Deterrence Instability and Nuclear Weapons in South Asia DETERRENCE INSTABILITY & NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SOUTH ASIA EDITED BY Michael Krepon Joshua T. White Julia Thompson Shane Mason 1  This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government [DOE Contract No. DE-NA0002456]. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, or any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof. DETERRENCE INSTABILITY & NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SOUTH ASIA APRIL 2015  © Copyright 2015 by the Stimson Center. All rights reserved. Printed in Washington, D.C. Stimson Center 1211 Connecticut Avenue, NW 8th Floor Washington, D.C. 20036 U.S.A. Visit www.stimson.org for more information about Stimson’s research. Deterrence Instability and Nuclear Weapons in South Asia CONTENTS Preface............................................................. 7 Ellen Laipson Key Terms and Acronyms ............................................9 Introduction........................................................11 Michael Krepon The Myth of Deterrence Stability Between Nuclear-Armed Rivals..........15 Michael Krepon The Credibility of India’s Nuclear Deterrent............................ 43 Manoj Joshi An Evolving Indian Nuclear Doctrine? ................................69 Shashank Joshi Pakistan’s Strategic Culture and Deterrence Stability on the Subcontinent.. 95 Rasul Bakhsh Rais India’s Strategic Culture and Deterrence Stability on the Subcontinent.....119 Sarang Shidore Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Operational Myths and Realities ... 149 Jeffrey D. McCausland Dependent Trajectories: India’s MIRV Program and Deterrence Stability in South Asia............177 Joshua T. White and Kyle Deming Contributors .....................................................205 Contents 6 Deterrence Instability and Nuclear Weapons in South Asia PREFACE I am pleased to present the latest publication of the Stimson Center’s South Asia program. Our new monograph, like the last, Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia, will hopefully become a standard reference for academic courses as well as essential reading for government officials, military officers, and nongovernmental experts. Stimson is a thought-leader in the dynamics of deterrence, escalation, crisis management, and nuclear competition on the subcontinent. For more than 25 years, the Stimson Center has examined the threat of conflict in South Asia, ways to mitigate tensions between India and Pakistan, and means to reduce nuclear risks. During the past year, Stimson has convened workshops at which some of the authors in this volume have presented their works in progress. Feedback from these workshops and from project advisors is reflected in this collection. I’d also like to call your attention to related activities from our South Asia pro- gram that contribute to our ability to be a valued resource on this vital region. In 2013, Stimson launched a new website, South Asian Voices (www.southasian- voices.org), to give voice to a rising generation of strategic analysts and to fa- cilitate cross-border dialogue. In 2015, Stimson will launch a ground-breaking, open online course on nuclear issues in South Asia that will give thousands of students the chance to study this important topic free of charge. I wish to express gratitude to the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the National Nuclear Security Administration for their support of Stimson’s programming on nuclear issues in South Asia. The editors also wish to thank Stimson’s communications team — Jim Baird, Greg Lachapelle, and Lita Ledesma — copy editor Jenny Moore, and interns Sanaa Anwar, Kyle Deming, Leslie Glotzer, Siddharth Ravishankar, and Elizabeth Whitfield. Sincerely, Ellen Laipson President and CEO, Stimson Center 7 Preface 8 Deterrence Instability and Nuclear Weapons in South Asia KEY TERMS AND ACRONYMS AFAP Artillery-fired Atomic Projectile BMD Ballistic Missile Defense CBM Confidence-building Measure CMD Credible Minimum Deterrence CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty DAE Department of Atomic Energy (India) DRDO Defence Research and Development Organisation FMCT Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty IAF Indian Air Force ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile IRBM Intermediate-range Ballistic Missile ISI Inter-Services Intelligence ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba LNO Limited Nuclear Options LoAC Line of Actual Control LoC Line of Control MIRV Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle MOD Ministry of Defence MRBM Medium-range Ballistic Missile NCA Nuclear Command Authority (India) NCA National Command Authority (Pakistan) NFU No First Use NRRM Nuclear Risk Reduction Measure NSA National Security Advisor (India) PAL Permissive Action Link SFC Strategic Forces Command (India) SLBM Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile SPD Strategic Plans Division (Pakistan) TNW Tactical Nuclear Weapon 9 KeyTermsandAcronyms 10 Deterrence Instability and Nuclear Weapons in South Asia INTRODUCTION Michael Krepon Deterrence between India and Pakistan is becoming less stable with the passage of time and the increase in nuclear weapon capabilities. India and Pakistan have not addressed basic issues in dispute, nor have they agreed to set them aside. Direct trade and other means of connectivity remain purposefully cir- cumscribed. Spoilers who oppose Pakistan’s rapprochement with India remain in place and are poorly constrained. The last massive, deadly acts of violence against India took place in 2008, directed against iconic targets in Mumbai. These terrorist acts effectively nullified efforts by Indian and Pakistani leaders to improve relations. Seven years earlier, another spectacular act of extremist violence directed against the Indian Parliament building brought India and Pakistan to the brink of war. In 2015, seven years after the Mumbai attacks, India and Pakistan are no closer to resolving their differences. Instead, backsliding is painfully evident. The issue of the disputed Kashmir border, which remained mostly quiet from 2003 to 2013, has heated up again. Pakistan and India continue to diversify their nu- clear weapon capabilities in ways that make deterrence stability more difficult. Two kinds of delivery vehicles — short-range systems that must operate close to the frontlines, and sea-based systems — are especially problematic when com- mand and control is maturing and when operational safeguards are opaque. These conditions now apply to Pakistan’s investments in short-range systems to counter Indian conventional military advantages, and to India’s sea-based nuclear capabilities that are coming online. Deterrence stability can be secured most readily when states have no reason to fight — or if they do, when nuclear and conventional capabilities are bal- anced and national trajectories are commensurate. Nuclear capabilities are roughly equal on the subcontinent, but disparities in national power are great and growing. The advent of new military technologies and resource advantag- es will further extend India’s lead over Pakistan in conventional capabilities, while providing India the capacity to outpace Pakistan in nuclear capabilities. Pakistan’s security managers are making headway to reclaim the writ of the state against violent extremists — but not against those who are dead-set against more normal ties with India. Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities continue to grow as social and economic conditions languish. Nuclear postures are 11 Introduction evolving in ways that fuel requirements for more weapons that will, in turn, exacerbate security dilemmas. The essays in this volume assess nuclear dynamics in South Asia. The chapters by Manoj Joshi and Shashank Joshi assess Indian nuclear posture and its po- tential evolution. Key elements of Indian and Pakistani strategic culture in- tersect at times in negative, reinforcing ways, as analyzed in chapters by Rasul Bakhsh Rais and Sarang Shidore. Pakistan’s national security managers have decided that the risks involved with inducting short-range nuclear-capable systems are worth the benefits of deterring Indian ground forces. A chapter in this volume by Jeffrey D. McCausland suggests a far different risk-benefit equation. New technologies beckon India and China that could take their nuclear competition to a higher level, raising more dilemmas for Pakistan. Joshua T. White and Kyle Deming’s chapter looks into this uncertain future. Taken together, these chapters point to serious challenges to deterrence sta- bility unless leaders in India and Pakistan try to resolve their grievances, or consider dampening measures to mitigate their costly and risky strategic competition. If not, I argue in my chapter, deterrence stability will elude India and Pakistan, and difficult times lie ahead. My essay, “The Myth of Deterrence