DOCSLIB.ORG

Recent French Interventions in the Sahel

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Recent French Interventions in the Sahel Policy Brief ORSAM No: 146 / November 2020 RECENT FRENCH INTERVENTIONS IN THE SAHEL ABDENNOUR TOUMI ORSAM Copyright Ankara - TURKEY ORSAM © 2020 Bu çalışmaya ait içeriğin telif hakları ORSAM’a ait olup, 5846 Sayılı Fikir ve Sanat Eserleri Kanunu uyarınca kaynak gösterilerek kısmen yapılacak makul alıntılar dışında, hiçbir şekilde önceden izin alınmaksızın kullanılamaz, yeniden yayımlanamaz. Bu çalışmada yer alan değerlendirmeler yazarına aittir; ORSAM’ın kurumsal görüşünü yansıtmamaktadır. Center for Middle Eastern Studies Adress : Mustafa Kemal Mah. 2128 Sk. No: 3 Çankaya, ANKARA Phone : +90 850 888 15 20 Faks: +90 312 430 39 48 Email : [email protected] Photos : Anadolu Ajansı (AA) Policy Brief No:146 ORSAM POLICY BRIEF RECENT FRENCH INTERVENTIONS IN THE SAHEL About the Author Abdennour Toumi Abdennour Toumi, a journalist and a North African Studies expert at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM), received his PhD in Toulouse University Political Science department. His articles are published in the National Turkish newspaper Daily Sabah English. He worked as a lecturer at Portland Community College in the Department of Middle Eastern and North African studies. He was the reporter at Maghreb & France Arab Daily News. Currently, he is the member of Paris France Arab- American Journalists Association and Chicago IL USA. Mr. Toumi focuses on North Africa’s socio- political mutation, the role of Turkey in the region, immigration issues and North African diaspora in France. November 2020 orsam.org.tr 2 Recent French Interventions in the Sahel CONTENTS Introduction ..........................................................................................................................3 Nov 2015, Paris Attacks (Bataclan) Shadow ........................................................................4 CFA Currency Becomes ECO................................................................................................7 Call for Greater ‘Political Clarity’ From the G5 Sahel..........................................................8 Conclusion ..........................................................................................................................10 Index....................................................................................................................................11 References..........................................................................................................................12 Policy Brief No:146 Recent French Interventions in the Sahel 3 Introduction To better understand one should go back to the source of this cobra. Why did then-French In an effort to establish law and order in Mali, President François Mitterand turn his back on President Macron, like his predecessor Presi- the legalist freedom fighters in Afghanistan dent Hollande, recently wore the military uni- like Ahmed Shah Massoud? Ahmed Shah Mas- form and is acting as Commander-in-Chief. soud warned him and his allies about the On his inaugural day in May 2017 he visited the danger he faced after the Soviet Red Army French troops in Mali like his predecessor who withdrawal in the real Afghan political transition ordered Operation Serval in January 2013, a between 1992-1996. bombing mission against armed terrorist groups based throughout the big Sahara. President This security vacuum left the country open to Macron’s first trip outside of Europe since the what the world discovered later to be the start of COVID-19 pandemic is a sign of solidarity Talban (Taliban). with the region. According to the Elysée Palace, Militarily, didn’t President Hollande learn any- French President Emmanuel Macron and lead- thing from Americans’ “Shock and Awe” oper- ers from the G5 Sahel group of countries have ation in Iraq seventeen years ago? That mission met in Mauritania to discuss the ongoing fight was accomplished, but its consequences are against Islamic armed groups. still boiling up even to this moment in Iraq and President Hollande’s justification then for his Syria. Consider also the Libyan debacle, whose act-of-war in Mali was, “freeing the Malian foreign forces’ alibis are like the Malian war. people from Al-Qae’eda.” Didn’t France go to According to news reports the Malian Islamists Afghanistan decades ago to eradicate this conquered a southern city despite heavy bomb- supra-national organization? Until President ing of its bases and manpower. President Hol- Hollande brought his soldiers home, he realized lande was acting like a French neo-con ideo- it was a lost cause. If the mission in Afghanistan logue, where foreign policy analysts were ex- was impossible, how could it be possible in pecting a French realpolitik foreign policy in Mali? Didn’t France and Algeria stand hand- the region because of his political background. in-hand on the question of eradicating terrorist President Macron’s foreign and defense policies groups? Why did they allow the Algerian Islamist in the Sahel and MENA in general are like his radical groups (GSPC) to regroup in the Sahara predecessor. and become AQIM in the Maghreb and Sahel. In spite of the initial success of the Serval op- eration in 2013, French intervention in the Militarily, didn't President Hollande Sahel region has now reached an impasse. learn anything from Americans’ The already complex situation is further com- "Shock and Awe” operation in Iraq plicated by France’s status as a former colonizer seventeen years ago? That mission operating in the region, understanding how was accomplished, but its conse- France’s former colonial status translates into quences are still boiling up even to relationships between local communities, this moment in Iraq and Syria. French troops, and armed terrorist groups will influence long term engagement. orsam.org.tr 4 Recent French Interventions in the Sahel Following the growing instability in Mali, north however, did oppose France’s counterterrorism Niger, and Libya, the enduring presence of mission, operation Barkhane, deploying 3,000 Boko Haram in Nigeria and the territorial loss soldiers of the member states of G5 Sahel of ISIS in Iraq and Syria in the year of 2019, with the backing of the African Union (U.A.), France has increasingly turned to the Sahel as called on the U.N.S.C to set up an international a crucial battleground in the fight against force to neutralize armed groups, help national violent and radical non-state actors. As such, reconciliation, and establish stable democratic the significance of recent French operations in institutions in Libya. the region has increased in wake of the Paris terrorist attacks in 2015 and the Nice attack in Unlike Serval, which fielded small, highly 2016. In this way, French Prime Minister, Jean flexible forces that were tailored to the specific 2 Castex did not hesitate to draw comparisons political goals of the intervention, Barkhane with the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris that reflects a much broader regional counterter- shook the country. “It’s very likely the same rorist effort. The declared aims of the operation hatred, the same cowardice, the same inhu- are carefully aligned to those countries of the manity that was at work in Niger and at the G5 Sahel (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Bataclan.” and Niger) and emphasize the need for capacity building that enables local partners to secure their own safety independently. This close co- ordination with, and emphasis on, local state Unlike Serval, which fielded small, actors in the region signify a clear departure highly flexible forces that were from the operational independence of the Serval tailored to the specific political goals operation. of the intervention,2 Barkhane reflects a much broader regional The Barkhane operation has had some notable counterterrorist effort. achievements in terms of both hard and soft power,3 however, what constitutes success at a broader strategic level remains unclear. The wide-ranging aims of the current operation Nov 2015, Paris Attacks are ambiguous and ill-defined, ultimately ren- (Bataclan) Shadow dering France’s departure an uncertain prospect. This vagueness, when viewed along- However, time has revealed Serval’s operational side the complexity of the region, is a clear in- successes to be temporary. The operation did dicator of the impasse that lies immediately little to contribute to the overall stabilization ahead of French forces. and restoration of Malian state authority, with the security situation now widely accepted to Despite these apprehensive circumstances, have worsened since 2014..1 The decision to there are numerous factors that have influenced launch Barkhane operation in 2014 confirmed France’s decision to remain firmly engaged in that Serval, despite its strengths, had failed to the region. The initial framing of the Serval address the underlying causes of the Malian operation is in the context of the “War on conflict. Algeria as a pivotal state in the region, Terror” or a war without an end! It is crucial to Policy Brief No:146 Recent French Interventions in the Sahel 5 understand continued involvement. Since Ser- and they met evil,” Jean Castex said in a somber val’s launch in 2013, France suffered numerous speech at an airport lounge of Orly airport, domestic terrorist attacks. France’s continued Paris transformed for the occasion into a investment in tackling terrorism overseas thus funeral home. No group has yet claimed re- represents not only an attempt to ensure re- sponsibility. Unidentified gunmen attacked the gional stability within the Sahel, but
Load more

Recommended publications
  • From Operation Serval to Barkhane
    same year, Hollande sent French troops to From Operation Serval the Central African Republic (CAR) to curb ethno-religious warfare. During a visit to to Barkhane three African nations in the summer of 2014, the French president announced Understanding France’s Operation Barkhane, a reorganization of Increased Involvement in troops in the region into a counter-terrorism Africa in the Context of force of 3,000 soldiers. In light of this, what is one to make Françafrique and Post- of Hollande’s promise to break with colonialism tradition concerning France’s African policy? To what extent has he actively Carmen Cuesta Roca pursued the fulfillment of this promise, and does continued French involvement in Africa constitute success or failure in this rançois Hollande did not enter office regard? France has a complex relationship amid expectations that he would with Africa, and these ties cannot be easily become a foreign policy president. F cut. This paper does not seek to provide a His 2012 presidential campaign carefully critique of President Hollande’s policy focused on domestic issues. Much like toward France’s former African colonies. Nicolas Sarkozy and many of his Rather, it uses the current president’s predecessors, Hollande had declared, “I will decisions and behavior to explain why break away from Françafrique by proposing a France will not be able to distance itself relationship based on equality, trust, and 1 from its former colonies anytime soon. solidarity.” After his election on May 6, It is first necessary to outline a brief 2012, Hollande took steps to fulfill this history of France’s involvement in Africa, promise.
    [Show full text]
  • Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Dynamics in Mali
    MC Chartrand Map of Mali and neighbouring countries. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Dynamics in Mali by Ismaël Fournier Ismaël Fournier is a former infantryman with the operations. Key to these groups’ freedom of movement and 3rd Battalion of the Royal 22nd Regiment, who deployed with them to freedom of action is their access to geographical lines of com- Bosnia in 2001, and then to Kabul and Kandahar in Afghanistan in munication and to the civilian population. The former allows 2004 and 2007 respectively. Severely wounded in an IED explosion insurgents to move from their bases of operation to their objec- during the latter deployment, and after multiple restorative surger- tives, the latter will provide intelligence, recruits, food, and, in ies, Ismaël made a professional change to the military intelligence some cases, safe havens for the insurgents. VEO leaders will branch. Since then, he completed a baccalaureate, a master’s frequently deploy overseers in the villages to control the popu- degree, and a PH. D from Laval University in history. Leaving the lation and impose their will on the villagers. In other instances, armed forces in 2019, he is currently employed by the Department insurgents will come and go as they please in undefended villages of National Defence as am analyst specializing in strategy and to preach radical Islam, impose Sharia law and collect whatever tactics related to insurgencies and counter-insurgencies. they require. Introduction Part of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations will aim to deny insurgents access to villages via the deployment of static security ince the launch of the Tuareg rebellion in 2012, forces that will remain in the populated areas to protect the civil- violent extremist organisations (VEOs) have been ians.
    [Show full text]
  • The Sahel Alliance
    POLICY BRIEF DISORDER FROM CHAOS: WHY EUROPEANS FAIL TO PROMOTE STABILITY IN THE SAHEL Andrew Lebovich August 2020 SUMMARY France, Germany, and Sahel countries launched the Sahel Alliance in 2017 with the aim of bringing together major international donors to better coordinate development assistance and other financing efforts for the region. The Alliance aimed to integrate security, development, and governance perspectives but has struggled to find coherence and effectiveness – although it has adopted some novel approaches. The worsening security situation in the Sahel led international actors to then set up new initiatives, including the Partnership for Security and Stability in the Sahel and, more recently, the Coalition for the Sahel. However, the relationship between these initiatives remains largely theoretical, with the practicalities of cooperation and burden sharing yet to be fully defined. These new initiatives risk privileging security solutions to complex problems, meaning that necessary governance reforms may fall by the wayside. This is despite widespread acknowledgement, including from senior French officials, that there is no purely military solution to the varied conflicts and challenges in the Sahel. Introduction Hopes were high when French President Emmanuel Macron announced the creation of the Sahel Alliance at a G5 meeting in Nouakchott, Mauritania in July 2017. The new alliance’s goal was for France and Germany, along with other international partners, to play a more effective role in improving stability in the Sahel by bringing development concerns together with security and governance work. The activities of the Sahel Alliance since its formation demonstrate some of the wide-ranging ambitions of European and international policy in the region.
    [Show full text]
  • Niger: Frequently Asked Questions About the October 2017 Attack on U.S
    Niger: Frequently Asked Questions About the October 2017 Attack on U.S. Soldiers Alexis Arieff, Coordinator Specialist in African Affairs Lauren Ploch Blanchard Specialist in African Affairs Andrew Feickert Specialist in Military Ground Forces Kathleen J. McInnis Analyst in International Security John W. Rollins Specialist in Terrorism and National Security Matthew C. Weed Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation October 27, 2017 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R44995 Niger: Frequently Asked Questions About the October 2017 Attack on U.S. Soldiers Summary A deadly attack on U.S. soldiers in Niger and their local counterparts on October 4, 2017, has prompted many questions from Members of Congress about the incident. It has also highlighted a range of broader issues for Congress pertaining to oversight and authorization of U.S. military deployments, evolving U.S. global counterterrorism activities and strategy, interagency security assistance and cooperation efforts, and U.S. engagement with countries historically considered peripheral to core U.S. national security interests. This report provides background information in response to the following frequently asked questions: What is the security situation in Niger? How big is the U.S. military presence in Niger? For what purposes are U.S. military personnel in Niger, and what role has Congress played in the U.S. military presence there? Is the U.S. military presence in Niger related to the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)? What is the state of U.S.-Niger relations and aid? Where else in Africa are U.S. military personnel deployed? Medical evacuation: What is the “golden hour” and does it apply to troop deployments in Africa? What are the broader implications of building partner capacity in Niger for DOD? Who were the four U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • The Transmutation of Jihadi Organizations in the Sahel and the Regional Security Architecture
    No. 10, April 2018 FUTURE NOTES THE TRANSMUTATION OF JIHADI ORGANIZATIONS IN THE SAHEL AND THE REGIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE Djallil Lounnas This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation programme under grant agreement No 693244 Middle East and North Africa Regional Architecture: Mapping Geopolitical Shifts, regional Order and Domestic Transformations FUTURE NOTES No. 10, April 2018 THE TRANSMUTATION OF JIHADI ORGANIZATIONS IN THE SAHEL AND THE REGIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE Djallil Lounnas1 In March 2017, the four most powerful jihadi organizations in the Sahel, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar al-Din, Al-Mourabitoun and Katibat Macina – the latter three linked directly or indirectly to Al-Qaeda – announced their unification and the creation of the Jama’a Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimin’ (JNIM) also known as Group in Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM), under the leadership of Iyad Ag Ghali. This unification ended the factionalism that had long characterized jihadi organizations in the region and gave birth to what can be considered as one of the most powerful Al-Qaeda affiliates. The creation of the GSIM is especially dangerous in view of the fact that the Sahelian sub-regional system is composed of weak states unable to quell the jihadi threat and geographically linked to Libya, a collapsed state and considered a safe haven for jihadi organizations, in spite of the presence of the international community, especially the French military operation Barkhane. Even more dangerous is the presence of an affiliate of the Islamic State, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) led by Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, an organization which, although on the surface appearing to be the main rival of the GSIM, has been following a strategy of rapprochement with Iyad Ag Ghali.
    [Show full text]
  • Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain
    SECTION VI UAS / UAV HOSTILE USE & COUNTERMEASURES R. K. Nichols, J.J.C.H. Ryan, H.C. Mumm, W.D. Lonstein, C. Carter, and J.P. Hood | 351 Chapter 15: Africa - World’s First Busiest Drone Operational Proving Ground Student Learning Objectives – Africa has become the drone investment -playground of many nations. The student will be introduced to activities of these geopolitical players (US, France, EU, Germany, Egypt and China) and the significance of their intentions. The history of drone investments / operations in Africa is directly a function of the growth of terrorist organizations and African economy. Africa – Overview Africa is a developing continent comprised of unstable states due to undeveloped economy, poor education, and unified government among the states. Africa’s leaders want to see their country develop and become a world leader. They look to their long-term allies to solve their issues. Radical Islam continues to spread and threaten the future of Africa. With the turbulence of state’s government, insurgence groups have joined forces with terrorist organizations affili- ated with radical Islam. Radical Islamic extremists are a global security threat. Therefore, sev- eral countries fighting terror at home are also assisting Africa in the fight on terror. A priority goal of many African leaders is to defeat terrorism. They feel this can be achieved by stopping terrorist organizations membership growth. Conflict on land is not the only issue facing Africa, maritime security is a huge factor in Africa’s economic growth. Other countries willingly assist Africa in protecting their waterways to reap the benefits of trade and profit.
    [Show full text]
  • Report of the Secretary-General
    United Nations S/2018/432 Security Council Distr.: General 8 May 2018 Original: English Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel Report of the Secretary-General I. Introduction 1. By its resolution 2391 (2017) of 8 December 2017, the Security Council welcomed the progress achieved in making the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel fully operational and requested me to take the steps necessary to conclude a technical agreement between the United Nations, the European Union and the States members of Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel), with a view to providing operational and logistical support to the Joint Force through the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). 2. The Council also requested me, in close coordination with the States members of G-5 Sahel and the African Union, to report on the activities of the Joint Force, focusing on progress in making it operational, international support for it, the implementation of the technical agreement, challenges encountered and the implementation by the G-5 Sahel countries of a human rights and international humanitarian law compliance framework and the human rights due diligence policy. II. Operationalization of the Joint Force 3. Pursuant to resolution 2391 (2017), the States members of G-5 Sahel, the United Nations and the European Union, at the margins of the international high-level conference for the Sahel, held in Brussels on 23 February 2018, signed a technical agreement defining the scope and scale of United Nations support for the Joint Force through MINUSMA.
    [Show full text]
  • Rethinking the Response to Jihadist Groups Across the Sahel
    Research Rethinking the response Paper to jihadist groups across Africa Programme the Sahel March 2021 Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, is a world-leading policy institute based in London. Our mission is to help governments and societies build a sustainably secure, prosperous and just world. Contents Summary 2 01 Introduction 3 02 Governments and armies in the Sahel: structural failures 6 03 The case of northern Mali 10 04 Niger: a counterexample 14 05 The role of local militia groups 18 06 The limitations of proxy warfare 20 07 Conclusion: the end of military cooperation? 24 About the author 27 Acknowledgments 27 1 Chatham House Summary — Rather than the ideology of global jihad, the driving force behind the emergence and resilience of non-state armed groups in the Sahel is a combination of weak states, corruption and the brutal repression of dissent, embodied in dysfunctional military forces. — The dominant narrative of a global jihadi threat has overshadowed the reality of the key role played by military nepotism, prevarication and indiscipline in generating and continuing conflict in the Sahel – problems that long predated the ‘war on terror’. Moreover, it has pushed the international community to intervene to regulate local conflicts that have little to do with global terrorism or religious indoctrination. — Mali offers a clear example of this. The widespread use of poorly controlled militias, the collapse of its army, two coups – in 2012 and 2020 – and a weak state presence in rural areas, on top of a history of repression and abuse suffered by its northern population, has done much more to drive the growth of insurgent groups than did the fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya in 2011, Salafist indoctrination, or alleged support from Arab countries.
    [Show full text]
  • The Roots of Mali's Conflict
    The roots of Mali’s conflict The roots Mali’s of The roots of Mali’s conflict Moving beyond the 2012 crisis CRU Report Grégory Chauzal Thibault van Damme The roots of Mali’s conflict Moving beyond the 2012 crisis Grégory Chauzal Thibault van Damme CRU report March 2015 The Sahel Programme is supported by March 2015 © Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright holders. About the authors Grégory Chauzal is a senior research fellow at Clingendael’s Conflict Research Unit. He specialises in Mali/Sahel issues and develops the Maghreb-Sahel Programme for the Institute. Thibault Van Damme works for Clingendael’s Conflict Research Unit as a project assistant for the Maghreb-Sahel Programme. About CRU The Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ is a think tank and diplomatic academy on international affairs. The Conflict Research Unit (CRU) is a specialized team within the Institute, conducting applied, policy-oriented research and developing practical tools that assist national and multilateral governmental and non-governmental organizations in their engagement in fragile and conflict-affected situations. Clingendael Institute P.O. Box 93080 2509 AB The Hague The Netherlands Email: [email protected] Website: http://www.clingendael.nl/ Table of Contents Acknowledgements 6 Executive summary 8 Introduction 10 1. The 2012 crisis: the fissures of a united insurrection 10 2. A coup in the south 12 3.
    [Show full text]
  • The United Nations Foundation Team Traveled to Bamako, Gao, And
    The United Nations Foundation team traveled to Bamako, Gao, and Timbuktu from September 16-26, 2018, to learn more about the United Nations Integrated Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). During our visit, we met with more than 50 UN officials, civil society groups, Western diplomats, and international forces including leadership in MINUSMA, Barkhane, and the G5 Sahel Joint Force. Below you will find our observations. Background The landlocked country of Mali, once a French colony and a cultural hub of West Africa, was overrun in January 2012 by a coalition of Tuareg and terrorist groups moving south towards the capital of Bamako. At the time, the Tuareg movement (MNLA) in northern Mali held legitimate grievances against the government and aligned itself with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar Dine (Defenders of Faith), the Islamic militants and jihadists in the region. Simultaneously, a mutiny of soldiers launched a military coup d’ etat led by Captain Amadou Sonogo, who took power from then President Amadou Toumani Touré and dissolved government institutions, consequently leading to a complete collapse of institutions in the northern part of the country. This Tuareg movement declared Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu an Independent State of Azawad by April 2012. However, soon after, the Tuareg move- ment was pushed out by the jihadists, Ansar Dine and Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO).1 In the early days of the conflict, the UN and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) put together a power-sharing framework which led to the resignation of President Toure. Dioncounda Traoré was subsequently appointed interim President and a transitional government was established.
    [Show full text]
  • The Successful Legitimization of the French Interventions in Sahel
    The successful legitimization of the French interventions in Sahel Félix Tanvé International Relations Dept. of Global Political Studies Bachelor programme – IR103L 15 credits thesis Spring semester 2020 Supervisor: Derek S. Hutcheson Student name: Félix Tanvé Personal Number: 960703-1797 Abstract This thesis aims to contribute to the scholarship of International Relations (IR) by researching the processes that lie at the heart of military interventions and their legitimization through the lens of securitization theory. Focusing on the case of the French operations Serval and Barkhane in Sahel. This study builds on the contention that securitization is best applicable to military interventions in the form of a sequential model that distinguish three steps: the stage of identification, the stage of mobilization and the stage of desecuritization. Coupled with a qualitative content analysis it becomes a redoubtable tool to uncover the construction of legitimization. Word Count: 12,900 2 Student name: Félix Tanvé Personal Number: 960703-1797 Table of Contents 1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 5 1.1 Interest of study and aim. ..................................................................................................... 5 1.2 Research question and proposition ....................................................................................... 6 1.3 Thesis outline ...........................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Sahel Europe’S Forever War?
    March 2021 The Sahel Europe’s forever war? By Katherine Pye The Sahel: Europe’s forever war? By Katherine Pye Violence in the Sahel region of Africa has been continual for nine years. Despite the long-term involvement of the EU and France, the conflict has continued to escalate, spreading from Mali to Niger and Burkina Faso, costing thousands of civilian lives every year. The region is of strategic interest to Europe: a large number of migrants to the EU come from the Sahel or transit through it. It also hosts a sizeable presence of armed Islamist groups affiliated with al-Qaida and Islamic State (IS). But the Sahel also matters for Europe’s credibility as a crisis manager. Having invested money and political capital in the region, the EU must now prove that it is capable of solving complex problems in its own backyard. The violence first began in northern Mali in 2012, and was instigated by Tuareg insurgents who were briefly supported by jihadist groups. Since 2015 new intercommunal conflicts have festered in central Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Jihadist groups have taken advantage of ethnic tensions to increase their membership. Europe’s current military-focused approach, pioneered by France in 2013, has achieved little more than a string of tactical victories against jihadists in the past eight years. By supporting governments that are feared and mistrusted by many of their citizens, Europe may be undermining its own aim of curbing violence. In 2020, more civilians were killed by national security forces than jihadist groups in Mali and Burkina Faso.
    [Show full text]