Eastern Focus ISSUE 05 | Spring 2021 A project by GlobalFocus Center,

Defusing a blitzkrieg against democracy Turkish balancing act - between the West and a rising Asia Black Sea - the epicenter of geopolitical storm NATO 2030 - strategic simultaneity

SPECIAL REPORT Who Summons the Dragon? China's demand-driven influence in CEE and the Western Balkans Oana Popescu Zamfir: Editor's Foreword � /p.002 Ana Maria Luca (Beirut): A question of trust. Table of Why is China not as sexy as ? DEMOCRACY & RESILIENCE. THE SECURITY RISKS A Romanian perspective ______/p.096 OF (SOCIETAL) MARGINALISATION Vlad Iaviță (London): The AURo-Atlantic CHANGING CHARACTER OF CONFLICT: Contents ______/p.012 THE RISE OF COGNITIVE WARS Brad Allenby, professor of engineering Andrei Tiut (Bucharest): Let’s make a folder. What do we know about AUR, the new golden and ethics, Arizona State University (Tempe): ‘Pluralism was designed for a time when party of the Romanian far right? ______/p.018 information moved more slowly’ ______/p.108 Kamil Całus (): : the first ‘pas’ forward ______/p.026 DISRUPTION. EUROPE AND THE CHALLENGES OF ‘STRATEGIC SIMULTANEITY’ Siegfried Mureșan, Romanian MEP (): ‘We need to do more to inform people of the real Wess Mitchell, principal at The Marathon Initiative (Washington D.C.): ‘The West needs to redevelop the benefits of European integration’______/p.032 tools and mindset of strategic competition’ _ /p.118 Ramona Strugariu, Romanian MEP (Brussels): ‘I fear that we might end up with a blitzkrieg Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, vice president at the GMF (Berlin): ‘We need a robust German‑American against democracy’ ______/p.040 relationship at the core of NATO’ ______/p.130

EUROPE ONWARD. THE TROUBLED PERIPHERY About Eastern Focus George Vișan (Bucharest): The saber-rattling in SPECIAL BRIEF: is heating up the Black Sea ______/p.050 Who Summons the Dragon? A focus on Central-Eastern Europe, Mădălin Blidaru (Bucharest): Turkey’s regional China’s demand-driven influence the Black Sea and the Balkans, options in the 21st century: between the political in Central‑Eastern Europe and in a transatlantic key West and the wider Asia ______/p.064 the Western Balkans Bucharest-based English-language Romario Shehu (Tirana): Next generation Marius Ghincea, Clara Volintiru, quarterly bringing regional voices, ideas Ivan Nikolovski Turkey and its foreign policy in the and topics to the great debates of today. (Florence, Bucharest, Skopje) /p.138 Western Balkans ______/p.074 Shedding light on regional developments. Anchored in democratic values. Delivered DISINFO/HYBRID: UNWRAPPING THE ‘ANACONDA’ straight to the movers' and shakers' OF MALIGN NARRATIVES inboxes across Europe, America and Oana Popescu-Zamfir (Bucharest): globally. Connecting people across Information wars and regime stability. geographies and thought bubbles. How can nations respond? ______/p.088 The cover builds on details from “The Rufin Zamfir (Bucharest): Malign foreign of Europa”, a painting by the Italian artist influence: a triangle with its vertex abroad Titian (ca. 1560–1562). It hangs in the and the base at home ______/p.092 Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum of Boston, Massachusetts. Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 Oana Popescu Zamfir: Building a transatlantic constituency for democracy

Editor's Foreword

Building a transatlantic interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. What is new under What is new under current circumstances is the focus on delivery capacity, which is why current circumstances constituency for democracy POTUS has tasked the government to deliver within 200 days concrete recommendations is the focus on for battling corruption worldwide; as well as the framing of this necessity for the United delivery capacity. States to be ‘flanked by nations that share our values and our vision for the future – by other democracies’1 not as a strategy for facing potential future challenges (as has been the case throughout the 20th century), but as an existential imperative to preserve As US president is making his first trip not only international standing, but also our way of live within abroad in Europe, his administration seems to have the transatlantic community in the face of immediate threats. defined how the United States aims to deal with the shifting global order and the rise of revisionist powers Biden’s approach is momentous, and if Europe rallies around the like China: the answer is promoting democracy same goal, it may still be able to push back against the ‘blitzkrieg worldwide as the best delivery option for both old against democracy’2 that we can increasingly witness all around and new needs, from creating jobs and prosperity us. With both domestic leaders in the EU and around its borders, to lowering inequality, from tackling new realities and foreign powers like China and aggressively promoting and challenges in trade and technology, to providing alternative systems of thinking, of values and of government, good healthcare or crisis management infrastructure. the response cannot be reactive only. No amount of effort in countering such influences can match the impact of pro-actively The concept is not new; nor is its centrality to putting out there our own democratic narrative, and building an American power projection globally. In fact this is actual societal constituency around democracy, rule of law and how America has both gained unparalleled influence anticorruption as the backbone of good governance and freedom. in many parts of the world, especially Europe (from defending Europe in WWII to rebuilding it via the Marshall Plan, and from supporting resistence The anticorruption drive in Romania – against communism and the fall of the Iron the paradox of unexpected success Curtain, to advancing Central and Eastern Europe’s NATO and EU accession), and lost more of said While not transferable as such to its neighbours in the EU or influence than it might have imagined, following around its borders, Romania’s experience is perhaps especially indicative of both ‘how to’ and ‘how not to’ go about building rule © Photo by Steluța Popescu of law, with the benefit of hindsight and awareness of current

Oana Popescu Zamfir @OanaPope challenges to democracy across Central-Eastern Europe.

Editor-in-chief, Director GlobalFocus Center

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Alongside , Romania is one of only overall credibility of enlargement is much with almost unanimous approval from both society and political two countries to have become EU members lower, governments and societies do not actors. It was constructed as the country’s sole national project and still be subjected to an ongoing feel that they necessarily have to make for a decade and a half and beyond5, giving the EU and the United monitoring mechanism on justice and the an exclusive ‘East/West’ type of choice, States unmatched leverage over the internal agenda. It was rule of law. Pressure from the EU (and US) the incentives to effect painful reforms are also the subject of an unprecedented accord among all political and political will at home concerning the proportionally reduced and the EU has put parties, ratified in the Snagov Declaration of 21 June 1995, which accession and most of its eggs granted their full support to the national EU accession strategy6. integration process in the baskets of to both NATO and As both the domestic regimes that have Political will was therefore paramount to the full implementation the EU, against lost much of their of justice and good governance reforms, building democracy the background of political will and internal legitimacy and rule of law. It reflected also the widespread option of the massive popular and used the EU to electorate, but it was embraced by the top levels of the country’s support for external leverage have consolidate power. leadership and seen as an exclusive strategic West vs. East reintegration with the Yet a few important choice which would ensure nothing less than the country’s West, have allowed started to wane in principles of action survival as an independent state, providing security guarantees for a comprehensive can be extracted in an otherwise troubled region, and the political and socio- institution-building recent years, the which, we believe, economic integration with the EU that would ensure the de effort to be deployed have universal facto structural transformation of the country into a Western (albeit not with the long‑term sustainability applicability. democracy. After the initial focus on liberalising the economy, most democratic Chapter 24 Justice and Internal Affairs, was opened in 2002 and it means), which in of this endeavour The particular became the main sticking point in negotiations between Romania turn has led to a background of and Brussels, given the high level of corruption in the country. societal process, i.e. seems to lie more the anticorruption Romania eventually became an EU member without having fully building an actual and justice reform met all of the criteria regarding judicial reform and corruption, constituency for rule with this rule of law drive started in the therefore the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism/CVM7 of law among the course of NATO was set up as a transitional mechanism to ensure delivery general population. constituency than and EU accession of reforms in these fields. Politically, the CVM has positioned As both the domestic in the 2000s (one Romania and Bulgaria as ‘second tier’ EU member states, a political will and with the structural that can hardly be very uncomfortable status vis-à-vis the other 25 (later 26, as external leverage replicated today3) Croatia entered without a CVM), where reports by the European have started to elements at play was the enormous Commission of transgressions very similar to those of Bucharest wane in recent popularity of the or Sofia had much less bearing on their conduct of domestic years, the long-term (relevant institutions, Europeanisation or ability to negotiate their interests at EU level. The trade- sustainability of this and Westernisation off though was seen as the only win-win option: giving the EU a endeavour seems legislation, etc.). process among big say in Romania’s internal affairs in exchange for ratification to lie more with the Romanian of accession in 2007. In practice, the monitoring process, as this constituency population, which well as the constant attention and pressure from outside than with the structural elements at play throughout the years has constantly remained partners has functioned as a very strong enabler of reforms. (relevant institutions, legislation, etc.). the highest4 among the Eastern bloc. Seen as an existential, identity issue, the rectification One can only speculate as to the reasons why the ruling political At present, other countries in transition (such of a historic injustice done to Romania after class of the time (among whom a former prime-minister, Adrian as the EU’s neighbours in the Western Balkans the Yalta Conference that relegated it to the Năstase, who would later go to jail on charges of high-level and Eastern Partnership), do not enjoy the domination of the , the prospect corruption) consented to relinquish some of their privileges that luxury of a similar mix of circumstances: the of returning to the bosom of the West was met came with a domestic environment of impunity. Perhaps they

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held the belief that become a dominant body regulating the Whether it was making progress or The political investment in rule of law toeing the EU line profession, or the head of the DNA and experiencing setbacks, anticorruption became would allow them current European Chief Prosecutor Laura the buzzword for over a decade, it was and anticorruption over the years, the some wiggle room for Codruța Kovesi to pursue high visibility cases making the political and public agenda and their own influence or of high-level political corruption, in close concentrating around it much of the effort centrality of the subject in media and public give them an edge in cooperation with the National Intelligence aimed at building and then consolidating debate, and the constant attribution of negotiating their own Service, or former Justice Minister Monica democracy. Two impeachment attempts exit from the political Macovei to implement robust reforms9. of former president Traian Băsescu were poor governance to endemic corruption stage with Brussels grounded in accusations of abuse of power and Washington. At the same time though, legislation was at against political rivals through politicisation has eventually managed to build a Also, at a later stage, times sketchy and not debated in parliament, of the appointment of prosecutors, use of powerful players the courts were inefficient and access to national intelligence services and illegal constituency among the population. such as president justice remained a problem for both the phone-tapping. Current president Klaus Traian Băsescu (2004 common citizen, the business environment Iohannis won his first term almost exclusively – 2014) deployed a on an anticorruption agenda. The government and high-ranking politicians. The latter often full-fledged effort of prime-minister Victor Ponta collapsed accused political vendettas as the reason for to build institutions able to take on state capture (such as the following a fire in Bucharest club Colectiv, their prosecution, with cases often tried in National Integrity Agency/ANI or the National Anticorruption which left 65 dead, and whose underlying the court of public opinion, following leaked Directorate/DNA, which were studied as models of good practice causes were attributed to corruption. information to the press, yet later dismissed for a number of years before quietly slipping into irrelevance When people took to the streets calling in court due to inconclusive evidence10. The of late), in an attempt to use the anticorruption fight as an for the government’s resignation, chants of press as a watchdog remained endemically influential instrument to eliminate political adversaries under ‘Corruption kills’ were heard for the first time. de-professionalised, underfunded, politicised the cloak of legitimacy and commitment to EU benchmarks. When the Social-Democrat Party/PSD under and corrupt (with virtually all owners of the leader Liviu Dragnea came back to power in major media groups having been indicted Whatever its reasons, the strong political will behind the 2017 and spent two years having as its primary by now on corruption charges or at least anticorruption drive and building rule of law has translated in agenda the reversal of justice, rule of law and investigated, and most of them using the practice into a forceful top-down, centralised and highly efficient anticorruption reform, in order to spare its outlets they owned to cater to the interests of process8, unlike, for instance, in Bulgaria, where there was never members (who had been the prime – though their political patrons and secure protection any genuine reform effort. Corruption was framed as a national largely legitimate – targets of prosecutors for their other business interests). Civil security threat, and thus the anticorruption fight was placed supported by former president Traian society was as intensely polarised as the under the authority of the National Security Council (CSAT), which Băsescu) lengthy jail sentences, the PSD was made it relatively easy to rally behind all the institutions of force, justice system itself; neutrality became a eventually ousted at the polls, where it first including the intelligence services. It also gave the president rare commodity, as influencers would rally lost elections for the decisive influence, including through appointments of the heads behind what they regarded as the ‘righteous and then local and national elections. of the National Anticorruption Directorate, the Attorney General, camp’ – which was hard to make out, since the the magistrates of the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court field was divided between those who were The political investment in rule of law and and it often bypassed the Parliament completely (either in its essentially the flag-bearers for anticorruption anticorruption over the years, the centrality of legislative functions or as the institution exercising control over and building rule of law, and those who the subject in media and public debate, and the executive) – and hence the mechanisms of democratic accused them of instrumentalising these the constant attribution of poor governance accountability. This has led to a highly personalised system, goals for their own interest. Opposing the to endemic corruption has eventually where political support was key and allowed institutions such former would be seen as lacking integrity and managed to build a constituency among as the National Integrity Agency under its Secretary-General going against ‘the good fight’, while supporting the population. It has primarily resonated Horia Georgescu to increase the transparency of the fortunes the latter would necessarily translate into with the growing professional middle class, of political leaders, or the Supreme Council of Magistrates to weakening the anticorruption drive itself. mostly urban, increasingly educated and

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financially independent, who could afford to begins anew then. Similarly, in Romania, priority than anticorruption, creates a gaping chasm of political- NOTES speak truth to power, developed a notion of a weak president and a government still ideological polarisation and even strong resentment between 1. https://www.washingtonpost.com/ opinions/2021/06/05/joe-biden-europe-trip-agenda/ active citizenship and were reclaiming political dominated by the old political guard, who the liberal, urban agents of change (themselves somewhat 2. as Romanian MEP Ramona Strugariu defines it in an agency. The unprecedented protests that is now aware of the full extent of the storm disillusioned with the modest outcome of their relentless fight for interview in this issue of Eastern Focus 3. https://www.eastern-focus.eu/2019/08/rule-law-de- preceded the fall of the Dăncilă11 government, that can await them should they lose grip on democracy and rule of law) and those left behind, who have now cade-eastern-partnership-lets-talk-political-change/ mostly organised spontaneously, on social power and remain within reach of the hand of started to blame changes induced by European integration, rather 4. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/583 5. Romania initiated relations with NATO in 1990, immedi- media, as well as the amount of public the law, have – at least temporarily – put an than corruption, for all their woes. In this growing space between ately after its regime change in December 1989, and offi- debate over executive measures targeting end to political will and the efficiency of the these two groups, democratic dialogue and consensus‑building cially notified the Secretary General of its intention to join the Alliance in 1993. The same year, the country signed its the justice system testify to the importance anticorruption fight. The topic has gradually has become almost impossible; people may be inclined to Association Agreement with the . It became that regular people had come to attach to the evaded public attention, relevant institutions accept that democracy is a slow-moving creature that always a member of NATO in 2004; democratic reforms started in view of its membership of the North Atlantic Alliance paved anticorruption fight. A process that started have been decapitated and/or deprived produces part-frustrating compromise, but they are not willing its way to EU accession in 2007. out as top-down, highly centralised and, in all of the resources to do their job to the full to embrace it if it fails to deliver a better life altogether. 6. http://old.presidency.ro/pdf/date_arhiva/370_ro.pdf 7. https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fun- truth, not very democratic, reliant on political extent needed and their lack of sustainability damental-rights/upholding-rule-law/rule-law/assis- will and geared very much toward the defence became obvious. The main buffer against A recipe for pairing democracy and delivery is still in the works, tance-bulgaria-and-romania-under-cvm/coopera- tion-and-verification-mechanism-bulgaria-and-romania_en of one’s own political interests at the expense democratic backsliding remains, at this but from Romania’s experience, a handful of lessons can still be 8. https://www.eastern-focus.eu/2019/05/ of one’s adversaries had morphed into a point, the enduring societal condemnation of learnt, as democratic transformation may be reignited in Europe: romanias-permeability-authoritarian-tendencies/ 9. https://www.politico.eu/article/the-dna-of-roma- bottom-up, grassroots movement demanding corruption – but it remains to be seen if this l Do not trade long-term sustainability (accountability, due nias-anti-corruption-success-eu-transparency-interna- accountability for the political class in can be a strong enough element of pressure democratic process, political negotiation) for short-term tional/ 10. https://www.eastern-focus.eu/2019/08/ how they implement the self-professed on the institutions and the political class. efficiency. Yet short-term results and investment in drivers of beyond-dna-steroids/ European values of rule of law and integrity. So far the signs are not encouraging. Poor change are necessary to build up the credibility of the process. 11. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-49998670 governance remains a constant despite the Striking the golden mean is painstaking, but rewarding As history has shown, however, the effort macro-economic growth, and its ravaging l Hold out credible reward for performance (e.g. EU of building or sustaining democracy does impact on a large part of the population, for accession) and build a rule of law constituency (invest not end with victory at the polls; it often just whom poverty reduction was always a higher in independent media, CSOs, public communication). Empower them to carry the flag and be domestic agents of change. Beware of window-dressing reformers Poor governance remains a constant despite using the accession process for their own ends l Treat rule of law, anticorruption and good governance as the macro-economic growth, and its ravaging cross-cutting issues to be incorporated and monitored in every chapter of negotiation and partnership with the EU/ US; ensure impact on a large part of the population, for whom stakeholder participation up and down the decision-making process; maintain focus on values, not just ticking boxes poverty reduction was always a higher priority than anticorruption, creates a gaping chasm of political‑ideological polarisation and even strong resentment between the liberal, urban agents of change and those left behind, who have now started

A slightly modified version of this article was written for the to blame changes induced by European integration, WB2EU network, co-funded by the European Commission under its Erasmus+ Jean Monnet programme www.wb2eu.eu rather than corruption, for all their woes. 008 009 Democracy & Resilience

The security risks of (societal) marginalisation

Vlad Iaviță (London): The AURo-Atlantic Romania /p.012

Andrei Tiut (Bucharest): Let’s make a folder. What do we know about AUR, the new golden party of the Romanian far right? /p.018

Kamil Całus (Warsaw): Moldova: The first ‘pas’ forward /p.026

Siegfried Mureșan, Romanian MEP (Brussels): ‘We need to do more to inform people of the real benefits of European integration’ /p.032

Ramona Strugariu, Romanian MEP (Brussels): ‘I fear that we might end up with a blitzkrieg against democracy’ /p.040

010 011 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 Vlad Iaviță: The AURo-Atlantic Romania

Bucharest-London-Washington axis that we are invulnerable to the problems The AURo-Atlantic was not derailed even by Brexit, Donald faced by our neighbours – from the rise of Trump or Liviu Dragnea. Currently, the far-right and the intolerance towards in the EU Parliament, Romania votes migrants and minorities of any kind, to Romania consistently along the lines promoted by the slide into authoritarianism, the spread the Western Franco-German nucleus, and of Russian propaganda and attempts is methodically avoiding any association at destabilisation, simply because ‘we with the democratic backslidings of other are so pro-West and anti-Russian’. Vlad Iaviță | London Eastern European states. Everything in our history and identity is European, and the There is another reality pinnacle of our post-1989 aspirations was always to represented by a version of be sought in the West. Romania that looks more and EU membership has brought us the possibility to work and more different from what Europe study in the West. In spite of repeated and considerable really represents structurally and he illusion generated by Romania’s pro-European political pressures on the rule of choice has led to a collective blindness towards the country’s law and democracy, over in terms of values and identity. T backsliding from European values. Increasingly, one of our core the past years security threats comes from within, rather than outside our borders. have supported the anti-corruption agenda, Notwithstanding these realities which whether at the ballot or in the streets through some of us share, there is another reality protest. Romania’s presence at the head of represented by a version of Romania that the fastest-growing EU economies has been looks more and more different from what constant in recent years, its GDP increasing Europe really represents structurally and in eightfold since the 1990s. We are among the terms of values and identity. The political most reliable European countries regarding class is using the pro-European discourse Romania’s accession to the European Union and NATO the NATO defence expenditure pledges. opportunistically, rather than with the was backed by almost unanimous popular support, and purpose of genuinely promoting a set of throughout the years the country has maintained its position values to Romanian society. The policies among the states which held the EU and the US in the The forest of adopted in the past decades have effectively highest esteem. One generation after another has learned backwardness marginalised the people that do not live in in school that the Latin origins of the hidden behind the large urban centres, and thus see themselves and people (through which we are related to France, Italy European trees trapped in a context that does not offer them and Spain, countries that many Romanians call home today) many of the opportunities that promised to are defining for our national identity. Through the royal In such a context, how could one ever suspect be so abundant at the time of the country’s family we have become related to Europe once again. that we are anything but the quintessential accession to the European Union: a country expression of Euro-enthusiasm? We have with families split between those that have The post-1989 strategic choice Romania made was firmly fed ourselves with the illusion that the left to a seek better income in the West pro-Western, even during the times of and only possible direction was ‘further and and those that have stayed and have been Adrian Năstase, when very little of what was happening in further to the West’; that modernisation and supported by them, a country in which some our country was reminiscent of the realities in the EU. The Europeanisation are inevitable processes; of us have prospered because of the new

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economic trends, whilst others have felt turnout since the overwhelmed by changes that we did not this translated into little more than around understand and that nobody prepared us for. 540,000 votes. This number seems less impressive if compared with the one The success of AUR, inconceivable until million votes received by PPDD in the 2012 recently, as well as all the instances of elections, when this (now-defunct) party ultraconservative and antidemocratic actions capitalised upon the ongoing hardships are primarily a consequence of this trend. associated by the economic crisis through its staunchly populist discourse.

The traditional parties The duplicitous rhetoric used by have fostered a radical Romania’s main political parties is one electorate behind their of the reasons why this segment of the democratic rhetoric population has remained largely under the radar in the past years. Hence the Until the moment the exit poll in Social Democratic Party (PSD), along with December’s parliamentary elections smaller parties such as PRO Romania was announced, the Romanian media’s or ALDE, and even the National Liberal interest in the AUR party was close to zero. Party (PNL), have adopted a nominally rankings in the EU: according to Eurostat, in 2018, 23.5% The shock generated by the collective democratic pro-European rhetoric meant of Romanians were in a difficult or very difficult financial realisation that a party unknown to most to gain the sympathy, or at least the trust, situation. At the same time, although the PNL defines people was to become the fourth-largest of Romania’s international partners. At the its vision as promoting a ‘respect for diversity’, among political force in the country generated same time, these same groups have not others, this party voted almost unanimously in favour of an avalanche of articles that shied away from adopting the illiberal 2018 referendum aimed at banning same-sex either presented the profile of socially conservative marriages in Romania. It is also fairly clear that repeated the AUR candidates and their AUR has and even antidemocratic declarations with nationalist and anti-Hungarian undertones most outrageous declarations, positions when this by some PNL leaders did not do much in helping promote or commented in an alarmist achieved promised some easily the party as a defender of liberalism in our society. tone on the consequences of obtained electoral points. Romania’s entry in the ranks prominence In fact, such electorates Although it may seem that the rise of AUR comes from its of the European states with were actively cultivated. clear, simple and ideologised discourse, this dimension comes extremist representation in because it only second among the factors that have contributed to its their parliaments. However, Apart from social values, success. Although undeniably persuasive and well-adapted all these approaches are gives a voice the main parties have also to the dynamics of social media, the discourse of AUR only distant from the essence pushed for policies that led represents a vehicle being used with great effectiveness. of the problem. to a part of the in the end to an uneven, First and foremost, AUR has achieved prominence because imbalanced development. it gives a voice to a part of the population, and promises The Romanian electorate with population, After three decades to fill the void that they feel. This void is the key, and not sympathies towards populist when PSD, nominally a the fact that an agile and opportunistic actor has observed or nationalist narratives is not and promises social-democratic party, a vulnerability and has learned to exploit it. The current new. Although the 9% score has regularly governed excessive focus on AUR, as if it represents a sole and obtained by AUR may seem to fill the void Romania, our country is exhaustive expression of political radicalisation in Romania, is very high, in the parliamentary still at the very bottom moving the spotlight away from the true issue: the practices of elections with the lowest that they feel. of the risk of poverty the main parties and the failure of their development policies.

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place in the EU to improve your social and financial situation The Romanian version of the article if you are from a low-income background. Only Greece, a was published on Adevărul. country devastated by an economic crisis spanning almost Abandoning such a large portion of our About the project 10 years, fares worse among EU states at this indicator. This article is part of the project 'Authoritarian Shadows in the population to underdevelopment represents a European Union', supported by the National Endowment for Democracy, which brings together major vulnerability for our country in the face Marginalisation – a national security risk Political Capital (Budapest) and its partners from Austria, Bulgaria, An analysis conducted in 2016 by the Romanian National Institute Czechia, , and of rising authoritarianism and illiberalism, and Romania to research values‑based of Statistics revealed that the counties with the largest percentage attitudes to foreign policy and of former residents that have emigrated over the shortage of authoritarian influence in the therefore poses a structural risk that malign European Union institutions. jobs were in the province of Moldova. In Neamț, the number of foreign actors will be very keen to exploit in emigrants almost equals the number of existing workplaces in the county. There is no coincidence that such regions lacking any order to slow down and reverse the country’s opportunities have the constituencies where AUR obtained its best results. For as long as the socio-economic developments leave modernisation and Europeanisation. behind winners and losers separated by such a large gap, the conditions favouring the success of nationalist parties will linger on. And as economic and political results are oftentimes attributed AUR remains the least unequal socio-economic evolution of our to the European Union in the public psyche, the resentment of our worries country has led precisely to this reality. towards a West perceived as not delivering on expectations can be expected to rise (which will also be amplified by parties What we are seeing is fundamentally a problem Between 2014 and 2019, Romania prided itself in keen to find a scapegoat for all of the country’s misfortunes). of social exclusion and absence of opportunities. one of the biggest GDP increases in the EU, over The chronic distrust in the state authorities 40%. In recent years, some areas of the country Abandoning such a large portion of our population to and moderate political forces, or even the have experienced a remarkable growth, with underdevelopment represents a major vulnerability for our quintessential institutions of representative standards of living coming to a par with those in country in the face of rising authoritarianism and illiberalism, democracy, stems from their sustained Western Europe. According to Eurostat, in 2019 and therefore poses a structural risk that malign foreign actors incapacity to generate prosperity. Although the Bucharest-Ilfov area had a GDP per capita will be very keen to exploit in order to slow down and reverse not alone in facing this issue, Romania has (at purchasing power parity) larger than that of the country’s modernisation and Europeanisation. When people been performing exceptionally poorly in this cities such as Helsinki or Berlin. The contrasts see themselves systematically neglected by conventional chapter, year after year. In September 2020, within the country, however, are enormous. political actors and the institutions that are meant to serve

essential democratic institutions received Romania has the largest disparities between the them, they turn their hopes and support to whichever options VLAD IAVITA works on the

abysmal trust ratings: only 9.5% of Romanians regions with the highest and lowest GDP per promising a change. AUR has communicated effectively; it knew Asymmetric Threats Programme,

trusted the country’s parliament, while 13.7% capita in the entire European Union (the most who its target-audience was; it has indeed been helped by the where he primarily conducts

had confidence in the country’s government. developed region in our country is 3.6 times context of heightened uncertainty and distrust amplified by qualitative research on

more prosperous than the least developed one). the pandemic, and it has exploited the popularity of the church disinformation narratives and

If there were truly a climate of public trust in All other regions of our country feature on the in the countryside to attract the most visible and vocal part of proliferation as well as on other

the country’s institutions, the conspirational and lower third of the EU’s development ranking. the dissatisfied. However, many more have remained under forms of malign content. He

anti-system discourse of AUR could not have the diffuse influence of PSD, PNL and their smaller satellites, holds a BA History, Politics and

resonated in such a way. Their nationalist and Romania has a major social mobility issue where they serve as an exploitable demographic that is much Economics degree at University

illiberal rhetoric lacks rigour if it is not assembled as well. According to the 2020 Global social larger than the 500,000 votes which AUR won last time. College London (UCL). upon a frame of distrust and alienation amongst mobility index from the World Economic segments of the society. Unfortunately, the Forum, Romania is the second most difficult

016 017 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021

Let’s make a folder What do we know about AUR, the new golden party of the Romanian far right?

By Andrei Tiut | Bucharest

Starting 2011, George Simion was instrumental in building a coalition of NGOs from Romania and Moldova that launched the civic platform "Acțiunea 2012" (Action 2012) and pleaded for the re-unification of Romania with the Republic of Moldova. The slogan “Basarabia is Romania” was one of the core messages of the campaign.

he far-right Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (AUR) was the big moderate unionism and Romania a bad surprise of the recent Romanian parliamentary elections. Against What does AUR name. According to at least two sources, a background of low turnout (32%) it obtained 9% of the vote. Only seem to want? T this is also an opinion shared at least by two months ago, during the recent local elections, it had only 1% . The full name (The Alliance for the Unity some in the Moldovan secret service. In of Romanians) itself references nationalist fact, by Mr Simion’s own account, he was tones and alludes to the possibility of a future once interrogated in Moldova and banned union between Romania and the Republic of from entering the country for a while. The increase took pretty much all commentators by surprise. Moldova. The acronym also means “gold”. Some were infused with a sense of panic. Where did this Another group is formed by neo-fascists or, party come from and where will it take Romanian politics, The party seems to draw from two main to put it more precisely, people who deny they wondered? Others took a more down-to-earth approach. ideological groups. One is made of radical the crimes of the interwar far-right. They Sociologist Claudiu Tufiș expressed on Facebook the hope that unionists gathered around George Simion. are gathered around Claudiu Târziu, who social scientists would now (finally!) make a folder called ‘AUR’ to Mr Simion is a former ultra (radical football leads an association called “Rost” (transl. study the new party [and perhaps provide insight on how its rise fan) and a staunch promoter of unconditional “meaning”) that promotes such ideas. The can be stopped]. That same hope inspired the title of this article. unification between Romania and the Republic association runs a publishing house and a of Moldova. For many years his name was website with the same name. Mr Târziu was In the following piece I have tried to put together what we associated with the all-present graffiti a leading figure of the Coalition for Family, already know about AUR. Some things I know personally, around the country that said “ which advocated changing the Romanian having looked into the history and activity of the party. is Romania”. Bessarabia is the name of the Constitution to prevent any possible Some came from others who share my interest. And, historical region of which the present-day legalisation of gay marriage. Rost is the only finally, some insight came from a debate hosted by Republic of Moldova is the biggest part. association known to have been retired Global Focus Center under Chatham House rules. from the Coalition due to public outcry. His unionist views were so strong and The good news is that we know quite a bit. The bad news expressed so unwisely that many believed It is important to know that, in Romania, is that it’s more complicated than first meets the eye. him to be an agent of Moscow sent to give far‑right ideas have been getting

018 019 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 Andrei Tiut: Let’s make a folder. What do we know about AUR, the new golden party of the Romanian far right?

traction mostly through the discourse of The second area is Banat, in the West, mainstream parties. Both the liberals and where evangelical-inspired Protestant social-democrats, while mostly keeping churches have long been proselytising to a pro-European discourse, have ultra- and trying to promote their social agenda. conservative and nationalist elements Like Northern Moldova, the area provided among their rank and file and who will support for the referendum ‘for the frequently voice such convictions freely, and family’ and continues to be a hotspot with impunity from the party. Proper far-right for the pro-life movement. The religious movements have been notoriously unable agenda is not limited to the protestant to get traction ever since the dissolution of churches but it has also spread to the local the much more notorious Orthodox and Greek Catholic clergy. Party, and used to be a subject of jokes rather than concern. This explains, to We can also see a spotty picture of some extent, why AUR came as a surprise AUR support throughout southern even though the groups that formed the Transylvania (roughly at the centre of the party have been known for a long time. map). There is no obvious explanation for this but it is worth remembering that Also, the party did not run on a maximalist Transylvania is the home and beacon platform but rather on a lower-key, of anti- . patriotic, pro-family platform. They were staunchly opposed to anti-COVID Dobrudja (South-East), long considered restrictions and held a sit-in in front of a model of multicultural integration due Diana Iovanovici Șoșoacă How bad is it? (a former leader of AUR) the Government building for days. to Orthodox Romanians and Turkish/ and George Simion As AUR was entering Parliament, two other parties found (co-president of AUR) Tatar Muslims living together ever since themselves unable to reach the electoral threshold (the Based on a photos Ottoman times, is the new addition to the Popular Movement and Pro Romania). These parties, by Timi Slicaru Who voted for AUR? radicalisation map. The region “hosted” while nominally mainstream and, in fact, led by a former a heated dispute between the local According to exit polls, AUR voters president and a former prime minister respectively, have archbishop and the authorities, due to skew younger and less educated courted nationalist and ultraconservative discourse restrictions on religious activities during the than the average. They also tend to on several occasions, hoping to compensate for the pandemics. The dispute recently included live either in rural Romania or in small dwindling popularity of their leaders. Thus, in a sense, a row about holding a pilgrimage to the towns (CURS data, details below). wannabe radicals were only replaced with truer ones! “cave of Saint Andrew”, the purported founder of Christianity in Romania. The The electoral map shows four main lawyer of the Archbishopric, Diana areas of AUR success. Moldova (East) Şoşoacă, is a COVID-denialist who ran and particularly Northern Moldova is successfully on the AUR electoral lists. a known hub for ultra-religious feeling. The party seems to draw from two main ideological The constitutional referendum for AUR has also made great strides in the the (heterosexual only!) family also groups. One is made of radical unionists gathered Diaspora, where it got roughly a quarter of drew support from here. Even in the the vote. Note that the Diaspora includes urbanised county of Iasi, the AUR vote around George Simion. The other group is formed a significant number of was significant, possibly due to recent with dual citizenship, who live either conflict over holding a traditional by neo-fascists or, to put it more precisely, people in the Republic or in Western Europe pilgrimage during the pandemic. (thanks to their Romanian passport). who deny the crimes of the interwar far-right.

020 021 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 Andrei Tiut: Let’s make a folder. What do we know about AUR, the new golden party of the Romanian far right?

Another result of their place. With such improvisations it seem to be more inclined to vote for AUR voters tend to live either in demise is that, in the current seems likely that not only true-and- AUR. Also, it is interesting to see the Parliament, it is close tested hard unionists and defenders of results in Spain and Italy. It is generally rural Romania or in small towns. to impossible to build a fascism entered Parliament, but also considered that governing majority without opportunists. Or maybe even well- are generally better integrated; It has also made great strides the parties that represent meaning people who wanted to play indeed, the vote for AUR, while the ethnic minorities in politics a bit and were not bothered still excellent, was 10 percentage in the Diaspora, where it got Romania, and in particular by pompous nationalist discourse. points lower there than in Italy. the Hungarian minority. roughly a quarter of the vote. For obvious reasons, these Ideology / local groups. Narratives minorities are expected to Why did people about Romanian exceptionalism are reject any government that would include the radical nationalists vote for AUR? commonplace in Romania among both of AUR. The presence of minorities in the government could also politicians and voters. Going back to the This is, if I may, the golden question. moderate nationalist tendencies within the government parties. map, we see how all four regions carry Like in other cases of populist/extremist histories of fringe ideas and in three rise, multiple explanations are possible. We must keep in mind that this is not the first time when out of four cases, these are not recent. a brave new party, representing the younger and less This is not to say that these narratives Social causes and lack of educated population takes Parliament by storm. are dominant locally – in fact AUR did representation. It is almost a consensus not win elections in any county. On the that Romanian parties have lately The predecessor is PP-DD (People’s Party - Dan Diaconescu). other hand, it remains entirely possible broken much of the bound that It was created by… well, Dan Diaconescu; the charismatic that these regional narratives do not connected them to the electorate. owner of a tabloid TV-station and it represented populism in drive the vote directly, but rather that Governance has been negligent under its purest form: it promised people a good life, easily obtained. narratives are there because they are both right- and left-wing parties and pushed by local groups, and it is in fact the voter hit by the economic downturn PP-DD got 14% percent of the vote in the 2012 elections, the local organisers who get out the vote. associated with the pandemic following the global crisis. It is not usually considered does not seem to find an far-right as such, since it directly addressed economic interest in their problems hardships and showed far less interest in identity politics. It now comes down to the from political leaders (for But there is at least a similarity in constituencies. example, the pandemic does mainstream parties and civil not appear in the short version PP-DD was put together hastily. Reportedly, eligible of the electoral program, seats were bought and sold. Most analysts predicted society to not only make a brute which the top three parties that would impact the cohesion of the party. And have been circulating). indeed, it imploded during its first and only term. cordon sanitaire but also to

Various kinds of dissatisfaction AUR comes from a stronger organisational base, but address legitimate grievances seem to have boiled into a needed more than that for a win. One recruitment tool protest vote. If you check out were “mystery” ads that invited citizens to change the local and be seen to care about the the demographic structure mayor. The link (now leading to the party website) brought once more, you will see that the one who clicked it to an anonymous web form where will of the electorate; to keep the younger, less educated they were invited to leave their data for further contact. people, living in smaller at bay ideas and leaders, but communities that are less Also, at least one member of the AUR “Senate” (its ‘elders’) connected to prosperity, claimed that he had never joined the party in the first win back the populace.

022 023 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 Andrei Tiut: Let’s make a folder. What do we know about AUR, the new golden party of the Romanian far right?

dissatisfaction and low turnout, it more than doubles the share of far-right votes expressed and enters Parliament.

Further analysis will tell us what combination of factors was actually involved. But it is worth noting that some of these factors allow for future growth. COVID cases may still rise after the holidays and a vaccine for the general population will likely not be available until spring at the earliest. The far-right is prone to factionalisation but, once in Parliament, may acquire a taste for unity. More local groups with their own identities could theoretically join.

It now comes down to the mainstream parties and civil society to not only make a brute cordon sanitaire but also Anti-lockdown feeling. Romanian lockdown was harsh on to address legitimate grievances and be seen to care about the economy, somewhat inconsistent, and, some would the will of the electorate; to keep at bay ideas and leaders, say, incompetently implemented. One could also argue that but win back the populace. AUR might make us the favour the anti-lockdown protest in Romania, though powerful, and implode on its own, but we should not count on it. For was severely underrepresented among mainstream now, they plan on making a Thank You tour to 43 different parties. If this is the case, then AUR, even without knowing places (cities and counties) across the country in their brightly it, is an anti-lockdown party that will disappear once the coloured bus (again, not something other parties have done!). epidemic is over - just as UKIP waned after Brexit.

Far-right unity. AUR seems to come out of nowhere, but it really does not; there was a nationalist vote in 2016 also . At the time, the top three nationalist / far-right parties totalled ca. 5%. These have neither disappeared, nor massively lost votes. The increase in far-right voting is still worrying, but it seems a bit less incomprehensible now, especially given the factors above.

Naturally, all four hypotheses could be simultaneously true. The pandemic breeds fear. Fear increases the search for simple solutions and authoritarian leaders. Such simple solutions can be taken from the wealth of far-right ideas

that are tolerated within Romanian public debate. ANDREI TIUT is a political

consultant and advocacy worker

Fear for one’s own health can lead and, in fact, seems to have (on Romanian electoral laws) with a

led, to COVID-denialism as a strategy for mental welfare. background in domestic politics and

online research. He has extensive

So, a party makes its appearance, bringing together existing experience on political campaigns,

groups, but now in better organised form, promising both both at home and abroad. salvation from exploitation from the outsiders / nefarious elites and a life without masks. Given the high degree of

024 025 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 Kamil Całus: Moldova: the first ‘pas’ forward Moldova: the first ‘pas’ * forward

By Kamil Całus | Warsaw

he acronym for the group led by Maia Sandu – PAS – has a symbolic meaning in the context of the latest T elections. This word means ‘step’ in Romanian, and indeed Sandu’s victory, although it was ground-breaking for all the reasons mentioned below, is only the first step on the way towards possible serious changes to the political and social situation in Moldova. On 15 November, Maia Sandu, the former prime minister of Moldova and the leader of the pro‑Western Action and Solidarity Party (PAS), won the second round of the presidential elections in Moldova with 57.75%. At the same time her rival Igor Dodon, the outgoing president and the informal leader of the pro-Russian Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM) won 42.25% of the vote.

*‘Pas’ is the Romanian equivalent of ‘step’ - a stage in a process or an action in a series of actions taken for a particular purpose.

New elites and kingmakers of the oligarchic elites and the defender of the entrust not simply a woman, but an unmarried interest in the elections held in their homeland, from abroad ‘old order’, in which the state serves primarily as and childless one, with the position of head of but the scale of their participation has never an instrument for the enrichment of a specific state. The gender issue, and especially Sandu’s been as massive as it was in November 2020. November’s elections were ground-breaking group of people. On the other hand, the first matrimonial status, has been exploited many In the second round of elections, over 260,000 in many respects. Never before in the short three presidents of the republic between 1990 times in recent years by her political opponents. votes were cast in polling stations abroad. history of the independent existence of the to 2009 had previously held high positions in the The absence of spouse or children allowed This is twice as much as in the first round, and Republic of Moldova have its citizens chosen Communist Party of Moldova, the local branch her political opponents to spread groundless four times more than in the first round of the for their president a person who did not of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. rumours about her sexual orientation. 2016 elections. Foreign votes accounted for belong to the former Soviet nomenclature or up to 15 percent of all ballots cast. A quarter was not associated with shady local political Also for the first time, the Moldovan people, Another novelty is the role played by the of the vote for Maia Sandu came from abroad. and business groups. Dodon, for example, is who are quite conservative and have a diaspora. Moldovan emigrants, estimated at up There is no doubt that one of the important perceived by many as a corrupt representative traditional view of social roles, decided to to one million in number, have always shown factors that led to such a large mobilisation

026 027 Kamil Całus: Moldova: the first ‘pas’ forward

This was one key to her success, but there were other issues that undermined Dodon’s position. One of the most important was the return of Renato Usatîi, the populist, pro-Russian leader of ‘Our Party’, onto the Moldovan political scene. Six years ago, this politician was the socialists’ main rival on the Moldovan left. In 2014, just a few days before voting, a court (presumably influenced by Plahotniuc) banned Usatîi’s party from participating in the parliamentary elections, which enabled the socialists to achieve a spectacular success. Soon after, Usatîi left Moldova and moved to Russia. He only came back to his homeland in the second half of 2019, after Plahotniuc had fled the country. His return initiated the fragmentation of the Moldovan political left. The leader of ‘Our Party’, who has been highly critical of Dodon’s presidency, managed to rebuild his support in just over a year and win up to 17% of the votes in the first round of the presidential elections. This allowed Sandu to enter the second round in first place, which demobilised the socialist voters. Moreover, Usatîi asked his of the diaspora in the second round was the The fragmentation electorate to vote ‘against Dodon’ in the runoff critical, if not mocking, comment made by of the left and elections. As a result, many of his supporters President Igor Dodon after the results from corruption fatigue decided not to vote in the second round, or to Never before in the the first round were released; he called the cast their vote for Sandu, which – in both cases Moldovan emigrants a “parallel electorate”, and The final result of the elections was an obvious – contributed to victory for the leader of PAS. short history of the suggested that they do not fully understand the surprise for Dodon. Even though the incumbent situation in the country. It is worth noting that president had realised he could lose the independent existence this large-scale mobilisation for Sandu almost race, he did not expect his rival to obtain What can a president do? exclusively applied to Moldovan emigrants such a crushing advantage over him. One of of the Republic of living in the West, i.e. the EU, Great Britain and the key reasons for the outgoing president’s The limited prerogatives that the Moldovan the USA. These countries accounted for over failure is the widespread accusations of constitution gives to the president will not allow Moldova have its 90% of all the votes cast outside the republic. corruption levelled against him. The de facto Sandu to implement real structural reforms. leader of the PSRM is seen by many as an However, this does not mean that her victory has no citizens chosen for Meanwhile, the Moldovan émigrés in Russia associate and informal political ally of Vlad political significance. From her new post Sandu will – although estimated at up to half a million – Plahotniuc, an ex-oligarch who lost power in be able to observe more closely what is happening their president a remained very passive. In the second round June 2019 and fled the country. Plahotniuc is behind the scenes and monitor the government’s of elections, fewer than 14,000 of this group suspected to have been involved in numerous actions. She will also gain access to materials person who did not went to the polls; their votes accounted for frauds (including the embezzlement of US$1 prepared by the intelligence services. The office only 5% of all those cast by the diaspora. billion from the Moldovan banking sector in of the presidency will also provide her with greater belong to the former Moreover, the myth that Moldovans living 2014), and he is the virtual embodiment of recognition and access to the media. This in turn will in Moscow or St. Petersburg are inclined to corruption in the eyes of the Moldovan public. boost the image of the opposition. She will also be Soviet nomenclature or almost unanimously support pro-Russian Sandu took advantage of Dodon’s negative able to influence the country’s foreign policy, which candidates was also broken. Although Igor image and focused her campaign not on would be particularly important, as in the months was not associated with Dodon won in Russia with a total of 75% of the the usual geopolitical issues that divide the to come Sandu will surely focus on diplomatic votes, the 25% Sandu won there should be nation (the choice between East or West), activities and try to improve Moldova’s relations shady local political considered a huge success and proof that the but on the corruption fatigue that unites with its Western partners from the EU, as well as views of the local electorate are evolving. people beyond their political differences. its immediate neighbours Romania and Ukraine. and business groups.

028 029 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 Kamil Całus: Moldova: the first ‘pas’ forward

which – judging by Usatîi’s result – may take Apart from corruption, Sandu laid the away a lot of votes from PSRM. It is therefore Romania should emphasis in her campaign on social issues There is no doubt that clear that in this situation the socialists will and improving the citizens’ standard of living. attempt to rebuild their majority and maintain the therefore focus its Romania should therefore focus its political Usatîi’s return to the current composition of parliament, at all costs support for Sandu and consider increasing and for as long as possible. Even though this will political support for financial assistance to Moldova. It is also Moldovan political be difficult, there has been speculation about important that Bucharest becomes more alleged agreements between the socialists Sandu and consider actively involved in Moldova’s fight against scene will have negative and representatives of the Şor Party, together the pandemic. Not only will this have a with a group of deputies affiliated to Plahotniuc. increasing financial positive effect on the image of Sandu and consequences for the The true position of the ‘DA’ Platform Party the opposition (as the electorate will see it led by Andrei Năstase is also uncertain. This assistance to Moldova. as a direct benefit of her victory), but it will situation in Moldova grouping, although nominally pro-Western, also improve the perception of Romania in has found itself increasingly at odds with PAS. It is also important that Moldova, which was damaged by the fact in the long run. Moreover, given the low support for ‘DA’, early that in recent years Bucharest unofficially elections could pose a threat to this party’s presence in the Bucharest becomes but clearly supported Plahotniuc. There parliament. All these factors may foster the establishment is also no doubt that support from the EU of cooperation between ‘DA’ and the Socialists. more actively involved (which will help improve the quality of life of the country’s inhabitants) will be of great There is no doubt that Usatîi’s return to the Moldovan political in Moldova’s fight importance in building confidence in the scene will have negative consequences for the situation in Moldova pro-Western opposition. Relations with in the long run. This controversial politician, who has strong but against the pandemic. Russia are likely to deteriorate, despite the very obscure ties to Russia, will probably try to position himself new president’s desire to pursue a balanced as Sandu’s ally in the fight against corruption and the oligarchy, foreign policy. Sandu will find it hard to avoid difficult topics although in geopolitical terms he is an opponent of PAS. As a such as the issue of Russian troops in Transnistria or the status result, his actions may compromise the opposition’s pro-reformist of this region, as shown also by her recent media statements, efforts. Establishing any cooperation with him or his associates which have elicited negative reactions from Moscow. should therefore be undertaken very carefully, if at all. Otherwise, PAS risks a repeat of the scenario from the end of the second half On the home front of 2019, when it was pushed out of power after just five months due to an agreement between the Socialists and the Democratic PAS, strengthened by Sandu’s victory, will call for parliamentary Party, which was previously led and sponsored by Plahotniuc. elections to be held as soon as possible. To start real reforms and deliver on Sandu’s election promises, the pro- European opposition needs not only the president, but also a parliamentary majority. This will not be an easy task, although the situation in the Moldovan parliament seems to be favourable. The Chicu government does not currently have a majority in

the chamber. After Dodon’s dramatic failure, his party is no KAMIL CAŁUS is research fellow in

longer interested in early parliamentary elections, although the the Department for Ukraine, Belarus

incumbent president had supported them just a few months ago. and Moldova at Centre for Eastern

The socialists are not only afraid of the pro-Western electorate Studies (OSW), Warsaw. motivated by Sandu’s victory; more importantly, they realise that in the next elections they will undoubtedly face ‘Our Party’,

030 031 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 Siegfried Mureșan: “We need to do more to inform people of the real benefits of European integration”

Interview Siegfried Mureșan, member of the European Parliament – We have to stand firm, we have to defend our values, European People’s Party (EPP), Romania. as I said, at national and European level, but also in our European Neighbourhood, because we can only be safe in our Union if we are surrounded by countries “We need to do more to inform that share our values and that are safe and stable.

people of the real benefits of “The questioning of our democratic institutions serves European integration” autocrats around the world” It is all good to say that we need to keep our house in order, but there are many within the ranks of the EU that do not seem to agree with the same idea of order that some of us may have. Do we have at a European level the instruments to ensure that we are playing by As the vice-chair of EPP, you are in a delicate leadership the same rules, or do we just need to wait until position: you are a young voice in an older party, you have the day comes when the Hungarian people go always been vocally pro-European and pro-democracy, to the poll and vote Orbán out of office? but at the same time you have had to manage anti- democratic developments outside the European Union, The truth is that fake news and disinformation within its borders and sometimes even within your European play a very big role in the era of social media. party. What do you feel is your greatest challenge at It is just as true that a spectacular lie survives this point as an EPP leader in trying to keep at bay anti- much more on Twitter than a boring truth. To democratic developments within the European Union? the challenges that we are facing, solutions are often complicated. There is no silver bullet. What we have to do is first and foremost keep our house in order. At a national and European level, we have to We as policymakers need to do a better job in promote democratic values, a balance of power and explaining that populism offers no real solutions. strong, resilient institutions including the judiciary. We need to educate people and better inform them on how to behave online, because it can be There is no better news for authoritarians around the world a dangerous place, too. They have to understand than a European Union that is not strong in defending its values. that internet is as serious as real life, and that As it often goes in life, there is first the disease and then you you have to learn where and how to read and find the vaccine or the medicine. We have seen developments how to better spot disinformation. that we could not anticipate: Brexit in 2016 and the rise of Siegfried Mureșan extremism and populism in some member states There is no better news for of the European Union. We all saw the negative authoritarians around the world consequences of Brexit and these days we than a European Union that is not are just witnessing the figures, UK exports to strong in defending its values. the EU are collapsing.

032 033 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 Siegfried Mureșan: “We need to do more to inform people of the real benefits of European integration”

We also need to provide more rules for distributing content We need to establish clear rules for the virtual One thing is clear: if you receive European online. The fact of people being encouraged in undertaking world just as we have rules for the real world, support, you should respect European violent acts online represents a threat to our security not that need to be determined by democratic rules and values. This should be a basic only at the level of cybersecurity, but also in real life. institutions, through a democratic process. We principle and we have made lots of need predictable and clear regulations that progress in the past months to adopt How often have we are communicated to the users beforehand legislation. For example, as of the 1st The preoccupation of a party seen attacks from anti- so that they know what they are allowed to do of January 2021, you can only receive European politicians (that and what they are not, and these rules shall EU funds if you respect the rule of law. which cannot become a majority are instead branding be decided in very transparent debates. In This is valid for the traditional Budget themselves as Social- the European Parliament, we are planning to of the European Union, but also for the party will be to keep the loyalty of Democrats, Conservatives, invite the social media companies to share €750bn support made available for those or Christian-Democrats, their insights and their challenges, and we affected by the COVID-19 pandemic: that minority, and that makes you when in fact they are going to evaluate what they are going to people, enterprises, regions, countries. aren’t) towards the tell us. Parliaments around the world need to go towards the extremism corner European institutions set these standards, and I would appreciate Secondly, populists by definition always in countries like Poland a consultation with the US Congress on this need an enemy. We just need to call and tell people whatever comforts or Romania appearing topic so that the regulations that we adopt their bluff and explain to the people why just weeks before on are similar on both sides of the Atlantic. defending democratic institutions at the them, not necessarily what is true. pro-Russian outlets? end of the day is in their best interest, We have to connect The legislative process is still in the because if the rule of law is weakened, the dots and explain to people the global picture and beginning, so it is too early to present the the individual is not safe anymore. that the questioning of our democratic institutions serves final details. The European Commission has autocrats around the world. It is much harder to create for presented the draft legislation in December Yes, the people who are opposed to instance a pro-Putin, or a pro-Erdoğan group of supporters and the Parliament’s work has just started, our democratic order are a consistent in members states of the EU than it is to seed doubt but we are going to carry it in a transparent minority, but a minority, nonetheless. with regard to management at the European level. way so that people know what awaits them They represent a higher percentage of online and that corporations have a clear the population in some states, but they textbook on the basis of which they can act. are not a majority. The preoccupation “We need to establish clear of a party which cannot become rules for the virtual world, just a majority party also because of like for the real world” “If the rule of law is demographics will be to keep the loyalty weakened, the individual of that minority, and that makes you go The European Commission has already advanced two major is not safe anymore” towards the extremism corner and tell policy proposals to the European Parliament, the Digital people whatever comforts them, not Services Act and the Digital Markets Act. As the discussion We have seen with the storming of the necessarily what is true. We should not has started on this topic, what is the pulse in the European US Capitol how the idea of freedom has forget, Brexit too started with lies. Parliament regarding the form of these proposals? become a relative one, with some rioters considering their actions as legitimate forms This is why we have moved into a public Months ago, we saw large social media companies of freedom of expression. Does Brussels debate in which there are no more like Facebook and Twitter shut down the accounts of a have the instruments to ensure a healthy generally accepted truths, but only former US President. Some of us said “Maybe a bit too democracy, where one’s freedom does not opinions. This is why the promotion of late, but finally!”, some of us said “Why?”. The companies impinge on anybody else’s? Or is it just up facts and science as well as tackling fake were in a position where there was no legal basis to to national politicians to make sure that news is so important and is something act upon, and they had to act in their own name. people make the best-informed choices? that we have not done sufficiently so far.

034 035 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 Siegfried Mureșan: “We need to do more to inform people of the real benefits of European integration”

In Romania, the vast majority of the “We need to get out population and the political class is of party headquarters. theoretically very pro-European, but in Politics needs to reality, our system of values is something reflect society” that has not fully evolved into becoming European. This may be the reason why we What is the most effective way of did not pay attention that nationalism communicating with the electorates of such was rising in Romania too, and that we Eurosceptic parties, to avoid alienating have authoritarian tendencies as well. them further, but without legitimising Do you feel like this is something that the radical forces they support? needs to be addressed soon, or just that it is there, as in many other countries and Firstly, established parties need to get out that it is nowhere near becoming a crisis? of their comfort zone. We need to get out of party headquarters, go to where people The general consensus at the level of are, talk as people talk and address the the society is that NATO is good, the issues that concern them. Politics needs EU is good and that the West is good. to reflect society: we need politicians of all But politicians have not made sufficient qualifications, age, and backgrounds. efforts in explaining to the people what the actual benefits of transatlantic Secondly, pro-European centre-left and centre- integration are, due to two main reasons. right parties should cooperate on this issue. I was encouraged by the debate in the European “Small states are the stewards Woman with red lightning bolt Firstly, many of them simply did not Parliament on the 20th of January, when we drawn on her hand, symbol of of European values” the National Women's Strike have the intellectual capacity and the were discussing the US presidential inauguration against the tightening of the anti-abortion law in Poland. competence to do that. Secondly, the and the future of the transatlantic relations. What direction do you think the transatlantic relationship is less educated the people are, the more My political family, the centre-right European heading into? We have just seen Josep Borrell’s highly criticised vulnerable they are and that was simply People’s Party was united with the newly visit to Russia, and the EU debate, with some countries being in the interest of some political actors. established Renew Europe group, with the more cooperative towards Moscow than others. So who is going The Social-Democratic party for instance Greens, and even with a significant part of the to be the steward of the transatlantic relationship in Europe? has never declared itself to be anti- Social-Democrat group, in advocating towards European, but it has at decisive moments making our economies more modern, cleaner, We need to be clear that economic interests and human played the card of “We are fighting and greener on both sides of the Atlantic. On rights go hand in hand. You cannot say “business first, human Brussels, we are sovereign!”. We have the other side, there was the extreme right, a rights later”, because the more money you pour into the not seen the rise of a Eurosceptic party in part of the conservative group which is in power accounts of the Kremlin, the easier it will be for it to keep Romania in recent electoral cycles also in Poland and a part of the Communist group. the Russian people hostile. The more money comes through due the fact that slight Euroscepticism At the end of the day, the extreme parties have gas revenues for instance, the easier it is for the government was taken care of by other parties, more in common than we may initially realise. to increase pensions and keep people happy with a regime particularly the Social-Democratic party. that is endangering human rights and the rule of law. When it comes to the rise of extremism, we We need to do more to inform people the centre have to work together but also be Who will be the steward of European values? I was recently of the real benefits of European able to differentiate ourselves. Otherwise, encouraged by the behaviour of small states of the EU, integration. The less they know about it, in the absence of a differentiation, there is a countries from the Baltic Area for instance, and Eastern the more vulnerable this pro-European risk that the centre will shrink, and extremist Europe in general, who are standing up to Russia and have a consensus will be in the future. parties will end up having more space to grow. competitive advantage in this regard. I think that especially

036 037 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 Siegfried Mureșan: “We need to do more to inform people of the real benefits of European integration”

with Antony Blinken as Secretary of State there is an open door to better explain to the people of the Republic of Moldova the now in Washington and it is time to strengthen the transatlantic concrete results of the support offered by the European Union. partnership and not to seek a warm spot in the middle between Moscow and Washington. I believe that the visit in Moscow To conclude we have to provide more support now, of the High Representative was a mistake and a failure. during the COVID-19 crisis. We did a lot in supporting the Moldovan economy and in providing immediate medical assistance. However, we have to find a way to also provide “We have to get more European vaccines for the people in our neighbourhood, in particular vaccines to the Republic of Moldova to the medical personnel. People in these countries will before Vladimir Putin does the not forget who helped them, so we have to get more same with the vaccine” European vaccines to the Republic of Moldova before Vladimir Putin does the same with the Sputnik vaccine. Some weeks ago, you were among the EU officials that The solution would be for the European Commission to new Moldovan President Maia Sandu has met with during establish a pool in which each member state can donate her latest visit in Brussels. She faces an uphill struggle in some of its vaccines without making the numbers public, promoting democracy and the rule of law domestically, as so that domestic public pressure can be avoided. The EU she lacks the parliamentary support needed for reforms already has orders of 760 million vaccines for this year, in these areas. What concrete measures is the European while in order to vaccinate the entire medical personnel in Parliament considering in supporting her agenda? the countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood, one needs 750,000 doses, which is 0.1% of what the European Union This interview is The fact that one of our immediate neighbours has moved has ordered. I think we should be able to find these doses. part of the project from being led by a pro-Kremlin president to being led by a 'Authoritarian president who wants to work closer with Europe is an important Shadows in the development. My message towards my colleagues in Brussels is European Union', that we need to stretch our hand now and we need to cooperate supported by the with the Republic of National Endowment Moldova through financial for Democracy, which When it comes to the rise of and technical support. brings together Political Capital extremism, we the centre have We are widely opening (Budapest) and its our doors with technical partners from Austria, to work together but also be assistance, also through the Bulgaria, Czechia, newly created European Poland, Slovakia able to differentiate ourselves. Public Prosecutor’s Office, and Romania to as the new president has research values- Otherwise, in the absence of a vowed to continue the based attitudes fight against corruption, to to foreign policy differentiation, there is a risk strengthen the judiciary and authoritarian and the fight to recover influence in the that the centre will shrink, and the money lost in the European Union very large fraud of the institutions. extremist parties will end up country’s banking system. In terms of financial having more space to grow. support, we also have The interview was conducted by Oana Popescu Zamfir and Vlad Iavita

038 039 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 R amona Strugariu: I fear that we might end up with a blitzkrieg against democracy

they can act with impunity, and that the European Union is Member of the European Parliament – Interview Ramona Strugariu, not exactly equipped with those tools to be able to efficiently Renew Europe, Romania. and rapidly respond to such breaches on the rule of law.

I fear that we might end up with We ignored to deal with the issue for a number of years, but let’s take a look at the instruments that we do have. a blitzkrieg against democracy “We will never reach unanimity within the Union to apply Article 7 to one member state”

We have the CVM (Cooperation and Verification Mechanism), which is specific to Romania and Bulgaria. It is a very commendable initiative which is related Throughout the pandemic, democratic standards to the acts of accession and implies a lot have worsened around the world, examples of such of recommendations and concrete steps developments coming from within the European Union to take, but all of them non-binding. as well. What tools and plans does the Union have to reverse these trends, at least within its borders? Then we have the Commission’s rule of Ramona law framework and the Council’s rule of Strugariu We have a lot of work to do. Some worrying law dialogues, which essentially situations have become critical, and I am specifically represent some discussions and referring to and Poland here. produce some non-binding recommendations. The trend of deterioration for our democracies is very rapid. It Budapest, 12 April, 2017. Thousands demonstrate in central Budapest is speeding up unless we intervene, and I fear that we might Then we move to against new higher education end up with a blitzkrieg against democracy. Not necessarily infringements, and legislation seen as targeting the Central European University. overnight, but in a very short period of time. That is why I am here we have a sound asking myself sometimes whether we are legal basis and that equipped enough to respond to that or is the Article 258 not. And the answer is: rather not. Why? TFEU. Infringements however are moving What Viktor Orbán is doing to Hungary for quite slowly, Romania example is not happening since yesterday, it is for instance has a happening since around 2010. This example long list of them but was followed by Poland, which acted similarly nonetheless, other against the judiciary, and expanding on countries are on that list other areas, the latest development being as well. These procedures a ban on abortion which is a step back to are legally‑binding the Medieval Ages. The reason they did it and can determine was that they realised at some point that possible sanctions. Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 Ramona Strugariu: I fear that we might end up with a blitzkrieg against democracy

And lastly, we have the so-called “nuclear option”, the “Sanctions only will not countering disinformation in a responsible way, Article 7. The Article 7 paragraph 1 is on a “clear risk” of improve the state of bringing Eastern Partnership countries closer to a breach of values and is activated on the vote of four democracy in the Union” the European Project, building resilience within fifths of the members of the Council and determines the member states, or even talking the citizens existence of this serious risk. However, in order to move to However, this mechanism is triggered only through the alphabet of EU values that have a Article 7 paragraph 2, which is very concretely related to if the financial interests of the Union are direct influence on their lives. All of these will sanctions, unanimity is required, and this ends the story. affected. It is not per se directed against probably be more effective than sanctions on top It is so because breaches of rule of law, and the causal of sanctions. Yes, we need a mechanism to be we will probably relationship between the financial interests triggered in complicated situations, for the Union never reach such of the Union and a breach of the rule of law and for the relationship with third countries alike, There should be an emphasis unanimity within is very difficult to establish. So, do we have but my hope ultimately does rely more on how the Union when it a mechanism that is essentially toothless we can build up upon the values that we have. on education, media literacy, comes to applying because it is very hard to use, if not impossible, such sanctions to or do we really have an instrument that we countering disinformation in one member state, can use, even though with some difficulty? “Societies will change as that state will governments. We will a responsible way, bringing always have friends, We have a mechanism with a preventive not be able to do that” or will always have component, that can also be triggered when Eastern Partnership countries regional strategic there is a serious risk of a breach in the rule Generous funding has been approved for partners supporting of law, which can prevent situations when the Rights and Values programme, with a closer to the European Project, its position in EU funds could be allocated towards ends in guaranteed funding of over €600m and also a the Council. conflict with EU values. On the other hand, I am possibility of extension of this funding to over building resilience within fully aware that there is no perfect mechanism €1.5bn. This is a programme that is very clearly We are a bit stuck, to be triggered in this kind of situations. targeted towards strengthening the civil society member states, or even talking but not hopeless. and key EU values amongst citizens. Does Firstly, we are Article 7 is in my view an impossible procedure. this renewed focus on more bottom-up action the citizens through the alphabet looking towards A serious discussion on how to act more signal a change in approach from the Union? the Conference efficiently will come of course after a change in of EU values that have a direct for the Future of the Treaties. However, we have this mechanism I think it is simply a wake-up call, and the Europe with a lot conditioning financing from the EU budget on realisation that we either get stuck forever influence on their lives. of responsibility, the respect of the rule of law and this should give in an unfunctional mechanism that we built also in view of us a bit more hope and a bit more space to act. up ourselves, or we start to address in a changing these more proactive way the challenges ahead mechanisms. It Nonetheless, if we refer to sanctions and only of us. Disinformation and hybrid war are for may seem far away, but it is something that needs to sanctions, I am afraid that we will not necessarily instance huge ones. This is exactly the type happen fundamentally if we want a more responsible improve the state of democracy in the Union. of action that builds resilience within societies European project. Secondly, we do have the Here I would really welcome initiatives like no matter what governments may say. conditionality mechanism related to the rule of law, the European Democracy Action Plan, or the which is a mechanism that is able to trigger specific Rights and Values Programme, this kind of Governments come and go, and educated sanctions upon those member states that are in actions that are not applying financial sanctions, societies are the ones that are giving ground breach of these principles and values. More so, we and therefore create more tension within the to emerging political forces which are capable can have these measures being taken even when European Project, but instead build upon the to economically and socially support the we determine that there is a risk, and not only when values that we have to preserve. There should country and uphold these European values. an attack on the rule of law has already occurred. be an emphasis on education, media literacy, The focus should be rather here, than dealing

042 043 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 Ramona Strugariu: I fear that we might end up with a blitzkrieg against democracy

with some stubborn governments that will not We have seen during the pandemic that Going back to the new change: societies will change governments, we have serious backsliding from those rule of law mechanism: but we will not be able to do that. countries which were considered models does it protect against of democracy, and models of respect for governments seizing These governments, especially Poland and human rights. Democracy is not a given. control over the Hungary, do have a solid electoral base, It is something that you build up every judiciary, which is so trying to apply outside pressure might day. Through the civil society, through the a very quick way to actually alienate these citizens. Are we educational systems of these countries, backslide seriously (as trying to bring societies to a level where they through a coherent policy in the Union in Hungary), or does would make more educated democratic dedicated to media literacy. We ignored these it also open a country judgements on their governments? things for a while, and we are now in a huge like Romania to the and unequal battle to fight something that we danger that inefficient The media is dying in Hungary. The did not bother to address at the right moment. and insufficiently propaganda machine that Orbán uses to developed justice target the population does not need any Regarding the Eastern Partnership, I have might end up being other source of inspiration, not even Russia, been part of several discussions in the punished more than because he does it so well. It will have an past days with people from parties in these politically controlled impact upon the people, and their political countries who are desperately calling for justice, which is what decisions. And if we are to call it an “informed support in tackling the crisis. I wonder if we have in Hungary? decision”, we have to ask ourselves what kind we realised that essential, small, targeted of information does reach these citizens. steps towards these partners could In the last years, the degradation that you mean enormously in terms of solidarity, mentioned advanced so quickly that and I am afraid Maybe we should be looking there a lot more and for their democracies as well. it might take some time to properly fix it. than we are doing it today. Maybe through a consistent, longer-term effort we are able Vaccines deliveries, at least for the essential A significant effort has to be made, and within the country. to help these citizens understand that what medical staff are necessary. Russia and China I am not saying that the EU should not help: it should, it is happening is wrong and that it will be a are looking at this too, and if they get to do does, and it is of course fundamental for the European huge mistake to reconfirm through vote a it before us, their geostrategic influence and institutions to react when things go wrong. But it is primarily leader that is depriving them of information. influence in the region will increase significantly. our national responsibility to make sure we do not end up Targeted economic measures for SMEs as well in the situation when we are literally screaming “EU, help as funds for media freedom are also important. us!”. Because we were not so long ago in the situation “We are in a huge when we were begging for a message coming from and unequal battle to If we look at the numbers, the Union is doing Vice-President Timmermans or Commissioner Jurova fight something that a lot of things, and it would be unfair to say to send signals that what was happening in Romania we did not address at otherwise. But since the crisis is an effort for was wrong. I think it definitely did make a difference, the right moment” all governments, I would not exclude the because the people out in the streets were probably Eastern Partnership, not even the Western feeling very lonely in the beginning but these messages Are we back to acknowledging that democracy Balkans from this effort. Let us think about coming from the EU institutions encouraged them. is not something that EU members just have it together with them. Let us include them as a given, and we have to build it together? in the Green Deal project and engage with But all of this is indeed only applying pressure. We do have Does that mean that the EU is prepared to them in our discussions. Let us bring them a long list of outstanding recommendations on Justice, take its influence more seriously around more in our policies and trans-sectoral and we do have a long list of infringement procedures as its borders too, in the Western Balkans cooperation. After all of this, they will naturally well. Whether all of these are fixed, is a matter of national and Eastern Partnership countries? come closer to the European Project. responsibility, regardless of the government of the day.

044 045 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 Ramona Strugariu: I fear that we might end up with a blitzkrieg against democracy

“We have problems from rather places: people are upset in the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal and unexpected places” France. There is a sign that there is a very vulnerable path and a fragile balance everywhere. When acknowledging backslidings, we are not relying on statements from political sources, but on One of the more encouraging recent developments is the reports from institutions and the analyses of think tanks and NGOs. creation of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. In light It is up to the civil society to signal such backsliding and speak of the latest conditionalities on rule of law, how influential out loudly about it. Luckily, we are not self-evaluating ourselves, will this new institution be? And as this institution is still and this is one of the good signs that we do have mechanisms being consolidated, will the stakeholders have the necessary within our countries and the Union to support democracy. political will to fully empower it to function at full capacity?

On a scale of 1 to 10, how likely do you think it You need political will to make it functional, but then you will not is that the Conference on the Future of Europe need that anymore because the prosecutors will just have to do will result in a change in the treaties? their job. That is why there is still some resistance from the level of some member states when it comes to delegating prosecutors. I would say at least 8. I believe our only option to provide a secure environment for the European Project and to turn Once set up and fully functional, it will definitely do its duty. They it into a resilience instrument for preserving democracy is are estimated to start with a number of approximately 3000 to adapt it to the changes and to the world around us. cases, and then the average will be of about 2000 per year, which is a lot. For this, they need full support budgetary-wise, and we We saw during the crisis that in such situations, the tendency is not are trying to persuade the Commission to fund this institution as to act in solidarity and in a coherent manner, but to think of ourselves This interview is a full judicial body of the Union and not as a simple agency. first. The sad truth is that nobody can secure their own backyard part of the project alone. Not in this kind of situations, and not in general either. 'Authoritarian Nevertheless, we need to observe that we do not have Shadows in the problems in appointing prosecutors from CEE countries, European Union', but from rather unexpected places. For instance, Portugal supported by the and Belgium are some of the more notorious examples, National Endowment when the evaluation of the independent selection body for Democracy, which was replaced via a political national decision. brings together Political Capital Should we expect every (Budapest) and its Our only option to provide a state will be treated fairly, partners from Austria, or that it will be very easy Bulgaria, Czechia, secure environment for the to bully Central Eastern Poland, Slovakia Europe into a corner since and Romania to European Project and to turn we already have a problem research values- of capital of trust? it into a resilience instrument based attitudes to foreign policy I think we are a bit past and authoritarian for preserving democracy is that kind of bullying, influence in the because we have seen European Union to adapt it to the changes and that during the crisis, we institutions. have had backsliding in to the world around us. the most unexpected The interview was conducted by Oana Popescu Zamfir and Vlad Iavita

046 047 Europe Onward

The Troubled Periphery

George Vișan (Bucharest): The saber-rattling in Ukraine is heating up the Black Sea /p.050

Mădălin Blidaru (Bucharest): Turkey’s regional options in the 21st century: between the political West and the wider Asia /p.064

Romario Shehu (Tirana): Next generation Turkey and its foreign policy in the Western Balkans /p.074

048 049 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 George Vișan: The saber-rattling in Ukraine is heating up the Black Sea The saber-rattling in Ukraine is heating up the Black Sea

By George Vișan | Bucharest

s things heat up between Russia and Ukraine, George Vișan explains the stakes for each player and the strategic landscape in the Black A Sea region. Seven years have passed since Russia annexed and began a proxy war against Ukraine. These events marked the beginning of the most brutal and serious armed conflict in the Black Sea region since the

end of World War II. The advent of war between Russia and Ukraine in 2014 seemed a very unrealistic possibility. There was no consensus in Painting by Thomas Ender has had a negative impact on the regional security environment. Furthermore, 2014 within Ukraine in favour of becoming a NATO member, and (Austrian, 1793-1875) - The Imperial and Royal Steamboat Marianna subsequent events have changed the regional balance of force in Russia’s favour. there was no consensus within the Alliance for Ukraine to join it. in a Storm in the Black Sea

In February 2014, Russian troops wearing unmarked uniforms took over military installations in Crimea, as well as key civilian infrastructure. On 18 March 2014, Crimea was officially annexed by Russia: projecting force within the the Russian Federation after an illegal referendum. In parallel with Black Sea region and beyond its actions in Crimea, Russian-sponsored individuals started a breakaway movement in eastern Ukraine, in Since 2014 the Russian Federation has been engaged in a proxy the coal-rich and mostly Russian-speaking Donbas Russia plans to further war against its neighbour Ukraine. The purpose of the Kremlin’s region. When Ukrainian armed forces decisively military campaign against Kyiv has been to stop it from joining the beat back the rebels in Donbass, Russian forces escalate the arms West and thus bring Western influence closer to Russia’s border. intervened on their behalf, decimating the Ukrainian Russia claims the former republics of the Soviet Union as its own troops with precision fire and armoured assaults. race in the Black Sea sphere of influence.1 Moscow began its aggression against Ukraine in 2014 when it became clear that rather than joining Russia’s Despite the Minsk agreements signed in 2014 region by deploying Eurasian Union, the country would have preferred to have closer and the ongoing Normandy Format talks, relations with the West, by signing an association and free trade fighting continues in eastern Ukraine to this day. the first hypersonic agreement with the European Union. Russian elites construed Russia is fighting a proxy war of attrition against Ukraine’s option for the EU as a further step towards NATO Ukraine, the goal of which is to compromise anti-ship cruise accession. Despite being a part of NATO’s Partnership for Peace Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity in (PfP), Ukraine’s NATO accession was not on the table in 2014 and order to turn Kyiv away from its Western path. missile in the world.

050 051 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 George Vișan: The saber-rattling in Ukraine is heating up the Black Sea

The annexation of Crimea provided Russia Since 2014, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet has of such vessels. It represents a trend for escalation dominance with an important geostrategic asset in the received six new Kilo class submarines and and operational flexibility, as the Kalibr missile in its land attack Black Sea region and beyond. The Kremlin three new Admiral Grigorovich class guided variant is capable of hitting targets as far as 2000 km away. can now effectively project force within the missile frigates. It should have received six of Black Sea region, as well as beyond in the this new type of guided missile frigate, but Of particular note for the Black Sea region is the development and Eastern Mediterranean. According to the new Ukraine cut off the supply of turbine engines. deployment of the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile. This is likely US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, “Russia’s Nevertheless, until Russian industry can replace an Iskander-M tactical ballistic missile adapted strategic goals in the Black Sea include the Ukrainian turbines with similar products, for launch from MiG-31K long-range interceptors6. maintaining access to the Mediterranean Sea in place of the three frigates, the Black Sea Its stated purpose is to take out ballistic missile The annexation of and facilitating the defense of the Russian Fleet has received small missile corvettes defence interceptor bases, such as the one at homeland. In the Eastern Mediterranean capable of launching land attack cruise missiles. Deveselu in Romania. This particular combination Crimea provided Russia Russia seeks to expand power projection Moreover, the shipyards in Crimea have started of missile and aircraft was first deployed in the capabilities, demonstrate expeditionary reach building fast attack craft for the Russian navy. Southern Military District which encompasses with an important to potential partners and influence a variety the Black Sea region. This is a very potent of ongoing diplomatic issues in its favor”2. The Crimean peninsula has been transformed combination of carrier and vector: the MiG-31 is geostrategic asset in the into a ‘strategic bastion‘ by Russia in order a high-speed long-range interceptor designed The value and relevance of the annexation to protect its territorial acquisition as well as at the height of the Cold War to deal with US Black Sea region and was proven in 2015, when Russia intervened to project power. It has also become one of SR-71 supersonic reconnaissance aircraft. The militarily in using Crimea as the main the places where Russia showcases its latest Iskander-M is equipped with an electro-optical beyond. The Kremlin staging ground for the operation. The only military technology, for both strategic reasons guidance system which allows is to make terminal limitations regarding the use of Crimea as a and marketing purposes. In Crimea the Kremlin manoeuvres before hitting its target. The MiG-31K can now effectively power projection asset are geographical and has deployed S-400 Triumf long-range and the Kinzhal could be used to strike time- legal: the Straits of Bosporus & the Dardanelles, integrated air defence systems, as well as Bal sensitive targets in the region such as air bases, project force within the and the Montreux Convention. In the Black & Bastion-P coastal defence systems3. It has naval bases and reinforced command centres. Sea, Russia’s military presence is reinforced created an area denial and anti-access (A2/ Black Sea region, as well by its naval base at Novorossiysk and by the AD) network which secures the newly acquired Russia plans to further escalate the arms troops deployed in the breakaway ‘republics’ territory, provides a good air and maritime race in the Black Sea region by deploying as beyond in the Eastern of Abkhazia and , in . picture, increases the cost to outside actors the first hypersonic anti-ship cruise missile of projecting force, and allows it to blackmail in the world, the 3M22 Zircon, which is Mediterranean. Over the past seven years Russia has managed neighbouring countries into submission during currently undergoing operational testing. If to gradually overturn the military balance in a crisis. In the near future Russia will improve the system works as advertised by Kremlin propaganda, it will the region in its favour. Moreover, the Kremlin its surveillance and awareness of the Black provide the Russian Navy with a capability without parallel in has learned how to take advantage of the and Mediterranean Seas by deploying the NATO navies. Moscow considers hypersonic weapon systems existing differences between NATO members Voronezh-SM long range radar in Sevastopol4. as a major component of its conventional deterrence. and use it to its favour. Turkey’s grievances with the US, Greece and France have been Lacking new large surface combatants, the Of particular concern for US planners is the so-called ‘escalate to exploited and used as a wedge against NATO. Russian navy has been forced to deploy Kalibr deescalate’ strategy, which is defined as “a strategy that purportedly cruise missile on every newly commissioned seeks to deescalate a conventional conflict through coercive One of the Russian Federation’s main priorities submarine and surface combatant.5 This threats, including limited nuclear use”. The Kremlin could use this after it took over Crimea from Ukraine has been tendency towards ‘Kalibri-sation’, as the strategy in a potential conventional war against NATO to secure to revamp the military assets based in the Military Balance has called it, is being used to territory Russia seizes by threatening and even using tactical peninsula: the Black Sea Fleet (BSF), air bases for compensate for the newer and larger surface nuclear weapons. However, it must be noted that this strategy has naval aviation and the Russian Air Space Forces, ships which are now beyond the capabilities of not been mentioned in any Russian policy-planning document, but as well as infrastructure for the land forces. the Russian shipyards, as well as for the cost has been inferred by US military and nuclear weapons experts.

052 053 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 George Vișan: The saber-rattling in Ukraine is heating up the Black Sea

Although Russia seems to have achieved some sort of local military effects of the sanctions imposed after 2014, NATO: a two-speed approach superiority, it has by no means overtaken NATO. Overall the Alliance, the drop in oil prices and the effects of the for the eastern flank and the United States in particular, still have the lead. However, COVID-19 pandemic. More importantly, with Russia is trying to use some of its few competitive advantages in access to Western technology being curtailed, Seven years after the annexation of Crimea and missile technology to offset NATO’s military preponderance by Russian defence programs have stalled or five years after NATO’s Warsaw Summit, the trying to exploit its dependence on follow-on reinforcements.7 been delayed9. Third, the pandemic is forcing alliance is maintaining a two-speed approach The process of modernising the Russian armed forces began in the Kremlin to pay attention to domestic for the eastern flank: Poland and the three Baltic 2011, but has not yet been completed. Russia’s armed forces still developments. The handling of the SARS- states are recipients of the Enhanced Forward depend on battalion tactical groups (BTGs, similar to Western battle CoV 2 pandemic has not been stellar, Russian Presence force-posture approach, while groups) rather than standing operational military formations. Russian authorities being forced to acknowledge at the Romania and Bulgaria have to make do with forces now have around 136 battalion tactical groups made up start of 2021 that more Russians have died of the the Tailored Forward Presence. A two-speed exclusively of professional soldiers; the target is 200 such groups8. pandemic than previously announced. Finally, approach regarding the security and defence of the protests that have developed following the eastern flank is not conducive to a coherent Russia’s military posture may not be sustainable in the future for a the poisoning of Russian opposition leader deterrence posture. The Trump administration multitude of overlapping reasons. First, Russia has overextended Aleksei Navalny and his subsequent arrest is exacerbated this issue with a schizoid policy itself militarily over the past seven years: it has been involved in forcing the Kremlin to prioritise the survival regarding NATO and a Janus-faced approach conflicts or has deployed troops to Ukraine, Syria and Libya. It of the regime, rather than force projection. to Russia. Despite deploying more troops on maintains a significant naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea, the eastern flank and allocating more funds to and has plans to build bases in the region. Losses from these In the ex-Soviet space, Russia’s reputation the European Deterrence Initiative, the Trump conflicts have mounted over the years, sapping political support at as an ally and security provider has taken administration did not fundamentally alter Working trip of the President of Ukraine to Donbas (April 2021) home. Second, its economy has been affected by the cumulative a serious hit after Azerbaijan’s success in NATO’s military posture on the eastern flank.10 reclaiming some of its territory in the Nagorno Moreover, it failed to articulate a new NATO Karabakh region, following a short but highly strategic concept; also, President Trump’s sophisticated war in 2020. Moreover, an outside instinctive distrust of multilateral alliances power (Turkey) has been allowed to give dealt a severe blow to the Alliance’s cohesion. military support to a client state (Azerbaijan) The decision taken in July 2020 to withdraw in Moscow’s ‘backyard’ (Central Asia) without troops from Germany, because Berlin was not visible consequences. The security guarantees meeting its 2% of GDP spending target and provided by the CSTO and Russia’s claim to for supporting the ill-conceived North Stream a sphere of influence in its near aboard have 2 gas pipeline, has needlessly exacerbated been called into question. In the case of relations with one of Washington’s most Armenia, the Kremlin has sacrificed strategic important allies in Europe and has called its credibility for dubious local political gains. commitment to Europe’s security into question.11 Overall, the American attitude towards NATO Russia presents a complex strategic picture in the past four years has had a negative of military and diplomatic prowess, but also impact on the Alliance’s cohesion, and has of political fragility. This situation defines contributed to what President Emmanuel Moscow more as a regional actor, with some Macron has termed NATO’s ‘brain death‘. limited capabilities of power projection, than as a global player which could keep up If Washington exposed profound divisions with the US or China. However, this disparity between the president and the deep between capabilities and status should not administration over strategic directions and lead to underestimating Moscow’s will to tactical execution, some Western European generate instability in its near abroad. members have sent mixed signals that have

054 055 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 George Vișan: The saber-rattling in Ukraine is heating up the Black Sea

negatively impacted NATO’s posture on the S-400 Triumf integrated air defence system and Western manufacturers. Technical cooperation concerning the eastern flank. Germany and France have indeed its descent into authoritarianism. Turkey has a development of an integrated air defence system would represent deployed troops in the Baltic states and Poland; complex relationship with Russia, characterised a high-tech prestige project for Turkey which would emphasise however, Berlin is still underinvesting in defence both by competition and cooperation. The the advancements in science, technology and military power and cooperating with Russia in building the Nord Kremlin did indeed exacerbate the tensions Ankara has made over the past 100 years in general, and under Stream 2 pipeline. Paris considers terrorism existing between Ankara and its western allies the leadership of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to be the greatest security threat it faces, and over Syria, Iraq and the attempted coup in in particular. In the case of the S-400 procurement, Erdoğan felt is mainly focused on the Middle East, North 2016 in order to separate it from the Western that his country was not being taken seriously and needed to send Africa, the Sahel and the Indo-Pacific.12 The alliance. However, Turkey proved to be a a signal to its allies in NATO. However, his brinkmanship may have eastern flank is merely an genuine competitor to not paid off, as the United States has eliminated Turkey from the afterthought on the Élysée Russia in Syria, Libya and F-35 Lightning II multirole fighter programme and has imposed a and the Quai d’Orsay – or Over the past two in the South Caucasus. number of sanctions against it. The F-35 programme is far more even a source of irritation, Ankara was instrumental lucrative in financial terms, and has more cutting-edge technology when the countries in years Ankara in Azerbaijan’s successful than what the Russian Federation may offer in the long run. the region acquire US campaign in Nagorno military equipment13. has successfully Karabakh and deployed The Kremlin may have overplayed its hand when it comes to advisors, foreign fighters separating Ankara from the US and its NATO allies. Despite the confronted Russia and state-of-the-art ongoing controversies regarding the Erdoğan regime, Ankara’s Turkey: NATO’s military equipment in disputes with Athens in the Eastern Mediterranean, tensions linchpin in the Eastern support of the Azeri forces. with Paris over Libya and Syria and with Washington over the in the Black In Libya in 2020, Turkish S-400 procurement and Syria, Turkey remains anchored within Sea region Mediterranean equipment and military the Western camp and disapproves of Moscow’s policies in advisors helped the GNA to the Black Sea. Turkey is helping Ukraine rebuild its navy and its Turkey’s control of the as well as in its stem the attacks launched shipbuilding industry by selling its latest type of multirole corvette. Bosphorus and Dardanelles by the forces of Marshal In 2020, Turkey discovered a rich gas field in the Black Sea15. This Straits combined with its own backyard, in Khalifa Haftar, whose main discovery may help resolve some of the disputes in the Eastern military prowess, make supporter is Russia14. Mediterranean with Greece, France, , Israel and Egypt, while it the most important the Caucasus. at the same time focusing Ankara’s attention on the Black Sea. alliance member in Turkey’s procurement of the Black Sea region. the S-400 missile system is both a cautionary However, most of Turkey’s strategic attention tale of political hubris and diplomatic Romania: the fulcrum of NATO has been focused on the Mediterranean Sea, brinkmanship as well as a lesson to the rest of in the Black Sea region Central Asia, North Africa and the Middle the Alliance. Turkey was not entirely satisfied East as far as the Indian Ocean. However, the with the military assistance it received in The importance of Romania for the Western alliance has steadily main issue with Turkish foreign policy is not protecting its territory from ballistic missile grown since it became a member of NATO in 2004. Bucharest’s necessarily its reach, but its predictability. attacks and air raids during the Syrian civil strategic partnership with Washington its and support during the war. Moreover, Ankara has technical and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have enhanced Romania’s strategic Over the past two years Ankara has successfully technological ambitions that the Western allies profile. In 2011, Romania along with Poland became the host nations confronted Russia in the Eastern Mediterranean have not taken seriously, as they have not for the US ballistic defence system in Europe. Romania’s main as well as in its own backyard, in the Caucasus. offered a level of technological cooperation interest in the Black Sea is to balance Russian power by means Most debates concerning Turkey right now commensurate with Turkey’s expectations. The of integrating the region into what is broadly termed the Western concentrate on its dispute with Greece over Turkish defence industry has progressed a great Alliance, that is NATO and the European Union. A defining feature of maritime exclusive economic zones in the deal, and the Turkish authorities want to cash Romania’s strategic posture is the large popular support enjoyed by Eastern Mediterranean, the procurement of the in by creating lucrative partnerships with large NATO and the EU in the country, as well as the general consensus

056 057 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 George Vișan: The saber-rattling in Ukraine is heating up the Black Sea

of its political elites concerning the benefits of NATO, one of Romania’s main aims within the naval command over the Black Sea. Moreover, being a member of these two organisations. Alliance has been to host US or allied troops Bucharest is hosting a NATO Force Integration Unit Romania’s main interest on its territory on a permanent basis. The (NFIU), the Headquarters Multinational Division The Russo-Georgian war of 2008 and Russia’s rotational nature of the US and allied forces South-East, East, the Multinational Brigade South- in the Black Sea is to proxy war in Ukraine began in 2014 have deployed in Romania is suboptimal, and not East, and is also investing in modernising its bases, greatly affected Romania’s security posture in conducive to a coherent deterrence posture especially Mihail Kogălniceanu near Constanța. balance Russian power the Black Sea. For the first time since World on the eastern flank. This is made worse by War II the region has become a theatre of war. the alliance not treating the eastern flank as a Romania is promoting a Black Sea agenda by means of integrating The main threat in Bucharest’s perception single, coherent space. The distinction made within NATO and the EU. The most successful is the re-emergence of the use of force as between Enhanced Forward Presence status diplomatic projects so far have been the the region into what the primary means of resolving disputes for Poland and the Baltic states on one hand, Bucharest Nine forum (B9) and the Three Seas between states and territorial revisionism.16 and Tailored Forward Presence for Romania Initiative (3SI). The B9 is an intra-alliance forum is broadly termed the and Bulgaria on the other, translates into a less which promotes the issues of eastern flank, while After 2014 Romania’s diplomatic and military credible deterrence posture on the southern the promotes economic Western Alliance. efforts concentrated on improving its defence tip of the flank. Although Bucharest has been development for the member states in the EU posture by allocating 2% of its GDP to defence, lobbying to have this status changed, it has adjoining the Black, Baltic and Adriatic Seas. securing the deployment of NATO and US so far failed to achieve a change of policy. troops on its territory in order to deter any potential aggression, and promoting a Black The Trump administration, despite improving Bulgaria - the ‘soft underbelly’ Sea agenda in NATO and the EU, in order to the US presence on the eastern flank, also of NATO on the eastern flank? maintain the international diplomatic focus on introduced an element of unpredictability, as the region. Bucharest has been moderately was demonstrated by the ill-conceived decision Bulgaria has a complex relationship with Russia. On one hand successful in its efforts to improve its strategic taken in July 2020 to withdraw US troops from there is the cultural and historic relationship between Bulgaria posture in the face of the Russian challenge. Germany.18 Most of those troops would have and Russia; on the other, Sofia is a member of both NATO been sent back to the US, while the rest would and the EU. Bulgaria’s security dilemma in the Black Sea is Largely neglected until 2014, defence have been deployed on the eastern flank and further complicated by its fraught relationship with Turkey. procurement plays an important role in in Italy. Worse, the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, Sofia is concerned at Turkey expanding its influence into the counterbalancing Russia. In 2017 Bucharest a unit originally deployed to Romania and Western Balkans. Moreover, Bulgaria wants to leverage its began an ambitious defence acquisition Poland in 2015, would have been sent back to geographic position in order to become an energy hub in programme worth €9.3 billion in order to the US. Besides the political hurdles Romania the region. Consequently, Sofia’s policy is oriented towards revamp its military. However, after four years faces concerning the deployment of Alliance avoiding direct confrontation with Russia, but also maintaining most of Romania’s procurement programmes troops on its territory, the country’s poor and benefitting from its status as NATO and EU member. are suffering from delays due to litigation, infrastructure hinders the deployment, mobility and have been implemented later than and re-enforcement of US and NATO forces. Compared with the eastern flank’s northern tip, the southern tip has originally planned17. The branch of the not agreed on a particular strategic assessment regarding the threat Romanian armed forces most affected is the Nevertheless, despite Romania’s misgivings posed by the Kremlin. Despite sharing the same security dilemma Romanian Naval Forces, which have seen all regarding the status of US and NATO troops in the Black Sea, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey have not agreed of their procurement programmes delayed. on its territory, there have been some palpable on a strategic agenda for the region. When Romania proposed in Without a modern navy, Romania cannot be benefits for Bucharest. The US has pre- 2016 the creation of a Black Sea flotilla to train and patrol in the a credible actor in the Black Sea region. positioned heavy equipment in Romania and region, Bulgaria initially agreed to the Romanian project, but then is investing in modernising Romanian military withdrew its support for the project before NATO’s Warsaw Summit. After 2014, the US and NATO deployed troops on bases. Recently the US has deployed unmanned Prime Minister Boyko Borisov then stated that he wants to see the eastern flank of the alliance on a rotational Predator aerial vehicles at the Câmpia Turzii “sailboats, yachts, large boats with tourists, and not becoming an basis. Ever since becoming a member of air base in order to improve the Alliance’s arena of military action ... I do not need a war in the Black Sea.”19

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In the Black Sea region Bulgaria, along with and retired military personnel has been proved the Russian narratives about the politics. As the 2020 elections approached Romania, are the only regional states that caught spying for Russia. What made artificial nature of Ukrainian statehood to the Trump administration conditioned US are both members of the EU and NATO. matters worse is that some of its members be entirely wrong. It reconfirmed the old military aid on Kyiv providing incriminating They are also among the poorest members were officers in the military intelligence political science adage that ‘states make evidence on Donald Trump’s political rival of these international organisations, which service of the Bulgarian armed forces. war and war makes the state’20; Ukrainian Joe Biden. When the information was limits their defence capabilities as well as statehood has been consolidated by leaked to the press it led to Trump’s first their regional influence. Sofia has started the conflict. The election of Volodymyr impeachment trial; the scandal came close to modernise its air force and its navy, Ukraine needs to maintain Zelensky in 2019 as Ukraine’s president to compromising US-Ukrainian relations. after a long period of time in which it had diplomatic momentum on demonstrated both the country’s capacity to underinvested in defence. Bulgaria has Crimea and the Donbas resist prolonged aggression, as well as the Kyiv has also invested its limited resources bought 8 F-16 Block 70 multirole fighters, need for structural reforms in order to make in modernising the Ukrainian armed forces. and it is likely to buy 8 more in the near future Kyiv is currently facing a triple challenge. the state more accountable to its citizens. Leveraging its existing industrial base, in order to have an operational squadron. First, there is the conflict in the Donbas that Ukraine is developing locally designed Lürsen has won a tender to build two has yet to be resolved. Second, the pandemic Ukraine is trying to build up its civilian and anti-ship missiles, anti‑tank missiles and multirole patrol ships, roughly equivalent to has affected Ukraine quite hard, and the military institutions with the help of the West. armoured vehicles. Ukraine is forging multirole corvettes. Bulgarian is participating government has had trouble finding vaccines Nevertheless, the help that has come from industrial partnerships with Turkey and in the Multi-National Brigade South East, for inoculating its citizens. Third, it has been Europe and the US has not come without Poland to build tactical UAVs, multirole based in Romania. The United States uses difficult to continue the democratic upgrade controversies. Germany and France insist corvettes and advanced anti-tank missiles. four Bulgarian bases and training facilities of Ukraine’s institutions while fighting a war. that the conflict in Ukraine is civilian in in Bulgaria, and will deploy 2500 troops nature and does not represent an instance of On the diplomatic front, Ukraine is trying in the country over the next 10 years. Russia failed spectacularly in 2014 when foreign aggression. The Minsk and Normandy to put Crimea on the front burner of it decided to use force against Ukraine in negotiation formats are premised on this international diplomacy by promoting the In Russia’s assessment Bulgaria may order to support its proxies in the east of notion, and consequently favour Russia. The Crimea Platform project. If the fighting in be the ‘soft underbelly’ of NATO on the the country. The Kremlin’s main aim was Kremlin has consistently ignored the Minsk eastern Ukraine still catches the eye of the eastern flank. This is proven by the latest to undermine and irreparably damage agreements, despite Kyiv adhering to them. international community, Crimea is being espionage scandal that has affected Ukrainian sovereignty; but despite this, The lack of US participation in both formats treated as de facto Russian territory. In Bulgarian-Russian relations and has cast Ukraine managed to survive the Russian further tips the scale in Moscow’s favour. Western chancelleries the prevailing wisdom doubt over Sofia’s credibility as a NATO armed onslaught. Ukraine’s resilience in is that Ukraine has no chance of taking ally. A network of six Bulgarian active the face of territorial losses and aggression Although NATO has no plans to admit back Crimea, either by peaceful means or Ukraine within its ranks in the near future, it through force. However, it is diplomatically has helped the Ukrainian military deal with important to keep Crimea on the international The destroyer of the Royal Navy “Dragon” visited the port of Odessa. (11 October, 2020) the Russian threat. Advisers and trainers from agenda, especially now that it has become NATO countries helped the Ukrainian armed an asset for Russian power projection. forces get back on their feet after the initial defeats at Donețsk and Ilovaysk. The US, For Ukraine, maintaining diplomatic Turkey and the UK are providing training and momentum on Crimea and the Donbas in are selling naval vessels to Ukraine to rebuild the near and medium term is important. its navy. Non-lethal and lethal equipment Crimea may be drowned out by other has been donated or sold to the Ukrainian issues on the international agenda such as military; most importantly Washington has the pandemic, strategic arms limitations provided Kyiv with Javelin anti-tank missiles and climate change. Faced with internal to deal with advanced Russian armour. pressure and the socio-economic impact Unfortunately, in the case of US military aid of the pandemic, Russia in the near future this has been entangled in American partisan may be tempted to ‘freeze’ the conflict in

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eastern Ukraine. Such a development would have a negative NOTES impact on Ukraine, which would find itself in a strategic limbo. 1 Richard Sakwa, Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016) 2 Senate Armed Service Committee Advance Policy Questions for Lloyd J. Austin Nominee for Appointment to be Secretary of Defense, p. 39 3 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), ‘The Military Balance 2020’, (Routledge: London, Georgia: resisting creeping annexation 2020), p. 170 4 Ibid., p. 170 5 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), op. cit, p. 6 ‘Creeping annexation’ is how Georgian officials are describing 6 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), ‘The Military Balance 2020’, (Routledge: London, 2019), p. 169 the process through which gradually Russia is annexing the 7 Overall some of the comparative advantages of NATO over Russia are: better and competent breakaway republics of Abkhazia and . The 2008 command structures; the advantage of ‘home turf’ in defending the eastern flank; better training and a greater pool of experienced troops than Russia’s armed forces; better communications and Russo-Georgian war was the first instance of military aggression command facilities; superior ISR capabilities; a more balanced force structure overall. in the Black Sea region and showed that ‘frozen conflicts’ in the 8 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Op. Cit, p. 171 9 Author’s conversation with a Russian defence analyst. former Soviet space can be rekindled. In 2021 Tbilisi obtained a 10 The EDI began in 2015 with $985 million in funding. The effort peaked at $6.5 billion in symbolic but significant victory at the European Court of Human FY2019, while in FY2020 it was reduced to $5.91 billion. Source: Congressional Research Service, ‘The European Deterrence Initiative: A Budgetary Overview’, 16 June 2020, pp. 1-3, available at Rights, which acknowledged that Abkhazia and South Ossetia https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10946 are under occupation and that Russia committed war crimes 11 Heinrich Brauß, ‘The US Troop Withdrawal Plan: Bogus Strategic Claims and a Warning Signal for Europe’, DGAP, pp. 1-3, available at https://dgap.org/sites/default/files/article_pdfs/dgap-com- during the 2008 conflict. Nevertheless, this decision changes mentary-2020-24-en.pdf very few things on the ground. Russia’s military presence 12 Interview du Président Emmanuel Macron au think tank américain Atlantic Council, Élysée, February 5, 2021, available at https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2021/02/05/inter- in the breakaway territories has increased, while Georgia is view-du-president-emmanuel-macron-au-think-tank-americain-atlantic-council. See also Le Grand facing a troubling political crisis. Before the 2008 war, Georgia Continent, ‘The Macron Doctrine. A conversation with the French president’, 16 November 2020, available at https://geopolitique.eu/en/macron-grand-continent/ was described as a post-Soviet success story; now it looks 13 Ibid. more like a ‘frozen conflict success story’ for the Kremlin. 14 Jason Pack and Wolfgang Pusztai, ‘Turning the Tide: How Turkey Won the War for Tripoli’, Middle East Institute, pp. 1-22, available at https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/2020-11/Turning%20 the%20Tide%20-%20How%20Turkey%20Won%20the%20War%20for%20Tripoli.pdf 15 Reuters, ‘Turkey lifts Black Sea gas field estimate after new find: Erdogan’, 17 October 2020, avail- able at https://thaimilitaryandasianregion.blogspot.com/2017/09/gowind-2500-corvette.html Conclusions 16 Strategia Națională de Apărare a Țării pentru perioada 2020-2024: Împreună pentru o Românie sigură și prosperă într-o lume marcată de noi provocări, available at https://www.presidency.ro/files/ userfiles/Documente/Strategia_Nationala_de_Aparare_a_Tarii_2020_2024.pdf The Black Sea region is going through its greatest period of 17 George Vișan, ‘The Known Unknowns of Romania’s instability since the end of World War II. Control of the region is Defence Modernization Plans’, ROEC, 3 July 2017, available at https://www.roec.biz/project/the-known-unknowns-of-romanias-defence-modernization-plans/ being disputed between NATO and Russia, as the Black Sea offers 18 Suspended in 2021 by the Biden administration pending a review of the US military global access to other geopolitical relevant regions: the Mediterranean commitments. 19 Reuters, ‘Bulgaria says will not join any NATO Black Sea fleet after Russian warning’, 16 June 2016, Sea, the Middle East and Central Asia. Russia has obtained a certain available at https://www.reuters.com/article/nato-bulgaria-blacksea-idUSL8N19835X 20 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1990, (Oxford: John Wiley and Sons military advantage at the regional level, but it is not clear whether GEORGE VIȘAN is an expert in Ltd, 1993) this is sustainable over the long run. NATO and the US need to have foreign and security policy with the

a coherent approach to the eastern flank in order to deter Russia Romanian Diplomatic Institute (IDR)

and secure the Black Sea. This approach should consist in viewing and the Romania Energy Centre

the eastern flank as a single and integrated military space. A unified (ROEC). He has published reports

Alliance military posture should be applied to the entire eastern and analysis on Black Sea issues

flank. The U.S. should increase its presence on the eastern flank in Romania, the United States of

while maintaining an adequate response force in Germany. Paris and America and Great Britain. The

Berlin should also increase their military presence on the eastern views expressed in this article do

flank: this will improve the case for European strategic autonomy. not reflect either the views of the

Key infrastructure for military mobility should be improved as Romanian Diplomatic Institute or

soon as possible to improve the deployment of follow-on forces. those of the Romania Energy Centre.

062 063 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 Mădălin Blidaru: Turkey’s regional options in the 21st century: between the political West and the wider Asia Turkey’s regional options in the 21st century: between the political West and the wider Asia

By Mădălin Blidaru | Bucharest

urkey is located at the crossroads of a variety of geographical, economic, political, and cultural boundaries – across continents, T regions, and subregions. This article documents Turkey’s dilemmas about participating in European and Asian cooperation formats and the structural limits they pose for further integration in one or the other direction. This can be achieved by answering questions such as how the participation in these formats evolved, what the limits of integration in the Asian and/or European regional architectures are, and to what extent the economy, in particular trade, is leading or following this process. Suleymaniye Mosque and Bosphorus Bridge, Istanbul Turkey.

A traditional Western follows Turkish fluctuations in foreign Turkey has been a NATO member since 1952, a pillar of the Western bloc, taking part in partner questioning policy options between the West and Asia. joining the Alliance during the first wave some of the most ambitious cooperation the regional order of enlargement, only three years after the initiatives in the North Atlantic space. For almost the whole of World War II, it remained Treaty of Washington was signed; it was also An analysis of Turkey’s regional neutral, only joining the Allies in 1945. The Soviet a founding member of the OECD, following The Cold War and the following period cooperation preferences highlights threat to the Western democracies contributed the same economic development path as dominated by a single superpower provided consistent variations across time regarding to its accession to the first Atlantic structures. other, more developed member states. the image of a Turkey committed to Euro- its cooperation and integration in different Later, it reanimated interest in the Greater Similarly, it received an invitation to be a Atlantic integration. The post-Cold War regional structures (mainly regional Middle East, while not remaining separate from founding member of the era emerged with the hopes of further organisations, but also other regional Europe. Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 and in 1949. From 1987, it has been an applicant, political liberalisation in Turkey. Yet, as the cooperation formats). Changes over generated multiple crises. “NATO is viewed as and then a candidate for accession to the last decade has shown, Turkey has been the past decade have raised questions weakened by the war on Cyprus” was a headline European Union. We can therefore argue challenging this regional order, and not concerning its commitment to the in the New York Times in a report on the worries that the international order after the Second for the first time. Moreover, the present Euro‑Atlantic area. But how true is this? about “a renewal of 500 years of hostility” World War assumes a Turkey that is integrated shows ongoing structural changes with the A breakdown of the regional structures between two vital allies on the southern flank1. in the Western regional architecture and emergence of Asia at the forefront. This

064 065 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 Mădălin Blidaru: Turkey’s regional options in the 21st century: between the political West and the wider Asia

emergent Asia has brought forth a set of A chronology of Turkey’s Turkey’s regional assertiveness in the regional initiatives which are affecting the opening up to the East Greater Middle East is constant Western periphery of the Asian continent. In 2002, an intergovernmental forum – the At the subregional level, Turkey’s cooperation and participation The terms of Turkey’s cooperation with Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) was have been constant over time. Its interests in the Middle East and Europe were defined in the first part of launched at continental level, with Turkey northern Africa region, in the Turkish space, in Central Asia and the Cold War. Formal relations with the becoming a member from 2013 and even the basins of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea are not European Economic Community were chairing the forum between 2019 and novelties. Yet there may be surprises regarding its assertiveness established in 1963 with the signing of an 2020. The ACD provides a bottom-up non- and contestation of the subregional order, as is the case with association agreement in Ankara. In the institutionalised format, trying to set topics its renewed territorial claims in the Eastern Mediterranean area, meantime, Turkey has become a strategic related to regional cooperation and Asian not to mention its active involvement in the Caspian area. partner of the EU, an associated state, and unity, with a strong economic agenda: growing a member of a customs union for trade interdependency between Asian countries, During the Cold War a less well-known military alliance was in goods (from 1995), and a candidate economic development, increasing the established: the Middle East Treaty Organisation (METO), an anti- country, albeit one whose accession competitiveness of Asia, and creating an ‘Asian Soviet initiative with linear participation from Turkey to Pakistan, plus negotiation has come to a standstill Community’2. Turkey is among the Asian states the United Kingdom. It benefited from the participation of the United over its democratic backsliding. As an that joined this cooperation format later. States for one year in the military committee associated country, the Ankara Agreement during the presidency of Dwight Eisenhower. The international order aims to consolidate trade and economic The 2000s increased interest in the The organisation did not last, but in the 1970s relations, with an important impetus to development of the Shanghai Cooperation three general-secretaries of this military after the Second World War develop cooperation – to raise both the Organisation (SCO), a Sino-Russian organisation intergovernmental organisation came from Turkish economy and the living standards started from scratch with the Shanghai Five Turkey. Despite being unsuccessful, it was assumes a Turkey that is of its citizens. The creation of a customs initiative, and which was institutionalised also a receptacle of Turkish interests. union and the alignment of policies in key in 2002. The SCO has a specific vision of integrated in the Western economic sectors are among its provisions. international relations and exceeds the Turkey was a founding member of the bounds of classical economic cooperation: Economic Cooperation Organisation regional architecture and a These functions define different paths it has competences and initiatives related in 1985, a successor to an organisation and purposes for EU/Turkish cooperation, to judiciary cooperation, law enforcement, established by Turkey, Iran and Pakistan pillar of the Western bloc. based on an Accession Partnership that defence and security. Since 2012, Turkey in 1964, the Regional Cooperation for prepares Turkey for membership based has been a dialogue partner of the SCO. The Development (RCD), which focused on on the Copenhagen criteria. Some of concept of dialogue partner is formalised intraregional economic cooperation. In the meantime, the ECO this new path, as we show in the next at SCO level, based on the idea that the now has ten member states from wider Central Asia, covering 6% sections, can create tensions. states and organisation share principles of the global population, but only 2% of global trade. The role of and goals. This opens up the possibility for Turkey in this organisation is important from the perspective of the Lastly, Turkey is an international partner cooperation with third parties that cannot organisation’s future and the sustainability of the regional project. that has played a significant role in limiting or do not want to become observers, thus the migration crisis. This has given it gaining the possibility to take part in joint Focused on transport, trade, energy and tourism, the vision prospects as a foreign actor, albeit one projects and meetings. Turkey is the largest assumed by the organisation encourages economic integration, which sometimes adopts conflicting paths economy with dialogue partner status among a free trade area and, overall, enhanced cooperation3. It sets the in the absence of better cooperation and the SCO non-members, which consequently doubling of intraregional trade as a strategic objective, with the understanding. The Eastern Mediterranean is valuable to it from this point of view. This implementation of the ECO trade agreement (signed in 2003, in force crisis between Turkey and Cyprus, and also indicates Turkey’s availability for more from 2008), the growth of the number of parties, and its upgrade to the clash of Turkish and foreign interests intense cooperation within Asian cooperation a free trade area from the preferential-trade agreement role as its in relation to Libya, are such instances. structures, thus opening itself up to the East. expected outcomes. Turkey is part of this vision, which could create

066 067 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 Mădălin Blidaru: Turkey’s regional options in the 21st century: between the political West and the wider Asia

a free trade area from the Mediterranean Sea to Western China, from programmes, which aim to Siberia to the Indian Ocean, despite still being a distant prospect. achieve the objectives of the With the rise of Asia, Turkey organisation, and analyse, Currently, the vision of the ECO is centred on the growth of endorse and submit them for has been embracing the Beijing intraregional trade cooperation. For example, its connectivity approval by the ministers. projects can be highlighted: the launch of a freight train route Consensus: this is premised between Islamabad and Istanbul, which was announced more than Due to the customs union, 10 years ago, is expected to come about in 2021, with promises of Turkey faces some trade on an active role for the state further connections to Europe. This railway should be around 6500 policy dependencies, km in length and allow trains with a capacity of 20 containers to reducing its own options in economic development and reach their destination in only 11 days4. Turkey has been investing for trade agreements, and in Asia and in its neighbourhood and broadening its foreign policy leaving it to mostly follow national interests, and a reduced options. This is supported by the economic trends presented below; a reactive pattern. The nevertheless, there are certain limits to its further integration. operationalisation of the focus on liberal institutions. ECO trade agreement as a preferential agreement with Central-South- about Turkey’s commitments to the Euro- Incompatibilities amongst organisations Western Asia, together with the preparation for a Atlantic structures. The SCO Charter adds challenging deepened integration free trade agreement for the region, could bring a long list of areas for regional cooperation new challenges to the prospect for a renewed which are distinct from the trans-Atlantic ones. Bronze memorial statue of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk on These institutional architectures in the political West and the wider trade agreement with the European Union. his horse, the founder of the Asia are by default incompatible. In addition, some of them set These differences are perceptible in practice. Republic of Turkey. (Bursa, Turkey, 11 August, 2020) limits of cooperation through their provisions, plans and actions. The SCO is not only about defence If we consider electoral rights, the differences are significant. The OSCE criticised the 2018 Alternative development The dialogue with the SCO is a challenge early presidential and parliamentary elections plans and trade policies for Euro-Atlantic cooperation. Unlike the in Turkey6, while the SCO’s observers reported general perception, the SCO is not only the elections as a mere formality, even Limits emerge from processes a defence-focused alliance. It has strong claiming they were “transparent, authentic and such as the coordination of political, economic, energy, technological democratic”7. While this may not be a problem the regional planning and the and trade dimensions. Turkey is a dialogue for the state and its autocratic leaders, the national development plans partner for the SCO, an organisation that Euro-Atlantic ideals of free institutions and or, as mentioned above, the has a revisionist vision for the international the focus on individual rights and liberties implementation of customs world order. When the memorandum are having their core values contested. unions. Turkey’s enhanced between Turkey and SCO was signed in 2013, integration in the European before the “new age of systemic rivalry”, In the area of defence, tensions emerged economic ecosystem the Turkish foreign minister declared that it with the procurement of the Russian S-400 could raise challenges and was the declaration of a “common destiny” Triumph air missile defence system, which incompatibilities between and ”the beginning of a long road where cost up to US$2.5 billion, in contrast to the the development plans in Turkey and the SCO walk hand in hand”5. operability of a NATO system. After numerous relations to Europe and Asia. warnings, the United States imposed For example, the Regional Since 2002, SCO members have been taking sanctions based on CAATSA against Turkey Planning Council of the ECO part in joint military exercises, without Turkey. for its involvement in a significant transaction is responsible for preparing These drills are highly visible, and rather with Rosoboronexport for this procurement. action programmes, including unimaginable for a NATO member state. But This decision provoked a spill-over against the annual sectoral work other forms of cooperation may raise concerns other joint projects within the North Atlantic

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Alliance, such as the partnership for F-35 fighter jets. It is worth even if the recent conflicts on emerging Asia with 3% of the exports share and 10% highlighting that the S-400 procurement is not only a Russian- technologies demonstrate that the economy, of the imports share. In 2018, the share Turkish affair, but one that suggests a broader pattern across technology, and even cultural cooperation of imports from Europe and Central Asia the Asian space, particularly under the SCO’s umbrella. For can be weaponised. In the Council of fell to 51% and exports to just under 60%. China, units of the system were delivered in 2018-198, while in Europe, the single forum which includes Furthermore, the growth of Turkey’s trade the case of India the first units are planned to be delivered in almost all of Europe’s states, this type of deficit with Russia, China, India and Iran 20219. Iran is still using the older S-300 system. The defence community engagement in transactional, can be emphasised. By country, as shares cooperation dynamics in Asia provide an outlook which calls power-driven terms is mostly missing. of Turkish exports, in 2000 Germany had a for a concrete response from the West. This shows how 18.18% share, followed by the United States Turkey’s option, despite not being the final one, was intended (11.11%) and the United Kingdom (7.36%), to support the projects of a revisionist alliance of states. The relative economic followed by Italy and France with around 6% decline of the each. In 2018 the same states, despite their Testing the resilience of long-lasting Euro‑Atlantic actors in top position, collapsed as market shares for policy cooperation frameworks Turkish trade relations Turkish exports: Germany 9.61%, the United Kingdom 6.61%, and Italy 5.69%. The United With the rise of Asia, Turkey has been embracing the Beijing The third point of this investigation States almost disappeared, with a similar Consensus: this is premised on an active role for the state concerns the impact of economic export market share to Iraq, of around 5%12. in economic development and national interests, and a interests on readjustment towards the reduced focus on liberal institutions. Membership in the Eastern or Western partners. Economic Of Turkey’s import markets share, Europe Asian organisations trends show that Turkey is increasingly and Central Asia had 65.12% in 2000, East Turkey’s trade intensity is largely considered dependent on Asia and preoccupied Asia and the Pacific 10.1%, the Middle East as a transmission belt by the trade in its neighbourhood. and North Africa 9.95%, and North America within the ECO increased at a for this model. 7.65%. In 2018, Europe and Central Asia The symmetric trade introversion index had only 50.91%, East Asia and the Pacific faster pace compared to those For illiberal political displays the growth pace of intra-regional 17.82%, while the Middle East and North elites, the challenges trade flows to the extra-regional ones. Its Africa remained constant at around 9.8%, within the European Union - that may arise from the value for Turkey over the past two decades and North America dropped to 6.44%. In liberal dimensions of the shows that the intensity of the flows within 2000, Germany led exports to Turkey with Turkish macroregion, the latter Western organisations the ECO have accelerated significantly, 13.13%, followed by Italy with 7.98%, then limits their further reaching a similar level to a virtual UE- United States and the Russian Federation remaining at a constant level. integration. One concrete Turkey macroregion11. This indicates that with around 7% each. In recent years, China illustration of this is the Turkey’s trade intensity within the ECO was the main source for Turkey’s imports, implementations of the increased at a faster pace compared to in competition for first place with Germany decisions taken by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), those within the European Union-Turkish and the Russian Federation at around 10% a sine qua non condition of the European integration process. macroregion, the latter remaining at a each, while the United States stabilised Such obligations are not applicable in the case of the Eurasian/ constant level. This reflects a growth at 5%. Moreover, India and Iran followed a Asian counterpart organisations (ECO, SCO), which are focused in intraregional trade flows within the trend in which they overcame France and on economic development without liberal constraints. ECO compared to stability of the intra- the United Kingdom through their shares. European flows. When we analyse the trade However, Turkey has a tradition of engaging with the Council indicators, the data supports this finding. The correlation between trade and of Europe for 70 years that contrasts with its engagement with political options can be noticed. Turkey’s the wider ‘Asian Community’ for only 7 years. On the other In 2000, Europe and Central Asia made participation in regional cooperation hand, the ACD’s cooperation pillars do not include hard-power up approximately 65% of Turkey’s exports projects in Asia is encouraged by this elements that could easily transform to zero-sum games10, and imports, followed at a distance by East region’s positive economic trend in Turkey’s

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trade relations, as well as its increasing and the wider Asia, including in a complex NOTES dependence on Asia, as shown by trade Eurasian and Middle Eastern space. 1 The New York Times, 13 August 1974, ‘NATO Is Viewed as Weakened by the War on Cyprus’, https:// deficits. At the same time, Europe and www.nytimes.com/1974/08/13/archives/nato-is-viewed-as-weakened-by-the-war-on-cyprus.html the United States have diminished their As we have shown, there are limits and 2 ACD, 2020, About Asia Cooperation Dialogue, http://www.acd-dialogue.org/about-acd.html 3 ECO, 2017, ECO Vision 2025, Economic Cooperation Organization, http:// position in the trade policy of Turkey, even incompatibilities to further integration in www.eco.int/pa rameters/eco/modules/cdk/upload/content/general_ though they still retain a principal role. both structures. This could be a challenge content/3624/1506486491201cflnbtm0acra83f5arho4dgc65.pdf 4 Financial Tribune, 23 December 2020, ‘Islamabad-Tehran-Istanbul Train to Be Launched in 2021’, for consolidated political and economic https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy/106699/islamabad-tehran-istanbul-train-to-be- integration as well as security cooperation, launched-in-2021 5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, 2013, ‘Turkey and the Shanghai Cooperation Functional cooperation while at the same time offering opportunities Organization Dialogue Partnership Memorandum was signed in Almaty’, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ instead of grand narratives for functional cooperation. It seems this turkey-and-the-shanghai-cooperation-organization-dialogue-partnership-memorandum-was-signed- in-almaty.en.mfa path is being followed through selective 6 OSCE Elections Observer Mission, 25 June 2018, Statement of preliminary findings, early presidential To conclude, the previous points engagement, consistent with the relative and parliamentary elections Turkey, 24 June 2018, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ turkey/385671 underline that Turkey remains closely decline of Euro-Atlantic trade relations. 7 SCO Elections Observer Mission, 25 June 2018, Statement by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s associated with the West, despite the Observer Mission on monitoring the preparations for and holding of the special presidential and parliamentary elections in the Republic of Turkey on 24 June 2018, http://eng.sectsco.org/ perception of increasing conflicts. However, in the medium and long term news/20180625/454510.html However, there have been structural one may see the perspective of a Turkey 8 TASS, 24 January 2020, ‘Russia completes delivery of second S-400 missile system regimental set to China – source’, https://tass.com/world/1113113 developments allowing it to functionally that remains anchored in the Euro-Atlantic 9 Indian Times, 12 November 2020, ‘Working hard to ensure early supply of S-400 missile systems to broaden its foreign policy options. As regional organisations. This analysis has India: Russia’, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/working-hard-to-ensure-early-supply-of-s- 400-missile-systems-to-india-russia/articleshow/79189588.cms a transcontinental country, Turkey had emphasised the challenges to managing 10 ACD, 2020, Areas of cooperation of the Asia Cooperation Dialogue, http://www.acd-dialogue.org/ traditional access to continental economic, Turkey’s external actions, particularly its areas-of-cooperations.html 11 United Nations University Institute on Comparative Studies (UNU-CRIS), 2020, political and security architectures. deepened engagement with the regional Regional Integration Knowledge System 2.0 (RIKS). https://riks.cris.unu.edu organisations and cooperation frameworks 12 WITS, 2020, World Integrated Trade Solution, Turkey Import/Export Partner Share by region in percentage 2000-2018, https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/TUR Since the Second World War, it has been part of the West and of the wider Asia; at some of the Euro-Atlantic space and included in point it will have to choose sides, with most organisations developed in the West. their institutions and their trade influence. However, the emergence of Asia has opened Considering Turkey’s policy dependency its gates to participation in the frameworks path with the West, 70 years of cooperation of wider Asia. In both cases, the participation cannot be convincingly replaced by an is incomplete, largely due to its peripheral emerging continental architecture in Asia. role and transit function, which restrict the opportunities for deepened integration. Despite the recent tensions, which are not

novelties, its options for regional cooperation MĂDĂLIN BLIDARU is a PhD

remain open between the political West candidate at the National University

of Political Studies and Public

Administration in Bucharest,

Romania. With a background

in International Relations and

European Studies, he earned a While Turkey remains closely associated with the West master’s degree in Diplomacy and International Negotiations, there have been structural developments allowing it as well as in Labour Studies.

to functionally broaden its foreign policy options.

072 073 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 Romario Shehu: Next generation Turkey and its foreign policy in the Western Balkans Next generation Turkey and its foreign policy in the Western Balkans

By Romario Shehu | Tirana

he end of the Cold War, the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the fall of the one-party system in Albania were turning points in Turkey’s T engagement in the Western Balkans (WB) for a number of reasons. A leading intellectual figure in the AKP and outreach to the WB, which was nuanced with the architect of its foreign policy was Ahmet references to the Ottoman past. The third and Davutoğlu, who took the helm of Turkey’s most recent phase of the AKP’s strategy towards foreign policy in 2009. His doctrine, often the WB is a more pragmatic approach led by called ‘neo-Ottomanism’, projected a new era President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This phase The WB is considered as a bridge between Turkey and Europe, an in Turkish foreign policy6 by portraying Turkey marks a pragmatic focus on greater economic area of vital importance for Turkey’s economy, energy, transportation as a major actor in the region. Since coming to ties and a prominent role for the Turkish and tourism. Turkey’s interest in the European Union (EU) power in 2002, AKP has adopted three broad, president, by direct engagement and through membership is another reason for the region’s importance, because successive approaches7 towards the WB. First, personal ties with Western Balkan leaders. despite setbacks Turkey has not lost its interest in becoming an EU a continuation of its traditional Atlanticism. member1, and it regards the countries of the Balkans as potential From the early 1990s until the late 2000s, supporters of Turkey’s EU bid in the future2. Migration is another Turkey’s WB foreign policy was in sync with Turkey and the three element of Turkey’s engagement, given that the conflicts in the and complementary to the West, particularly Muslim‑majority countries Balkans have caused waves of mass migration by Turkish minorities3 the US. The AKP’s foreign policy approach in of the Western Balkans: and Muslim populations. Another reason is that by taking an active general at this time was to maintain and improve A three‑dimensional role in the Balkans, Turkey attempted to prove its importance to the its relations with nearby countries, labelled as relationship Western world4 because the maintenance of its ‘Western’ identity “zero problems with the neighbours”. During was an important factor in the formulation of Turkish policies in the this period Turkey expanded visa-free travel This article explores three main areas as 1990s. A final driver of Turkish policy in the Balkans was the fear that and free trade agreements with its neighbours, the main pillars of the relationship between the dissolution of Yugoslavia would lead to Greek hegemony in the which lasted roughly until Turkey’s appointment Turkey and the three Muslim-majority region5, therefore downplaying Turkey’s role as a regional power. of Davutoğlu as foreign minister in 2009 and countries of the WB: Albania, Bosnia and Turkey’s disagreements with the West – when Herzegovina (BiH), and Kosovo. The first As a result of its strong economic growth in the early 2000s, and the second phase of the AKP’s WB ‘neo- part is dedicated to the economic ties, the the rise of the newly formed Justice and Development Party (AKP), Ottoman’ turn began. This phase was marked second to the political ties, and the third part Turkey found itself capable of playing a bigger role in the region. by an intensification of Turkey’s diplomatic analyses the cultural ties among countries.

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Economy

In order to explore the extent of Turkey’s economic engagement in the region, three indicators will be taken into consideration: the imports, exports and foreign direct investments (FDI) of the three countries. Although those three indicators have their limits in revealing the full intensity of the economic cooperation among countries of the region and Turkey, they are still solid data points that provide a picture of their economic volume. In overall economic terms, Turkey has the advantages of geographical proximity with the WB, which allows for a reduction in transportation costs, as well as an existing similarity in consumption habits. Turkey has also signed free bilateral trade agreements with Albania, BiH, and Kosovo. Nevertheless, as indicated by the following official data, Turkey does not play a significant role in the economies of the WBs’ Muslim-majority countries. Nevertheless, Figure 1: Albanian Institute of Statistics, Data for 2019. Albania’s imports & exports by country. even though Turkey’s economic relevance is Turkey manages to considerably less than other states, Turkey manages to appear more relevant than it appear more relevant actually is by investing in popular and highly visible projects such as highways, hospitals, than it actually is by schools, mosques, bridges and restorations of buildings from the Ottoman heritage. investing in popular and Regarding imports to Albania, Italy leads highly visible projects. the figure with more exports to Albania than the next three countries (Turkey, Greece Figure 2: The chart includes data for the second quarterly stock of direct investment-liabilities in Albania and Germany) combined. Turkey is second in line, but far less by country for 2018, 2019 and 2020- BPM6. Source: Albanian Institute of Statistics, December 2020 compared to Italy. With regard to Albanian exports, Italy imports as much Albanian goods as twice the amount of the next four countriescombined. Kosovo ranks second, followed by Spain, Germany and Greece. Turkey is ranked only 17th, and it lags behind all the other states to which Albania exports its goods: there are fewer exports to Turkey than to every other WB country except BiH. In terms of Foreign Direct Investments, Switzerland has the highest FDIs in Albania for the past three years, followed by the Netherlands, Canada, and Italy; Turkey ranks only fifth.

The data from three economic indicators reveal the massive role of Italy in Albanian trade, while Turkey only plays a limited role. As regards trade between Albania and Turkey, the current trade exchange is favourable for Turkey, as it exports large amounts to Albania while importing only little. Figure 3: Kosovo’s Agency of Statistics, data for 2019

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When it comes to Kosovo’s In contrast to Albania trade relations, Germany From a and Kosovo, which both leads the figure with the have (albeit unfavourable) most exports to Kosovo, Realpolitik considerable trade volumes followed closely by Turkey, with Turkey, BiH does not China and Italy. Albania tops perspective, enjoy such levels of trade. The the list of Kosovo’s exports data from first two economic as it receives twice as much the best option indicators reveal that BiH as the combined amount has several trade partners of the next two countries. for the small such as Germany, Croatia, North Macedonia is ranked and Italy. Turkey is not Figure 4: Data from the Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo, December 2020 second, followed by Germany. states is to align significant in the overall trade Turkey is ranked only 13th in volume of BiH, ranking sixth the list and constitutes only their foreign highest in exports to BiH and 1.8% of Kosovo’s exports. On eighth in imports from BiH. the other hand, Germany policy with the Furthermore, Turkey also plays and China have had the an insignificant role in BiH’s highest FDIs in Kosovo for the superpower. FDIs, as it is ranked 12th. past three years; Turkey is third and the United States is fourth. While Turkey does not play a significant role in the region’s economy at the moment, it is The data from these three economic important to mention that economic volume indicators reveal that Kosovo does not have alone does not fully explain the overall any particularly significant trade partner, and connectedness of Turkey and the WB countries. Turkey plays only a small role in its economy. The political and cultural links coupled with The country mainly imports from Germany, the economic aspect comprise the mosaic China and Turkey, and mainly exports to its of the overall ties between the countries. immediate neighbours Albania and North Macedonia. Like Albania, the trade exchange Figure 5: Trading Economics, Data for 2019 between Kosovo and Turkey is favourable Politics to the latter, as Turkey exports significantly to Kosovo and imports very little. In order to understand Turkey’s role in the region, one must look at the broader geopolitical Germany leads the figure with the most exports dynamics of the international system. In the to BiH, followed closely by Italy, Serbia and literature, uni-interpolarity best explains the Croatia. China is ranked fifth and Turkey sixth. features of today’s international system8, Germany also tops the list of BiH’s export although the post-Covid-19 situation has called destinations, followed closely by Croatia, Serbia its legitimacy into question9. Uni-interpolarity and Italy. Turkey is ranked only eighth in the list. is a structure characterised by comprehensive interdependence. It is based on a superpower In terms of Foreign Direct Investments, with undisputable global influence and some Austria tops the list of countries with the most major powers with lesser influence than the FDIs in BiH, followed closely by Croatia and superpower. Multilateralism is a key component

Figure 6: Data from the Central Bank of Bosnia & Herzegovina (CBBH), December 2020 Serbia, while Turkey is only ranked 12th. of a uni-interpolar configuration because certain

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fundamental issues such as security, economic the two pillars of its foreign policy in the post- peace accord, and are now and environmental concerns cannot be tackled Cold War era. The US has been the most focusing on their own narrow Turkey is not hindering the by a single state, not even the most powerful important foreign actor in Albanian politics ethnic interests13. In this one. The superpower in the international system since the beginning of that country’s transition environment, and without Western Balkans’ path to the EU; is the US; the major power closer to the WB is process12, which culminated with its accession having a positive US legacy14 the EU, while Turkey’s role is that of a regional to NATO in 2009. Similar to Albania, Kosovo’s such as Albania and Kosovo, on the contrary, it has constantly power. In this realm, Albania, BiH and Kosovo foreign policy orientation has been shaped the country is more vulnerable can all be described as small states10. Although by its efforts to integrate into the EU and to foreign interference, claimed to support the region’s a variety of factors affect the foreign policy the Euro-Atlantic structures. The US led the especially when each alignments of each state – such as economic, 1999 NATO bombing campaign that paved is increasingly integration with the EU, because cultural, historical and ideological values – from the way to Kosovo’s independence in 2008, interdependent with their a Realpolitik perspective, the best option for the and the US’s continuous support has been allies. Turkish leverage in BiH Turkey’s strategic goals (contrary small states is to align their foreign policy with particularly important for Kosovo’s path towards is noticeably higher than in the superpower, the second-best option is the international recognition of its independence Albania or Kosovo, thanks to to those of Russia) would be still major power, and the last is the regional power. and its ability to join international organisations. the Turkish President’s political Nevertheless, despite both Albania’s and friendship with the leader better served if the WB countries Albania and Kosovo’s foreign policy priority Kosovo’s open allegiance to a Western political of the Bosniaks, especially is to join the Western political and economic model, Turkey has significant political clout in their leader Bakir Izetbegović, join the EU, as this would stabilise a structures, thus aligning itself with the both countries, occasionally supplemented who once described Erdoğan superpower (US) and the major power (EU). In by declared political friendships. This was as “a man sent from God region where Turkey has economic, the case of the WB, these countries aspire not witnessed when President Erdoğan’s hunt for his with a special mission.”15 only to align their foreign policy with the major political opponents in both countries forced the political and cultural ties. power (EU) but they want to become part of it; as extradition of five Turkish citizens from Kosovo Considering the international a result, these relations are particularly important. and one from Albania who were accused of being system and the regional role of Turkey in the WB, it is important to involved in the 2016 Turkish coup attempt. examine Turkey’s foreign policy orientation and how that may affect Albania is a NATO member and EU candidate the WBs’ course. Although a NATO member since 1952, Turkey has country, whose foreign policy course reflects Regardless of its Euro-Atlantic orientation, the been decoupling with the West during the last decade, especially a balance between the state’s European and situation in BiH is substantially different from since the Gezi Park protests in 2013 when then-PM Erdoğan used American orientations11 which have constituted that of Albania and Kosovo. In recent years, harsh rhetoric towards the West. From a Turkish perspective16, BiH has been facing a crisis President Erdoğan’s rapidly escalating anti-Western approach which exceeds the country’s was a reaction to Western meddling in Turkey’s domestic affairs. Despite both Albania’s and habitually difficult traditional From an EU perspective17, this decoupling started in 2016 when political, security, economic the failed military coup in Turkey prompted President Erdoğan to Kosovo’s open allegiance to a and social situation. As a result reinforce his ties with Moscow and to embark on a series of foreign of the country’s complicated policy interventions18 in Libya, Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, Western political model, Turkey institutional setup established and Nagorno-Karabakh that have been contrary to, or at least by the Dayton Peace uncoordinated with, the Western allies’ interests. Regardless of has significant political clout Accord, the political leaders this perceived transformation of Turkey from regional to major of the Bosniaks (Bosnian power, the country is still looking for positive relations with the in both countries, occasionally Muslims), the Bosnian Croats US and the EU. President Erdoğan recently stated that Turkey (predominately Catholics), hopes to “turn a new page in its ties with the US and the EU”, and supplemented by declared and the Bosnian Serbs that Ankara had been subjected to “double standards” by both (mostly Orthodox) seem to be Washington and Brussels19. In a videoconference with the President political friendships. abandoning the UN=brokered of the European Commission, the Turkish President stated that

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he believes Turkey’s future Affairs Directorate).26 The Diyanet’s role has been Given that the WBs are a multi-religious region, Closer ties with Turkey might is in the EU, and that steps strengthened as a foreign policy tool primarily there is a concern that Turkey’s careless should be taken in resuming focused on providing quality educational and public diplomacy rhetoric30 describing itself create a precedent that in the future membership negotiations.20 humanitarian services to local communities, but as a ‘protector’ of Muslims, may deepen the also as a competitor to the Gülen Movement. longstanding divisions among different ethnic could hurdle the EU conditionality Turkey is clearly a regional Second, the new Turkish foreign policy has groups in the Balkans31. Turkey has shown power, and it cannot replace aimed to make Turkey a tourist destination no strategic favour to Muslim-dominated principle, which is crucial for the role of the US or the EU for people in the Balkans27, while at the same areas of the Balkans, and its trade and in the region. Like the WB time encouraging Turkish people to set up relations follow no clear cultural logic, but the process of Europeanising the countries, Turkey itself is businesses and invest in the Balkans, as well are instead highly pragmatic32. However, interested in resuming the as streaming Turkish soap operas on Balkan Turkey’s religious rhetoric may cause further Western Balkans and keeping EU membership process and media platforms. In addition, the countries of divisions among the multi-religious countries aligning its foreign policy with the WB and Turkey are also connected by their in the region, where strengthening ties with the WB leaders’ authoritarian the US, or at least maintaining diaspora28, including Bosnians and Albanians Turkey may create reactions among the other a flexible relationship with in Turkey and small Turkish minorities in the religious communities, and risks upsetting the tendencies in check. both in order to serve its WB, which in Davutoğlu’s thinking29 creates an religious balances inside those countries. best interests. Turkey is not organic link between Turkey and the Balkans. hindering the WBs’ path to the EU; on the contrary, it has constantly The WB countries have entrusted their state- claimed to support the region’s integration with the EU21, because This soft power, and especially the foreign development process to the EU enlargement Turkey’s strategic goals (contrary to those of Russia) would be aid, should be taken with a grain of salt, strategy which is centred on the principle of still better served if the WB countries join the EU, as this would because foreign aid is not used only to conditionality – the offer of the EU rewards stabilise a region where Turkey has economic, political and cultural unconditionally help developing countries, (most importantly financial assistance and ties. It would also make exports to its main trading partner (the but also to promote the donor country’s membership) on the condition that WB states EU) easier; it will indirectly increase Turkish leverage with the EU; geostrategic interests as well as its political, meet the demands set by the EU33. While the and it might help Turkey’s own aspirations to EU membership. economic and security goals. Therefore, West has the conditionality principle of “carrots all the countries of the WBs should clearly and sticks” which keeps the pressure on WB distinguish not only what benefits they gain in leaders to stay in line with the development Culture the short term, but also how it could damage process, Turkey has no state-reforming their national interests in the long term. conditionality for WB leaders – it is enough for The cultural aspect is one of the main factors in the ‘soft power’ Turkey that the WB leaders do not challenge approach in international relations, and countries often decide Turkey’s interests in the region. This triggers where to invest based on their own foreign policy goals and national The implications of the second concern, that closer ties with interests, taking into consideration their historical, cultural, political, Turkey’s engagement Turkey might create a precedent that in the geographical and economic ties with the recipient country. In in Albania, Bosnia and future could hurdle the EU conditionality the case of Turkey, this ‘soft power’ approach was advanced by Herzegovina and Kosovo principle, which is crucial for the process of Davutoğlu’s foreign policy which placed a strong emphasis on Europeanising the WB and keeping the WB the ‘Ottoman heritage’.22 This new foreign policy relied23 first on In contrast to Davutoğlu’s assumptions, the leaders’ authoritarian tendencies in check. utilising various Turkish institutions such as the Turkish Cooperation role of Turkey in the WB is that of a regional and Coordination Agency (TIKA), thanks to whom the WBs have power and not a major power. Turkey is neither The dispute between President Erdoğan been getting more than 2 percent of its overall budget since interested nor able to change the Euro- and Fethullah Gülen has also penetrated the 201024 focused on the rebuilding or rehabilitation of a number Atlantic path of the WB countries. Regardless region34. This is the root of the third implication of significant Ottoman heritage monuments;25 the Yunus Emre of what role it chooses to play, however, of Turkey’s engagement in the WB: President Institute, Turkish universities, Turkish media outlets broadcasting there are still several overall implications Erdoğan’s hunt for his opponents in the in regional languages, as well as the Diyanet (the Turkish Religious of Turkey’s engagement in the WBs. region exports Turkish problems into the WB,

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violates the WB states’ national sovereignty, and also pressures NOTES WB countries into infringing their own justice systems. This might also set a precedent for other similar cases in the future. 1 According to survey data, the public opinion of Turkish citizens who believed that joining the EU would be positive fell from 73% in 2004 to 38% in 2010, but bounced back up to 53% in 2014. See http://www.tepsa.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/tepsa-brief-senyuva_final-2.pdf. More recent data Although, to Turkey´s dismay, most WB leaders have refused to from EU barometer 2020 indicate low percentages of Turkish people feeling attached to the EU, Available at https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/ comply with Ankara’s strenuous efforts to interfere with domestic publicopinion/index.cfm/survey/getsurveydetail/instruments/standard/surveyky/2262. However, the waves of support and opposition are affected by both sides (EU and Turkey), and are very much linked with political developments in Turkey, in Europe and between Turkey & the EU. issues – which shows the true limits of Turkish power in the 2 Dyrmishi, 2015. Albania-Turkey Security Relations. Available at http://csdgalbania.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Albania-Turkey-Security- region – the existence of direct Turkish political interference was Relations-1.pdf. 3 Eroğlu, 2005. Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans in the Post-Cold War Era. Middle East Technical University. clearly exemplified by the arrest of six Turkish citizens in Kosovo35. 4 Demirtas, 2013. Turkey and the Balkans: Overcoming Prejudices, Building Bridges, and Constructing a Common Future. The arrests were made without informing the prime minister of 5 Dyrmishi, 2015. Albania-Turkey Security Relations. Available at http://csdgalbania.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Albania-Turkey-Security- Relations-1.pdf. Kosovo, and the Parliamentary Investigative Committee, created 6 Davutoğlu, 2008. ‘Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007’. Insight Turkey. in Kosovo to investigate the case, found 31 legal breaches. 7 Aydıntaşbaş, 2019. ‘From Myth to Reality: How to understand Turkey’s role in the Western Balkans’, European Council on Foreign Relations. See also Öztürk and Akgönül, 2019. Forced marriage or marriage of convenience with the Western Balkans? Taylor and Francis. 8 Tella, 2015. Polarity in contemporary international politics: a uni-interpolar order? Available at https://journals.co.za/content/polit/34/2/EJC187681. The role of Turkey in the region has been praised by Turcophiles 9 Garewal, 2020. ‘Is pandemic leading to ‘bi-multipolarity’?’ Available at https://asiatimes.com/2020/04/is-pandemic-leading-to-bi-multipolarity/. 10 Jeanne, 2003. Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior. and condemned by Turcophobes. Turkey is a natural ally given 11 Lani and Schmidt, 1998. ‘Albanian Foreign Policy between Geography and History.’ International Spectator. its proximity to the region, its common past, as well as the Euro- 12 Seitz, 1991. ‘U.S. and Albania Re-establish Diplomatic Ties after 52 Years.’ The New York Times. 13 Latal, 2019. ‘Country Report 2 – Bosnia and Herzegovina. Western Balkans at the Crossroads: Assessing Influences of Non-Western External Actors’. Atlantic course. However at present, and in real terms, Turkey The Prague Security Studies Institute. does not have a significant role in the region’s economy, and it 14 The US’ late intervention in the war in Bosnia and the Dayton Peace Accord which it brokered are not perceived as the best scenario for BiH’s future. For more information see Daalder, 1998. Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended. Available at https://www.brookings.edu/articles/ plays only a moderate role in the region’s culture. Turkey is clearly decision-to-intervene-how-the-war-in-bosnia-ended/. a regional power, and it cannot replace the US or the EU in the 15 BIEPAG 2018. ‘Erdoğan in Sarajevo: It’s my Party and I’ll campaign in Europe if I want to’. https://biepag.eu/ erdogan-in-sarajevo-its-my-party-and-ill-campaign-in-europe-if-i-want-to/ region. Moreover, Turkey’s strategic goals, in contrast to those of 16 Akyol, 2015. ‘What turned Erdoğan against the West?’ Available at https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/02/turkey-Erdoğan-anti-west. Russia, are better served if the WB countries join the EU. Therefore, html. 17 Stanicek, 2019. ‘Turkey's military operation in Syria and its impact on relations with the EU’, Brussels: European Parliament. the greatest challenge for the future of the WB is not posed by 18 For more on the Turkish intervention in Libya, see https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-parliament-approves-libya-troops-motion-161062. For the Turkish engagement in the region, but by the US’s isolationism Syria, see https://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-Briefing-642284-Turkeys-military-operation-Syria-FINAL.pdf. For the Eastern Mediterranean, see https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2020C62/. For Nagorno-Karabakh, see https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2020C53/. and the EU’s enlargement fatigue. For as long as the US and the 19 Ekathimerini, 2020. ‘Turkey hopes to turn new page with US and EU in 2021, Erdoğan says’. Available at https://www.ekathimerini.com/260586/ EU are invested in the region, it is unlikely and unfavourable for article/ekathimerini/news/turkey-hopes-to-turn-new-page-with-us-and-eu-in-2021-Erdoğan-says. 20 Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, 2021. Videoconference with President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen. Available at https:// the WB countries to relinquish their Euro-Atlantic commitments. www.tccb.gov.tr/en/speeches-statements/558/123508/videoconference-with-president-of-the-european-commission-ursula-von-der-leyen. (Accessed on January 12, 2021). 21 Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, 2018. ‘Bushati- Çavuşoğlu pave the road to setting up the Albania-Turkey High-Level Cooperation Council’. Available at: https://punetejashtme.gov.al/en/bushati-cavusoglu-celin-rrugen-e-ngritjes-se-keshillit-te-bashkepunimit-te-nivelit-te-larte-shqiperi- turqi/ ROMARIO SHEHU is a project 22 President Erdoğan restated this “common culture” during the 2021 bilateral talks with the PM of Albania. See more at https://www.youtube.com/ coordinator and researcher at watch?v=OnEUI7dyDEs. (Accessed on January 12, 2021). 23 Latal and Büyük, 2020. Political Influence in Southeast Europe in Current Turkish Foreign Policy. Southeast Europe in Focus. the Institute for Democracy 24 Data from; www.tika.gov.tr/en (Accessed 28 December 2020) and Mediation (IDM), Tirana. His 25 Kočan and Arbeiter, 2019. ‘Is TIKA Turkey's platform for development cooperation or something more? Evidence from the Western Balkans’. International Journal of Euro-Mediterranean Studies. work centers on radicalization 26 The Diyanet, short for Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, is the Turkish Religious Affairs Directorate. and violent extremism, civil 27 TURSAB: https://www.tursab.org.tr/. 28 Emin, 2020. ‘Is there a Balkan Diaspora in Turkey?’ Available at https://insamer.com/en/is-there-a-balkan-diaspora-in-turkey_3445.html. See also society sustainability, organized Vračić, 2016. Turkey’s Role in the Western Balkans, SWP Research Paper. crime, community resilience and 29 Davutoğlu, 2008. Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007. Insight Turkey. 30 Populari, 2014. A Political Romance: Relations between Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Available at http://populari.org/files/docs/411.pdf. international relations. Romario 31 Vračić, 2016. Turkey’s Role in the Western Balkans. SWP Research Paper. holds an MSc in International 32 See Aydıntaşbaş, 2019. ‘From Myth to Reality: How to understand Turkey’s role in the Western Balkans’, London: European Council on Foreign Relations. See also https://www.dailysabah.com/columns/ibrahim-kalin/2018/06/02/whatdoes-turkey-want-in-the-balkans [accessed 28 December Relations, a BA in Political 2020]. Science and International 33 Elbasani, 2013. Europeanization Travels to the Western Balkans: Enlargement Strategy, Domestic Obstacles and Diverging Reforms. Routledge. 34 For BiH see Palickova, 2019. ‘Erdoğan visits Bosnia as part of bigger game’. Available at https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/ Relations, and is fluent in news/Erdoğan-visits-bosnia-as-part-of-bigger-game/. For Albania, see Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, 2018. ‘Bushati- Çavuşoğlu Albanian, English, and Turkish. pave the road to setting up the Albania-Turkey High-Level Cooperation Council’. [Online] Available at: https://punetejashtme.gov.al/en/ bushati-cavusoglu-celin-rrugen-e-ngritjes-se-keshillit-te-bashkepunimit-te-nivelit-te-larte-shqiperi-turqi/ 35 Radio Free Europe, 2018. ‘Turkey’s Erdoğan Slams Kosovo Criticism Of Deportation Of Gülen-Linked Turks’. Available at https://www.rferl.org/a/ kosovo-investigation-arrest-deportation-turkey-teachers-gulen/29137309

084 085 Disinfo/ Hybrid

Unwrapping the ‘anaconda’ of malign narratives

Oana Popescu-Zamfir (Bucharest): Information wars and regime stability. How can nations respond? /p.088

Rufin Zamfir (Bucharest): Malign foreign influence: a triangle with its vertex abroad and the base at home /p.092

Ana Maria Luca (Beirut): A question of trust. Why is China not as sexy as Korea? A Romanian perspective /p.096

086 087 ?Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 Oana Popescu-Zamfir: Information wars and regime stability. How can nations respond Information wars and regime stability. How can nations respond?

By Oana Popescu-Zamfir | Bucharest

f civilians are engaged in conflict, then the solution can only come in a ‘whole-of-society’ I approach, and not from government only.

Increasingly, as global competition steps up and technology and in the very ability of the institutions of that responsibility for facing this onslaught of affords ever more efficient ways of compelling the enemy into representative democracy to deliver on emotionally - and bias- loaded information lies submission without firing a shot, we will continue to see information their mission. The most fragile balance ultimately with the individual only to decide what warfare being used more often and by a wider range of state and to maintain, under the circumstances, is best for oneself hugely underestimates the toll non-state actors. Since the very essence of such campaigns is to is between countering information that the information environment that we live in remain below the threshold of conflict - where their perpetrators manipulation, and preserving information takes on our ability to cope. Similarly, institutions may be identified and proportional response may be triggered integrity and the freedom of expression. and democracy itself have not evolved to - there will be no non-combatants. What is more, the civilian effectively deal with the challenge, while population will be the target of choice, because the modus To be clear, there is no one-size-fits-all solution, preserving fundamental principles: they remain operandi of ‘influence’, perhaps a more adequate name than as dis-/misinformation and manipulation slow, often hierarchical and bureaucratic, in a ‘war’, campaigns is to turn the native populations, or part thereof, are versatile weapons and they adapt to world that is increasingly horizontal, ad-hoc, and into unknowing accomplices/ domestic agents of the attacker, the target, and no definitive comprehensive empowering for a whole new range of citizens. most often by inciting them to contest the very institutions tasked answer yet. The simple truth is that technology with preserving stability, continuity and legitimacy of the state. and communication have progressed at a That being said, there are a number of things to rate unmatched by either human emotional do – and fast – to limit the impact of information If civilians are engaged in conflict, then the solution can only and cognitive development, or adaptation of operations, while safeguarding democracy and come in a ‘whole-of-society’ approach, and not from government institutions. We remain unable to cope with civil liberties. They are grouped along an axis only. Quite on the contrary, the role of government is often a information overload and speed, microtargeting that goes from ‘detection’, to ‘damage limitation’ delicate one, since malign foreign influence seeks to deepen and the pushing of all our emotional triggers and ‘deterrence’ and involve two lines of action: the mistrust that citizens already have in their own governments without enormous effort. This is why advocating Resilience and Response. The goal is both to

088 089 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 Oana Popescu-Zamfir: Information wars and regime stability. How can nations respond?

equip societies to deal with the threat when it operations for the adversary; and for ‘response’ the ‘swing’ segment, who can be turned relatively easily by a presents itself, and to take preventive measures mechanisms to be activated, the ‘enemy’ malevolent actor, but can also be protected from manipulation with to avoid it materialising at all, given that once needs to be clearly identified in national the right and timely actions. To this end, the government needs to falsified information has made it into the public strategic documents, especially in cases where develop a robust strategic communications strategy (StratCom) space, damage has already been done. Hence, subversive behaviour is employed repeatedly and infrastructure, to make sure it has the upper hand on relevant and/ or with a manifest purpose. communication and it is not only in a position to refute falsehood, but also persuade the public, in a manner that is both truthful, The simple truth is that Both detection and damage efficient and respectful of existing biases, without appearing limitation (through building to challenge the core beliefs and values of its constituency. technology and communication resilience) can improve if an Both StratCom and anti-disinformation measures need to be ‘early warning’ system is put well‑coordinated across relevant agencies, with a clear focal point, have progressed at a rate in place, by means of a self- placed with an authority that has the constitutional and executive assessment of permeability ability to direct other institutions. Too often, at present, government unmatched by either human to information manipulation. works in silos and information or intelligence-sharing is deficient. Since foreign actors will use emotional and cognitive existing rifts, grievances and More widely, cooperation among official institutions, the private perception biases and aim to sector, especially social media and online platforms, and civil development, or adaptation of amplify them, the identification society is key. On the one hand, the public will be better protected of such vulnerabilities will make if these platforms help identify automated inauthentic behaviour institutions. We remain unable to it easier to plug the gaps before online (trolls, bots) and through real-time fact-checking and others can take advantage of flagging, limit the access of perpetrators to their audience, as cope with information overload them. That is not to say they well as their financial incentives. On the other hand, the capacity will always be easy to address, of platforms and of those using them to microtarget individuals and speed, microtargeting and since many are structural and and use emotional response triggers needs to be limited, closely linked with the overall while the transparency of algorithms and policies needs to be the pushing of all our emotional resilience of state and/ or greatly improved. This is also the case with the ease of access democracy: Critical thinking, and understanding of the user concerning any dangers he/ triggers without enormous effort. scientific education and media she faces in operating the respective platforms, to empower the literacy among the population, individual in relation to these companies. In so doing, the role of one of the main challenges is to get ahead of confidence in government, perceived inequality, independent watchdogs is crucial, because these are, after all, the game and pre-emptively reduce exposure corruption, intra-societal trust, etc. Also, singular private entities working for profit, while governments themselves to manipulation, rather than simply be reactive. measures are unlikely to significantly reduce can be seen as having a stake in the regulation and non-/

the risk. Media literacy education is always disclosure of information. The principle that offline rules should OANA POPESCU-ZAMFIR is director

The difficulty of ‘detection’ derives from the good, but it’s a long-term endeavour and it naturally extend online is gaining widespread approval, but only and founder of GlobalFocus Center,

competitive edge of information operations: is insufficient; debunking alone, rather than international standards (such as the EU Code of Conduct, Five an independent foreign policy

they are often detected only after they have setting the facts straight, is likely to reinforce Eyes and other collective arrangements) will realistically make and strategic analysis think-tank,

produced effects. Attribution, the determination false narratives by repeating them, as well as to a difference in addressing a problem that is inherently a cross- and former State Secretary for

of what constitutes the threshold for calling induce the belief that no one can be trusted - border one and can easily elude a single state’s jurisdiction. EU Affairs. Oana was a Fulbright

‘an attack’ and what constitutes proportional which plays right into the hands of manipulators. scholar at Yale University, with

response are equally challenging. All these executive studies at Harvard

decisions will of necessity be highly political, To boost resilience, governments and societies Kennedy School of Government

not just a military or technical matter. Yet, for also need to focus primarily on those segments and St Andrew's University. effective ‘deterrence’ to work, one needs to of the population who are not hardcore believers

increase the costs of carrying out information of fabricated ideas or ideology, but represent This article was first published as part of the series — Raisina Edit 2021.

090 091 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 Rufin Zamfir: Malign Foreign Influence – A Triangle With its Vertex Abroad and the Base at Home Malign foreign influence: a triangle with its vertex abroad and the base at home

Rufin Zamfir | Bucharest

oreign influence is a multi-dimensional attack that is often mistaken by observers as merely linear. Understanding F the thread is the only way to counter it effectively.

January 6th, 2021 will likely remain in the minds of Europeans with both Moscow and Beijing. A bit more to analyzed and faced on all three dimensions as the day that a crowd of turned against the south, overlapping Russian and Chinese along which it deploys: the influencers, everything that America historically represented to the world. interests have turned the largest and most the influencing, and the influenced. Fewer will see in it the underlying malign foreign influence influential country in the Western Balkans, operation unfolding for years against the background of Serbia, from the poster child of the region’s The influencers have partly overlapping (at best) a complacent administration in Washington. The EU accession, into a puppet of foreign objectives, strategies and tactics. Russia’s is to operation was aimed at influencing elections, but also helping powers and corrupt domestic interests. A preserve Putin’s power structure domestically radicalize the local population online in ways that end up staunch US ally and the most consistently and – to this end - create a “near abroad” undermining democracy, stability and social cohesion. pro-European country in the region, space of influence insulated from Western Romania came close to succumbing to a and democratic competition (which could Across the Atlantic, Brexit was exposed sooner as a similar – government of little ideological conviction give ideas to its own citizens). Its methods and successful – endeavor. In both cases, the public image but committed to roll back anticorruption combine military dominance with a set of will still remain that of a part of ‘we, the people’ upending the reforms to preserve power and impunity at values opposed to Western liberal democracy status quo, whether at the polls or in the streets. Behind it lies a all costs. It was ousted by the voters in 2019, (Slavic brotherhood, traditional values, much more intricate web of domestic and foreign collusion. but one year later, the socially conservative Orthodoxy). The Kremlin uses cultural ties, electorate it left floating propelled a historical narratives or psychological levers In Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the same kind of brand-new far-right party straight into to foster socio-political fragmentation and mechanism has so far resulted in the democratic backsliding parliament, the first time in over 10 years. polarization, leading to weak, dysfunctional of Poland and Hungary: the former under the leadership of a states that either reject Western institutions government hostile to Russia, but fully playing into the hands of Going forward, Russian and Chinese malign and values altogether, or exhaust the capacity Russian interests; the latter in full-fledged, brazen cooperation foreign influence (MFI) in CEE should be and/or willingness of the West to support

092 093 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 Rufin Zamfir: Malign Foreign Influence – A Triangle With its Vertex Abroad and the Base at Home

democracy. Once that is accomplished, Europe as a whole that is very hard to walk that would be un unlikely outcome. Yet enough people in Russia has a free hand to use its other arsenal back within any optimistic timeframe!). The both countries, while still proclaiming loyalty to a pro-Western of influence and manipulation: organized onset of COVID-19 though has left an embattled strategic orientation, have proved to be rather easily swayed crime, business-political nexus of corrupt China scrambling for options to quickly repair away from Western values to support antidemocratic forces. interests, funding political parties, or civic its international reputation damaged by “the movements/civil society organizations, etc. Wuhan virus.” However, Beijing has been able to In CEE, as everywhere else, the battleground therefore turns do so at spectacular speed, domestic, with the tremendous ethical and practical challenge thanks to its opportunistic of identifying a state’s own citizens as “the enemy within.” The The Kremlin uses cultural synergies with Russia, which influenced are (quite massive) vulnerable groups, who experience have put China in the enviable polarization and inequality, caused by uneven economic ties, historical narratives or position of simply having to development and modernization, and disillusionment with political reach out with an offer to representation; or who are frustrated with the mixed results of psychological levers to foster those domestic agents which integration into the West. In these permeable populations, malign Moscow had already identified foreign influence heightens a sense of threat around societal socio-political fragmentation and prepped, incentivizing values and amplifies grievances with respect to state, society, or them to step up their game. the West. Eventually, it perverts the argument of self-expression and polarization, leading to weak, and exercise of democratic freedoms to incite to insurrection Raising the costs (both against the very fundamentals of democratic order. At the decision- dysfunctional states that either material and reputational) making level, hostile states corrupt influential voices and discredit for hostile actors conducting institutions to further aggravate the low confidence in government. reject Western institutions and such influence operations is paramount, and it Given the region’s history of communist oppression, accelerated values altogether, or exhaust the requires early detection, and uneven transition, and lingering differences from the exposure and response. West (both cultural and developmental), driving a wedge capacity and/or willingness of between society and its leaders is a relatively easy and In the information space, inexpensive game, with high and quick return on investment. the West to support democracy. however, the influencing is done by constructing The pandemic has recently shown how lack of trust in China’s agenda is apparently more benign fundamental narratives that create in the minds elected authorities can immediately (not in an abstract because it often uses legitimate means, but of a vulnerable audience binary oppositions: future) translate into active resistance to life-saving measures it is essentially like being strangled by the “democracy and Western capitalism do not and an economic and humanitarian crisis of proportions. anaconda that wraps around you till you can’t really serve the interests of the citizens,” Investment in societal resilience is therefore the only effective breathe. Beijing has so far sought to secure “liberal values are morally bankrupt and answer, coupled with the relentless investment in building

for itself a favorable investment and trade threaten traditional identities and ways of up democratic culture and independent institutions. In CEE, RUFIN ZAMFIR is Programme

environment and has focused more on directly life,” “the US/ EU/ NATO are imperialist fortunately the experience of pre-NATO/EU accession Director at GlobalFocus Center

influencing decision-makers than the masses. powers,” “the West is the aggressor who cooperation with the West is still fresh, the actors themselves where he coordinates the

To advance its global political and economic seeks to box Russia and China into a corner to still active, an invaluable resource to tap into and reactivate. Asymmetric Threats programme.

agenda, however, it has a direct interest in eliminate opposition,” “national governments He was a Visegrad Fund Fellow in

diminishing Western power and challenging are vassals of great powers/supranational Bratislava where he studied the V4

the Western-dominated rules-based order and bodies,” etc. Neither Russia nor China insist states' Stratcom mechanisms, and

rule of law set. Until recently, it has done so less that the “manipulated” need to turn into This article was first published in Europe’s Edge an online journal a scholar with the Atlantic Council's

actively than it has engaged in promoting its their admirers. In countries like Romania or covering crucial topics in the transatlantic policy debate, as part 360/Digital Sherlocks programme.

own economic interests (resulting in a degree Poland, both Atlanticists with vivid memories of #CEEDisinfoWeek – a series of articles highlighting the current

of dependence on Beijing of both CEE and of communism and Russian dominance, disinformation landscape in Central and Eastern Europe.

094 095 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 A Question of Trust. Why is China not as sexy as Korea? A Romanian perspective A question of trust. Why is China not as sexy as Korea? A Romanian perspective

By Ana Maria Luca | Beirut

n spring 2018, a convenience store selling Korean and Japanese with news on Korean music and dramas, Spotify’s 207 million at the beginning of products opened in central Bucharest, behind one of the city as well as all things Korean, including food 2019 (Russell 2018). Moreover, Beijing has museum’s buildings. The shop sells various foods produced in South I recipes, cosmetics and how they’re used. started to invest in foreign policy research, Korea, including ramyeon, nori, frozen dumplings, spring rolls, kimchi, and is currently funding several doctoral noodles, tofu, and even Korean ice cream. It also sells Korean cosmetics Several online shops opened delivering Korean programmes at British universities that have – from lipstick and eyeliner to aloe vera-based skin care from Jeju Island food and cosmetics, while other online shops opened campuses in China in the past few – and K-pop albums released by various artists, as well as memorabilia. specialised exclusively in Korean cosmetics years. The main focus of these programmes is or in K-pop band memorabilia and music to determine how audiences in the countries albums which otherwise could not be found of the Belt and Road Initiative react to Chinese in the mainstream commercial outlets. cinema and television and the political ideas included in the Chinese pop culture project. At the entrance, before picking up a shopping basket, the Moreover, several crowdsourced websites with customer has to pass life-size cardboard effigies of the Bang Asian (but predominantly Korean) movies and C-pop has not generated the same type of Tan Boys/BTS, one of the most successful Korean boy bands. dramas have acquired over 200,000 followers. soft power effect as Korean pop culture – at The shop is more than a minimarket; it is designed to resemble Community members translate drama episodes least not yet. According to some insiders, this is a convenience store in , . The shop also has a into Romanian, in real time and for free, to support because Beijing has not yet been that interested food court where customers can sit and enjoy a box of freshly their passion for Korean actors and Korean culture. in promoting its entertainment products prepared instant ramyeon while listening to K-pop songs. outside the East and South-East Asian region, The popularity of the Korean Wave in where they are already a hit (Kelley 2019). By the summer of 2019, the shop had become already a Romania has also spotlighted other East meeting point, a ‘third place’ for K-pop fans from Bucharest Asian pop cultures, including Chinese. However in the rest of the world, where Korean and travellers from other regions of Romania who were K-pop popular culture is gaining ground and is able fans and had heard about the shop on vlogs, blogs and other C-pop, just like K-pop, means billions of dollars: to influence foreign societies by creating a social media groups dedicated to Korean popular culture. China has a self-sustaining entertainment largely positive and desirable image of Korea, industry. Chinese internet giant Tencent’s four markets with Chinese noodles and dumplings At the beginning of 2020, there were scores of Romanian language music platforms – QQ Music, Kugou Music, are not becoming third places for groups of groups and pages on social media dedicated to Korean pop Kuwo Music and WeSing – have a combined C-pop fans to put on Chinese make-up, sing bands, idols, movies and movies stars, and blogs and vlogs 800 million monthly users, compared to Chinese pop songs and eat Chinese noodles.

096 097 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 A Question of Trust. Why is China not as sexy as Korea? A Romanian perspective

Nor do C-pop and C-drama fans gather in ‘We between states rest less on coercion and more mechanism, and insists on the power of ideas, the East Asian markets in the late 1990s, right love China’ cultural groups to spread Chinese on attraction, common values and popular but also on the fact that soft power is more than after the Asian Financial Crisis when the Korean culture and language. Cultural activities like these culture – on soft power, rather than hard power, just public diplomacy, development aid and economy was in shambles and the export of have been directly backed by the Chinese state as American political scientist Joseph Nye, planned cultural exchanges (Lee 2009, p. 207): it popular culture seemed a resource that needed through its Confucius Institutes, but they have not Jr. argued in his book Bound to Lead (1991), a is also about changing the thinking framework to be exploited (Iwabuchi & Chua 2008). won the hearts and minds of millions of people critique of realism in international relations. of a recipient community and/or society. around the world. Neither have they won the The rise of the ‘Korean Wave’ in the new hearts and minds of C-pop fans in Romania. Later he developed a theory of soft power as a Soft resources, which he defines as ideas, millennium happened because of governmental means of success in international relations in a images, theories, know how, education, culture, and corporate support (Doobo 2008). The wave So why does China have a hard time generating changing world where attractiveness gradually traditions or national and global symbols, are started in 1994 with government support for soft power in countries like Romania? becomes more important than coercion (2004). applied to a recipient in order to change their the domestic cinema production as a national behaviour. But they only produce soft power strategic industry as an effect of the liberalisation According to Nye, states do not only resort to when the attractiveness or fear they produce on of the media markets in East Asia and the success Soft is the new strong military or coercive diplomacy to exert influence or a short term becomes ‘common sense’ in the of US made cinema. Due to the tax incentive, dominate other states and international institutions, recipient group/community/society, changes the investments of chaebols (Korean business In sociology, it was Pierre Bourdieu who first spoke but they can also ‘charm’ them into supporting the way of thinking and the interpretative conglomerates) facilitated processes of capital of symbolic power, which finds its expression in certain policies or actions at the international frameworks, and produces long-term effects. accumulation in the media sector, but also cultural practices and forms which sustain unequal level, or simply in order to pacify them. attracted many talented human resources. distribution of scarce resources (Swartz 2013). In And, based on tens of interviews of consumers Bourdieu’s view, power is not only a matter that His theory is based largely on the United States of Korean and Chinese pop At the same time, after the should concern the political domain, but it is also and its influence over numerous states at a time culture, I argue that the key in 1990s financial crisis, when linked to culture and economics, and it is present of liberalism when coercion had become frowned whether pop culture becomes C-pop has Korea’s economy took a big in all human relations; symbolic forms of power, upon in international relations (Nye 2011). soft power or does not is trust. hit and it prioritised its media capital, and violence sustain social hierarchies. not generated industry, other East Asian Nye argued at the time that pop culture in itself countries also liberalised their But in the case of states in the international is not necessarily soft power; soft power, he says, The K in soft power the same type media markets, making it easy system, the same symbolic forms of power, rests on a country’s culture, the legitimacy of its for the Korean blockbusters capital and violence, form political hierarchies. foreign policy and political values. The more its In Korea’s case, the K is in of soft power to sell abroad and become Bourdieu’s work was largely focused on the values are universal and globally shared, and its everything that makes up a regional phenomenon. idea of the state as a holder of symbolic power domestic policies in tune with the global trend, the ‘Korean Wave’ – K-pop, effect as Korean on the domestic level. However, looking at the the greater the country’s potential (Nye 2004, K-drama, K-beauty, all of By 2006, Korean media international system at any point in time, despite p. 11). The more parochial a culture (including which are anchored in Korea. pop culture – at products were becoming its de jure anarchic character, the symbolic power its political ideas and social rules), the less widely consumed in East and and capital of various states and non-state actors potential it has for soft power, even if its cultural K-pop has been mentioned least not yet. South-East Asia and started play a role in the de facto international hierarchic goods are well received outside its borders. by various political scientists to spread across the world system that David A. Lake speaks of in Hierarchy as a manifestation of (Chua and Iwabuchi 2008), in International Relations (Lake 2009). He argues South Korean political scientist Lee Geun (2009) soft power (Watson 2012) (Kim & Hogarth creating a mass of fans that not only shared the that the world is made of patron/client bargained realised that his own country was being cited 2013). The association of terms is well consumption of Korean media products, but relations between dominant states that provide more and more as a model of soft power at enough established in the literature, and has also the love for South Korea as a country. security or know-how and subordinate states the dawn of the 21st century, and developed a grown to be a model for other East Asian in exchange for support or compliance. theoretical framework based on Nye’s concept. countries, including China and . In some cases, K-culture fans become political agents promoting South Korean In a decentralised world where it is increasingly Lee makes the actual connection between soft The penetration of Korean pop culture, nationalist ideas in their own home societies, easy for information to travel, the relations power resources and the power conversion especially K-pop and K-dramas, began with spreading knowledge and normalising

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the ideas spread through K-culture. culture like that of South Korea; and The body is central following Lee’s theory, how does this to post‑modern Pop culture is not only about Irina Lyan (2019) points out that non-Korean Hallyu attractiveness become soft power? geopolitics fans in Israel, for instance, often become the fashion and music, but also about voices of South Korean nationalism. By looking at This can only be achieved by looking at The human body is the first who participates in and what happens in events culture through the lens proposed by territory conquered by soft political ideas, freedoms or lack organised on Korea Day during 2000-2010, she Richard Hoggart (1957), which includes not power, if you look at the matter found that it was the local non-Korean fans that only music, entertainment and the arts in from Foucault’s perspective. At of them, experience, social and celebrated the state’s national day and spread general, but also political ideas and social about the same time Joseph the culture, and took on the roles of experts and behaviours which, in an age of information, Nye came up with the idea moral values that a group in a educators, and even of cultural ambassadors. can become part of pop culture. of soft power in international relations, Michel Foucault distant geographical location can She calls the phenomenon fan-nationalism: Pop culture is not only about fashion (1990) established a theory fans are mobilised by the idea of promoting a and music, but also about political ideas, of biopower, as opposed to choose, based on its local already- positive image of Korea in their home societies. freedoms or lack of them, experience, social the idea of sovereign power, and moral values that a group in a distant or the power over death existing culture, to like, adhere to, I have found that this happens to geographical location can choose, based which ruled over society until some extent in Romania too. on its local already-existing culture, to like, the French Revolution. trust, digest and internalise. adhere to, trust, digest and internalise. If sovereign power was individual starts acting as a political agent in the The experience on When discussing this process of exercised by states whose ultimate expression interest of a foreign state by replicating political the demand side transforming pop culture into soft power, it is of power was the monopoly of capital force, ideas and social norms in their home society. also imperative to not only look at states, but then biopower in fact means power over life What exactly makes certain groups in a also at the level of the individual and their through regulatory controls which result in the distant society be attracted to a popular immediate surroundings and social relations. biopolitics of the population. Foucault looks at the A five-stage apprenticeship human being – le vivant – from the relationship – from Netflix to political between the body and the surrounding tools, embodiment spaces constraining and enabling physical or mental movements. The object of the For most of the respondents interviewed, the power relationship becomes the living, due to journey starts with one K-drama they either mutations in social relations in modern times. found by accident on Netflix or another streaming service, or they get referred to by a friend who However, Foucault believes that the state is already a consumer and acts like an expert in no longer needs to be an oppressive or ‘Korean affairs’. They like one of the actors starring coercive factor on living bodies, but can in the drama, they look for more information about also charm them into submission. the celebrity in the media and also on social media, and look for other dramas he/she starred in. Our bodies, all of us, are, therefore, central to post-modern geopolitics. Following Foucault’s Phase 1: ‘Alice in Wonderland’ idea, the body becomes a consenting object of soft power, remaining central to the new “I really want to understand more what is actually paradigm of geopolitics. Falling in love with a happening to me. I started to watch a couple of foreign country, at the individual level, becomes weeks ago and I am already hooked. I simply a manifestation of geopolitical power when the think about it all day and want to escape in that

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world, which is super-colourful, with insanely Last but not least, the demand for Korean beautiful people and where everything ends language classes has increased dramatically happily,” one of the interviewees explained. during the past ten years in Romania: Korean- language programmes in universities are receiving Phase 2: Networking higher numbers of applicants, and some private universities have set up Korean-language classes When asked, fans said that most of their with native teachers, regularly host Korean knowledge of South Korea comes from the professors as guest lecturers, and send more dramas themselves and, although they are students on exchange programmes to Korea. aware that reality might not be the same, they are still tempted by the Korean dream and want Phase 4: Experts on all things Korea to be transported into that fantasy world. Many K-drama fans look for other fans on social media, The first result of this embodied hybrid Korean first express about Korea and spread among language classes and organise Korean speech join groups on Facebook, Instagram and TikTok, popular culture in groups of fans in Romania friends and Romanian society in general, rather contests or karaoke contests for K-pop fans. and they also join international communities. is that they become agents who spread than their preferences in terms of music or dramas. They also participate in events organised by Korean cultural and social ideas, values, and the Korean embassy in Bucharest on various Phase 3: Internalising the new culture become experts in everything Korean. Phase 5: Economic and political entrepreneurship occasions, including Korea Day. They also publish a magazine about all things Korean. Fan group members also start using words While going through their lists of favourite After the K-drama and K-apprenticeship phase, they hear in movies when they speak to each actors, many of the fans interviewed (mostly some K-culture fans become Korea fans and seek These activities, together with a number other, or make up inside jokes with references women) became interested in Korean to boost their link to Korea more than simply by of personal blogs and the social media to both the Romanian culture they have history and researched the characters reading and expressing their expertise and views presence of many ‘experts in all things Korea’, learned and embodied since childhood and the portrayed by the favourite actors, read and comparing their home society to that of Korea. promote and generalise the idea that South Korean popular culture they see in dramas. English-language Korean media and started Korea is a “cool and interesting country”. looking for more in-depth information about Some become K-entrepreneurs: they They call each other jeonha (‘majesty’ in Korean) the government and society in the country. establish businesses that sell Korean products However, there is a catch. Not just any way they learned from historical dramas, or they (mostly food and cosmetics). Others become country with a huge entertainment industry say sarang-hae instead of ‘I love you’ to each other. Romanian K-pop and K-drama consumers, social and/or political entrepreneurs. can follow in South Korea’s steps. especially if they visit Korea for a vacation or have They dress like K-drama characters, they order studied for a few months in Korea, act like experts Most countries use cultural diplomacy as a and wear Korean cosmetics, put on make-up on Korean society and often explain it to friends. tool to spread their culture and their political So why is China the Korean way, they cook Korean food. Several conversations I have had with K-drama messages to other states, but most of the cultural not that attractive? and K-pop fans have turned into long hours of institutes are usually funded by governments, The imitation can also go as far as making gestures explainers on what Korean popular culture is and are managed by their ministries of Foreign It is not really attractive to Romanians in particular; considered polite in Korea, but adapting them to about, social pressures in Korea, gender issues, Affairs. South Korea does not need to advertise and it is indeed about the political culture that Romanian society. The culture they see and absorb expat issues, as well as the way the Korean its cultural activities in Romania too much. Beijing infuses its media content with – which it from dramas becomes embodied in the way government handled the coronavirus pandemic does too obviously for this particular audience. they relate to other people in their own society. without imposing restrictions, as well as how The association that serves as a Korean cultural the society reacts to corruption, the culture of institute is founded and operated by Romanians Most K-culture fans I interviewed and observed The K-culture consumed and metabolised from protesting for labour rights, and the political class. who act as local cultural ambassadors: they during months of research consumed both K-drama also impacts their physical and social organise cultural events such as Korean movie Chinese and Korean pop culture. However, in the bodies, as well as material culture: they bow to However, when members of the Romanian festivals (twice a year) with some backing case of most Chinese productions, they say they people when they say hello, or use both hands fan base act like experts, it is the political ideas from the Korean embassy, run stands at Asian feel the intervention of the state-driven political to offer an object, as is polite in Korean culture. contained in the Korean popular culture that they cultural festivals around the year, offer Korean propaganda and the government’s grip on social

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relations, as well as individual freedoms. kingdoms. However, when in the middle of References: an episode of a drama about demi-gods and

The political ideas that Romanian K-drama and fairies such as Ashes of Love, one peripheral • Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. Harvard University Press.

K-pop fans spread most when they speak of Korea character says, “Don’t trust the fairies, they are as • Chua, Beng Huat, and Koichi Iwabuchi. 2008. East Asian Pop Culture:

are that the country is seen as a democracy, which unreliable as Hong Kong”, an eastern European Analysing the Korean Wave. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

shares freedom of speech and transparency, two audience may not see it as a very good joke, • Doobo, Shim. 2008. ‘The Growth of Korean Cultural Industries and the Korean

values that are globally cherished and are also but as a clear sign of state censorship. Wave’ in East Asian Pop Culture: Analyzing the Korean Wave, by Chua Beng Huat

shared by Romanian society. It is a question of trust. and Koich Iwabuchi, 15-31. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

• Foucault, Michel. 1990. History of Sexuality. New York : Random House Western European interviewees who consume “The fact that I know that China is not a democracy, • Hoggart, Richard. 1957. The uses of literacy. Transaction publishers. Chinese pop culture and who absorb cultural and I know how people live in a Communist • Holyk, Gregory G. 2013. ‘Paper Tiger? Chinese Soft Power in ideas much more quickly become fans of Taoism, country, because we lived through that before East Asia’, Political Science Quarterly 223- 254. and they begin to study the language and history 1989 in Romania makes me distrust Chinese • Iwabuchi, Koichi. 2010. ‘Globalization, East Asian media cultures and – which also creates a more fertile ground for movies to a certain extent,” one fan bluntly put it. their publics.” Asian Journal of Communication 197-212. receiving political ideas and norms. In some • Iwabuchi, Koichi, and Chua Beng Huat. 2008. “East Asian TV Dramas: Identifications, Western societies the mythical representation of Young K-pop fans explained that they felt that Sentiments and Effects.” In East Asian Pop Culture: Analyzing the Korean Wave, by Chua China as the world’s greatest civilisation in pop- in the Chinese media they consumed there was Beng Huat & Koichi Iwabuchi ed., 1-13. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. culture (movies, music, web novels, animation, a certain amount of Communist propaganda, • Nye, Joseph Jr. 2004. Power in the Global Information Age: or video games) is a niche hobby which is conservatism and censorship which they From Realism to Globalization. New York: Routledge. more successfully accepted by the youth. defined as ‘a certain degree of fake’. They said • Kim. 2016. “Korea’s Cultural Juggernaut is a Soft-Power Strategy

that Korean products were closer to Western Worth Copying’, National Interest, 14 August.

culture and they could identify more with them, • Kuwahara, Yasue. 2014. The Korean Wave. Korean Popular Culture As opposed to Eastern European consumers especially because they did not feel there was in Global Context. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. of mainland Chinese popular culture, Western any political infringement of individual liberty. • Lake, David A. 2009. Hierarchy and International Relations. Cornell University Press. European consumers of Chinese movies, novels, videogames are more inclined to absorb the idea of • Lee, Geun. 2009. ‘A theory of soft power and Korea’s soft power They shared the idea that South Korean pop strategy’, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 205-2018. mythical historical China as a great civilisation, and bands, despite the fact that they knew the artists • Lyan, Irina. 2019. ‘Welcome to Korea Day’, International Journal of Communication 3764–3780. more readily dismiss the topics of authoritarianism, are subjected to a strict regimen that is sometimes • Lyan, Irina, and Nissim Otmazgin. 2019. ‘Fan entrepreneurship. Fandom, Communism and China’s human rights problems. abusive, were not submitted to censorship Agency, and the Marketing of Hallyu in Israel’, Kritika Kultura 289–307.

by an explicit political actor (i.e. a government • Nye, Joseph Jr. 1991. Bound To Lead: The Changing Nature Of But in the former Communist bloc, consumers institution). “In the Chinese dramas, however American Power. New York: Ingram Publisher Services. of pop culture are already skilled at detecting cool the topics are, you just see people acting • Nye, Joseph. 2004. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs. state pressure on media and individual freedoms really awkward and naïve. Koreans are simply • Swartz, David L. 2013. Symbolic Power, Politics, and Intellectuals: The Political ANA MARIA LUCA is a senior and can smell government enforced censorship more genuine,” a 17-year-old respondent said. Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. researcher with GlobalFocus Center. from afar. In societies like Romania it is difficult for China to rely on its charm based on an During 2008-2016 she was based as The problem with China’s soft-power a journalist in Beirut, Lebanon, and image constructed on the idea of its mythical push is that, in Romania and some other covered the Arab Spring, the Syrian civilisation, because the trauma of having survived Central and Eastern European countries, conflict and Middle Eastern politics. Communist rule is greater than the fascination it simply does not generate trust. She holds an MA in International for cosmeticised Chinese cultural products. The C-culture consumers who also admire the Affairs from the Lebanese American Most Chinese period dramas portray a mythical University and a BA in Journalism Chinese political model are a tiny minority in Chinese society, with fantastic heroes and from the . comparison with the K-pop and K-drama ‘armies’. well-designed costumes, Taoist cultivators of immortality, or historical heroes that conquer

104 105 Changing character of conflict

The rise of cognitive wars

Brad Allenby, professor of engineering and ethics, Arizona State University (Tempe): ‘Pluralism was designed for a time when information moved more slowly’ /p.108

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Interview Brad Allenby, Lincoln Professor of Engineering and Ethics How do you see the impact of AI and big data on democracy at Arizona State University and pluralism at a time when the public square has increasingly moved online? Can they make democracy and pluralism more resilient and healthy, or are we going to see “Pluralism was designed the opposite: AI-enabled malign information campaigns, tribalism on steroids (with societies that become divided along Hutu vs. Tutsi lines), or even Orwellian states for a time when information where comprehensive surveillance is dominant?

moved more slowly” Especially because there are so many dimensions to these changes, I think that you can’t predict; the only thing you can really do is to create scenarios. It is not an unreasonable scenario to ask if the integration of AI, the party and private firms into a network in China, which is part of the Social Credit System (SCS) doesn’t give authoritarianism a significant jump in fitness. Meanwhile the difficulty with pluralism is that the

In this wide-ranging interview, Writing about the rise of AI, Henry Kissinger pointed out pluralistic structure was designed for a period when information Brad Allenby warns us about his concern with “the historical, philosophical and strategic aspect in particular moved much more slowly. You see that in the the transformational impact of technology (including AI) on the of it. I’ve become convinced that AI is going to bring a change First Amendment and with the checks and balances system. existing institutions and shares in human consciousness exceeding that of the Enlightenment.” These are fine until the rate of change and technological reality his insights on the future of war. What worries you about the rise of AI (especially as the rise decouple them from the governance system. Institutions that of AI happens in a context where advances in biotechnology were designed for a low-bandwidth world suddenly find and neuroscience seem to be opening new frontiers)? themselves overwhelmed by information flows. Once that happens, pluralistic societies have to think One of the difficulties is that AI is one of those technologies like deeply how they reinvent themselves, because electricity, an enabling one across the technological frontier. We are their authoritarian competitors are already going to be using it in the car navigation systems, in cellphones or reinventing themselves. A reasonable scenario refrigerators. It is not that we are going to have this integrated AI as is that the changes tend to weaken pluralism a technological threat in the same way that we perceive a nuclear and tend to strengthen soft authoritarianism. weapon. AI is going to enable new behaviors and new activities, which is one source of problems—just think about the intervention In this context, the thing to keep an eye on is how of the Russians in the 2016 American elections. At the same time, different cultures manage to use the integrated you are also going to have fundamental changes in the assumptions capability of the emerging cognitive ecosystem that underwrite our institutions. If you look at the American political — 5G, social media, AI, the Internet of Things. Brad Allenby system today we are arguing about the First Amendment [on Are they able to use that in ways which augment freedom of speech]. But AI as integrated into social media, and the the effectiveness and the power of the state and amount of information that we are generating means that that is party? Or does it rebound on their system in such a an irrelevant question. If you can’t get on social media you don’t way that it fragments even more? The Chinese are have free speech. You have AI integrated with other things acting putting together the Social Credit System in ways that are destabilising for the existing institutions. This is our (SCS) which integrates all of those. biggest problem. The rate of change is accelerating, it is going to Everyone depends on the social be more profound, so we are going to need to be able to develop credit system. You have a new institutions that are much more agile and adaptive, and yet high credit score and you at the same time more ethical than the ones they are replacing. can get in airplanes,

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in trains, you can go to certain colleges. It The West: too This new type of becomes a very powerful way of nudging successful to adapt? medievalism might happen behaviour. They are creating a structure where also inside the states not unless people behave the way you want During the 19th century, the Industrial only in the international them to, they are going to hurt themselves. Revolution was a hugely disruptive force system. Tribalism is on that reshaped the international system steroids, the space for Are the 21st century autocracies better and the balance of power globally. Some compromise-oriented elites positioned to compete and master AI/ benefited and others lost. Are we in the is shrinking. This is a huge cognitive infrastructures than democracies? early stages of a similar competition pressure for the US, as it between the West and the Rest, used to function under the Democracies in particular have a big problem. spearheaded by a new technological logic of E pluribus unum. In the Constitution of the US we have this revolution? With what implications? strong split between the military and civilian It is a problem that powers. That is great until your adversaries Yes, we are. Successful institutions are going particularly the Americans adopt a whole strategy of civilisational conflict to be successful because they are fit for the have. To the best of my (and both the Chinese and Russians have current environment. That has been true for knowledge we never really done it), in which case you are in trouble. 200 years of Western models of governance. had a world power that Your military knows that it is a threat, but That also means that when things change didn’t have an exceptionalist it is over the civilian infrastructure, so they fundamentally, they are the unfit ones. It is very narrative. The problem is can’t intervene. The pluralistic response may hard for a successful organisation to adapt. that today in their pursuit become more chaotic, and very importantly, AT&T used to be a great telephone company, of identity politics the it begins to take longer. The but along comes internet Americans have managed problem with authoritarianism telephony and AT&T goes to destroy the integrating has always been that it was If the US is away. The same is true of social narrative. The fragile. But designed properly, very successful governance exceptionalist narrative in a social credit system can not going to be systems. The problem that the US is very weak. Over only nudge citizens to behave the Americans have is that time the US will become the way the authoritarians want successful they’ve been successful, and less competitive because them to do, but it can also that is going to inhibit their tribal interests are going to detect when there are issues going forward, ability to adjust to a world grow to dominate the body that might affect the legitimacy where the fundamental politic. If the US is going to of the authoritarian. It can it is going assumptions underlying be successful going forward, last 10 years. The amount of information that is become a way of channeling those institutions have it is going to have to figure out how to create available, the too many different stories, create information upwards as well. to have to changed. Internationally, we a pluralism that embraces tribalism. That is an information overload so people fall back on Designed right, the traditional may be entering a period going to be very hard. Tribalism, identity politics their core narratives, not because they are stupid problems of authoritarianism figure out where we are moving toward are here to stay. It is important to understand but because they are forced to. The only way are ameliorated by this a kind of neo-medievalism: why. Individuals are information-processing they can continue to make sense of the world integrated AI/human how to create rather than having a single mechanisms. If you fundamentally change is to fall back on a tribal narrative that is more capability. If that is the case, power we are going to the information environment you are going to a matter of belief than of applied rationality. In then you have pluralism a pluralism have competing local perturb the performance of individuals and their short, a shifting away from System 2 thinking getting more and more power dynamics that tend institutions. Technologically-enabled trends are (predisposed to slow, applied rationality), back to chaotic, more sclerotic, and that embraces to disrupt international slowly undermining the core assumption of a System 1 thinking (predisposed to fast, emotional, you have soft authoritarianism commerce and could lead pluralistic society — the individual as a rational intuitive thinking). That means that tribalism is becoming more effective. tribalism. to higher levels of violence. citizen. That is exactly what we’ve done in the not only going to continue, but strengthen.

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The era of civilisational more those kind of fundamental changes across that entire frontier. The idea that war is restricted to conflict may need to be thought through. certain times and certain forms of combat becomes obsolete. Something that we need to recognise is that Russia is in But back to this paradigm change. The constant war with the West; they have been over a long time, You have written a lot on the changes easiest way to think about the civilisational and they are continuing to fight it. The problem that NATO that affect conflict and war. What conflict is that over the last 30 years, has is that it is more like a digital system. It is either on or off, significant trend-lines do you see the US has become the preeminent it is either war or not. With the Russians it’s analogue. That is as shaping the future of conflict? traditional military power. If you are China not something that the West is well designed to meet, either or Russia you are not going to be able in terms of strategy or institutions. As much as the West To me the deeper question is what to accept that that limits your freedom may not like it, our adversaries have chosen civilisational fundamental structures have to change to protect what you feel are your vital conflict, and that is where we are. We need to adapt. as we move into an era of ongoing, low- interests. So you are going to figure level civilisational conflict. Unless and out some way of developing effective You can see the different ways in which major powers until something dramatic happens, that asymmetric warfare and strategies. Overall, structure, for example, their cyber-activities. The Russians tend is going to be the state of the world. If strategic and technological imperatives to use both internal government and criminal organisations. that is the case, what works and what are changing how war and conflict are The Chinese tend to keep their high-technology companies doesn’t? You might say that clearly the framed, generating a shift from military very close and integrated with the state, so the party, the military-civilian divide embedded in confrontation to a much broader and state and the private companies are all generally aligned in the US Constitution is obsolete and you complex conflict waged across all domains their behaviour. The Americans tend to let their companies go should rethink it. That is never going to of civilisation. Both Russia and China have and view their private sector as being the innovative sector. happen, but the deeper you get into what gone in the same direction moving toward That kind of fragmented approach means the Americans are is happening to those assumptions, the coherent theories of unable to coalesce and align, even informally, the way the 21st-century conflict, Chinese are. They have a different idea of what constitutes The amount of information that is and contemplating a civilisational conflict structure than the Americans do. the inclusion of all available, the too many different dimensions of a How do you see the implications of the emerging cognitive civilisation in a very infrastructure for the traditional Boydian OODA loop? stories, create an information deliberate, strategically Visions of the war of the future talk about ‘algorithmic integrated process of warfare’, where decision dominance is of the essence. overload so people fall back on long-term, intentionally coordinated conflict. You Conflict at the level of world powers of all kinds is going their core narratives, not because see this trend with the to be faster, more complex, and more systemic. Being fast so-called ‘Gerasimov and understanding your environment better – accelerating they are stupid but because they doctrine/New-generation the OODA loop beyond the point that your adversary can warfare’ and the follow – is going to provide the strategic advantage. At the are forced to. The only way they ‘Unrestricted warfare’ same time, there will be many conflicts, such as in the Middle doctrine of the Chinese, East and sub-Saharan Africa, that are going to be low-level can continue to make sense of the and the implication is communal and tribal violence powered by deep ideological that all elements of differences – the so-called neomedieval environment. Speed, world is to fall back on a tribal an adversary’s culture agility, access to large data pools, and adaptability are key, so and society become the nations that figure out how to do that – how to get inside narrative that is more a matter of fair game for conflict. It the OODA loop of one’s adversaries – are going to dominate does mean that you will over time. The West is not doing particularly well on any belief than of applied rationality. be constantly attacking of those metrics, which should be a cause of concern.

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Let’s also discuss the main ethical We always tend to think about the robots and AI as being kind of Brad Allenby is a Lincoln What do we want implications. People fear a future where like us. But they are not going to be. We are the product of the Professor of Engineering and to save about the Ethics and co-chair of the robots might control us. What principles things that were evolutionarily necessary for a species like ours to Weaponised Narrative Initiative ancien régime? of the Center for the Future of should regulate/govern the use of AI? prosper and become the dominant species on the planet. But there War at Arizona State University. Do you see the potential to educate and is no reason why the Internet should develop that same cognitive Parts of this interview were What are the implications of how programme the intelligent machines in the structure. For humans, emotion is among other things a shortcut published in Romanian in the printed issue of Cronicile Curs we should think or rethink about the spirit of the 10 commandments? Or are we to decision-making. If the situation is too complex, emotions kick de Guvernare, No. 91. resilience of a pluralist democracy? becoming too much dependent on the old in and we respond. An AI should not have the same constraint. It assumptions when imagining the future? may have different ones, but it is not going to think the way we If pluralism is going to prosper, it needs do. It is going to think profoundly differently. We keep thinking to develop a way to reinvent itself from All of the above. I think we are already too of AI as the Skynet. It may not be Skynet, it may be like Google the foundations up. In doing so it may dependent on the assumptions that were maps or Alexa, that just become more and more part of your life. lose something that we value, but that valid during the first Enlightenment, but they is because it is becoming obsolete. are going to change. The first Enlightenment didn’t fail – it succeeded brilliantly, but In some ways we should think about the task now it has obsoleted itself. The second as sitting down in 1788 – what do I want to save Enlightenment is going to require us to about the ancien régime? Because things are rethink our ethical structures. As far as going to change and are going to be different. robots are concerned we are going to France was France before 1789 and it was find that we have a far more complex France after 1789. So the question for the environment, but the ethics are not part West is, what kind of West do we want to be? of what the robots bring to the table.

Something that we need to recognise is that Russia is in constant war with the West; they have been over a long time, and they are continuing to fight it. The problem that NATO has is that it is more like a digital system. It is either on or off, it is either war or not. With the Russians it’s analogue.

114 115 Disruption

Europe and the challenges of ‘strategic simultaneity’

Wess Mitchell, principal at The Marathon Initiative (Washington D.C.): ‘The West needs to redevelop the tools and mindset of strategic competition’ /p.118

Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, vice president at the GMF (Berlin): ‘We need a robust German‑American relationship at the core of NATO’ / p.130

SPECIAL BRIEF Marius Ghincea, Clara Volintiru, Ivan Nikolovski (Bucharest, Skopje): Who Summons the Dragon? China’s demand-driven influence in Central-Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans /p.138

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Interview Dr. A. Wess Mitchell, co-chair of the NATO 2030 Reflection Process1 another, their actions create China and Russia represent a a dynamic of strategic simultaneity — of having to tandem problem set for the West. The West needs to redevelop deal with concurrent pressures from different directions. the tools and mindset Their actions create a dynamic of This is a very different strategic simultaneity — of having problem-set for the US of strategic competition and for NATO than we have to deal with concurrent pressures known in the recent past. Since the Cold War, the from different directions. West has existed in a kind of greenhouse environment, where we could reasonably assume the absence of a peer competitor and the availability of more or less infinite financial resources. The challenges that NATO faced in Let’s describe the strategic environment of the 2020s and the that permissive era – the wars in the Balkans in Dr. A. Wess Mitchell was co-chair of the NATO 2030 structural drivers that push for the NATO strategic adaptation the 1990s, the terrorist threat after 9/11 – were Reflection Process. He is over the next decade. Essentially what sets aside the 2020s real, but they were the kinds of challenges that co‑founder and principal at The Marathon Initiative, a policy compared with the 1990s, and the post 9/11 eras? What are are surmountable on the basis of willpower. initiative focused on developing the key operational problems of NATO going into 2020s? There was never any doubt about the material strategies to prepare the United States for an era of sustained ability of the West to overcome them. great power competition. I think the defining characteristic of the international Previously, he served as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for environment of the 2020s is the return of great power In that genial environment, I think NATO Dr. A. Wess Mitchell European and Eurasian Affairs competition. Specifically: the rise of China and the basically got out of the business of serious from 2017 to 2019. Prior to joining the State Department, persistence of Russia as a militarily capable large state. strategy – because it didn’t need it. Enlargement Mitchell cofounded and served in a way came to substitute for strategy. as President and CEO of the Center for European Policy China’s significance lies in the fact that it is the first rival in America’s NATO’s preoccupation was with Analysis (CEPA). modern history with the potential to surpass the US in the major exploiting the opportunities of its categories of national power; its economy is already larger than environment. Operationally, it was America’s and its military has ambitious plans to surpass the focused on enlargement and later US quantitatively and qualitatively within the coming decade. on out-of-area operations

Russia is of course not a full-spectrum competitor like China, but it nevertheless possesses substantial conventional power projection capabilities and the world’s largest nuclear arsenal. Russia stands out because it also possesses motivation: this is a country that was the main loser of the last systemic rivalry so it sees itself as having the most to gain from reversing the verdict of the previous contest, so to speak.

I think that China and Russia represent a tandem problem set for the West. Irrespective of whether they formally ally with one

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equipment) and it is also spreading its political to say, this would not be the moment to against non-peer foes. Crisis-management rather than strategic influence through the Belt and Road Initiative define downward the Wales metric. But in my anticipation came to dominate the culture and processes of NATO. (BRI) and 17+1 formats. But China’s presence view meeting Wales commitment is at this in Europe and in areas around Europe is also point a receding de minimis requirement. A central message of our report is that that permissive era is over. increasingly military in nature. China siphons The West faces serious peer competitors and cannot assume talent and know-how from Europe as part of We will eventually need to move toward a continuation of its own material and military dominance. its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) Strategy and it something like a European Level of Ambition It needs to set strategic priorities and redevelop the tools has a growing naval presence in the Arctic, inside NATO that encourages pooling/ and mindset of strategic competition. It needs to focus its Atlantic, and Mediterranean. I think over the economies of scale among European militaries attention on strategic and political consolidation within the next decade that presence will grow larger tied explicitly to NATO capability targets. I would alliance itself – using NATO as a platform for strengthening the as China’s power and ambition grows. view this as a favourable alternative, both to cohesion of the strategic and political West in conditions of the current, fragmented and anemic European protracted competition with determined big-power rivals. For NATO, there should be no doubt at this military spending landscape and to the concept point that China poses a threat that needs of EU Strategic Autonomy in the defence sphere. NATO has to develop the tools to to be dealt with. That does not mean that protect its members’ equities at home NATO needs to operate in the Indo-Pacific. Does this gradual “division of labour” Rather I think it means, in the near term, that mean ultimately more of the Old Europe In an October 1995 White House meeting Vaclav Havel pointed out NATO has to develop the tools to protect invested in securing the Eastern Flank of that “there is no danger of a Soviet-era type of military occupation its members’ equities at home, in the Euro- NATO especially in a time when US is forced of Central Europe. But the danger does exist of political and Atlantic area. It needs a sound China strategy. to adapt to a “China first, Russia second” economic pressures on Central Europe that would seek to It needs tools – safeguards against MCF, kind of environment? Because I think this perpetuate a dependency.” How should NATO see the China rise? procurement and technology transfer filters, will also require a change of mindset on the Is the Havel lenses relevant also in understanding the Chinese investment screening, criteria for avoiding part of the Old Europe, with a necessary threat to Europe? Is the China issue going to be a make-or-break excessive Chinese influence and control of threat reassessment and acceptance of the point for the transatlantic relationship relevance in the 2020s? critical equipment and infrastructure. Basically, renew great power competition stance. anything in Chinese investment behaviour China’s rise affects NATO in two ways. First, indirectly, it tilts that could impede readiness, interoperability It is indispensable from a strategic standpoint the international balance of power in ways that require the US or the ability to communicate securely in that the large Western European states and in to devote more resources and attention to the Indo-Pacific. SACEUR’s AOR (Area of Responsibility) should particular Germany bear a share of the burden And because these resources are finite, those tilts inevitably be fair-game for attention and action at NATO. for the defence of the continental Europe that mean less US resources and attention for Europe, which ceases And I think we are playing catch-up on that. is proportionate with Germany’s enormous to be the primary theater in the world for the US for the first economic power and population. It is true that time. That is a very unfamiliar place for Europeans to be. Longer term, NATO needs to be part of the Germany has stepped up defence spending solution for handling the problem of strategic in recent years, and I think the credit for that Second, China’s rise affects simultaneity in the event of a major war. should go to the Trump administration. But a Longer term, NATO needs NATO directly, through its To my mind, the ultimate goal should be state of Germany’s size and wealth should be activities in and around something approaching a global division of able to handle far more of the responsibility to be part of the solution Europe. The commercial and labour between the US and European NATO for defending Europe than it currently does. technological dimensions that allows US to devote more attention to the for handling the problem of China’s penetration are Indo-Pacific without endangering stability in The key focus must continue to be on most familiar to us: China is European theater. At present NATO’s members the Eastern flank – especially the Baltic of strategic simultaneity in acquiring critical infrastructure do not share burdens and risks at anything and Black Sea areas. The EFP (Enhanced in Europe (ports, bridges, close to the levels that will be demanded Forward Presence) was an important the event of a major war. airports, telecommunications by the new strategic environment. Needless first step towards strengthening NATO’s

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defence capabilities there. But 7 years after the Russian The organising problem for deterrence in the invasion of Ukraine it is time for us to evolve beyond those very light structures and have the ability to bring greater 2020s is that Russia and China have invested in NATO capabilities to bear for securing the Eastern Flank. capabilities aimed at allowing them to control space As outlined in the NDS2 we need a strong “blunt-layer” (where the central idea is the imperative of preventing Russia from and deny access in strategically important places. achieving a fait accompli) whereby the US military in the region is intertwined with European militaries, who ultimately have to carry Basically you have large land powers attempting more responsibility for local defence. The goal should be to shift the escalatory burden back onto the Russians in the advent of a to ‘seal off’ portions at each end of Eurasia. crisis. But ultimately you have to have large European members of NATO that are putting in the field the capabilities to be able to handle Russia in a conventional crisis. Until you have that the ‘seal off’ portions at each end of Eurasia – the The object of Russian and Chinese strategy, US will find it hard to shift attention to the Indo-Pacific in the way idea is to create environments where the US in a sense, is to make that a more militarily that is envisioned in the NDS without exposing the secondary would draw the conclusion that it could not tenuous and therefore also politically fraught theater - the European theater - to significant risk of instability. prevail without enormous effort and cost but proposition - in effect, to convince America also, on the basis, where it would likely decide that the game is not worth the candle. The resurgence of the that it lacked the political will to wage such continental powers a strenuous contest. These investments are The report emphasises also the role of the made all the more credible in Russia’s case by emerging disruptive technologies. In other Should our thinking about how we understand and frame an ambitious nuclear modernisation program words it is an invitation to reflect to and deterrence, defence and war change and evolve in the 2020s? and warfighting concepts that envision nuclear observe the changing character of warfare. The expeditionary war fighting model becomes increasingly escalation on the battlefield as an offset to What lessons are relevant for NATO from the complicated in access-denial environments. It seems that we enter what they see US conventional superiority. historical periods in which major transitions in the age of protracted defence. At the same time, the revisionist between regimes of warfare took place? powers increasingly adopt disruptive insurgent methodologies. In geopolitical terms you can think of all of this What could be the costs for the alliance as the resurgence of the continental powers, of failing in keeping pace with the military The organising problem I see for deterrence in the 2020s is that regaining an edge over maritime power. It’s the technical revolution of its times? Today Russia and China are both in their own ways creating facts on latest installment in a long contest stretching it seems that we are in another transition the ground that negate accustomed US military advantages back centuries of sea power developing the period away from a rough parity in precision and create the potential for deterrence failure. Both of these tools (expeditionary forces, onshore alliances) guided munitions battle networks towards powers absorbed lessons from America’s wars in the 1990s to project power inland and land powers a new military regime – the algorithmic and in particular the wide conventional superiority that the developing tools to resist and restrict those warfare – built around harnessing AI, US enjoyed as a result of stand-off precision weapons and incursions. At least on paper it does look like machine learning, big data and autonomy. other technological by-products of the Second Offset3. Russia and China are gaining an edge. The clear lesson from history is that states which If you fast-forward to the 2020s what you see is that both of these The reason that this is strategically significant lose the commanding heights of technology powers have invested in capabilities aimed at allowing them to is that the US has assumed at least since the lose not only the ability to win at war in a control space and deny access in strategically important places. end of the Second World War that its security tactical sense but also lose the ability to shape would be met best by a forward presence, the political order that follows. China clearly You see this pattern in the Formosa Strait, in the Black Sea, and both militarily and politically, well beyond didn’t limit its study of America’s military- in the Baltic. Basically you have large land powers attempting to America’s shores, in the rimlands of Eurasia. technological lessons to the wars of the 1990s; it

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also learned lessons from the States which or centralise their efforts from earlier US victory – in the Cold above, the less likely they War – that allowed America lose the are to produce the kinds of to be the shaping power innovations that you need. after the USSR collapsed. commanding That’s not to say that state- We are accustomed in the heights of directed efforts and R&D West to thinking of our victory do not have a role – clearly in the Cold War to ideological technology they do, but as outlined in factors but we overlook the the NSCAI report, it is more technological dimension. lose not only of a cloud-seeding role that America’s superior system of embraces decentralisation representative government the ability to and either partners with and financial powers enabled or outsources to private it to undertake technological win at war sector innovators. leaps that dramatically altered the course of the conflict in a tactical The Chinese wager, it seems and placed the Soviets on to me, is that their system can the horns of a dilemma — to sense but be sufficiently hands-off in either yield any presumption approach to enable private of dominance in the scenarios also lose innovation to flourish and that counted most; or to launch achieve breakthroughs but the technological challenge from China. But I think that is right. It is a balancing act where ambitious military-industrial the ability still have a higher degree it does have an important and, in my view, you have to lower barriers wherever possible catch-ups that were well of coordination, courtesy of under-developed role to play in acting as a for innovation and technological cooperation beyond the financial abilities of to shape the CCP power structure and platform for allies to coordinate on security- while also being in commercial competition the Soviet system to sustain. things like the Military-Civil related tech developments, pool R&D where with one another within the Western world. the political Fusion strategy, to ensure possible, and most importantly, provide a A major difference I think that the push for those pressure mechanism and interface with the Why does the report plead for institutionalising today is the method of order that breakthroughs is both more EU to avoid a situation where that entity’s an Andy Marshall4 kind of capability? What stimulating major innovation. determined and focused and restrictive data regulations hobble the West would be the value of net assessment for The byproducts of those follows. more likely to achieve military in the technological competition with China. the alliance in navigating the international earlier US leaps – precision- utility for the state rather ecosystem of the 2020s? Is this an attempt guided munitions, stealth, than just for consumers. A The goal should be for the West and in relearning the lost art of the Cold GPS, even the Internet – were made possible key Chinese advantage in making this wager likeminded nations, including in Asia- War when Andy Marshall’s ONA focused by US government-directed research is the sheer size of the Chinese population Pacific, to have the lowest possible barriers on providing a long-term competition and spending in places like DARPA. and domestic market. The West would do well to aggregative data access, funding framework within which it highlighted key not to underestimate Chinese entrepreneurial and innovation to go toe to toe with a strategic asymmetries and strengths to By contrast, the technologies that will give spirit and scope for innovation. That’s true demographically massive China in those build upon relative to the competition? states an edge in algorithmic warfare – not just in areas of military technology fields that will most determine success. derivatives of quantum computing, AI, etc. we’ve been discussing but in Fintech and An organising problem for NATO – come overwhelmingly from smaller and the digitalisation of the renminbi too. In a way, it seems to me to be about continues to be the divergences in threat more highly diffuse centers of innovation in pooling and channelling efforts of the assessment so we have to start here. the private sector that are by definition hard to NATO will never be the main tool of choice for free world to set the stage/ground for a The divergences are due in large part to steer or control. The more you try to manage Western nations to respond to the entirety of third offset strategy-ripe ecosystem. geography and the fact that different allies

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feel greater exposure to different threats. But as the quantity mindset of the last two decades and agree on. This is the modern equivalent of of major threats increases we can expect that divergence of reinject more disciplined, anticipatory the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth’s perceptions to also increase. NATO political cohesion is in a strategic thinking into the NATO culture. liberum veto - a recipe for paralysis. sense a derivative of how well it manages those divergences of threat assessment. So, if your goal is to increase NATO Our report recommends dealing head‑on cohesion you have to ask: how can we be more deliberate The Alliance needs to avoid with both of these problems. about achieving convergences of threat assessment? paralysis when it matters At the strategic level, we need to force the A big part of that is something that you cannot control: it’s We often hear that preserving cohesion is issue by updating the Strategic Concept to a byproduct of political will, which is rooted in geography, the center of gravity for the transatlantic reflect the new strategic environment. That state interests, and other seemingly immutable factors. But alliance. But in a time of increasingly will require a lot of hard work diplomatically the history of NATO is the history of attempting to mitigate different security optics we can end up with a building consensus around the fact of those differentials in threat assessment. You can do that situation where cohesion becomes a liability the new and unfamiliar threats. There through political consultation – that’s why from the time of for military credibility and deterrence. is no substitute for that hard work. the Wise Men report, in the late 1950s, onward NATO has How can such a scenario be avoided? had structured habits of consultation to proactively foresee But in addition, our report argues that NATO and manage those differentials in threat assessment. Cohesion in a multi-country alliance is of course would benefit from proactively reforming the result of political will. But it is also the result decision-making. In an alliance like NATO But you can also do it by building better institutional tools of the members of that alliance possessing whose ultimate use is for deterrence and if for studying and assessing threats. The US found in the capabilities that in aggregate provide greater necessary, sending lives into combat, consensus Cold War as you pointed out that there is strategic value security than individual members could must remain the metric on things that count to having a standing effort/office whose job is to put all achieve on their own. The quest for cohesion and matters of life and death. On many other of the pieces on the table – red team, blue team, etc. becomes a liability when it is pursued matters however, we may not need consensus. but also all of the relevant tools at America’s disposal artificially, as a kind of ‘higher good’ in itself The report recommends for example not for managing competition. The premise is that doing that supersedes the purposes for which the requiring consensus on certain administrative this allows you to see aspects of the game, aspects of alliance was created or in ways that prevent it and staffing matters. It recommends allowing the competitive dynamic, that you might have missed or from responding to clear risks or opportunities. sub groups of allies to move ahead on overlooked if just making decisions from a political or crisis missions under the NATO chapeau without management perspective. So, the idea would be to give A good example is China. The threat from all members participating, as well as placing NATO a dedicated tool for helping to understand the entirety China is real and growing and all but a time limits on crisis decision making. of its threat environment and, on that basis, do a better at handful of allies appear to grasp that fact. proactively mitigating differentials in threat assessment. But imagine if NATO were to prioritise the The key in all of this is to avoid paralysis maintenance of a superficial unity over taking when it matters, to make it harder for one or NATO has already begun to move in this direction with the the difficult steps to deal with this problem. two allies to consistently use single country development of the Joint Intelligence and Security Division That would be an example of the idea of vetoes to import bilateral disputes into NAC (JISD), Policy Planning Unit (PPU), and the informal practice cohesion superseding security. It would that don’t belong there. So, we recommend of the senior staff policy board meeting for purposes of be a case of lowest common denominator for example raising the threshold for those horizon scanning and strategic anticipation. The idea with the reasoning and allowing the concerns of the blockages to the Ministerial level. Ultimately, net assessment is to regularise these practices, give them a few to prevent the action of the majority. I believe NATO will need to develop a kind of designated institutional home and staff inside the NATO HQ. constructive abstention model along the EU Another example is the practice of some lines. The key though is to ensure that in the What’s important is not just the organisational piece or creating allies importing external, bilateral disputes more contested and complicated strategic layers of bureaucracy for the sake of creating bureaucracy, into NATO, essentially withholding consensus environment that I am describing, NATO has but getting ways to get out of the reactive/crisis management on initiatives that all 29 of the other members to be able to achieve collective action.

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The ability to tend to the undermining Western societies from within, and But I think we also have to keep in mind the ultimate goal NOTES democratic foundations on principled grounds, in positioning the West which is to strengthen the political cohesion of the Alliance. of the Alliance will be at the moral high grounds in the battle of ideas. The quickest way to weaken the political cohesion of NATO 1 In December 2019, NATO leaders would be to indulge in finger pointing that singles out allies for invited the Secretary General to lead a integral to NATO’s success forward-looking reflection process to Those two dimensions should shape how we public rebuke. It would invite profound discord into the alliance strengthen NATO's political dimension. It seems that the 2020s have increasingly think about so-called ‘democratic resilience’. and create an opening for Russia and China to eagerly exploit, To support him, NATO Secretary General has appointed a group of the contours of an inter-regnum, a time Resilience is a term that gets thrown around which would be the opposite of the cohesion we need. ten experts co-chaired by Thomas of an intensive ideological competition a lot so I think it’s worth defining clearly for de Maizière and Wess Mitchell. between democracies and authoritarianism. NATO, what resilience means in the context I also think we should abide by a mindset of ‘do no harm’ when 2 The National Defense Strategy Has the time come for the allies to renew of democracy. To my mind to speak of the it comes to the all-important function of deterrence. NATO is, (NDS), together with the National their vows to the founding principles – to resilience of a democracy is to speak first in the final analysis, a military alliance to deter enemies and if Security Strategy (NSS), were the first documents that signalled a paradigm the core NATO values? What role has and foremost about ensuring the capacity for necessary go to war for its members. This is its supreme function shift by officially acknowledging resilience to play and how should resilience self-correction through frequent, peaceful and all political changes have to be assessed by how they affect that for the first time after the end of the Cold War, inter-state strategic be understood in a NATO context? transfer of power. Integral to that capacity that core function. As our report argues, deterrence rests not competition, not terrorism, has become for self-correction is what we in the Anglo- only on military capabilities but in clearly-expressed and credible the primary concern in U.S. national security. You can find more on the It is important to acknowledge that there is an American and Madisonian tradition call the signals of political willingness to fight on behalf of members. broader logic of NDS in an Eastern Focus ideological character to the emerging era of principle of the separation of powers—or for discussion with the lead author here. great power competition. China and Russia are continental Europeans, the German concept There has to be crystal clarity on this point; any lack of clarity 3 The 2nd Offset Strategy - initiated both large Eurasian land powers but also the of Rechtstaat and from Montesquieu the on the political willingness to defend members weakens the under the Carter Administration and world’s leading authoritarian regimes. They principal of political non-interference. deterrent function. This would preclude some of the more matured in the late 1980s - was a way to compensate for the Soviet size use not only military power but divisions inside ambitious ideas I have heard – for example, the idea that NATO can advantage in conventional forces and our societies to undermine representative Secondly resilience must include due strengthen democracy by making Article 5 cohesion contingent thus re-establish general military parity. Most importantly, it leveraged a network institutions, social cohesion and trust. regard for anything that could undermine on members maintaining certain democratic benchmarks. That of stealth, smart sensors, and smart the political will of democracies to defend would be a departure from the 70 years practice and precedent weapons together with new innovative operational concepts (Air Land Battle) Our report argues that in strategic competition one another – specifically, anything that of NATO playing the long game for strategic influence and to generate decisive battlefield effects, with these states the ability to tend to the would degrade a member’s support for continuing to engage with vulnerable allies so that they do not denying the Soviet Union theory of victory and shoring up deterrence. democratic foundations of the Alliance will be executing its commitment of Article Five. fall into rival spheres of influence. That danger today is very

integral to NATO’s success on two levels. First great. It would be a dangerous innovation because the minute 4 Andrew W. Marshall, a former strategist internally, in the political cohesion of the Alliance The question in both cases is: what is NATO’s you define the factors upon which Article 5 will be contingent, at the RAND Corporation served as head of the Pentagon’s Office of Net itself. NATO is an alliance built on the concept of appropriate role? I think the key in a NATO you are pinpointing where Russia should focus its efforts to Assessment (ONA) from its founding in intimate cooperation of democracies. Historically, context is to focus intently on the intersection of undermine an ally and bring about a deterrence failure. 1973 until his retirement in 2015, at the age of 93 years. He was probably the it’s worth noting that since antiquity, democracies democracy and foreign influence or coercion. longest public servant in the United tend to form alliances and despotic regimes That is to say: we will succeed in proportion The key I think in all three principles is to look at democracy States. Under his leadership, ONA focused on scrutinising the future and the past to do not. The two concepts are deeply linked. In to how organically our efforts stem from the in the context of security – in the context of an environment try to understand long-term trends and NATO’s case we can go further and say that any core function and raison d’etre of NATO. So where you now have alert external rivals as agitators for shifts, especially the key competitions that were taking place. ONA understood movement of members toward the authoritarian for example our report recommends building undermining us and opportunists for seizing the openings the emerging revolution in precision- camp does weaken NATO and undermine a center of excellence at NATO to support that come from those agitations. So the appropriate frame strike warfare as well as the rise of the anti-access/area-denial capabilities support of publics for helping one another. allies in the quest for democratic resilience. of reference for democratic resilience in a NATO context is that could inhibit and disrupt the ability This is an important evolution in my mind to keep it at the intersection of democracy and security. of the US to project its power overseas. Andy Marshall was also instrumental And second, it is integral to NATO’s success because it elevates threats to democracy in theorising the competitive strategy externally - in competition with Russia and to attention at the NATO level; NATO needs mind-set adopted by the US against the Soviet Union in the 1980s by highlighting China. The report highlights the fact that a way to defend democratic resilience the the need to identify and invest in these are authoritarian states from which the same way that it has a center of excellence for The interview was conducted by Octavian Manea enduring competitive advantages and This interview is published simultaneously in both strengths while exploiting the particular West must deny them the opportunity of countering cyber or other types of threats. Eastern Focus Quarterly and Small Wars Journal. weaknesses of the competitor.

128 129 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff: We need a robust German‑American relationship at the core of NATO

Interview Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff (GMFUS), vice president control or climate policy; multilateralism will be positively at the German Marshall Fund of the United States affected, whether we talk about the G7, or the G20, or NATO.

Where we continue to differ on both sides of the Atlantic, we can We need a robust approach these differences in a new and more cooperative spirit. Most likely, there will no longer be a vicious circle of escalation. Part of President Trump’s strategy was to solve problems by escalating German‑American relationship them. Now we will be solving problems by de-escalating them and emphasising the common ground on which we stand. Areas of at the core of NATO frictions will remain, but our means to deal with them will improve.

One thing, however, will not change and will not go away, and that is great power competition. That will be an imperative for transatlantic change. Adaptation to this new environment will be critical.

“Everything is still possible in China policy coordination” THOMAS KLEINE-BROCKHOFF, What would you expect to fundamentally change and what Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff vice president at the German not under a Biden administration in foreign policy? With what Is there an emerging trans-Atlantic Marshall Fund of the United implications for Europe and the transatlantic relationship? consensus on the challenge posed by States (GMFUS), shares his China, which is increasingly ‘dividing insights about the future of the Some people expect that lots of things will stay the same. and ruling’ Europe, by projecting power transatlantic relationship under They believe the frictions between Europe and the United and influence through companies, the Biden administration and States and certainly those between Germany and the United strategic assets and regional formats? the need to reinvent NATO’s States will continue, because the geopolitical environment Do you see any potential strategic conventional defence around does not change; the bipartisan foreign policy consensus in convergence between Germany German contributions. In the selected policy areas does not change; the domestic pressures and the US in counter-balancing recent months, GMF has been in the US do not subside. That would lead you to believe that Chinese influence and projecting at the forefront of the new Mr. Biden is a twin brother of Mr. Trump, except friendlier and a common euro-Atlantic front? Or administration. Just last week, less brash. But nothing could be further from the truth. does the economic accord between President Biden announced the EU and China set a different path?

nomination of Dr. Karen Donfried, An internationalist is following on a nationalist; a man who

president of the GMF, as Assistant believes in alliances and sees them as a force multiplier is From the American perspective, China will

Secretary of State for European succeeding a man who saw alliances as a burden to America; be the lynchpin of the future transatlantic

and Eurasian affairs. Other GMF a climate activist is at the helm, following a climate skeptic; relationship. The value and usefulness of this

experts have already assumed a supporter of liberal democracy succeeds a detractor from alliance will be evaluated and judged

key prominent positions: Derek these principles. I could go on to describe the fundamental by the American side by its

Chollet (counselor to the State differences between these two gentlemen, in terms of their usefulness on the

Department), Laura Rosenberger governing philosophy as well as their respective outlooks China challenge.

(director for China on the on international affairs. If such differences will not result Europeans may

National Security Council) or in differing policies, then I don’t know what will ever be like or dislike

Julianne Smith (senior advisor consequential in foreign policy. These changes will open up it, or find it

to the Secretary of State). new opportunities in numerous policy areas, such as arms to be an

130 131 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff: We need a robust German‑American relationship at the core of NATO

exaggerated focus. But it is simply going to decoupling. That is clearly a no-go area be a fact. And the external environment in for Europe and especially for Germany. the triangle between Europe, America and China points toward greater convergence But it is not the direction Mr Biden is taking so far. of views for a couple of reasons. He sees China as a systemic challenger. Military contestation is only part of the larger picture. Mr. Under the absolute leadership of Xi Jinping, Biden does not seem to see Cold War 2.0 ahead, China is becoming more assertive by the but an interconnected and interdependent day. The alarm bells about the Chinese world in which even an authoritarian great power reach in Europe are being heard increasingly needs to be managed within the confines of loud and increasingly clear. We are seeing a rules-based order. A rules-based system China’s international posture change, which, with security and technological caveats is a in turn, results in changing European and very different proposition for Europe. To find American perceptions of Chinese behaviour. common ground on the China challenge is Transatlantic interests on China are similar, clearly the goal of the coming months and years. but not fully aligned. And the question is how to increase and speed up convergence, and whether we can find compromise on how A transatlantic renewal to approach China. So far, we do not even have a transatlantic forum to discuss this A few years back, in his Washington Quarterly question. Is it a NATO issue or an EU issue? article, Thomas Bagger pointed out that the Therein also lies an opportunity: everything post-1989 German foreign policy consensus is still possible in China policy coordination. no longer existed. The world has changed, the assumptions and premises of the 1990s If the China challenge is simply seen as are being contested. Can a new foreign a competition for hegemony amongst policy consensus emerge? Around what core the German question had been solved, to get out in front of developments has great powers, in which allies are integrated ideas? What needs to change in transatlantic in harmony with its neighbours and for always been slower than the change of the vertically as followers to the greater relations and NATO in this context? the first time since industrialisation. external environment itself. The result is cause of the hegemonic struggle, my that the gap between the external change prediction is that Europe will try to duck In Thomas Bagger’s precise telling, post-1990 This unusual situation has led to a phenomenal and Germany’s response keeps widening. and run. Containing and supressing the Germany, for the first time in 150 years, finds period of affluence, peace, neighbourly Chinese rise in the name of American itself on the right side of history. Others, not convergence and allegiance. The benefits of A contributing factor to this growing cleavage hegemony will result in economic Germany, had to adapt and Germany itself this golden age have turned Germany into is the extraordinary stability of the political was in a glide path toward the ultimate status-quo power. Why change system that Germany enjoys: a decade the end of history. According what has benefited you so tremendously? The of economic boom, full employment, a One thing, however, will not to convergence theory, downside of this attitude is that Germany is not long-time Chancellor supported by stable everybody would become exactly the speed boat of international relations. coalitions in parliament. The extent to which change and will not go away, and “like us” in Germany and the It is not a change agent, even when a changing Germany has been a haven of democratic and rest of the West. Therefore, environment requires it. Therefore, Germany’s economic stability and was able to project that is great power competition. we just had to administer adaptation to a new environment – especially this stability outward into the European a predetermined change. to one shaped by the return of great power continent has really been extraordinary. That will be an imperative We would not have to do competition and by less American involvement The moderating and unifying quality of much. On the basis of post- in Europe – has been excruciatingly slow. this quiet projection of power, stability and for transatlantic change. 1990 liberal hegemony, In fact, so gradual that Germany’s attempt universally accepted norms, its effect on

132 133 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff: We need a robust German‑American relationship at the core of NATO

European peace, stability and prosperity which is a conservative – green coalition. How should the whole issue of European “strategic autonomy” have sometimes been underestimated The greening of the transatlantic agenda will be understood? There have been tensions between Berlin domestically as well as internationally. mean to be strong on climate, social justice, and Paris in how they each approached it, while in Eastern democracy, trade norms, human rights; it Europe it was understood as strategic emancipation from But that period has definitely come to an will mean a degree of outspokenness vis a the US. Does a new US administration create a new window end and the country is struggling to adapt vis authoritarians in places like Russia and of opportunity to reframe and channel strategic autonomy to an environment that demands to take China; but such an agenda will be combined in the right direction - and what is the right direction? positions which uneasily remind people of with a more conservative emphasis on attitudes prevalent during the Cold War. The security and resilience, a strong focus on The proponents of strategic autonomy or European sovereignty posture that Germany necessarily needs NATO and on the idea that the transatlantic don’t seem to know themselves what they mean when they to adopt is one of robust liberalism – a relationship is the guarantor and the reinsurer use these terms. They have a definitional problem. They claim modest, humble and non-missionary, but of European integration. It is a combination to desire European sovereignty, also more resilient, more defence-oriented of classical conservative elements with a but need to face the reality attitude that values the protection of liberal multilateralist green human-rights agenda. that transferring sovereignty If the China challenge is simply democracy at home, as well as the defence to a supranational centre is from external threats and coercion. If we don’t have a robust and reliable German- not supported by a majority seen as a competition for American relationship at the core of NATO, of Europeans, as well as their To have a government that can be forced and if we do not have a solid land defence governments. If anything, hegemony amongst great powers, into submission because it does not have the capability of NATO centred around German turmoil has allowed for a bit means to deter such blackmail is increasingly contributions in conventional defence, there more centralisation – see the in which allies are integrated unacceptable. Living off economic strength will be a dim future for NATO. Unfortunately, last Eurozone crisis as exhibit and acquired respect from others will not the centrality of Germany’s role for the future A. The proponents of European vertically as followers to the be enough during this next period. We will of NATO is least understood in Germany sovereignty seem to mean need a renewal based on the principles itself. That is a worrying sign and it points ‘capability and capacity’ when greater cause of the hegemonic of liberal democracy, but with a stronger to the need for political leadership. they say sovereignty. That’s a emphasis on resilience, alliance, defence bit of an intellectual fudge. struggle, my prediction is that and deterrence, externally and internally. At In the end, a new consensus is needed. No the same time, we will also need a realistic longer should we be talking about burden Autonomy is an equally Europe will try to duck and run. assessment of the limited means of power sharing, we should start talking about burden contentious term. When at Germany’s disposal. That will limit the shifting. The conventional defence of Europe talking about the economic and technological sphere, country’s ambition. The federal elections will should largely be shouldered by Europeans. autonomy always brings a degree of protectionism in the be a turning point. It is unclear whether there The German contribution is key; it will allow name of national (in this case, European) independence with will be the same degree of internal stability to end America’s overstretch in Europe and it. Russia and China are after a sovereign and autonomous with any new Chancellorship and what kind of make it easier for Washington to concentrate data space in order to better control their citizens. Is that influence can actually be projected outward. on the Indo-Pacific; it will probably be the really what we want to emulate? Of course not. Which is precondition to a continued American why the proponents of this idea now start talking about A group of German atlanticists, myself included, commitment to Europe (including its important open strategic autonomy to avoid misunderstandings. Again, have published a manifesto called More nuclear component). We will need the nuclear an intellectual fudge and, to me, a dead-end road. Ambition, Please! Toward a New Agreement component to continuously deter a nuclear- between Germany and the United States. armed Russia, but also because only the When we talk about autonomy in the strategic space it gets It includes a few ideas for a transatlantic American nuclear presence ensures that no worse. Some people think autonomy means positioning renewal. And it also includes the outline of additional countries in and around Europe Europe as an independent great power alongside America, what a German foreign policy might look like aspire to build a nuclear weapon. In that sense China and Russia. That, to me, smells like equidistance under the most likely post-election scenario, NATO is an instrument of nuclear arms control. and, therefore, the path into a strategic no man’s land.

134 135 Eastern Focus Issue 05, Spring 2021 Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff: We need a robust German‑American relationship at the core of NATO

What I like about the sovereignty crowd is their ambition. While the motivation and the drive by the Biden administration Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff is They want Europe to step up and gain muscle. As long as are palpable, there are numerous questions still to be resolved. vice president at the German Marshall Fund of the United States this is done within NATO and with America, I am all for it. (GMF) where he oversees the organisation’s activities in Germany. Prior to joining GMF, he served as Is the alliance of democracies at the core of the Biden vision The German-American an advisor to Joachim Gauck, the (as projected during the campaign) a realistic construct? Or relationship needs a restart president of Germany. should it be designed around the logic of ‘the mission defines the coalition’ - ready to be adapted for multiple niche fronts? You plead for a rebalanced transatlantic relationship, where the European pillar should be strengthened and should have The events on January 6th have reinforced the belief in the Biden more weight. But is Germany ready to change and ultimately team that democracy is fragile and precious, that democracy reject some of the really problematic policies that created a needs to be defended time and again, and that democracies credibility gap on the other side of the Atlantic, but also in Europe, need to stand together in especially in the East – with the Nord Stream 2 for example? defence of their political A new consensus is needed. system. In fact, this impetus I certainly think it is necessary; whether it will happen is has never been stronger another question. It will very much depend on the next No longer should we be talking in the United States. Chancellor, who will have a key role in recharting the course. If the next coalition has a green component, then some of the about burden sharing, we should However, it is less clear contentious issues will be easier to solve - Nord Stream 2 for what the consequences of example; some will be harder to solve, take nuclear sharing. start talking about burden this insight might be. There are definitional, as well as The larger context will matter, too. How will the German-American shifting. The conventional institutional questions. First, relationship be repaired? With little ambition, as a return to daily what is a democracy? What business in a cooperative fashion? Or as a larger scale investment defence of Europe should largely about illiberal democracies? into the future, something that is designed to outlast the Biden What about the America administration? Will such a restart include broader agreements be shouldered by Europeans and itself at this current moment? on how to deal with China, on how to see Russia in future, on how There is a credibility to see the role of NATO and on how America can support the EU, the German contribution is key. gap that the Biden team rather than undermining it? Only if both sides reinvest into this acknowledges: America relationship, will we create a changed political environment. And first has to get its own act together in order to be able to project in such an environment problems will more easily be solved. outward and command followership in some sort of league or alliance of democracies. And then there is the question of whom else to include. Some tough choices would need to be made.

The second set of challenges revolves around the question, ‘what type of institutional set up do you wish to create?’ Do you want to build on the “alliance for multilateralism” that the Germans and French created in the absence of America as an internationalist power during the Trump administration? Or do you adapt the British idea of a D10, of ten leading democracies, growing out of the G7? Or do you mean the double Quad – the Asian Quad and the European Quad, as a combination of America’s most important The interview was conducted by Octavian Manea A slightly different version of this interview was published in Romanian allies on both continents as a practical coordination tool? in the printed issue of Cronicile Curs de Guvernare, No. 91.

136 137 WHO SUMMONS THE DRAGON?

China’s demand-driven influence in Central-Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans A political and economic regional comparison

MARIUS GHINCEA CLARA VOLINTIRU IVAN NIKOLOVSKI A project by Table of Contents

Bucharest, Romania April, 2021 The report can be accessed at www.global-focus.eu or ordered at [email protected] +40 721 259 205 Str Dimitrie Orbescu 8, et. 2, ap. 5, Bucharest, Sector 2

GlobalFocus Center is an independent international studies think-tank which produces in-depth research and high quality analysis on foreign policy, security, European affairs, good governance and development. It functions as a platform for cooperation and dialogue among individual experts, NGOs, think-tanks and public institutions from Central and Eastern Europe and Euro-Atlantic partners. Executive Summary 138 Introduction 140 A project supported by Mapping Cooperation with China in the Region 142

Political cooperation 143

Economic cooperation 147

A Case in Point: the Huawei 5G saga in Central and Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans 152

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 161

Notes 164

Authors 167

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141 WHO SUMMONS THE DRAGON? GlobalFocus Center Policy Paper

China also aims to increase its economic influence in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Western Balkans as a leverage for political influence. Chinese economic influence can be Executive Summary particularly powerful in the region on two accounts: (1) in the case of strategic sectors, where the CEE and WB countries have a substantial investment gap and are starving for capital (i.e., energy, transport infrastructure, telecommunications, and more recently health) or (2) in smaller economies in the region, where the impact of trade, investments or loans can be greater. In both cases, domestic economic vulnerabilities are ‘weaponisable’ dimensions, and the potential for China to exploit these strategic openings is real. Whether it concerns investments and loans, or trade and inter-dependencies in the supply chains, China is willing to weaponise its economic force.

Still, in economic terms, the threat to counterweight Western eco-political influence is (strategically) exaggerated. Chinese economic commitments are completely asymmetric in comparison to both the size of its economic ties with Western European countries, as well as in comparison to the economic ties that CEE and WB have with the transatlantic world.

The outliers in the region are Hungary and Serbia, which have both displayed a substantial China’s cooperation framework with CEE and Western Balkan countries has attracted the attention political commitment to China. In these countries, however, Chinese economic influence is only of both analysts and decision-makers from Western Europe and the United States. The 17+1 slightly higher than the rest of the region, targeting strategic economic sectors (e.g. energy, format is now almost a decade in the making, experiencing regular ebbs and flows in the process. health, infrastructure), and still well below EU and US economic ties, suggesting that domestic Political cooperation and geopolitical concerns, both for CEE and Western Balkan countries and political choices are more powerful explanations than economic integration. Furthermore, despite Western actors, continue to shape the degree and character of how the countries in the region registering levels of Chinese investments and trade flows which are above the regional average, at cooperate with China. While China’s involvement in the region is conventionally depicted as that of the moment countries like the , Poland, Romania, Slovakia and North Macedonia an increasingly influential power using its economic and political tools to reshape the region and display only formal bilateral political relations with China. In contrast, Bulgaria, Montenegro and pull it apart from its Western European partners, we provide a different vision. Bosnia and Herzegovina seem to show stronger political engagement, despite having economic ties with China below the regional average. Based on a mixed-method methodology cross-cutting the political/economical divide, we show that while China wants to increase its economic and political influence in the region, there is a In terms of 5G network deployment and attitudes toward Huawei, both the CEE and WB countries significant difference between the story we hear and the facts we see. Despite China’s efforts to follow the same patterns, although there are some notable exceptions. Except for Bosnia and leverage vulnerabilities in the region, its political influence seems to be still relatively low. Economic Herzegovina, Hungary and Montenegro, all the other countries from the 17+1 bloc have joined the influence by itself cannot match Western economic ties either. Political engagement with China is US-led Clean Network Initiative. Targeting it as an ‘untrusted vendor’, China’s partners from CEE shaped mostly by domestic factors and geopolitical considerations, particularly those related to and WB have pledged to prevent the supply of equipment from Huawei for the rollout of their security. This is why we suggest that analysts and Western partners focus on the demand-side of national 5G networks. For a long time, the Chinese company has been a trusted and affordable China-CEE relations, not on the Chinese supply-side. It is what happens inside the CEE countries partner to the countries and their national operators in the two regions, especially in developing which determines China’s influence in the region, and not necessarily what Beijing wants. the previous generations of cellular networks. However, amid the politicisation and securitisation of the 5G network construction, the majority of CEE and WB countries have either opted for ‘trusted’ We classify regional relations with China into formal and substantive, while also dividing substantive Western alternatives such as Ericsson and Nokia, or are expected to follow this path as a result of engagement between committed and uncommitted. We show that there is no relationship anti-Huawei laws or corporate decisions by the national operators’ Western parent-companies. between economic investment and political engagement, with the notable exceptions of Hungary Hungary and Serbia, on the contrary, are provid a safe and friendly environment for Huawei’s and Serbia. We also find that what drives bilateral political engagement with China is a desire for operations as Budapest and Belgrade announce new projects and deeper cooperation, including strategic autonomy vis-à-vis the West. Thus, a given country’s intensification of relations with China in the field of 5G technologies. is mostly the result of domestic political dynamics and the emergence of a political will for foreign policy autonomy from Western partners. It is thus an effect of home-grown dissatisfaction with the West, and not caused by a strategic detachment from Western structures.

142 China’s demand-driven influence in Central-Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans 143 WHO SUMMONS THE DRAGON? GlobalFocus Center Policy Paper

with China. We argue that the threat posed by the Chinese attempts to actually succeed is (sometimes strategically) exaggerated, and that Western partners should be more concerned Introduction about home-grown incentives to cooperate with China, particularly domestically-driven desires for strategic autonomy vis-à-vis the West. According to the available evidence, China has not been able and does not, at least currently, seem to be able to counterbalance Western economic and political influence from a supply-side perspective. The region, and especially the EU members in the region, are deeply embedded in the West’s economic and political networks and institutions. However, when some CEE and Western Balkan governments do increase the intensity of their political and diplomatic relations with China, they seem to do so in order to signal a certain degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the West. Thus, Chinese influence in the region is an effect of domestic desires for strategic autonomy, not a cause of such desires.04 This means that Western partners should pay close attention to what happens inside the CEE and Western Balkan countries, and focus less on the purported threat posed by the supply-side strategy China is employing.

However, at the same time, China’s economic incentives may weigh more heavily in the strategic calculations of those CEE and Western Balkan countries with smaller economies that are also less Over the last decade, China’s relations with Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries01, as well integrated in Western economic networks. Western countries should pay more attention to how as with those in the Western Balkans02, have experienced a resurgence. In the aftermath of the Chinese incentives affect the political and economic orientation of these countries, and should be 2008 Great Recession, China has pushed forward a new cooperation framework with CEE and the ready to provide counter-incentives. Western Balkans, also known currently as 17+103. This framework promises increased engagement between CEE countries and China, investments in regional infrastructure, trade, and growing ties This paper fleshes out the economic and political relations between the CEE and Western Balkans in cultural and other areas. The conventional wisdom is that this new push for cooperation from and China, as well as the latter’s influence in the region as it follows on. We first contextualise China in CEE is part of the former’s attempt to establish itself as a global leader, to contest the China-CEE relations by providing a brief analysis of economic flows and political relations over the supremacy of the United States in the region, and to divide the European Union. Accordingly, the last decade. We then provide a new analytical framework through which we can analyse China- China-CEE cooperation framework is seen as akin to other regional platforms created by China, CEE relations. By supplying an analytical model across two dimensions – economic and political such as the China-Africa or the China-Latin America and Caribbean cooperation forums. In most – we classify the relations between the countries in the region and China in four comprehensive media analyses and scholarly evaluations, the Chinese involvement in CEE has been portrayed as categories. Finally, we illustrate our argument with an in-depth case study on Huawei’s substantial, impactful, and set to continue developing and deepening into the future. activities in the region.

At first glance, this conventional depiction of China’s engagement in Central and Eastern Europe seems to be well-founded, and fits neatly with the conventional narrative about great-power competition that has dominated the economic and political analysis of world affairs. China is depicted as an emergent power that has the resources, interests, and willingness to pursue a systematic contestation of the Western-led order. It intends to do so by undermining liberal institutions such as the World Bank or the European Union by creating alternatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), or by co-opting developing countries through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Overall, China’s growing influence is taken for granted, with all the policy and rhetorical consequences emerging from this position (Vangeli and Pavlicevic 2019).

We provide a different reading of China’s relations with the CEE and Western Balkan countries, focusing on the interplay of economic and (geo)political relations. We shift from a supply-side perspective that focuses on what China does to a demand-side perspective that looks at what drives the governments in CEE and the Western Balkans to engage economically and politically

144 China’s demand-driven influence in Central-Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans 145 WHO SUMMONS THE DRAGON? GlobalFocus Center Policy Paper

Mapping Cooperation Political cooperation From a political perspective the CEE and Western Balkan countries are embedded, to various degrees, into Western economic, political, and military structures that are increasingly opposed with China in the Region to Chinese stances on an expanding number of issues. Eleven of the seventeen CEE countries are members of the European Union and the other six are candidate countries. Of these eleven, six have joined the euro and nine are members of the Schengen area. As for military integration in Western structures, all but two are members of NATO, and all but one (Serbia) have a strategic partnership with the United States.

Over the past four years, the United States has embarked on an increasingly clear path of confrontation with China. The trade wars and the implementation of various protectionist measures by the United States, but also by the European Union, signals an increasing tendency to use economic tools to safeguard political objectives against Chinese influence. Furthermore, the EU’s position in the global multilateral framework has been made increasingly difficult, as it has stretched itself between aligning with its strategic partner, the US, and its growing economic benefits from Formal cooperation between China and the Central and Eastern European countries, including further integration with its largest exports market, China. Germany’s economy in particular, which those in the Western Balkans, takes place through an initiative of the Chinese Foreign Affairs is responsible for more than a quarter of EU’s international trade, has been increasingly tied to Ministry called the ‘17+1 cooperation format.’ Launched in Warsaw in 2012, it aims to intensify the the Chinese market over the course of the past decade. Moreover, the economies of most CEE cooperation between the region and China by including the region in the Belt and Road Initiative, countries are highly dependent on the German economy, which in turn is dependent on the increasing trade, Chinese investments in the region, and political and cultural engagement between Chinese economy. This creates interconnected economic dependencies that spill over into politics the two sides. and foreign policy.

While the initiative’s multilateral format gives the impression that it implies multilateral cooperation However, as tensions have mounted between the US and China, the EU has also implemented between all the participating countries, China engages with each individual country bilaterally. restrictions on Chinese FDI, given its own concerns about the involvement of Chinese state-owned Some transnational investments, such as the Chinese investment in the railway connection companies (SOEs) in key strategic sectors or companies in Europe. The recent US ‘Policy for managed between Belgrade and Budapest, do involve more than one CEE government, but China still relates strategic competition with the PRC’ marked a new milestone in the increasingly divergent path with each CEE country mostly on a bilateral basis. This begs the question of the utility and actual between the transatlantic world and China. This has substantial geopolitical consequences for the relevance of the multilateral framework. Thus, the China-CEE format should be understood more entire world, and in particular for regions such as CEE and the Western Balkans, which are among from Beijing’s perspective as referring to the Chinese strategy towards the region, not as an actual the most integrated developing areas in the institutional and economic Western frameworks. multilateral cooperative framework. China just packs the CEE countries together for conceptual and planning reasons, but it relates with each country on an individualised, bilateral basis05. This In this context, and considering other geopolitical evolutions in the region (particularly the explains why we observe such a great degree of variation between CEE countries when it comes resurgence of Russia and the continuous crises issuing from the Middle East), the CEE and Western to their economic and political engagement with China. Balkan countries embedded into Western structures have been drawn closer to their transatlantic partners. This is influenced both by the degree to which they are embedded into the Western While both the CEE countries and China have agreed several times to upgrade the 17+1 over the structures and by the sensitivity to risk of each national government, particularly in areas such years, the CEE countries have different types of incentives to actually push to upgrade or downgrade as national security. In this context, security concerns are coupled with political objectives and the format’s relevance and significance. The main incentives are related to the perceived or economic interests. actual economic opportunities China provides, their degree of embeddedness into the Western political and economic (institutionalised) networks, and the degree of their governments’ strategic This state of affairs complicates the political cooperation between China and the CEE and Western autonomy. The ebb and flow of the 17+1 framework is shaped and ultimately determined by the Balkan countries. However, these concerns or even their degree of embeddedness into the Western domestic incentives present in each of the CEE countries, as well as other strategic and constraining structures should not be treated as an absolute or unique factor that precludes an intensification of anxieties and commitments.

146 China’s demand-driven influence in Central-Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans 147 WHO SUMMONS THE DRAGON? GlobalFocus Center Policy Paper

said cooperation. As is shown in the case of Hungary, a country deeply integrated in the Western Type of engagement Implication Example political and economic networks, institutional embeddedness does not prevent the deepening of relations with China; the domestic priorities of government leaders and key domestic interest Formal engagement Membership in the 17+1 Albania, Czechia, Poland, framework and expectations Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, groups seem to be the main predictors of the ebb and flow of political cooperation. If the political for economic investments, Macedonia, , elite governing the country desires to assert a higher degree of strategic autonomy, then we should but no intensification of expect an intensification of bilateral relations with China. This is why we argue that Western actors political engagement. interested in the China-CEE cooperation framework should look less at what China does, and more Substantive engagement at what domestic governments do and why they decide on a given course of action. Committed- Intensification of political Hungary, Serbia engagement as a way of As Szczudlik (2019) argues, the China-CEE framework is upgraded or downgraded depending expressing and signalling on the configuration of incentives and interests that either the CEE countries or China have at a strategic autonomy. particular point in time.06 Being embedded in Western structures creates political incentives for Un-committed- Intensification of political Bosnia and Herzegovina, limiting political cooperation with China, but when domestic interests for strategic autonomy engagement as a posturing Montenegro, , Bulgaria prevail, more intense engagement comes about. But how should we conceive this political and strategy vis-à-vis third diplomatic engagement between the CEE countries and China? party actors or as a form of pragmatic foreign policy. We suggest that one way of thinking about this is by classifying what types of political engagement take place. For this purpose, we make the distinction between ‘formal engagement’ and ‘substantive From a methodological perspective, the placement of these countries in one or another category engagement’. Furthermore, we sub-divide substantive engagement into two categories: was decided based on qualitative analysis of diplomatic relations, publicly-available strategic and ‘committed’ and ‘uncommitted’ substantive engagement. This allows us a more nuanced and political documents, as well as the secondary sources analysis of particular bilateral relations. granular understanding of how and why the countries in the region cooperate with China. Currently, most of the countries in CEE and the Western Balkans seem to be engaging only formally • Formal engagement refers to political and economic engagement that is driven only by the desire with China. Countries such as Albania, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, to maintain cordial and friendly relations, without actually seeking an intensification of bilateral Macedonia, Latvia and Lithuania are actively engaging with China economically, and participating relations in the political or diplomatic sphere. in the China-CEE political cooperation framework. However such engagement, while active, seems to be limited to economic relations and an expectation for Chinese investments in these economies. • Substantive engagement refers to political and economic engagement driven by an interest to These countries seem to show no actual interest in intensifying political and diplomatic relations, intensify political and economic relations with China. This type of engagement can be subdivided privileging their relations with the US and other Western partners at the expense of China’s influence into two subtypes: and interests. This can be observed in the recent low-level participation in the latest China-CEE summit and in the political positions adopted by countries such as Romania, which are distancing • “committed” substantive engagement, which refers to real desire to intensify engagement themselves from China and excluding Chinese firms from public tenders. with China due to domestic pressures for strategic autonomy; or However, because of changes in the domestic power dynamics, some of these countries currently • ‘uncommitted’ substantive engagement, which refers to instrumental but substantive exhibiting low interest in the intensification of political relations with China have shown a certain engagement as a method of posturing vis-à-vis a third party, particularly the US or the degree of interest in substantive relations in the past. The Czech Republic, where foreign policy is EU, or as a form of pragmatic foreign policy. disputed between the populist President Zeman and the incumbent prime minister, has exhibited different positions in relation to China. While currently engaging mostly in formal relations with China, in past years Prague exhibited a more active desire for an intensification in political and economic relations with Beijing, under the direction of President Zeman. The Czech posturing vis-à-vis China is an issue of domestic struggle and it alters with the power distribution inside key institutions in Prague. Similarly, the current Romanian government has expressed a strong disinterest in intensifying political (or economic) relations with China, while the previous Social Democratic government adopted a much more amicable approach towards the country. The

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difference in strategic vision between the two governments shapes actual state behaviour and, To sum up, the political cooperation between the CEE countries and China varies depending on therefore, the intensity and type of political relations with China. domestic incentives to assert strategic autonomy vis-à-vis the West. Thus, there is no one-size- fits-all model of cooperation in the region, especially due to the mostly bilateral character of the Among these, the case of the Baltic states is particularly interesting. The exceptional security multilateral framework developed by the CEE countries and China. Overall, we suggest that the concerns they face creates incentives for them to remain deeply embedded in the Western political, conventional narrative about China’s increasing political influence in the region is exaggerated. military, and economic networks. In light of these incentives, but also maintaining the rational With the exception of Serbia and Hungary, China’s levels of influence in the region are low. desire to entertain relatively cordial relations with rising powers, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia have accepted participation in the cooperative framework with China, but have tended to balance political cooperation with their commitment towards Western partners. Estonia seems engaged in more intense political relations with China; this may be an attempt to rehabilitate bilateral relations Economic cooperation after a diplomatic three-years diplomatic crisis that started in 2011 over the Dalai Lama’s visit.

The economic component represents the core element of the China-CEE cooperation framework, When it comes to committed substantive engagement with China, Serbia and Hungary present and represents one of China’s main priorities as part of its Belt and Road Initiative. Over the course almost unique cases, that Western analysts often use, nevertheless, to generalise about the entire of the past decade, China has sought to expand its economic influence in Europe. While most region: Hungary most often to comment on what is happening with the Central European members of its trade and investment has been concentrated in Western Europe, its relative significance of the EU, whereas Serbia is treated as being representative for the Western Balkans. We argue that has captured more attention in the context of the capital-thirsty countries of Central and Eastern these two cases should be treated as special cases, as they are rather the exception than the rule. Europe. The conventional story tells us that Beijing seeks to expand its market access, expand Both Hungary and Serbia have expressed and sustained a high degree of commitment towards their the use of its technologies, and establish in the region an increased dependency on the Chinese substantive relationship with China and have benefited economically. We argue that both countries economy. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including those in the Western Balkans, have adopted a committed engagement strategy towards China because of their governments’ have been involved in growing economic exchanges with China. This growth has provoked stances on increased strategic autonomy vis-à-vis the West. Both the Orbán government in anxieties informing the conventional narrative that this increase in economic exchanges will lead to Budapest and the various governments in Belgrade have promoted a strategic position through the region becoming increasingly reliant on Beijing and less so on Western economies. which they have sought to assert this autonomy. In the case of Serbia, the desire for committed substantive engagement with China is a consequence of the political pragmatism adopted by the Some estimates claim that the impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative on Central and Eastern ruling political party in Belgrade, led by President Aleksandar Vučić. By committing to developing Europe will be approximately 6% of its aggregated GDP by 2040, or that it would involve a direct substantive relations with China, Belgrade is trying to adopt a strategic balance between the West and indirect benefit of US$48 billion for Poland, US$33 billion for Romania, US$16 billion for the and Russia/China, aiming to extract benefits from all parties. Hungary’s committed and substantive Czech Republic, and US$13 billion for Hungary (CERB 2019). However, when we look at incoming engagement with China is an expression of the foreign policy vision adopted by Viktor Orbán after capital from China into CEE markets alone, the figures are somewhat more modest, with only US$6.8 his return to power in 2010, which involves maintaining close relations with both Russia and China. billion coming into the entire CEE region between 2000 and 2019 (Merics 2020). In contrast, the US’s total FDI in CEE for just the past decade has been over US$300 billion (BEA 2021). The greater Finally, countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and arguably Estonia have adopted gains are therefore driven by the indirect effects of trade. What is more, the majority of FDI inflows what seems more like an uncommitted but substantive relationship with China at various points in continue to target the richer economies of Northern and Western Europe, not the capital-thirsty time over the past decade. In the case of Montenegro, the high dependency on Chinese capital economies of CEE. China seems to be investing based on a return-on-investment rationale that is makes intensive political engagement with the latter mandatory. China owns a substantial size of driven by economic logic, not so much by geostrategic or political logic. Montenegro’s debt and has provided funding for major infrastructure projects in the country. The future of Montenegro’s engagement with China will thus depend on the ability of the EU and the However, when compiling an overall economic ratio between Western and Eastern investments, US to provide both political and economic assistance. Re-starting the process of EU accession for we find that two categories of vulnerabilities emerge in CEE. On one hand, there are the countries Montenegro may represent a good trigger to intensify relations with the West and slow down the with larger Chinese inflows of capital, such as Hungary with US$2.9bn over the decade, but also development of its relations with China. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with its fragmented Poland with US$1.7bn or Romania with US$1.5bn. In these larger economies, it is not the overall and complicated political system, the relationship with China is also deepening mostly because of inflow value that matters, but its targeted usage. an absence of opportunities for intensified relations with the West.

There are important developmental divides between Eastern and Western member states of the EU in terms of infrastructure connectivity. Only Croatia and Slovenia come close to Western

150 China’s demand-driven influence in Central-Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans 151 WHO SUMMONS THE DRAGON? GlobalFocus Center Policy Paper

Europe’s average of motorway accessibility and more importantly, motorway density. For Romania, energy is one of the leading areas of Chinese investments in Hungary, after the electronics and Poland or Bulgaria, the physical infrastructure needs are very large, and Chinese involvement automotive industries. Chinese companies have also bought foreign companies with subsidiaries in in such projects has at times come as a much-welcomed solution. Chinese companies adopted Hungary, such as Lenovo-IBM; its concentration on this market is driven by domestic openness as different strategies for such projects. For example, in Hungary, Chinese Railways established a joint much as it is by location, as Hungary is targeted as a regional hub from where the whole European venture with Hungarian Railways (MÁV) in 2015 to coordinate the upgrade of the Hungarian section market can be supplied with Chinese products or services (Volgyi and Lukacs 2021). of the Budapest-Belgrade railway line.

U.S. direct Chinese direct Western economic investment in CEE investment in CEE influence ratio (US$bn) (2009-2019) (US$bn) (2000-2019)

Poland 135.6 1.7 80

Hungary 68.4 2.9 24

Czech Republic 60.5 1.2 50

Romania 30.2 1.5 20

Slovakia 7.3 0.1 73

Bulgaria 5.8 0.5 12

Slovenia 2.3 0.4 6 Additionally, China has targeted other strategic investments in the region concerning the defence Croatia 1.5 0.5 3 and energy sectors, from the acquisition of the Polish military equipment producer Huta Stalowa Wola in 2012, to the more recent focus on energy investments. Throughout CEE, most of the Estonia 0.9 0.1 9 energy production facilities were built during the Communist period, and as such, their current Lithuania 0.9 0.1 9 status requires many investments in re-technologisation or the development of new facilities in Latvia 0.3 0.1 3 order to maintain the domestic energy supply (Volintiru et al 2021). Within the context of the Green Deal and the coal phase-out, CEE countries like Poland, Romania, Hungary, the Czech Republic EU funding is the main source of capital for public investments in both CEE and the Western and Slovakia have started to struggle with the energy transition, as well as the dual pressure of Balkans. On average, 80% of public investments in CEE countries have been carried out with EU keeping energy prices low for internal consumption and competitiveness while covering the costs funding. Given that they represent only a small fraction of national budgets, this is telling of the of large investments in energy production facilities. For some, energy security is more sensitive structural vulnerability of the countries in this region, relying as they do on outside sources of than for others. For example, the Chinese presence in Poland’s energy sector is framed as an issue capital for larger infrastructure investments. of availability, affordability, and efficiency which allows it to maximise efficient use of local coal resources while at the same time reducing its dependence on Germany and Russia (Turcsany In a regional counterweight to the Belt and Road Initiative, the US has backed the Three Seas 2016). Nuclear production is one of the leading sub-sectors where China has tried to take the lead Initiative in CEE. But beyond these regional formats, bilateral economic relations can derive over Western involvement, such as the case of the Cernavodă plant in Romania or Temelín in the economic substance from different US institutions. For example, the US Export-Import Bank (EXIM) Czech Republic. was one of the leading actors behind recent Memorandums in the region. This could facilitate the acquisition of American goods, especially in the technology sector, where the competitiveness With the recent US Memorandum of Understanding with Romania’s Ministry for Economy, Energy of Chinese prices has been a major attraction for national and local governments in CEE and the and Business Climate totalling US$7bn, the expansion of nuclear energy in Romania has shifted Western Balkans. In the context of the Covid19 crisis, EXIM can play a role in the pharmaceutical firmly away from Chinese investments. Also, two MoUs were signed last year between the US and sector as well. USAID has been one of the leading donors for civil society organisations in the Poland on energy investments and broader economic cooperation. The US is also launching a region. Finally, a lesser-known American institution in the region is the International Development transnational rail project, linking Constanța in Romania with Gdańsk in Poland as part of the Three Finance Corporation (DFC), which is currently a leading actor in facilitating investment projects Seas Initiative. Also, the Romanian Government is currently blocking access of Chinese companies in energy and critical infrastructure in the region, by partnering up with private-sector actors. to bids for large public investments on its territory. In Hungary, in contrast, China is still in line to Given the poor regional coordination, many of the countries in CEE or the Western Balkans will build Europe’s largest solar plant, contributing to its climate goals in a decisive manner. Renewable

152 China’s demand-driven influence in Central-Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans 153 WHO SUMMONS THE DRAGON? GlobalFocus Center Policy Paper

continue to prefer bilateral negotiations with the US on investments. In the case of CEE, particular and what we believe explains them. At the same time, we have analysed the economic relations of attention should be paid to the coordination of US-backed investments and EU programmes and the region with China, and these provide additional evidence in support of our argument that China priorities, such as InvestEU. This is especially relevant for energy and infrastructure sectors where cannot even come close to the economic influence and penetration of Western capital. However, EU-wide plans have been developed. With poor institutional capacity for investment prioritisation we have not yet discussed the existing cross-country variation in connection to China’s influence in and implementation, governments in the region might end up chasing two rabbits and eventually greater detail. Here we provide a map of China-CEE relations based on two dimensions, economics deliver nothing, except on paper. If their investment needs remain unmet, they can always become and politics. Each of these dimensions is sub-divided into two other dimensions on a spectrum. an entry point for China or Russia. Based on our conceptualisation of political cooperation, we distinguish between countries engaged in formal vs. substantive engagement with China. Conversely, based on our economic analysis, we A second category of countries that could be more vulnerable to Chinese investments are smaller distinguish between countries benefiting substantially from Chinese investments and trade, and economies where the ratio between Chinese and US investments is much smaller given the size of those that do not. As can be observed in the matrix, there is very little connection between political the economy as a whole, as in the cases of Croatia or Latvia. Indeed, both have seen their economic cooperation and large-scale economic investment or trade. Hungary and Serbia represent the two ties with China increase over the past decade. For example, Latvia has had the highest rise in special cases where we notice a convergence of the two, but this is not the case for the other imports from China over the past decade from among the sample of countries in CEE and Western countries in the region. Balkans, with a five-fold increase.

While countries in CEE or the WB are much too small to target the Chinese market directly in terms of exports, they are very well integrated in the regional supply chains that in turn are reliant on the Chinese market. More specifically, while CEE countries have only an average export share to China directly of about 1.5% of their total exports, approximately a third of their exports go to Germany. Of these exports, many are components, in the automotive sector among others. German automotive exports to China represent a key source of recovery for this leading economic sector in Europe, in a context in which both the EU and the American markets have seen demand fall in the context of the pandemics. As such, the trade exposure of CEE and the WB to China is not direct, but indirect. In a context in which China is keen to weaponise economic interdependencies and international supply chains, an EU-wide industrial policy should take into account the resilience derived from near-shoring production in CEE.

The trade integration with China is not a direct link to political engagement, as we can see in the case of Lithuania; it has seen its exports to the Chinese market increase eight-fold over the last decade, and its imports have risen above regional averages, but it announced recently that it is leaving the 17+1 regional cooperation format with China. In contrast, Bulgaria has seen its imports from China increase three-fold over the period, thus contributing to the re-export capacity of some of its domestic economic agents. In contrast to Lithuania, Bulgaria’s economic engagement with China is linked to a political engagement, being the only country in CEE to prefer a common EU Source: the authors, based on a variety of political (e.g., Clean Network, MoUs, EU-level policy policy position which defines China as a strategic partner rather than a competitor (ECFR 2020). positioning) and economic (e.g., FDI, trade) evaluations

Until this point, we have shown that the conventional depiction of China’s influence in Central and Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans tends to be somewhat (strategically) exaggerated. In support of this position, we have analysed the broad political cooperation patterns in the region

154 China’s demand-driven influence in Central-Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans 155 WHO SUMMONS THE DRAGON? GlobalFocus Center Policy Paper

– Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovenia – were represented by ministers instead of their heads of governments and states.12 What is more, the summit took place amid rising A Case in Point: distrust toward China among its 17+1 partners and the dissatisfaction with the lack of consistent investments, which had initially been promised, somewhat pompously, at the initiative’s inception.13 Furthermore, in the foreseeable future the Central and Eastern European and Western Balkan Huawei 5G Saga countries will most probably refuse to deal with Huawei and ZTE, companies with a substantial footprint in the two regions’ telecommunication sectors. in CEE and the Western Balkans From Affordable Quality to “Untrusted Vendors”

Huawei has been present on European markets for 20 years, opening its first research lab in Stockholm in 2000.14 Today, Huawei has nearly 15,000 employees across Europe and 23 research facilities in different European countries, while the company’s contribution to the EU’s GDP in 2018 was €12.8 billion.15 Closely cooperating with some of Europe’s largest telecommunication operators like Deutsche Telekom, A1 Telekom Austria, Telenor, Orange and Telefónica, both Huawei and ZTE have been heavily involved in the construction of the infrastructure for the previous generations of 4G and 3G cellular networks, as well as the technological development and testing of the newest 5th generation across the continent. Nevertheless, most of Europe’s operators have joined the Clean Network Initiative becoming 5G Clean telecoms16; some of them, such as Deutsche Telekom, have frozen all their 5G network equipment deals, amidst the debate in Germany over a potential ban of Huawei.17 The deployment of the fifth-generation technology standard for broadband cellular networks (5G) has been transformed into a new avenue for geo-political and geo-economical confrontation. It is Being dependent on the German economy, many Central and Eastern European countries have fair to say that the 5G rollout has become one of the most polarising, politicised, and securitised followed Berlin’s example in preventing Huawei’s further penetration in their telecommunication issues ever since the Trump administration first raised the issue, as well as a major ‘battleground’ in sectors, despite its significant role in the development of their 4G and 3G national infrastructures.18 the heated trade war between the US and China.07 A recent comparative study by the Association for International Affairs (AMO) in Prague analysed national approaches toward Huawei, the most visible Chinese telecom company with the highest Calling upon the so-called Prague 5G Security Proposals08, in 2020 the US government launched share of components in local networks in the CEE countries. AMO’s study demonstrates differences the bi-partisan ‘Clean Network’ initiative aimed at addressing the threats to data privacy, security and among the CEE countries in their approach toward Huawei, whose future in the region is conditioned human rights from authoritarian malign actors.09 Directly targeting the Chinese telecommunication by five factors: the change of government in the upcoming general elections, Germany’s stance, giants like Huawei and ZTE – accused of being ‘untrusted vendors’ required to observe the directives the local telecom companies’ preferences, bilateral relations with the US, and the effectiveness of of the Chinese Communist Party – the US’s 5G diplomacy has actively engaged in ensuring support Washington’s ‘Clean Network’ diplomacy.19 from countries across the world, especially from its NATO and EU allies in Europe.10 As a result, most European countries have signed bilateral memoranda of understanding with the United Although Czechia was a pioneer in voicing scepticism on the state of 5G security in Europe back States agreeing not to pursue equipment from such ‘untrusted vendors’ in the development of in 2018, it has not yet introduced similar legislation. Ahead of the upcoming general elections, the their national 5G infrastructures. Czech intelligence agencies, Prime Minister Andrej Babiš, and President Zeman have taken different positions on the matter. While the Czech government has voiced concerns over Huawei-related Apart from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary and Montenegro, all of China’s partners from Central cybersecurity risks to the national 5G network, the President has often downplayed them. Moreover, and Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans – organised in the Beijing-led cooperation initiative Huawei has been actively influencing the national debate on 5G20 by launching a promotional commonly known as 17+1 – joined the Clean Network Initiative.11 The “5G breakup” awkwardness website and hiring an attorney to challenge the National Cyber and Information Security Agency’s was felt at the last 17+1 summit held virtually on February 9, as six founding members of the bloc interpretation of the risks posed by foreign vendors.21 The announced ‘5G breakup’ expectedly

156 China’s demand-driven influence in Central-Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans 157 WHO SUMMONS THE DRAGON? GlobalFocus Center Policy Paper

resulted in a diplomatic scandal; the Chinese ambassador to the country called the National Cyber fair competition, transparency and the rule of law,25 although the major Bulgarian mobile operators and Information Security Agency’s 5G warnings erroneous, whereas Prime Minister Babiš accused (A1 Bulgaria, Vivatel and Telenor Bulgaria) have relied on Huawei for the development of their him of lying. As demonstrated in the engagement spectrum, the Czech Republic has substantive 4G networks26 and have been testing their 5G equipment using the company’s technologies.27 economic cooperation with China, while Beijing also has an ally in Czech President Zeman. Hence, However, some of them, such as Vivatel, signaled that they might disengage from Huawei.28 it can be expected that China and Huawei will not easily back off from the construction of ’the Sofia will probably need to compensate the mobile operators if it decides to exclude the Chinese Czech Republic’s 5G network. company from the national 5G network rollout.29 Therefore, experts believe that the transition to “trusted vendors” will not be sudden, but gradual. Namely, the preferred approach would be for the The only outlier in the region is Hungary. It is highly unlikely that the Orbán’ government will ban telecommunication companies that currently use Huawei technology to use liberalisation in the the use of Huawei’s technology in the national 5G network in the foreseeable future, given that the network modernisation regime, enacted with the new amendments to the Spatial Planning Act, as company enjoys a friendly environment in the country and has announced the establishment of a transition phase in which they could discontinue their partnership with the Chinese company and a new research and development centre in Budapest. Again, we can observe Hungary’s special thus enter the second phase already prepared to use other suppliers.30 The Chinese Embassy in the status in the region in regards to China. Nothing seems able to break the friendly Sino-Hungarian country has not remained silent on these developments and accused the US of reviving ‘fascism’ relationship, as Budapest nurtures both substantive economic and political relations with Beijing, and ‘McCarthyism’, imposing a digital Iron Curtain and being the biggest threat to global security, thus demonstrating its strategic autonomy vis-à-vis the West, including the latest purchase of citing WikiLeaks and Edward Snowden’s case as examples.31 The embassy has also expressed China-made Sinopharm’s COVID-19 vaccines – the first of its kind in the EU. In contrast, neighbouring hope that Bulgaria will continue to provide a non-discriminatory working environment for Chinese Poland has introduced amendments to its cybersecurity law enabling the exclusion of high-risk companies, including Huawei.32 vendors, in spite of its substantive economic cooperation with Beijing. This may be a result of the 2019 spying scandal wherein a Huawei employee was arrested on charges of espionage and finally Slovenia also joined the Clean Network Initiative in August 2020, during a visit to the country by the indicted in 2020. Poland’s neighbours, the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, have taken former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. As a result, Slovenia’s Ministry of Public Administration a similar tack as they all signed memoranda of understanding on 5G with the US. We may expect is preparing a draft of the new Electronic Communications Act, which proposes a prohibition of them to introduce legislation or policies designed to exclude or limit Huawei as a potential vendor the use of equipment from high-risk vendors in certain parts of the networks, such as critical involved in constructing the national 5G networks. Since the Baltic states generally keep their infrastructure, government, defence, and rescue systems, as well as thre replacement of the political and economic relations with China at a formal level, no significant action from Beijing or existing equipment provided by the high-risk vendors in these parts.33 Furthermore, Ljubljana has Huawei should imminently be expected. suggested a transition period for the replacement of high-risk vendors’ equipment of five years after the secondary legislation is enforced.34 The proposed criteria to determine high-risk vendors Unlike Czechia, its neighbor Slovakia has a less substantive economic cooperation with China include a strong link between the supplier and a government of a given third country; the third and has taken a firmer stance as its National Security Authority has been drafting a Decree on 5G country’s legislation, especially where there are no legislative or democratic checks and balances security measures, which can be easily overturned nevertheless as it does not have the power in place, or there are no security or data protection agreements between the EU and the given of a law. Furthermore, in October 2020, Slovak President Zuzana Čaputová canceled her speech third country; the characteristics of the supplier’s corporate ownership; the third country’s ability to at the famous security-related Globsec Forum in Bratislava over its cooperation with Huawei, exercise any form of pressure, including concerning the place of manufacturing of the equipment; resulting in the former’s decision to cancel the cooperation with the Chinese company.22 Unlike its the supplier’s ability to guarantee supply; and the overall quality of the supplier’s products and Czech colleague, Huawei’s Slovak branch declined to comment on the country’s move.23 Lastly the cybersecurity practices, including the degree of control over its supply chain and whether adequate position of Romania, being the first country in the region to sign a memorandum of understanding prioritisation is given to security practices.35 Huawei’s Slovenian branch has found this intention with the US in 2019, as well as proposing a law that envisions the prime minister’s approval for discriminatory, adding that even if the country bans Huawei, the company will not leave Slovenia, all technology manufacturers, equipment, and software programs planned for constructing where it has been present for quite some time.36 In the meantime, Telekom Slovenia, a publicly the 5G national network’, ’is the most decisive within the region on declining Huawei’s services. owned operator, has launched the first commercial 5G network in the country in cooperation with Notwithstanding its substantive economic cooperation with Beijing, Bucharest seems to have Ericsson.37 Thus, it seems very unlikely that Huawei will get involved in the national 5G network taken a U-turn, by announcing a ban on Chinese investments in capital infrastructure projects in the rollout in Slovenia, a country which has no substantive political or economic relations with China. country. The study did not include Bulgaria, Croatia, and Slovenia, which are discussed separately. Croatia, on the other hand, did not sign the memorandum of understanding with the US. By signing a memorandum of understanding on 5G with the US, Bulgaria joined the Clean Network Nevertheless, the Croatian government has made a public pledge to ensure a clean 5G network. Initiative in October 2020, despite its substantive political cooperation with China.24 Prime Minister Moreover some of Croatia’s operators, such as Croatian Telecom (part of the Deutsche Telekom Borissov stressed that the 5G rollout in the country would be clean, safe, and based on free and Group) have signed a 5G network contract with the ‘clean’ Swedish company Ericsson. Despite the

158 China’s demand-driven influence in Central-Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans 159 WHO SUMMONS THE DRAGON? GlobalFocus Center Policy Paper

overall delays in rolling out the national 5G networks, as in Slovenia, Croatian Telecom introduced main entity-based operators – BH Telekom, Mtel Bosnia and Herzegovina (owned by Mts Telekom the first commercial 5G network in the country in late October 2020. Others like Telemach Croatia Serbia), and HT Eronet49 have shown little interest, postponing the network’s commercial use to (formerly owned by the Swedish Tele 2) and A1 Croatia (part of the A1 Telekom Austria Group) have 2025 at the earliest.50 Equipment-wise, all three operators have relied on Huawei and ZTE during the used equipment from different suppliers – including Huawei – and have not yet shown an intention 4G network rollout, while BH Telekom has also been using Ericsson’s and Siemens’ technologies for to stop their cooperation with the Chinese company. Hence, Zagreb’s position on the matter is not the 3G network.51 Moreover, there have been many rumours about a potential 4G deal between BH entirely clear, which creates an uncertain working environment for the Croatian operators. However, Telekom and Huawei wherein matters such as a free supply of equipment in exchange for company it is also possible that their foreign owners – mainly Western European telecoms – will eventually shares, exclusive rights over the newly-built network’s maintenance, and obligations for BH Telekom decide the issue. to use Huawei’s equipment for the future 5G network construction have been allegedly discussed.52 Moreover, Huawei is associated with the installation of surveillance cameras in Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Similar to CEE, there are some notable differences among the Western Balkan countries’ approaches East Sarajevo, and other places across the country.53 Furthermore, Bosnia and Herzegovina has not to Huawei. It is worth mentioning, though, that most of the countries’ operators have not relied yet joined the Clean Network Initiative, while the country’s compliance with EU cybersecurity rules, on a single vendor in developing the previous generations of cellular networks, cooperating with such as the EU Tool Box, is low or non-existent.54 In response, the US Embassy in Sarajevo has been Ericsson, Huawei, Nokia, ZTE, and other smaller suppliers alike. Nevertheless, the exact share of calling the Bosnian authorities and operators to join the Clean Network Initiative, warning that the Huawei’s components in the national networks was not easy to identify.38 That notwithstanding, US will reconsider sharing its information with those countries that opt for untrusted vendors.55 The besides their membership in or support of the Clean Network initiative, their national approaches American embassy and the US government more generally have also been lobbying for the removal toward Huawei will most probably be conditioned by the compliances with the EU cybersecurity of the untrusted equipment from the existing 4G network and its replacement with technologies rules and standards (primarily the EU Tool Box), their governments’ foreign policy positioning, and from secure suppliers.56 However, there are no legislative or political actions directed against their ties with China, as well as the stance of the parent companies which own the Western Balkan Huawei on the horizon. Given that Bosnia and Herzegovina – a deeply divided society along ethnic national operators (mainly EU-based telecoms). and political lines with no internal consensus about its strategic goals and geopolitical positioning – is lagging behind its neighbours in terms of 4G and 5G rollout, it remains unclear what stance the Despite being among the lowest-ranked European countries ready to deploy and adopt 5G 39 and not country will take. having 5G network and spectrum auctions scheduled40, Albania was the first country in the region to become part of the Clean Network Initiative back in 2019, agreeing to avoid any transmission, Kosovo is the only Western Balkan country whose independence China does not recognise, control, computing, or storage equipment from Huawei or ZTE.41 Nevertheless, it is therefore very in spite of its liaison office in Prishtina57, while the Kosovar public has a significantly negative likely that Albania will introduce legislation omitting Huawei from its 5G networks, although the perception of Beijing with 65% expressing an unfavourable opinion.58 Hence Prishtina is not part of company has been present in the country since 2009 as it has been a crucial partner for Tirana the 17+1 Initiative, and has not reported Chinese FDIs regardless of the two states’ increased trade in the national 4G networks operation, while its phones and equipment have an extensive market exchange, which may result in closer political relations in the future.59 Like Albania, Kosovo has not share.42 Moreover, in November 2019, one of Albania’s major operators Vodafone Albania ran a 5G announced a 5G network and spectrum auction60, although it did join the Clean Network Initiative network test using Huawei equipment, while at the same time denying it had a contract with the by signing the so-called White House Agreement, an umbrella term for the 2020 economic Chinese company for the entire network rollout, even though Vodafone Albania’s British parent normalisation agreements between Kosovo and Serbia signed under US’ auspices61, followed by company had concluded such contract in the UK.43 On the other hand, another major Albanian the memorandum of understanding on 5G with Washington concluded a month later.62 Irrespective operator, One Telecommunications (part of the Deutsche Telekom group), chose the Swedish of China’s non-recognition, Huawei’s telephones have a significant market share in some of Kosovo’s company Ericsson as the only vendor to update its radio and core networks.44 Although China was mobile and cable operators, while rumours of a Chinese bid for Vala–Kosovo Telekom (the state once Albania’s only ally, in contemporary times it has not had an as significant economic footprint telecommunications company) circulate within the country.63 Furthermore, in 2019, Huawei offered in and close bilateral relations with the country as it has with the rest of the Western Balkans. a big loan in exchange for developing Kosovo’s 5G network, although the authorities declined it over security concerns.64 Despite not being fully recognised, Kosovo’s domestic and foreign affairs Bosnia and Herzegovina is by far the most peculiar case in the region. Due to its complex political are under major influence from the West (especially the US), which is backed up with heavy NATO system and lack of sufficient coordination between its entities, Bosnia was the last in the region to troops presence. Thus, Huawei’s prospects for participating in the 5G network buildup in Kosovo introduce 4G, facing additional difficulties in providing full 4G coverage across its territory.45 Despite are very slim. signing the memorandum of understanding on 5G digital transformation in the Western Balkans, B osnia an d H e r ze g ovina l ack s n et work c ap aciti es 46 and political will47, being at the very bottom among Montenegro is another Western Balkan country which has undertaken substantial economic European countries in terms of its readiness to install 5G.48 Although at the beginning of 2020 the cooperation with China and has not yet joined the Clean Network Initiative. In August 2020, the publicly-owned BH Telekom ran a 5G network test using a 5G base station on its premises, the three country held parliamentary elections ousting the Democratic Socialist Party, which had been in

160 China’s demand-driven influence in Central-Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans 161 WHO SUMMONS THE DRAGON? GlobalFocus Center Policy Paper

power since 1990. Therefore, it is still too early to say what geopolitical direction the new coalition Like Montenegrins, the majority of Macedonians have a positive opinion of China (56%),82 while government led by Zdravko Krivokapić will take, including vis-à-vis China, given that some of the North Macedonia also has a high debt exposure (31.5% of total budget revenue after the adoption coalition parties have been known for adopting openly anti-Western and Eurosceptic stances.65 of a supplementary budget in May 2020), resulting from the Chinese EXIM bank’s loan for the Nevertheless, the US opposition to Chinese ICT companies has been felt in Montenegro as well. construction of the Kichevo-Ohrid and Miladinovci-Shtip motorways.83 Nonetheless, despite North The US embassy in Podgorica revealed that it had discussed the cooperation in the field of 5G with Macedonia’s substantial economic cooperation with China, Skopje’s approach toward Beijing has the previous Montenegrin government, reaffirming American readiness to support Montenegro been ambiguous since the ruling Social Democrats assumed power in 2017.84 On the one hand, in strengthening its national 5G network capacities.66 The Chinese embassy responded by the centre-left government led by Zoran Zaev committed almost entirely to the country’s EU and accusing the US of promoting Cold War rhetoric, expressing hope that Montenegro would take an NATO membership prospects, discontinuing the practice of taking large Chinese loans for capital independent decision.67 projects which its predecessor VMRO-DPMNE had established. On the other hand, Prime Minister Zaev described 17+1 as a initiative complementary to North Macedonia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations, In terms of its readiness to launch 5G, Montenegro has been ranked 27th, higher than some EU and has expressed a willingness to deepen his country’s economic ties with Beijing.85 member states such as Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Romania and Slovakia68; the country is now set to introduce 5G by the end of 2022.69 Montenegro was also among the first countries in the The cooperation in the field of ICT has followed the same ambivalent fashion. Initially dedicated to region to introduce mobile telephony and, due to its size and population, has often been subjected expanding the business with Huawei with new investments and projects,86 North Macedonia joined to ICT experiments by Western telecoms.70 Throughout the years, the Montenegrin operators – the Clean Network Initiative by signing a memorandum of understanding on 5G security with the Telekom Montenegro (part of the Deutsche Telekom Group), Telenor Montenegro (owned first by US in October 2020.87 The move was defended by the Macedonian President Stevo Pendarovski the Telenor Group and then sold to the PPF Group), and Mtel Montenegro (owned by Telekom and Zaev himself, who argued that as the newest member-state North Macedonia is obliged to Serbia) – have been using equipment from different suppliers in the development of the previous follow NATO’s security protocols strictly, including preventing digital technology corporations generations of cellular networks. For instance, Telenor Montenegro has been using Huawei’s and with incompatible goals and values from penetrating the country’s economy.88 As a result, the Nera’s equipment, Telekom Montenegro has relied on Ericsson and Huawei, while Mtel Montenegro Macedonian government has prepared amendments to the Law on Electronic Communications, used Ericsson’s technologies.71 Even though Montenegro is not part of the Clean Network Initiative, obliging the Macedonian operators to pursue equipment from credible suppliers that would the country’s agency for electronic communications and postal services (EKIP) has insisted that not hand Macedonian citizens’ data to third parties without a court decision.89 Besides, North Montenegro will, above all, follow the European Commission’s position on 5G security.72 Macedonia has already banned the replacement of the current equipment with equipment from ‘untrusted vendors’ once outdated.90 In response, Zhang Zuo, the Chinese ambassador to the The implementation process of the EU Tool Box has started; the transposition of the European country, accused the US of pressuring and forcing other countries to abandon Huawei, adding that Electronic Communications Code is expected this year73, while in its accession negotiations with the company has ten years’ experience in North Macedonia built on trustful, beneficial, and secure the EU, Montenegro has significantly progressed in Chapter 10 (‘Information society and media’).74 cooperation with the Macedonian operators.91 EKIP will take NATO standards on cybersecurity into consideration as well,75 as NATO allies are expected to carry out a thorough risk assessment of their cybersecurity infrastructure and remove Indeed, Huawei has been present on the Macedonian market since 2010, being a major actor in the any threats, including those arising from foreign ownership, control or direct investments.76 In that fields of ICT and education, and closely cooperating with the country’s institutions and telecoms on respect, Montenegro Telekom stated that it aims to diversify the 5G equipment while avoiding various projects, such as the ‘Huawei Seeds for the Future’ programme, donations of ICT equipment single-supplier dependence, in line with the EU Tool Box, and has expressed its readiness to to North Macedonia’s education facilities, and others.92 Moreover, the company has been involved cooperate with Nokia and Ericsson.77 Moreover, Telenor Montenegro has added that it will fully in the previous cellular networks’ rollout. Both Macedonian Telekom (part of the Deutsche respect the domestic legislation and international standards in this field.78 All in all, despite being Telekom Group) and A1 Macedonia (part of the A1 Telekom Austria Group) have been using mixed an EU accession frontrunner and a NATO member-state, Montenegro’s approach to Huawei will not equipment, combining Ericsson, Huawei and ZTE’s technologies.93 What is more, Huawei was be challenge-free. Montenegrins have a generally favourable opinion of China (68%)79, while the unofficially the top-ranked bidder at the public bidding procedure for purchasing 5G equipment country finds itself in a debt-trap (above 70% of GDP) after taking a large loan from China for the carried out by Macedonian Telekom.94 In anticipation of the memorandum of understanding with Bar-Boljare highway construction. As the first annual repayment of US$67.5 million is due in 2021,80 the US, the procedure was nevertheless put on hold upon request by the state’s representatives there is a room for Montenegro to be forced to shift its position toward Beijing, and consequently to on the company’s board of directors, as North Macedonia possesses 35% of Telekom’s shares.95 find a role for Huawei in its national 5G network construction.81 However, both the Agency for Electronic Communications (AEK) and the Macedonian operators have stressed that they will fully comply with Macedonian law at the upcoming 5G radio frequency public bidding scheduled for 202196, as well as with the provisions of the North Macedonia-US MoU, the EU Tool Box, and other EU cybersecurity directives97 which have already been successfully

162 China’s demand-driven influence in Central-Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans 163 WHO SUMMONS THE DRAGON? GlobalFocus Center Policy Paper

transposed in the domestic legislation.98 Therefore, Huawei’s involvement in North Macedonia’s 5G networks construction appears unlikely, despite the country’s economic ties with the company and China in general. Conclusions and Policy

In spite of joining the Clean Network Initiative by signing the so-called White House Agreement99, Serbia, like Hungary in CEE, is the Western Balkans’ outlier in terms of its approach toward Huawei. Recommendations Just a few weeks after the White House Agreement was concluded, the Chinese company opened an Innovations and Development Centre in Belgrade, in the presence of the Chinese ambassador and the Serbian Prime Minister Ana Brnabić, who added that Huawei will be substantially involved in Serbia’s further digitalisation, working on many technologies that are a precondition for the 5G rollout.100 Two months later, Huawei and Serbia’s Office for Information Technologies and eGovernment agreed to install Huawei’s equipment at the State Data Centre in the Serbian town of Kragujevac.101 Surprisingly however, in December 2020, despite the ongoing preparations for the 5G launch, Brnabić made a U-turn informing the public that the Serbian citizens do not need 5G at this stage.102 The reason behind this statement might be Serbia’s intention, on the one hand, to (Geo)political recommendations declaratively observe the White House Agreement, while on the other keeping its cooperation with Huawei and China intact.103 The Western partners of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Western Balkan (WB) countries should focus on domestic factors which drive national interest for intensification of It can therefore be expected that Huawei will compete for Serbia’s 5G networks notwithstanding the political relations with China. Interest groups and political movements seem to be leading the White House Agreement, which is not legally binding.104 After all, besides the 17+1 projects, thanks intensification of political relations with China. Targeting these groups with alternative incentives to which Serbia is by far the greatest beneficiary of Chinese capital in the region, Huawei is heavily could produce changes in their political stances vis-à-vis China. invested in Serbia’s ICT sector as well. Apart from rolling out high-speed networks in cooperation with the three major Serbian operators – Mts Telekom Serbia (publically owned), Telenor Serbia, and For the countries engaged in uncommitted substantial engagement, offering alternative Vip mobile (part of A1 Telekom Austria Group)105 – the Chinese company has a €150 million contract opportunities from US and European partners may be sufficient to change the character of their with Telekom Srbija to purchase equipment, services and works for landline network modernisation, relations with China. as well as a strategic partnership agreement to develop the broadband network in Serbia in 2017.106 The company has been also named as a development partner107 with Telenor’s 5G network. What is more, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in cooperation with the Serbian interior ministry, Huawei has launched the ‘Smart City’ public security system, involving a massive surveillance network with Economic recommendations more than 1000 face-recognition cameras placed around Belgrade.108

National governments in CEE and the WB should develop a better prioritisation of investments, Thus, it is very unlikely that Serbia will ban Huawei’s 5G technologies, and, even if it does so, that and make their investment needs known to their strategic partners in the West. would not significantly harm the cooperation with the Chinese company in those fields not covered by the White House Agreement, let alone the deep and friendly Sino-Serbian relationship.109 In Diplomatic collaborations between CEE and the WB countries on one hand, and the US and other fact – by consistently supporting each other’s national interests, introducing a mutual visa-free Western stakeholders on the other, should bring more private sector stakeholders into the fold; as regime, signing the 2009 Strategic Partnership aimed at intensifying the political and economic ties in the fields of technology (e.g. 5G) or energy, it is private companies that need to take the lead in between the two countries – China, along with Russia, the EU, and the US, plays an important part offering affordable and effective solutions in the region. in Serbia’s four-pillared foreign policy of neutrality.110 Needless to say, an overwhelming majority of the Serbian citizens (85%) have a positive attitude toward Beijing as opposed to Washington Western partners should do more to make the extent of their economic engagement in the region (less than 30%), while China is the country’s third-biggest donor.111 Hence, without clear EU publicly known, as the narrative at local level is often skewed in favour of Eastern partners (such membership prospects and in opposition to NATO, a definite shift in Serbia’s position toward China, as China or Russia) that have taken the lead in leveraging key projects in energy, infrastructure or and consequently Huawei, could only happen as a result of an eventual resolution of Kosovo’s health services. recognition problem.112

164 China’s demand-driven influence in Central-Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans 165 WHO SUMMONS THE DRAGON? GlobalFocus Center Policy Paper

The US and the EU should pay closer attention to how regional supply chains both feed NOTES economies in CEE and WB, integrating higher value-added production, and maximise the proximity advantage of production in the region. Increased trade dependency with China is 1. This paper looks at the CEE countries of Estonia (EE), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), the Czech Republic (CZ), Slovakia (SK), Poland (PO), Hungary (HU), and Slovenia (SI), Bulgaria (BU) and Romania (RO). not a primary vulnerability in CEE and WB, but it could be a strategic capability in a context of 2. This paper looks at the Western Balkan countries of Albania (AL), Bosnia and increased regional competition on the world market. Herzegovina (BA), Montenegro (ME), North Macedonia (MK), and Serbia (SR). 3. Croatia, Kosovo and Greece fall outside the scope of this paper. 4. Strategic autonomy is defined here as the ability of a state to carry out foreign and economic policy (at least partly) independently from Western partners and allies. 5. Agatha Kratz, Dragan Pavlicevic, Angela Stanzel, and Justyna Szczudilk. 2016. China’s investment in influence: the future of 16+1 cooperation. London: European Council of Foreign Relations. Justyna Huawei-related recommendations Szcsudlink. 2019. Seven Years of the 16+1. An assessment of China’s “Multilateral Bilateralism in Central Europe”. Paris: The Center for Asian Studies at the French Institute for International Relations. 6. Justyna Szcsudlink. 2019. Seven Years of the 16+1. An assessment of China’s “Multilateral Bilateralism in Buying 5G equipment from Ericsson or Nokia seems to be the most convenient alternative for Central Europe”. Paris: The Center for Asian Studies at the French Institute for International Relations. 7. This section is based on a combination of secondary sources and semi-structured interviews with experts, many operators from the region, including CETIN from the Czech Republic, Magyar Telekom from journalists, former officials, representatives from academia, civil society, regulatory agencies, and telecoms from Hungary, Latvijas Mobilais Telefons and Tele 2 in Latvia, Telia Estonia, Telia Lietuva in Lithuania, the Western Balkans. Ten interviews out of 27 interview invitations were carried out online in the period between February 2 and February 12 (one covering Bosnia and Herzegovina, two covering Montenegro, four covering Plus from Poland, Digi in Romania, Orange Slovakia, One Telecommunications and Vodafone in North Macedonia and three covering Serbia). Due to the sensitivity of the research topic, some of the interviewees Albania, Croatia, Montenegro, and Slovenia Telekom, as well as others.113 Those operators that asked to remain anonymous. Although eight invitations were sent to individual experts and governmental or corporate entities, interviews with representatives from Albania and Kosovo were not conducted. have not yet voiced their position on the matter may have closely cooperated with Ericsson or 8. Government of the Czech Republic, “The Prague Proposals: The Chairman Statement Nokia in the past and are ready to continue the collaboration on the national 5G networks rollout on Cyber Security of Communication Networks in a Globally Digitalized World - Prague 5G Security Conference,” May 3, 2019, https://www.vlada.cz/en/media-centrum/aktualne/ as well. Notwithstanding the less competitive offers by Ericsson and Nokia, and regardless of the prague-5g-security-conference-announced-series-of-recommendations-the-prague-proposals-173422/. United States Department of State, “The Clean Network,” 2020, https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-clean-network/. different readings of the urgency to replace Huawei, the telecoms in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 9. 10. United States Department of State. Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia will be ready to buy 5G equipment from the Western 11. The 17+1 format was previously known as 16+1. The founding members in alphabetical order are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, China, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, North Macedonia, ‘clean companies’, as a result of either a political or corporate decision, by their governments or Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia. In 2019, Greece joined the initiative becoming parent-companies respectively.114 its 17th member. Kosovo, whose independence China does not recognize, is excluded from this format. 12. Reid Standfish, “Chinese Summit Gets Chilly Reception From Central, Eastern European Countries,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, February 9, 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/chinese- The EU should reconsider its position towards the integration of the small and vulnerable summit-gets-chilly-reception-from-central-eastern-european-countries/31094507.html. Standfish; Andreea Brînză, “How China’s 17+1 Became a Zombie Mechanism,” February 10, 2021, economies of the Western Balkans, at least by making the often unavailable EU development 13. https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/how-chinas-171-became-a-zombie-mechanism/. funds less bureaucratic and more accessible, as well as by better connecting the EU companies 14. Huawei Europe, “The Win-Win Relationship between the EU and Huawei,” May 6, 2020, https://www.huawei.eu/story/win-win-relationship-between-eu-and-huawei. with the capital investment needs of the region, therefore assuring greater resilience to the 15. Huawei Europe. economic and political challenges posed by the rival powers.115 16. United States Department of State, “The Clean Network.” 17. Douglas Busvine, “Exclusive: Deutsche Telekom Freezes 5G Deals Pending Huawei Ban Decision,” Reuters, December 4, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-deutsche-telekom-germany-exclusive-idUSKBN1Y81MI. Another possibility is the diversification of global supply chains that can bolster the EU’s 18. Ivana Karásková, ed., Huawei in Central and Eastern Europe: Trends and Forecast (Prague: Association for International Affairs (AMO), 2021), https://chinaobservers.eu/huawei-in-central-and-eastern-europe-trends-and-forecast/. resilience. For instance, through subsidies and the moving of companies in the Western Balkans, 19. Karásková. the EU could connect economic independence and EU enlargement.116 This could be a win-win 20. LDEkonom and Huawei, “5G Platforma pro Chytrý Svět,” accessed February 18, 2021, https://www.5gvcesku.cz/. 21. Toman Devátý & Partneři, “Stanovinsko k Implementaci EU Toolbox,” March 30, 2020, https:// approach, as the EU would get the chance to demonstrate its values-based foreign policy in its www.5gvcesku.cz/DATA/dokumenty/A_Toman_Pravni_stanovisko_Implementace_EU_Toolbox.pdf. immediate neighbourhood, in practice, while at the same time, by investing in the Western Balkan 22. Radoslav Tomek, “Huawei Blocked From Sponsoring Security Event in NATO’s Slovakia,” Bloomberg.Com, October 7, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-07/ EU candidates’ economies, Brussels would be participating in the creation of a joint values-based huawei-blocked-from-sponsoring-security-event-in-nato-s-slovakia. future for Europe.117 23. Tomek. 24. Radio Free Europe, “Bulgaria, Kosovo, North Macedonia Join U.S. Initiative To Block Chinese Equipment In 5G Network,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, October 23, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/bulgaria-kosovo- The US should be more engaged in the region, especially economically, perhaps through north-macedonia-join-us-initiative-to-block-chinese-equipment-in-5g-network/30909512.html. 25. Krassen Nikolov, “Bulgaria Joins US Coalition against Huawei,” www.euractiv.com, October 26, 2020, creating its own variants of ‘17+1’,118 and should strive to diminish the appeal of the ‘cheap’ Chinese https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/bulgaria-joins-us-coalition-against-huawei/. loans, and consequently the economic dependence on Beijing. 26. Йоан Запрянов, “БТК и United Group обмислят окончателна раздяла с оборудването на Huawei,” www.capital.bg, March 14, 2021, https://www.capital.bg/biznes/ telekomi/2021/03/14/4185233_btk_i_united_group_obmisliat_okonchatelna_razdiala_s/. 27. Nikolov, “Bulgaria Joins US Coalition against Huawei.” 28. Запрянов, “БТК и United Group обмислят окончателна раздяла с оборудването на Huawei.” 29. Nikolov, “Bulgaria Joins US Coalition against Huawei.”

166 China’s demand-driven influence in Central-Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans 167 WHO SUMMONS THE DRAGON? GlobalFocus Center Policy Paper

30. “Consultation with a Local Expert from Bulgaria,” March 18, 2021. 66. Centar za istraživačko novinarstvo Crne Gore, “Američko protivljenje kineskoj informativnoj 31. Посолство на Китайската народна република в Република България, “Говорителят На tehnologiji stiglo i do Crne Gore: Oprezno sa 5G,” September 26, 2020, http://www.cin-cg.me/ Китайското Посолство в България, Относно Речта На Заместник-Държавния Секретар На САЩ americko-protivljenje-kineskoj-informativnioj-tehnologiji-stiglo-i-do-crne-gore-oprezno-sa-5g/. Кийт Крак, Която Директно Атакува и Дискредитира Китай, Изнесена По Време На Посещението 67. Centar za istraživačko novinarstvo Crne Gore. Си в България,” October 27, 2020, http://www.chinaembassy.bg/bjly/dtxw/t1826939.htm. 68. Centar za istraživačko novinarstvo Crne Gore. 32. Посолство на Китайската народна република в Република България. 69. Vijesti, “Jevrić: 5G mreža do 2022. godine stiže u Crnu Goru, strategija uvođenja do 33. Information Security Administration of the Republic of Slovenia, “E-Mail Correspondence with the Information kraja ove godine...,” vijesti.me, May 12, 2020, https://www.vijesti.me/tv/emisije/434597/ Security Administration of the Republic of Slovenia Regarding the 5G Network Rollout in Slovenia,” March 9, 2021. jevric-5g-mreza-do-2022-godine-stize-u-crnu-goru-strategija-uvodenja-do-kraja-ove-godine. 34. Information Security Administration of the Republic of Slovenia. 70. Interview with an expert from Montenegro; Interview with Boris Jevrić, assistant to the 35. Information Security Administration of the Republic of Slovenia. executive director - Head of the Sector for Radiocommunications, Montenegro Agency 36. 24ur.com, “Huawei: Način odločanja o tem, kdo je dobavitelj z visokim tveganjem, je nejasen,” October 6, 2020, https:// for Electronic Communications and Postal Services, Zoom, February 4, 2021. www.24ur.com/novice/slovenija/huawei-nacin-odlocanja-o-tem-kdo-je-dobavitelj-z-visokim-tveganjem-je-nejasen.html. 71. Georgi Georgiev, “Montenegro’s Crnogorski Telekom in Network Upgrade Deal with China’s Huawei,” SeeNews: Business 37. Ericsson, “Ericsson First with 5G in Slovenia,” August 12, 2020, https://www.ericsson.com/en/ Intelligence for Southeast Europe, December 19, 2011, http://seenews.com/news/montenegros-crnogorski-telekom-in- press-releases/2020/8/telekom-slovenije-and-ericsson-roll-out-first-5g-commercial-network-in-slovenia. network-upgrade-deal-with-chinas-huawei-210698; Interview with Boris Jevrić, assistant to the executive director - Head 38. In order to obtain official data and verify the information collected during the semi-structured interviews, short of the Sector for Radiocommunications, Montenegro Agency for Electronic Communications and Postal Services. inquires on the origin of the 4G and 3G equipment was sent to all the major operators in the Western Balkan countries. 72. Centar za istraživačko novinarstvo Crne Gore, “Američko protivljenje kineskoj Until the publication of this study, only Vip Serbia responded, while Telekom Serbia answered that is not able to share informativnoj tehnologiji stiglo i do Crne Gore: Oprezno sa 5G.” that information. In North Macedonia, the local Huawei branch was asked to provide information about the company’s 73. Interview with Boris Jevrić, assistant to the executive director - Head of the Sector for most significant projects in the country, as well as to comment on the US accusations. The company did not respond. Radiocommunications, Montenegro Agency for Electronic Communications and Postal Services. 39. inCITES Consulting, “Europe 5G Readiness Index,” 2019, https://www.incites.eu/europe-5g-readiness-index#. 74. Interview with an expert from Montenegro. 40. Catherine Sbeglia, “Kosovo and Albania Agree to Develop Pristina-Tirana Digital 5G Corridor,” RCR 75. Interview with Boris Jevrić, assistant to the executive director - Head of the Sector for Wireless News, October 12, 2020, https://www.rcrwireless.com/20201012/network-infrastructure/ Radiocommunications, Montenegro Agency for Electronic Communications and Postal Services. kosovo-and-albania-agree-to-develop-pristina-tirana-digital-5g-corridor. 76. Centar za istraživačko novinarstvo Crne Gore, “Američko protivljenje kineskoj 41. Henri Haxhiraj, “Digital Infrastructure in Albania – Perspective,” Tirana Observatory: Foreign Policy and International informativnoj tehnologiji stiglo i do Crne Gore: Oprezno sa 5G.” Relations, October 20, 2020, https://tiranaobservatory.com/2020/10/20/digital-infrastructure-in-albania-perspective/. 7 7. Centar za istraživačko novinarstvo Crne Gore. 42. Wouter Zweers et al., “China and the EU in the Western Balkans A Zero-Sum Game?,” Clingendael 78. Centar za istraživačko novinarstvo Crne Gore. Report (Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations, August 2020), 36, https://www. 79. International Republican Institute, “Western Balkans Poll Shows Strong Support for EU.” clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/china-and-the-eu-in-the-western-balkans.pdf. 80. Samir Kajosevic, “Cash-Strapped Montenegro Borrows Biggest Loan in Decades,” Balkan Insight (blog), December 43. Zweers et al., 36. 10, 2020, https://balkaninsight.com/2020/12/10/cash-strapped-montenegro-borrows-biggest-loan-in-decades/. 44. Sbeglia, “Kosovo and Albania Agree to Develop Pristina-Tirana Digital 5G Corridor.” 81. Martin Vladimirov and Christophe Rolland, “The Chinese Economic Footprint in Central and Eastern Europe: 45. BHRT, “Mitrović za BHRT: Digitalna transformacija otvara put ekonomskom razvoju BiH,” November 4, 2020, Impact on Energy Transition and Climate” (Center for the Study of Democracy, January 21, 2021), 5, https://csd.bg/ https://bhrt.ba/mitrovic-za-bhrt-digitalna-transformacija-otvara-put-ekonomskom-razvoju-bih/. publications/publication/policy-brief-no-97-the-chinese-economic-footprint-in-central-and-eastern-europe-impact- 46. Selma Boračić-Mršo, “Dok čeka 5G mrežu, BiH nema ni punu 4G pokrivenost,” Radio Slobodna Evropa, October 20, on-energy/; International Monetary Fund, “Montenegro : 2019 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and 2020, https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/dok-čeka-5g-mrežu-bih-nema-ni-punu-4g-pokrivenost/30903247.html. Statement by the Executive Director for Montenegro,” September 10, 2019, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/ 47. Interview with Aleksandar Brezar, a journalist investigating the Chinese Issues/2019/09/09/Montenegro-2019-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-48667. influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Zoom, February 11, 2021. 82. International Republican Institute, “Western Balkans Poll Shows Strong Support for EU.” 48. inCITES Consulting, “Europe 5G Readiness Index.” 83. Zoran Nechev and Ivan Nikolovski, “Hustled Into a Dead End: The Delusional Belief In 49. Semi-private company co-owned by the Government of the Federation of Bosnia Chinese Corrosive Capital for the Construction of North Macedonia’s Highways,” 39 (Skopje: and Herzegovina, the Croatian Telekom and the Croatian Post. Institute for Democracy “Societas Civilis” - Skopje, September 28, 2020), 24. 50. Boračić-Mršo, “Dok čeka 5G mrežu, BiH nema ni punu 4G pokrivenost”; Interview with Aleksandar 84. Zoran Nechev and Ivan Nikolovski, “After Prespa: External Influences in North Macedonia,” in Brezar, a journalist investigating the Chinese influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Strategic Role of External Actor in the Western Balkans (Wilfried Martens Centre for European 51. Interview with Aleksandar Brezar, a journalist investigating the Chinese influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Studies and e Political Academy of the Austrian People´s Party, 2021), 48–74, https://www.aies.at/ 52. Zweers et al., “China and the EU in the Western Balkans A Zero-Sum Game?,” 31. download/2021/Role_of_External_Actors_in_WBDeutscherExecutiveSummary_1.pdf. 53. Interview with Aleksandar Brezar, a journalist investigating the Chinese influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 85. Government of the Republic of North Macedonia, “Premierot Zaev od plenarnata sesija na Shefovi 54. Interview with Aleksandar Brezar, a journalist investigating the Chinese influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. na Vladi od CIE i NR Kina 16+1: Silno ja poddrzhuvame inicijativata 16+1, imame ogromen potencijal da gi 55. Boračić-Mršo, “Dok čeka 5G mrežu, BiH nema ni punu 4G pokrivenost.” unapredime ekonomskite i biznis partnerstvata,” April 12, 2019, https://vlada.mk/node/17465. 56. Interview with Aleksandar Brezar, a journalist investigating the Chinese influence in Bosnia 86. Government of the Republic of North Macedonia, “Premierot Zaev so menadžmentot and Herzegovina; T. Lazović, “BiH će morati ukloniti kinesku 4G mrežu?,” Dnevni Avaz, January 4, na Huavei na Samitot 16+1: Vo Makedonija se sozdadeni uslovi za novi investicii i sorabotka 2021, https://avaz.ba/vijesti/bih/621132/bih-ce-morati-ukloniti-kinesku-4g-mrezu. na zaednički proekti,” November 27, 2017, https://vlada.mk/node/13786. 57. Demush Shasha, “The Strategic Role of External Actors in the Western Balkans: Kosovo’s 87. Government of the Republic of North Macedonia, “Premierot Zaev so menadžmentot Perspective,” in The Strategic Role of External Actor in the Western Balkans (Wilfried Martens Centre for na Huavei na Samitot 16+1: Vo Makedonija se sozdadeni uslovi za novi investicii i sorabotka European Studies and e Political Academy of the Austrian People´s Party, 2021), 97, https://www.aies. na zaednički proekti,” November 27, 2017, https://vlada.mk/node/13786. at/download/2021/Role_of_External_Actors_in_WBDeutscherExecutiveSummary_1.pdf. 88. Ilinka Iljoska, “Huavej ḱe počeka za vlez vo Makedonija!,” Sloboden pechat, September 21, 2020, https://www. 58. International Republican Institute, “Western Balkans Poll Shows Strong Support for EU,” June slobodenpecat.mk/huavej-ke-pocheka-za-vlez-vo-makedonija/; Dragana Petrushevska, “N. Macedonia to 2, 2020, https://www.iri.org/resource/western-balkans-poll-shows-strong-support-eu. Prepare MoU with NATO for 5G Deployment,” SeeNews: Business Intelligence for Southeast Europe, September 59. Shasha, “The Strategic Role of External Actors in the Western Balkans: Kosovo’s Perspective,” 97. 24, 2020, http://seenews.com/news/n-macedonia-to-prepare-mou-with-nato-for-5g-deployment-714764. 60. Sbeglia, “Kosovo and Albania Agree to Develop Pristina-Tirana Digital 5G Corridor.” 89. Vladimir Mirchevski, “Vlasta saka da se osigura deka idnata 5G-mreža nema da se 61. Milica Stojanovic and Xhorxhina Bami, “Kosovo and Serbia Sign ‘Historic’ Deal Under Trump’s gradi so oprema na „Huavej“ i ZTE,” 360 stepeni, February 2, 2021, https://360stepeni.mk/ Auspices,” Balkan Insight, September 4, 2020, https://balkaninsight.com/2020/09/04/ video-vlasta-saka-da-se-osigura-deka-idnata-5g-mrezha-nema-da-se-gradi-so-oprema-na-huavej-i-zte/. kosovo-and-serbia-sign-historic-deal-under-trumps-auspices/. 90. Interview with Damjan Manchevski, former minister for public administration 62. Radio Free Europe, “Bulgaria, Kosovo, North Macedonia Join U.S. Initiative To Block Chinese Equipment In 5G Network.” and information society, Microsoft Teams, February 12, 2021. 63. Zweers et al., “China and the EU in the Western Balkans A Zero-Sum Game?,” 27. 91. Iljoska, “Huavej ḱe počeka za vlez vo Makedonija!” 64. Zweers et al., 27. 65. Interview with an expert from Montenegro, Zoom, February 4, 2021.

168 China’s demand-driven influence in Central-Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans 169 WHO SUMMONS THE DRAGON? GlobalFocus Center Policy Paper

92. Ivan Nikolovski and Zoran Nechev, “Fortifying 5G Networks in North Macedonia: The Need for Western Partners,” chinaobservers, January 12, 2021, https://chinaobservers.eu/ fortifying-5g-networks-in-north-macedonia-the-need-for-western-partners/. 93. Interview with a representative of the Macedonian operators, Zoom, February 2, 2021; Interview with prof. Zoran Hadzhi- Authors Velkov, full professor at the Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Information Technologies, Zoom, February 2, 2021. 94. Vladimir Mirchevski, “Vladata bara od „Makedonski telekom“ da ne kupuva 5G-oprema od kineski „Huavej“,” 360 stepeni, September 15, 2020, https://360stepeni.mk/ video-vladata-bara-od-makedonski-telekom-da-ne-kupuva-5g-oprema-od-kineski-huavej/. 95. Mirchevski. 96. Agencija za elektronski komunikacii, “Godišna Programa Za Rabota Na Agencijata Za Elektronski Komunikacii Za 2021 Godina,” January 13, 2021, https://aek.mk/en/годишна-програма-за-работа-на-агенциј-2/. 97. Interview with a representative of the Macedonian operators; Interview with an expert for electronic communications from North Macedonia, Zoom, February 9, 2021; Jane Jakimovski, “Aktivnosti Na AEK Za Voveduvanje Na 5G” (Agencija za elektronski komunikacii, December 29, 2020), https://aek.mk/wp- content/uploads/2021/01/Jane-Jakimovski-Aktivnosti-na-AEK-za-voveduvanje-na-5G.pdf. 98. Interview with Damjan Manchevski, former minister for public administration and information society. 99. Stojanovic and Bami, “Kosovo and Serbia Sign ‘Historic’ Deal Under Trump’s Auspices.” Sasa Dragojlo, “China’s Huawei Opens Tech Centre, Consolidating Presence in Serbia,” Balkan Insight, September 15, 100. MARIUS GHINCEA is a Ph.D. Researcher at the European University 2020, https://balkaninsight.com/2020/09/15/chinas-huawei-opens-tech-centre-consolidating-presence-in-serbia/. 101. Huawei, “Huawei Signed an Agreement with Serbia’s Office for Information Technologies and EGovernment,” Institute (EUI) in Florence, pursuing a Ph.D. in Political and Social Sciences. Huawei Enterprise, November 12, 2020, https://e.huawei.com/layouts/layouts/EBG/News_detail.aspx. Simultaneously, he is a Senior Teaching Assistant at the Johns Hopkins 102. Miloš Obradović, “Oko 5G mreže vrti se Vašingtonski sporazum, besparica i teorije zavere,” Danas, December 24, 2020, https://www.danas.rs/ekonomija/oko-5g-mreze-vrti-se-vasingtonski-sporazum-besparica-i-teorije-zavere/. University, Bologna. His research agenda focuses on identity and foreign Interview with Igor Novaković, research director at the International and 103. policy, FPA, transatlantic relations, the Common Foreign and Security Security Affairs Centre - ISAC Fund, Zoom, February 3, 2021. 104. Interview with Dragorad Milovanović, ICT lecturer and consultant, Zoom, February 3, Policy of the EU, and global political orders. He also provides policy- 2021; Interview with a cybersecurity expert from Serbia, Zoom, February 10, 2021. oriented consultancy to various private and public actors. 105. Huawei, “Serbian President-Elect Aleksandar Vucic Meets with Huawei Chairwoman Sun Yafang in Beijing - Huawei Press Center,” May 14, 2017, https://www.huawei.com/en/news/2017/5/sunyafang-serbia. 106. Dragojlo, “China’s Huawei Opens Tech Centre, Consolidating Presence in Serbia.” 107. Dragojlo. 108. Dragojlo; Vuk Vuksanovic, “In Serbia, China’s Digital Silk Road Might Be in Trouble Very Soon,” September 23, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/in-serbia-chinas-digital-silk-road-might-be-in-trouble-very-soon/; Iva Martinović CLARA VOLINTIRU is Associate Professor in the Department of and Nemanja Stevanović, “‘Pametni gradovi’ Srbije po kineskim standardima,” Radio Slobodna Evropa, February 10, 2021, https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/pametni-gradovi-srbije-po-kineskim-standardima/31096262.html. International Business and Economics (REI), at the Bucharest University of Majda Ruge and Stefan Vladisavljev, “Serbia’s 5G Deal with Washington: The 109. Economic Studies (ASE). She holds a Ph.D. from the London School of Art of Muddling Through,” ECFR, September 22, 2020, https://ecfr.eu/article/ commentary_serbias_5g_deal_with_washington_the_art_of_muddling_through/. Economics and Political Science (LSE). Her projects focused on Central 110. Strahinja Subotić, “Serbia: The Hub for External Actor Involvement,” in The Strategic Role of External Actor in the and Eastern European and EU’s peripheries. She has conducted research Western Balkans (Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies and e Political Academy of the Austrian People´s Party, 2021), 75, https://www.aies.at/download/2021/Role_of_External_Actors_in_WBDeutscherExecutiveSummary_1.pdf. for international organisations such as the World Bank, European 111. International Republican Institute, “Western Balkans Poll Shows Strong Support for EU.” Commission, OECD, Eurofound, or the Committee of Regions. She is 112. Interview with Igor Novaković, research director at the International and Security Affairs Centre - ISAC Fund. 113. Nokia, “5G Contracts,” accessed February 22, 2021, https://www.nokia.com/networks/5g/5g- currently Director of the ‘Economic Opportunities and Financing the contracts/; Ericsson, “The Latest Publicly Announced 5G Contracts,” Ericsson.com, February 15, 2019, Economy’ Programme at the Aspen Institute Romania, and a German https://www.ericsson.com/en/5g/contracts; Karásková, Huawei in Central and Eastern Europe. 114. Interview with a cybersecurity expert from Serbia; Interview with Dragorad Milovanović, ICT lecturer and Marshall Fund ReThink.CEE fellow. consultant; Interview with an expert from Montenegro; Interview with an expert for electronic communications from North Macedonia; Interview with prof. Zoran Hadzhi-Velkov, full professor at the Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Information Technologies; Interview with Damjan Manchevski, former minister for public administration and information society; Interview with Aleksandar Brezar, a journalist investigating the Chinese influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 115. Interview with Aleksandar Brezar, a journalist investigating the Chinese influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Interview with Damjan Manchevski, former minister for public administration and information society; Interview with Igor Novaković, IVAN NIKOLOVSKI is a researcher and project assistant at the Centre for research director at the International and Security Affairs Centre - ISAC Fund; Interview with an expert from Montenegro. European Integration within Institute for Democracy "Societas Civilis" 116. Zoran Nechev and Marie Jelenka Kirchner, “Time to Move to the Western Balkans: How Diversification of Global Supply Chains Can Benefit EU Resilience” (Institute for Democracy “Societas Civilis” - Skopje, forthcoming). - Skopje. His fields of academic and professional interests include EU 117. Nechev and Kirchner. integration, international affairs, divided societies and social movements. 118. Interview with Igor Novaković, research director at the International and Security Affairs Centre - ISAC Fund.

170 China’s demand-driven influence in Central-Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans 171 Editorial Board

Oana Popescu Zamfir, Octavian Manea, Ana Maria Luca, Rufin Zamfir

Editor-in-chief

Oana Popescu Zamfir

Managing editor

Octavian Manea

Proofreading

Jim Todd, Ioana Chilom

Layout concept

Alexandra Andronache

Art director

Florin Vedeanu About GlobalFocus Center Issue 05 / Spring 2021

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