non-aid support, and the involvement of NGO employees in a few cases in corrupt practices, were major weaknesses of the NGOs’ post-Aila response and recovery operations.

8.3 Contribution to Knowledge and Policies

The study contributes to the theoretical development and application of the concept of social capital in empirical research by defining the concept in terms of social networks. The study

255 deliberately excludes questions of trust and norms from the definition of the concept, as the study adopts Nan Lin’s network-based theory of social capital, which does not include trust and norms as components of social capital (Lin 2008). Karen Schweers Cook (2005) argues that social capital as ‘networks, norms and trust’ appears as an ‘everything but the kitchen sink concept’ (Cook 2005, p. 8). Using concepts such as trust and norms in addition to social networks risks detracting from my focus here, which is on the contribution of different network types of social capital (Cook 2005).

The study contributes to knowledge by focusing on the role of social capital in the post- disaster response and recovery process, exploring in particular how social capital contributes to the economic, housing and psychological recovery processes of the affected households. The study contributes to a significant gap in knowledge by showing how bonding, bridging and linking types of social capital contribute to evacuation, search and rescue, survival and economic, housing and psychological processes of recovery and how the roles of each type of social capital differ from one another in each of these processes. The study also fills a gap related to the link between social capital and psychological recovery following a cyclone in Bangladesh by exploring the role of each of the three types of social capital in the psychological recovery process of the members of the affected households. Finally, the study contributes to knowledge by defining and distinguishing bonding and bridging networks clearly in the context of coastal Bangladesh.

The findings of the study confirm the claims that bonding social capital is helpful for survival or getting by (Briggs 1998; Putnam 2000; Woolcock 2001, 2002b; Woolcock & Narayan 2000; Pelling & High 2005). However, the study adds to existing knowledge by demonstrating that although bonding social capital helps people to get by, it helps for a limited period, and not over a longer timeframe. The study also contributes to new knowledge by showing that the purpose of action is vital in understanding the role of bonding social capital. Lin (2008) suggests two purposes of action: expressive (does not require additional or new resources) and instrumental (requires additional or new or better resources). My study suggests that bonding social capital is usually useful when households require few material and monetary resources from their bonding networks, such as for survival for a limited period, or require non-material and non-monetary resources from their bonding networks such as assistance with evacuation, search and rescue and psychological support. However, bonding social capital is usually not useful when households do require substantial material and

256 monetary resources from their bonding networks, such as for survival for a long period, economic recovery or housing recovery. The study also contributes to theoretical knowledge by showing that bonding social capital usually does not play an important role in survival for a long period (or even for survival over a short period in many cases) and economic and household recovery due to the homophily principle, i.e. people close to someone are likely to have similar resources (Lin 2001, 2008). Most of the households in my study area were poor or lower-middle-class and had bonding networks with similarly poor relatives. However, in the case of a few households that had access to relatively rich resources through bonding networks, bonding social capital may have played an important role in terms of instrumental action (Lin 2008, p. 60). For instance, bonding social capital played a significant role in the housing recovery of two households out of 83 interviewed households in the qualitative phase, as these two households were linked to relatively rich resources through their bonding networks, i.e. relatives.

My findings contradict the argument that bridging social capital is useful in getting ahead as people gain access to varied or rich resources through bridging networks (Putnam 2000; Granovetter 1973, 1983; Briggs 1998; Woolcock 2001, 2002b; Woolcock & Narayan 2000; Lin 2008). The general idea is that when people reach beyond their immediate circles, as in the case of bridging networks, they gain access to more diverse and better resources due to the heterophily principle (Lin 2008). Contrary to this theoretical expectation, this study shows that households do not have access to rich resources through bridging networks with neighbours, friends and acquaintances. Bridging networks played a limited role in all aspects including survival, economic, housing and psychological recovery by comparison with bonding networks. The study contributes to knowledge by showing that the richness of resources embedded in the networks is an important factor in understanding the role of a network (Lin 2008, p. 60). Neither bonding nor bridging networks were able to provide the necessary resources following Cyclone Aila. Instead, in the absence of livelihood restoration for a long period, affected households were dependent mainly on resources through linking networks for their survival and economic and housing recovery. Thus, the study confirms that the access to the resources through households’ linking networks with the government and NGOs is a critical factor in the disaster response and recovery process of the affected households (Islam & Walkerden 2014, 2015; Islam, Walkerden & Amati 2017). Moreover, the study also contributes to knowledge by showing that although households do not receive psychological support as an intervention from the linking networks, aid and non-aid support

257 other than psychological support from the linking networks can also significantly contribute to the psychological recovery process.

Finally, the study provides evidence-based knowledge to policymakers and development practitioners on the relationship between social capital and post-disaster response and recovery. The findings should be helpful for policy-makers and development practitioners in devising effective policies and programs to strengthen the capacity of the bonding and bridging networks and to modify the operations of linking networks by recognising the dependency of households on linking networks for survival and assistance during recovery. The findings relating to the weaknesses of the government’s and NGOs’ post-Aila response and recovery operations will be helpful for policymakers and development practitioners in Bangladesh and elsewhere in designing more effective post-disaster response and recovery operations that ensure a bottom-up participatory approach and that focus on recovery support measures such as livelihood and housing assistance, and the introduction of psychological support, in the context of future disasters.

8.4 Limitations of the Study

Limitations in the study are evident in the following four main areas. First, the fieldwork for this study began eight years after Cyclone Aila. As the study was conducted a long time after the event, the interviewees during the qualitative phase and the survey respondents had to recall Aila-related emotions, experiences and information. The memories of interviewees and survey respondents may have diminished over the course of time. However, this study collected data from various sources through different data collection methods (observation, interviews with the household-level interviewee, FGD, key informant interview, and household-level survey) and crosschecked the data collected from various sources to overcome the problem of recall bias. Moreover, the study also drew on the available relevant documents from the government agencies and local government and national and international NGOs to crosscheck data collected through qualitative and quantitative data collection methods. It is worth noting that many important documents from the government agencies and local government and national and international NGOs were not available because the government agencies and NGOs do not store documents over longer periods.

Second, as the study fieldwork was conducted eight years after Aila, it was not possible to conduct interviews with many of the government officials and employees of national and

258 international NGOs who had participated in the Aila response and recovery operations. Most of these individuals had left the study areas or the upazila or district in which the study villages are located due to transfers and promotions or had moved on to new jobs in other organisations.

Third, as the study was carried out in the two villages most impacted by Aila, it is important to keep in mind when generalising the study findings that the contribution of social capital to the disaster response and recovery process of the affected households may vary in less impacted villages.

Fourth, the study has considered the relationships of the affected households with relatives (bonding networks), neighbours, friends and acquaintances (bridging networks) and organisations, i.e. government including local government and NGOs (linking networks). However, the study did not explore the relationship between local government and central government, the relationship between different agencies of the central government involved in the response and recovery operations, or the relationship between national NGOs and international NGOs in detail. Again, the difficulties involved in tracking down individuals within central or local government or in NGOs who were present during the Aila response made this task impractical.

8.5 Implications of Climate Change and Sea Level Rise

The coastal zone will be the area worst affected by climate change in Bangladesh due to sea level rise (MoEF 2009). It is predicted that sea level rise will exacerbate many of the existing hazards within this zone (MoEF 2009; Paul & Rashid 2017). Sea level rise will increase both salinity and the intensity of the tropical cyclones, with higher storm surges and higher wind speed (MoEF 2005, 2009). The IPCC (2019, p. 20) forecasts that the global mean sea level rise by 2100 may be 0.43 m (likely range: 0.29 m to 0.59 m) with a low greenhouse gas emissions and high mitigation future, and 0.84 m (likely range: 0.61 m to 1.10 m) with the highest greenhouse gas emissions in the absence of measures for combating climate change. Bangladesh’s Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (2009), quoting the IPCC, mentions that the rise in sea level will be up to 79 cm along the Bangladesh coast by the next 100 years (MoEF 2009, p. 56). This action plan also suggests that sea level rise could displace 6 to 8 million people in Bangladesh by 2050. The IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (2007, p. 485) states that sea level rise in 2050 may directly affect more than one million people in the

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Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna delta in Bangladesh. A World Bank (2010) study suggests that a one metre rise in sea level rise would inundate 18 percent of the total land of the country. Houghton (2009, p. 182) predicts that Bangladesh will lose 10 percent and 20 percent of the habitable land due to a sea level rise of half a metre and one metre respectively.

Projected sea level rise along the Bangladesh coast varies from one study to another. Some earlier studies suggested that sea level rise along the Bangladesh coast could be 1 metre by 2050 and 2 metres by 2100 (Paul & Rashid 2017; Rashid & Paul 2014). A World Bank (2011) study assumes 27 cm rise in sea level by 2050 in Bangladesh. Another World Bank (2013) study assumes 50 cm rise in sea level by 2070 under 2o C warming and 50 cm rise in sea level by 2060 under 4o C warming in the South Asian coastlines. The same study also projects that sea level rise in the South Asian coastlines could be 70 cm (60–80 cm) by 2080–2100 under 2o C warming and 105 cm (85–125 cm) by 2080–2100 under 4o C warming.

Future rise in sea level is thus certain and the inundation of the coastal area of Bangladesh appears inevitable, with people of the coastal area being forced to move and resettle in other places at some point in the future (MoEF 2009; Paul & Rashid 2017; Rashid & Paul 2014). However, there is great uncertainty regarding the rate of sea level rise along the Bangladesh coast, though there is some agreement that the rate of rise will be relatively small by 2050, but accelerate thereafter to about one metre in rise by 2100 (Paul & Rashid 2017; Rashid & Paul 2014; World Bank 2011). If the rate of increase in sea level remains low up to 2050, it may be possible for people in the coastal areas of Bangladesh to live with rising sea levels for the next three to four decades or for at least another generation by undertaking various adaptation measures (Paul & Rashid 2017; Rashid & Paul 2014). Nevertheless, in broad terms, the outlook for future inundation along the Bangladesh coastline is grim.

8.6 Policy Recommendations

The Government of Bangladesh considers that disaster risk-reduction measures promote adaption to climate change (MoFDM 2010a; MoEF 2009). Although not all disaster risk- reduction measures are linked to climate-related hazards and not all climate change impacts are hazards, there is substantial overlap between disaster risk-reduction measures and climate change adaptation measures (Rashid & Paul 2014). Both disaster risk-reduction measures and climate change adaptation measures focus on reducing vulnerability and enhancing resilience (MoFDM 2010a). Recognising the potential of disaster risk-reduction in promoting adaptation

260 to climate change, the Government of Bangladesh has also included comprehensive disaster management as one of the six pillars of its Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan 2009 (MoEF 2009). Likewise, national disaster management plans have also highlighted the importance of integration between disaster risk-reduction measures and climate change adaptation measures (MoFDM 2010a; MoDMR 2017). Here, I make a series of recommendations directed at policies that seek to enhance the resilience of coastal households to cyclone hazards in the short-term and medium-term (Paul & Rashid 2017). Implementation of these policies will also help coastal households to adapt to the adverse impacts of sea level rise, at least in the short-term and medium-term (they may need to relocate to other places in the long-term). Recommendations are presented in the following areas: infrastructure, livelihood and employment, cyclone-resilient houses, disaster preparedness and post-disaster response and recovery, and social networks.

Infrastructure

This study shows that the key future threat confronting affected households is further destruction of the embankment. As the households in both the studied villages live on land protected by the embankment, its destruction inundates the villages. They must live on the embankment or other places or in flooded homesteads and cannot restore livelihoods or build durable houses until the embankment is repaired and the waters have receded (UN-Habitat & IFRCRCS 2010). As the embankment protects the villages from flooding, the fate of the embankment determines the fate of the households living in these villages. Thus, the proper maintenance of the existing embankment so that it does not fail, and the repair of breaches in the embankment in the quickest possible time, are the two most important actions that the government should take to save the villages within the polder from future disaster. One of the most important steps the government can take to ensure the proper maintenance of the embankment is to implement stringent measures to stop the illegal breaching of the embankment by shrimp farmers trying to bring saline water from the rivers into shrimp farms located within the polder. The Aila experience shows that many of the breaches along the embankments were precisely the points that had been cut by shrimp farmers to bring saline water inside the polder.

The government could set up a special task force involving community people trained by the Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB) with the goal of repairing breaches in the embankment in the quickest possible time after any event like Aila (UNDP 2012). The repair

261 of the breaches in the embankment in the quickest possible time will not only lessen the suffering of the affected people but also reduce the cost of repairing the breaches later as they become bigger over time and thus require more money to repair. Swift repair will also save the resources of the government and NGOs as they will need to commit fewer resources for the post-disaster response and recovery operations. Moreover, it will be necessary to upgrade the embankment to protect the area from storm surge and sea level rise (MoEF 2009). It is worth noting that protection from storm surge is an issue that was not given proper attention when the polders were originally designed (MoWR 2013a). Likewise, roads, bridges, culverts and existing rural market centres need to be raised above the highest local tide or flood level, including any projected rise in sea level, so that tidal waters cannot inundate these infrastructures (Paul & Rashid 2017).

There is also an urgent need to construct additional cyclone shelters, which are fewer in number than required, to save coastal people from high magnitude cyclones and storm surges in the future (MoFDM 2010a; MoDMR 2017; Paul & Rashid 2017; Paul et al. 2010; Paul 2009; Parvin, Takahashi & Shaw 2008). Cyclone shelters must have water and toilet facilities and, if possible, power facilities such as solar power (Paul & Rashid 2017; Paul et al. 2010; Paul 2012). Moreover, they should have separate spaces and toilets for women and should also be disabled friendly (Paul 2012; Paul & Rashid 2017; Paul et al. 2010; Ahsan et al. 2016). They should be connected to the roads so that people can easily reach them, and should have storage facilities so that people can store valuable items including documents when they take refuge (Paul et al. 2010). There is also an urgent need to construct killas (raised earthen platforms) adjacent to the cyclone shelters for livestock, as the lack of safe places for livestock is one of the principal factors that discourages people from moving to save their own lives (Ikeda 1995; Paul 2012; Paul et al. 2010; Ahsan et al. 2016; MoDMR 2017).

Livelihoods and Employment

Enhancing livelihood resilience is one of the key components required to make coastal households more resilient to future disasters. There is a serious need for external support for agricultural livelihoods in coastal areas. Farmers cultivating rice and other crops have already been experiencing serious problems due to salinity in agricultural fields (Mainuddin et al. 2011). For instance, in both the studied villages, households that cultivate rice can usually cultivate only one time per year due to salinity. In Dakshin Bedkashi Village, cultivable land is used mainly for shrimp farming instead of rice cultivation. The effect of sea level rise is

262 already evident from the increase in salinity over time and continued sea level rise would further exacerbate this situation and badly affect agriculture (MoEF 2009; Paul & Rashid 2017). Sea level rise has added new challenges for the coastal farmers as they have very limited options to adjust to the salinity problem in their agricultural fields though their traditional agricultural adaptation practices (Paul & Rashid 2017). The government and NGOs need to support households through providing saline-tolerant rice varieties, fertilisers, cash and technical support for rice production. Rice varieties that can grow in highly saline soils need to be developed to support farmers of the coastal area living in areas with such soils and to sustain coastal agriculture in the future as soil salinity increases (Paul & Rashid 2017). Moreover, the government and NGOs need to support the households to cultivate alternative crops when the land cannot be used for rice cultivation, and to have access to fresh water for the cultivation of these alternative crops. Likewise, the government and NGOs should also support households that want to stop saline-water shrimp farming and resume rice cultivation due to the negative impacts of the saline-water shrimp farming on local employment, livestock and the environment. In many parts of the coastal areas, conversion of agricultural land into shrimp farming land has further exacerbated the salinity problem (Paul & Rashid 2017; Habiba et al. 2013). Furthermore, a significant proportion of the households in these villages undertake seasonal migration to other places. Income through migration is helpful for households in general and will also assist them if the coastal villages become flooded for a long period. Thus, policies and programs that support and facilitate seasonal migration to other areas as a livelihood strategy and adaptation strategy are necessary (Siddiqui & Billah 2014).

The government and NGOs also need to support coastal households through the creation of more local employment opportunities as the lack of local employment opportunities is a serious problem for most of the households (MoWR 2005). The lack of local employment opportunities creates more problems for women and households that do not have male members who can migrate to other places to bolster their livelihood. As women do not usually undertake seasonal migration like men, they cannot earn even if they badly require money due to the lack of local employment opportunities. Thus, it is necessary to provide more support to the women so that women can engage in income-generating activities such as tailoring, duck rearing, chicken rearing, goat raising, sheep raising, cattle raising, homestead gardening, and handicrafts in the local areas (MoWR 2005). The government and NGOs can support coastal households through donations, interest-free loans or loans with minimum interest, skills

263 development training for income-generating activities, and through linking their products to the market. While creation of both on-farm and off-farm opportunities for income generation in the local areas is important, creation of off-farm income-generating activities will make coastal households more resilient to disasters that impact on-farm activities (agriculture and livestock).

Cyclone-Resilient Houses

The construction of cyclone-resilient houses is one of the most important requirements for coastal households to become resilient to future cyclone events. Poor quality of housing is one of the critical factors that has contributed to the huge number of deaths due to cyclones in Bangladesh. Although construction of cyclone-resilient houses is a necessity, most coastal households are not able to afford cyclone-resilient houses (Paul & Rashid 2017). The government, NGOs and donors need to assist coastal households by providing cyclone- resilient houses as aid and supporting the construction of cyclone-resilient houses though various measures such as special long-term loans with little or no interest. Capable people should be encouraged to construct two-storey buildings as these can serve as mini cyclone shelters and can save people from storm surge (Bern et al. 1993). In addition to cyclone- resilient houses, raising the level of homesteads and house plinths is also necessary for protection from storm surge and adaptation to sea level rise (MoEF 2009; Paul & Rashid 2017; Alam & Collins 2010).

Disaster Preparedness and Post-Disaster Response and Recovery

This study shows that there is considerable scope to enhance disaster preparedness at the community level. The involvement of the community for preparedness programs should be a central focus (MoFDM 2010a; MoDMR 2017; Shaw 2012). Moreover, it is also essential to strengthen the capacity of UP to undertake effective preparedness measures. Crucially, the Government of Bangladesh has placed importance on disaster risk-reduction through pre- disaster prevention or mitigation and preparedness measures instead of the previous style of responding after the disaster takes place (MoFDM 2010a; MoDMR 2017). The study demonstrates that the local government or UP does not have the necessary resources to conduct search and rescue operations and relief operations immediately after the event. Equipping UP with necessary equipment supports and the creation of trained volunteer groups for search and rescue operations at the UP level would enhance the capacity of UP (MoFDM

264 2010a). Moreover, one of the important measures that should be taken is to ensure a sufficient UP disaster fund to provide emergency relief materials to the affected people until aid arrives from outside, including from central government and NGOs. Likewise, NGOs did not start aid operations immediately after the event and one of the main reasons for this was the dependency on donors to start aid operations. Although NGOs need funds from donors to undertake full aid operations, they must develop their own capacity to start and continue emergency aid operations independently for at least the initial two to four weeks after a disaster.

The study affirms that the livelihood and housing support were limited compared to need although these two are the most critical sectors in the recovery process. The post-Aila recovery phase was an opportunity for the government and NGOs to ‘build back better’, including livelihoods and houses, to reduce the vulnerability of the households and make them more resilient to future disasters (UN 2005; UNDRR 2015). Thus, there is a need for more focus on the improvement of livelihoods and houses (Islam & Walkerden 2015).

The government and NGOs did not provide psychological support to the affected people, and must consider psychosocial support programs as one of the core areas of the post-disaster response and recovery operations, and as significant as economic or housing recovery (MoFDM 2010a; UN 2005; UNDRR 2015; Haque at al. 2012; Kenny & Clarke 2010).

The study argues that aid recipients became passive recipients as they had no role in designing and modifying the externally designed projects. Thus, there is a need for a bottom- up participatory approach instead of a top-down approach for the successful implementation of the response and recovery interventions (James & Paton 2015; Paton, Jang & Liu 2016; Nadiruzzaman & Paul 2013; Kenny 2010; Fanany 2010b; Shaw & Guda 2004; Shaw & Sinha 2003; Shaw, Pulhin & Pereira 2010).

Social Networks

The study demonstrates that most of the affected households are primarily dependent on linking networks for survival and recovery after Aila as the post-Aila situation has been characterised by long-term flooding that has prevented the initiation of recovery activities, including the restoration of livelihoods. This flooding situation also limits the capacity of the bonding and bridging networks as the affected relatives, neighbours, friends and

265 acquaintances of the affected households are also primarily dependent on linking networks for their survival and recovery. Nevertheless, resources through bonding and bridging networks cannot contribute to survival for a long period or substantial economic and housing recovery in the case of most of the households because most of the households have bonding relationships with poor relatives and bridging relationships with poor neighbours, friends and acquaintances. Thus, the government and NGOs need to assist coastal households in Bangladesh for both survival and recovery after a disaster like Aila.

The study affirms that bonding and bridging networks play a significant role in evacuation and search and rescue operations. Therefore, it is necessary to devise effective policies and programs to strengthen the capacity of bonding and bridging networks so that they can successfully act as the first responders.

The study also shows that household relationships with neighbours and friends and acquaintances within the village become tense, suspicious and conflictual and, in many cases, break down after a period due to the competition for access to relief items. Conflict often emerges due to the unfair distribution of aid items by the government and NGOs. The government and NGOs can play an effective role in minimising such conflict through ensuring maximum transparency about the available aid items, the beneficiary selection process and the participation of recipients in the aid distribution process (Islam & Walkerden 2014). These measures would also greatly contribute to curbing corruption (favouritism and bribery) in the post-disaster response and recovery operations.

Finally, poverty is a key factor that makes households and communities in the coastal area of Bangladesh more vulnerable to cyclone hazards (Kristof 1991; Paul & Rashid 2017). Thus, efforts to reduce poverty of the poor households and communities need to be reinforced to reduce their vulnerability to disaster risks and make them resilient to future disasters (MoWR 2005; MoFDM 2010a; MoDMR 2017; UNDRR 2015; UN 2013). Moreover, as sea level rise will permanently displace a large number of coastal households through the permanent inundation of coastal areas in Bangladesh in the long-term, the Government of Bangladesh should develop a resettlement plan for the displaced population to be resettled in other areas in future. The plan should include options for resettling the displaced population both inside and outside of Bangladesh, particularly in industrial countries (MoEF 2009; Rashid & Paul 2014).

266 8.7 Suggestions for Future Research

The study recommends further research that compares the role of social capital in post- disaster response and recovery between those areas that were not subject to flooding for a long period or became dewatered within a very short period after Aila and the areas that were subject to flooding for a long period, such as the two studied villages. The role of bonding, bridging and linking networks might vary based on these different post-Aila contexts. For instance, bonding social capital and bridging social capital might contribute slightly more while the dependency of households on linking social capital for survival and recovery might be relatively less in the areas that were not subject to flooding for a long period or became dewatered within a very short period after Aila.

The long period of flooding post-Aila in the studied villages was exceptional by comparison with the usual post-cyclone situation in Bangladesh. The quick repair of the breaches of the embankment could have enabled a quicker recovery and could have saved some of the resources the government and NGOs spent. Thus, another important research area is to explore the reasons for the delayed repair of the embankment by the responsible government agency (BWDB).

Other key areas for further research include exploring: how the post-Aila flooding situation impacted on children’s education in the affected areas; the impact of the loss of household members due to Aila on the psychological recovery process of the remaining members of the households; and how those households that migrated permanently to other places as a unit (with all the members of the household) have adjusted to their new environments.

There is also a need to explore ways to minimise corruption in government, particularly in local government and NGOs, during the distribution of emergency aid and recovery aid items, and extending to the role of public participation at the community level in fighting corruption in post-disaster contexts. There is also a need for further research to explore the factors that limit the capacity of the local government and that might enable them to undertake preparedness measures and immediate response and recovery measures.

Finally, I hope that this study will contribute practically to the households and communities whose lives, livelihoods and houses are frequently impacted by cyclones in Bangladesh and other countries. I believe that the findings of this study reflect the voices of the cyclone-

267 affected households and communities. Thus, improvement of policies and programs to ensure effective post-disaster response and recovery operations in future, based on these findings, will reflect the contribution of these affected households and communities and will ensure better success of the post-disaster response and recovery operations in future in Bangladesh and other countries.

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295

Appendix 1

In-depth Interview Guide for In-depth Interviews with Household Head (Including Female Headed Household) or Wife of the Household Head of the Selected Households in the Two Studied Villages.

1. Please describe the socio-economic and demographic characteristics related to you and your household (sex, age and education of the interviewee and household head if the interviewee is not household head, present and previous information on the number of household members, number of earning members, occupation of earning members, household income, size of the homestead and agricultural land [if any] and house type). 2. Please describe how Cyclone Aila impacted on your household (personal injuries or injuries to household members; loss and damage; economic impact; displacement and period of displacement [if any] and the location/s your household stayed during the displacement period). 3. How did your household cope with the post-Cyclone Aila situation? 4. How do you evaluate the level of economic recovery of your household after Cyclone Aila and the present economic condition of your household compared to the pre-Cyclone Aila economic condition? 5. How do you evaluate the level of housing recovery of your household after Cyclone Aila and the present condition of your house compared to your pre-Cyclone Aila house? 6. How do you evaluate the level of psychological recovery of you and members of your household after Cyclone Aila? 7. What are the factors (such as socio-economic, cultural, and political) that affected the economic, housing and psychological recovery process of your household following Cyclone Aila? 8. What aid and non-aid assistance did your household receive from relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances following Cyclone Aila? 9. How did aid and non-aid assistance your household received from relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances contribute to the survival and economic, housing and psychological recovery process of your household?

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10. What emergency and long-term aid and non-aid assistance did your household receive from both the government and NGOs/only government/only NGOs after Cyclone Aila? 11. How did aid and non-aid assistance received from the government and NGOs/only government/only NGOs contribute to the survival and economic, housing and psychological recovery process of your household? 12. In your opinion, what were the strengths and weaknesses of the post-Cyclone Aila emergency and long-term operations undertaken by the government agencies and NGOs? 13. If you received a house from the government or an NGO after Cyclone Aila, then how do you assess the processes involved when the house was given (such as consultation and beneficiary selection criteria)? 14. How do you assess the house you received from the government or NGO in terms of the following issues: number of rooms, quality of fence/wall, number of doors, number of windows and their placement, movement of air through the house, quality of materials, quality of construction, flexibility in the design so that structures can be adapted, any disaster risk reduction measures that were taken, space, privacy, comfort, suitability for health condition, suitability for long-term use, the capacity to withstand a severe cyclone and overall satisfaction with the assistance and other related issues you consider important? Did you repair the house or make any modifications to the house you received? If yes, why? 15. (If you have not received a house from the government or an NGO but want to comment) How do you evaluate the processes and outcomes of the Post-Cyclone-Aila housing project implemented by the government agencies or NGOs or both in your village? 16. How did your religious beliefs help you to view Cyclone Aila and cope with the post- Cyclone Aila situation? 17. Do you take safe refuge when you receive early cyclone warnings? If not, then why? 18. In your opinion, what would have happened differently if Cyclone Aila had struck at night? 19. Do you prefer agriculture or shrimp farming in your village? Why? 20. Do you have trust in relatives/neighbours/friends and acquaintances/community or village leaders/elected leaders of the local government (Union Parishad)/other concerned government agencies/ NGOs/ NGO staff?

298 21. How do you evaluate your household’s present and previous socio-economic condition in relation to other households in the village? 22. Do you think that your household is more disaster resilient compared to the pre-Cyclone Aila period? Why? 23. What are the factors that affected (either facilitated or impeded) the recovery trajectory of your village after Cyclone Aila? 24. How do you evaluate the overall situation of the village compared to the pre-Cyclone Aila period?

Do you have any questions or comments? If not, I would like to express my deep appreciation for your time and contribution to this interview.

299

Appendix 2

In-depth Interview Guide for Key Informant Interviews with Elected Representatives, Government Officials and NGO (Local and International) Officials Across Various Levels.

1. How do you evaluate the post-Cyclone Aila response and recovery process of the affected households and villages in general and the affected households and village under investigation in particular? 2. In your opinion, what are the factors that facilitated or impeded the recovery trajectory of the affected households and villages in general and the affected households and village under investigation in particular? 3. What emergency aid did government agencies/NGOs provide to the affected households? 4. What economic or livelihood related interventions did government agencies/NGOs provide to the affected households? 5. What housing related interventions did government agencies/NGOs provide to the affected households? 6. What psychological support interventions did government agencies/NGOs provide to the affected households? If not, why? 7. How would you evaluate the importance of cash for work/food for work/both cash and food for work programs operated by the government and NGOs to the survival and recovery process of the affected households? How would you evaluate the importance of cash for training programs operated by NGOs? 8. In your opinion, what were the strengths and weaknesses of the post-Cyclone Aila emergency and long-term interventions? 9. If your agency or NGO provided livelihood support to the affected studied village, then what type of livelihood support did your agency or NGO provide? How do you evaluate the effectiveness of the given livelihood support intervention? Please comment in detail. 10. If your agency or NGO provided housing to the affected studied village, then how did your agency or NGO implement the intervention? Please comment in detail. 11. Can you please comment on the given houses in terms of the following issues: number of rooms, quality of fence/wall, number of doors, number of windows and their placement,

301

movement of air through the house, quality of materials, quality of construction, flexibility in the design so that structures can be adapted, any disaster risk reduction measures that were taken, space, privacy, comfort, suitability for health condition, suitability for long-term use, the capacity to withstand a severe cyclone and satisfaction of the recipients with the assistance and other related issues you consider important? 12. Do you think that there are some households in the studied village which have not yet fully recovered? If so, do you have any plan to undertake any measures to support these households? What measures are you planning to undertake to support these households? 13. Can you please comment on the coordination between government agencies and NGOs as well as among government agencies or among NGOs? 14. Can you please mention any significant changes, if any, in Cyclone Aila-affected villages/areas compared to the pre-Cyclone Aila period in terms of employment patterns, migration patterns, housing structure, infrastructure and other changes that you consider important? 15. Do you think that post-Cyclone Aila structural and non-structural measures undertaken by the government/NGOs including your agency or NGO in various sectors such as economic or livelihood, housing, health, education and infrastructure have contributed to the reduction of disaster risk of the affected households and villages to future disasters? 16. Do you think that the Cyclone Aila-affected villages in general/the village under investigation are/is more disaster resilient compared to the pre-Cyclone Aila period? Why? 17. If you are aware of the present overall situation of the village, then how do you evaluate the overall situation of the village compared to the pre-Cyclone Aila period or the time when you started working in the village after Cyclone Aila or came to know the village after Cyclone Aila (for the government and NGO officials)? 18. Do you recommend any specific measures required to make households and the village more disaster resilient? Do you have any questions or comments? If not, I would like to express my deep appreciation for your time and contribution to this interview.

302 Appendix 3

In-depth Interview Guide for Key Informant Interviewees from the Two Studied Villages and Surrounding Areas (key informants from the surrounding villages were asked to comment with reference to the studied village as they were aware of the situation of the studied village).

1. How did Cyclone Aila impact on this village and its households? 2. How did households in your village cope with the post- Cyclone Aila situation? 3. How do you evaluate the recovery trajectory of your village after Cyclone Aila (1. economic recovery; 2. social recovery such as health, education and community support services; 3. cultural recovery; 4. housing recovery [repair or construction of houses] and recovery of infrastructure [schools, health complexes, mosques and temples, roads and embankments]; and 5. recovery of the natural environment)? 4. What factors affected the recovery trajectory of your village after Cyclone Aila? 5. How do you evaluate the levels of economic, housing, and psychological recovery of the households in your village? 6. Do you think that there are some households in your village which have not yet fully recovered? Can you please provide more details about these households? In your opinion, what are the reasons for their failure to recover following Cyclone Aila? 7. What emergency and long-term aid and non-aid assistance did households in your village receive from relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances for survival and economic, housing and psychological recovery following Cyclone Aila? 8. How did aid and non-aid assistance received from relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances following Cyclone Aila contribute to the survival, economic, housing and psychological recovery process of households in your village? 9. What emergency and long-term aid and non-aid assistance did the government and NGOs provide to the affected households in your village? 10. How did post-Cyclone Aila emergency and long-term aid and non-aid assistance from the government and NGOs contribute to the survival and economic, housing and psychological recovery process of households in your village?

303

11. How do you evaluate the post-Cyclone Aila emergency and long-term operations undertaken by the government and NGOs (strengths and weaknesses)? 12. How do you evaluate the processes and outcomes of the post-Cyclone Aila housing project implemented by the government agencies or NGOs or by both in your village? 13. Can you please comment on the coordination between government agencies and NGOs as well as among government agencies or among NGOs? 14. Can you please compare between the government agencies and NGOs in terms of emergency and long-term support interventions including the processes and outcomes of the post-Cyclone Aila housing project? 15. Can you please mention any significant changes, if any, in your village compared to the pre-Cyclone Aila situation in terms of employment patterns, migration patterns, housing structure, infrastructure, sanitation and any other changes that you may consider important? 16. Do you think that post-Cyclone Aila structural and non-structural measures undertaken by the government/NGOs in various sectors (such as economic or livelihood, housing, health, education and infrastructure) have contributed to the reduction of disaster risk of the affected households and village to future disasters? 17. Do you think that your village is more disaster resilient compared to the pre-Cyclone Aila period? Why? 18. How do you evaluate the overall situation of the village compared to the pre-Cyclone Aila period? 19. Do you recommend any specific measures that will be useful for government agencies and NGOs to undertake post-cyclone interventions effectively in the future in Bangladesh? 20. Do you recommend any specific measures to make households in your village as well as the village itself more disaster resilient? Do you have any questions or comments? If not, I would like to express my deep appreciation for your time and contribution to this interview.

304 Appendix 4

FGD Guide for FGDs with Male and Female of the Selected Households in the Two Studied Villages.

1. How did Cyclone Aila impact on your household and village? 2. How did households of your village cope with the post-Cyclone Aila situation? 3. Can you please mention problems women in your village faced during and in the post- Cyclone Aila period? (Only for FGDs with female participants). 4. How do you evaluate the levels of economic, housing and psychological recovery of the households in your village after Aila? 5. How do you evaluate the recovery trajectory of your village after Aila (economic recovery; social recovery such as health, education and community support services; cultural recovery; recovery of the built environment such as a) repair or construction of houses and permanent settlement of displaced people and b) infrastructure: schools, health complexes, mosques and temples, roads and embankments; and recovery of the natural environment)? 6. What are the factors that affected the economic, housing and psychological recovery of households in your village? 7. What type of households in your village suffered most after Cyclone Aila? Are there households in your village which have not yet fully recovered after Cyclone Aila? Why? 8. What aid and non-aid support did households in your village receive from relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances following Cyclone Aila? 9. How did aid and non-aid support households received from relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances following Cyclone Aila contribute to the survival and economic, housing and psychological recovery process of the households in your village? 10. What aid and non-aid support did the government agencies and NGOs provide after Cyclone Aila? 11. How did post-Cyclone Aila emergency and long-term support (both aid and non-aid support) from the government and NGO sources contribute to the survival and economic, housing and psychological recovery process of the households in your village? 12. How do you evaluate post-Cyclone Aila emergency and long-term operations undertaken

305

by the government agencies and NGOs (strengths and weaknesses)? 13. How do you evaluate the processes and outcomes of the post-Cyclone Aila housing project implemented by the government agencies or NGOs or by both in your village? 14. Which one do you prefer in your village: agriculture or shrimp farming? Why? 15. Do you think that your village is now more disaster resilient compared to the pre-Cyclone Aila period? Why? 16. How do you evaluate the overall situation of the village compared to the pre-Cyclone Aila period? 17. Do you recommend any specific measures that will be useful for government agencies and NGOs to undertake post-cyclone interventions effectively in the future in Bangladesh? 18. Do you recommend any specific measures to make households in your village as well as the village itself more disaster resilient? Do you have any questions or comments? If not, I would like to express my deep appreciation for your time and contribution to this interview.

306 Appendix 5

Household Survey Questionnaire

Social Capital, Post-disaster Recovery and Disaster Risk Reduction for Building Resilience: The Case of Cyclone Aila (2009) in Bangladesh

This research attempts to examine the recovery process of affected households and communities after Cyclone Aila (2009) in Dacope and Koyra Upazilas, Khulna District, Bangladesh. The results of the research will be useful for formulating appropriate policies and approaches to ensure effective post-disaster recovery in Bangladesh. To accomplish this research, I need to conduct a household survey in two villages: Channirchak Village of Dacope Upazila and Dakshin Bedkashi Village of Koyra Upazila, Khulna District.

I cordially invite you to participate in completing a household survey questionnaire. Your survey responses will be recorded on a paper questionnaire. The expected duration for the survey is an hour and a half. Your participation is completely voluntary. You can refuse to participate and refusing to participate will not affect you in anyway. You can also refuse to answer any questions during the interview and withdraw from the interview at any time.

I would hereby like to express my appreciation of your attention and hope that you will be able to participate in this research.

Ethics Committee Clearance: The ethical aspects of this research have been approved by the ANU Human Research Ethics Committee (Protocol 2017/115). If you have any concerns or complaints about how this research has been conducted, please contact: Ethics Manager, The ANU Human Research Ethics Committee The Australian National University, Telephone: +61 2 6125 3427 Email: [email protected]

Yours sincerely,

Sebak Kumar Saha, PhD Candidate School of Culture, History and Language, CAP The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. Phone: 01791-141409 Email: [email protected]

307

Section 1: 1.1: Information about Interviewer

1.1 Name of Interviewer Date of Interview

Date of Review

1.2 Name of Supervisor

Date of Re-interview

1.2: Information about Study Area

Area Name Remarks Code 2.1 District Khulna

2.2 Upazila

2.3 Village

2.4 Household Number

308 Section 2: Household Member Schedule

Serial No. Name Sex Age Relationship to Marital Status (for Educational Religion Working Primary Secondary (Give a tick 1. Male Head of 15 years or above) Level (for 5 1. Hindu Status (for Occupation* Occupation* in the serial 2. Female Household 1. Single years or 2. Muslim 12 years or no. to 1. Household head 2. Married above) 3. Other above)? indicate the 2. Husband/Wife 3. Widow/Widower 0. Not respondent) 3. Father/Mother 4. Divorced working 4. Son/Daughter 5. Other (specify) 1. Working 5. Daughter-in- law/Son-in-law 6. Brother/Sister 7. Other (specify) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 *1. Agriculture in own land, 2. Agriculture in rented land (sharecropper), 3. Shrimp farming in own land, 4. Shrimp farming in rented land, 5. Renting out land to others for shrimp farming, 6. Day labourer, 7. Fisherman, 8. Shrimp fry collector, 9. Crab catcher, 10. Own business, 11. Motorcycle driver, 12. Government/NGO service holder, 13. Housewife, 14. Other

309

Section 3: Household Information

01 How many members does your household have? No. Now At the time Aila struck

02 What is the type of your household? (1. Nuclear, 2. Extended/Joint) No. Now At the time Aila struck

03 How many earning members are in your household? No. Now At the time Aila struck

04 What was the occupation of the household head before Aila? Primary occupation (in case of more than one occupation, write number for the primary occupation): 1. Agriculture in own land 5. Renting out land to 9. Crab catcher 13. Housewife others for shrimp farming 2. Agriculture in rented 6. Day labourer 10. Own business 14. Other land (sharecropper) 3. Shrimp farming in own 7. Fisherman 11. Motorcycle driver land 4. Shrimp farming in 8. Shrimp fry collector 12. Government/NGO rented land service holder

05 Give details about the dwelling house (in case of more than one dwelling Now At the time house, give details about the main dwelling house) Aila struck Base (1. Earthen, 2. Semi-pucca, 3. Pucca) Pillar (1. Bamboo, 2. Wood, 3. Concrete, 4. Pillar (building), 5. Mud, 6. Other) Fence (1. Earthen, 2. Chhitter fence [Goran semi-stem usually coated with a mixture of mud and cow dung], 3. Straw, 4. Golpata, 5. Bamboo, 6. Bamboo and tin, 7. Tin, 8. Wood, 9. Brick wall, 10. Other) Roof (1. Tin, 2. Asbestos, 3. Golpata, 4. roof (building), 5. Other) Number of rooms in the dwelling house

06 What type of toilet do your household members use? (1. Septic toilet, 2. Ring-slab toilet with No. water seal, 3. Ring-slab toilet without water seal, 4 Pit toilet (open), 5. Open defecation, 6. Other) Now Before Aila

07 What are the sources of water of your household for the following purposes? Tube Rainwater Pond Pond River Other well sand filter Drinking Now Before Aila Food preparation & Now cooking Before Aila Bathing Now Before Aila Toileting Now Before Aila Other household works Now (for example: washing Before Aila

310 utensils and clothes)

08 Does the household have electricity or a solar electricity system? Now 1. Yes 2. No Before Aila 1. Yes 2. No

09 Have you or any member of your household: During the last six During the six months months before Aila

taken any loan to meet food expenditure? 1. Yes 2. No 1. Yes 2. No borrowed food from your 1. Yes 2. No 1. Yes 2. No relative/neighbour/friend/acquaintance? sold or mortgaged any asset to meet food 1. Yes 2. No 1. Yes 2. No expenditure? reduced expenditure on other heads of the household 1. Yes 2. No 1. Yes 2. No to meet food expenditure?

10 What is the overall food adequacy situation of your household? (1. More than enough, 2. No. Enough, 3. Sometimes not enough, 4. Never enough) Now (last six months) Before Aila (the six months before Aila)

11 How many domestic animals does your household have? Types of animals Now (number) At the time Aila struck Died due to Aila (number) (number)

1. Chickens/ducks 2. Goats/sheep 3. Cows 5. Other

12 Land information before and after Aila Now At the time Aila struck Yes No Amount Yes No Amount What is the total amount of homestead land (in decimal) of the household? What is the total amount of farming land (in bigha) of the household? 13 At present, are all your farming lands suitable for agriculture or shrimp 1. Yes 2. No farming?

14 Total monthly expenditure and income of your household Now Before Aila What is the amount of total monthly expenditure of your household (including the economic value of the rice consumed)? What is the amount of total monthly income of your household (including the economic value of the rice consumed)? 15 If your household had any savings prior to Aila, then how much (Tk.)?

16 In your opinion, what is the current health status of your household members? No. (1. Excellent, 2. Very good, 3. Good, 4. Fair, 5. Poor) 17 Have you or any member of your household suffered a major illness after Aila 1. Yes 2. No (major illness means the spending of 10,000 taka or more for that illness)? 18 If yes, how much was spent on treating the illness?

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19 How many members of your household are studying in the city? No. Now Before Aila

20 Are you or is anyone in your household a member of any groups, organisations, or associations? (multiple responses possible) 1. Farmers’ 3. Trade or business 5. Political party 7. Other (specify) group/cooperative association 2. Fishermen’s 4. Any village committee 6. NGO or CBO group/cooperative

21 In your opinion, what is your household’s present socioeconomic condition? No. (1. Ultra-poor, 2. Poor, 3. Lower middle class, 4. Upper middle class, 5. Rich)

Section 4: Impacts and Coping Strategies 4.1: Impacts

01 What were the impacts to your household because of Aila? (Multiple responses possible) 1. No income/reduced income 14. Scarcity of drinking water 2. Damage of shrimp farms 15. Problem relating to cooking 3. Damage or loss of business 16. Problem relating to the bathroom 4. Loss of work or employment opportunities 17. Cash money lost in the flood 5. Damage of house 18. Ornaments lost in the flood 6. Displacement from the homestead 19. Important documents lost in the flood 7. Damage of household materials (furniture, utensils) 20. Farming land was submerged /household materials washed away in the water 8. Loss of livestock 21. Farming land lost to river or canal 9. Loss of poultry (chicken and duck) 22. Homestead land lost to river or canal 10. Food shortage (first two weeks) 23. Health problem 11. Food shortage (after two weeks to the end of first 24. Physical injury month) 12. Food shortage (after first month) 25. Other 13. Damage or loss of stored paddy or rice or stored paddy or rice washed away

02 If your house was damaged by Aila, then how badly was it damaged? 1. Completely 2. Partial but major damage 3. Partial but minor damage

03 Was any member of your household injured by Aila? 1. Yes 2. No 04 Did the injury cause any loss to the household income? 1. Temporary loss 2. Permanent loss 3. No loss 05 In your opinion, how affected was your household by Aila? (1. Extremely, 2. Very, 3. No. Moderately, 4. Slightly, 5. Not at all) 06 In your opinion, how disrupted was your household due to Aila? (1. Extremely, 2. No. Very, 3. Moderately, 4. Slightly, 5. Not at all)

07 Where did your household members stay on the night Aila struck? 1. Homestead 3. Cyclone 5. Union Parishad 7. Relative’s house (outside the 9. Boat shelter building village but within the union) 2. Embankment 4. School 6. Relative’s house 8. Neighbour’s house 10. Other (within the village) (specify)

08 Was the whole of your household absent in the village on the day of Aila? 1. Yes 2. No

312 09 Was any member of your household absent in the village on the day of Aila? 1. Yes 2. No 10 If members of your household who were present in the home on the day of Aila moved to other places on the day of Aila, when did they leave the homestead? 1. After both homestead and house were inundated 2. After only the homestead was inundated 3. Before the homestead was inundated 4. Some members before the homestead was inundated and some members after both homestead and house were inundated 5. Some members before the homestead was inundated and some members after only the homestead was inundated

11 Did your household have to move outside of the homestead on the day of Aila 1. Yes 2. No or in the days or any time following Aila due to Aila? 12 If yes, then when did your household return to the current homestead for living? 1. Before the embankment was 2. After the embankment was 3. Still living in another place repaired repaired 13 If your household returned to the current homestead before the embankment was repaired, then when? 1. Next day 4. Within two weeks 7. Within six months 2. Within three days 5. Within a month 8. Within a year 3. Within one week 6. Within three months 9. Later

14 If your household became displaced due to Aila, in which place(s) did your household stay during the period of displacement? (include all places the household stayed since the day of Aila) If stayed only in one place If stayed in more First place=1, Place where Time for places than one place Second place=2, your where the (multiple responses Third place = 3 household household stayed possible) and so on stayed most for a short period of the time? of time (Tick here) 1. Embankment 1. Embankment 2. Cyclone shelter 2. Cyclone shelter 3. School building 3. School building 4. Union Parishad 4. Union Parishad building building 5. Relative’s house 5. Relative’s house (within village) (within village) 6. Neighbour’s house 6. Relative’s house (outside the village but within the union) 7. Other (specify) 7. Relative’s house (outside the union but affected) 8 Relative’s house (outside the union and unaffected) 9. Neighbour’s house 10. Other (specify)

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4.2: Coping Strategies

01 What coping strategies did your household employ to cope with the post-Aila situation (multiple responses possible) 1. Reducing the number of meals per day 15. Migration to other places for work 2. Reducing the amount of food intake per meal 16. Borrowing money from relatives 3. Relying on inexpensive foods 17. Borrowing money from neighbours, friends and acquaintances 4. Consuming rice stored before Aila 18. Taking loan(s) from relatives with interest 5. Using savings 19. Taking loan(s) from neighbours, friends and acquaintances with interest 6. Receipt of food, vegetables, clothes, and water 20. Taking loan(s) from NGOs/CBOs/microcredit from relatives organisations/cooperatives 7. Monetary aid from relatives 21. Taking loan(s) from government owned banks or sources 8. Receipt of food, vegetables, clothes, and water 22. Arranging cooking with other families for from neighbours, friends and acquaintances several days 9. Monetary aid from neighbours, friends and 23. Selling of livestock such as cows and goats acquaintances 10. Relying on emergency aid and long-term aid 24. Selling of farming land from the government and NGOs 11. Catching fish for household consumption 25. Mortgaging of farming land 12. Catching fish for selling in the market 26. Selling of homestead land or part of it 13. Participation in cash or food or cash and food for 27. Collecting drinking water from distant places work program 14. Participation in cash for training program 28. Other

02 Has your household lost any homestead/farming land due to Aila? 1. Yes 2. No If yes, please give details: Land type Tick here Quantity Homestead land (decimal) Farming land (bigha)

03 Because of Aila, did your household sell any land or other assets? 1. Yes 2. No If yes, please give details: Land or other assets Tick here Unit/Quantity Homestead land Farming land Cow Goat/sheep Other (specify)

04 Did your household have any outstanding loans at the time of Aila? 1. Yes 2. No If yes, give details: Total amount outstanding (up to the day of Aila) = Amount outstanding of that loan now =

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05 As a consequence of the cyclone, did your household take any loans? 1. Yes 2. No If yes, give details Serial Before the embankment was repaired After the embankment was repaired Number Purpose* Source Amount Amount Purpose* Source Amount Amount taken outstanding taken outstanding today today 1 2 3 *1. Only for surviving after Aila, such as for meeting expenditures of the household, 2. Starting a business/agriculture/shrimp farming/income generating activity, 3. House repair or construction, 4. Education cost of the children, 5. Healthcare cost, 6. Other

06 Did or does any member of your household migrate to other places for work? 1 Yes 2. No After Aila Before Aila If yes, give details: Time How Who? Where? How many How much time many (multiple 1.Within times in a of the year in members? responses Bangladesh year? total? (month) (number) possible) 2.India (number) 1. Household 3.Both within head Bangladesh 2. Other and India 4. Other After Before the Aila embankment was repaired After the embankment was repaired Before Aila

07 Did your household migrate as a unit (with all members) to another place for a 1. Yes 2. No period following Aila? If yes, please give details: When Where? (multiple responses possible) How many How much time Before the After the 1. Within upazila places? did your embankment embankment 2. Outside upazila but within district (number)? household stay was repaired was repaired 3. Outside district but within (month/year)? Bangladesh 4. India

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Section 5: Section 5.1: Aid or support from relatives, neighbours, friends, and acquaintances

01 Most of your close relatives live: 1. Within the village 3. Outside your union but within 5. Outside your district but within your upazila Bangladesh 2. Outside the village but within 4. Outside your upazila but within 6.Other your union your district

02 Are any of your neighbours also your relatives? 1. Yes 2. No 03 Are most of your neighbours your relatives? 1. Yes 2. No 04 Did your household borrow food and other necessary household items from 1. Yes 2. No relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances to cope with the post-Aila situation? 05 Did your household borrow money from relatives, neighbours, friends and 1. Yes 2. No acquaintances to cope with the post-Aila situation? 06 Did your household lend food and other necessary household items to the Aila 1. Yes 2. No affected relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances to help them to cope with the post-Aila situation? 07 Did your household lend money to any Aila-affected relatives, neighbours, 1. Yes 2. No friends and acquaintances to help them cope with the post-Aila situation?

08 From whom did your household first receive emergency aid? 1. Relative (affected) 4. Friend 7. NGO 2. Relative (unaffected) 5. Acquaintance 8. Stranger 3. Neighbour 6. Government 9. Other

316 09 Did your household receive any aid/support from relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances? 1.Yes 2. No If yes, what kind of aid/support did your household receive from relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances? Relatives Neighbours Friends and acquaintances Within Out of village but affected Out of Within Out of village but affected Out of village union but village union but unaffected unaffected Within union Out of union Within union Out of union Food Water Clothes Utensils and other necessary household items Shelter support at the time of Aila Shelter support for at least a week or more Provided caring for livestock in their house Informational support such as information about aid sources and work or employment opportunities Assistance to get work Monetary aid only for surviving after Aila Monetary aid for economic recovery such as for starting economic activities Monetary aid for repairing or constructing house Housing materials for repairing or constructing house Free labour for repairing or constructing house Providing psychological support Other (specify)

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10 Did anyone help your household or lobby for your household to be enlisted in 1. Yes 2. No NGO and government support (aid and not-aid) programs available in your village? (multiple responses possible) If yes, then who? 1. Elected members of Union 3. Relatives 5. Friends and acquaintances Parishad 2. Village leaders (unelected) 4. Neighbours 6. Other

11 If your household received monetary aid from relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances following Aila, then how much in total did your household receive? From whom? How much in total 1. Relatives 2. Neighbours 3. Friends 4. Acquaintances

Please rank the importance of aid received from relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances for the following questions between 1 and 5 [Extremely important=5, Very important=4, Moderately important=3, Slightly important=2, Not at all important=1] 12 If your household received any emergency aid (food Relatives 5 4 3 2 1 and water or either) from the following people, how Neighbours 5 4 3 2 1 would you assess the importance of emergency aid in Friends & Acquaintances 5 4 3 2 1 the survival of your household? 13 If your household received any aid/support from the Relatives 5 4 3 2 1 following people, how would you assess the Neighbours 5 4 3 2 1 importance of aid/support in the economic recovery Friends & Acquaintances 5 4 3 2 1 process of your household? 14 If your household received any aid/support from the Relatives 5 4 3 2 1 following people, how would you assess the Neighbours 5 4 3 2 1 importance of aid/support in the housing recovery Friends & Acquaintances 5 4 3 2 1 process of your household? 15 If your household received any aid/support from the Relatives 5 4 3 2 1 following people, how would you assess the Neighbours 5 4 3 2 1 importance of aid/support in the psychological Friends & Acquaintances 5 4 3 2 1 recovery process of your household members? 16 If your household received any psychological Relatives 5 4 3 2 1 support from the following people, how would you Neighbours 5 4 3 2 1 assess the importance of the psychological support Friends & Acquaintances 5 4 3 2 1 in the psychological recovery process of your household members?

17 Generally, how did you get the aid from relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances? 1. They offered spontaneously 2. You asked for aid 3. Both

18 If your household had not received monetary aid or in your opinion, had received a small amount of monetary aid from relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances, then what were the reasons? Affected relatives (multiple responses 1. Affected 2. Poor 3. Other possible) Unaffected relatives (outside the village and 1. No relatives outside the Aila affected areas union) (multiple responses possible) 2. Poor 3. Had capacity to help but did not 4. Other Neighbours (multiple responses possible) 1. Affected 2. Poor 3. Other Affected friends and acquaintances 1. Affected 2. Poor 3. Other (multiple responses possible) Unaffected friends and acquaintances 1. No friends and acquaintances outside the Aila- (multiple responses possible) affected areas 2. Poor, 3. Had capacity to help but did not 4. Other

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19 Did your household give any aid/support to relatives, neighbours, friends 1. Yes 2. No and acquaintances who were affected by Aila? If yes, what kind of aid/support did your household give to relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances who were affected by Aila? Relatives Relatives outside Neighbours Friends and Friends and within the village but acquaintances acquaintances the Aila-affected within the outside the village village village but Aila-affected Within Out of Within Out union union union of union Food Water Clothes Shelter support at the time of Aila Informational support such as information about aid sources and work or employment opportunities Assistance to get work Monetary aid only for surviving after Aila Free labour for repairing or constructing house Providing psychological support Other (specify)

20 If your household needed the following after Aila, whom did you prefer to ask first? No. (1. Relatives within the village, 2. Neighbours, 3. Friends and acquaintances within the village 4. Other) Borrowing food such as rice for one or two days Borrowing small amount of money (say up to 500 Taka) Free labour assistance 21 How often does your household borrow things from or lend things to relatives within the village, neighbours, and friends and acquaintances within the village? Borrow Lend 1. At least 3. At least 5. At least 1. At least 3. At least 5. At least once a week once in a once in six once a week once in a once in six month months month months 2. At least 4. At least 6. Never 2. At least 4. At least 6. Never once in two once in three once in two once in three weeks months weeks months

22 If your household faces any crisis and needs aid, who are the three people (other than members of your household) from whom you can receive the following aid? Who? (multiple responses His or her economic Whom you possible) condition would ask first (1. Ultra-poor, 2. Poor, (If multiple 3. Lower middle class, responses)? 4. Upper middle class, 5. Rich, 6. Do not know) Your household needs 1. Relative 1.Relative

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money to meet the 2. Neighbour 2.Neighbour household expenditure 3. Friend 3. Friend for at least one month 4. Acquaintance 4. Acquaintance 5. Other 5. Other 6. Nobody

Section 5.2: Government and NGOs

01 The number of Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) aid sources? 1. 3 or fewer 2. 4 to 6 3. More

02 What kind of aid did your household get from Government and NGOs? Government (give tick mark) NGO (give tick mark) Emergency food aid Emergency food aid Emergency water supply Emergency water supply Clothes Clothes

Utensils and other necessary Utensils and other necessary household items household items Medical assistance Medical assistance Support for water storage such as Support for water storage such as tank, motka tank, motka and big container for and big container for storing water storing water Gratuitous relief (GR) rice or Long-term food aid (received several times money from the same NGO) Rice under VGF Net and boat House Cash for income generating activities Small amount of money for house Poultry/livestock for income generating repair/construction activities 20,000/- Taka for house Goods for business repair/construction Tin for house House Agricultural support (such as seeds Plinth raising and fertilisers) Other (specify) Homestead raising Agricultural support (such as seeds and fertilisers) Other (specify)

03 Did you or any member of your household participate in any of the following programs operated by the government or NGO after Aila? Government NGO 1.Yes How 1.Yes How many Name of 2. No many 2.No times NGOs that times operated the programs Food or cash for work Cash for work Employment generation Food for work program for the poorest (40 Cash and food for days employment program) work VGD support Cash for training Other (specify) Other (specify) Participation in cash or food for work program under contractors for constructing or repairing embankments

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Please rank, from 5 to 1, the importance of aid received from the government or NGO(s) for the questions 4–10 and the importance of employment and training programs from the government or NGO(s) or contractor(s) for the questions 11–13. [Extremely important=5, Very important=4, Moderately important=3, Slightly important=2, Not at all important=1] 04 If your household received any emergency aid (food and water or Gov 5 4 3 2 1 either) from the government or NGO(s) after Aila, how would you NGO 5 4 3 2 1 assess the importance of emergency aid in the survival of your household? 05 If your household received any aid from the government or NGO(s) Gov 5 4 3 2 1 after Aila, how would you assess the importance of aid in the NGO 5 4 3 2 1 economic recovery process of your household? 06 If your household received any aid from the government or NGO(s) Gov 5 4 3 2 1 after Aila, how would you assess the importance of aid in the housing NGO 5 4 3 2 1 recovery process of your household? 07 If your household received any aid from the government or NGO(s) Gov 5 4 3 2 1 after Aila, how would you assess the importance of aid in the NGO 5 4 3 2 1 psychological recovery process of your household members? 08 If your household received a house from the government or any Gov 5 4 3 2 1 NGO(s), how would you assess the importance of this aid in the NGO 5 4 3 2 1 housing recovery process of your household? 09 If your household received 20,000 Taka from the government, how Gov 5 4 3 2 1 would you assess the importance of this aid in the housing recovery process of your household? 10 If your household received rice under VGF support from the Gov 5 4 3 2 1 government, how would you assess the importance of VGF rice in meeting the daily food necessity of your household? 11 If any member of your household participated in cash/food/cash- Gov 5 4 3 2 1 and-food for work and cash-for-training or any of them, how would NGO 5 4 3 2 1 you assess the importance of participation in the economic recovery Contractor 5 4 3 2 1 process of your household? (cash-for-work or food-for-work for the government and contractor) 12 If any member of your household participated in cash/food/cash- Gov 5 4 3 2 1 and-food for work and cash-for-training or any of them, how would NGO 5 4 3 2 1 you assess the importance of participation in the housing recovery Contractor 5 4 3 2 1 process of your household? (cash-for-work or food-for-work for the government and contractor) 13 If any member of your household participated in cash/food/cash- Gov 5 4 3 2 1 and-food for work and cash-for-training or any of them, how would NGO 5 4 3 2 1 you assess the importance of participation in the psychological Contractor 5 4 3 2 1 recovery process of your household members? (cash-for-work or food-for-work for the government and contractor)

14 If your household received 20,000 Taka from the government for house repair or 1. Yes 2. No construction, did your household spend the money for house repair or construction? 15 In your opinion, was 20,000 Taka sufficient for house repair or construction? 1. Yes 2. No 16 Was the distribution of 20,000 Taka in two instalments a problem for house repair 1. Yes 2. No or construction? 17 Was it possible for your household to receive 20,000 Taka as aid from 1. Yes 2. No relatives/neighbours/friends/acquaintances to cope with the post-Aila situation? 18 Was it possible for your household to borrow (without interest) 20,000 Borrow 1. Yes 2. No Taka or to receive 20,000 Taka as a loan (with interest) from Loan 1. Yes 2. No relatives/neighbours/friends/acquaintances to cope with the post-Aila situation? 19 At present, do you think that your household has any 1. Yes 2. No relatives/neighbours/friends/acquaintances who are capable of providing 20,000 Taka to your household as aid?

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20 At present, do you think that your household has any Lend 1. Yes 2. No relatives/neighbours/friends/acquaintances who are capable of lending Loan 1. Yes 2. No (without interest) 20,000 Taka or providing 20,000 Taka as a loan (with interest) to your household?

Section 6: Recovery 6.1: Economic Recovery

01 How do you evaluate the present economic condition of your household compared to the pre-Aila economic condition? a. Much better b. Somewhat c. About the d. Somewhat Much worse better same worse 02 How do you evaluate the present quality of life of your household members compared to the pre- Aila quality of life of your household members (consider standard of living, health, safety and security, achievement in life, personal relationships and connectedness to the villagers)? a. Much better b. Somewhat c. About the same d. Somewhat e. Much worse better worse 03 How much economic hardship did your household experience because of Aila? a. Extreme b. Major c. Moderate d. Minor hardship e. No hardship at hardship hardship hardship all 04 How was the quality of your household’s meals in the previous six months compared to the quality of your household’s meals in the six months before Aila? a. Better b. About the same c. Worse 05 How much time did the earning member/members of the household require to participate in income generating activities since Aila? (except participation in cash/food/cash-and-food for work programs operated by the government and NGOs) 06 Has any adult female member of your household who never worked before Aila 1. Yes 2. No to earn money started working at any time after Aila to earn money?

6.2: Housing Recovery

01 How do you evaluate the condition of your present house compared to your pre-Aila house? a. Much better b. Somewhat c. About the same d. Somewhat e. Much worse better worse 02 How disaster resilient is your present house compared to your pre-Aila house? a. Much more b. Little more c. About the same d. Little less e. Much less resilient resilient resilient resilient 03 Is your present house in the same place as it was before Aila? 1. Yes 2. No If no, in which place is the present house? 1. Another place but within the previous homestead 3. New homestead on land owned by others 2. New homestead on previously owned land 4. Other 04 The height of the floor level of your present house Higher than the house at the time Aila struck? 1. Yes 2. No Above the highest flood level observed on the day of Aila? 1. Yes 2. No Above the flood level observed during regular tidal flow following Aila (before 1. Yes 2. No the embankment was repaired)?

6.3: Psychological Recovery

01 How do you evaluate the psychological recovery of you and members of your household following Aila? a. No recovery at all, b. Minor recovery, c. Moderate recovery, d. Major recovery, e. Complete recovery 02 How much happier is your life and the lives of members of your household now compared to the pre-Aila period? a. Much happier, b. Somewhat happier, c. About the same, d. Somewhat unhappier, e. Much unhappier 03 Did you see anyone die in the water during Aila or any dead body during the 1. Yes 2. No

322 day of Aila or in the days following Aila? 04 Statements about Psychological Recovery Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following Level of statements. [Strongly agree=5, Agree=4, Undecided=3, Disagree=2, Strongly agreement disagree=1] Cyclone Aila was very traumatic for me and my household members. 5 4 3 2 1 Members of my household relied heavily on religious beliefs to overcome the 5 4 3 2 1 crisis caused by Cyclone Aila. My household members often recall unpleasant memories, worries, bad dreams, 5 4 3 2 1 or bad experiences from Cyclone Aila. When we get a cyclone warning signal or see bad weather or a lot of rain during a 5 4 3 2 1 cyclone warning signal, we fear for our lives and safety. When I get a cyclone warning signal or see bad weather or a lot of rain during a 5 4 3 2 1 cyclone warning signal, my memories of Cyclone Aila are revived. I avoid thinking about the damage caused by Cyclone Aila. 5 4 3 2 1 I feel very sad when I recall the memories of Cyclone Aila. 5 4 3 2 1 I have bad dreams about Cyclone Aila from time to time. 5 4 3 2 1 I cannot sleep when I remember Cyclone Aila. 5 4 3 2 1 As time passes, I have bad dreams about Cyclone Aila less frequently. 5 4 3 2 1 As time passes, I remember Cyclone Aila less frequently. 5 4 3 2 1 I believe Cyclone Aila is Allah’s/God’s will. 5 4 3 2 1 I believe Cyclone Aila is Allah’s/God’s wrath or the consequences of human sin. 5 4 3 2 1 I believed that I was able to deal with the post-Cyclone Aila situation. 5 4 3 2 1

Section 7: Government or NGO House (Only for respondents who received a house)

01 If your household has received a house from an NGO, then what is the name of the NGO? …………………………………______02 If your household has received a house from Islamic Relief 1 Dochala 2 Chouchala Bangladesh, then what type of house did your household receive? 03 Would you have been able to build the same quality house with your own 1. Yes 2. No capacity if you had not received the house from either the government or NGO? 04 Please indicate your satisfaction in relation to Satisfied Neither satisfied Dissatisfied the following aspects of the house (please tick) nor dissatisfied Number of room/s Quality of fences/walls Number of doors Number of windows Placement of windows Movement of air through the house Quality of materials Quality of construction Flexibility in the design of the house so that new structures can be added Disaster risk reduction steps that have been taken 05 To what degree were you or members of your household consulted during the provision of the house? 1. Completely 2. Considerably 3. Moderately 4. Slightly 5. Not at all 06 If you or anyone from your household asked for any 1. Yes 2. No 3. Did not request modification of the house, was it considered? for modification 07 Is the size of the received house sufficient for the number of 1. Yes 2. No 3. Do not know people in your household? 08 Is the house adequate for maintaining the privacy of the 1.Yes 2. No 3. Do not know members of your household? 09 How comfortable is the house for living? (5. Extremely comfortable, 4. Very 5 4 3 2 1 comfortable, 3. Moderately comfortable, 2. Slightly comfortable, 1. Not comfortable at all) 10 How comfortable is this house compared to your house at the time Aila 5 4 3 2 1 struck? (5. Much more comfortable, 4. More comfortable, 3. About the same,

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2. Less comfortable, 1. Much less comfortable) 11 How suitable is the house you received for your overall health condition? (5. 5 4 3 2 1 Extremely suitable, 4. Very suitable, 3. Moderately suitable, 2. Slightly suitable, 1. Not suitable at all) 12 How suitable is the house for long-term use? (5. Extremely suitable, 4. Very 5 4 3 2 1 suitable, 3. Moderately suitable, 2. Slightly suitable, 1. Not suitable at all) 13 Overall, how satisfied are you with the house you have received from 5 4 3 2 1 government or NGO? (5. Very satisfied, 4. Satisfied, 3. Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, 2. Dissatisfied, 1. Very dissatisfied) 14 Do you think that the house you received can withstand a 1. Yes 2. No 3. Do not know severe cyclone? 15 Did you make any modifications to the house you received from government or 1. Yes 2. No NGO? If yes, give details: Modification 1. Yes 2. No Was the feature present in your house at the time Aila struck) (1. Yes 2. No) Veranda constructed Extra room is constructed in the veranda Additional room is constructed NA Providing bars to the windows Windows repositioned NA Additional windows constructed NA Other (specify) 16 Did you undertake any repair work on the house due to poor quality of 1. Yes 2. No construction? 17 If you had a choice to take a cash payment of equivalent value instead of a 1. Yes 2. No physical house, would you have preferred to take the cash instead of the house? 18 Do you know the economic value of the house you received? 1. Yes 2. No 19 If you had received the equivalent money for the house provided, would you have been able to a. construct a better-quality house c. construct a lower quality house b. construct the same quality house d. do not know

Section 8: Disaster Resilience

Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements Level of [Strongly agree=5, Agree=4, Undecided=3, Disagree=4, Strongly disagree=1] agreement 01 My household has greater awareness and knowledge of disaster risk reduction 5 4 3 2 1 compared to the pre-Aila period 02 My household’s disaster preparedness for the next cyclone is better than it was in the 5 4 3 2 1 pre-Aila period 03 My household has diversified income sources through various livelihood strategies 5 4 3 2 1 04 My household has diversified income sources through non-agricultural livelihood 5 4 3 2 1 strategies 05 My household has the knowledge and skills to take the necessary disaster risk 5 4 3 2 1 reduction measures to deal with a cyclone with greater efficiency 06 My household has the resources to take the necessary disaster risk reduction measures 5 4 3 2 1 to deal with a cyclone with greater efficiency 07 My household has the knowledge and skills to employ climate change adaptation 5 4 3 2 1 strategies 08 My household has the resources to employ climate change adaptation strategies 5 4 3 2 1 09 My household is now more disaster resilient compared to the pre-Aila period 5 4 3 2 1 10 My household now has a better understanding of cyclone warning signals compared to 5 4 3 2 1 the pre-Aila period 11 The Union Parishad has the required capacity to deal with disasters 5 4 3 2 1 12 Construction of coastal embankments under CEIP will enhance the resilience of the 5 4 3 2 1 villagers to cyclone hazards

324 13 Government investment for disaster risk reduction is sufficient for enhancing resilience 5 4 3 2 1 to cyclone hazards 14 Participation in training sessions arranged by NGOs has increased awareness and 5 4 3 2 1 knowledge of my household members on disaster risk reduction 15 Participation in training sessions arranged by NGOs has increased awareness and 5 4 3 2 1 knowledge of my household members on climate change and climate change adaptation strategies 16 Training provided by NGOs on income generating activities (IGA) has contributed to 5 4 3 2 1 the diversification of income sources

Section 9: Cyclone Warnings and Taking Refuge

01 Did you receive cyclone warnings prior to the landfall of Sidr, Aila and Mora? Sidr 1. Yes 2. No Aila 1. Yes 2. No Mora 1. Yes 2. No 02 What were the sources of cyclone early warnings for Aila and Mora? (multiple responses possible) Aila Mora 1. Radio 1. Radio 2. Television 2. Television 3. Newspaper 3. Newspaper 4. CPP volunteers 4. CPP volunteers 5. Local government (Union Parishad) 5. Local government (Union Parishad) 6. NGOs/NGO volunteers 6. NGOs/NGO volunteers 7. Mosque/temple 7. Mosque/temple 8. Village leaders (unelected) 8. Village leaders (unelected) 9. Relatives, neighbours, friends and 9. Relatives, neighbours, friends and acquaintances acquaintances 10.Other source 10.Other source 03 Did you or any member of your household take refuge somewhere other than 1. Yes 2. No your own house during Sidr? 04 Did you or any member of your household take refuge somewhere other than 1. Yes 2. No your own house during Aila? 05 Did you or any member of your household take refuge somewhere other than 1. Yes 2. No your own house during any cyclone after Aila? 06 If yes, did you or any member of your household take refuge somewhere 1. Yes 2. No other than your own house during Cyclone Mora? If yes, then give details: Taking refuge at safe place If some members took refuge at Where? (multiple responses a safe place, then who took possible) refuge? (multiple responses possible)

1. All members 1. Women, 2. Children, 3. Old- 1. Cyclone shelter, 2. School 2. Some members aged people, 4. Men building, 3. Union Parishad building, 4. Relatives’ house, 5. Neighbours’ house, 6. Embankment, 7. Other place 07 What precautionary measures did your household take during Cyclone Mora? (multiple responses possible) 1. No measures were taken 7. Household goods were packed 2. All household members took shelter in safe 8. Household goods were moved to another place place(s) 3. Some household members took shelter in safe 9. Villagers were consulted place(s) 4. Livestock was moved to safer places 10. Prayed to Allah/God 5. Money, ornaments and necessary documents 11. Other

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were packed 6. Money, ornaments and necessary documents were moved to another place 08 If any member of your household did not take refuge in any place other than your own house during Cyclone Mora, what were the reasons for not taking refuge? (multiple responses possible) 1. There was no cyclone shelter 11. There was no place for keeping livestock in the cyclone shelter 2. Distance to the nearest cyclone shelter was too 12. Living in a pucca house far 3. Road network to go to the cyclone shelter was 13. Considered own house as a safe place poor

4. There were too many people in the cyclone 14. Cyclone shelter was filled mainly with males shelter 5. Lack of drinking water, light and toilet facilities 15. Male members were not at home in the cyclone shelter 6. Did not believe the warnings 16. Lack of separate space and toilet for women in the cyclone shelter 7. Took refuge in the cyclone shelter or other 17. Thought that cyclone would not occur here place after receiving warnings on previous cyclone/s but nothing happened at that time/those times 8. Received warnings on previous occasions but 18. Cyclone is Allah's/God's will; so, He will save nothing happened us 9. Weather was good despite warnings 19. Other 10. Fear of burglary 09 If members of your household took refuge in any place other than a cyclone shelter during Cyclone Mora, what were the reasons for not taking refuge in a cyclone shelter? (multiple responses possible) 1. There was no cyclone shelter 6. Cyclone shelter was filled mainly with males 2. The distance to the nearest cyclone shelter was 7. Lack of separate space and toilet for women in too far the cyclone shelter 3. Road network to go to the cyclone shelter was 8. Prefer taking shelter on the embankment poor 4. There were too many people in the cyclone 9. Other shelter 5. Lack of drinking water, light and toilet facilities in the cyclone shelter

Section 10: Village

01 What is your village’s overall situation at present compared to the pre-Aila period? Improved Stayed the Worsened Do not same know Economic condition of the households in the village The quality of housing The quality of health care Sanitation and hygiene related practices Educational opportunities Quality of religious and cultural festivals

Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements Level of [Strongly agree=5, Agree=4, Undecided=3, Disagree=2, Strongly disagree=1] agreement 02 Most people in the village will help you if you need it. 5 4 3 2 1 03 The people of this village usually trust one another. 5 4 3 2 1 04 The level of trust among the people of this village has decreased compared to the 5 4 3 2 1 pre-Aila period.

326 05 The people of this village think only about the welfare of their household, not the 5 4 3 2 1 welfare of the village. 06 Elected leaders give priority to the welfare of the village over their own family, 5 4 3 2 1 relatives and close ones. 07 Village leaders (unelected leaders) give priority to the welfare of the village over 5 4 3 2 1 their own family, relatives and close ones. 08 There is strong unity among villagers. 5 4 3 2 1 09 Unity among villagers has declined compared to the Pre-Aila period. 5 4 3 2 1 10 If there is a problem with the embankment in the village, the villagers will try to 5 4 3 2 1 solve the problem through mutual cooperation. 11 The local government (Union Parishad) is committed to consulting with villagers. 5 4 3 2 1 12 NGOs (that have worked or are currently working in this village) are committed to 5 4 3 2 1 consulting with villagers. 13 The people of the village have become more dependent on aid since Aila. 5 4 3 2 1 14 Shrimp farming in saline water is/was not good for the village. 5 4 3 2 1 15 The decision to stop shrimp farming in saline water was/will be a positive 5 4 3 2 1 decision.

Please answer the following questions (16-18) by choosing an option between 1 and 5. 16 How much do you trust the following people? [To a very great extent=5, To a great extent=4, Neither great nor small extent=3, To a small extent=2, To a very small extent=1] Elected representatives of local government (Union Parishad) 5 4 3 2 1 Village leaders (unelected) 5 4 3 2 1 NGO staff 5 4 3 2 1 Relatives 5 4 3 2 1 Neighbours 5 4 3 2 1 Friends and acquaintances 5 4 3 2 1 17 In your opinion, how honest are the following people? [Very honest=5, Honest=4, Neither honest nor dishonest=3, Dishonest=2, Very dishonest=1] Elected representatives of local government (Union Parishad) 5 4 3 2 1 Village leaders (unelected) 5 4 3 2 1 NGO staff 5 4 3 2 1 18 To what extent do the following differences divide people in your village? [To a very great extent=5, To a great extent=4, Neither great nor small extent=3, To a small extent=2, To a very small extent=1] Difference in wealth 5 4 3 2 1 Difference in land ownership 5 4 3 2 1 Difference in political ideology 5 4 3 2 1 Difference between supporters and opponents of shrimp farming 5 4 3 2 1 Difference in religious beliefs 5 4 3 2 1 19 Does any of the above differences cause problems? 1. Yes 2. No Which two differences most often cause problems? Rank Responses (1. Difference in wealth, 2. Difference in land First: ownership, 3. Difference in political ideology, 4. Difference between supporters and opponents of Second: shrimp farming, 5. Difference in religious beliefs) Do such problems ever lead to violence? First 1.Yes 2. No Second 1. Yes 2. No

20 What are your three main sources of Tick here (multiple responses possible) information about what the government, local 1. Relatives 6. Village leaders government (Union Parishad) and NGOs are (unelected) doing in your village and union? 2. Neighbours 7. Government employees 3. Friends and 8. NGO staff acquaintances 4. Radio 9. Other 5. Elected leaders of

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Union Parishad

21 What are the two main problems in your village that you think must be solved? 1. 2.

22 In your opinion, what additional measures should be undertaken by the government to reduce the negative impacts of cyclones in the future? (multiple responses possible) 1. Proper maintenance of the coastal 4. Raising the height of roads within the village embankment 2. Construction of more cyclone shelters 5. Stopping the unplanned breaching of embankments for water needed for shrimp farming 3. Plantation of trees 6. Other

23 What is your expectation for the future? 1. Better 2. About the same 3. Worse

328 Appendix 6

Socio-demographic Characteristics of the Survey Respondents (n=250)

Sex n (%) Male 160 (64.0) Female 90 (36.0) Age (years) n (%) 20-30 48 (19.2) 31-40 73 (29.2) 41-50 65 (26.0) 51-60 44 (17.6) 61-70 20 (8.0) Marital status n (%) Single 8 (3.2) Married 228 (91.2) Widow/widower 11 (4.4) Divorced 3 (1.2) Years of schooling n (%) 0 56 (22.4) 1-5 98 (39.2) 6-10 87 (34.8) 10+ 9 (3.6) Religion n (%) Hindu 99 (39.6) Muslim 151 (60.4) Primary occupation n (%) Agriculture in own land 48 (19.2) Agriculture in rented land (sharecropper) 6 (2.4) Shrimp farming in own land 18 (7.2) Shrimp farming in rented land 10 (4.0) Renting out land to others for shrimp farming 2 (0.8) Day labourer 45 (18.0) Fisherman 2 (0.8) Shrimp fry collector 13 (5.2) Crab catcher 1 (0.4) Own business 17 (6.8) Motorcycle driver 2 (0.8) Government/NGO service holder 2 (0.8) Housewife 76 (30.4) Other 8 (3.2) Respondents’ household monthly income now in Taka Mean income 8990 Median income 7500 Standard deviation 5481 Respondents’ household monthly expenditure now in Taka Mean expenditure 7976 Median expenditure 7000 Standard deviation 4735 Source: Author, Household survey (2017–2018)

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