Dodig-2016-107 for Official Use Only
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Report No. DODIG-2016-107 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY U.S. Department of Defense InspectorJULY 5, 2016 General Advanced Arresting Gear Program Exceeded Cost and Schedule Baselines INTEGRITY EFFICIENCY ACCOUNTABILITY EXCELLENCE The document contains information that may be exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY INTEGRITY EFFICIENCY ACCOUNTABILITY EXCELLENCE Mission Our mission is to provide independent, relevant, and timely oversight of the Department of Defense that supports the warfighter; promotes accountability, integrity, and efficiency; advises the Secretary of Defense and Congress; and informs the public. Vision Our vision is to be a model oversight organization in the Federal Government by leading change, speaking truth, and promoting excellence—a diverse organization, working together as one professional team, recognized as leaders in our field. Fraud, Waste, & Abuse HOTLINE Department of Defense dodig.mil/hotline|800.424.9098 For more information about whistleblower protection, please see the inside back cover. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Advanced Arresting Gear Program Exceeded Cost Resultsand Schedule Baselinesin Brief July 5, 2016 Finding (cont’d) Objective As a result, major AAG system components required costly redesign, which delayed developmental testing and will Our objective was to determine whether further postpone delivery of the full AAG system capability the Navy was effectively managing the to the CVN-78 aircraft carrier. AAG hardware and software acquisition requirements and testing for the component failures and test site preparation led to the AAG Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) program. program exceeding the Acquisition Category I threshold The arresting gear is the system responsible for Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) for stopping aircraft while landing on the costs. As of October 2015, RDT&E costs for the AAG program flight deck of a carrier. total $743.5 million, which was $571.5 million above the Finding planned costs in the 2005 Acquisition Program Baseline. Developmental testing originally scheduled to end in FY 2009 will continue through FY 2018, and reliability of the system The Program Manager, Aircraft Launch and is uncertain. Recovery Equipment (PMA-251), did not Recommendations effectively manage the acquisition to meet requirements and execute testing for the AAG program. Ten years after the program We recommend the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for entered the engineering and manufacturing Research, Development, and Acquisition perform cost-benefit development phase, the Navy has not been analyses to determine whether the AAG is an affordable able to prove the capability or safety of solution for Navy aircraft carriers before deciding to go the system to a level that would permit forward with the system on future aircraft carriers. actual testing of the system on an aircraft carrier because of hardware failures We recommend the Program Manager, Aircraft Launch and and software challenges. This occurred Recovery Equipment, update the AAG Test and Evaluation because the Navy pursued a technological Master Plan to revise the planned test strategy, test schedule, solution for its Ford-class carriers that was developmental and operational funding, and add measures not sufficiently mature for the planned to support the program’s reliability growth plan before use, resulting in hardware failures to the Acquisition Category IC Acquisition Program Baseline mechanical and electrical components and is finalized. software modifications to accommodate Management Comments and those failures. Our Response In addition, the program manager did not revise the Test and Evaluation Master Plan to address significant changes to Comments from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy the test strategy and schedule. This for Research, Development, and Acquisition; and the occurred because redesign changes Program Manager, Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment, required significant revisions to AAG addressed all the specifics of the recommendations and no key components, and those changes further action is required. Please see the Recommendations took priority over updating the Test Table on the back of this page. and Evaluation Master Plan. Visit us at www.dodig.mil FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY i DODIG-2016-107 (Project No. D2015-D000AE-0191.000) │ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Recommendations Table Recommendations No Additional Management Requiring Comment Comments Required Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition 1 Program Manager, Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment 2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ii │ DODIG-2016-107 (Project No. D2015-D000AE-0191.000) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY INSPECTOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500 July 5, 2016 MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITIO N NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL SUBJECT: Advanced Arresting Gear Program Exceeded Cost and Schedule Baselines (Report No. DODIG-2016-107) We are providing this report for your information and use. We determined that the program manager did not effectively manage the Advanced Arresting Gear Program acquisition to meet requirements and execute testing. The Advanced Arresting Gear Program exceeded cost and schedule baselines because of hardware and software failures and test site preparation. We conducted this audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We considered management comments on a draft of this report when preparing the final report. DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Comments from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition and the Program Manager, Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment conformed to the requirements of DoD Instruction 7650.03; therefore, we do not require additional comments. We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at (703) 604-9077 (DSN 664-9077). CJ~arver~ Assistant Inspector General Acquisition and Sustainment Management FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY DODIG-2016-lC ~ iii FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Contents Introduction Objective ________________________________________________________________________________________1 Background _____________________________________________________________________________________1 FindinReview ofg. Internal Advanced Controls ___________________________________________________________________ Arresting Gear Exceeded Cost 6 and Schedule Baselines ________________________________________________________7 Mechanical and Electrical Components Required Redesign During Testing _____________8 Software Challenges __________________________________________________________________________ 10 Program Cost Challenges ____________________________________________________________________ 11 Developmental Testing May Delay Shipboard Testing ____________________________________ 12 Reliability of the AAG System Is Uncertain _________________________________________________ 15 Conclusion ____________________________________________________________________________________ 16 Management Comments on the Finding ____________________________________________________ 17 AppendixeRecommendations,s Management Comments, and Our Response ________________________ 17 Appendix A. Scope and Methodology ______________________________________________________ 19 Use of Computer-Processed Data _______________________________________________________ 20 Use of Technical Assistance _____________________________________________________________ 20 Prior Coverage ___________________________________________________________________________ 20 ManagementAppendix B. AAG Test Comment Schedule ____________________________________________________________s 21 Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, Glossaryand Acquisition Comments ______________________________________________________________ 22 Acronyms __________________________________________________________________________________ and Abbreviations 26 _____________________________________________ 29 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY iv │ DODIG-2016-107 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Introduction Introduction Objective Our objective was to determine whether the Navy was effectively managing the acquisition requirements and testing for the Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) program. See Appendix A for a discussion of our scope and methodology and prior coverage related to the audit objectives. See the Glossary for the definition of Backgroundtechnical terms used in the report. 1 The AAG program is a Major Defense Acquisition Program (Category IC ). During the audit, the program was in the engineering and manufacturing development phase of the acquisition process. The Milestone Decision Authority for the AAG is the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN [RDA]). The Navy developed the AAG system to replace the existing Mark-7 (MK-7) arresting gear. The purpose of the arresting gear is to stop aircraft after it lands on the aircraft carrier. The Milestone Decision Authority approved the AAG program entry into the engineering and manufacturing2 development phase on February 10, 2005, as an Acquisition Category II program. On June 15, 2015, the Navy notified the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) that the AAG program had exceeded the Acquisition Category I threshold