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Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 18 / Friday, January 27, 1995 / Notices
5396 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 18 / Friday, January 27, 1995 / Notices Citizens National Bancshares, Inc., Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve in providing data processing and related Hammond, Louisiana, and thereby System, January 23, 1995. services for Applicant's subsidiaries: indirectly acquire Citizens National Jennifer J. Johnson, AmericanMidwest Bank & Trust, Bank, Hammond, Louisiana. Deputy Secretary of the Board. Melrose Park, Illinois, and American 2. SouthTrust Corporation, [FR Doc. 95±2053 Filed 1±26±95; 8:45 am] National Bank of DeKalb County, Birmingham, Alabama, and SouthTrust BILLING CODE 6210±01±F Sycamore, Illinois, and also Applicant's of Mississippi, Biloxi, Mississippi; to affiliate bank: First Bank of merge with CNB Capital Corporation, Schaumburg, Inc., Schaumburg, Illinois, Pascagoula, Mississippi, and thereby National Bancorp, Inc.; Notice of pursuant to § 225.25(b)(7) of the Board's indirectly acquire Citizens National Application to Engage de novo in Regulation Y. Bank, Pascagoula, Mississippi. Permissible Nonbanking Activities Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 3. Royal Bank Group of Acadiana System, January 23, 1995. Partnership, Lafayette, Louisiana; to The company listed in this notice has filed an application under § 225.23(a)(1) Jennifer J. Johnson, become a bank holding company by Deputy Secretary of the Board. acquiring 32 percent of LBA Bankgroup of the Board's Regulation Y (12 CFR [FR Doc. 95±2054 Filed 1±26±95; 8:45 am] Inc., Lafayette, Louisiana, which will 225.23(a)(1)) for the Board's approval change its name to Royal Bankgroup of under section 4(c)(8) of the Bank BILLING CODE 6210±01±F Acadiana Inc., Lafayette, Louisisna, and Holding Company Act (12 U.S.C. -
For the Year Ended December 31, 2010 (Ninety-First Edition)
State of Delaware Office of the State Bank Commissioner Annual Report For the Year Ended December 31, 2010 (Ninety-first Edition) Robert A. Glen Commissioner The Honorable Jack A. Markell Governor of the State of Delaware Tatnall Building Dover, Delaware 19901 Dear Governor Markell: I have the honor of presenting the 91st Annual Report of the State Bank Commissioner for the year ending December 31, 2010. This annual report includes the highlights for 2010, and an overview of our work in maintaining a strong financial services industry and protecting consumers. Detailed financial information about Delaware banks, trust companies, and building and loan associations is included in this report, together with tables, charts and graphs that show the strength of the banking industry in our State. The report also includes information regarding the non-bank businesses and individuals we license to provide financial services to consumers in Delaware. Respectfully submitted, Robert A. Glen State Bank Commissioner TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Year 2010 Highlights 1 Overview of the Office of the State Bank Commissioner Approving Bank and Trust Company Applications 2 Examining Financial Institutions 2 Administering the Bank Franchise Tax 3 Licensing Non-Depository Institutions 3 Licensing Individual Mortgage Loan Originators 4 Responding to Consumer Questions and Complaints 4 Providing Consumer Education 4 The State Banking Code and Regulations The State Banking Code 5 State Bank Commissioner Regulations 5 Organizational Chart 6 State Bank Commissioners 7 Council on Banking 8 Banks, Trust Companies, and Building and Loan Associations Bank and Trust Company Changes 9 Number of Type of Institutions 2009 vs. 2010 11 Assets and Income 2006 – 2010 12 Assets 2006-2010 13 Income 2006-2010 14 Delaware Bank Employees 1987 – 2010 15 Bank Franchise Tax Collections by Fiscal Year 16 List of Institutions 17 Financial Statements of Institutions 20 Edge Act Corporations Located in Delaware 104 Licensed Non-Depository Financial Institutions Number of Non-Depository Institutions 2009 vs. -
The Effect of FOMO on Stakeholder Enrollment
The Effect of FOMO on Stakeholder Enrollment Susan L. Young, PhD Kennesaw State University Kennesaw, GA Ph: 470-578-4536 [email protected] Birton Cowden, PhD Kennesaw State University Kennesaw, GA Ph: 470-578-36781 [email protected] 1 The Effect of FOMO on Stakeholder Enrollment Abstract Stakeholder theory suggests dishonest ventures would struggle with stakeholder enrollment, limiting resource access and ultimately failing. Yet cases exist where amoral entrepreneurs do enroll stakeholders through deceit. We propose “fear of missing out” on an opportunity facilitates enrollment by encouraging stakeholder acceptance of information asymmetry. To illustrate we use exemplar Theranos: a biotech firm which convinced stakeholders it would revolutionize healthcare, rising to a $10 billion valuation through 15 years of sustained deceit. We contribute to theory by demonstrating the dark side of stakeholder enrollment, where opportunism increases venture power over stakeholders, and deceit can endure long past start up. Keywords: stakeholder theory, stakeholder enrollment, entrepreneurial deceit, fear of missing out, legitimacy 2 The Effect of FOMO on Stakeholder Enrollment “Theranos had demonstrated a commitment to investing in and developing technologies that can make a difference in people’s lives, including for the severely wounded and ill. I had quickly seen tremendous potential in the technologies Theranos develops, and I have the greatest respect for the company’s mission and integrity.” (Johnson, 2015) — 4-star General Jim Mattis, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired U.S. Secretary of Defense, 2017-2019 The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged Silicon Valley-based private company Theranos Inc., its founder and CEO Elizabeth Holmes, and its former President Ramesh “Sunny” Balwani with raising more than $700 million from investors through an elaborate, years-long fraud in which they exaggerated or made false statements about the company’s technology, business, and financial performance. -
JP Morgan and the Money Trust
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS ECONOMIC EDUCATION The Panic of 1907: J.P. Morgan and the Money Trust Lesson Author Mary Fuchs Standards and Benchmarks (see page 47) Lesson Description The Panic of 1907 was a financial crisis set off by a series of bad banking decisions and a frenzy of withdrawals caused by public distrust of the banking system. J.P. Morgan, along with other wealthy Wall Street bankers, loaned their own funds to save the coun- try from a severe financial crisis. But what happens when a single man, or small group of men, have the power to control the finances of a country? In this lesson, students will learn about the Panic of 1907 and the measures Morgan used to finance and save the major banks and trust companies. Students will also practice close reading to analyze texts from the Pujo hearings, newspapers, and reactionary articles to develop an evidence- based argument about whether or not a money trust—a Morgan-led cartel—existed. Grade Level 10-12 Concepts Bank run Bank panic Cartel Central bank Liquidity Money trust Monopoly Sherman Antitrust Act Trust ©2015, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Permission is granted to reprint or photocopy this lesson in its entirety for educational purposes, provided the user credits the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, www.stlouisfed.org/education. 1 Lesson Plan The Panic of 1907: J.P. Morgan and the Money Trust Time Required 100-120 minutes Compelling Question What did J.P. Morgan have to do with the founding of the Federal Reserve? Objectives Students will • define bank run, bank panic, monopoly, central bank, cartel, and liquidity; • explain the Panic of 1907 and the events leading up to the panic; • analyze the Sherman Antitrust Act; • explain how monopolies worked in the early 20th-century banking industry; • develop an evidence-based argument about whether or not a money trust—a Morgan-led cartel—existed • explain how J.P. -
Temple R. Hollcroft Collection
Temple Hollcroft Collection WELLS COLLEGE ARCHIVES AND SPECIAL COLLECTIONS TEMPLE R. HOLLCROFT COLLECTION Quantity: 5 Linear Feet Containers: 5 Archival Boxes Date Processed: Fall 2010 Processed by: Kathryn McNamara Finding Aid: December 12, 2010 / Amended October 22, 2019 By: Kathryn McNamara / Amended by Robyn Fordyce Edited by: Molly Brown / Tiffany Raymond Prepared for Web: By: Access: There is no restriction on access to the Temple Hollcroft Collection for research use. Particularly fragile items may be restricted for preservation purposes. Copyright: Requests for permission to publish material from the Temple Hollcroft Collection should be directed to the Archives and Special Collections. It is the responsibility of the researcher to identify and satisfy the holders of all copyrights. Page 2 Temple Hollcroft Collection INTRODUCTION Biographical Note/Background: Temple Rice Hollcroft was born in Indiana in 1889. He was a Mathematics Professor at Wells College beginning in 1918 and stayed for 36 years. After his tenure as a faculty member, he was named as the Wells College Historian in 1953, and his interest in history served the college well. He was thorough and dedicated to the position, and a series of his short pieces of historical interest appeared in the Alumna News. He was interested in statistics and intent on accuracy and correct presentation. He died in New York, September of 1967. Related Material: Hollcroft, Temple. A History of Wells College. (3 copies) Hollcroft, Temple. Wells Fargo History. Manuscript (ribbon copy), 1968. Hollcroft, Temple. Salem Town: Partial Autobiography and Masonic Biography. New York: American Lodge of Research, Free and Accepted Masons, 1951. Print. -
A Work Project Presented As Part of the Requirements for the Award of a Master’S Degree In
A Work Project presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Master’s degree in Finance from the Nova School of Business and Economics. THERANOS: BETTING ON BLOOD DIOGO JESUS NETO Work project carried out under the supervision of: Paulo Pinho 06-01-2020 Abstract Theranos was a Silicon Valley start-up founded by Elizabeth Holmes in 2003. Holmes claimed to have developed a new blood-testing device that had the potential to revolutionize the healthcare industry. She established partnerships with Walgreens and Safeway to make her technology available nationwide. She also secured a prestigious board of directors and an equally impressive investor base that raised over $700 million at a peak valuation of $9 billion. However, an investigation by The Wall Street Journal revealed the company had misled investors and endangered patients’ lives. In 2018, Theranos collapsed after years of battling lawsuits and federal charges. Keywords: Theranos, Corporate Governance, Fundraising, Due Diligence This work used infrastructure and resources funded by Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (UID/ECO/00124/2013, UID/ECO/00124/2019 and Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209), POR Lisboa (LISBOA-01-0145-FEDER-007722 and Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209) and POR Norte (Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209). 1 Theranos: Betting on Blood “One of the most epic failures in corporate governance in the annals of American capitalism”. - John Carreyrou1 On June 28, 2019, a crowd of journalists awaited Elizabeth Holmes at the door of the San Jose Federal Court in California for a pre-trial hearing2. She was accused of engaging in a multi-million- dollar scheme to defraud investors, doctors, and patients alongside her former partner, Ramesh “Sunny” Balwani. -
UNITED STATES SECURITIES and EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C
UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 SCHEDULE 13G Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Edison International (Name of Issuer) Common Stock (Title of Class of Securities) 281020107 (CUSIP Number) Check the appropriate box to designate the rule pursuant to which this Schedule is filed: [X] Rule 13d-1(b) [ ] Rule 13d-1(c) [ ] Rule 13d-1(d) *The remainder of this cover page shall be filled out for a reporting person's initial filing on this form with respect to the subject class of securities, and for any subsequent amendment containing information which would alter the disclosures provided in a prior cover page. The information required in the remainder of this cover page shall not be deemed to be "filed" for the purpose of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Act") or otherwise subject to the liabilities of that section of the Act but shall be subject to all other provisions of the Act (however, see the Notes). 13G CUSIP NO. 281020107 1) NAME OF REPORTING PERSON S.S. OR I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NO. OF ABOVE PERSON Wells Fargo & Company (formerly known as Norwest Corporation)* 2) CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP* (a) [ ] (b) [ ] 3) SEC USE ONLY 4) CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION Delaware NUMBER OF (5) SOLE VOTING POWER SHARES 1,465,775 BENEFICIALLY (6) SHARED VOTING POWER OWNED BY 29,049,577 EACH (7) SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER REPORTING 166,802 PERSON (8) SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER WITH 30,502,622 9) AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON 30,686,544 10) CHECK IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (9) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES 11) PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (9) 8.7% 12) TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON HC _____________ * On November 2, 1998, Wells Fargo & Company merged into WFC Holdings Corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Norwest Corporation. -
Comptroller of the Currency Administrator of National Banks Midwestern District 2345 Grand Avenue, Suite 700 Kansas City, Missou
Comptroller of the Currency Administrator of National Banks Midwestern District 2345 Grand Avenue, Suite 700 Kansas City, Missouri 64108 GENERAL INFORMATION This document is an evaluation of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) performance of Norwest Bank Iowa, National Association, Des Moines, Iowa prepared by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the institution's supervisory agency. The evaluation represents the OCC's current assessment and rating of the institution's CRA performance based on an examination conducted as of July 25, 1996. It does not reflect any CRA-related activities that may have been initiated or discontinued by the institution after the completion of the examination. The purpose of the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (12 U.S.C. 2901), as amended, is to encourage each financial institution to help meet the credit needs of the communities in which it operates. The Act requires that in connection with its examination of a financial institution, each federal financial supervisory agency shall (1) assess the institution's record of helping to meet the credit needs of its entire community, including LMI neighborhoods, consistent with safe and sound operations of the institution, and (2) take that record of performance into account when deciding whether to approve an application of the institution for a deposit facility. The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101- 73, amended the CRA to require the Agencies to make public certain portions of their CRA performance assessments of financial institutions. Basis for the Rating The assessment of the institution's record takes into account its financial capacity and size, legal impediments and local economic conditions and demographics, including the competitive environment in which it operates. -
Staff Study 174
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Staff Study 174 Bank Mergers and Banking Structure in the United States, 1980–98 Stephen A. Rhoades August 2000 The following list includes all the staff studies published 171. The Cost of Bank Regulation: A Review of the Evidence, since November 1995. Single copies are available free of by Gregory Elliehausen. April 1998. 35 pp. charge from Publications Services, Board of Governors of 172. Using Subordinated Debt as an Instrument of Market the Federal Reserve System, Washington, DC 20551. To be Discipline, by Federal Reserve System Study Group on added to the mailing list or to obtain a list of earlier staff Subordinated Notes and Debentures. December 1999. studies, please contact Publications Services. 69 pp. 168. The Economics of the Private Equity Market, by 173. Improving Public Disclosure in Banking, by Federal George W. Fenn, Nellie Liang, and Stephen Prowse. Reserve System Study Group on Disclosure. November 1995. 69 pp. March 2000. 35 pp. 169. Bank Mergers and Industrywide Structure, 1980–94, 174. Bank Mergers and Banking Structure in the United States, by Stephen A. Rhoades. January 1996. 29 pp. 1980–98, by Stephen A. Rhoades. August 2000. 33 pp. 170. The Cost of Implementing Consumer Financial Regula- tions: An Analysis of Experience with the Truth in Savings Act, by Gregory Elliehausen and Barbara R. Lowrey. December 1997. 17 pp. The staff members of the Board of Governors of the The following paper is summarized in the Bulletin Federal Reserve System and of the Federal Reserve Banks for September 2000. The analyses and conclusions set forth undertake studies that cover a wide range of economic and are those of the author and do not necessarily indicate financial subjects. -
2016 Annual Report (PDF)
Our Commitment WELLS FARGO & COMPANY ANNUAL REPORT 2016 2016 ANNUAL REPORT Contents 2 | Letter from Chairman of the Board 4 | Letter from Chief Executive Officer and President 14 | Demonstrating Our Commitment 14 | Homeownership: More than a dream 16 | Journey through retirement 18 | A prescription for caring 20 | Bringing bankers to the kitchen table 22 | A home for hope 24 | Building with smart technology 26 | Helping create affordable housing 28 | A future of efficient freight 30 | A bank for life 32 | Operating Committee and Other Corporate Officers 33 | Board of Directors 34 | 2016 Corporate Social Responsibility Performance 35 | 2016 Financial Report - Financial review - Controls and procedures - Financial statements - Report of independent registered public accounting firm 273 | Stock Performance 2 2016 ANNUAL REPORT Dear Fellow Shareholders, Since 1852, Wells Fargo has worked to earn customers’ trust We have enforced senior management accountability by meeting their financial needs and helping them succeed for the damage to Wells Fargo’s reputation through very financially, while maintaining the highest standards of significant compensation actions. The Board accepted integrity. That is why my fellow Board members and I were John Stumpf’s recommendation to forfeit all of his unvested deeply troubled that Wells Fargo violated that trust by equity of approximately $41 million prior to his retirement opening accounts for certain retail banking customers that as Chairman and CEO. The Board required Carrie Tolstedt, they did not request or in some cases even know about. the departed head of Community Banking, to forfeit all This behavior is unacceptable, not only to the Board but of her approximately $19 million of unvested equity. -
The Japanese Economy During the Interwar Period
20092009--JE--21 The Japanese Economy during the Interwar Period: 両大戦間期Instabilityの日本における恐慌と政策対応 in the Financial System and ― 金融システム問題と世界恐慌への対応を中心にthe Impact of the World Depression ― Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies 金融研究所 鎮目雅人 Masato Shizume 2009 年 4 月 May 2009 The Japanese economy during the interwar period faced chronic crises. Among them, the Showa Financial Crisis of 1927 and the Showa Depression of 1930-31 marked turning points. The Showa Financial Crisis of 1927 was the consequence of persistent financial instability because of the incomplete restructuring in the business sector and postponements in the disposal of bad loans by financial institutions. The crisis brought reforms in the financial sector through large-scale injections of public funds and the amalgamation of banks. The Showa Depression of 1930-31 was caused by the Great Depression, a worldwide economic collapse, which had been intensified in Japan by the return to the Gold Standard at the old parity. Japan escaped from the Great Depression earlier than most other countries through a series of macroeconomic stimulus measures initiated by Korekiyo Takahashi, a veteran Finance Minister who resumed office in December 1931. Takahashi instituted comprehensive macroeconomic policy measures, including exchange rate, fiscal, and monetary adjustments. At the same time, the Gold Standard, which had been governing Japan’s fiscal policy, collapsed in the wake of the British departure from it in September 1931. Then, Japan introduced a mechanism by which the government could receive easy credit from the central bank without establishing other institutional measures to govern its fiscal policy. This course of events resulted in an eventual loss of fiscal discipline. -
Riders on the Storm
But………… Riders on the storm November 21, 2012: 11:25 AM ET Wells Fargo avoided the reckless tactics of other banks and quietly built a powerhouse in the West. Now its takeover of Wachovia makes it a national force, but how much toxic waste is aboard the stagecoach? By Adam Lashinsky This story is from the May 4, 2009 issue of Fortune. It is the full text of an article excerpted in Tap Dancing to Work: Warren Buffett on Practically Everything, 1966-2012, a Fortune Magazine book, collected and expanded by Carol Loomis. Pardners: Stumpf, with strongbox, took over as CEO last year, succeeding Kovacevich, who built the empire and plans to retire as chairman. FORTUNE -- Dick Kovacevich ought to be happy. The sun is shining in San Francisco on an early April morning, shares of Wells Fargo, where Kovacevich is chairman of the board, have almost doubled in a month, and Wells appears to have survived the worst of the banking crisis with its reputation intact (so far). Yet Kovacevich, at 65 a pugnacious and famously outspoken banker, is peeved, to put it mildly. He's miffed at short-sellers who have hammered Wells Fargo as if it were one of those troubled-asset repositories. He bemoans the media for failing to recognize Wells Fargo's achievements. Most of all, he's seething with anger at Washington for all sorts of bad decisions, from making a show of big-bank stress tests (which he has publicly The Brooklyn Investor Wells Fargo Page 1 called "asinine") to giving him exactly one hour to accept a $25 billion investment in October from the controversial Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP.