Chap 1-3 Final

Dreams in Homer, Heraclitus, and Plato

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Authors Novikova, Aleksandra

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Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/628164 DREAMS IN HOMER, HERACLITUS, AND PLATO

Aleksandra Novikova

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the

DEPARTMENT OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES AND CLASSICS

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

In the Graduate College

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

2018 Novikova !12 Novikova 3

Table of Contents

Abstract 4

Introduction 5

Chapter 1: Dreams as Messages of the Divine 10

Chapter 2: Dreams as Lack of True Knowledge 24

Chapter 3: Dreams as the Void of True Perception 35

Conclusion 53

Works Cited 54 Novikova 4

Abstract

My thesis examines the connection between dreams, knowledge, and perception in the works of Homer, Heraclitus and Plato. Although the perception is not a topic thoroughly discussed in the Iliad and the Odyssey, Homeric view on dreams will serve as a basis for comparison with Heraclitus and Plato. In Homer, dreams are generally messages from a supernatural force imparting some divine knowledge to the sleeper in order to fulfill their own will. As a reaction to the traditionally accepted views of the epics, Heraclitus asserts that dreams, because they are created by specific individuals and are cut off from the shared world fire, are a poor source of the true logos, true knowledge. Furthermore, Plato expands upon Heraclitus’ idea by stating that dreaming is a form of perception that is too unstable to be able to provide true knowledge. By exploring how people perceive dreams while asleep, we can get a better understanding of the sort of knowledge that is obtained in dreams. Novikova 5

Introduction

The subject of dreams is an interesting topic because of our own human desire to understand what we experience while asleep. On the one hand, with the advancement of medicine and neurological sciences in the last century, we now know the physiological needs of sleep and its essential part in our daily routine. Nowadays even the simplest sleep tracker can tell us how long we sleep and what stages of sleep we experience. We can also identify that most of dreaming happens during the rapid eye movement (REM) sleep stage (Mendelson 2017: 14-15).

However, dreams themselves have not been so easily defined and understood. Many of us try to assign some psychological explanations to what we dream in order to better understand our own subconscious mind, hoping that dreams could reveal some hidden knowledge about ourselves.

The significance of dream interpretation goes at least as far back as second and first millennium BCE to Babylonia and Assyria (Lewis 1996). Many cultures had their own dream interpreters who would record and help them interpret their dreams. Although the first comprehensive “dream-book” appeared in the second century CE in the Oneirocritica of

Artemidorus (Walde 1999), in Greek culture dreams already had an irreplaceable role in curing various aliments through the process known as sleep incubation. Healing sanctuaries were common throughout Greece and, although the most important sanctuary at Epidaurus of the god

Asclepius was not fully developed until the late 4th century BCE, there are many inscriptions dating back to the 5th century which reference this manner of curing various sicknesses

(Holowchak 2002: 151-156). It was a religious ritual in which the diseased sleeper would be granted the cure or other means by which the illness could be resolved through a visitation of a god. Additionally, by the late 5th century a collection of medical writings called the Hippocratic Novikova 6

Corpus, usually attributed to Hippocrates despite its questionable authorship, introduced the idea that sleep is necessary and the interpretation of whatever one sees asleep can lead to a better understanding of one’s health. The underlying assumption for all those seeking to understand one’s dreams is that there is some knowledge to be gained from their interpretation.

The earliest written record of dreams in Ancient Greece can be seen in Homer’s epic poems the Iliad and the Odyssey. In both of these works, the terms “to sleep” (εὕδειν) and

“dream” (ὄνειρος or ὄναρ) are generally used in conjunction with one another. Even though one asleep does not always dream, one has to be asleep in order to dream. The two states, though technically different, share the same requirement of being unconscious. Nevertheless, a dream comes into the narrative following a specific pattern (Morris 1983): a supernatural deity approaches the unsuspecting sleeper, stands above their head, and speaks to the recipient of the dream. In Homer, dreams are generally in association with some sort of divine or supernatural power and are a way for those powers to utter a message into the sleeper’s mind. The messages themselves are not merely words of wisdom or simple predictions of the future: they carry the will of whatever otherworldly power that created them. In many cases, it is some kind of knowledge which would lead the dreamer into accomplishing the will of the divine being.

Sometimes the knowledge imparted upon the sleeper is relatively straightforward.

In Book 23 of the Iliad, the ghost of Patroclus1 appears to Achilles in a dream urging the Greek hero to bury his friend as quickly as possible so that he could finally rest in peace. This interjection from the supernatural world immediately propels the grieving man into finally burying his lost comrade. Similarly, this visit serves as a parallel to his mistreatment of Hector’s

1 In the first chapter, I will further explain why I consider this particular episode a dream. Novikova 7 corpse and a reminder to respect the laws of the dead. Other times, however, the knowledge imparted upon the sleeper is deliberately misleading to its recipient (both with positive and negative results). It is evident in Book 6 of the Odyssey, where Nausicaa under the subconscious suggestions of Athena that she would encounter her husband inadvertently meets Odysseus and organize his return home. Regardless of the intention of the supernatural beings, in the epic poems it is only in the dreams provided by the divine that any knowledge can be attained.

For the ancient Greeks, the Homeric epics were not only literary works but also poems which represented a past that they otherwise did not have preserved in any other easily accessible form. They were a source of both a historical and a mythical past—a model to follow in many facets of their everyday lives (Scodel 2004; Osborne 2004). As the Greek world experienced economical, cultural, and geographic growth, so did writing and literature that the ancients began to produce. All of these factors facilitated the emergence of curious thinkers (the “pre-

Socratics”—more specifically, the early philosophers before the time of Plato) who, instead of accepting the commonly accepted views provided by Homer, pursued the “study of the nature, origin and processes of the natural world” (Warren 2007: 2).2 These early thinkers explored many aspects of the world; some of which were dreams and sleep.

The earliest thinker of this period to discuss dreams was Heraclitus in the late 6th to early

5th centuries BCE. Although the fragmentary nature of the texts is problematic, the fragments

2There were several different camps of thought sprawled all over the Mediterranean. The earliest (dating back to the first half of the sixth century BCE) of these scientist-philosophers were the Milesians on the Ionian coast. One of these was Thales whose main interest was to find the principal element from which all things in the universe are made and who is recorded as having accurately predicted a solar eclipse that occurred in 585 BCE (O’Grady 2005). Following was Xenophanes who, aside from composing lyric poetry, was also avidly questioning the epics and how the world works. Then, there were the so-called Eleatic philosophers (named after the Greek colony of Elea in Italy) whose leading philosopher Parmenides (late 6th/early 5th century) claimed that only one thing existed. The list does not end here; however, this extremely brief introduction gives a good overview of the topics that they tended to discuss. Novikova 8 provide a general overview of Heraclitus’ philosophy. Even though the fragments do not necessarily use the exact vocabulary (ὄνειρος or ὄναρ), Heraclitus discusses dreams while exploring sleep and whatever happens while one is asleep. However, unlike in Homer, dreams are seen as an insignificant part of sleep which does not impart any true knowledge upon the sleeper. Heraclitus, like many of his predecessors, disliked and rejected the traditional views of the divine presented in Homer. Most of all, his main argument was that men only assume to know what is the nature of the gods and not that they actually know. Thus, anything that Homer discussed concerning the divine should not be taken seriously—in this case, the dream-messages from the divine.

In his first fragment, Heraclitus attempts to explain that men have the tendency to not understand the logos, the fundamental principle that governs the nature of the universe, even though they have the potential for it. The philosopher also point out that one’s senses, like eyesight, which are used to gather information about the outside world are extremely important.

And asleep men are deprived of these senses, resulting in the inability to truly perceive anything one has dreamed. The one concept that Heraclitus reiterates multiple times in several of his fragments is that ideas, thoughts, or any truth that one acquires individually on his own is not the truth—it is only through the collective consciousness, so to speak, that humans can attain the true logos which I equate to true knowledge. Thus, since particular dreams are the creations of specific individuals and asleep one is cut of the common logos, whatever one believes to know through a dream, whatever knowledge one thinks to have obtained, is misleading and false.

Next, it is a natural progression to address Plato in relation to sleep and dreams (ca.

420s-347 BCE), one of the most important philosophers of the ancient world (Nails 2006). Plato Novikova 9 acknowledges that there are certain people who are able to gain true knowledge and insight in dreams; however, they are few and have to be of exceptional nature (Republic IX). Thus, what the majority of people perceive while asleep is false knowledge. In the Apology (40c-d), Socrates theorizes that perception is necessary for perceiving dreams—without perception there are no dreams since dreaming is perceiving. In the Theaetetus, Plato utilizes Heraclitus’ theories in making a deeper connection between perception, knowledge, and dreams. Attacking Heraclitus’ theory of flux by exaggerating its implications, Plato unravels how perception functions in dreams. Because there is a variety of different perceptions, no one perception can be taken as the true perception. And since dreams are an unstable form of perception, any apparent knowledge obtained in the course of dreaming is false. Thus, dreams are a good example why sense- perception cannot be knowledge. Because if dreams cannot give a trustworthy account of one perceives in sleep, then perception itself is unreliable.

In this paper, I will attempt to explain how individually produced dreams are a source of false or lesser knowledge. First I will use Homeric views on what knowledge is perceived in dreams as the basis for comparison against Heraclitus and Plato. Second, I will look at

Heraclitus’ rebuttal of Homeric views of the divine and his subsequent conclusions about dreams and knowledge. Lastly, I will attempt to show how Plato assimilates and amends Heraclitus’ theories in order to create a more refined and expanded view on dreams, perception, and knowledge. Novikova 10

Chapter 1: Dreams as Messages of the Divine

In Homer, dreams follow a specific formula which contains three essential elements that have to occur for a dream to happen. First, a supernatural being has to appear before the receiver of the dream while he or she is already sleeping, then the deity speaks over the head of the sleeper speaking the words directly above the person’s head (presumably speaking directly into the mind or ear of the recipient), and this supernatural power has to done the face of someone the recipient trusts. Furthermore, the sleeper generally awakens immediately after the deity is gone.

What I will call a “dream” is not a visual representation which consists of images but, in a way, an aural perception. Thus, the sleeper is a not an “active agent in the dream’s creation” but its

“passive recipient” ( Barbera 2008: 907; Hughes 2000). The dream does not necessarily represent anything from the dreamer’s own mind even though the message itself could correspond with what the receiver secretly desires to know. Thus, in Homer, dreams mainly function as a conduit of otherworldly knowledge between divine beings and mortals in order to prompt the dreamer into fulfilling the divine will.

The most striking example of a dream acting as a message or a vessel of divine will can be seen in Athena’s visit to Nausicaa, the princess of the Phaeacians, in Book 6 of the Odyssey.

The ultimate reason for her coming to the girl is to manipulate events in such a way that the princess would meet Odysseus—which would then facilitate his return to Ithaca. As the precursor to the dream, Athena takes the form of a young girl the same age as Nausicaa (22-23) and carefully instills the notion that she will no longer be a maiden (ἐπεὶ οὔ τοι ἔτι δὴν παρθένος

ἔσσεαι, 33) and that her marriage is not far off (σοὶ δὲ γάµος σχεδόν ἐστιν, 27). Therefore, in preparation for her upcoming marriage, she would need to go wash the clothes at dawn (31), Novikova 11 probably implying that she would meet her future husband rather soon. It is an enticing dream which she does not question since it preys on her own expectations and wishes, propelling her to execute everything the dream-Athena had instructed in hopes of it becoming true.

Just like Athena, who had come to her in secret, Nausicaa does not reveal her own reasons for suddenly going down to the river because she is actually thinking about her own nuptials; a fact that shames her a little (αἴδετο γὰρ θαλερὸν γάµον ἐξονοµῆναι/ πατρὶ φίλῳ, “for she was ashamed to name her blooming marriage to her dear father,” 66-7).3 Nonetheless,

Nausicaa goes to the river with her handmaids where she meets Odysseus. Athena’s influence is also seen here as she wakes him up in the exact bushes where she had hidden him in the first place in order that the two meet. The initial impression is not good since Odysseus’ appearance is a shocking sight to behold, for he was naked with only a leafy branch to cover his genitals

(128-9). All the young maidens flee from him except Nausicaa who remains, encouraged and made fearless by Athena (139-140). As a result, in order to ingratiate himself with her, Odysseus approaches the situation with much care, flattering her so that she would be more inclined to help him. He praises her by stating that any man would be blessed to have her as his wife (158-9).

Additionally, he curiously once again reiterates the idea of marriage by praying for the gods to grant her whatever she desires—which is a husband and a home (ἄνδρα τε καὶ οἶκον).

Swayed by his laudatory words and impressed by his magical transformation into a godlike figure, Nausicaa expresses clear interest in marrying him (242-5). The idea of marriage that was brought up by the dream is constantly on her mind and has been subconsciously guiding her decisions. For that reason, seeing Odysseus change from a filthy wild man to a refined god-

3 All translations are mine Novikova 12 like potential spouse, she is eager to help him sneak into the city and talk to her father (although her reasons are different from Odysseus’). The dream’s purpose is finally being accomplished—

Odysseus is closer to coming home. Because she is so adamant about marrying and getting him to the city, she fulfills the instructions of the dream. Everything was a plan carefully devised by

Athena: from watching over Odysseus when he arrived at the island to appearing in Nausicaa’s dream in order to push her towards him, from their consequent meeting to his rise from ruin and to him approaching the people who would be his way of returning home. The dream itself plays an important part by targeting Nausicaa’s innermost desires and compelling her to fully realize them. By providing somewhat misleading information, Athena ensures through the dream that her machinations would come to fruition.

Although sometimes dreams do contain some sort of misdirection towards the sleeper, a greater example of a deliberately sent false knowledge by a god is represented in the dream created by Zeus for Agamemnon in the beginning of Book 2 of the Iliad. Incensed by the treatment that Achilles was receiving at the hands of Agamemnon, he commands a destructive dream (οὖλον ὄνειρον) to bring a message to the Mycenaean king. Unlike Athena who comes into the dream donning someone else’s appearance, the king of all the gods does not personally appear to the Greek general, but it is the personified Dream that stands above his head in the likeness of Nestor (20-21) and conveys a misleading message concerning the current situation on

Olympus and the seemingly undeniable victory for the Greeks:

εὕδεις Ἀτρέος υἱὲ δαΐφρονος ἱπποδάµοιο· οὐ χρὴ παννύχιον εὕδειν βουληφόρον ἄνδρα ᾧ λαοί τ᾽ ἐπιτετράφαται καὶ τόσσα µέµηλε· νῦν δ᾽ ἐµέθεν ξύνες ὦκα· Διὸς δέ τοι ἄγγελός εἰµι, ὃς σεῦ ἄνευθεν ἐὼν µέγα κήδεται ἠδ᾽ ἐλεαίρει. Novikova 13

θωρῆξαί σε κέλευσε κάρη κοµόωντας Ἀχαιοὺς πανσυδίῃ· νῦν γάρ κεν ἕλοις πόλιν εὐρυάγυιαν Τρώων· οὐ γὰρ ἔτ᾽ ἀµφὶς Ὀλύµπια δώµατ᾽ ἔχοντες ἀθάνατοι φράζονται· ἐπέγναµψεν γὰρ ἅπαντας Ἥρη λισσοµένη, Τρώεσσι δὲ κήδε᾽ ἐφῆπται ἐκ Διός· ἀλλὰ σὺ σῇσιν ἔχε φρεσί, µηδέ σε λήθη αἱρείτω εὖτ᾽ ἄν σε µελίφρων ὕπνος ἀνήῃ.

You are sleeping, son of Atreus, the warlike tamer of horses: a man bearing counsels should not sleep all night long to whom people entrust themselves and to whom so many things are a care; now quickly hear me— I am a messenger of Zeus who, being far, is concerned for you and pities you. He ordered you to arm with all speed the Achaeans with long hair on their heads: for now he would seize the wide-street city of the Trojans: for the immortal gods, having Olympian houses, are no longer thinking separately: for Hera, praying, bent everyone to her own will, and she laid troubles upon the Trojans because of Zeus. but hold it in your heart, nor let forgetfulness seize you whenever sweet sleep would let you go. (Il. 2. 23-34)

This dream, a message from Zeus, clearly conveys false information, false knowledge, in order to undermine Agamemnon. Naturally, hearing such news, Agamemnon is thrilled, believing that he would capture Troy that very day (37). He feels confident because he is certain that he heard a divine voice (θείη…ὀµφή, 41). The apparently favorable dream-omen makes him act too rashly and be too confident about things that will never happen (τὰ φρονέοντ᾽ ἀνὰ θυµὸν ἅ ῥ᾽ οὐ

τελέεσθαι ἔµελλον, 36), not knowing that his sufferings have only just begun (39-40)— something that the king of the gods was probably hoping would happen. Thus, this dream gives

Agamemnon a false sense of security, making him more bold in his own confidence as a leader.

His arrogance inspired by false predictions of the dream, instead of helping him win victory, only leads to his own downfall. Believing that Zeus is on his side and that the Greek will be victorious no matter what, he attempts to test the resolve of the Greeks by stating that they should all flee to Novikova 14 their ships while the rest of the generals try to restrain them with words (73-75). Unfortunately, he did not anticipate that Zeus was working against him. The Greeks already under the influence of Rumor, the messenger of Zeus (Ὄσσα), rejoice at the prospect of finally going back home and do not waste time running to the ships and putting them out to sea (151-154). The outcome of his trickery is opposite to what he had intended. The dream delivered through the guise of Nestor creates a false belief of a certain and unequivocal success which misleads Agamemnon into exhibiting reckless behavior and unknowingly bringing about Zeus’ revenge. Thus, Agamemnon, just as Nausicaa, does not formulate his own dream but is only the recipient of whatever gods desire.

Moreover, a more ambiguous example of a divine message-dream is seen at the end of the Iliad in the form of Patroclus’ ghost who visits Achilles in his sleep. Although it is not confirmed that a god had sent Patroclus’ shade to Achilles, this episode follows the conventional pattern of how a dream would occur. The shade (ψυχή) comes to the Greek hero in the form of

Patroclus, stands over his head and speaks to him after sleep seized him (τὸν ὕπνος ἔµαρπτε, 62).

While it is unconfirmed if a some god had sent this shade, his ghost (even if acting on its own) is still a supernatural being outside of mortal understanding.4 Having taken vengeance upon Hector for killing his close friend, he now falls into a serious state of mourning, even refusing to wash off the blood of battle until he buried Patroclus properly (Il. 23.38-53). Patroclus’ ghost appears in this manner, chastising Achilles for not burying him as soon as possible:

εὕδεις, αὐτὰρ ἐµεῖο λελασµένος ἔπλευ Ἀχιλλεῦ. οὐ µέν µευ ζώοντος ἀκήδεις, ἀλλὰ θανόντος· θάπτέ µε ὅττι τάχιστα πύλας Ἀΐδαο περήσω.

4In Book 4 of the Odyssey, there is a similar scene where Athena does not come herself to the sleeping Penelope but sends an image, a likeness, a phantom of sorts (εἴδωλον, 796) in the guise of her sister. Novikova 15

τῆλέ µε εἴργουσι ψυχαὶ εἴδωλα καµόντων, οὐδέ µέ πω µίσγεσθαι ὑπὲρ ποταµοῖο ἐῶσιν, ἀλλ᾽ αὔτως ἀλάληµαι ἀν᾽ εὐρυπυλὲς Ἄϊδος δῶ. καί µοι δὸς τὴν χεῖρ᾽· ὀλοφύροµαι, οὐ γὰρ ἔτ᾽ αὖτις νίσοµαι ἐξ Ἀΐδαο, ἐπήν µε πυρὸς λελάχητε. οὐ µὲν γὰρ ζωοί γε φίλων ἀπάνευθεν ἑταίρων βουλὰς ἑζόµενοι βουλεύσοµεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐµὲ µὲν κὴρ ἀµφέχανε στυγερή, ἥ περ λάχε γιγνόµενόν περ· καὶ δὲ σοὶ αὐτῷ µοῖρα, θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ᾽ Ἀχιλλεῦ, τείχει ὕπο Τρώων εὐηφενέων ἀπολέσθαι.

You are sleeping, Achilles, but you have forgotten me. You took care of me while I was alive but now you take no care of me when I am dead: bury me so that I may pass through the gates of Hades as soon as possible. The ghosts keep me far off, the phantoms of those who have toiled. They do not yet allow me to mix with them over the river, but thus I wander above the broad-gated house of Hades. And give me your hand: I beg you, for never again will I come back from Hades when you have allotted me the fire. For alive and sitting far from our comrades we will deliberate plans, but hateful fate gaped around me which obtained me even when I came into being: but this fate is for you also, god-like Achilles, to die beneath the walls of the wealthy Trojans. (Il 23.69-81)

This dream imparts two specific pieces of knowledge: to bury Patroclus so that he can finally rest in peace5 and to warn Achilles of his future fate. He calls upon Achilles’ sense of companionship, drawing sympathy and implying that they will not be separated for too long since Achilles has the same wretched fate as he—to die at Troy and never return home. Of course, he is surprised and yet at the same time happy to see someone he holds so dear in his heart. As a result, he even tries to embrace him; however, his efforts are futile and what he ends up catching is nothing but smoke (ὠρέξατο χερσὶ φίλῃσιν/ οὐδ᾽ ἔλαβε: ψυχὴ δὲ κατὰ χθονὸς ἠΰτε καπνὸς/ ᾤχετο τετριγυῖα,

5 This is later echoed by Elpenor, Odysseus’ unfortunate companion, who in Book 11 of the Odyssey is found to have died falling off the roof of Circe’s house. He is the first shade Odysseus meets in the underworld, begging for a proper burial. Novikova 16

“he reached out with his own hands but did not seize him: but the shade, like smoke, departed down into the earth, uttering a cry,” 99-101). The image of a loved one serves as strong incentive for Achilles to fulfill and to abide by the will of the dead. Since the practice of burying the dead was essential in ancient Greek culture, Patroclus’ dream-shade reminds the importance of giving him a proper heroic burial. Since the burial process and ritual were not only a way for the deceased to find peace in the afterlife but also a tool of mourning for the family (Morris 1989:

30-31), it was a necessary step for Achilles to take. The grief at Patroclus’ death prevented

Achilles from burying him; fortunately, the dream forces Achilles into action—something he probably would not have done if he had not received the message from the dead.

Additionally, Patroclus’ ghost exposes the morality of Achilles’ actions regarding the respect for the dead. In Book 22, having at last killed Hector, Achilles concocted unseemly things (ἀεικέα µήδετο ἔργα, 395) for the Trojan hero by horribly mutilating his corpse and driving it behind his chariot (396-8). Although there is an ongoing debate concerning whether this horrific mutilation of the dead seems to be an expected and an honorable act of vengeance for Homeric heroes or an altogether shameful treatment of the dead (Kucewicz 2016), there is a consensus that Achilles’ prolonging of his torment upon Hector’s body is excessive. Having abused the body for eleven whole days, the Greek hero is still unsatisfied with revenge exacted on behalf of Patroclus. Even the gods become incensed at his behavior which has been fueled by his fury for far too long. The god Apollo (who supported the Trojans) grows angry at the horrible treatment of Hector’s body, and Zeus as well relents to help since the Trojan hero never failed to appropriately worship him (66-70). Achilles’ anger is so great that it is not until Priam himself comes for his son’s body that he begins to see the extent to which his own sadness is reflected in Novikova 17 the Trojan king’s and that he decides to release the body. The issue of Hector’s unburied body serves as a parallel to Patroclus’ own desire to be buried as quickly as possible. His own body was mishandled and abused when both the Greek and Trojans fought over his corpse (Il.

17.394-5); however, he avoided the torture that Hector had planned for him (Il. 17.126-7).

Moreover, the placing of the dream in Book 23 is telling since Patroclus himself was killed at the end of Book 16. Then, his shade comes to Achilles after he has killed Hector and during the continued torture of the Trojan’s corpse in Book 22. Patroclus’ appearance at that exact moment, at the high of Achilles’ mistreatment of Hector’s body, serves as reminder to respect the dead.

Thus, the dream acts as a warning from the supernatural for Achilles to follow proper etiquette in regard to the dead.

All of the dreams that I have mentioned subtly compel, in one way or another, the dreamer into achieving the will of some higher power. Taking on the appearance of or talking directly through someone familiar to the receiver of the dream, the gods exert their will upon the unsuspecting individuals. First, in the case of Patroclus, it may not seem as though a divine will is being applied when his shade appeals to Achilles that he be buried as soon as possible.

However, as Achilles’ extreme mistreatment of Hector’s corpse is emphasized, it is clear that the dream is there as an example of what should be done in regard to the dead and a covert expression of the gods’ will. Then, both Nausicaa and Agamemnon are visited by people whom they trust, rendering them more pliable to the dream’s suggestions mainly because the dreams themselves were cunningly depicting their own hopeful expectations of the future: Nausicaa wishing for a husband and Agamemnon’s “deepest conscious wishes” of defeating the Trojans and emerging victorious (Reid 1973: 35). The message delivered in the dream acts as the first Novikova 18 step in the realization of what the gods desires, driving the dreamers into unknowingly carrying out their will.

The final type of the message-dream that I will discuss is Penelope’s supposed prophetic dream in Book 19 of the Odyssey. Looking at the text, there is immediately a sign of this passage being different from the typical introduction of a dream, particularly because that essential element does not exist—Penelope dives directly into describing what she has dreamt. Since dreams follow a specific pattern in how they are introduced and usually they carry a divine message of otherwise unobtainable knowledge, Penelope could be using this information to concoct her own “dream” by exploiting these well-known motifs (Bulkeley 1998). The way the gods would appear to mortals in dreams was widely recognized. As previously seen in Book 2 of the Iliad, after Agamemnon wakes up from the dream sent by Zeus and addresses the council of elders, he regurgitates nearly similar or the same words used to describe the arrival of the Dream

(Il.2.56-9). Despite the fact that it is highly formulaic language, I would assume that people would be familiar with the image.

Having returned to Ithaca, Odysseus disguised as a beggar (17.202) scouts his own house in order to understand the current situation and to devise a plan to punish the insolent suitors.

After continuous abuses both from the suitors and from the servants, he finally gets a chance to be alone with Penelope, mainly because he, as the beggar, claims to have met Odysseus. Having exchanged a rather long conversation about each others’ woes, Penelope asks for his help in understanding a strange dream that she had:

χῆνές µοι κατὰ οἶκον ἐείκοσι πυρὸν ἔδουσιν ἐξ ὕδατος, καί τέ σφιν ἰαίνοµαι εἰσορόωσα· ἐλθὼν δ᾽ ἐξ ὄρεος µέγας αἰετὸς ἀγκυλοχείλης Novikova 19

πᾶσι κατ᾽ αὐχένας ἦξε καὶ ἔκτανεν· οἱ δ᾽ ἐκέχυντο ἀθρόοι ἐν µεγάροις, ὁ δ᾽ ἐς αἰθέρα δῖαν ἀέρθη. αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ κλαῖον καὶ ἐκώκυον ἔν περ ὀνείρῳ, ἀµφὶ δ᾽ ἔµ᾽ ἠγερέθοντο ἐϋπλοκαµῖδες Ἀχαιαί, οἴκτρ᾽ ὀλοφυροµένην ὅ µοι αἰετὸς ἔκτανε χῆνας. ἂψ δ᾽ ἐλθὼν κατ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἕζετ᾽ ἐπὶ προὔχοντι µελάθρῳ, φωνῇ δὲ βροτέῃ κατερήτυε φώνησέν τε· “θάρσει, Ἰκαρίου κούρη τηλεκλειτοῖο· οὐκ ὄναρ, ἀλλ᾽ ὕπαρ ἐσθλόν, ὅ τοι τετελεσµένον ἔσται. χῆνες µὲν µνηστῆρες, ἐγὼ δέ τοι αἰετὸς ὄρνις ἦα πάρος, νῦν αὖτε τεὸς πόσις εἰλήλουθα, ὃς πᾶσι µνηστῆρσιν ἀεικέα πότµον ἐφήσω.”

Twenty geese in my house eat wheat from the water, and I delight looking at them. But a great hook-beaked eagle, having come from the mountain, broke all their necks and killed them. And they in heaps were poured out in the halls, but he was taken into the divine heaven. I was crying and wailing as I was in the dream. The fair-haired Achaean women gathered around me who was pitiably lamenting the fact that the eagle killed my geese. But, having come back, he (the eagle) sat upon the projecting roof-beam and with a human voice he detained me and spoke: “Take courage, daughter of far-famed Ikarios: it is not a dream, but a true vision, which will happen. the geese are the suitors, and I who was formerly the eagle, the bird, now I have come as your husband, who will bring miserable death upon all the suitors.” (Od. 19.536-550)

On the one hand, to the audience who has been following Odysseus’ journey, the message of the dream seems to be clear: although he is not explicitly named, Odysseus is the eagle and the slain geese are the suitors. The dream foreshadows his return and the ultimate destruction of the suitors for wasting away his household. Presumably, it could be a message from a god as a way to reassure Penelope that her husband will return and her house will be freed from the suitors.6

6There has been an ongoing debate concerning Penelope’s sorrowful reaction to the death of the geese. Some argue that she actually was sympathetic and had feelings for them (Vannan Rankin 1962; Russo 1982; Katz 1991). Being depicted as domesticated animals who have their own place in the home perhaps signifies that, after all the years that Odysseus has been gone, the suitors have become almost permanent fixtures of the household whose disappearance would leave a void. While others state that this is not the case at all, and she truly despised these forceful wooers (Pratt 1994; Rozokoki 2001). Novikova 20

However, the exchange between Odysseus and Penelope that follows can be seen as a way of them mutually testing one another.

It may seem somewhat strange for her to ask for an interpretation since it seems that the dream “contains its own explanation” (Rozokoki 2001: 4). Previously, there were signs that her husband would return soon. In Book 17, Theoclymenus has prophesied that Odysseus is already back (157) and that he is planning his revenge for all the suitors (159). Even the disguised

Odysseus himself tells her that her husband is safe and will be coming back that very month

(19.300-7). Nonetheless, Odysseus does not waste time confirming that the dream will come true and cannot be interpreted in any other way:

ὦ γύναι, οὔ πως ἔστιν ὑποκρίνασθαι ὄνειρον ἄλλῃ ἀποκλίναντ᾽, ἐπεὶ ἦ ῥά τοι αὐτὸς Ὀδυσσεὺς πέφραδ᾽ ὅπως τελέει· µνηστῆρσι δὲ φαίνετ᾽ ὄλεθρος πᾶσι µάλ᾽, οὐδέ κὲ τις θάνατον καὶ κῆρας ἀλύξει.

Oh, woman, in no way is it possible to interpret the dream turning it in another way, since Odysseus himself has shown how he will bring things to an end: destruction appears for the suitors, very much for all: no one will flee from death or fates. (Od.19.555-58)

He obviously tries to clear any doubts about this vision by “dismissing any alternate interpretation as a perversion of the dreams’ clear message” (Pratt 1994: 150). Not completely knowing her true feelings, perhaps he is trying to test her resolve by maintaining that her dream will be realized. She seems to have succumbed to her fate and is now mourning the future that would not happen. Therefore, he strongly reinforces the idea of Odysseus’ return to see how she would respond. However, she rebukes Odysseus’ response by completely rejecting his reassurance of the dream. This provides further evidence that her dream could be some sort of a Novikova 21 test, for “why does she ask Odysseus to interpret a self-interpreting dream, and then assert that dreams are uninterpretable” (Redfield 2014: 8). Why would she ask someone to interpret her dream when she already has her own interpretation—an interpretation which does not change even after Odysseus gives his own opinion? Rather than being the expected “passive recipient” as there are seen in the previous dreams that I mentioned, she becomes actively involved in the dream’s creation in the same manner as a divine being would. Just like Odysseus is trying to gauge her reaction, Penelope is doing the same by continuously denying that her “dream” could in any way be trusted.

In the following passage, she subverts the traditional view of dreams as carriers of divine knowledge by questioning the legitimacy and the reliability of dreams. In order to support her stance, she explains that dreams can be unclear and portray false expectations:

‘ξεῖν᾽, ἦ τοι µὲν ὄνειροι ἀµήχανοι ἀκριτόµυθοι γίγνοντ᾽, οὐδέ τι πάντα τελείεται ἀνθρώποισι. δοιαὶ γάρ τε πύλαι ἀµενηνῶν εἰσὶν ὀνείρων· αἱ µὲν γὰρ κεράεσσι τετεύχαται, αἱ δ᾽ ἐλέφαντι· τῶν οἳ µέν κ᾽ ἔλθωσι διὰ πριστοῦ ἐλέφαντος, οἵ ῥ᾽ ἐλεφαίρονται, ἔπε᾽ ἀκράαντα φέροντες· οἱ δὲ διὰ ξεστῶν κεράων ἔλθωσι θύραζε, οἵ ῥ᾽ ἔτυµα κραίνουσι, βροτῶν ὅτε κέν τις ἴδηται. ἀλλ᾽ ἐµοὶ οὐκ ἐντεῦθεν ὀΐοµαι αἰνὸν ὄνειρον ἐλθέµεν·

Stranger, dreams are inexplicable and hard to discern, nor are they fulfilled for men in all things. For there are two gates of fleeting dreams: those made of horn and those of ivory. Those (dreams) that come through the sawn ivory, they are deceitful, carrying fruitless words. Those that come through the door of polished horn, they bring to pass true things whenever any mortal sees (them). But I do not believe that my horrible dream came from this place. (Od.19.560-9) Novikova 22

Once again she responds in a manner that can be misconstrued as despair and mourning of her unfortunate fate. Nevertheless, she employs this discussion of the two types of dreams as a tool to decipher her own “dream.” Since she does not believe that her dream came from the gate of horn, that it is not true, then it has to originate from the gate that carries words, knowledge, that are fruitless—no matter what the dream is, it will never come into reality. Following that logic, the “dream” that she dreamed should be dismissed entirely. Most of all, she emphasizes the idea that interpreting dreams is difficult because they can vary in content. Although she categorizes dreams into two groups, she implies that there is an uncertainty when it comes to identifying the dreams of ivory from the dreams of horn because of their flexible nature. Not all dreams can be discerned properly and even if they are, they are few. Thus, she puts forth the idea that one cannot rely on dreams to foretell the future because what the dream could be saying can be misinterpreted. Therefore, any knowledge that she had received from the dream is also not credible. The “vision” acts as a way to draw suspense and test her husband by slowly building up to her final challenge of the bow.

In conclusion, Homeric dreams are usually divine messages sent by the gods to mortals in order to achieve the wishes of the divine. Dreams provide potential knowledge which is enticing and which covertly manipulates the dreamer into accomplishing what the particular god or supernatural entity wants. Sometimes the message in the dream relays knowledge that intends to help and advise its receiver on how to act in an appropriate manner just as Patroclus warns

Achilles the importance of burying the dead. Sometimes the message is misleading, just as

Nausicaa is slightly deceived about the outcome of her dream, or is meant to provide Novikova 23 misinformation in order to bring about ruin, as it happened to Agamemnon. These divine dreams follow the same pattern and deliver knowledge to their dreamers without which they would have moved forward in the story. Thus, the manner in which dreams appear and the knowledge they tend to relay to their recipients are so well known that Penelope takes advantage of this fact by constructing her own dream in order to achieve her own purpose. She subverts the canonical representations of who is the passive recover and the active participant by becoming both. In all of these cases (except Penelope’s), dreams provide some sort of knowledge to the dreamer from the divine in order to influence mortal actions in the manner the divine has envisioned. In this way, dreams are a source of knowledge that mere humans are not able to obtain on their own. Novikova 24

Chapter 2: Dreams as Lack of True Knowledge

Just as Penelope challenges the traditional Homeric view of dreams and the worth of the messages expressed in them, Heraclitus does a similar thing several centuries later. Instead of blindly accepting that dreams usually carry a message full of divine knowledge, he argues that dreams cannot be a source of true knowledge. Removing the divine aspect from dreams, he says that people create their own dreams which are vehicles of false knowledge. First, it is important to understand why many of the post-Homeric writers strongly critiqued the representations of the divine that Homer included in the epic poems. It is one of the reasons that Heraclitus, like many of his predecessors, disliked and rejected Homer (and Hesiod): it was one of the characteristics that defined them (Morgan 2000).

The more vehement opponent of the two epic poets was his contemporary, Xenophanes.

He condemned the tendency of Homer and Hesiod—and, by extension, all of humankind— to attribute everything to the gods (πάντα θεοῖς ἀνέθηκαν Ὅµηρός θ᾽ Ἡσίοδός τε), all the things which were shameful and flawed among men (ὅσσα παρ᾽ ἀνθρώποισιν ὀνείδεα καὶ ψόγος ἐστίν) such as stealing, committing adultery and cheating one another (κλέπτειν µοιχεύειν τε καὶ

ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν, Diels7 11). Similarly, he protested against mortals’ tendency to anthropomorphize the gods:

ἀλλ’ εἰ τοι χεἶρας <γ’> εἶχον βόες ἠὲ λέοντες ἢ γράψαι χείρεσσι καὶ ἔργα τελεῖν ἅπερ ἄνδρες, ἵπποι µέν θ’ ἵπποισι βόες δέ τε βουσὶν ὁµοίας καί <κε> θεῶν ἰδέας ἔγραφον καὶ σώµατ᾽ ἐποίουν τοιαῦθ᾽ οἷόν περ καὐτοὶ δέµας εἶχον <ἕκαστοι>.

7 Hermann Diels was a turn of the century German scholar who compiled the first complete edition of the pre- Socratic fragments published in 1903 entitled Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. In 1951, his student Walhter Kranz published the sixth edition with revisions and corrections which is still the standard reference work for pre-Socratic scholarship (Stamatellos 2012). Novikova 25

But if oxen or lions had hands and were able to write With their hands and do deeds such as men do, Horses would scratch images similar to horses, oxen similar To oxen, and they would make such bodies as the kind Of a body that even each one has himself. (Diels 15)

In this fragment, he attempts to show the outlandish and ridiculous tendency of humans to anthropomorphize the gods by comparing what would occur when animals, if given the same attributes as human beings, would create the same things as humankind. For, if oxen or lions were to have hands and were able to write, they would probably draw images similar to themselves—oxen would create images of oxen and lions pictures of lions, just like humans are accustomed to do when it comes to themselves. Thus, it is likely that if animals were to have their own gods or any other divine being in which they believed, it is not altogether farfetched that they would imagine their gods in their own image—not unlike humans do with theirs.

Therefore, if divine beings are similar to humans in one aspect, they could be similar to humans in a variety of other aspects as well, both the good and the bad. However, this flawed nature of the divine directly clashes with what Xenophanes himself confirms about the divine—the fact it is “in no way similar to mortals neither in form or thought” (οὔ τι δέµας θνητοῖσιν ὁµοίϊος οὔτε

νόηµα, Diels 23) nor “does it change or move like mortals do” (αἰεὶ δ᾽ ἐν ταὐτῷ µίµνει

κινεύµενος οὐδέν, / οὐδὲ µετέρχεσθαί µιν ἐπιπρέπει ἄλλοτε ἄλλῃ, Diels 26). He concludes by suggesting that humans only seem to know the shape and voice of the gods (ἀλλ᾽ οἱ βροτοὶ

δοκέουσι γεννᾶσθαι θεοὺς / τὴν σφετέρην ἐσθῆτατ᾽ ἔχειν φωνήν τε δέµας τε, Diels 14). Since humans only assume to know the true nature of the divine, Homer should not be trusted in his portrayal of the gods, for to Xenophanes Homer’s view of the gods is undeniably false. Novikova 26

Likewise, Heraclitus’ reaction to Homer is along the same lines: τόν τε Ὅµηρον ἔφασκεν

ἄξιον ἐκ τῶν ἀγώνων ἐκϐάλλεσθαι καὶ ῥαπίζεσθαι καὶ Ἀρχίλοχον ὁµοίως ( “he said that Homer deserves both to be thrown out and to be beaten from the contests, Archilochus8 as well,” Diels

42). Since these contests consisted of the recitation of Homer and other poets at public festivals, a time when large numbers of the population gathered together in celebration, he seems to think that their inclusion is improper because of the inappropriate or misunderstood subject manner portrayed in the ancient writers’ poetry. He further echoes and elaborates upon what Xenophanes says concerning the relationship between immortal and mortal beings: τῷ µὲν θεῷ καλά πάντα

καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δὶκαια, ἄνθρωποι δὲ ἅ µὲν ἄδικα ὑπειλήφασιν ἃ δὲ δίκαια (“on the one hand, to god all things are beautiful, good, and just; on the other hand, men assumed what is unjust and what is just,” Diels 102). Heraclitus makes a solid distinction between what he believes the god perceives as good and what humans assume the god perceives—god has a constant idea of what is good while humans transpose their own ideas of what is good and just onto the gods without any understanding of the gods’ nature. This is a reason why he does not approve of Homer—he does not have the knowledge of the true behaviors of the divine and consequently deceives others through his poetry.9 Since the true nature of the gods and the divine knowledge which they

8 Archilochus’ poetry, although not berating mortals concerning their misconceptions of the gods, often depicted demoralizing and cowardly behavior opposite to what was typically expected of a good citizen, such as not caring that an enemy has taken his shield (although unwillingly left behind) since he could obtain one that is not worse:

ἀσπίδι µὲν Σαΐων τις ἀγάλλεται, ἣν παρὰ θάµνῳ ἔντος ἀµώµητον κάλλιπον οὐκ ἐθέλων· αὐτὸν δ᾽ ἔκ µ᾽ ἐσάωσα· τί µοι µέλει ἀσπὶς ἐκεινη; ἐρρέτω· ἐξαῦτις κτήσοµαι οὐ κακίω. 9“People are deceived concerning the knowledge of conspicuous things almost like Homer, who was wiser than all the Greeks” (ἐξηπάτηνται οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν τῶν φανερῶν παραπλησίως Ὁµήρῳ, ὅς ἐγένετο τῶν Ἑλλήνων σοφώτερος πάντων, Diels 56). Novikova 27 possess is beyond human understanding, anything that one dreams comes from one’s own misinterpreted view of what true knowledge is.

Moreover, taking into account Heraclitus’ stance in relation to the belief that human beings more often than not assume to know something they do not truly understand, we can now examine in detail how that notion of human misunderstanding and lack of true perception of the world affects his own conclusions concerning sleep—probably one of the most mysterious states of existence. In one of his fragments, Heraclitus lays out what he considers the law that governs everything and how humans are related to it:

τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ ἐόντος ἀεὶ ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον· γινοµένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε ἀπείροισιν ἐοίκασι πειρώµενοι καὶ ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων τοιούτων ὁκοίων ἐγὼ διηγεῦµαι κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων ἕκαστον καὶ φράζων ὅκως ἔχει· τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λανθάνει ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ποιοῦσιν ὅκωσπερ ὁκόσα εὕδοντες ἐπιλανθάνονται.

People are not able, both before hearing it and having heard it first, to understand this account that is always there. Although everything happens according to this account, they seem like inexperienced men, making trial both of the words and deeds of such a sort that I describe, distinguishing each one according to its nature and observing how it is. Whatever other men do while they are awake escapes them just as they forget whatever they do while they are sleeping.10 (Diels 1)

It is somewhat difficult to proceed without at least attempting to identify what Heraclitus means by logos. Although here I translated it as “account,” this word holds a far deeper meaning than just merely “word.” Logos is also translated as “principle,” a fundamental law, a rule, a universal truth that governs the cosmos—something that has existed since long ago and will continue to

10 In this chapter, I will use the words “sleep” and “dream” synonymously, for Heraclitus does not provide a distinction between the two states. Novikova 28 exist far in the future. He seems to imply that this account, this universal principle according to which everything in the world is carried out, is something stable and true and that it can reveal the nature of the universe. Since it has existed and will always exist, men themselves should be able to perceive it even though in reality they do not. Furthermore, it is significant that he states that men “seem” to be like inexperienced men and not that they actually are. They are ignorant of the world, blindly searching for the truth, questioning how things function and what they are, when they should already be aware of it—more precisely, “they seem to have experiences without becoming experienced” (Graham 2008: 9). He acknowledges the fact that humans are capable of much more than they appear, that thinking and understanding the world is common to all men (ξυνόν ἐστι πᾶσι τὸ φρονέειν, Diels 113). Additionally, being of sound mind about the world, speaking and doing true things while perceiving them according to their nature is the greatest excellence and wisdom that a man can achieve (σωφρονεῖν ἀρετὴ µεγίστη καὶ σοφίη

ἀληθέα λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαΐοντας, Diels 112). The greatest thing that one can do is to see the world as it is, unconcealed in its true nature. The first and significant step in acquiring knowledge about what is common to all is understanding oneself (Khan 1979: 119-123).11 If one can understand oneself, see his own true nature, then that intelligence can lead to the acquisition of knowledge that everyone shares. Despite all of this potential present in everyone, it is also an inherent tendency for man to simply be unable to comprehend the world which he inhabits or be incapable of perceiving what is already present in his own subconscious.

Because seeking knowledge is a key factor in Heraclitus’ philosophy (all of the pre-

Socratics as well), the fact that humans are incapable of perceiving it is especially important. For,

11ἐδιζησάµην ἐµεωυτόν—“I searched for myself” (Dies 101). Novikova 29 if one is unable to perceive true knowledge while awake, then it seems impossible that one would be able to perceive while dreaming. The acquisition of knowledge and the understanding of nature leads to the better understanding of the logos and how it works. In one fragment, he mentions that he honors, of all things, eyesight, hearing, and learning (ὅσων ὄψις ἀκοὴ µάθησις,

ταῦτα ἐγὼ προτιµέω, Diels 55)—the senses that help one gather information from the outside world. But, at the same time, he amends this statement by stating that eyes12 are sharper witnesses than ears (ὀφθαλµοὶ γὰρ τῶν ὤτων ἀκριϐέστεροι µάρτυρες, Diels 101)—seeing with one’s eyes is a more reliable source than hearing something with one’s ears—sight is more concrete than sound. Awake a man is at least is capable of receiving input from the outside world through the eyes despite having no comprehension of it. However, when one is asleep, he is unable to receive any of it because his sight (along with the other senses) is absent—one cannot see the truth in a dream (nor hear, nor learn it). Therefore, even if they do dream of something while sleeping, they will not be able to perceive whatever it is that they have dreamed. Likewise, because people do not perceive the logos while awake, they act as though they are asleep, for the two states are alike because they both consist of the lack of knowledge—the ignorance which one suffers both awake and asleep.

Heraclitus also points out that it is necessary not to act or speak as though asleep (οὐ δεῖ

ὥσπερ καθεύδοντας ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν, Diels 73)—that is to speak without understanding the true nature, the logos, of the world. As mentioned in the first fragment, the logos is everywhere in the world even though men are unable to perceive it properly. Nonetheless, since the sleepers are the

12“In the archaic period, men thought that all objects had to be visible, tangible, in order to be real. The invisible had no reality. Indeed, there were the gods and goddesses, who belonged to the supernatural universe, but they too were visible, and, when they came down from Olympus to intervene in human affairs, they had to be hidden little clouds or disguised in various human figures” (Thivel 2002: 240). Novikova 30 same people who exist while awake, they are still the active participants—the workers and co- workers of the things happening in the world (τοὺς καθεύδοντας ἐργάτας εἶναι καὶ συνεργοὺς

τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσµῳ γινοµένων, Diels 75). Awake and fully conscious they all have the same viewpoint of the world—the whole world is shared; however, asleep each one turns to their own privately created dream which is not common nor shared with everyone else (ὁ Ἡράκλειτός φησι

τοῖς ἐγρηγορόσιν ἕνα καὶ κοινὸν κόσµον εἶναι, τῶν δὲ κοιµωµένων ἕκαστον εἰς ἴδιον

ἀποστρέφεσθαι, Diels 89). Asleep the dreamer is separated from the conscious reality, the truth, taking refuge in his own fleeting truth which he makes by himself without the revealing influence of the logos. What the communally shared logos provides is the absolute truth about the world while the individually concocted one only dilutes and misleads one from that truth.

On the one hand, alive and awake humans have a shared capacity to understand the common logos, but on the other hand, having awoken from sleep many tend to assume that their individual thoughts, which they have dreamt, could be the actual logos (τοῦ λόγου δ' ἐόντος

ξυνοῦ ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν, Diels 2). Thus, since one’s dream cannot be trusted to convey the logos because it comes from one’s own mind and not the shared consciousness of the wakeful world, speaking as though one is asleep is not sensible. In addition, it could explain the idea portrayed in the first fragment. First, Heraclitus seems to imply that what happens in the dream is inconsequential because it is uncertain and is not rooted in fact for it does not contain any evidence of the logos. Second, he states that men tend to forget what they do awake in the same manner as they forget whatever they have dreamt. If their dreams are so unstable and untrustworthy because they do not contain the true knowledge of the logos, then it Novikova 31 is not altogether unfounded to infer that, since men are uncertain about what they perceive, they tend to forget what they are unable to interpret about the world.

The correlation between ignorance and sleep is further emphasized in the following fragment: θάνατός ἐστιν ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ὁρέοµεν, ὁκόσα δὲ εὕδοντες ὕπνος (“whatever we see while awake is death, and whatever we see while asleep is sleep,” Diels 21). It is important to remember that one prominent feature of Heraclitus’ philosophy is the constant flux that occurs in nature and how that flux contributes to the existence of opposites in the world. His overall philosophy is paradoxical by nature and is based on the idea that two opposing forces can coexist to create one whole (Kahn 1979; Wheelwright 1997). This further supports the idea that everything is one and the same. As one of his fragments states: ταὐτό τ' ἔνι ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκὸς καὶ

[τὸ] ἐγρηγορὸς καὶ καθεῦδον καὶ νέον καὶ γηραιόν· τάδε γὰρ µεταπεσόντα ἐκεῖνά ἐστι κἀκεῖνα

πάλιν µεταπεσόντα ταῦτα (“it is the same thing: living and being dead, being awake and sleeping, being young and old. For these things are changed into those and those again are changed into these,” Diels 88). There is no end nor is there a beginning to anything, for the world is one big whole constructed of various parts which continually change and are in the state of constant flux—one state fluidly turns into another: one who is alive will eventually die; one who is young will eventually grow old; one who is awake will eventually sleep and the one asleep will eventually wake up. Heraclitus’ cosmos is filled with opposites that are transformed into one another. Continuing this train of thought and supported by what I have said about the common and the individualized truths, awake we can catch a glimpse of true knowledge, true logos, while asleep through a dream we receive false knowledge. Novikova 32

Additionally, not only do these contrary ideas exist simultaneously, but they are also dependent upon one other, as seen in the following fragment: νοῦσος ὑγιείην ἐποίησεν ἡδὺ,

κακὸν ἀγαθόν, λιµὸς κόρον, κάµατος ἀνάπαυσιν (“sickness makes health sweet, evil makes good sweet, hunger satiety, and toil makes rest sweet,” Diels 111)—this is the unity of opposites: one does not exist without the other. When one is sick, being healthy is a desired outcome which becomes even more pleasant once achieved. Without evil events, the good that is done may not seem as impactful or could seem simply ordinary. Without a tiresome day, rest may not seem worthy of being taken up. So, in that regard, it can be assumed that there is no sleep without wakefulness and no full conscious alertness without sleep. However, it can also mean that awake there is knowledge and in sleep ignorance. It is a continuous and unending cycle: without the end of one there is beginning of the other.13 Therefore, it is natural to see death in the world of the living since the two states of being exist at the same time. It is also understandable when

Heraclitus mentions that everything men see while asleep is sleep because, as I have explained previously, dreams do not produce anything of import concerning the logos and are meaningless.

So, when men asleep see sleep, they do not actually “see” anything at all—it is a state of being that is not truly connected to the world of those who are awake. The sleepers see “sleep” because dreams bring nothing important to the mind—they are merely vessels of personalized ideas about the prime principles of the world which could mislead men when they are awake.

This close interrelation of the three states of death, wakefulness, and sleeping can be further explained in the following fragment: ἄνθρωπος ἐν εὐφρόνῃ φάος ἅπτεται ἑαυτῷ

ἀποσβεσθεὶς ὄψεις, ζῶν δὲ ἅπτεται τεθνεῶτος εὔδων, ἐγρηγορὼς ἅπτεται εὕδοντος (“a man

13ξυνὸν γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ πέρας ἐπὶ κύκλου περιφερείας (“for the beginning and the end is common in the circumference of a circle,” Diels 3). Novikova 33 kindles a light for himself at night, having been extinguished in his eyes; alive and sleeping he grasps at [the light] of a dead man, and awake he grasps at [the light] of the sleeping” Diels 26).

The first part of the fragment seems to refer to the dream state—when man goes to sleep, he is unable to perceive anything with his eyes because of the darkness. For this reason, he has to produce his own light (his own dream) to illuminate his surroundings; therefore, sleep is equated with darkness and light with a dream. In the second section, Heraclitus introduces the idea that sleeping is comparable to being dead because both those asleep and those dead are removed from the shared fire.14 It seems that “in sleep the soul is partly cut off from the world fire and so decreases in activity” (Kirk 1990: 205), making it unable to process and properly understand anything. The dream or “light” is a way to introduce some awareness into sleep despite its limited perception. In the final part of the fragment, Heraclitus adds to the idea which he mentions in the first fragment, that men tend to act as though asleep. Having awoken from sleep, man grasps, takes hold of, the light or whatever he has dreamed, employing what he has seen in his dream in his everyday life. However, because that light is specific to the individual who produces it, he is isolated from the truth which is common to all and is rather filled with false knowledge, further tainting the nature of the true logos.

In conclusion, there is a definite change in the views concerning sleep and dreams from

Homer to Heraclitus. Among the overreaching questioning of the world, Heraclitus does not believe that dreams give any genuine knowledge to the dreamer. Since dreams are individually created constructs of what happens while one is asleep, they are a source of misleading and false

14 For Heraclitus, fire is the primary element from which everything is created and which governs over all—“No god nor man made this world order, the same of all things, but it always is and always will be an everlasting fire, kindled in measures and extinguished in measures” (κόσµον τόνδε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων, οὔτε τις θεῶν οὐτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται πῦρ ἀείζωον, ἁπτόµενον µέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύµενον µέτρα, Diels 30). Novikova 34 knowledge about the true logos. Only awake one has the capacity for obtaining true knowledge through the commonly shared logos. Although there is a shift in the understanding and the conception of dreams from Homer to Heraclitus, the two key elements that remain constant are the pursuit of knowledge and the fact that one cannot perceive knowledge through sleep. In

Heraclitus, the sleeper can be seen as a “passive receiver” of the true logos. Since true knowledge is constant and almost seems to exist beyond any human’s capacity to understand it, any apparent “truth” that an individual creates by himself is false. Novikova 35

Chapter 3: Dreams as the Void of True Perception

As I have stated previously with Heraclitus, dreams and the pursuit of knowledge are closely connected by the fact that whatever one dreams while asleep does not lead to the true attainment of knowledge. Plato expounds upon Heraclitus’ idea that the highly individualized nature of dreams makes it impossible for one to obtain true knowledge while asleep. He introduces more prominently the concept of perception into his argument. Although I have used the words “to perceive” and “perception” with Heraclitus, it was to describe the basic act of seeing and obtaining external stimuli. In this chapter, I will attempt to explore Plato’s parameters for perception and how perception itself is related to true knowledge. In his dialogues, Plato has several different stances on dreams and their association with knowledge; however, overall we can infer from his discussions, both explicitly and implicitly, that in dreams people by nature lack the true perception needed in order to obtain true knowledge.

In one of his early15 dialogues, the Apology, the defense of his mentor Socrates, Plato mentions sleep and dreams at the end of the speech (40c-d) during Socrates’ pondering about his condemnation and the positive outlook on death. In this short discussion, Socrates remarks that there are two types of death (40c)—one of which states that dying could result in the absolute void of any sort of perception (αἴσθησιν µηδεµίαν). He adds that this type of death would be a marvelous gain (θαυµάσιον κέρδος ἂν εἴη ὁ θάνατος, 40d) because it leads to a state like the

15 The order of the dialogues has been a source of debate for over a century, resulting in various approaches in identifying their most likely chronology from looking at the language and style (Campbell 1867; Dittenberger 1881; Lutoslawski 1897; Kaluscha 1904; Arnim 1912; Ritter 1935; Wishart and Leach 1970) to employing modern computer techniques. Regardless of the manner in which many scholars tackled the problem, the general consensus is that the Apology belongs to an “early middle” group (387-380 BCE), the Republic II-X and Theaetetus are in the middle group (380-366 BCE), and the Timaeus is among the final group (355-347 BCE). For more detailed information about the various scholarship and the analyses implemented in discovering the order of the dialogues see Ledger 1989 and Brandwood 1992. Novikova 36 person “sleeping” sees no dreams of any kind (ὄναρ µηδὲν, 40d). If death is the lack of perception—that is, if one dies, one does not perceive anything from any of the senses—it is interesting that he introduces dreams into the conversation. He suggests that perception could happen while the sleeper experiences a dream—in any case other than death. As the result, the absence of perception and the dreamless state are very closely interconnected—if one cannot perceive, one does not dream, and if one cannot dream, one does not perceive. The two actions, perceiving and dreaming, are dependent upon one another. It also implies that dreaming is a form of perception because if one does not have dreams in sleep, then there is no perception.

Another instance where dreams are introduced is in Republic IX (Rep. 9.571c-572b) where Plato, describing the basic characteristics of a tyrant, discusses how dreams can show one’s true nature.16 This is the only instance in the passages that I am covering that a person is actually able to perceive some sort of knowledge in the process of dreaming. For Plato, a tyrannical man tends to yield to his innermost and uncontrollable desires which are generally exposed while he is asleep. These are the desires that awaken in sleep whenever one part of the soul sleeps—the one that is rational, civilized and ruling over the other (λογιστικὸν καὶ ἥµερον

καὶ ἄρχον, 571c). When this sort of a person goes to sleep, his dark and inappropriate desires, which he keeps hidden awake, are unleashed fully in his dreams: he is unstable internally because he allows the savage part of himself to remain victorious. On the other hand, anyone who is healthy and of sound mind (ὑγιεινῶς τις ἔχῃ αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ καὶ σωφρόνως, 571d) is able to quell the savage part of his soul before he goes to sleep and not permit it to run wild in the

16 These passages are very reminiscent of Hippocrates description of what happens when one falls asleep in his Regimen IV. The dreams that one perceives asleep help determine the condition of the body, whether it is healthy or sick. Novikova 37 dream. This allows the better part of the soul to grasp at perceiving something it does not know

(ὀρέγεσθαί του αἰσθάνεσθαι ὃ µὴ οἶδεν, 572a).

If the soul is calmed and collected while awake, then man rests in sleep (ἀναπαύηται) where he is especially capable of taking hold of the truth (τῆς τ᾽ ἀληθείας) and where the visions of dreams appear the least lawless (ἥκιστα παράνοµοι…αἱ ὄψεις…τῶν ἐνυπνίων, 572a-b). Thus, a good man with tempered desires can perceive some sort of truth while dreaming despite possessing some terrible, savage and lawless form of desires (ὡς ἄρα δεινόν τι καὶ ἄγριον καὶ

ἄνοµον ἐπιθυµιῶν εἶδος ἑκάστῳ ἔνεστι, 572b), Nevertheless, all of these negative attributes become clear in dreams (τοῦτο δὲ ἄρα ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις γίγνεται ἔνδηλον, 572b). Here dreams are a good indicator of the kind of character someone has—they are representations of suppressed desires which in an unbalanced individual could perhaps spill over into the everyday world of the living. Moreover, some individuals are able to perceive some true knowledge in their dreams— those who are good and moderate, and those who are unable to control that part of themselves only reveal their base nature while not perceiving any true knowledge.

The more revealing commentary on dreams and sleep is seen in his later work, the

Theaetetus. Although there are several different issues that are raised, the governing subject matter of the discussion is the attempt to answer the question of what is knowledge. Introduced as a written account of the event, the main part of the dialogue revolves around a debate between

Socrates, a young Theaetetus,17 and occasionally Theodorus,18 in the year of Socrates’ death. The

17 Theaetetus was an ancient mathematician in the early part of 4th century BCE and a student of Theodorus. At the beginning of the Theaetetus, he is said to have just returned badly wounded from battle at Corinth, which is generally agreed to have taken place in 369. 18 Theodorus of Cyrene (ca. 460-399 BCE) seems to have been a famous mathematician, a student of Protagoras and Plato’s teacher (Gautschi 2008). The details of his life are uncertain—we can only gleam as much of his life as it is revealed in Plato’s dialogues . Novikova 38 philosopher does not waste any time introducing the main question of the discussion: τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ

τοίνυν ἐστὶν ὃ ἀπορῶ καὶ οὐ δύναµαι λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς παρ᾽ ἐµαυτῷ, ἐπιστήµη ὅτι ποτὲ τυγχάνει ὄν

(“well, this is the thing about which I am puzzled and not able to understand sufficiently by myself—what indeed happens to be knowledge,” 145e7). It almost seems impossible to comprehend what direction the answer could take since it is such an abstract idea that encompasses a multitude of probable answers; perhaps it is even too abstract to define concretely. Initially, Socrates does not give Theaetetus any parameters, the criteria, with which knowledge is defined: it is only throughout the dialogue that the various constraints are introduced. However, this does not discourage the young scholar from introducing the first seemingly apparent and logical hypothesis: δοκεῖ οὖν µοι ὁ ἐπιστάµενός τι αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο ὃ

ἐπίσταται, καὶ ὥς γε νυνὶ φαίνεται, οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήµη ἢ αἴσθησις (“it seems to me that the one who knowing something perceives this thing which he knows; thus, now it appears, knowledge is nothing other than sense-perception,” 151e). Of course, perception is a re- occurring subject in Plato’s writing, and I believe it is especially important to understand what

Plato conceived of perception as it pertains to knowledge in order to gleam how dreams are interwoven and are dependent upon both of these concepts.

At the beginning, Socrates seeks to further understand and define Theaetetus’ suggestion by examining previous philosophers who expressed similar sentiment. Naturally, he remembers

Protagoras19 who states that “man (a human being) is the measure of all things—of the things in existence that they are, and of the things not in existence that they are not” (πάντων χρηµάτων

19 Protagoras was an ancient philosopher born around 490 BCE in Abdera on the southern coast of Thrace. Although first starting out as a manual laborer, he later became a student of the atomist philosopher Democritus (ca. 430-370). Having finished his training, he became one of the first sophists, a traveling teacher, offering instruction in various subjects for a fee (Silvermintz 2016)—this is one aspect of the philosopher that Plato seems to detest the most. Novikova 39

µέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν µὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ µὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, 151e). If man is the measure20 of all things, then he is the basis around which everything in the world is judged— he alone knows the correct order of everything in the universe. Socrates also clarifies that statement by explaining that each man has a personalized perception of whatever he perceives

(“every single thing which appears to me—such things are mine, the things that appear to you are yours,” οἷα µὲν ἕκαστα ἐµοὶ φαίνεται τοιαῦτα µὲν ἔστιν ἐµοί, οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί,

152b). Each person receives an individualized vision of everything around them: no single perception is the same because the manner in which the world is perceived is particular to every man: one thing may appear cold to one person but not to another.21 However, according to

Protagoras, it is also true that perception is without deceit and unerring because it usually is of the things which exist at that very moment (αἴσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἀεί ἐστιν καὶ ἀψευδὲς ὡς

ἐπιστήµη οὖσα, 152c). Consequently, this raises the question of the validity of each truth, each perception—how can we know which one is true knowledge if everyone has different experiences with the same thing.

Similarly, Plato recalls Heraclitus’ theory of flux and afterwards how it relates to perception. The contradictions that are inherent in Heraclitus’ philosophy are hinged upon the idea that everything in the world is part of a larger whole filled with many contrasts. According to Socrates, this theory of flux maintains that because of motion, movement, and mixing with one another (ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα), all the things which we, addressing them incorrectly, say are, those things are only coming to be (γίγνεται πάντα ἃ δή

20 The first literal definition of τό µέτρον is “the measure by which anything is measured” (Liddell and Scott). 21φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἴσθησις ταὐτὸν…οἷα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται ἕκαστος, τοιαῦτα ἑκάστῳ καὶ κινδυνεύει εἶναι —“Appearance and perception are the same thing…for, the things that each one perceives, those things may be in such a way for each one” (152c). Novikova 40

φαµεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοντες); therefore, there is never no thing, but there is always something that is being formed (ἔστι µὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτ᾽ οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δὲ γίγνεται, 152d). Many scholars call the arguments in the following passage (152e1-153d5) “bad” arguments, “an exercise in parody,” something not to be taken seriously—it is a way for Plato to address the ridiculousness of the theory of flux and its implications, that without motion everything will completely stop22 (Chappell 2005: 66; McDowell 1973; Burnyeat 1990). It is explained that it is movement that produces being and coming to be (τὸ µὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ τὸ γίγνεσθαι κίνησις

παρέχει) and rest/stillness creates the not being and destruction (τὸ δὲ µὴ εἶναι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι

ἡσυχία, 153a). Along this type of thinking, only motion brings about life, like fire and heat which are generated through motion and friction. On the contrary, stillness simply cannot exist since, as it was stated before, there is never no thing—there has to be something. The more Socrates tries to illustrate the theory of flux, the more it becomes laughable. He gradually discredits Heraclitus’ theory by exaggerating the original idea by going as far as to say that everything is in a such constant state of change (coming to be) that any sort of inactivity is detrimental to the soul (ἔτι

οὖν σοι λέγω νηνεµίας τε καὶ γαλήνας καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι αἱ µὲν ἡσυχίαι σήπουσι καὶ

ἀπολλύασι, τὰ δ᾽ ἕτερα σῴζει, “should I speak about all such things of stillness and calm, that rest corrupts and destroys, and the opposite preserves,” 153c). If this were true, it seems that, according to Socrates, we would not be able to exist at all if there is not the slightest movement

—the whole universe could collapse.

22 I can see the point that this could be a way to further support Heraclitus’ theory (Conford 1935) since, especially taking into consideration modern science, everything on the molecular level literally is in constant motion and without it there is no life. However, this is not what Plato was attempting to do. Novikova 41

Despite the unbelievable implications of the flux theory which Socrates is attempting to promote, the main point he keeps reiterating is that, according to Heraclitus, the universe is in the constant state of change (“everything is motion and there is nothing besides this,” τὸ πᾶν κίνησις

ἦν καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο οὐδέν, 152a). The primary example of this can be seen in the subject of perception itself and the senses. Socrates elucidates that there are two types of movement (τῆς δὲ

κινήσεως δύο εἴδη, 156a) which have an infinite number of combinations, one has the power of doing something (δύναµιν δὲ τὸ µὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον) and the other the power of experiencing it (τὸ

δὲ πάσχειν). The passive movement is the object of perception, the perceived (τὸ µὲν αἰσθητόν), and the active movement is sense-perception (τὸ δὲ αἴσθησις,), the senses—the objects that are perceiving the perceived. These two motions have to be executed together in order to produce what is altogether known as the act of perception—perception cannot occur if one of these is absent (“[it/sense-perception] always occurring and being produced with the perceiving,” ἀεὶ

συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωµένη µετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, 156b). Since everything, even the action of seeing itself, requires uninterrupted motion, nothing can ever exist by itself because it has to be in connection with something else. He strengthens this point by stating that even the verb “to be”

(τὸ εἶναι) should be removed from everywhere (πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον) even though people have been compelled to use it because of custom or ignorance (οὐχ ὅτι ἡµεῖς πολλὰ καὶ ἄρτι

ἠναγκάσµεθα ὑπὸ συνηθείας καὶ ἀνεπιστηµοσύνης χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ, 157a). Additionally, no word/ name should be spoken which would stand still and exhibit any qualities of being inactive (οὔτε

ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὄνοµα ὅτι ἂν ἱστῇ, 157b). Because of the flux theory, nothing ever exists by itself but in conjunction with something else—being by itself will result in stillness, and there has to be continuous movement for anything to just be. All in all, Plato seems to be putting out the “notion Novikova 42 of extreme flux” in order to weaken the definition of perception as it relates to knowledge

(Runciman 1962: 19-20). Because the world is in such constant motion, no true perception can ever be formed, for there is no stability for actual perception to be performed. If there is no constant perception, there is no constant knowledge.

Subsequently, Plato begins to slowly dismantle the flux theory of perception by examining dreams. As I stated before, perception plays an important part in the study of dreams, especially since dreams are a form of a perception. If the senses are key in perceiving and receiving the world during the day, it seem logical that the same thing happens at night when one is dreaming. However, he also states that this is the case in which perception actually fails:

λείπεται δὲ ἐνυπνίων τε πέρι καὶ νόσων τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ µανίας, ὅσα τε παρακούειν ἢ παρορᾶν ἤ τι ἄλλο παραισθάνεσθαι λέγεται. οἶσθα γάρ που ὅτι ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ὁµολογουµένως ἐλέγχεσθαι δοκεῖ ὃν ἄρτι διῇµεν λόγον, ὡς παντὸς µᾶλλον ἡµῖν ψευδεῖς αἰσθήσεις ἐν αὐτοῖς γιγνοµένας, καὶ πολλοῦ δεῖ τὰ φαινόµενα ἑκάστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τοὐναντίον οὐδὲν ὧν φαίνεται εἶναι. (157e-158a)

It falls short in regard to dreams and sicknesses—the ones of madness and of other things which we are said to hear or to see or misperceive as something else. For you know that in all these cases admittedly it seems that the theory which we were just discussing is questioned—that, most assuredly, false perceptions happen for us in them (dreams and sicknesses), and far from the case that the things which appear to each one are; on the contrary, of the things which appear, none exist.

One of the key elements which endorses the initial idea that perception is knowledge is that it is without deceit (ἀψευδὲς), that it always reveals the truth. It is important to notice that, while referring to dreams, Socrates employs the same verbs of hearing, seeing, and perceiving that describe the same kind of actions that one would be expected to perform while awake. It seems Novikova 43 that one would employ one’s own eyes and ears to perceive anything in a dream. However, here one is mis-hearing, mis-seeing, and misperceiving—the prefix παρα- introducing the idea that one is not directly interacting with the object of the perceiving but looking past it, interrupting the connection so-to-speak. Secondly, since the act of perception itself is accomplished only by the combination of the object perceived and the perceiving instrument, and if the object of the perceiving is false, then, theoretically, perception does not occur at all. Therefore, one does not truly “see,” or “hear,” or “perceive” anything in a dream because whatever one believes to have perceived is misleading. Whatever one perceives in a dream is not true perception but a false one, whatever one thinks is appearing to him, it is not. Theaetetus agrees with Socrates on this point by stating that both those who are insane and those dreaming are similar in the fact that they hold false opinions (ὡς οἱ µαινόµενοι ἢ οἱ ὀνειρώττοντες οὐ ψευδῆ δοξάζουσιν, 158a). For example, some madmen believe that they themselves are gods, while others in sleep think that they are with wings and as though they are flying (ὅταν οἱ µὲν θεοὶ αὐτῶν οἴωνται εἶναι, οἱ δὲ

πτηνοί τε καὶ ὡς πετόµενοι ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ διανοῶνται, 158b). While awake insanity can produce irrational beliefs such as thinking oneself to be equal, if not greater, than the gods. In the same manner, some dreams produce unbelievable and impossible things like flying which obviously cannot happen while awake.

True perception has to stable and unable to be contested, but dream-perception is rooted in wavering and uncertain reality. Socrates further challenges the very idea of what is real and what is not, what is true and what is false, by posing a puzzle: τί ἄν τις ἔχοι τεκµήριον ἀποδεῖξαι,

εἴ τις ἔροιτο νῦν οὕτως ἐν τῷ παρόντι πότερον καθεύδοµεν καὶ πάντα ἃ διανοούµεθα

ὀνειρώττοµεν, ἢ ἐγρηγόραµέν τε καὶ ὕπαρ ἀλλήλοις διαλεγόµεθα (“what evidence could Novikova 44 someone be able to show, if someone were to ask now, like at the present time, whether we are sleeping and dreaming everything that we are thinking, or we are awake and are in reality conversing with one another,” 158b-c). Theaetetus once again becomes an active participant by elaborating that the two states are counterparts (ὥσπερ ἀντίστροφα)—that in sleep there is nothing which prevents them from seeming as though they were having the exact same conversation they just had (158c). Whatever they had said awake could happen in the same manner asleep—there would virtually be no distinction between the two occurrences. Moreover, whenever they seem to describe dreams in a dream, the resemblance of describing a dream within a dream to describing a dream while awake is extraordinary (καὶ ὅταν δὴ ὄναρ ὀνείρατα

δοκῶµεν διηγεῖσθαι, ἄτοπος ἡ ὁµοιότης τούτων ἐκείνοις, 158c). Thus, if one cannot distinguish between being awake and being asleep, there is no indicator of one waking up once having gone to sleep. If a dream can mimic everything that happens while a person is conscious, there is no reason to suspect that one is actually dreaming because one would not know that he is. Socrates further adds that whatever one says to be true in sleep is just as equally to be believed as true while awake—the mind is just as confident in one as it is in the other. So, in a dream, one’s mind is sure that whatever it perceives is real, exactly like the conscious mind perceives everything to be true while awake. Nevertheless, an essential difference that Theaetetus points out is that there is a similarity between the two states, and, although they may seem the same, there have to be some discrepancies which separate the two. Likewise, the knowledge that one perceives in dreams may seem like true knowledge but it is not.

In the same manner, sickness is comparable to dreams (sleep) in the way that the two states experience false perceptions. Plato examines this idea by looking at the different Novikova 45 perceptions that occur for a sick Socrates (ἀσθενοῦντα) in contrast to a healthy one (ὑγιαίνοντα,

159c). Using the taste of wine as an example, he emphasizes the fact that to a sick man the wine would appear bitter but to a healthy man sweet. When it comes to a healthy person, the two motions of one thing performing the action and the other thing experiencing the sweetness and perception (τό τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον γλυκύτητά τε καὶ αἴσθησιν) are being carried out together

(ἅµα φερόµενα ἀµφότερα). The perception from the thing being acted upon causes the tongue to be perceiving (ἡ µὲν αἴσθησις πρὸς τοῦ πάσχοντος οὖσα αἰσθανοµένην τὴν γλῶτταν

ἀπηργάσατο, 159d), and the sweetness from the wine, carried around it (the wine), makes the wine sweet to a healthy tongue (ἡ δὲ γλυκύτης πρὸς τοῦ οἴνου περὶ αὐτὸν φεροµένη γλυκὺν τὸν

οἶνον τῇ ὑγιαινούσῃ γλώττῃ ἐποίησεν)—it is both sweet and appears to be (καὶ εἶναι καὶ

φαίνεσθαι, 159d). As has been stated before, perception itself requires the combined movements of the thing perceived with its perceiver. For this reason, in order for the object of perceiving to be perceived properly, the perceiver has to be commensurable with the perceived (σύµµετροι).23

If thinking of the two in the terms of positives and negatives, let us say that a healthy man is positive and the sweetness of the wine is positive as well. When the two notions come together, they create a positive outcome—the tongue perceives that the wine is sweet. Now, if a sick man is negative and the wine is still positive, then the result is negative—although the properties of the wine have not changed and it is still sweet, the sick man perceives something different to what a healthy man does, that the wine is bitter. Therefore, if the perceiver and the perceived do not correspond, they produce something different from what is supposed to be.

23 The prime example of this can be seen Plato’s explanation of how sight works when it comes to the color white. The notion of seeing is possible when the eye comes into contact with something that is commensurable with itself —something that is of equal quality (ὄµµα καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν τούτῳ συµµέτρων, 156d). Only things that are similar to one another can combine together—if one thing is slightly different to the other, nothing is created. Novikova 46

It appears that there are two main components of perception: what is and what appears to be—what the mind interprets as the truth is not necessarily what actually is. In this scenario, the sweetness of the wine is what is but the bitterness is what it appears to be to a sick man— regardless of the state of the man, the wine has not changed. This is in direct contrast with what

Protagoras said about appearance and perception being the same thing. But, at the same time,

Socrates comments that it is only for the individual to judge what is and what is not for each one

—what he believes is and what he believes appears to be (160d). Nevertheless, the thing perceiving the actions and the thing receiving the actions react differently depending on not only the particular individual who is experiencing it but also on the state of the specific person— perception can differ from person to person but it can also differ within the same person. If a healthy man correlates to someone awake and a sick man to the one dreaming, whatever same thing he perceives in the two states could yield different outcomes. If we apply the same type of logic to dreams and sleep as Socrates does to sickness, then it seems illogical that whatever one

“sees” asleep should be explained using the same criteria as the things one sees awake since perception can be rather fluid and unpredictable. In a dream, one could perceive oneself flying and feel the wind on their face and move through the sky like a bird; however, one could not perceive the same thing awake because it is impossible for a human being to fly. Both of these cases cannot be true: either man can fly or he cannot. For this reason, perception fails because of its inconsistency and instability when it comes to differing perception of the same thing in one person.

Overall, Socrates repeats himself several times in the first part of the dialogue to instill the notion that whatever principles support the idea that perception is knowledge are unreliable Novikova 47 or even that any perception we experience can lead to true knowledge. Just as I have been interjecting some inconsistencies in the theories that he himself was laying out, Socrates does question the validity of the theories discussed by Protagoras and Heraclitus. First, he attacks

Protagoras’ statement that man is the measure of all things by addressing how inconceivable it is that all perception is without deceit and infallible (ἀψευδὲς). Like Xenophanes who criticized humans for anthropomorphizing the gods, Plato criticizes Protagoras for generalizing the idea that man could know anything at all. For, he might just as well say that a pig (ὗς) or a baboon

(κυνοκέφαλος) were the measure of all things or anything else strange as long as they have the ability to perceive (τι ἄλλο ἀτοπώτερον τῶν ἐχόντων αἴσθησιν, 161c). More precisely, Plato

“attacks the idea that the opinion or judgement that anyone forms on the basis of perception is infallible” (Chappell 2005: 91). If every man is a measure for the things which he perceives in the world, and if perceptions vary from person to person, then, each one’s judgment about whether something is true or not can also differ. The perception about the same object could be seen differently. If it is for one to judge what one perceives on his own, then someone else’s interpretation of the same thing could be drastically dissimilar.

Furthermore, dreams are similar to memory because both rely on utilizing one’s senses in order to perceive, regardless of whether it is a true or false perception. He brings up the question of whether someone, having learned something, may not know it even though he remembers it

(εἰ µαθών τίς τι µεµνηµένος µὴ οἶδε, 163d). Having stated previously that knowledge is sense- perception and sight is one of the senses through which one perceives external stimuli, then when someone sees something with his own eyes, he receives and, consequently, knows it. Therefore, both sight and perception and knowledge are considered to be the same thing (ὄψις γὰρ καὶ Novikova 48

αἴσθησις καὶ ἐπιστήµη ταὐτὸν ὡµολόγηται, 164a). As a result, someone may not know something about which he has become knowledgeable because he does not see it (συµβαίνει ἄρα,

οὗ τις ἐπιστήµων ἐγένετο, ἔτι µεµνηµένον αὐτὸν µὴ ἐπίστασθαι, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ ὁρᾷ, 164b). So, if someone does not see, he does not know. Following this logic, since one mis-sees and mis- perceives anything one encounters in dreams, then one does not truly know what one has dreamt.

That is why someone may remember something but not know it because remembering is not the same as seeing, just as dreaming is not. One has to experience the perception physically first hand—see it, hear it, feel it—in order to know it. Assuming that here sight is the only sort of perception, this leads to the ridiculous notion that remembering is not knowing. This impossible conclusion leads to the final idea that, despite the fact that the two are related, knowledge and perception are two different things (ἄλλο ἄρα ἑκάτερον φατέον, 164b). After all, how can memory not be knowledge of something that someone has already perceived. Thus, perception cannot be the sole criterion by which one forms an opinion about what one has seen and call that knowledge. Or, at least, what one perceives individually can be a form of knowledge, one that is misleading. Mere perception of anything cannot be true knowledge just like hearing someone speak does not mean that one knows what that person is saying (163b). Knowledge is constant while perception, in all of its multiple forms, can vary greatly—perception changes from one person to another and is “dependent on its instruments in ways that knowledge is not” (Chappell

100). Knowledge gained from perception, in theory, is the same for everyone while perception itself depends on elements such as sight and hearing (among others). Because perception itself varies from person to person and dreams are a form of perception, then the “knowledge” obtained from dreams cannot be true knowledge. Novikova 49

Moreover, the varied nature of perception and the inconsistencies that it could produce are in direct conflict with the fact that “for knowledge to be possible, there has to be…stability in the world” (Cooper 2000: 29). This especially comes into effect when Socrates finally re- addresses Heraclitus’ theory of flux and concludes that this theory is too unstable to provide a concrete answer. The contradictory nature of his philosophy makes it impossible to reach a single whole conclusion. If everything is in motion, then every answer which anyone gives could both be correct, be both one way and another way at the same time (183a). If everyone has their own interpretation of the same thing which they perceived, then everyone’s perception is correct— something could both be hot and cold, sweet and bitter depending on the individual. Hence, since perceptions also vary from one sensory input to another (what one sees could be different from what one hears), Socrates contemplates what kind of force (ἡ δύναµις) is able to make clear what is common to all things, the senses (185c). Both Theaetetus and Socrates agree that it is the soul by itself (αὐτὴ δι᾽ αὑτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ) that seems to examine the commonalities among all things (τὰ

κοινά…φαίνεται περὶ πάντων ἐπισκοπεῖν, 185e). He clarifies that knowledge is not in experiences (τοῖς παθήµασιν) but in the reasoning about those things (ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων

συλλογισµῷ). It is possible to grasp the concept of being and truth from reasoning but impossible from base perceptions (οὐσίας γὰρ καὶ ἀληθείας ἐνταῦθα µέν…δυνατὸν ἅψασθαι, ἐκεῖ δὲ

ἀδύνατον, 186d). The final conclusion that Plato reaches is that “immediate sensory awareness never tells us anything…[because] sensation in itself has no cognitive content” (Chappell 151-2)

—knowledge is not merely perceiving something externally but also understanding what has been perceived internally. Novikova 50

How does all of this relate or even illuminate anything about dreams as described thus far in the dialogue? It is important to consider dreams both by themselves in their unconscious state and in relation to perception one receives while conscious. While exploring the multiple aspects of perception, Plato purposefully alienates dreams, forcing them into a separate category. By linking the dream state to physical sickness and mental insanity, he attempts to prove that all three of these states are similar in the way that they provide skewed and unstable views of perception by the senses. If the senses themselves cannot be trusted to convey a truthful account of what one perceives, then perception itself is compromised. Moreover, in a dream it is not only the senses that could be untrustworthy but whatever one perceives as well. Sleep, in a way, creates a separate “reality” where the normal and stable rules of the conscious world are disrupted. It could produce objects of perception that are fantastical and unrealistic. Thus, it is that instability in the truth of what one perceives that makes dreams an unreliable source of knowledge. Since perception overall does not lead to true knowledge, no true knowledge can be gleamed from dreams. Furthermore, if we draw a parallel between sleep and wakefulness, dreams (or what is perceived in them) are bare sensory perceptions which do not provide the dreamer with an explanation of what they actually mean. Regardless of whether what one dreams is true or false, the dream itself does not truly relate anything at all. If we consider all of the perceptions experienced in a dream as one whole, the dream does not signify anything to the dreamer during the dream, and awake it has to be interpreted by the soul to gain any insight whatsoever. Therefore, it seems that dreams in the Theaetetus are unfortunately deceitful forms of perception which yield nothing knowledgeable to the dreamer. Novikova 51

There is a brief but interesting interjection of the word ὄναρ in the third definition of knowledge. As an introduction to the last attempt in identifying knowledge, Theaetetus states that he remembers some men saying that knowledge is true belief with an account. Unlike the previous two debates where the definitions came from his own mind, here he distances himself from the upcoming argument and discussion. It is not he himself who is suggesting this, but it was something he heard from someone else (ὅ γε ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπόντος του ἀκούσας

ἐπελελήσµην, νῦν δ᾽ ἐννοῶ, 201d). Consequently, Socrates immediately counters this statement by introducing something that he had also heard: ἄκουε δὴ ὄναρ ἀντὶ ὀνείρατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ αὖ

ἐδόκουν ἀκούειν τινῶν ὅτι τὰ µὲν πρῶτα οἱονπερεὶ στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν ἡµεῖς τε συγκείµεθα καὶ

τἆλλα, λόγον οὐκ ἔχοι (“Listen to a dream in return for a dream. For, in turn, I seemed to hear from some people that the first elements, as it were, from which both we and other things are composed, do not have an account,” 201d-e). There could be two possible interpretations: the predisposition of the following argument as false or an open-ended invitation for further theories.

One of the questions that rises from Socrates’ statement is why he refers to what Theaetetus heard as a dream. Is he introducing this argument in order to invalided it before it is really explored in the discussion? Since dreams, as it has been said previously, are unreliable and deceitful, it is natural to assume that whatever Theaetetus heard from others is just as false and uncertain as what he himself is about to impart upon his listeners—one falsehood for another, one dream for another. Similarly, Plato could be deliberately calling the following argument a result of some faraway dream in order to welcome his audience into interpreting this statement in their own right. Because dreams are mere sensory perceptions that one receives without proper understanding behind them, Plato could practicing his own intellectual midwifery by putting Novikova 52 forth some ideas that are disguised as a dream, an unformed and unrefined vessel, and welcoming others to organize their own conclusions, for his own deliberations about this subject regrettably lead to nothing.

In conclusion, in Plato dreams are forms of individually shaped perceptions which usually carry false knowledge to the sleeper. Regardless of whether it leads to true knowledge or not, perception is still an integral part in receiving information from one’s senses. In the Apology, the lack of a dream is equated to the lack of any perception which would translate to no gain of any sort of knowledge during sleep (death): the two concepts have to occur simultaneously to either to happen, without perception there is no dream because the dream is part of perception.

Even in the Republic IX, although the words of αἴσθησις and αἰσθάνοµαι, or any other variations,24 are not specifically used, it is implied that dreams represent and are a mirror of internalized and suppressed desires which one cannot experience, or perceive, awake. True knowledge can be derived from dreams for certain people who are good, and it is unattainable for those who are bad. Lastly, in the Theaetetus, dreams are the source of and are considered to be false perceptions, misleading perceptions, which trick the dreamer into believing what they dream is true knowledge when it is not. Since perception is rooted in the reliance on one’s sense to receive incoming data, when the senses themselves are untrustworthy, what one perceives in dreams becomes unstable and unreliable. Thus, dreams are an inaccurate manner of attaining true knowledge. Nevertheless, although Plato’s ideas may change from one dialogue to another, his conception of dreams, for the most part, remains constant—generally dreams do not hold any significant value in attaining true knowledge.

24 Plato does use αἱ ὄψεις (“visions of dreams”) in reference to dreams. Novikova 53

Conclusion

Attaining any sort of knowledge through dreams is a tradition that began millennia ago and is still the subject of study today. The study of dreams is vast, and the short selection that I have addressed in my thesis is small compared to the centuries of research and contemplations.

Having specifically chosen Homer, Heraclitus, and Plato as the sources of my research, I was able to conclude that in the philosophical sphere, dreams came to signify something different in the 4th/5th centuries BCE to what importance they tended to have in Homer. In the Iliad and the

Odyssey, dreams were generally messages of supernatural knowledge imparted upon the sleeper by a higher power. There were a form of aural perception that the sleeper, acting as a passive recipient, would perceive from an outside source. The individual did not create the dream himself but accepted it from somewhere else. However, in Heraclitus, it is the individual who constructs the dream in his own private world while asleep. Any knowledge that the dream could contain is not true knowledge because it does not come from the common perception that everyone shares. Finally, in Plato, in accordance to Heraclitus, the sleeper also makes his own dreams. Additionally, as a form of perception dreams are too unreliable and inconsistent to lead to true knowledge. Thus, perceiving something in a dream, or receiving a dream at all, is not a good source of true knowledge because it is too personalized. Every person has his own perceptions and subsequent reactions to what he has perceived. Seeing the way the conception of perception itself changed throughout the centuries is interesting because it also shows a growing interest in how the individual himself perceives the world. By further studying the connection between dreams, perception, and knowledge, we can perhaps start questioning our own perception in dreams and attempt to see what we truly know about them. Novikova 54

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