Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies Vol. 39, No. 2, March 1991
Abhidharmika Logical Deadlock in Kathavatthu and Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka Dialectic
Shohei ICHIMURA
The Kathavatthu preserved in the Theravadin Pali Abhidhamma Pitaka is a peculiar work in two ways: (1) it entirely consists of doctrinal contro- versies between different Abhidharmika schools carried out on the basis of genuinely logical proceedings, and (2) each of these controversies invariably ends up in logical deadlock with no decisive determination as to disputing rival doctrines. Mrs. Rhys Davids and S. Z. Aung published an English translation entitled "The Points of Controversy or Subjects of Discourses" in 1915 and, in its introductory section, gave a brief analysis of the logical method. This analysis, however, did not clarify the logical rules adopted by those Abhidharmikas in precise terms. Hence, neither the problem of the logical deadlock nor the doctrinal crisis resulted therefrom was not sufficiently clarified. This paper is to elucidate the nature of this logical deadlock within a perspective so that the thread of doctrinal development can be traced from the Abhidharmika crisis to the M'adhyamaka solution by Nagarjuna's dialectic. Scholars, such as Daniel H. H. Ingalls, held a theory that Indian logic evolved from the science of grammar in ancient India.1) George Cardona indirectly proved it in his paper on the grammarian's principles of anvaya and vyatireka as their inductive as well as deductive method of reasoning.2) Out of a vast numbeer of cases, if one seeks to establish a certain linkage of two linguistic units "p" and "q" as a grammatical rule (niyama) one ought to apply the above two priciples inductively in order to collect similar cases in which "p-q" linkage occurs into one group and also collect dissimilar cases in which "-q-P" linkage occurs into another group. Once the "p-q" linkage is established to be a grammatical rule, he can apply
-1035- Abhidharmika Logical Deadlock in Kathavatthu and (21) Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka Dialectic (S. ICHIMURA) this linkage deductively to further analysis as well as practical use of a language in. question. In Indian logic, as evolved out of the grammatical science, the logical relation between reason "p" (hetu) and conclusion "q" (sadhya) was not conceived in terms of conceptual comprehension, but rather in terms of concomitance, concurrence, or accompaniment of two linguistic terms or propositions in linkage. The logic of concomitance or that of linkage between two terms or pro- positions allows four alternative categories (catuskoti) to their referential variables: (1) the category of 'x' such that "(x)p(x)q" (anvaya); (2) that of 'y' such that "(y)-q(y)-p" (vyatireka); (3) that of 'u' such that "(u)p- (u)-q" and (4) that of 'v' such that "(v)q-v)-p." Let us take an example of causal linkage between "smoke and fire," i. e. "p-q." We transcribe similar instances, a hill, a kitchen, etc., collectively as a variable 'x' which verifies the linkage as "(x)p-x)q" and dissimilar instances, a pond, etc., as another variable 'y' which falsifies the linkage as "(y)-q-y)-p." Now, the two remaining variables 'u' and 'v' neither totally verify nor totally falsify the "p-q" linkage but only partially, because the respective results are "(u)p-(u)-q" and "(v)q(v)-p." The reason is that these variables u' and 'v,' crossing the logical boundary between the categories of 'x' (sapaksa) and 'y' (vipaksa), become in part 'x' and in part 'y', i. e. something that has smoke but no fire ("p-q") and something that has fire but no smoke ("q-p") respectively. Suppose, with these alternative categories of logic in mind, a speaker infers that a distant hill 'a' is on fire i. e. "(a)q" from the fact that a rise of smoke is observed on its slope, i. e. "(a)p" If a listener doubts about the linkage over the given locus by asserting "(a)p but (a)-q," the speaker may appeal to the locus of a kitchen 'b' as a similar instance by validating the linkage as "(b)p then (b)q," which the listener cannot refute. He also may appeal to the locus of a pond 'B' as a dissimilar instance by validating "(B)-q then (B) -p," which the listener also cannot refute. Thus, the speaker can successfully conclude demonstrating the validity of his inference as "(a)p, therefore (a)q." In other words, the speaker ought to prove the given
-1034- Abhidharmika Logical Deadlock in Kathavatthu and Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka Dialectic (S. ICHIMURA) (22) locus 'a' to be neither a member of the class of 'u' of which "p-q" follows, nor a member of the class of 'v' of which "q-p" follows. This ipso facto estabishes the logical ity of "p-q" in the locus of 'x' and its contraposition "-q-p" in the locus of 'y.' Now, this same proceeding can strategically be utilized in argument by applying it. in reverse order to disprove one's rival thesis: first, inducing one's opponent to admit a linkage "p-q" or "q-p" in reference to a given locus, of which he holds "p"; second, reminding him of the valid linkage "p-q" (anvaya) and its contraposition "-q-p" (vyatireka); and third, telling him that his thesis "p" is logically invalid, or at best, indeterminate. This is the standard Kathavatthu proceeding. The initial controversy is concerned with two classes of entities: (1) that of the individual person (pudgala) abiding as one's self (atthi puggalo attahitaya patipanno) along with the psycho-physical elements (i. e. rupadham- mas, etc.), but it is not sufficiently clear whether or not this pudgala is strictly confined to the empirical domain, and (2) that of those trans-em pirical dharinas, i.e. rupa-, vedana-, etc. which are supposed to be known in the sense of a genuinely real thing (rupan ca upalabbhati saccikatthapara- matthena), but again it is not clear whether or not these entities are in- disputably distinguished as different from the pudgala which is supposed to be an empirical agent. The Theravadin links up two propositions to refute the Pudgalavadin (1) whatever is known in the sense of a genuinely real thing (upalabbhati- saccikatthaparamatthena="p"); (2) that is known in the same way as a ge- nuinely real thing is known (saccikattho paramattho tato so upalabbhatisacci- katthaparanatthena="q"). In his strategy, the Theravadin expects that if a given variable is a dharma, the linked propositions ought to be equally affirmed as "p-q," whereas if it is an empirical pudgala, the both propositions ought to be negated as "-q-p." Now, the Pudgalavadin asserts "p" as to. the nature of pudgala, but he is obliged to negate the second proposition as "-q", because a dharma and a pudgala cannot obviously be indentified. Ingeniously, however, in rejoinder, the Pudgalavadin reverses the order of the two propositions, forcing the Theravadin, who denies the reality of
-1033- Abhidharmika Logical Deadlock in Kathavatthu and (23) Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka Dialectic (S. ICHIMURA) pudgala as "-p" to affirm the second proposition as "q," because a pudgala ought to be known as unreal only in the same way in which dharmas are known as real. The, initial round of the Theravadin refutation versus the Pudgalavadin rejoinder is sufficient to domonstrate how the foregoing me- thod of argument leads to mutual invalidation and hence logical deadlock. See my transcription of the arguments into symbolic logic elsewhere.3) The seriousness of the foregoing result is that the doctrine of Anatman for which the Abhidharma system stands is undermined from within the system itself. The problem is, indeed, far more extensive in that the denial of reality to every phenomenon can also be challenged in similar manner. Such challenge could elevate a pudgala as well as that of a phenomenal entity to the trans-empirical status or, at least, make it indeterminable, because the linkages "p-q" and "q-p" equally violate the logical boundary between the trans-empirical category 'x' which verifies "p-q" and the em- pirical category 'y' which falsifies it as "-q-p." This means that when the Buddhist repudiates ultimate reality from an empirical phenomenon on the basis of the causality of "dependent origination" (pratityasamutpada) or the Skandha configuration of psycho-physical elements (hetupratyata), this denial of reality can bechal lenged as logically indeterminable. The Abhidharmika failed to resolve the problem of this logically indeterminable controversy. The doctrine of nihsvabava or sunyata which Nagarjuna invaiably ex- presses throng his dialectical negation achieves two objectives; (1) to refute the Sarvastivadin doctrine of svabhuva as to the nature of dharmas, and (2) to resolve the Theravadin doctrinal crisis tantalized in the Kathavatthu by logical deadlock. The concept of svabhava is essentially logical and linguistic and is a corollary factor with the above problem of logical dead- lock. The term can best be rendered as "self-identity principle," because our logical and linguistic behavior is compelled by two kinds of mental force to take such principle for granted as inherent in every referential variable of terms and propositions: namely, (1) referential force of the mind toward objective variables, and (2) tendentious or purposive force of the mind to ward term or propositional linkages. The Abhidharmika disputes invari-
-1032- Abhidharmika Logical Deadlock in Kathavatthu and Nagarjuna's Madhy, amaka Dialcctie. (S. ICHIMURA) (24) ably originated in this twofold force of the mind. Nagarjuna never allows partial identity or difference between two related variables throughout his dialectical passages. This means to eliminate the categories of 'u' and 'v' which lead to mutual invalidation or indetermination. On the other hand, he invariably juxtaposes the contrapositive categories of x' and 'y' through his dialectic. In convention, we refer a phenomenon of combustion to the spatio-temporal sphere where fuel and fire are conceived to fuse, or a phenomenon of illumination to the spatio-temporal sphere where light and darkness encounter. Convention ascribes to fuel and fire, light and darkness, their respective self-identity principle (svabhava) and yet, in order to explain the fact of combustion or that of illumination, it freely violates the logical boundary by juxtaposing the contrapositive variables over the spatio-temporal sphere of fusion or encounter. It is on this dialectical context4) that Nagarjuna invariably identifies 'x' and 'y' in reference to their spatio-temporal co-presence. This means that convention is possible only when 'x' and 'y' are simultaneously different and identical, nullifying their respective identity -principles, i. c. nihsvablrava, hence sunyata. Nagarjuna's solution, however, is not to abandon the orthodox system of Skandhas, Ayatanas, etc. He restored the status of dharmas to the trans- emprical and non-linguistic domain as the totally transcendent matter of the saintly insight by demoting those dharmas and pudgalas that are logically and linguistically subjected to controversy to the empirical domain.
1) Cf. Ingalls: Materials for the Study of Navya-Naaya Logic, Harvard Oriental Series 40, 1951, Prefatory Note. 2) Cardona: "Anvaya and Vyatireka in Indian Grammar," The Adyar Library Bulletin, 31-32, (1967-68), 313-352. 3) Ichimura: "A Study of the Madhyamika Method of Refutation, Especially of its Affinity to that of Kathavatthu" JIABS, III, i (1980) 7-5, esp, p 12, 4) Cf. Ichimura: "Buddhist Dialectical Methods and Their Structural Identity," Proceedings of the 31st International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa, Tokyo: The Toho Gakkai, 1984, pp. 1491-50.
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