Air Accident Investigation Authority—The Application to the Editorial Offices
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Human Factors of Flight-Deck Checklists: the Normal Checklist
NASA Contractor Report 177549 Human Factors of Flight-Deck Checklists: The Normal Checklist Asaf Degani San Jose State University Foundation San Jose, CA Earl L. Wiener University of Miami Coral Gables, FL Prepared for Ames Research Center CONTRACT NCC2-377 May 1990 National Aeronautics and Space Administration Ames Research Center Moffett Field, California 94035-1000 CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 2 1.1. The Normal Checklist .................................................... 2 1.2. Objectives ...................................................................... 5 1.3. Methods ......................................................................... 5 2. THE NATURE OF CHECKLISTS............................................... 7 2.1. What is a Checklist?....................................................... 7 2.2. Checklist Devices .......................................................... 8 3. CHECKLIST CONCEPTS ......................................................... 18 3.1. “Philosophy of Use” .................................................... 18 3.2. Certification of Checklists ........................................... 22 3.3. Standardization of Checklists ...................................... 24 3.4. Two/three Pilot Cockpit ............................................... 25 4. AIRLINE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS .......................... 27 5. LINE OBSERVATIONS OF CHECKLIST PERFORMANCE.. 29 5.1. Initiation ...................................................................... -
A Study Into the Structural Factors Influencing the Survivability Of
DOT/FAA/TC-16/31 A Study into the Structural Federal Aviation Administration William J. Hughes Technical Center Factors Influencing the Aviation Research Division Atlantic City International Airport Survivability of Occupants in New Jersey 08405 Airplane Accidents September 2016 Final Report This document is available to the U.S. public through the National Technical Information Services (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161. This document is also available from the Federal Aviation Administration William J. Hughes Technical Center at actlibrary.tc.faa.gov. U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority NOTICE This research was carried out at the request of the United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority and the United States Federal Aviation Administration. This activity has been carried out in cooperation with the Federal Aviation Administration and the UK Civil Aviation Authority under the auspices of the International Cabin Safety Research Technical Group whose goal is to enhance the effectiveness and timeliness of cabin safety research. This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of Transportation in the interest of information exchange. The U.S. Government assumes no liability for the contents or use thereof. The U.S. Government does not endorse products or manufacturers. Trade or manufacturers’ names appear herein solely because they are considered essential to the objective of this report. This document does not constitute FAA certification policy. Consult your local FAA aircraft certification office as to its use. This report is available at the Federal Aviation Administration William J. Hughes Technical Center’s Full-Text Technical Reports page: actlibrary.tc.faa.gov in Adobe Acrobat portable document format (PDF). -
Sunday Night, March 22, 1992, Usair Flight 405 Waited in Line to Take Off from New York's Laguardia Airport
Wed., Oct. 16, 2019 - Overwhelmed Overcomer - part 1 Sunday night, March 22, 1992, USAir flight 405 waited in line to take off from New York's LaGuardia Airport. 51 people were on board, including Bart Simon, a Cleveland businessman. A snowstorm was blowing, and an already delayed flight sat in line for 30 more minutes until the control tower gave clearance for takeoff. The plane barely lifted into the air, back down, and up again. But the left wing dipped and hit antennas on the side of the runway; the fuselage began to break apart. The plane flipped into Flushing Bay. 27 people died. But Bart Simon survived. He needed stitches, shoes, and more clothes. Surviving a plane crash is a traumatic experience. Some people would never fly again. But the day after the crash, Bart Simon climbed aboard another USAir plane and flew-safely-home to Cleveland. Bart Simon is an overcomer. Fear and failure ground many people. An unknown future paralyzes people. But “God did not give us a spirit of fear, but of power and love and of a sound mind.” - 2 Tim. 1:7 John 16:33 - "I have told you these things, so that in me you may have peace. In this world, you will have trouble. But take heart! I have overcome the world." As followers of Jesus, we are called to be overcomers. Romans 8:37 - New International Version - “No, in all these things we are more than conquerors through him who loved us.” New Living Translation - “No, despite all these things, overwhelming victory is ours through Christ, who loved us.” Why do we have this victory? Because of God’s love for us. -
Aircraft Safety Accident Investigations, Analyses, and Applications
FM_Krause_140974-2 6/30/03 10:59 AM Page iii Aircraft Safety Accident Investigations, Analyses, and Applications Shari Stamford Krause, Ph.D. Second Edition McGraw-Hill New York Chicago San Francisco Lisbon London Madrid Mexico City Milan New Delhi San Juan Seoul Singapore Sydney Toronto ebook_copyright 7.5x9.qxd 9/29/03 11:41 AM Page 1 Copyright © 2003, 1996 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Manufactured in the United States of America. Except as permitted under the United States Copyright Act of 1976, no part of this publication may be reproduced or distributed in any form or by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the publisher. 0-07-143393-7 The material in this eBook also appears in the print version of this title: 0-07-140974-2 All trademarks are trademarks of their respective owners. Rather than put a trademark symbol after every occurrence of a trademarked name, we use names in an editorial fashion only, and to the benefit of the trademark owner, with no intention of infringement of the trademark. Where such designations appear in this book, they have been printed with initial caps. McGraw-Hill eBooks are available at special quantity discounts to use as premiums and sales promotions, or for use in cor- porate training programs. For more information, please contact George Hoare, Special Sales, at george_hoare@mcgraw- hill.com or (212) 904-4069. TERMS OF USE This is a copyrighted work and The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. (“McGraw-Hill”) and its licensors reserve all rights in and to the work. -
Ryan E. Quinn2
Collegiate Aviation Review International, Volume 35, Issue 2 © 2017 When “SOP” Fails: Disseminating Risk Assessment in Aviation1 Case Studies and Analysis Ryan E. Quinn2 Saint Louis University Abstract In the early 1990s, a regional jet taking off from LaGuardia airport with ice and snow on the wings crashed into a nearby bay and killed 27 passengers and crew. The accident of USAir Flight 405 is studied critically in this review as a result of incomplete identification and dissemination of the risks involved in operations under icing conditions. The improper system risk dissemination and mitigation led the crew of USAir 405 to believe they were in a condition for a safe takeoff. In the larger context outside of this accident, unidentified hazards resulting from poor communication and company dissemination are still an everyday threat. I argue that this disconnect is a causal factor in Normalization of Deviance. Contemporary examples of safety incidents are used to support this argument and introduce possible new areas for monitoring and research. The author argues that companies should employ techniques to open new policies up for testing and feedback before being implemented as policy or standard operating procedure. Accident Narrative On the night of March 22nd, 1992, a fifty-passenger twin engine regional jet known as a Fokker F28-4000 lined up on runway 13 at LaGuardia Airport in New York City. With the Captain advancing the thrust levers, USAir 405 accelerated down the runway and reached one hundred thirteen knots. Upon “Vee R”3 being called out by the First Officer, the nose was raised to thirteen degrees pitch up under the Captain’s command and three seconds later the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) registered the sound of a stick shaker4 activation. -
Public Sector Pilot Perceptions of Flight Operational Quality Assurance Programs
PUBLIC SECTOR PILOT PERCEPTIONS OF FLIGHT OPERATIONAL QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAMS By THOMAS ACCARDI Bachelor of Arts in Public Administration Upper Iowa University Fayette, Iowa 1976 Master of Arts in Public Administration Long Island University Westbury, New York 1990 Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate College of the Oklahoma State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF EDUCATION May, 2013 PUBLIC SECTOR PILOT PERCEPTIONS OF FLIGHT OPERATIONAL QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAMS Dissertation Approved: Dr. Steve Marks Dissertation Adviser Dr. Mark Kutz Dr. Fred Hansen Dr. Lynna Ausburn . ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS No one accomplishes anything alone. I would never have begun this seven year journey without the true love and support of my wonderful wife Debbie. She is with me always. We are a great team. I appreciate my parents and grandparents who encouraged the pursuit of my aviation dreams and my education through the years, and I appreciate the love and support of my two daughters, Michelle and Lisa, and my extended family. Dr. Mary Kutz encouraged me to start this journey in 2006 as my advisor and committee chair. After her retirement in 2012, she volunteered to remain as a committee member through my defense of this dissertation. I will never forget it. She made all the difference. Dr. Steve Marks was critical and instrumental in my completion of this degree. He served as my committee chair and advisor giving me the specific guidance, direction, encouragement and confidence to finish my work. Dr. Lynna Ausburn gave wonderful guidance in areas I had overlooked, and she challenged my thinking. -
Usair Flight
PB93-910402 b NTSB/AAR-S3/02 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594 AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT 1 TAKEOFF STALL IN ICING CONDlVlONS USAIR FLIGHT 405 FOKKER F-28, N485US LAGUARDIA AIRPORT FLUSHING, NEW YORK MARCH 22,1992 The Natuiond Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency dedicated to promoting aviation, railroad, highway, marine, pipeline, and hazardous materials safety. Established in 1967, the agency is mandated by Congress through the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974 to investigate transportation accidents, determine the probable causes of the accidents, issue safety recommendations, study transportation safety issues, and evaluate the safety effectiveness of government agencies invo!ved in transportation. The Safety Board makes public its actions and decisions through accident reports, safety studies, special investigation reports, safety recommendations, and statistical reviews. Information about available publications may be obtained by cofitacting: National Transportation Safety Board Public Inquiries Section, RE-51 496) L'Enfant Plaza, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20594 (202)382-6735 Safety Board publications ma; be purchased, by individual copy or by subscription, from: National Technical Information Service 5285 Port Royal Road Springfield, Virginia 22161 (703)487-4600 NTSBiAAR-93IM NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD WASHINGTON, DX. 20594 AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT TAMEOFF STALL IN ICING CONDITIONS USAIR FLIGHT 405 FOKKER F-28, N485US LAGUARDIA AIRPORT FLUSHING, NEB' YOWK MARCH 22,1992 Adopted: February 17,1993 Notation 574211 Abstract: This report explains the crash of USAir flight 405, a Fokker 38-4000, after an attempted takeoff from runway 13 at LaGuardia Airport, Flushing, New York. on March 22, 1992. ??le safety issues in the report focus on the weather, USAir's deichp procedures, industry airframe deicing practices, air naffic contrcl aspects of rhe tiighs, IjSAir's takeoff and preflight procedures, and flightcrew qualifications and training. -
Military Medals and Awards Manual, Comdtinst M1650.25E
Coast Guard Military Medals and Awards Manual COMDTINST M1650.25E 15 AUGUST 2016 COMMANDANT US Coast Guard Stop 7200 United States Coast Guard 2703 Martin Luther King Jr Ave SE Washington, DC 20593-7200 Staff Symbol: CG PSC-PSD-ma Phone: (202) 795-6575 COMDTINST M1650.25E 15 August 2016 COMMANDANT INSTRUCTION M1650.25E Subj: COAST GUARD MILITARY MEDALS AND AWARDS MANUAL Ref: (a) Uniform Regulations, COMDTINST M1020.6 (series) (b) Recognition Programs Manual, COMDTINST M1650.26 (series) (c) Navy and Marine Corps Awards Manual, SECNAVINST 1650.1 (series) 1. PURPOSE. This Manual establishes the authority, policies, procedures, and standards governing the military medals and awards for all Coast Guard personnel Active and Reserve and all other service members assigned to duty with the Coast Guard. 2. ACTION. All Coast Guard unit Commanders, Commanding Officers, Officers-In-Charge, Deputy/Assistant Commandants and Chiefs of Headquarters staff elements must comply with the provisions of this Manual. Internet release is authorized. 3. DIRECTIVES AFFECTED. Medals and Awards Manual, COMDTINST M1650.25D is cancelled. 4. DISCLAIMER. This guidance is not a substitute for applicable legal requirements, nor is it itself a rule. It is intended to provide operational guidance for Coast Guard personnel and is not intended to nor does it impose legally-binding requirements on any party outside the Coast Guard. 5. MAJOR CHANGES. Major changes to this Manual include: Renaming of the manual to distinguish Military Medals and Awards from other award programs; removal of the Recognition Programs from Chapter 6 to create the new Recognition Manual, COMDTINST M1650.26; removal of the Department of Navy personal awards information from Chapter 2; update to the revocation of awards process; clarification of the concurrent clearance process for issuance of awards to Coast Guard Personnel from other U.S. -
Inspection Report
Office of the Inspector General Inspection Report REPORT ON FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION DEICING PROGRAM Report Number: E5-FA-7-001 Date: October 2, 1996 REPORT ON FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION DEICING PROGRAM Report Number: E5-FA-7-001 Date: October 2, 1996 Prepared by the Office of Assistant Inspector General for Inspections and Evaluations Office of Inspector General Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General, Department of Transportation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Office of Inspector General (OIG), Department of Transportation, conducted an inspection of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Deicing Program. Following the March 1992 crash of USAir Flight 405 at La Guardia Airport in New York, New York, FAA amended Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 121.629, and developed the "Aircraft Ground Deicing and Anti-Icing Program," to prevent future icing-related accidents. This inspection was to determine how these changes improved air safety during icing conditions. As a part of the inspection, we contacted 179 officials from FAA Flight Standards Service, Air Traffic, and Airports divisions, as well as air carriers and airport operators. The FAA amended regulation still makes the pilot responsible for determining the airworthiness of an aircraft before takeoff, just like the deicing regulation prior to 1992. However, under the amended regulation, the pilot now has additional guidance, training, and support to make critical decisions on aircraft deicing. FAA sees its Deicing Program as having improved safety because -
October 22, 2018 Ms. Lirio Liu Director, Office of Rulemaking Designated
October 22, 2018 Ms. Lirio Liu Director, Office of Rulemaking Designated Federal Official for the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee Federal Aviation Administration 800 Independence Avenue, SW Washington, DC 20591 RE: Transport Airplane Crashworthiness and Ditching Working Group Recommendation Report; Approved Direction of ARAC at September 20, 2018, Meeting Dear Ms. Liu, Attached is the Recommendation Report of the Transport Airplane Crashworthiness and Ditching Working Group (TACDWG), a Working Group established under the Transport Airplane and Engine (TAE) Subcommittee. This report was approved by the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) on September 20, 2018, in accordance with the following stipulations: 1. Pages 2-3 of the report submitted to ARAC prior to the September 20, 2018, meeting were directed by ARAC to be removed. 2. The record was ordered to be kept open until October 20, 2018, to allow for the Association of Flight Attendants (AFA) to submit a dissent to the report’s Executive Summary. 3. The AFA’s dissent was ordered to be inserted into the report directly after the report’s Executive Summary. I have confirmed the actions directed by ARAC have been followed, therefore, on behalf of the ARAC members, please accept the attached TACDWG Recommendation Report and forward it to the relevant program offices within the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Please also accept the TACDWG’s report as completion of its tasking, See 80 Fed. Reg. 31946 (June 4, 2015). Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions. Thank you very much. Sincerely yours, Yvette A. Rose ARAC Chair cc: David Oord, ARAC Vice Chair Kevin Davis, Boeing, TACDWG Chair Keith Morgan, Pratt & Whitney, TAE Chair Chris Witkowski, Association of Flight Attendants, ARAC Member Transport Aircraft Crashworthiness and Ditching Working Group Report to FAA RELEASE/REVISION RELEASE DATE B 20 September 2018 CONTENT OWNER: Transport Aircraft Crashworthiness and Ditching Working Group All revisions to this document must be approved by the content owner before release. -
New Regulations for Deicing Aircraft Could Be Strengthened
AVIATION SAFETY New Regulations for Deicing Aircraft Could Be Strengthened --. -.... illllllllllll Ill 148201 ..-. RESTRICTED-Not to be released qutside the General Accounting Office unless specifically approved by the Office of Congressional Relations. 5597~3 - RELEASE-)+ I., _. ._ ._ “. .“. ..“. _.I... ._ ._“.““.. _.“. _..I “..“I -... .~ -... l”“.l.-.” _l”i 111--1 ..-.. I---- ? “-.‘““- -” ..- ._II ._....._ “- ..^ I -..-_ -._“.I-.. -- --.-. -. ._.__.I_. --..- . --l..---._-_--.--_--_- -- I United States General Accounting Office GAO Washington, D.C. 20548 Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division B-260933 November 18,1992 The Honorable Alfonse M. D’Amato Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Transportation and Related Agencies Committee on Appropriations United States Senate Dear Senator D’Amato: On March 22,1992, USAir Flight 405 crashed on takeoff in a snow storm at LaGuardia Airport, killing 27 people. The accident-which may have been caused by ice on the aircraft‘s wing’ -raised questions about whether the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) regulations sufficiently address the actions that airlines must take when ice is present. In April 1992, the Subcommittee on Transportation and Related Agencies, Senate Committee on Appropriations, held a hearing to examine FAA’S regulations governing airlines’ ground operations during icing conditions. At the hearing, FAA stated that it would issue new regulations for airlines to implement by October 1, 1992. Accordingly, you asked us to (1) determine FAA’S progress in developing these new regulations, (2) describe the manner in which the new regulations address safety concerns, and (3) identify any areas needing improvement. Within 6 months following the USAir Flight 405 accident, FAA issued Results in Brief interim final regulations that more strictly govern airlines’ ground operations during icing conditions. -
CAUSES and IMPACTS on SYSTEM RISK Thiago Tinoco
ABSTRACT Title of Dissertation: ORGANIZATIONAL INTERFACES: CAUSES AND IMPACTS ON SYSTEM RISK Thiago Tinoco Pires, Doctor of Philosophy, 2017 Dissertation directed by: Dr. Ali Mosleh, Mechanical Engineering Organizational Interfaces exist when two or more organizations interact with each other in order to achieve objectives that would not be possible or feasible by operating independently. When organizations become interdependent an entire new class of vulnerabilities emerge, and understanding these is vital. Ideally, probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) account for the reliability of hardware, software, humans and the interfaces among them. From a reliability and PRA disciplines perspective, very little is available in terms of methodologies for estimating the chances that OIs problems can contribute to risks. The objectives of this work are to address the following questions: 1) Are OIs important contributors to risks? 2) What are the ways/means of OI failures? 3) Can causal model of OI failures be developed? 4) Can improvements in the reliability discipline be made to incorporate the effects of OI failures? The importance of OIs as contributors to risks were confirmed through an investigation on past accidents in different industrial and service sectors and identifying the evidence on how OI failures played a role. A set of OIs characteristics that provide an understanding of how deficiencies and enhancements in such characteristics can lead to or mitigate/prevent OI failures were proposed. These are derived from insights gained from the accidents reviewed, and from a review on organizational behavior theories and models. The OI characterization was used to propose a Bayesian Belief Network causal model of OI failures for communication transfer.