After Afghanistan: Canada’S Return to UN Peacekeeping
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ENGAGEMENT R E D EA L S U O I G LI E UN photo #313990 by John Isaac John by #313990 UN photo R United Nations Headquarters, New York City D AFTER AFGHANIstan: CANADA’S RETURN TO UN PEACEKEEPING by Michael Byers NG, AN Introduction “We need action not only to end the fighting but to make the peace.” BUILDI – Lester B. Pearson poken by Lester B. Pearson in 1956, these words grace the side of the peacekeeping monument in Ottawa. They also provide an insight into the true EACE S nature of this difficult and often dangerous task. P Pearson knew a great deal about war. He served in both 1 the army and air force during the First World War. During the NG, Second World War, he served as a diplomat in both London and Washington. During the Korean War, he served as PI Minister of External Affairs. When Pearson spoke about mak- ing the peace, he was drawing a distinction from two other types of missions: the defence of one’s country from outside attack, and forward-leaning interventions aimed at defeating opponents overseas. Professor Michael Byers, PhD, holds the Canada Research Chair in EACEKEE Global Politics and International Law at the University of British Columbia. The author of War Law and Intent for a Nation, he has been P Duncan Cameron/Library and Archives Canada/PA-212238 Archives and Cameron/Library Duncan a Professor of Law at Duke University and a Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford. He has also taught as a Visiting Professor at the Universities of The Honourable Lester B. Pearson as Prime Minister of Canada Cape Town, Tel Aviv, and Novosibirsk. Vol. 13, No. 1, Winter 2012 • Canadian Military Journal 33 Defending the country from outside attack is the funda- was initially reported that the Canadian Forces were “… mental role of the Canadian Forces (CF), and they must be angling to take command of the UN’s largest peacekeeping well trained and equipped for that purpose. Some overseas mission,”5 and the required deployment of just one general and missions will also be necessary: during the Cold War, the prin- a couple of dozen Canadian troops “… would be small enough cipal duty of Canadian soldiers was not to make the peace, but not to make any impact on resources.”6 But then the politicians to guard against the Soviet threat. From sailors in the North stepped in, and, before long, Department of Foreign Affairs Atlantic, to fighter pilots on patrol over West Germany, to spokesperson Catherine Loubier was explaining: “We’re fully technicians at DEW-line stations across the North, they pro- engaged in Afghanistan until 2011, and that’s what we’re con- tected both Canada and our NATO allies. centrating on for now.”7 Canada did keep nine soldiers in that UN peacekeeping force, and nearly two years later, the head Other overseas missions will take place in circumstances of that contingent was reporting some progress – while calling where there is no real military threat to Canada. Most recently, for continued Canadian involvement in the Congo.8 CANADA’S RANK AMONG CONTRIBUTORS TO UN PEACEKEEPING Canadian soldiers served bravely in a forward-lean- 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 ing ‘counterinsurgency’ 1 mission in Afghanistan. A 5 mission that from a secur- ity perspective was 11 optional, since al-Qaeda 16 had relocated elsewhere by 2005 and the Taliban 21 posed no significant threat 26 to Canadians in Canada. As Canadian historians 31 David Bercuson and Jack 36 Granatstein opined in 2011: “Canada did have 41 one core reason … to be 46 in Kandahar from begin- 51 ning to end. Ottawa wanted to take on a dan- 56 gerous and heroic mission 61 in a difficult struggle in Walter Dorn Walter order to achieve influence 66 in determining the course Canada’s rank among contributors to UN peacekeeping of that struggle. That was so that Canada would no longer be seen in Washington and This article accepts that the Canadian Forces play several Brussels as a free rider… .”2 essential roles. My argument is simply that peacekeeping should represent a larger proportion of our discretionary mis- Peacekeeping is also optional, insofar as it does not sions than it does today. To that end, I question some of the address direct threats to this country. It is something that arguments made in favour of Canada’s disengagement from Canada traditionally did, not only to curry favour with the peacekeeping by examining them within an updated context, United States, but to promote our long-term interests in inter- since much has changed during the past decade, including in national peace and security. the way in which the UN approaches peacekeeping. A strong case for reengagement can now be made – and that creates the For almost four decades between 1956 and 1992, Canada need for a reappraisal. was often the single largest contributor of UN peacekeepers. Its involvement then began to slip, and today, Canada occu- Peacekeeping actually works pies 57th place with only 11 military personnel and 116 police officers participating in UN peacekeeping missions.3 or more than a decade, Jack Granatstein and others argued Logistical and personnel constraints in Kandahar were only F that peacekeeping is passé, and counter-insurgencies are partly responsible for this downward trend, which began well the new reality.9 They often pointed to the failed UN missions before 2005.4 in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda, where peacekeepers were forced to stand by – due to ‘toothless’ Instead, the retreat from peacekeep- “For almost four decades mandates and inadequate equipment or ing has been a political decision, as was numbers of personnel – while thousands demonstrated in 2010 when the United between 1956 and 1992, of innocent civilians were abused and Nations wanted to place Canadian Canada was often the killed. They often overlooked the core Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie in single largest contributor reason for those failures of the ear- command of its 20,500-soldier force in ly-1990s, namely, a lack of political will, the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It of UN peacekeepers.” not on the part of the UN as an organiza- 34 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 13, No. 1, Winter 2012 tion, but on the part of its member states. For example – and date, UNIFIL was equipped with tanks, artillery, and surface- as Granatstein has himself identified – the UN ‘came up short’ to-air missiles. In addition, UNIFIL’s commanding officer is in Rwanda, due to a lack of political will on the part of the ‘double-hatted’ to also serve as the UN head of mission, members of the Security Council, especially France and the eliminating any potential confusion between the military and United States.10 political leadership. UNIFIL is currently composed of sol- diers from 36 countries, including major contingents from Italy, France, and Spain, with maritime support provided by Germany and Denmark. Significantly, a number of the main contributing nations are ENGAGEMENT NATO members – although Canada, R with its ideally-suited bilingual E English-French military, is conspic- D uously absent. Since 2006, UNIFIL has successfully prevented a return to all-out hostilities between Israel EA and Hezbollah. L S There have been many other U successful UN peacekeeping mis- O sions. For example, from 1992- I 1993, the UN Transitional Authority G in Cambodia (UNTAC) stabilized DND photo IS2008-1291 DND photo and administered an entire country, LI E Canadian Forces members serving in Lebanon as part of UNIFIL, 2008 ran an election, and managed a tran- sition to a power-sharing govern- R There was also a learning process underway, as the end ment with strong public support, while sidelining the notori- of the Cold War enabled the UN to take on more robust and ous Khmer Rouge. The UN Peacekeeping Operation in D complex peace operations.11 As a result of that process, UN Mozambique (ONUMOZ) from 1992 to 1994, and the UN peacekeeping has evolved significantly since the early-1990s, Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) from as evidenced by changes made to the operation in Lebanon.12 1999 to 2002, had similar mandates and successful outcomes. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was initially The UN Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) from 1991 to formed in 1978. In the summer of 2006, after two months of 1995 successful demobilized the FMLN guerilla organization, NG, AN intense fighting between Israel and Hezbollah, the Security as well as military and police units implicated in serious Council increased the number of troops in UNIFIL from human rights abuses, and also trained a new national police around 2000 to a new authorized level of 15,000 personnel. It force. The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) from 2005 to 2011 also provided an expanded and much more robust mandate, led to the end of the civil war, a referendum, and the relatively one that authorized UNIFIL to take all necessary action in peaceful secession of South Sudan. areas of deployment of its forces BUILDI and as it deems necessary within its capabilities to ensure that its area of operations (AO) is not utilized for hostile activities of EACE any kind, to resist attempts by P forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council, NG, and to protect United Nations per- sonnel, facilities, installations and PI equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers, and, with- out prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.13 EACEKEE P UN photo #476122 by Paul Banks Paul by #476122 UN photo Consistent with this robust ‘take all necessary action’ man- Thousands fleeing fighting in Kadugli, Sudan, seek refuge in an area secured by UNMIS, 09 June 2011.