(Economics 279), Instructor: Muriel Niederle
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Graduate Experimental Economics (Economics 279), Instructor: Muriel Niederle (Economics 334 , Phone: 723 7359; [email protected], www.stanford.edu/~niederle Office hours: by appointment (but feel free to make an appointment!) Class webpage: coursework There is no textbook, but a useful book to have is: The Handbook of Experimental Economics, John Kagel and Alvin E. Roth, editors, Princeton University Press, 1995. Other interesting books are: Colin Camerer, Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction, Princeton University Press, April 2003. Advances in Behavioral Economics, Colin F. Camerer, George Loewenstein, Matthew Rabin, editors, Princeton University Press, February 2004. There will also be supplementary readings, particularly as the course progresses. This course will be an introduction to experimental economics, its methods, and some of the major subject areas that have been addressed by laboratory experiments. An effort will be made to concentrate on series of experiments, in order to see how experiments build on one another and allow researchers with different theoretical dispositions to narrow the range of potential disagreement. 1 The following is a rough guide to the topics that will be discussed in the quarter—it is subject to revision as we see how the class progresses (some topics may take more or less than one lecture). Methods and Introduction: • Roth, Alvin E. "The Early History of Experimental Economics." Journal of the History of Economic Thought,1993, 15(2), pp. 184-209. • Samuelson, Larry. Economic Theory and Experimental Economics. Journal of Economic Literature, 2005, 43(1), pp. 65-107. • Rabin, Matthew. Psychology and Economics. Journal of Economic Literature, 1998, 36(1), pp. 11-46. • Hertwig, Ralph and Andreas Ortmann. Experimental Practices in Economics: A Methodological Challenge for Psychologists? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2001, 24(3), pp. 383-402. • Kahneman, Daniel. Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics. American Economic Review, 2003, 93(5), pp. 1449-1475. • Binmore, Ken. Economic Man or Straw Man? Commentary on Heinrich, et al. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2005, 28, pp. 815-818. • Roth, Alvin E. "Let’s Keep the Con out of Experimental Econ.: A Methodological Note." Empirical Economics, 1994, 19(2), pp. 279-289. Lecture 1: Behavioral Preferences, Eliciting Valuations Endowment Effect • * Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler 1990, “Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem,” JPE, 98, 6, 1325-1348. • * Kahneman, D., J. Knetsch and R. Thaler. “Anamolies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and the Status Quo Bias.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1991, 5(1), pp. 193-206. • Knetsch, Jack L. “The Endowment Effect and Evidence Nonreversible Indifference Curves.” American Economic Review, 1989, 79(5), pp. 1277-1284. • * List, John A. "Preference Reversals of a Different Kind: The More is Less Phenomenon," American Economic Review (2002), 92 (5): pp. 1636-1643. • List, J.A. “Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (2003), 118(1), pp. 41-71. • Charles Plott and Kathryn Zeiler “Asymmetries in Exchange Behavior Incorrectly Interpreted as Evidence of Prospect Theory” AER, 2004. • Harbaugh, William T., Kate Krause and Lise Vesterlund. “Are Adults Better Behaved Than Children? Age, Experience, and the Endowment Effect.” Economics Letters, 2001, (70)2, pp. 175-181. • Morewedge, C. M., Shu, L. L., Gilbert, D. T., & Wilson, T. D. (2009). Bad riddance or good rubbish? Ownership and not loss aversion causes the endowment effect. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 947–951. 2 Lecture 2 & 3 Behavioral Preferences • * Dan Ariely, George Loewenstein and Drazen Prelec (2003), “Coherent Arbitrariness: Stable Demand Curves without Stable Preferences,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, No.118 (1), (February), 73-105. • Kahneman, Daniel, Peter Wakker and Rakesh Sarin, 1997, “Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility”, Quarterly Journal of Economics. • Kahneman, Daniel, Barbara L. Fredrickson, Charles Schreiber and Donald Redelmeier, “When more pain is preferred to less: Adding a better end”, Psychological Science, Vol 4, No 6, November 1993, 401-405. • Thaler, Richard “The Psychology of Choice and the Assumptions of Economics,” in A.E. Roth, editor, Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: Six Points of View,” Cambridge University Press, 1987. • Lichtenstein, Sarah and Paul Slovic. “Reversals of Preference Between Bids and Choices in Gambling Situations,” Journal of Experimental Psychology, 89, Jan. 1971, pp. 46-55. • Lichtenstein, Sarah and Paul Slovic. “Response-induced Reversals of Preference in Gambling: An Extended Replication in Las Vegas,” Journal of Experimental Psychology, 101, Nov. 1973 pp. 16-20. • Grether, David M. and Charles R. Plott. "Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomenon," American Economic Review, 69, Sept. 1979, pp. 623-38. See also • Thaler, Richard and Cass Sunstein. “Libertarian Paternalism.” American Economic Review, 2003, 93(2), pp. 175-179. Papers that came up through discussion in class: An experiment on commitment: • Burger, Nick, Gary Charness and John Lynham Three Field Experiments on Studying and Procrastination, working paper. Prospect Theory • Thaler, Richard “The Psychology of Choice and the Assumptions of Economics,” in A.E. Roth, editor, Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: Six Points of View,” Cambridge University Press, 1987. • * Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. Prospect theory: An analysis of decisions under risk. Econometrica, 1979, 47, 313-327 • Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. "Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty." Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (1992): 297-323. • * Rabin, Matthew, “Risk Aversion and Expected Utility Theory: A calibration Exercise”, Econometrica, vol. 68, No. 5, September 2000, 1281-1292. • * Rabin and Thaler (2001), “Risk Aversion,” Journal of Economic Perspectives. 3 • Palacios-Huerta and Serrano question the data in "Rejecting Small Gambles under Expected Utility,“ Economics Letters 91, (2006), 250-259. • Harbaugh, Krause, and Vesterlund, “The Fourfold Pattern of Risk Attitudes in Choice and Pricing Tasks,” forthcoming, Economic Journal. • Ralph Hertwig, Greg Barron, Elke U. Weber, and Ido Erev, in "Decisions from Experience and the Effect of Rare Events in Risky Choices." Psychological Science 15, 2004 Lecture 3&4: Incentives • * Gneezy, U., and A. Rustichini "A Fine is a Price," Journal of Legal Studies, vol. XXIX, 1, part 1, 2000, 1-18. • * Gneezy, U., and A. Rustichini "Pay Enough or Don't Pay At All" Quarterly Journal of Economics August 2000, 791-810. • Gneezy, U., “The W effect of Incentives”, working paper. • Ariely, D., U. Gneezy, G. Loewenstein and N. Mazar (2008) “Large Stakes and Big Mistakes.” Forthcoming in the Review of Economic Studies. Lecture 4: Coordination games • Cachon, Gerard P., and Colin F. Camerer. February 1996. "Loss-Avoidance and Forward Induction in Experimental Coordination Games." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 165-94. • Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil "Asset Markets as an Equilibrium Selection Mechanism: coordination failure, game form auctions, and forward induction." Games and Economic Behavior, 5(3), July 1993, 485-504. • Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil "Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(3), August 1991, 885-911. • * Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil "Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure," American Economic Review, March 1990, 234-248. Lecture 5: Guessing Game • Nagel, Rosemarie, "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study,” American Economic Review 85(5), (1995) 1313-1326. • Ho, Teck, Colin F. Camerer, and Keith Weigelt. September 1998. "Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best-Response in Experimental 'p-beauty contests'." American Economic Review, 88, 947-69. • Bosch-Domènech, Antoni, Jose García-Montalvo, Rosemarie Nagel, and Albert Satorra "One, Two, (Three), Infinity…: Newspaper and Lab Beauty-Contest Experiments,"” American Economic Review December 2002. • Grosskopf, Brit and Rosemarie Nagel "The Two-Person Beauty Contest,” Games and Economic Behavior, 62 (1), 2008, pp. 93 - 99. 4 From the in class Discussion • Antonio Merlo and Andrew Schotter, “Learning By Not Doing: An Experimental Study", Games and Economic Behavior , 2003. • David Cooper and John Kagel “Are Two Heads Better than One? Team versus Individual Play in Signaling Games,” American Economic Review, vol 95, 2005. Lecture 5: Nash Bargaining Games • Roth, A.E. and Malouf, M.K. "Game-Theoretic Models and the Role of Information in Bargaining", Psychological Review, Vol. 86, 1979, 574-594. • Roth, A.E. and Murnighan, J.K. "The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study," Econometrica, Vol. 50, 1982, 1123-1142. • Roth, Murnighan and Schoumaker, "The Deadline Effect in Bargaining: Some Experimental Evidence," AER, 1988. • Roth, A.E. and Schoumaker, F. "Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining: An Experimental Study", American Economic Review, Vol. 73, 1983, 362-372. Lecture 6: Oct 7: Guest Lecture: Charles Sprenger • Jim Andreoni and Charles Sprenger, “Estimating Time Preferences with Convex Budgets” • Jim Andreoni and Charles Sprenger, “Risk Preferences Are Not Time Preferences” Lecture 7: Sequential Bargaining Games and Self-Serving Bias • Babcock, Loewenstein, Isacharoff and Camerer,