LaborHistory, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2001

NewUnionism at the Grassroots: The Amalgamated Clothing Workersof Americain Rochester,New York, 1914– 29

CHRISTOPHERT. MARTIN*

The 1920s didnot begin badly for organized labor. The robusteconomy and the surge in unionmembership during theFirst World War generatedpolitical strength for American labor that Warren Harding wasloath tochallenge. However,the decade’ s auspiciousbeginning waseclipsed by thehardening ofthe federal government’s attitude towardtrade unions,the post-war depression, a renewedoffensive from industry,and aurry ofcourt injunctions. In theface of this onslaught,unions reacted with uncharacteristic listlessness,drained of the activism that had deŽned trade union activity during theprevious decade.While someindustries, such as building andthe railways, beneŽted from more inward andcautious behavior, mostdid not. The labor movement,as a whole,suffered marked reversals that historians have long identiŽed with the1920s. The reason,as Melvin Dubofskyhas explained, isthat “thoseunions that had beenin theforefront of labor militancy from 1916 to1922 sufferedthe severestlosses.” 1 The garment industrywas among thosein theforefront. The prosperity that the demandfor military uniformsbrought tothe makers ofready-made men’s clothing was withoutprecedent in anindustry that had long beenconsidered pre-modern. Riding the coat-tails ofthe First World War, SidneyHillman’ s edgling Amalgamated Clothing Workers ofAmerica (ACW)doubled its membership, drovewages upward, and effectively routedits rival, theUnited Garment Workers (UGW).The state’s needfor an uninterrupted owof manufactured goods to the trenches also brought much- neededreform. LouisKirstein, the Administrator ofLabor Standardsfor Army Cloth- ing, helpedto bring an endto child labor, homework,and unsanitary facilities, and createdthe 48-hour weekas an industry standard. 2 The relatively easyrelations that developedbetween the ACW, leading manufactur- ers,and the federal government resultedfrom Hillman’s newvision oftrade unionism, whichKirstein and others shared. Hillman deŽned new unionism as the effective management ofthe process of production against thewaste and inefŽ ciency of the capitalist system.SpeciŽ cally, negotiatedstandards of production, informed by the principles ofscientiŽ c management, andthe democratic rule ofthe rank andŽ le would

*Theauthor wishesto thank Daniel Borus, MaryYoung, Stanley Engermanand PatrickKuhlmann for readingan earlyversion of this paper and StewartWeaver, Richard Greenwald,and Robert Vanderlan fortheir comments on the Žnal draft. Particularthanks to Robert Westbrookfor reading this articlemore than onceand discussingit with meat length. And MargaretMartin, ofcourse. 1MelvinDubofsky, The State andLabor in ModernAmerica (Chapel Hill, NC, 1994),97; also chap. 4. 2RochesterJoint Board, Rochester Clothing Labor,1915– 1939: Twenty Five Years ofOrganization and Growth (1939), 15.

ISSN0023-656Xprint/ ISSN1469-9702online/ 01/030237–17 Ó 2001Taylor & Francis Ltd onbehalfof The Tamiment Institute DOI: 10.1080/00236560120068119 238 C. T. Martin provide thebasis for labor relations. William Leiserson,a labor mediator andfuture chairman ofthe National Labor RelationsBoard, wrote that thenew unionism provided for asystemof industrial democracy in whichtrade agreementsserved as “constitutionswhich setup organs ofgovernment, deŽ ne and limit them,provide outsideagencies for making, executing,and interpreting lawsfor theindustry, and meansfor enforcingthem.” 3 Although industrial democracyprotected the membership from arbitrary rule,it also curtailed their unqualiŽed right tostrike. Thus Hillman’ s newunionism relied onthe rationalization oflabor relations toachieve stability onthe onehand, and democracy on theother. According to Hillman’ s biographer, thegenius ofthis newunionism lay in its commitment “neither tosuppress from above norto succumbto the centrifugal forceof ‘ thoseof the extreme left’.” 4 Asan amalgam ofthe rationalization oflabor relations andindustrial democracy, Hillman’s newunionism succeeded initially in achieving theunity andstability required ofa young organization. However,the ACW sufferedfrom labor’s defensiveposition in the1920s. Indeedno union, save perhaps that ofthe brewery workers,endured thesetbacks that befell organized labor in thegarment industry.Moreover, external setbackswere compounded by internal dissentwithin theorganization itself. Throughout muchof the1920s internal factionalism becamethe deŽ ning characteristic ofthe ACW, threatening thearbitration agreementsupon which the union’ s success rested. The prevailing explanation attributes thecon ict within theunion to the desire of Žrst-generationworkers for artisanal independenceand militant unionism.As historian StevenFraser has written,such workers were “ notyet sufŽciently deracinatedto be assimilated intothe bureaucratic patternsof behavior expectedof an industrial citi- zenry.”5 In particular, ethnicdifferences, especially betweenJews and Italians, andthe tenacity ofveteran craftsmenwere the roots of opposition in theunion’ s formative years.But, while noone would deny that linguistic andother cultural factorshampered organization in theearly years ofindustrial unionism,an ethnocultural explanation obscuresthe greater signiŽcance of nonethnic factorsin generating conict. Part ofthe difŽculty is that this ethnocultural argument relies heavily ondocumentsdepicting the attitudesand perspectives of the national unionand its leadership. While usefulin understandingSidney Hillman’ s path from socialist totechnocrat, these sources pre- cludeclose examination ofthe underlying issuesof concern to the individuals who actually made theclothing andpeopled the organization. Anexamination oflocal documentsopens the largely unexploredquestion of the workers’ response, not only to theinternal setbacksof the 1920s, butalso tothe new unionism of the early 20th century.Looking at therank andŽ le andtheir local organizations suggeststhat internal unionturmoil in the1920s representedchie y astruggle over thedeŽ nition ofnew unionism,between the workers who insisted on a democratic organization andunion leaderswho demanded stability at any cost.In other words,it wasmore theerosion of

3Amalgamated Clothing Workersof America, General Executive BoardReports andProceedings (of Biennial Conventions), 1914–1916 (New York), xvi, 34,57– 60, 64– 65, 111. Hereafter referred to as Doc. Hist. 4StevenFraser, LaborWill Rule: Sidney Hillmanand the Rise ofAmerican Labor (NewYork, 1991),134; also 43–44, 91– 96, 130– 131, 133– 134; Fraser, “ DressRehearsal for the NewDeal: Shop-Floor Insurgents,Political Elites,and IndustrialDemocracy in the Amalgamated Clothing Workers,”in Michael H.Frischand Daniel J.Walkowitz (eds.), Working-ClassAmerica: Essays on Labor,Community, and American Society (Urbana, IL,1983),213– 223. 5Fraser,“ DressRehearsal for the NewDeal,” 232. New Unionism atthe Grassroots 239 industrial democracyrather than thestubbornness of an “ ethnocultureof work” that threatenedto cleave theunion. 6 This examination ofthe ACW may also contributeto recent debates over howbest tobring together arenewedinterest by labor historians in politics andinstitutions with thesocial andcultural studiesof the last 30 years.Recent historiographical debateshave centeredon the need to bring institutions,in particular, back tothe forefront of labor history. The challenge has beento Ž nda way todo this that buildsupon, rather than rejects,the studies of theprevious generation ofscholars. By assuming,as Michael Kazin haswritten, that unionswere the “ primary vehicles for theexpression of the aspirations, cultural practices,and racial prejudicesof white working people,”we can avoid therigid dichotomy ofhaving tochoose between the narrowly conceivedstudies of the old labor economistsand the “ newlabor history.”7 This studyof the ACW andthe new unionism positsthat aninstitutional “history from below”can be attentive toissues, such as kinship, migration, ethnicity, andleisure, for example, andmay beone way toresolve what onehistorian has called labor history’s “unrequitedsearch for synthesis.”8 * * * * * * Rochester,New York, provides anexcellent case to examine labor’s responseto the new unionismand to understand the divisions the ACW facedat thelocal level. Rochester wasnot simply animportant local market, buta leader in thenational clothing industry. Ashistorian Blake McKelveyhas written,“ only Chicago boastedof clothing factories that rivaled thoseof Rochester in sizeand in excellenceof product.”In 1911, ninecities accountedfor more than 70% ofthe industry’ s output,with Rochesterranking Žfth. Locally, theclothing industrywas one of thecity’ s chiefemployers, secondonly tothe newindustrial giant, EastmanKodak Company. Although they lackedthe foreign suppliesof raw materials andpatent rights which bolsteredother manufacturers, Rochesterclothiers relied ontheir reputation for quality. The importance ofthe clothing industryto theRochester economy was captured by theChamber ofCommercemotto: “RochesterMade Means Quality.” 9 Likemost cities where the ACW thrived, theRochester clothing industrywas characterized by “industrial dualism.”Unlike such cities as New York, whose garment industrywas comprised almost exclusively ofsmall sweatshopswith afewemployees, theRochester, Chicago, andBaltimore markets weredominated by asmall numberof large manufacturers.Rochester, in particular, had thelargest average size“ inside” factory, that is,factories which employed hundredsor thousandsof employees in one location.These large factoriesalso boastedthe most technologically advancedand sophisticatedequipment. This pattern emergedin Rochesterin theŽ rstdecade of the 20th century,when many ofits largest manufacturersexpanded their operationsand movedto new locations. Stein-Bloch opened their newfactory onSt. Paul’ s Streetin 1903. L.Adler andCompany openedtheir “model”factory in 1909. Hickey-Freeman

6Ibid., 228–242. 7MichaelKazin, Barons ofLabor: The San Francisco Building Tradesand Union Power in the Progressive Era (Urbana, IL,1989),6. 8This phrase is MelvinDubovsky’ s; seealso Jonathan Zeitlin,“ From Labour Historyto the Historyof IndustrialRelations,” Economic History Review ,40(1987), 381–415. 9Blake McKelvey,“ TheMen’ s Clothing Industryin Rochester’s History,” Rochester History , 22 (July, 1960),14; Steven Fraser, “ Combined and UnevenDevelopment in the Men’s Clothing Industry,”Business History Review ,57(Winter, 1983), 541; McKelvey, Rochester: The Quest forQuality 1890–1925 (Cambridge, MA, 1956),chapt. 9. 240 C. T. Martin

TABLE 1.

Ethnicpopulation 19101920 1930

Percentageforeign-born 27.024.1 22.8 Percentageof the population with foreign-bornparentage 38.41 26.5 26.6

1 This higherŽ gureis foreignand mixedparentage combined in the 1910Census. Source:13th, 14th, and 15th U.S. Censuses. movedto its modern location onAvenue D in 1911. Ahandfulof other large manufacturersopened in Rochesterthroughout the1910s. Asthe large clothing manufacturersemerged, the number of small shopsdeclined. The onesthat remained grew in size.In 1900, 307 small shopsemployed 5293 workers.By 1909, 8559 workers labored in only 196 small shops.Moreover, small shopsseldom operated indepen- dently,but tended to do mainly contractwork for large manufacturersaccording to uctuationsin theclothing market. 10 This type ofmanufacture had aspecial signiŽcance for employees.Small shopswith fewemployees and little investmentin their equipmentwere Ž nancially freeto operate in accordancewith the uctuationsof themarket. Onthe other hand,a large manufac- turer,heavily investedin permanentmachinery, had avestedinterest in thestability of labor relations andwas thus more inclinedto accept the new unionism. Still, theprimary reasonwhy Rochestermakes an excellent case-study is the signiŽcant ethnic diversity ofits working population in this period.The ethniccompo- sitionof Rochester’s workersin theŽ rstthree decades of the20th centuryre ects that ofsimilar clothing economies.Table 1further demonstratesthat therate offoreign- born individuals andindividuals with foreign parentage remained remarkably stable throughout theŽ rst threedecades of the 20th century. In Rochester,the ethnic population includedsigniŽ cant numbers of Irish, English, Germans,Poles, Russians, and Lithuanians. Italians constitutedthe single largest ethnicpopulation in thecity, afactof particular signiŽcance as they werefar andaway themost difŽ cult ethnic group toorganize. Giventhe overwhelming numberof Italian immigrants in Rochester,one can assume that, if ethnictension and craft resistance threatenedthe organization anywhere,it almost certainly wouldhave beenhere. In other words,Rochester was not a homogeneousand isolated place tuckedaway in upstateNew York. In theearly 20th centuryit wasa major urban centerwith arich social andcultural life, adynamic economy,and a complex pattern oflabor relations. AsGarson Kanin, the son of a RussianJewish immigrant, declared:“ Rochesteris America, proof ofits basic character.”11 What thecity lackedin size,it madeup for in quality, asthe success of its clothing industrysuggests. It isnot surprising that Rochesterbecame, in David Montgomery’s words,a “stronghold ofthe ACW.” 12 * * * * * * The foundingof theACW in 1914 grew outof awaveof strikes in thegarment industry

10Fraser,“ Combined and UnevenDevelopment,” 543; McKelvey, “ TheMen’ s Clothing Industryin Rochester’s History,”14– 15. 11Quoted in Blake McKelvey, Rochester on the Genesee: The Growth ofa City (Syracuse, NY, 1973),11. 12David Montgomery, The Fall ofthe House ofLabor: The Workplace,the State, andAmerican Labor Activism,1865– 1925 (Cambridge, MA, 1987),421. New Unionism atthe Grassroots 241 that began in Chicago in 1910 andreached a crescendoin 1913. The tumult that began in theMidwest did not spare Rochester.Late in 1912, amilitant group ofjourneymen tailors called ageneral strike in whichthey demandedunion recognition, the abolition ofsweatshops, and a 10% wage increase.Despite the best efforts of a small bandof labor organizers, worker protestquickly abated.The strike,however, was revived afew monthslater by activists from NewYork City whocame toRochester to organize workersthey claimed wereŽ lling ordersfor city Žrms whoseemployees were out on strike.Using a tactic that wouldbecome standard in theACW, theorganizers made their appeals in Yiddish,Polish, andItalian. This allowed them toreach clothing workersin unprecedentednumbers. Adding the 8-hour day andpay for holidays and overtime totheir list ofdemands, workers voted overwhelmingly 2644 to228 in favor ofa strike.A spokesmanfor theRochester Clothiers’ Exchange (RCE),an association ofmanufacturers, denied the charge that they wereŽ lling ordersfor companieswith striking workersand threatened that if the3000 workerswho were currently onstrike didnot return, all theclothing factoriesin thecity wouldbe closed. This wouldmean putting 12,000 employeesout of work. 13 In themidst of the tension, two groups ofstrikers weremarching downClifford Streetsinging “Solidarity Forever”when they noticeda light still burning in the windowof a contractor’s shop.Someone from thecrowd hurled a stonethrough the window.Other strikers began poundingat thefront and back doorsdemanding that the workersbe let out.Carmen Lucia, the daughter ofaRochestertailor, wasonly 12 years oldthe night shefollowed her father downClifford Street.He was unaware that shehad slipped outthe door behind him andhad followedhim through theoverwrought crowd. Lucialater rememberedthat shewas looking upat thecontractor’ s windowwhen the noseof his rie came through theglass. HeŽredseveral shotsinto the crowd wounding many andkilling 17-year-old Ida Brayman. Luciarecalled seeingBrayman’ s lifeless body fall 10–15 feetaway. Alifelong member ofthe ACW, Luciawas not alone in viewing unionmembership asone way “toavenge her death.”14 Lucia’s connectionwith the“ great uprising in Rochester”illustrates therelationship betweenthe failed clothing strikesof this period andthe furor which gave rise tothe ACW.Membership blamed many factorsfor thefailure ofthe strikes, not the least of whichwas the UGW, “whonever failed toarrive onthe scene in time tomake a settlementthat justsettled things theemployer’ s way.”Thus, when the factional leadership ofthe UGW ledby Hillman merged with theIndustrial Tailor’s Union (formerly theJourneyman Tailor’s Association),the militant tailors ofRochesterrallied in support.At thefounding convention in NewYork City,Rochester workers sent to the“ progressives”four delegates representing four of Ž ve newlocals. 15 For themembers ofthe newly formed ACW, thefounding convention expounded theideals ofthe new unionism. In aseasonof youth, members declareda “newspirit ofactive andintelligently directeddemocracy [against] theimmobile anddeadening aristocracy”from which it had rebelled.Indeed, the language ofthe convention, an

13McKelvey, Rochester: The Quest forQuality , 278–280. 14Interviewwith Carmen Lucia,“ TheRochester I Know,” PBS,WXXI (1986). Thestory of Ida Brayman also appears in Joan M.Jensen,“ TheGreat Uprising in Rochester,”in Joan M.Jensenand Sue Davidson (eds.), ANeedle, ABobbin,A Strike:Needle Workersin America (Philadelphia, PA, 1984), 94–113. 15RochesterJoint Board, Rochester Clothing Labor ,11–12. Locals in this periodincluded former members ofthe Brotherhood ofTailors numbers 14,136, 232, 234, and 235. 242 C. T. Martin admixture ofsocialism andAmerican Revolutionary idealism, wasa responseto those whocharged theleadership with secession.“ Wesecededfrom nobody,”the leadership announced.“ It isa physical impossibility for amajority tosecedefrom aminority.”The chiefvirtue ofthenew unionism lay in thedemocratic form ofits organization. Leaders frequentlymade referenceto the promise ofdemocratic leadership andof popular sovereignty within theunion. “ The messagesent by therevolutionary fathersof this countryto their owngeneration andto the generations that wereto follow them … renewedstrength and courage toprotect itself from being misled back totheslavery of old.”In aletter from theconvention to the district councilsand local unionsof the UGWdatedDecember 9, Secretary–Treasurer JosephSchlossberg stated as the new union’s primary goal theremoval of“ antiquatedand undemocratic forms and methods ofour organization.” Setting for itself animportant precedent,the collective leadership ofthe new ACW declaredthat “this conventionwill fail in its missionif it fails to provide for ademocratic rule ofthemembership.” Surely rhetorical, themessage of the NewYork conventionnonetheless reafŽ rmed Hillman’s belief that thenew unionism wouldnot “ suppressfrom above.”16 The initial ardor ofthe founding convention did not prepare enthusiastictrade unionistsfor theopposition they facedin Rochester.Just as the leadership ofthe UGW had assailed theinfant clothing unionat thenational level, its local organ, the Labor Herald,maligned Rochesterclothing workers.The newspaperfollowed with great interestthe initial failures ofthe ACW in NewYork andChicago. Thesesetbacks, it argued,were proof that therenegade union was doomed to early dissolution.“ The glittering promisesof speedy returns from theAmalgamation plan …have failed to materialize.”17 The LaborHerald capitalized onthe dissension caused by theACW, arguing that it gave employers theopportunity totake back many ofthe gains achieved during the1913 strike.Charges ofsecession and failure wereunion labels ofadifferent sortthat thestruggling ACWwouldhave tolive with in Rochesterfor sometime. The publication continuouslyundermined the ACW’ sability toestablish itself in the Rochesterclothing market. 18 The period following theNew York conventionwas a time oftransition in Rochester. Anestimated 60– 70% oftailors wereunemployed, divided loyalty betweenthe UGW andthe ACW createdrifts, and the local leadership founditself paralyzed. Numerous lettersfrom theRochester Joint Board (RJB),an administrative body representingthe city’s local unions,queried the national leadership onhow to deal with theUGW locals whichwere closing downthroughout thecity. The presidentof the RJB summedup the institutional disorderat thelocal level: “Wehave everyday complaints butwe are absolutely helplessand powerless.” Most of theletters from theRJB in this period were writtenon the back ofUGW stationery well into 1915, suggesting that theinstitutional transition wasa slowprocess. Still, theinitial enthusiasmfor theunion, in theface of heavy unemployment,was surprising. Lithuaniansand Poles were among theŽ rstto expressinterest in forming their ownlocals. Even the Italians, “theharder nutto crack,”as RJB secretary LouisFeldman wrotein 1915, respondedto the union more readily in theface of employer repressionand wage cuts.“ In spiteof this factthe tailors

16Doc. Hist., 1914–16, xxvi, 43, 68, 72. 17LaborHerald ,July 23,1915, 4. 18Interviewwith Elma (last name withheld), October3, 1995at UNITERochester Joint Board Headquarters.Elma beganworking with the Hickey-FreemanCompany in 1924,when sheŽ rstjoined the union, and remembersher family having bought the LaborHerald every2 weeks. New Unionism atthe Grassroots 243 are very enthusiasticfor ournew organization. Wecan be sure that wewill build upa strong organization.”19 However,the initial enthusiasmin Rochesterwas short-lived. Employer resistance wasa constantthreat tothe viability oftheunion, particularly whencombined with the general passivity ofthe majority ofworkers. Numerous letters from theRJB tothe national leadership expressedfrustration with theunion’ s inability torecruit themasses ofunorganized clothing workers.Organizers failed tomotivate workerseven after the Žrst biennial conventionof the ACW washeld in Rochesterin May,1916. Louis Feldman wroteto Secretary Schlossbergthat “theworkers take practically nointerest in theorganization now.The bulk ofthem seemperfectly stupeŽed to let well enough alone.We have had several meetingssince the convention and not one could be called a success.”20 Apathetic workerswould not be roused until they began tofeel the effects of America’s preparations for theFirst World War. The lack ofa plentiful labor forceand thepromise oflucrative government contractsfor military clothing predisposedother- wiseintransigent manufacturersto accommodate the demands of labor. America’s entry in March 1917 solidiŽed this propitious shift for workersin thebalance ofpower within theclothing industry.Both the LaborHerald andthe ACW newspaper, Advance, celebratedthe signiŽ cant drop in unemploymentas a resultof wartime demand.The RJB secretary washappy toreport asearly asthe summer of 1918 that “thespirit ofthe people ishigher than ever.”21 While theFirst World War produceda newoptimism within thestruggling locals, Rochester’s largely unorganizedworkforce proved anembarrassment toHillman. Hillman had workedhard tocultivate relationships with thelikes ofLouis Kirstein, his successorWilliam Ripley ofHarvard, andthe leader ofthe Taylor Society,Morris Cooke.In doing so,he brought thepurposes of the new unionism and the national government together for thesake of labor peaceand stability during atime ofnational crisis.And yet, representatives from theRCE refusedto negotiate with him or his union.At thesame time, garment workers,realizing theincreased power they wielded in thewartime economy,began toforce stoppages, usually demandingan increase in wagesto offset the general rise in thecost of living. In July 1918, astrike broke outamong thepressers and pocket makers ofRosenberg Brothers,one of Rochester’ s largest clothing manufacturers.This wasthe Ž rstformal strike ofmajor proportions in thelocal clothing industrysince 1913. Newsof the strike quickly spreadfrom shopto shop, threatening Rochester’s clothing industrywith a general strike andendangering thefulŽ llment ofthe RCE’ slucrative government contracts.Taking matters intohis ownhands, Louis Kirstein persuaded Sam Weill of theStein-Bloch Company andMax Holtz,president of the RCE, to sit downat the bargaining table with SidneyHillman. Labor leaderspleaded with workersto exercise restraint during thecourse of the negotiations. Both parties agreed tosubmit their grievances toarbitration. William Ripley andLouis Kirstein were chosen by both sides asarbitrators. Dueto wartime pressures,the arbitrators reacheda decisionwithin afew

19LouisFeldman to Joseph Schlossberg,Feb. 9, 1915,ACWA Papers, Labor–Management Documentation Center,New York State School ofIndustrial and Labor Relations, MartinCatherwood Library, CornellUniv. (hereafterreferred to as ACWA Papers), Box53, Folder 11; Max Goldfarb to Sidney Hillman, Nov. 14,1914, ACWA Papers, Box53, Folder 10. 20Feldman to Schlossberg,June 23,1916, ACWA Papers, Box54, Folder 1. 21Advance,Nov. 23,1917; LaborHerald ,Oct. 31,1918; Louis Feldman to Jacob Potofsky, June 28, 1918,ACWA Papers, Box54, Folder 3. 244 C. T. Martin days.They provided for a10–20% wage increase,time-and-a-half for overtime, establishmentof the 48-hour week,and maintenance of the open shop. Because the agreement had beenreached by theRCE, thearbitration extendedbeyond Rosenberg Brothers toinclude the entire industry in Rochester.Only theMichaels-Stern company refusedto accept the agreement andimmediately resignedfrom theRCE. Meyer Jacobstein,a professorof political economyat theUniversity ofRochester,was chosen asthe arbitrators’ local representative.Workers werejubilant at theoutcome of the arbitration. Ata massmeeting the3000 clothing workersin attendanceapproved the agreement.This marked theinformal establishmentof the new unionism in Rochester.22 The formal establishmentof new unionism, however, was not immediate. While settinga signiŽcant precedent, the arbitration in 1918 left thedeŽ nition ofacceptance opento interpretation. In other words,without a writtenagreement or aformal procedureto air grievances,the provisional arbitration wasleft toan honor system. Workers quickly felt theagreement’ s limitations. Jacobsteinwas barraged with com- plaints from workerswho claimed that anumberof shops were not holding uptheir end ofthe agreement, either failing topay thewages they had promisedor requiring workers tolabor longer hours.Though heasked the workers to uphold the agreement, Jacob- steinadmitted that hewas powerless to enforce the arbitration unlessboth sides returnedto the bargaining table. 23 Strikes andstoppages grew more frequentas workers becamemore disillusionedwith thenew unionism. Becauseof Hillman’ s associationswith menlike Kirstein,Ripley, andCooke, the newunionism is sometimesdepicted as the brain-child ofelites, but the events in Rochesterin thefall of1918 suggestthat workersthought otherwise.On Halloween night, theRJB decidedthat theprovisional arbitration agreement wasof little use withouta formal processof collective bargaining anda proper grievance procedure.In addition tothe terms of the arbitration agreement,local labor leadersinsisted on the elimination ofdischarge withoutcause, the prohibition ofsubcontracting, bonus systems,and homework, and a board ofarbitration whichincluded two union men, two company men,and an impartial chair. The battle wagedby theRJB quickly spread. LazarusMarcovitz ofthe General Executive Board ofthe national ACWwrotethat “thegeneral unrestin Rochesteris due to the failure ofthe arbitration machinery to bring democratic collective bargaining in theshops.” Looking back tothe ideals ofthe NewYork convention,workers declared: “ Democracy in theshops is thecrying necessityfor theworkers. We meanthe right oftheworkers to discuss their grievances, ofwhatever naturethey may happen tobe,whether wages, discrimination against their fellowworker, excessive tasks or anything else.”24 Ignited by thedaring ofthe RJB, small strikesand stoppages spread through the Rochesterindustry during thefall of1918. Workers denouncedthe original agreement asa “sham democracy.”25 Regarding asmall strike at Levy Brothers,a letter from the RJB summedup thesituation for Hillman: “Amachinery headedby suchfamous men asProfessor Ripley andMr. Kirstein not to be in apositionto end a trouble in ahouse

22Donald B.Straus, “Hickey-FreemanCompany and the Amalgamated (CIO),”in Clinton S.Golden and VirginiaD. Parker(eds.), Causes ofIndustrial Peace under Collective Bargaining (NewYork, 1955),123; Fraser, LaborWill Rule ,120;Rochester Joint Board, Rochester Clothing Labor , 14–15; Advance,Aug., 1918. 23Advance,Sept. 13,27, 1918. 24RochesterJoint Board Minutes(hereafter referred to as RJB Minutes), Oct. 31,1918, ACWA Papers, Box45, Folder 4; Advance,Nov. 15,1918. 25Advance,Nov. 15,1918. New Unionism atthe Grassroots 245 like LevyBros. is not quite encouraging for theidea ofcollective bargaining.”26 Yet, Kirsteinwas confounded and issued a numberof complaints tothe union’ s president. “There is lessjustiŽ cation for astrike in Rochesterthan any place Iknow,”he wrote to Hillman.27 Kirsteinfailed tounderstand why these“ labor people,”as he called them, continuedto strike in violation ofthe labor agreement.Despite his protestationsand Hillman’s attempts toapply pressurefrom above,the RJB heldout in supportof workers’discontent. A13-weekstrike in theNew York City clothing industryin January 1919 anda concurrentoutbreak at Rochester’s Hickey-Freeman plant forcedthe hand of the RCE. OnJanuary 23, 1919, exactly 1day after thesettlement of the New York City strike, theRCE announcedthe establishment of the 44-hour weekand a willingnessto renegotiate theprevious arbitration agreement.Fearing theunstable effects of labor unrestduring aperiod ofreconversion, the RCE agreed toa formal collective bargain- ing agreement,which provided for agrievance committee andan impartial chairman. In exchange for anofŽ cial grievance procedure,the 44-hour week,and a guaranteed wage increase,the workers agreed tohalt all strikesand stoppages. The establishmentof industrial democracyin Rochesterwas a crowningmoment for thenational ACW,not only becausethe battle washard-fought butalso becauseof what Rochesterrepresented in theclothing industry.Writing in Advance in February, SidneyHillman summedup the victory for theworkers and the union: “ Rochesteris theoldest manufacturing centerin thecountry, and is a market ofthe highest standards.The recognition ofcollective bargaining in this centerhas establishedthis principle for practically theentire industry.” 28 That industrial democracy,the capstone ofthe new unionism, was created on terms set forth by theworkers themselves cannot beemphasized enough. The demandsof theRJB at its meeting onHalloweenprovided thespeciŽ c details uponwhich the arbitration agreement wasbased. That it didnot get everything it had hopedfor shouldnot obscure the signiŽ cance of the demands themselves.Workers sawthe 1919 arbitration notonly asan example ofwhat new unionismcould be, but also asa Žrststage in theeventual fulŽ llment ofall their goals. Working classRochesterians provided Hillman andthe national leadership with a speciŽc modelof the new unionism on workers’ terms. As Survey reported,both workersand employers “traveled far onthe road toenvisaging thebusiness of making clothesas a fundamentalhuman service.To understandthat isto face the future. Rochesterthus points toward progress.” 29 The concessionsthat emergedfrom the1919 arbitration agreement proved to workersthat industrial capitalism wasa systemthat had thepotential tobeneŽ t both labor andmanagement concurrently.Much like thewelfare capitalism programs that beckonedthe steelworkers and meat packersof Chicago about which Lizabeth Cohen has written,the 1919 arbitration agreement appealed toclothing workersin Rochester asa modelof justor “moral capitalism.”Peaceful coexistence, job security, and higher wagesachieved through democratic unionismwere no longer a“pipe dream”in an industrythat had beenconsidered pre-modern and uncivilized. Asthe decade wore on andunion leaders and manufacturers began totrim away at thegains that were

26AlexCohen to Hillman, Nov. 17,1918, ACWA Papers, Box54, Folder 3. 27Quoted in MicahBarbash, “Crackingan Anti-Union Town: TheAmalgamated Clothing Workersof Americain Rochester,NY, 1913–1938” (unpublished MAessay, Pennsylvania State Univ., 1992),31. 28Advance,Feb. 21,1919. 29Survey,May 1, 1920. 246 C. T. Martin achieved,it wouldbecome clear that theclothing workersviewed the 1919 agreement asthe model against whichall other agreementswould be measured. 30 * * * * * *

Oncethe principles ofnew unionism were laid downin theRochester clothing industry, asenseof calm settledover labor relations in thecity. The massive strike wavewhich plagued thenation in 1919 seemedespecially brutal whencontrasted with thepeaceful coexistenceof labor andmanagement in Rochester.Ethnic tension was virtually absent. True,the majority oflocals that composedthe RJB wereseparated by ethnicity, butthe pressers’ local 200 had always beena mixture ofItalian, Jewish,and Lithu- anian pressers,and this mix posedno special difŽculty. Moreover, the grievance procedureappeared tobe functioning as expected. The RJB minutesfrom theearly 1920s are Žlled with countlessreports ofgrievances by both workersand their employers. Although stoppagesand other minor problems didoccur after the1919 arbitration, all matters weremore or lesseffectively handledthrough thegrievance committee.Fully 50% ofgrievances weresettled directly onthe shop  oor.Forty percentwere settled with businessagents in theshop or by local unionofŽ cials. Only about 10% ofgrievances reachedthe desk of the impartial chairman, William Leiserson. Only twodisruptions of note occurred in theŽ rstyears after thewar. The Michaels- SternCompany, the only manufacturer in thecity torefuse to sign thearbitration agreement,sued Sidney Hillman andthe ACW in RochesterSupreme Court for an injunctionagainst picketing and$100,000 in damages.Not only didthe ACW losethe lawsuit,but Michaels-Stern invited theUGW toorganize its shop.Although this reignited conict betweenthe rival organizations, it didnothing toendanger labor relations betweenACW locals andthe RCE. Industrial peace,however, was threatened in 1921. The post-warrecession which gripped thenation particularly affectedRochester’ s clothing industry.Claiming its inability tomaintain suchhigh wagesin ashrinking economy,the RCE requesteda 25% wage cut.When it wasŽ rstpresented to the RJB, the request was unanimously denied.Still, employers persisted,adding totheir requestthe repeal ofthe 44-hour week.To preventa disruptionof the arbitration agreement,representatives from both sidesagreed tosubmit their casesto the impartial chairman. The civility ofthe negotiations wascaptured in thenational press.The New Republic reportedthat “while workersin thebuilding tradeswere engaged in strikesagainst wage cuts… theclothing manufacturersof Rochester and leaders of theAmalgamated Clothing Workers met in theballroom ofthe Powers Hotel last weekto settle by discussionthe question of a wage cut.”31 Both sidespresented their arguments,at which time theimpartial chair- man madea decision.Citing theeconomic outlook and higher rates ofunemployment, Leisersondecided that a15% wage cutwas in factappropriate. Aconversation overheard betweentwo workers following themeeting capturedboth theexcitement surroundingindustrial democracy andthe pessimism Leiserson’ s decisionultimately engendered: One:I have beenin atailor shopfor twentytwo years andI neverthought I’d

30Lizabeth Cohen, Making aNew Deal: Industrial Workersin Chicago,1919– 1939 (Cambridge, MA, 1991), 209. 31New Republic ,May 4, 1921,283– 284. New Unionism atthe Grassroots 247

seethe day wecouldstand up andtell thebosses all wewanted to tell them. This isgreat stuff…

Two:This thing’ll neverlast. What’ s theuse of trying toprove tothe bosses that we’re agoodunion? Who in thehell caresfor agoodunion anyway? 32

Indeed,the relative calm that characterized labor relations for 2years wasnot fated to last.Following thedecision, the national leadersaddressed meetings of the various locals tourge their support.Hillman andthe national leadership wereimmediately frustratedby theItalian local 202 andthe Lithuanian local 203, both ofwhichinitially refusedto accept the agreement. At a meeting ofthe General Executive Board (GEB), Hillman decriedas “ worsethan bad”what came tobe known in ACWparlance throughout the1920s asthe “ situation”in Rochester. 33 Although theunion eventually persuadedthe locals toaccept the agreement, the implication wasthat they accepted underextreme duress.To protestthe alleged strong-arm “methods”of the national leadership, Italians from local 202 boycottedthe biennial conventionin 1922. 34 By the fall, tensionshad easedsomewhat and the functioning of thearbitration agreement was nolonger imperiled. Yet,the RJB minutessuggest that workersstill felt betrayed bya wage decreasethey consideredunjustiŽ ed. Moreover, the “ methods”which theleader- ship usedto ensure support of the agreement ultimately brought intoquestion the democratic baseon which thenew unionism rested. The squabble betweenthe local unionand the national leadership over theratiŽ cation ofthe agreement portendedtwo seriousdisruptions in 1925 and1926. It wasalready clear in 1922 that whatever struggles lay ahead,they wouldalmost surely involve thegrowing Italian population, questionsof local control,the viability ofunionismby arbitration, andthe testing of the ideals ofindustrial democracy.New unionism, which had beenso well receivedin 1919, wouldbe tested and redeŽ ned in the1920s. Although the15% wage cutwas restored in 1923, wagesin Rochesterremained well belowthe industry average. Continueddiscontent led to two serious disruptions in 1925 and1926, theŽ rstcentering on a charge ofillegitimate elections,the second over proportional representationon the RJB. In both cases,the Italian local 202 tooka leading role. Somehave argued that Italian workerswere unwilling tosubmit tothe industrial routineof the factory, andthat aggressive effortsby theCommunist Party through itsTrade UnionEducational League challenged theACW leadership in Rochesterfrom within andignited ethnictensions between Jews and Italians. 35 How- ever,an examination ofboth disruptionsindicates that while suchan interpretation may bepartially true,it obscuresthe more important rebellion against thenational leadership over theerosion of democratic formswithin theunion. In both casesthere isno evidence to suggest that ethnicanimosity, which wasnever a seriousproblem in Rochesterto begin with,was at theroot ofthe disruptions. On the contrary, the

32Ibid. 33GeneralExecutive Board Minutes(hereafter referred to as GEBMinutes), May 3–6, 1922,ACWA Papers, Box164, Folder 8. 34RJB Minutes,April 22,1922, ACWA Papers, Reel1. Themethods which arereferred to in the RJB minutes arenot disclosed,but it is clearthat members found them unacceptable. 35StevenFraser makes this argumentin “Landslayt and Paesani: EthnicCon ict and Cooperation in the Amalgamated Clothing Workersof America,” in Dirk Hoerder(ed.), “Struggle aHardBattle” : Essays on Working-ClassImmigrants (DeKalb, IL,1986),280– 303; see also Fraser, LaborWill Rule and “Dress Rehearsalfor the NewDeal.” Micah Barbash, citingFraser’ s work, also makes this argumentin herMA essayon the RochesterACW. 248 C. T. Martin evidencesuggests that among thoselocals whichsupported Italian protestationswas the largely Jewishlocal number14. Throughout themiddle ofthe decade the number of workstoppages in violation of thearbitration agreement grew alarmingly. This threatenedthe viability ofthegrievance processand the peaceful labor relations.The reasonsfor thestoppages were simple. First, theeffects of theeconomic recession meant hard times for mostpeople employed in theclothing industry.Second, the 1921 wage cutshook workers’ faith in unionism by arbitration. Third, employers didnot always abide bythearbitration any more than workersdid. And fourth, Sidney Hillman’ s decisionto support Robert LaFollette’s campaign for Presidentin 1924, areversal ofhis previous loyalty tothe Communist Party, ignited unionfactionalism. Smarting from its exclusionfrom thenominating convention,the Communist Party orchestratedthe penetration of individual organiza- tionsby its Trade UnionEducational League. One of these organizations wasthe ethnically mixed ACWpressers’local 200 in Rochester. 36 Already annoyedby theintransigence of Rochester workers toward the 1921 arbi- tration agreement,Hillman returnedto investigate charges ofvoting fraudand violence. Conveningthe meeting ofthe GEB in thePowers Hotel in downtownRochester on July 31, 1924, Hillman addressedthe GEB members:

The Rochestersituation came toaclimax last weekafter brewing for anumber ofyears …thereis a completeloss of control here. We do not have a considerablegroup whoare loyal tothe organization. 37

Hillman proceededto identify theproblems in thelocal union,including anIWW- dominatedItalian local 202, problems with theCommunist Party, anda lack of leadership onthe shop  oor andin theRJB. Even before hearings began Hillman declaredthat “thenational Organization musttake charge ofRochester with suspen- sionsand expulsions of ofŽ cers as well asmembers …wewill have toput in new ofŽcers under the direction of theGeneral ofŽ ce.” Although Hillman agreed toprovide “anopportunity toas many members in Rochesteras possible to be present at the Board,”Hillman had already madehis decision. 38 Oncethe hearings at thespecial sessionof the GEB began,it quickly became apparent that thedispute involved theelection of business agents for theRJB. SpeciŽcally, unfair electionprocedures lay at theroot ofthe discontent. The GEBgave the oor toindividual workershoping toshed some light onthe current state of disorder.Sadie Goodman, a unionmember, explained that theelection at L.Holtz and Sonswas not legitimate. Goodmanrecounted a conversationwith an electionofŽ cial: “Isaid,do you know what youare doing andhe said, I am acommittee man andI am hereto show the people how to votehe said, I am abuilder ofthis organization andI am going toseethat things are donesquare.” Goodman expressed the fear ofmany that members’concerns were not being registered by either thenational unionor theRJB. “Iwantto know how long thebuilders are going topoison the organization,” she concluded.Others reportedthat electionoverseers were actually marking workers’ ballots for them.Mr. Zeitses from Local200 questionedone man whowas handing out andmarking ballots: “Do youdo that here”and he said “ yes.”Wander [another

36Fraser, LaborWill Rule ,194–195; Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years:A History ofthe American Worker 1920–1933 (Boston, MA, 1960),136. 37GEBMinutes,July 31–Aug. 2, 1924,ACWA Papers, Box164, Folder 23. 38Ibid. New Unionism atthe Grassroots 249 overseer] grabbed aballot from awomanand took it upand threw it onthe  oor.” Countlessexamples ofballot andelection fraud Ž lled testimonyof the GEB minutes. 39 However,Hillman wasmore interestedin thecharge ofrioting, andhad twiceto warnthose present that theGEB had heard enoughabout fraudulentballoting. Apparently, agroup ofworkers had burstinto aroom wherethe “ illegitimate”ballots werebeing counted.One of the marauders, with ametal wrenchin his pocket,jumped upon a table wheremembers satcounting the ballots. Whenthey werecalled before theGEB, the“ rioters”claimed that they simply “wantedto see that weget asquare deal.”As local member Rathman said,“ Ifelt it wasmy liberty togo in andI told Soloman [RJB manager] tolive uptothe rules.” Their explanations, which all focused onthe desire for fair elections,illuminated thethrust of worker discontentand the growing division betweenan unresponsive leadership anda discontentedrank andŽ le. All Žve accusedwere suspended from theunion. Hillman voidedthe election, forced outthe existing RJBmanager, andinstalled Hyman Blumberg, anexecutive ofŽ cer, as theprovisional manager. All local electionswere suspended until further notice. Decisionsin Rochesterwere now made directly by theGEB. Newunionism in Rochester,as an experiment in industrial democracy,passed from thehands of the workersto the highest echelonsof union bureaucracy. 40 The problem wasthat thedecisions made at theemergency GEBmeeting in Rochesterwere based on faulty assumptions.Sidney Hillman andthe GEB character- izedall workers’complaints within thelocal unionas the product of radical, left-wing thugswhose primary goal wasto destroy the machinery ofarbitration. In part, hewas right, especially asit concernedlocal 200. Buthe was unable, or unwilling, to distinguish betweenthe forms of protest. Workers’ complaints, particularly from Italian local 202, about theunresponsiveness of theunion and election fraud were superseded by theneed for order andstability. Asa result,tensions deriving from the1925 conict wereleft unresolved.The lack ofaresolutionfurther disillusioneda local membership already rockedby ashaky economyand suspicions that thenew unionism of the ACW wasno longer serving theinterests of theworkers. In aspeechbefore the RJB, Joseph Schlossbergadvised that “individuals orgroups within theorganization cannottake it uponthemselves to determine organization policy in suchcases without the counsel and consentof the general membership representedby its general ofŽcers.” Although he articulated what probably seemeda truism totheleaders of theRJB, he wasreinforcing ashift in thenew unionism in Rochester,from termsset forth by workersand the local unionto those deŽ ned by thenational leadership. 41 The sensethat workerswere losing controlof their organization in Rochester precipitated asecondupheaval in thesummer of 1926. At ameeting in mid-July, the Italian local 202 proposeda resolutionbefore the executive board ofthe the RJB, which wasstill underthe ofŽ cial controlof the GEB. It summedup its frustration: The members oflocal 202 andothers in this city have notbeen taken in the proper considerationeither by thelocal administration or by thenational organization …wehave beena very large part ofthemembers in this city who have many times beencompelled to obey theofŽ cers of thenational organiza- tion,which wedid in thebest interests of the organization. To help remedy thesituation, local 202 proposeda reapportionment ofdelegates.

39Ibid. 40Ibid. 41RJB Minutes,July 7, 1924,ACWA Papers, Reel1. 250 C. T. Martin

Localswith 1000 workersor fewerwould be permitted sevendelegates. Locals with 1000 members or more wouldbe permitted sevendelegates plus one for eachaddi- tional 200 members.The resolutionwas declared out of order. The Italian representa- tive ofthe RJB appealed thedeclaration, butwhen a votewas Ž nally taken,the recommendationwas rejected by theboard. 42 Whenthe RJB executivecommittee meton July 22 thefollowing week,local 202, reinforcedby theradical local 200, sentadditional delegatesanyway. Whenthe RJB presidentasked them toleave, they refused.Hyman Blumberg, still in charge ofthe Rochesterlocal, threatenedthat thedeŽ ants “ wereattempting toforce their will upon theJoint Board [and] wouldbe dealt with by theGEB.” He claimed that hewas sympathetic totheir demands,but denounced their tactics. 43 Newsof theaborted meeting traveled quickly andthe actions of locals 202 and200 becamea topic ofgreat interest.Only onelocal came outofŽ cially against theaction. The others,like theJewish local 14, reported“ agreat deal ofinterest was shown by its members.Numerous questions were asked as to what proportional representation meantand whether same would improve thecondition in theshops.” The subject causeddissension within other locals.Lithuanian local 203 wasdivided over whetheror notto accept the minutes from theJuly 22 meeting.Members clamored for avote,but thechair refusedand resigned in theface of protest.Members held a voteanyway and agreed tosupport the deŽ ant locals. 44 Beginning August26, theGEB again stagedits meeting at thePowers Hotel and held hearings onthe problems in Rochester.Hillman again denouncedwhat hecalled the inuence of “ outsideorganization” . This time AldoCursi, a prominent Italian labor organizer andan ally ofHillman, came tothe defense of local 202. Heexplained tothe national presidentthat thein uence of the Trade UnionEducational League and the CommunistParty wasgreatly exaggerated. Although theCommunist-in uenced local 200 supportedthe Italian local’s claims for proportional representation,it wasthe Italian local whichwas leading theŽ ght. Local202, heargued, was expressing legitimate grievances towhichthe national unionshould respond. Despite Cursi’ s plea, Hillman wasunconvinced. He wassure that theIWW heldin uence among theItalians andthat theTrade UnionEducational League had also inŽltrated thelocal and jeopardizedthe union’ s leadership. Although it may have beendifŽ cult to tell at the time, given theradical activities oflocal 200, hindsight makesit clear that the Communists,not to mention the IWW, had madeno signiŽ cant inroads into the Italian workers’organization. 45 Ledby Hillman, theGEB blamed the“ subversiveand destructive tactics [of] an outsideagency benton this, as on previous occasions,on disrupting theUnion in Rochester.”In its decisionhanded down in August,1928, theGEB called for the dissolutionof local 200 andthe expulsion of its Communistleader, Peter Teems.In language that theUGW had onceused against theACW, the GEB argued that local 200 was“ in form andspirit, asectionalorganization, notin conformity with the industrial form oforganization which is thegoal ofthe Amalgamated.” They also acceptedthe idea ofproportional representation,but put off its implementation for a futuredate. 46 Although theresponse to the decision was not uniform, disagreement did

42Ibid.,July 22,1926. 43Ibid.,Aug. 5, 1926. 44Ibid.,Aug. 19,1926. 45GEBMinutes,Aug. 26–28, 1928, ACWA Papers, Box165, Folder 4. 46GEBdecision,RJB Minutes,Aug. 28,1926, ACWA Papers, Reel2. New Unionism atthe Grassroots 251 notturn on ethnic divisions. Whether or nota local acceptedthe GEB’ sdecision dependedon how it felt about thedissolution of local 200. Ascould be expected, Italian local 202 “disagreedstrongly.” But also GustaveStrebel ofthe Jewish local 14 read the GEBdecisionat its meeting,after which“ it wasmoved that thelocal go onrecord protesting against thedecision.” Other locals also passedsimilar resolutionsof protest. Brother Rissiman oftheGEB helpedto restore calm tothe aggrieved locals.He spoke at several meetingsin whichhe appealed tothe membership “that theonly way their interestscould best be served was by helping establish law andorder in theRochester organization.”47 However,it wasnot the law andorder that troubledmany members,but the GEB policemenwho still controlledtheir local. In November, 2monthsafter theGEB’ s decision,Hyman Blumberg announcedthat electionsfor theRJB andits manager wouldcontinue to be withheld. Local 202 wenton record against thedecision: “ the Joint Board shouldknow that this action is resentedby thelocal.” Lithuanian local 203 also opposedBlumberg’ s decision.Later in themonth, however, the national leadership sentits proposal for proportional representationto the locals. It wasnearly identical to theone the Italians had Žrstproposed. This, coupledwith acall for general elections, settledtempers in Rochesterfor theŽ rsttime in several years. 48 Although internal disruptionswithin theRochester organization neverreached the level they didin 1926, thenational leadership didnot manage toquell dissidentvoices entirely. In theprocess of choosing delegates for the1928 convention,Blumberg again foundhimself chastising theRochester workers: “ The organization wouldbe forced to take actionin any casewhere it isdetermined that statementsare being made deliberately with malicious intent.”Local 202 continuedto test the leadership with a resolutionin which they insistedon the right tobargain with theRCE directly. However,such concerns faded into the background as1928 came toa close.The ailing economywas beginning tobear downon the local industry.The downturnin Rochester’s clothing manufacturing sectoranticipated thecoming national Depression. By 1931, Rochester’s Fashion Park, whichrepresented a merger ofseveral clothing manufacturersin thecity, fell prey tohard times.“ Whenit is considered,”a delegate ofthe RJB wrote,“ that onehalf ofour Rochester membership workin Fashion Park it becomesclear that this isthe most serious situation we have ever beenconfronted with.”Rochester was now distracted by anewset of concerns. The battle for demo- cratic controlof the organization against thenational leadership wassimply subsumed by thepressing concern of mass unemployment in thelate 1920s and1930s. 49

* * * * * *

In 1926, SidneyHillman declared,“ wewill nottolerate revolutionsin theAmalga- mated.”50 Onthe one hand, it wasthis ability tostand strong in thedark daysleading upto the Great Depression that enabledHillman’ s ACWtosurvive while muchof the restof the labor movementlay in ruins.On the other hand,that thelanguage ofthe foundingconvention in 1914 wouldultimately beused against theunion membership is bitterly ironic. The ACWhad always deŽned itself in oppositionto the conservative andrepressive unionism of the UGW. Yet,in lessthan twodecades the ACW had

47Ibid.,Sept. 30,1926. 48Ibid.,Nov. 11,30, 1926. 49Ibid.,April 12,1928, Oct. 22,1931. 50GEBMinutes,Aug. 26–28, 1926, ACWA Papers, Box165, Folder 4. 252 C. T. Martin dissolvedlocals, voided elections, accepted arbitration agreementswithout workers’ consent,and taken over theleadership ofa leading Joint Board. Asthe deŽ nition ofnew unionismpassed from workers’locals tothe national hierarchy, thespirit ofthe ancien re´gime re-emerged. StevenFraser writesthat RochesterItalians’ “ anger with theunion leadership was sparkednot by political differencebut by asenseof ethnicdiscrimination anda general reluctanceto submit toindustrial routine.”51 However,there is no evidenceto suggest that ethnicdifferences or craft resistanceplayed amajor role in theItalian opposition tothe union in Rochesterin the1920s. Neither thesubstance of their grievances nor theethnicity oftheir allies leadsto this conclusion.Had resistance to new unionism beensuch a juggernaut in Rochester,it mostsurely wouldhave sabotaged thegreat successof 1919. But,as that successand as the words and actions of the workers themselvessuggest, such problems couldnot have accountedfor themassive disrup- tionsof the 1920s. Instead,what unionmembers foundmost troubling wasthe sense that, after 1919, theACW wasbecoming alessand less effective way ofmeeting workers’demands. As the national unionattempted to maintain stability in adecadeof employer andemployee resistanceand economic recession, bureaucratic necessity simply overpoweredthe democratic ideals ofnew unionism. As employers andnational leaderschipped away at initial gains andindustrial democracybegan toerode, workers becameunderstandably more restless.It isa fair guessthat had theeconomy not soured in 1928, protestagainst theunion leadership wouldhave persisted. 52 Fraser correctly identiŽes the ethnic divisions that existedamong clothing workers. However,he seems mistakenly toassume that ethnicdivision necessarilyimplies ethnic divisiveness.In this case,it doesnot. Like their native-born counterparts,Jews and Italians turnedto organized labor whenthey sawthat it couldhelp them andshied away whenit didnot. What workersin Rochesterin the1920s resentedwas not so muchthat they werebecoming part ofan industrial citizenry, butthat theloss of their political voice wasthe price ofmembership. This conclusioncorroborates theŽ ndingsof a numberof immigration historians whoseown studies of Jewsand Italians suggestthat immigrants werenot only not dragged kicking andscreaming intothe modern industrial world,they oftenaccepted it asa meansof upward mobility. 53 In other words,they

51Fraser, LaborWill Rule ,204;see also “Landslayt and Paesani,”283, and 298and “DressRehearsal forthe NewDeal,” 228– 242. 52Aquestion which invariably ariseswith acase-studyconcerns the extentto which its conclusionscan be generalized.J. B.S.Hardman, an ACW insiderwho becameeditor of Advance in 1925,examined the sourceof intra-union conict in his editedcollection of essays, American LaborDynamics: Inthe Light of Post-WarDevelopments (NewYork, 1928).Using the NewYork InternationalLadies’ Garment Workers Union(ILGWU) as his primary example, Hardman identiŽed the main issuesthat divided union leaders fromtheir rank-and-Ž le opposition in the 1920s:“ the demand forthe exerciseof greater democracy,” “the Žghtagainst insufŽ cient leadership,” “the failureof the administration to enforceexisting agreements,” “the demand forfreedom of expression and anti-administration groupings,”“dissatisfaction with the generallyconservative course of the union leaders,”“and opposition to extravagance,to directdishonesty, to the ‘pretorianguards’ with which union leadershave surroundedthemselves at the expenseof the organizationand forno betterpurpose than to assureelections and to intimidate oppositions”(31). Not surprisingly, many ofthe same issuesthat plaguedthe NewYork ILGWUsimilarly aficted the Rochester ACW. Thereason, Hardman argued,is that “the claims ofthe opposition cannot be said to be characteristicof developments in NewYork City orthe ladies’garment industry only”but were representiveof a widespreadpattern of con ict within the needletrades (31). Inotherwords, Hardman not only supports the casefor the non-ethnocultural rootsof intra-union factionalism, but suggeststhat it is an explanation not limited to the Rochesterexample. 53See,for example, John W.Briggs, An Italian Passage:Immigrants to Three American Cities, 1890–1930 New Unionism atthe Grassroots 253 werenot as backward looking asFraser andothers would have it. Historian David Brody suggested,several years ago, that “thejob concerns of American workerswere largely boundup with, and sometimes observable tous only through collective activity andlabor organization.”54 Attempts,however, to write institutionslike theACW back intothe history ofAmerican labor runthe risk ofassuming that workers,whose voices are notalways readily discernible,will fall intopreconceived patterns of behavior. That they donot is the value ofstudying the ACW, andother organizations like it, at the grass roots.

(NewHaven, CT,1978)and AndrewHeinz, Adapting to Abundance: Jewish Immigrants,Mass Consumption andthe Searchfor American Identity (NewYork, 1990). 54David Brody, “TheOld Labor Historyand the New: InSearch of an AmericanWorking Class,” Labor History,20(1979), 126.