IP 39
Agenda Item: ATCM 11, CEP 10 Presented by: Australia Original: English
Australian Antarctic Treaty and Environmental Protocol inspections January 2010
Attachments: Report of Australian inspections 2010.pdf 1
Antarctic Treaty – Australian Inspection Team 2010
AUSTRALIAN ANTARCTIC TREATY INSPECTIONS January 2010
Syowa Station (Japan) Molodezhnaya, Druzhnaya IV and Soyuz Stations (Russian Federation) Mount Harding Antarctic Specially Protected Area (ASPA) 168
Report of an Inspection under Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty and Article 14 of the Protocol on Environment Protection
May 2011
REPORT OF AN INSPECTION UNDER ARTICLE VII OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY AND ARTICLE 14 OF THE PROTOCOL ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
1. Introduction
2. Overview 2.1 Conduct of the inspections
3. Acknowledgments
4. Molodezhnaya station (Russian Federation) 4.1 General information 4.2 Observations 4.3 Other comments
5. Syowa Station (Japan) 5.1 General information 5.2 Observations 5.3 Other comments
6. Druzhnaya IV Station (Russian Federation) 6.1 General information 6.2 Observations 6.3 Other comments
7. Soyuz Station (Russian Federation) 7.1 General information 7.2 Observations 7.3 Other comments
8. Mount Harding ASPA 168
9. Photographs 9.1 Molodezhnaya Station 9.2 Syowa Station 9.3 Druzhnaya IV Station 9.4 Soyuz Station 9.5 Mount Harding ASPA 168
1. INTRODUCTION
Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty provides that each Consultative Party has the right to designate observers to undertake inspections in Antarctica. Observers have complete freedom of access at any time to any and all areas in Antarctica. Parties are obliged to have all areas of Antarctica, including stations, installations and equipment, open at all times to inspection by designated observers. This also applies to all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel in Antarctica. The provision for inspection is a key element of the Treaty and is designed to promote the objectives of the Treaty and ensure observance of its provisions.
Article 14 of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (the Protocol) also provides for the conduct of inspections, consistent with Article VII of the Treaty, to promote protection of the Antarctic environment and ensure compliance with the Protocol. The Protocol requires that reports of inspections are sent to the Parties whose facilities are subject to inspection and that, after those Parties have been given the opportunity to comment, the report and any comments on it are circulated to the Committee on Environmental Protection, considered at the next Treaty meeting and then made publicly available.
This was the seventh inspection program undertaken by Australia since the entry into force of the Treaty in 1961, and the third by Australia since the entry into force of the Protocol in 1998.
2. OVERVIEW
2.1 Conduct of the inspections
The Australian inspection team conducted inspections in East Antarctica over a ten day period from 9 to 18 January 2010. The Australian team comprised:
Ms Lyn Maddock, Australian Antarctic Division (AAD) Mr Tom Maggs, Strategies Branch, AAD Mr Peter Nagy, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
The inspections and aerial observations were conducted under the provisions of Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty and Article 14 of its Protocol on Environmental Protection (the Protocol). In accordance with Article VII of the Treaty, all Parties to the Antarctic Treaty were notified, in advance, of the names of the members of the Australian observer team. In order to facilitate the conduct of the inspections, the team included a speaker of Russian and Japanese.
The activities of the observer team in Antarctica were subject to an authorisation in accordance with sections 12E and 12F of Australia’s Antarctic Treaty (Environment Protection) Act 1980 which implements the obligations of the Protocol in Australia’s domestic law. The inspection team was also subject to a permit issued under section 9 of that same Act, for entry into Mount Harding Antarctic Specially Protected Area (ASPA)168. This permit was carried by the inspection team on the visit to the ASPA.
The Australian observer team: conducted an aerial observation of Molodezhnaya Station (Russian Federation) on 9 January 2010, as provided for under Article VII(4) of the Antarctic Treaty; inspected Syowa Station (Japan) on 9-11 January 2010; inspected Druzhnaya IV Station (Germany) on 13 January 2010; inspected Soyuz Station (Russian Federation) on 18 January 2010; and, inspected the Mount Harding Antarctic Specially Protected Area (ASPA) 168 in the Grove Mountains, Princess Elizabeth Land on 19 January 2010.
The inspection team flew to Australia’s Wilkins runway near Casey Station on Australia’s airlink Airbus A319, then to Davis Station (Australia) and inspection sites using the AAD’s ski-equipped CASA 212 fixed-wing turboprop, and Sikorsky S-72 helicopter.
The members of the team also visited the Larsemann Hills, where Australia operates a summer facility, conducts scientific activity, and is an active participant in Antarctic Specially Managed Area 6. The team met with personnel at Zhongshan station (China), at Progress station (Russian Federation), and at the site of India’s proposed new station. This visit was to enhance management coordination and cooperation between Australia and other nations active in the area, consistent with the objectives of the ASMA management plan. The visit to the Larsemann Hills did not include formal inspection activities.
In conducting the inspections the observer team was guided by the inspection checklists adopted under Resolution 5 (1995). The observers also looked at activities not covered by the checklists. The observers carried with them information exchanged by the Japanese and Russian Governments in accordance with Article VII.5 of the Antarctic Treaty.
In accordance with Article 14(4) of the Protocol, copies of the reports were provided to the Russian Federation and Japan for comment. Comments were received from Japan and have been incorporated into this final version of the inspection report presented to ATCM XXXIV.
3. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Australia extends its gratitude to the Russian Federation and Japan for their cooperation and assistance with the conduct of these inspections, and for the kind and hospitable welcome provided at Syowa and Druzhnaya IV Stations.
Australia thanks Japan for hosting the inspection team at Syowa Station, providing skiway access and aircraft communications support, local area helicopter transport, and fuel. 4. MOLODEZHNAYA STATION (RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
4.1 General information
Molodezhnaya Station is located at 67°40.30'S, 45°23.00'E, on the western coast of Enderby Land. It comprises numerous large buildings, mostly elevated above ground and connected by site services.
Australia contacted Russia in the planning phase of the inspection tour to determine the state and availability of the Molodezhnaya skiway. Russia advised Australia that the station would be unoccupied and the skiway likely unusable. Russia’s COMNAP data notes that the station is temporarily closed. It was decided to observe the station from the air in accordance with Article VII (4) of the Antarctic Treaty. Molodezhnaya Station has been inspected twice in the past, in 1966-1967, and in 1982-1983, in both instances by the USA.
4.2 Observations
An aerial observation of Molodezhnaya Station was conducted on 9 January 2010 from a CASA 212 aircraft. Inspectors were able to obtain a clear view of the station from the aircraft rear ramp. At the time of the aerial observation, there was considerable snow and ice cover evident around and between buildings, facilities and site services. Numerous low-level, low-speed passes were made over the station to allow observation and photography.
The observers concluded in general that the station buildings and infrastructure appear to be largely intact. It was not possible to make conclusions in detail regarding the condition of fuel storages, although wind scouring around the bulk fuel storage tanks allowed a view of the ground immediately around the tanks, and while no evidence of secondary containment could be seen, no damage or spillage was evident. Inspectors estimated the capacity of the tanks at in excess of 100 000 litres each.
No structural building damage was evident from the observations or the photographs. It is noted however that the inspection was conducted in mid January, when the summer melt might be expected to be approaching its peak. However, there remained extensive snow cover throughout the station complex and in several cases snow partially buried buildings and pipework.
The inspection team concluded that, should the station area continue to accumulate snow while it is temporarily closed, it is likely that some water ingress to buildings will occur during future summers, hastening deterioration, as has been the case at other stations in Antarctica. Continued freeze-thaw cycling is likely to rapidly render buildings uninhabitable, and to split pipes.
Additional structures and equipment were observed in a complex situated some 12km to the southeast of the station area, understood by the observers to be the site of the former intercontinental runway.
The structures and aircraft in this location were substantially buried by snow.
4.3 Other comments
Australia recognises that the information which can be obtained by aerial observation is limited, but regards the observation activity as valuable, particularly given the size and complexity of Molodezhnaya Station and associated facilities, and its status as temporarily unoccupied.
The observers assess that, based on what could be seen from the air, considerable effort would need to be expended to bring Molodezhnaya Station as a whole into a fully operational capacity, and to ensure that buildings and facilities are not deteriorating to a point where environmental harm becomes a risk.
A comprehensive set of photographs and has been supplied to the Russian Federation to assist with managing the station associated facilities at Molodezhnaya, and with planning future activities.
5. SYOWA STATION (JAPAN)
5.1 General Information
Japan’s Syowa station is located on East Ongul Island, approximately 4 km from the Soya Coast of Dronning Maud Land at 69°00.37'S 39°35.40'E. The station was opened in 1957 to continue work begun during the IGY, and has been continuously occupied since, except for one interruption (1962-65) whilst the icebreaker ‘Soya’ was replaced. Syowa Station comprises 51 buildings of varying age and design, mostly connected by above ground site services, on an exposed rock and gravel site spanning 13 hectares. Syowa Station has been inspected three times in the past, in 1966-1967, 1982-1983, and 1994-1995, on each occasion by the USA.
As the inspection party was hosted at Syowa for three days, the station leader provided a general induction to the station and its procedures, including a safety briefing. The station leader of the outgoing contingent (Japanese Antarctic Research Expedition (JARE) 50) had completed an inspection checklist in anticipation of the inspection visit, greatly facilitating the guided tour and the discussion, which was conducted in English and in Japanese, supported by the inspection party’s interpreter and greatly assisted by the English fluency of several JARE members.
The station leader and his JARE 51 replacement were senior Japanese academics, administering and supported by some 25-28 expedition personnel from each of the overlapping winter contingents.
Syowa has a clear focus on science, in particular atmospheric and upper-atmospheric physics, with numerous antenna arrays supporting long-term experiments. In addition the station supports ongoing programs in geology, biology, oceanography, and geosciences.
The Station Leader elaborated on the three themes of Japan’s 6-year science strategy to 2011: Global Warming per se, in relation to the ice cap, and in relation to ocean coupling. Eleven scientists, including 5 meteorology personnel and the Station Leader, had wintered through 2009.
5.2 Observations
The inspection team observed that the Syowa Station’s buildings and vehicles span many decades in age and show adaptation to the changing standards of habitation and environmental management.
A cleanup program was underway to remove waste material from a recent fire, accumulated fuel drums, building remains and general waste. The inspection team was advised that further station cleanup activity is planned for 2011 and beyond.
Water is drawn from a nearby tarn fed by summer meltwater and treated by reverse osmosis. Waste water and sewage is processed in an aerated wastewater treatment plant, with effluent monitored monthly and discharged to sea, and sludge containerised and shipped to Japan for disposal.
The station is powered by two diesel generators run alternately, backed up by two emergency generators with 860 000 litres of vehicle and generator fuel stored in bunded tanks, each of 100 000 litres capacity or less. Fuel storages and associated facilities are checked weekly. Tanks, bunds and pipework appeared to be sound.
The inspection team observed signs of what appeared to be minor accumulated spills into rock and gravel at the vehicle refuelling point. A pilot wind-turbine was in operation but was not rotating under weak wind at the time of the inspection.
The inspection team was advised that the station does not possess firearms, explosives or radio isotopes. Military personnel are employed in support of resupply and building activities during summer.
5.3 Other comments
Station personnel are inducted and trained prior to departure in safety, first-aid and survival, as well as in Japan’s responsibilities and procedures under the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty and Japan’s implementing legislation. Emergency drills are undertaken monthly at the station.
Japan appears to face similar issues to other nations operating IGY-era stations, Australia included. They include the ability to manage activities within the existing station footprint; to minimise and manage wastes and clean up minor spills; to manage infrastructure of different ages and prevent material from entering the environment as a result of deterioration in the harsh climate; and to adapt existing infrastructure to increasingly stringent environmental and safety requirements. In the view of the inspection team, these issues are well recognised and provided for in the management plans and processes at Syowa.
The team was impressed by the commitment to science demonstrated by the JARE team and by the suitability of the station for scientific research. Japan’s commitment to ensuring environmental protection and minimising the impact of station operations was evident. The management systems in place for environmental protection and for safety were comprehensive.
6. DRUZHNAYA IV STATION (RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
6.1 General information
Druzhnaya IV is a seasonal station located on Landing Bluff at 59o 44’ S, 73o 42’E, on the coast of Sandefjord Cove, Ingrid Christensen Coast, in Princess Elisabeth Land, adjacent to the north-eastern edge of the Amery Ice Shelf. The station comprises sixteen small wooden structures and at the time of the inspection accommodated eight expeditioners, with a further 12 at outlying field camps. The station was inspected in 1976-1977 by the USA.
Druzhnaya IV supported mainly geoscience field programs at the time of the inspection including a small group working in the Vestfold Hills. The station is supported by ship and helicopter from Sandefjord Bay, and from Progress II station in the Larsemann Hills, some 100kms distant. The Station Leader advised that, while core facilities such as generator, kitchen/mess and communications huts remain, a number of the other huts are removed at the close of each summer season and returned as needed in subsequent seasons.
6.2 Observations
Electrical power is provided at the station by a diesel generator, with fuel delivered and stored in 200 litre drums. Since its establishment the station has accumulated a considerable number of empty drums in a nearby gully, and a project was underway to dig them out from the snow and remove them intact by helicopter to the resupply ship.
Other wastes are managed on site, with some putrescible wastes machine-dried before incineration in a closed (but not high-temperature) incinerator. Most other wastes are removed by relief voyages, generally contained in used fuel drums.
The inspection team observed that some drums containing food wastes, including eggshells, were unsecured against foraging by birds, notably skuas which appeared to be comfortably habituated to the human presence at the site. The inspectors considered that the risk of the introduction of disease to local bird populations warranted close attention to this aspect of waste management.
Human wastes and grey water are discharged to the sea untreated. Station occupancy is within the limits specified by Annex III to the Environmental Protocol for this practice.
There are no significant concentrations of wildlife nearby, but small numbers of several bird species were present in the area.
6.3 Other comments
The inspection team regarded the operation and management of the station as appropriate to the scale of activities that it supports. The team was pleased to see the station personnel working to recover and remove accumulated fuel drums.
7. SOYUZ STATION (RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
7.1 General information
Soyuz Station is located at 70o 35’ S, 68o 47’E on the exposed low rock ridge of Jetty Peninsula, Prince Charles Mountains, Mac.Robertson Land. The station is on the eastern shore of the freshwater Beaver Lake, in the south western corner of the Amery Ice Shelf. The Russian Federation’s COMNAP information indicates that the station was established in 1982, is a seasonal station that is temporarily closed. It comprises some twelve plywood huts in a line along the ridge. The station was unoccupied at the time of the inspection, and the inspection team did not see any evidence of use in recent years. The station has not previously been inspected.
7.2 Observations
The inspection team observed that most of the huts showed weather-related damage to some degree, and some contained substantial amounts of snow and ice.
The site appeared not to have been secured on the departure of the most recent occupants, with unsecured material including empty drums and open-top waste containers in several locations.
The inspection team observed some localised fuel or lubricant spills. De-laminating plywood, collapsed structural elements, broken windows, and failed door seals point to substantial further deterioration in the near future.
The inspection team assessed that there was a high risk of debris irretrievably entering the environment, and a substantial loss of utility as a seasonal station.
There were several outdoor piles of apparently obsolete or waste equipment as well as numerous open fuel drums containing solid partly burned wastes or liquid oily wastes.
The inspection team regarded these wastes as a high environmental risk to the ice free peninsula as well as to the adjacent freshwater ecosystems of Beaver Lake. Should those wastes enter the environment it is the view of the inspection team that they will not be recoverable, and the effects would be long-lasting.
7.3 Other comments
The inspection team did not have material or equipment to deal with the most immediate environmental threats as a first-aid response. The inspection team recommends that action be taken as a high priority to reduce the environmental hazard present at Soyuz Station, and to secure the structures against further deterioration or remove them and remediate the site.
A full set of photographs has been provided to the Russian Federation to assist with planning and conducting future activity at the site.
8. MOUNT HARDING ANTARCTIC SPECIALLY PROTECTED AREA (ASPA) 168
The Grove Mountains are located approximately 400 km south of the Larsemann Hills in Princess Elizabeth Land, at a surface elevation of around 2000 m. A large area including Mount Harding (around 120 km²) was adopted as Antarctic Specially Protected Area 168 at ATCM XXXI in 2008, principally to protect scientific, aesthetic and wilderness values. The area is characterised by steep nunataks, blue ice exposures, and geomorphological and glaciological features indicative of ice sheet advance and retreat.
The inspection team inspected the ASPA from the air, and made a short on-ground inspection by foot. The team gave consideration to the provisions of the management plan, and their suitability for the protection of the values of the area. The inspection team concluded that the provisions of the management plan remain appropriate. The team saw no evidence of non-compliance with the management plan. 9. PHOTOGRAPHS
9.1 Molodezhnaya Station
Figure 1: Molodezhnaya Station
Figure 2: Molodezhnaya Station
Figure 3: Building and meltwater
Figure 4: Large fuel tanks
Figure 5: Station area and fuel storage
Figure 6: Snow accumulation
Figure 7: Station buildings and fuel storage
Figure 8: Station buildings and meltwater
Figure 9: Station buildings and stored materials
Figure 10: Aircraft 9.2 Syowa Station
Figure 11: Syowa Station
Figure 12: Syowa Station
Figure 13: Laboratory
Figure 14: Station buildings
Figure 15: Station buildings
Figure 16: Waste sorting and management
Figure 17: Stored drums
Figure 18: Fuel storage
Figure 19: Stored materials
Figure 20: Pilot wind turbine
9.3 Druzhnaya IV Station
Figure 21: Druzhnaya IV Station
Figure 22: Druzhnaya IV Station
Figure 23: Inspection team with station personnel
Figure 24: Putrescible waste dryer
Figure 25: Fuel drums buried in snow
Figure 26: Fuel drum storage
9.4 Soyuz Station
Figure 27: Soyuz Station
Figure 28: Station buildings
Figure 29: Stored materials
Figure 30: Snow ingress
Figure 31: Snow in building
Figure 32: Drums and fuel storage
Figure 33: Waste in open drum
Figure 34: Oily liquid in open drum 9.5 Mount Harding ASPA 168
Figure 35: Mount Harding ASPA 168
Figure 35: Mount Harding ASPA 168