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Home , Militarization of police, SWAT

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Author: Mary Hinz May 2020

Militarization of : A Research Project of Friends for a Nonviolent World Community safety is an essential component to a healthy community. Many police departments are currently working to implement community policing, a style of policing that is, by its very nature, based upon respect for all community members. At Friends for a Nonviolent World, we recognize the need to build trust between personnel and community members.

There are many impediments to the creation of trust between the police and the communities they serve. One recent and pernicious cause of the gulf between the police and those they are hired to serve and protect is the “ of police.” Media stories, journal articles, scholarly studies, and books describing this phenomenon have been appearing more frequently over the past several years. As part of our work in exploring departmental policies, FNVW volunteers began researching the meaning of police militarization and discovered police department policies and practices that either encourage or discourage this development.

This paper describes the characteristics of militarized police forces and follows with questions citizens can investigate to assess their local law enforcement departments.

What is “”?

Scholars define militarization of police as the “process whereby police increasingly draw from, and pattern themselves around, the tenets of and the model” (Kraska, 2007, p.3), leading to “beliefs and values that emphasize the threat and to solve problems” (Lawson, 2019). Wikipedia (2020) defines this process as “the use of military equipment and tactics by law enforcement officers. This includes the use of armored personnel carriers, assault rifles, submachine guns, flashbang , launchers, rifles, and Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams.”

What is the Mindset of a Militarized Police?

Mindset refers to how individuals and departments working in law enforcement view their roles. Both scholars and police draw a distinction between two types of police training and deployment, those functioning as a guardian or as a warrior. According to Police Chief Joseph Price, quoted in a PoliceOne article, the contrast between “a guardian mentality” and the “warrior mentality” is a choice between an officer being there to “protect the citizens rather than conquer them” (Brocklin, 2015, section 3).

An article in the Harvard Law Review contains a more extensive definition of the warrior mindset and speaks to its underpinnings (Stoughton, 2014):

From their earliest days in the academy, would-be officers are told that their prime objective, the proverbial “first rule of law enforcement,” is to go home at the end of 2

every shift. They are taught that they live in an intensely hostile world. A world that is, quite literally, gunning for them. As early as the first day of the police academy, the dangers officers face are depicted in graphic and heart-wrenching recordings that capture a fallen officer’s last moments. Death, they are told, is constantly a single, small misstep away. A recent article written by an officer for Police Magazine opens with the description: “The dangers we expose ourselves to every time we go [on duty] are almost immeasurable. We know this the day we sign up and the academy certainly does a good job of hammering the point home.” For example, training materials at the New Police Academy hammer that point quite explicitly, informing recruits that the suspects they will be dealing with “are mentally prepared to react violently.” Each recruit is told, in these words, “[Y]ou could die today, tomorrow, or next Friday.” Under this warrior worldview, officers are locked in intermittent and unpredictable combat with unknown but highly lethal enemies... For Warriors, hypervigilance offers the best chance for survival. Officers learn to treat every individual they interact with as an armed threat and every situation as a deadly force encounter in the making. Every individual, every situation — no exceptions. Because the enemies’ identities are unknown, everyone is a threat until conclusively proven otherwise (pp. 226- 228).

In summary, the warrior mindset is a belief that the world is a dangerous place, that many “bad guys” exist in the world, and the “” of a police force is the only barrier blocking dangerous criminals ready and willing to prey on at every possible opportunity, leading to a “us versus them” attitude. From the perspective of a former police chief, “This syndrome, I believe, begins when recruits are assembled together in a para-military style of organization to begin their academy training, where from the onset the attitude is one of elitism” (Gigliotti, 2016). In light of the far more frequent occurrence of in BIPOC neighborhoods compared to all others, it is worth considering whether this warrior mindset is more likely to be triggered in those neighborhoods. Are they truly more dangerous with more “bad guys,” or are the police more likely to assume BIPOC taxpayers are “bad guys”?

The following article provides an example of law enforcement training that emphasizes ever- present mortal danger: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2017/02/14/a-day- with-killology-police-trainer-dave-grossman.

The Use of Military-Grade Armaments

The perception that fighting drug called for a “” was reflected in the kind of weapons and equipment that became available to local law enforcement departments. Weapons became more powerful, protective clothing advanced from a to total body garb, and equipment included armored tanks, helicopters, and shoulder-borne missile launchers.

The escalation in armaments available to local law enforcement departments began over 50 years ago with the War on Drugs. During the mid-60s, the fear of increasing and the possibility 3 of spreading across the nation occupied the public mind. “In city after city across America, the police are stockpiling armored vehicles … and high-powered rifles… they are preparing for summer and the riots they hope will not occur” (Balko, 2013, p. 63).

Congressional funding to fight the “war” began in the 1960s in response to protesting and rebellion against the Vietnam War and urban poverty, and Congress continued to increase funding on a regular basis and in ever-increasing amounts for the next decades. The “war” gained more similarity to military action when, in 1981, police departments were able to acquire military-grade equipment. The Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies Act permitted the military to collaborate with civilian law enforcement, including sharing information and facilities and training on the use of military equipment.

Section 1208 of the National Defense Act of 1990, signed by Pres. George H.W. Bush, allowed transfer of surplus military equipment to law enforcement agencies, provided the agencies used this equipment in the fight against drug crimes. Distribution of the equipment started with the 1208 program. The program was expanded in 1994 when the U.S. Department of Justice and the Department of Defense agreed to a memorandum of understanding, and again, the priority was the transfer of federal military equipment to local police forces for action against drugs and .

Section 1033 of the Defense Authorization Security Act of 1997 accelerated the transfer of military equipment to domestic law enforcement departments. All law enforcement agencies were allowed to request this equipment, and many did. Between 1997 and 1999, the agency created by the Defense Authorization Security Act conveyed 3.4 million orders of military equipment to over 11,000 local police agencies in all 50 states (Balko, 2013).

The transfer rate of weapons continued to increase after 9/11. Congress highlighted the need to transfer such equipment in support of (Phillips, 2017). The type of equipment transferred went beyond armored vehicles, helicopters, and grenade launchers to include army tanks, machine guns, and protective gear such as military-grade full- and helmets with shields that mask identification.

The emphasis on fighting a war appeared in statements by various civilian and police leaders, as reported in Rise of the Warrior Cop (Balko, 2013), as they described the military equipment acquired for fighting a war:

“Blessed are the peace makers, for they shall be called the children of God.” -Sherriff Leon Lott of Richland County, South Carolina, quoting Matthew 5.9 in a press release announcing his acquisition of a track-propelled armored personnel carrier with a belt-fed rotating turret capable of firing .50-caliber rounds of ammunition. (p. 239)

“The war on drugs… I liken it to the Vietnam War. Hit and miss, there is no clear win – we don’t know if we’re gaining ground or not. What we want to do is we want to change our strategy. We want to make this more like the Normandy invasion.” -Former Clayton County, Georgia Victor Hill. (p. 333)

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“The way these people were treated has to be judged in the context of a war. -Hallandale, Florida, Attorney Richard Kane, after city police mistakenly raided Edwin and Catherine Bernhardt. (p. 333)

“I have my own army in the NYPD - the seventh largest army in the world.” Mayor Michael Bloomberg. (p. 333)

The costs associated with the transfer of equipment is notable and has continued regardless of which party controls the presidency. Under , LESO, ’s Law Enforcement Support Organization, dramatically increased the value of distributed armaments by several hundred million dollars. Equipment valued at one-half billion was distributed annually in 2011 and 2012. During the early Trump administration, these levels were maintained. Between 1990 and 2017, “the program has transferred more than $6.8 billion worth of property” to local law enforcement agencies (Defense Logistics Agency; Balko, p. 301).

A link to information about equipment accessed by departments is available at: https://www.dla.mil/DispositionServices/Offers/Reutilization/LawEnforcement/ .

Many but not all departments have been pleased with the program. Problems with mismanagement and accountability, have, in recent years, led some departments to discontinue the program.

“Especially over the last 10 years, mismanagement has plagued the 1033 program. Military grade weapons have been sent with little or no accountability to local communities. Reports of missing equipment and inappropriate transfers prompted a moratorium on the program from May 2012 through October 2013. Missing weapons and a failure to comply with guidelines also led to the suspension of three entire states and 146 individual law enforcement agencies from the 1033 program by 2014.” (FCNL, 2018, xi)

A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report from July 2017 reveals an ongoing lack of accountability. The GAO created a mock police department, using the address of a vacant parking lot, and received approximately $1.2 million in controlled military items. The materials received, including simulated rifles and pipe bombs, were able to be modified into lethal weapons with commercially available products (Mosteller, 2018), and “recipients routinely did not even have to show identification to receive the materials” (FCNL, 2018).

Policies accompanying the weapons acquisition can be costly and may alter the direction or change the incentives of law enforcement activity within a community:

”Furthermore, regulations that accompany the receipt of property under the 1033 program create perverse incentives for local law enforcement agencies to ensure they are able to retain the property for their department’s use. First, police must use any property acquired through the program within one year of receipt, otherwise they must return it to the Department of Defense. Second, law enforcement agencies are responsible for all of 5

the transportation, maintenance, and conversion costs of this equipment. Although the initial zero cost for the equipment may be appealing, the insurance, fuel, storage, training, and cost to convert the equipment for law enforcement’s use can be extremely high. In some instances, these costs are too expensive for many jurisdictions to justify retaining the equipment if it is not being used on a frequent basis. This creates an incentive for the agency to utilize the equipment in circumstances where it may not appropriate or reasonably necessary simply to justify its retention by the agency. It also encourages police to shift resources away from catching individuals who are the largest threat to public safety to activities that will reap financial benefits for the department through civil asset forfeiture or seizure of property associated with low-level drug possession” (Mosteller, 2018).

Increased weaponry also raises concerns about a rise in civilian deaths. “A 2017 analysis by the Washington Post found that police departments which invested in more military hardware were associated with more civilians killed each year by police” (Rodriguez, 2019).

The Road to Military-Style Enforcement: No-Knock Warrant and Exigent Circumstances

The “exclusionary rule” reinforced the need for a warrant by prohibiting the use of evidence obtained in illegal searches. This rule allowed defense attorneys to request dismissal of evidence obtained by law enforcement officers without a warrant. The requirement for law officers to obtain a warrant for entry has been eroded by the police and the US court system since the mid- 60s (Balko, 2013, 56).

The launching of the war against drug crime contributed to this erosion. During the 60s and 70s, the rhetoric continued about the dangers of the drug war and the dangerous nature of the criminals involved in the drug war. Law enforcement turned to the no-knock warrant, a warrant that allows police entry without prior indication, such as a knock on the door. Judges or issue the warrant upon presentation by the police of a strong indication that, at a certain time, criminal activity or evidence of criminal activity is on the premises (Balko, 2013, 83-85).

The initial grounds for no-knock warrants were the “exigent circumstances” rule, the presumption that providing notice prior to entry would allow for the destruction of evidence. courts, in 1963, rendered the decision that allowed no-knock searches when there is to believe that illegal drugs would be seized on the premises if they were not disposed of, e.g., flushed down a toilet.

Another presumption providing grounds for allowing the use of a no-knock warrant is “in the event where there is a large perceived threat to officer safety during the execution of the warrant” (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/No-knock_warrant, n.d.).

To little avail, court cases such as v. Tobin have challenged the use of a no-knock warrant. A reasonable presumption has been liberally and perhaps unconstitutionally applied, particularly in narcotics cases, to ward off defendants' suppression of evidence motions in situations where there was no real exigency prior to police action (United States v. Tobin, 1991) 6 but has not served as an effective deterrent to the practice. Presently 80% of all warrants issued, many unrelated to criminal drug activity, are no-knock warrants.

Some examples of inappropriate use of no-knock warrants include: to enforce rules applicable to poker games in American Legion Halls, Tibetan monks overstaying their visa, underage drinking laws, occupational licensing (a barbershop), or adequate labeling of beer bottles (BaIko, 2013, 322).

Paramilitary Tactics: SWAT Units

Another example of the militarization of the civilian police force is the SWAT team. The military developed an operational tactic called dynamic entry. A dynamic entry is sudden, no notice is given, a battering ram is used to break open doors, and flashbang grenades or smoke bombs may be used to startle or disorient occupants. The team of officers executing the maneuver is called a SWAT team, or, Special Weapons And Tactics team.

Police Chief of first introduced this strategy to law enforcement in 1964 (Balko, 2013, 53). The intent was to develop highly trained units that were able to deal with crisis situations: and rioting as in Watts, taking during a crime in progress, school shootings, attacks upon crowds by gunmen holed-up in buildings, and other events of imminent danger to the public.

What began in Los Angeles quickly spread. By 1975, there were approximately 500 SWAT teams in the US. By 1982, 59 percent of all US cities with populations over 50,000 had a SWAT team and, by 1995, this had increased to 89 percent. In 1995, the average annual number of times each SWAT team in the US was deployed was 55 times. More than three-quarters of all these deployments were for drug warrants (Balko, 2013, 137, 175). In 1987, the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) conducted 36 SWAT raids; a decade later, in 1996, the MPD carried out more than 700 SWAT raids.

Once departments had the teams, they used them. The laxity around signing no-knock warrants and exigent circumstances justifications combined to allow for a scenario where the use of no- knock SWAT raid proliferated. “A battering ram or other forced-entry device is used in two- thirds of these raids, nearly 80 percent of which target private homes. The great bulk of SWAT raids are in service of the drug war, though nearly four out of 10 find no contraband at all” (Kristian, 2015).

Most SWAT teams spend their time carrying out home raids. The ACLU analyzed 818 records of SWAT exercises from police departments around the country in 2011 and 2012. They found that 80 percent of the time, SWAT teams were deployed to execute a — instead of crises such as hostage situations or active shooters (Lind, 2015).

A single database of SWAT team incidents has not been compiled. Information has been assembled from reports in the news media from around the nation. Here are some of the sources:

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The article Overkill: The Rise of Police Raid in America, written in 2006, contains an appendix listing 89 examples of botched SWAT raids that caused harm, injury, and death.

“[A] Times’ investigation, which relied on dozens of open-record requests and thousands of pages from police and court files, found that at least 81 civilians and 13 law enforcement officers died in such raids from 2010 through 2016. Scores of others were maimed or wounded...Since 2011, at least seven federal lawsuits against officers executing no-knock warrants have been settled for over $1 million” (Sack, 2017).

Today’s SWAT teams operate wearing battle-grade dress and carrying battle-grade weapons. They enter in force and unannounced, using battering rams, screaming and shouting, pointing weapons, setting off flash grenades and . Officers describe SWAT work as a “a big shot of adrenaline. It’s a rush. And you have to be careful because the raids themselves can be habit- forming” (Balko, 2013, 214). Moreover, local officials are limited in their ability to control these local forces because their funding comes from the federal government and whatever proceeds they reap from the forfeiture of seized assets (Balko, 2013, 244).

The Consequences of SWAT Raids

The fact that SWAT raids overwhelmingly target drug offenders and so often take place in private homes undermines the original justification that these were tools for the police to be effective in crisis situations. Further doubt about their utility is raised by the fact that in many instances, the outcome is tragic.

In a news article titled Houston Officer Lied About Confidential Informant in Deadly Drug Operation, Chief Says, “[a] raid ended in a that killed two people and injured several officers” (Mervosh, 2019). A month later, Houston police ended the use of a no-knock warrant.

Raids that lead to deaths of innocent people are increasingly common; since the early 1980s, forty bystanders have been killed, according to the in Washington, D.C. (Balko & Berger, 2006).

As we forward at FNVW, we should examine research on the decline in public trust of the police. The large number of SWAT raids across the nation, and the instances when the SWAT team forcibly enters an innocent’s home have perhaps undermined public trust. Whether or not these innocent victims of mistaken SWAT raids are adequately compensated for damage to their homes should also be investigated.

Why the Tremendous Growth in the Use of SWAT Teams? One psychological theory advanced by Abraham Maslow that is relevant for explaining but not justifying the increasing use of SWAT teams is the “Law of the Instrument.” The theory proposes that if a tool is handy, it will likely be used even if is not the most appropriate choice. Maslow has been paraphrased to have argued that it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail.” The proliferation of a department’s military- grade equipment correlates with its use in SWAT-style action. 8

Mentioned in multiple articles is the excitement of a SWAT raid. Peter Kraska, a criminologist at the University of Eastern Kentucky, completed a thorough study of the use of SWAT teams. He has written extensively on the growth of SWAT teams, beginning in the 1990s and up to the present day. Below are comments from one of his interviews with SWAT trainers:

“Why serve an warrant to some crack dealer with a .38? With full armor, the right shit, and training, you can kick ass and have fun.” -US military officer who conducted training seminars for civilian SWAT teams in the ‘90s (Balko, 2013, p. 177).

“Most of these [training session participants] just like to play war; they get a rush out of search-and-destroy missions instead of the bullshit they do normally” (Balko, 2013, p. 177).

A third factor in their growth is the perception that SWAT team members are the elite of law enforcement (Smith, 2018). Team members may believe that they are the best trained, the best equipped, and address the situations of the highest risk. (These incentives, wanting to be seen as “the best of the best,” to use the military-grade equipment, the excitement of high-risk situations, are motivations that produce outcomes that do not jibe with public protection and service). A story on the PoliceOne website recommends instead: a de-escalation mindset, the ability to reprogram the body in high-stress environments, mental flexibility (humble servanthood, guardianship, desire, and communication skills), and the will to work hard. “We want people who use eyes and ears first, brain second, mouth third. We want people who listen, think and process information, and act and speak last” (Smith, 2018).

Are SWAT Teams Effective?

A SWAT team is necessary and has proved effective in the situations they were designed to address, such as hostage situations, shooting rampages, terrorist actions, or armed stand-offs. When their use is extended beyond the scope, findings are less positive.

A research study investigated the relationship between increased weaponry in law enforcement agencies and violent behavior by departments. Using county-level data on police killings in four states, the researchers found a positive relationship between “transfers [from the 1033 program] and fatalities from officer-involved shootings” across three separate variables measuring violent behavior: “the number of civilian causalities; the change in the rate of civilian casualties; and an increase in the number of dogs killed by police” (Delehanty, Mewhirter, Welch, & Wilks, 2017).

Researchers investigating the usefulness of SWAT teams for other than the intended limited scope find they have had no effect on crime reduction or on officer safety. According to Jonathan Mummolo, an assistant professor of politics and public affairs at Princeton University, “there is no evidence that acquiring a SWAT team lowers crime or promotes officer safety” (Mummolo, 2018).

Veteran officers have questioned the broader use of SWAT teams. Some SWAT veterans find it confounding that many police agencies remain so devoted to dynamic entry. The tactic is far 9 from universally embraced, and several departments have retired or restricted its use over the years, often after a negative experience. The National Tactical Officers Association, which might be expected to mount the most ardent defense, has long called for using dynamic entry sparingly. Robert Chabali, the group’s chairman from 2012 to 2015, goes so far as to recommend that it never be used to serve narcotics warrants.

“It just makes no sense,” said Mr. Chabali, a SWAT veteran who retired as assistant chief of the Dayton, Ohio, Police Department in 2015. “Why would you run into a gunfight? If we are going to risk our lives, we risk them for a hostage citizen, for a fellow officer. You definitely don’t go in and risk your life for drugs” (Miron, 2017).

Another former chairman of the association, Phil Hansen, said SWAT teams tended to use dynamic entry as “a one-size-fits-all solution to tactical problems.” As commander of the Police Department in Santa Maria, California, and before that a longtime SWAT leader for the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, he said it seemed foolhardy to move so aggressively in a state that voted in November to legalize recreational marijuana (Sack, 2017).

SWAT Teams: Public Demonstrations and

The televising of events during the 14 days of protests in Ferguson, Missouri in August 2015 brought public awareness of the way in which officers, clad in military garb, carrying military equipment, and arriving in military transport and attack vehicles, were used to manage public protest. This was learning akin to watching police activity in Selma, Alabama.

“Bring it on. You fucking animals, bring it on,” one police officer was caught on video telling protesters. In Ferguson and beyond, it seems that some police officers have shed the blue uniform and have put on the uniform and gear of the military and brought the attitude along with it (Szoldra, 2014).

The appearance of the police is directly related to the assumption that police are “militarized” in the public mind.

In a study on the use of SWAT teams and their equipment,

...the results...suggest that military-like displays may prove problematic for the police [when viewed by the public], primarily in appearance, rather than substance. For example, a sizable number of respondents agreed that some tactical characteristics of policing, such as the use of armored vehicles, military-style uniforms, and patrol rifles, contribute to a militarized appearance unacceptable for much of the public” (Phillips, 2017).

According to Mosteller,

The increased militarization of police has occurred alongside a significant decline in public trust for law enforcement agencies. While the public continues to respect their own community’s law enforcement agencies, public confidence and trust in law enforcement 10

as an institution have decreased since the early 2000s. In a national survey from 2016, a majority of Americans stated that they believe the use of military equipment by police is ‘going too far.; This same study also found that most Americans believe that police should be required to receive a warrant before conducting a search of homes and vehicles or monitoring phone calls (Mosteller, 2018).

What Can We Do? Corrective Action This paper is not intended to assert that all law enforcement departments, or even the majority of law enforcement departments, misuse resources and abuse the protections in the process of requesting and serving a search warrant and obtaining resources.

By asking questions and completing basic research, citizens may find information to determine if militaristic behavior is present in their local law enforcement department.

Here are some of the questions to explore:

• How much equipment has your local department requested under the 1033 program? What was acquired? For what use? • How many SWAT teams are in your local department? What proportion of the force qualifies to participate on a SWAT team? How often are they deployed? In what circumstances are they deployed? • How are warrants related to drugs served? Warrants related to other crimes? What percentage of warrants sought and used are no-knock warrants? • Have there been local news stories reporting harm to persons and/or property as an outcome of a SWAT team-type action? Has your municipality been required to provide restitution for police action, such as a SWAT raid? • How robust is your local community policing program(s)? • Are individual officers able to attend any training program of their choice, such as the “killology” type of program? • What is the appearance of uniformed officers when policing a public gathering, a protest march, or a demonstration? If your local department is one that eschews the use of SWAT teams except for very well- defined and limited circumstances, thank your local police leadership.

If something concerns you, using the information you have gathered, begin conversations with your local police and city governance.

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References

Balko, R., (2006). Overkill: the rise of paramilitary police raids in America. CATO Institute.

Balko, R., (2013) Rise of the warrior cop. Perseus Press.

Balko, R. and J. Berger, (2006) “Wrong Door,” CATO Institute, cato.org.

Brocklin, V. (2015). Warriors vs. guardians: A seismic shift in policing or just semantics? Police. One. com.

Delehanty, C., Mewhirter, J., Welch, R., & Wilks, J. (2017). Militarization and police violence: The case of the 1033 program. Research & Politics, 4(2), 2053168017712885.

FCNL (Friends Committee on National Legislation) (2018). “1033 Program & Police Militarization.” FCNL.org.

Gugliotti, M., (2016). The us vs. them syndrome. Medium. medium.com

Kraska, P. B., (N.A.). Militarization and policing-its relevance to 21st century police. Policing advanced access. https://cjmasters.eku.edu/sites/cjmasters.eku.edu/files/21stmilitarization.pdf

Kristian, B., (2015) The troubling rise of SWAT teams. The Week. https://theweek.com/articles/531458/troubling-rise-swat-teams

Lawson, E., (2019). Trends: Police militarization and the use of lethal force. Political research quarterly. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1065912918784209

Lind, D., (2015). Cops do 20,000 no-knock raids a year. Civilians often pay the price when they go wrong. VOX. https://www.vox.com/2014/10/29/7083371/swat-no-knock-raids-police-killed- civilians-dangerous-work-drugs

Marcou, D., (2015) 9 bad and good crowd control lessons from Ferguson’s riots. PoliceOne. https://www.policeone.com/crowd-control/articles/9-good-and-bad-crowd-control-lessons-from- fergusons-riots-W7OglF0Ig8ygiAdN/

Mervosh, S. (2019). “Houston officer lied about confidential informant in Deadly Drug Operation.” New York Times, Feb. 16.

Miron, J. (2017). “No-Knock warrants and the war on drugs,” CATO Institute, cato.org.

Mosteller, J. (2018). Militarization of police. Charles Koch Institute. https://www.charleskochinstitute.org/issue-areas/...policing.../militarization-of-police/

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Mummolo, J. (2018). “Militarization fails to enhance police safety or reduce crime but may harm police reputation.” PNAS 115:37, 9181-9186.

Phillips, S., (2017). Police Militarization. Police Militarization-LEB. https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/police-militarization

Rodriguez, I. (2019). “Is the Warrior Cop a Myth?” The Crime Report. https://thecrimereport.org/2019/05/22/534501

Sack, K., (2017) Door-busting raids leave a trail of blood-the heavy toll of using SWAT teams for search warrants. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/03/18/us/forced-entry-warrant-drug-raid.html

Smith, S. B., (2018). Avoiding the us vs. them mentality. Police Link. http://policelink.monster.com/education/articles/88372-avoiding-the-us-vs-them-mentality

Stoughton, S. (2014). Law enforcement's warrior problem. Harv. L. Rev. F., 128, 225.

Szoldra, P. (2014). “This is the terrifying result of the militarization of police,” businerssinsider.com/police-militarization-ferguson-2014-8.

United States v Tobin, United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1514-17 (11th Cir. 1991) (Clark, Circuit (11th Circuit Court 1991).

Washington Post, 2018. There’s overwhelming evidence that the criminal-justice system is racist. Here’s the proof. The Washington Post, 18.