“Here in the South, we do not like Carnival” Subnational Identity as a Political Strategy in Southern

Author: Alexine van Olst Student ID: 10000552 Supervisor: Prof. Dr. C.G. Koonings Second Reader: Dr. B. Hogenboom Master’s Thesis in Latin American Studies CEDLA Master’s Programme December 2017

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I sincerely would like to thank Professor C.G. Koonings for sharing his knowledge, for his enthusiasm and his insightful comments that lifted my thought process to a higher level throughout every stage of this thesis. Thank you to all leaders, members and supporters of O Sul É O Meu País who have been willing to explain me their outlook on life. In particular I would like to thank Wanderlei Salvador, who has been so kind to show me around the beautiful state of . Furthermore, I would like to express my gratitude to Professor R.G. Oliven for sharing his knowledge with me. To everyone I discussed my thesis with over time: I am so glad all of you took the time to share your knowledge, opinions and doubts about this research with me. Last but certainly not least, a special thanks to my family, friends, and fellow CMP-students who have always encouraged me to work hard, to stay focused and to not forget to have fun every once in a while.

1 Abstract

This thesis explores the role of subnational cultural identity in separatist movements. To do so, it focuses on a case study of the movement O Sul É O Meu País. This movement aims to establish an independent nation state for the three most southern states of the Brazilian federation, Paraná, Santa Catarina and . The findings in this thesis are based on a survey among members of the movement as well as interviews with leaders and supporters of the organisation. Through a combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods, the differences between the official narratives on cultural subnational identity, reasons for supporting the movement and possible outcomes are compared to the interpretations of these factors by members of the movement. Moreover, the differences in interpretations in Paraná, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul are explored, as to highlight the distinct reasons for support for independence in these three states. Regarding the importance of subnational cultural identity in this separatist movement, it is argued that although the cultural otherness is not considered the most important reason to support secessionist ideas, it forms the ‘cherry on top’ that lifts O Sul É O Meu País’s narratives from rational fiscal and political reasons to a narrative of a Sulista Self seeking independence from the Brazilian Other.

Esta tese explora o papel da identidade cultural subnacional nos movimentos separatistas. Para isso, concentra-se em um estudo de caso do movimento O Sul É O Meu País. Este movimento visa estabelecer um Estado-nação independente para os três estados da região Sul da federação brasileira, Paraná, Santa Catarina e Rio Grande do Sul. As evidências nesta tese são principalmente baseadas em uma pesquisa entre os membros do movimento, bem como entrevistas com líderes e apoiadores da organização. Através de uma combinação de métodos de pesquisa qualitativa e quantitativa, são comparadas as diferenças entre as narrativas oficiais sobre a identidade subnacional cultural, as razões para apoiar o movimento e seus possíveis resultados e as interpretações desses fatores pelos membros do movimento. Além disso, são exploradas as diferenças de interpretação no Paraná, Santa Catarina e Rio Grande do Sul, para destacar os motivos distintos de apoio à independência nestes três estados. Em relação à importância da identidade cultural subnacional neste movimento separatista, argumenta-se que, embora a alteridade cultural não seja considerada a razão mais importante para apoiar ideias separatistas, ela forma a ‘cereja no bolo’ que levanta as narrativas de O Sul É O Meu País de razões fiscais e políticas a uma narrativa do Próprio Sulista buscando independência do Outro Brasileiro.

2 Contents

Acknowledgements ...... 1

Abstract ...... 2

Chapter 1. Brazil: Everyone’s Country? Subnationalism and Separatism in Southern Brazil ...... 5

Case Study: O Sul É O Meu País ...... 6

Key Concepts and Research Question ...... 8

Methodology...... 9

Structure of the Thesis ...... 13

Chapter 2. Key Concepts and Debates on (sub)National Identity and Separatism ...... 14

National Thought in Europe and : a Comparative Overview ...... 15

Decentralisation, Subnationalism and the Politics of Subnational Identities ...... 18

Building Brasilidade: the Process of National Identity Construction in Brazil ...... 21

Brazilians by Choice: Subnationalism in the South of Brazil ...... 24

Conclusion ...... 29

Chapter 3. Manifestations and Direct Democracy: the Organisation O Sul É O Meu País ...... 30

National, Regional and Municipal: the Three Organisational Levels of O Sul É O Meu País ...... 30

From A-Political to Political Movement? ...... 33

Democratic Values and Unification of Região Sul: Objectives and Strategies ...... 35

Online and Offline Visibility: Building Support for the Cause ...... 36

Basta de Brasília: to the Streets for O Sul É O Meu País ...... 37

Plebisul: Testing Secessionist Ideas on the General Public ...... 39

A New Political Strategy: Popular Law Initiatives (PLIP) ...... 41

Conclusion ...... 43

Chapter 4. Subnational Cultural Identity in Região Sul ...... 44

Official Narratives on Sulista-culture in O Sul É O Meu País ...... 44

Interpretations of Sulista-culture among the Members of O Sul É O Meu País ...... 48

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Cultural Differences between Região Sul and Brazil through the Eyes of Members ...... 52

Conclusion ...... 54

Chapter 5. Reasons to Support OSEOMP and Preferred Outcomes ...... 56

Eight Reasons for Supporting O Sul É O Meu País ...... 56

Reasons for Support in Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina and Paraná ...... 57

“To feel Sulista and not Brazilian”: General Trends in Supporting O Sul É O Meu País 60

Let’s Dream: Preferred Outcomes of the Activities of O Sul É O Meu País ...... 61

Looking Ahead: Outlines of an Independent Sulista Nation State ...... 63

Conclusion ...... 65

Chapter 6. Subnationalism and Separatism in Southern Brazil: Conclusions ...... 66

The Construction of a Sulista Subnational Cultural Identity ...... 66

Small Bureaucracy and Participatory Democracy: the Politics of O Sul É O Meu País .... 68

Reflections on O Sul É O Meu País as a Movement in a broader Context ...... 69

Appendix 1. Survey Questions in Portuguese and English ...... 72

Appendix 2. Research Question, Subquestions and sub-Subquestions ...... 81

Appendix 3. Publicity Materials O Sul É O Meu País ...... 82

Appendix 4. Overview Place of Birth Respondents and Ancestors ...... 85

Appendix 5. Ranking of Importance of Factors for Support for O Sul É O Meu País ...... 89

Appendix 6. Original Quotes in Portuguese per Chapter ...... 97

Bibliography ...... 102

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Chapter 1. Brazil: Everyone’s Country? Subnationalism and Separatism in Southern Brazil

“I do not identify with the Brazilian stereotype”, “Because I do not consider myself Brazilian”, “Because and I rarely identify with the rest of Brazil.” These are just three of the responses to the question as to why people support separation of the three southern states from the rest of Brazil.1 In turn, these responses question whether it possible and desirable to have a single, national identity in a nation state of over 200 million people.2 It is easy to imagine the existence of a variety of local interpretations of what it means to be Brazilian. Moreover, it is also easy to imagine the existence of distinct subnational identities in particular regions of this sizable federation. In Brazil, one of these subnational identities is found in the three southern states of Brazil: Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina and Paraná (Região Sul). The otherness of this region is discussed in academic literature by for example Oliven and Kraus Luvizotto.3 Said otherness is often connected to the culture of European migrants that came to the region in the nineteenth century and the subnational cultural identity of the southernmost state, Rio Grande do Sul: the Gaúcho-identity. Based on this combination of cultural othernesses, I decided to study the southern cultural identity beyond the Gaúcho-identity and shift towards a broader subnational Sulista-identity which includes all three states of Região Sul. In this way, an interesting development can be studied: the organisation of civil society in a socio-political movement that uses the Sulista-identity and its otherness contrasting the national Brazilian identity (Brasilidade) as part of a means to a political end. The Brazilian federation is divided in twenty-six states and these states are in turn geographically combined into the five regions.4 The statistics from 2016 collected by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística demonstrate that 29,439,773 people live in Região Sul. Zooming in per state, the statistics show that Rio Grande do Sul has the most inhabitants (11,286,500), closely followed by Paraná (11,242,720) and lastly the smaller state of Santa Catarina with 6,910,553 inhabitants.5 To research the subnational identity of Região Sul and in particular its use in a political context, I conducted three months of fieldwork in the region, visiting all three states

1 Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017. 2 Population figure available via: https://www.ibge.gov.br/estatisticas-novoportal/sociais/populacao/9103- estimativas-de-populacao.html. Consulted on 25 September 2017. 3 See for Oliven’s work on the subject: Ruben Oliven, A Parte e O Todo: A Diversidade Cultural de Brasil-Nação, (Petrópolis: Editora Vozes), 2006. See for Kraus Luvizotto’s work on the subject: Caroline Kraus Luvizotto, Cultura Gaúcha e Separatismo no Rio Grande do Sul, (São Paulo: SciELO - Ed. UNESP. 2009). 4 Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia Estatística, “Estimativas de População”. Accessed digitally via: ftp://ftp.ibge.gov.br/Estimativas_de_Populacao/Estimativas_2016/estimativa_TCU_2016_20170614.pdf. Consulted on 25 September 2017. 5 Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia Estatística.

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in the period May 2017 to August 2017. I decided to make , the capital of Rio Grande do Sul, my base and from there travel to both Santa Catarina and Paraná. The main reason for spending most time in Rio Grande do Sul is based on the idea that, through the lively memory of its history as the forever frontier state and the Gaúcho-identity, this would be the state where the otherness of the region is expressed the strongest. In order to study the mobilisation of this cultural subnational identity for political objectives, I decided to approach a social movement that does exactly that. I contacted the largest movement that aims at separating Região Sul from the Brazilian federation and they were more than willing to show me various aspects of their organisation. Although their otherness in a cultural sense is not their only argument for their political objectives, it is part of their narratives. This movement is called O Sul É O Meu País (OSEOMP) and has been active in its current form since 1992.

Case Study: O Sul É O Meu País

Separatist movements are active in many shapes and forms in various parts of the world. The Kurdish on 25 September 2017 and the Catalan independence referendum on 1 October 2017 are only two of the most recent and famous examples of acclaimed nations that aim to separate themselves from an existing nation state to which they claim not to belong. As a less known example, the case study of the secessionist movement in this thesis serves as an instrument to explore similar sentiments in the southern region of Brazil. From an academic point of view, this research aims to contribute to the debate on the relationship between national identities, subnational identities and separatism. Moreover, it aims to explore how cultural subnational identities can be mobilised as a political strategy. The particular subnational identity that will be studied in this research appears to be a niche in international studies on subnational identity in Latin America and Brazil in particular. From a social perspective, this research aims to shed light on a group of Brazilian citizens who are interested in breaking their relationship with the Brazilian nation state. In the unstable socio- political and economic context of present-day Brazil, this research aims to contribute to the debate on the current structure of the Brazilian federal nation state by mapping the use of cultural identity narratives as a political strategy in the south of Brazil. In order to find out how this particular subnational identity is formulated and activated in a political context, I studied the movement O Sul É O Meu País (OSEOMP) as briefly mentioned above. Besides emphasising and cherishing the cultural differences of southern Brazil compared to the single national identity constructed on a federal level, this movement also frames their otherness in a political manner for they use it to advocate a separation of the three southern states from the rest of Brazil. One day before the most recent municipal elections in

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October 2016, the movement organised its first consultative plebiscite (‘Plebisul’) on the separation of the region from the Brazilian federation. Since the movement claims to value direct democracy, organising a consultative plebiscite appears to be a logical step. The question on the ballot for the plebiscite was formulated as follows: “Do you want Paraná, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul to form an independent country?”6* The voter could only respond affirmative or negative without elaborating on the answer. The movement published the following figures on the results of this plebiscite. A total of 616,917 people in Região Sul voted in the Plebisul of 2016. Of this total, 95.74% voted in favour of an independent country for the three states in the region and 4.26% voted against this proposal. The figures per state show that Paraná had relatively the most people voting who opposed the idea, with 88.82% in favour and 11.18% opposing the idea as formulated on the ballot. In Santa Catarina 94.63% voted in favour and in Rio Grande do Sul 97.21%.7 The movement organised another Plebisul with the same question on the ballot on 7 October 2017, demonstrating similar outcomes albeit based on a smaller group of voters.8 The consultative plebiscites described above are the most recent campaigns organised by the movement. Founded in Santa Catarina on 17 May 1992, some of the predecessors of the movement that merged into the current organisation O Sul É O Meu País were associated with radical, political Right independence movements in the region such as Pampa Livre and Separatista Sulino.9 In recent years, the movement’s focus shifted towards building a narrative of a democratic and pacifistic movement that aims at providing a platform for the people in Região Sul to be heard and potentially to establish an independent nation state for the region. The movement’s current leadership, referred to as Diretoria or Comissão Nacional, installed for the period 2014-2017, has its seat in , Rio Grande do Sul.10 The decision to focus on this movement is based on their recent activities, with as a main component the annual consultative plebiscites in October as well as their active use of social media and frequent appearances in other media to discuss their objectives. Moreover, as their political goal is to create an independent ‘Sulista nation state’, this movement provided a suitable case study to research the

6 O Sul É O Meu País, “Plebisul”. Accessed digitally via: http://www.sullivre.org/. Consulted on 25 September 2017. *All quotations in the text are translated by the author, unless indicated otherwise. A list of quotations in the original language of the interviews (Portuguese) can be found in Appendix 6. 7 O Sul É O Meu País, “Resultado Oficial do Plebisul 2016”. Accessed digitally via: http://www.sullivre.org/cco-divulga- resultado-oficial-do-plebisul-2016/. Consulted on 25 September 2017. 8 The two editions of the Plebisul will be discussed extensively in Chapter 3. 9 Caroline Kraus Luvizotto: Cultura gaúcha e separatismo no Rio Grande do Sul. (São Paulo: SciELO - Ed. UNESP, 2009), p. 42. 10 O Sul É O Meu País, “Sobre o Movimento”. Accessed digitally via: http://www.sullivre.org/sobre-o-movimento/. Consulted on 25 September 2017.

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relationship between subnational identity and mobilisation of popular support for further decentralisation or in federal states, such as Brazil.

Key Concepts and Research Question

In order to construct an analytical framework for this thesis, I will use a set of concepts that are important in the understanding of the case study. These concepts include the nation, the nation state and subnationalism. Throughout this thesis, the definition of the nation as formulated by Guibernau will be used for it attributes a set of dimensions to the nation that is also used in the narratives of O Sul É O Meu País. Guibernau defines the nation as: “a human group conscious of forming a community, sharing a common culture, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, having a common past and a common project for the future, and claiming the right to decide upon its political destiny. This definition attributes five dimensions to the nation: psychological, cultural, territorial, political, and historical.”11 Additionally, the definition of a nation as an imagined community as elaborated upon by Anderson will be of importance in this thesis. Chapter two provides a more in-depth discussion of theoretical concepts and debates related to subnationalism in the Brazilian nation state. To operationalise the idea of the nation state and (sub)nationalism, I use the definition by Gellner, who frames nationalism as a political idea that emphasises the unity of the political and the cultural entities.12 It is important to note that local cultural identities in this thesis will be referred to as subnational identities rather than as regional identities. This decision is based on the idea that subnationalism provides a clearer formulation for the subject, because it highlights one subgroup in one nation state that formulates their local identity as fundamentally different from the single, national identity promoted by the nation state. The main research question for this thesis is: how does the movement O Sul É O Meu País use the cultural otherness of the southern region of Brazil to mobilise support for political goals? To answer this research question, various subquestions (SQs) and sub-subquestions (SSQs) focus on different aspects of this main research question. The SQs address themes such as the organisational structure of the movement, their objectives and strategies, the role of cultural subnational identity in the movement and the preferred outcome of the movement’s actions. The SSQs focus on the differences per state in Região Sul.13

11 Montserrat Guibernau, “Nationalism without States” in The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism, chapter 30, ed. J. Breuilly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p.2. 12 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Introduction by John Breuilly (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008). 13 An overview of all subquestions (SQs) and sub-subquestions (SSQs) can be found in Appendix 1.

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Methodology

In order to answer the main research question, the SQs and the SSQs, I decided to use both quantitative as well as qualitative methods. The quantitative method is a survey that has been distributed among the members of the movement via the register of email addresses the movement’s leadership keeps. The main qualitative methods are open interviews with the movement’s leadership and informed outsiders and semi-structured interviews with members of the movement from all three states of Região Sul.14 As complementary methods I used participant observations when visiting events organised by the movement as well as document analysis for the articles and official documentation published by the movement itself and for news articles written about the movement in the media. My justification for the use of both quantitative as well as qualitative methods is threefold. Firstly, the combination of a survey complemented by interviews, allowed me to map the motivation of citizens in the three states to support this movement compared to the official narratives formulated by the movement’s leadership. Secondly, the survey allowed for the collection of large amounts of data from a specific population that shares similar interests, in this case the support of the movement, but who might have different reasons to support the cause, based on how they interpret the conceptualisation of the subnational identity. Thirdly, by complementing the main methods with participant observation at events and document analysis, I analysed the movement and its members both from an inside perspective as well as from a more distant view. The quantitative part of the methodology was a survey distributed via email to all registered members of the movement. It is assumed here that the total population of the movement is about 25,000 registered members.15 The survey was spread through an email with the URL to the survey in it distributed by the movement’s leadership via their official email address. The use of the official email address of the movement increased the likeliness that members would open the email and participate in the research rather than upon receiving an email from an unknown address like mine. Since all members have an email address registered with the movement, it is assumed here that the distribution of the survey via email could theoretically have reached all 25,000 members of the movement equally. Furthermore, as this survey is distributed to registered followers of the movement, I expected that the respondents answered in line with the official narratives of the movement’s leadership. This bias in the responses is not considered problematic for the survey aims to compare the members’ narratives and the movement’s official narratives in an explorative manner. The survey was designed using

14 A complete list of questions of the survey in both Portuguese and English can be found in Appendix 2. 15 This number of registered members is the number that I have been told by various members of the movement’s leadership on municipal, regional and national level.

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Qualtrics with the clear intention to be completed online. Moreover, a digital survey also allowed for an easier way to reach respondents, for the population that I aimed to reach is spread over three states, which is a rather large geographical spread to cover in the time available for this research. The survey contained closed questions to answer in the style of a Likert-scale when appropriate, as well as questions that required answers in a form of ranking and three open questions. Furthermore, not all questions were set as obligatory to answer in order to proceed to the next question. Since the open questions were placed in various positions in the survey, making these questions obligatory could lead to respondents cancelling their participation since open questions clearly require more effort than closed ones. Of the total assumed population of 25,000 registered members, a total of 702 at least partially completed the survey. This total dataset has been adjusted to a final set of 429 respondents who completed at least the closed questions and one out of three open questions which will be used for the data in the empirical chapters of this thesis. The analysis of the survey data consists of cross tabulations to identify relations between multiple variables. As the method of analysis already indicates, the data collected through the survey is decidedly of explorative nature. The main qualitative methods used in this research are interviews and observations. The interviews with members of the movement from all three states of Região Sul aimed at creating depth and nuances in the narratives that a survey is unable to gather. Moreover, the interviews mostly took place before members had taken the survey which lead to the inclusion of topics in the conversation, such as the importance of education, that I had not thought to be important when designing the survey. Since most interviewees were active members of the movement, the emphasis lay more on finding nuances and personal interpretations of the narratives used by the movement rather than finding radically different reasons for supporting the movement. For a different point of view, I interviewed two informed outsiders and had various informal conversations about the topic with people not associated with the movement. The interviews with informed outsiders were conducted at the end of my fieldwork period. Their opinions and interpretations of the movement allowed me to widen my view on the movement and created interesting contrasts since I had before these interviews spent most of my time in the field talking to members of the movement. In total, I conducted five interviews that have been officially recorded. All these interviewees were men and active members of OSEOMP. As the survey data show, more than 90% of the respondents are male, so this trend in the qualitative data is not surprising. Additionally I interviewed about twenty other members of the movement in more

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informal settings and at events organised by the movement. These informal conversations are used to illustrate the observations throughout my visits to the three states of Região Sul. The first of these five recorded interviews took place in Santa Catarina and was an almost three hour long in-depth conversation with the movement’s current Strategic Mobilisation Director and one of the founders of the GESUL, the movement’s research group. As a representative of the national board, a long term member of the movement and author of a book on the movement, this interviewee was a valuable resource in terms of the movement’s official discourse and narrative and their future plans. The second interview took place in Rio Grande do Sul with a regional leader of the movement from a nearby city. This interview focused on the otherness of Rio Grande do Sul in particular and the more political and economic arguments for his support of the movement. The third interview was conducted in , with a regional leader from that city. To cover the interview with a member from Santa Catarina, I turned to the many conversations I had with a long term local member of the movement who invited me to show me around the state and with whom I therefore travelled throughout the state for four consecutive days to visit the movement’s leaders and other places connected to the movement. The two other recorded interviews were conducted with the informed outsiders. The first was a PhD candidate in Philosophy from the Federal University of Santa Catarina, who is originally from Recife, Pernambuco. His interpretations as an academic and as a literal outsider, for he is born and raised in the Northeast of the country, have been extremely valuable in understanding the opposition to this movement. Lastly the fifth interview I recorded was a conversation with professor Oliven, who is professor of Anthropology at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul and who is an expert on Gaúcho-identity and separatism in the region. Looking back at the fieldwork, the quantitative and qualitative methods have been able to complement each other as was intended in the research design. As a researcher, I wish I had been more proactive in approaching more informants and informed outsiders for (follow-up) interviews. To some extent, my impression of the fieldwork now is that I have only been doing most of the work in the second half of the time spent in the field and by that time, as most informants referred me to other potential informants, I seemed to run out of time to speak to all the people I would have liked to speak to for this research. Furthermore, the vast majority of people I reached out to were open to meet with me and to help me out with any further information or contacts if needed. Since the movement is strongly focused on presenting itself as a democratic, transparent and pacifistic movement, possibly to combat negative associations of the movement in the past, it was easy for me to enter and approach the movement as a

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researcher, to talk to members and leaders of the organisation and to visit public events that they organised. To guarantee the safety of the collected data, I have stored all my qualitative data in three different formats: written notes during observations, events and conversations in a notebook, digital files of said written notes stored online via Google Drive and all collected data digitally on a flash drive. The results of the quantitative data are stored online in the original format in Qualtrics and copies of it are stored both in Google Drive and on a flash drive. Before each recorded interview, I have sent a letter explaining my status as a Master student at CEDLA to the informant in order for them to verify my story. Moreover, permission was asked for all recordings specifically before every interview and again when I started the recordings. Throughout the thesis I have opted not to refer to informants who are members of the movement by name for it does not add any value to the story, even though most of them confirmed that they did not have a problem with having their name in the research. Therefore, only one informant is mentioned by name for in his case explaining his role in the movement and the use of his name contributed to the lines of argumentation in this thesis. As a final note, I would like to reflect on my position and role as a researcher. Something I did not specifically pay attention to in the field but what becomes very clear from the survey data as well as my qualitative data is how unequally distributed the ratio men-women is within the movement. The vast majority of the respondents and the all of the recorded interviewees were male.16 However, in the field this has not been something that I noticed in a negative sense or that put me in a notably difficult position as a female researcher. Moreover, when studying a movement with a political objective, the political position and the extent to which this position has been propagated by the researcher, are important. In my situation, I have not explicitly shared my political beliefs with members of the movement during interviews or other conversations unless the informant specifically asked me to. My main reason for this was based on the idea that I wanted to hear the complete stories of the informants, rather than getting involved in a discussion on political ideologies. A question about my own political beliefs was asked only once in a recorded interview with a member of the movement in Paraná, who asked if he was correct in assuming that a researcher interested in the movement, is aligned with the movement’s political views. This informant was surprised to learn that I did not start this research out of support for the political ideology of the movement but rather out of interest in subnationalism and decentralisation, and did not hold my answer against me in any way. In conversations with informed outsiders however, informants were more directly interested in my political position.

16 Respondents to the author’s survey were 90.5% male and 9.5% female.

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Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is divided in six chapters. This first chapter served as an introduction to the research theme, the research site and some key theoretical concepts as used in this study. Moreover, it introduced the main research question and the methodology used to conduct the research. The second chapter builds an analytical framework for the case study by formulating the definitions of the key concepts used for this research. Secondly, it gives an overview of the academic debates on nationalism, national identity construction and the use of subnational identity as a political strategy. This chapter will also outline an overview of the development of a single national identity in Brazil since independence. The third chapter is the first empirical chapter and concentrates on the organisational structure of OSEOMP, their objectives and strategies. The fourth chapter is another empirical chapter which centralises role of the cultural subnational identity within the movement’s official narratives. It compares the interpretations and importance given to said subnational identity from the movement’s leadership to those of the members who responded to the survey questions on this topic. The fifth chapter is the final empirical chapter which aims to explore the reasons for supporting the movement and the desired outcome of the movement’s actions. Again a comparison between the interpretations of the movement’s official discourse and the most desired outcomes from the movement’s members is made. The concluding chapter explores to what extent O Sul É O Meu País should be seen as a movement operating on the fringes of the Brazilian society and what their strategies can tell us about subnational identity and its use as a political strategy in Brazil and in a comparative global perspective. Moreover, it centralises the complexity of rational and emotive reasons as underlying causes for supporting OSEOMP as a movement in particular and separatist movements in general.

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Chapter 2. Key Concepts and Debates on (sub)National Identity and Separatism

In the field of studies on (sub)nationalism and (sub)national identity, many debates exist on the exact definitions of nations, states and nationalism. In order to apply these rather fluid and abstract concepts to this case study, I explore some main definitions on the concepts below. Guibernau defines a nation as: “a human group conscious of forming a community, sharing a common culture, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, having a common past and a common project for the future, and claiming the right to decide upon its political destiny. This definition attributes five dimensions to the nation: psychological, cultural, territorial, political, and historical.”17 Whereas Guibernau formulates a broad definition that attributes a list of dimensions to the ‘human group’ in the nation, Anderson’s famous concept of the nation as an imagined community emphasises both the abstraction of the concept, as well as its excluding nature. He describes the nation as: “[…] an imagined community, a political community and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”18 Moreover, Anderson is able to capture the psychological or even emotive aspect of this idea in the concept of imagined communities: “It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow- members, meet them or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”19 For the concept nationalism, I will use the definition of Gellner, as shortly phrased by Leerssen as: “Nationalism is the attempt to map political frontiers on cultural borders.”20 The definitions above demonstrate that studies on nationalism and as an analogy studies on subnationalism as is this thesis, study a conflict between cultural boundaries and political frontiers. Another approach to nations and nationalism is explored by Hobsbawm. Continuing on the idea that the political and national unit should coincide, he adds the importance of the top-down construction of the nation, demonstrating his more Marxist interpretation of the concept.21 Hobsbawm formulates his interpretation of the nation therefore as both a continuation of Gellner’s conceptualisation as well as a critique: “If I have a major criticism on Gellner’s work it is that his preferred perspective of modernization from above, makes it difficult

17 Montserrat Guibernau, “Nationalism without States” in The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism, chapter 30, ed. J. Breuilly (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013), p.2. 18 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 2006), p. 6. 19 Benedict Anderson, p. 6. 20 Joep Leerssen, National Thought in Europe: A Cultural History (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), p. 175. 21 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990), pp. 9-10.

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to pay adequate attention to the view from below.”22 This importance of popular culture and the use of mass media in the construction of (sub)national identity will be discussed further in the next section of this chapter. For the definition of a state, I will follow the definition as formulated by Weber, which is often used in studies on nationalism. This definition defines the modern concept of a state, for it is not the scope of this research to include more historical interpretations of the state. Weber defines a state as: “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”23 By using this definition of a state, it becomes apparent that the state that will be referred to and studied here is the modern state in a Eurocentric sense, as emerged on the European continent since the French Revolution. In general, processes of nationalism and consequently constructing a national identity for a nation can be divided in groups of three different objectives: (1) nationalism as a form of state centralism, (2) nationalism as unification process and (3) nationalism as a means for separatism.24 I focus on the third group, where (sub)nationalism is used as a means to a separatist end. Another concept requires explanation in this section: subnationalism. As Anderson remarks in his introduction on imagined communities: “[…] subnationalisms are nationalisms which naturally dream of shedding this subness one day.”25 I opt for the use of subnationalism to describe the situation in southern Brazil, rather than another common concept in this field: . Regionalism in my opinion suggests a multilateral phenomenon, rather than a phenomenon occurring within the political boundaries of one existing nation state. Some scholars use the concept of subnationalism and more specifically non-secessionist subnationalism as a synonym for regionalism or federalism. However, I agree with Guibernau who argues that those concepts do not clearly demonstrate that subnationalism is a struggle for acknowledgement and power from a local subgroup within a nation state.26

National Thought in Europe and Latin America: a Comparative Overview

Generally speaking, the rise of nationalism began in the nineteenth century, with the growing influence of (political) Romanticism on the European continent.27 Since an in-depth

22 Eric Hobsbawm, pp. 10-11. 23 Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (London: Routledge, 1970), p. 78. 24 Joep Leerssen, National Thought in Europe: A Cultural History (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), pp. 137-170. 25 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 2006), p. 3. 26 Montserrat Guibernau, “Nationalism without States” in The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism, chapter 30, ed. J. Breuilly (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013), p. 2. 27 Joep Leerssen, National Thought in Europe: A Cultural History (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), p. 125.

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explanation of the reasons to why this happened is not the scope of this thesis, I will follow Leerssen in his summary on the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century: “[…] nationalism emerges in the nineteenth century from eighteenth century roots: Herder’s belief in the individuality of nations, Rousseau’s belief in the sovereignty of the nation and a general discourse of national peculiarities and ‘characters’.”28 The comparison between nationalism and national identity processes in Europe and Latin America is interesting for their colonial history makes the processes both closely related as well as fundamentally different at the same time. In the following section, this dichotomy will be explored further, as well as the role of literature, printed press and elites in processes of national identity formation in both Europe and Latin America. Anderson explains some key differences in processes of nationalism and national identity creation in Latin America compared to these processes in (old) European nations. He argues that: “language was not so much a differentiating factor [in Latin America] and that while in Europe the rise of the middle class was key to nationalism, this group was still insignificant or non- existent in Latin America in those days.”29 Therefore, the creation of the national identity in Latin America became mostly a matter of state elites and intellectuals. Moreover, as nationalism was rising in Europe, Latin America became an Other, a periphery to the Eurocentric Self.30 Since processes of identity formation rely on the framing of the Self in relation to an Other, the role as centre for Europe and that of periphery for Latin America, is a crucial aspect in the development in both European as well as Latin American national identity. However from the point of view of Latin American elites, the experience of the Self was considered inferior to the European Other. This pessimistic interpretation of the Latin American Self, which lasted according to Larraín until the second half of the nineteenth century, was based on the notion that the Self was created by affirmation and opinions of the Other on the Self. Since the Other, Europe, created negative stereotypes about the Latin American Self, these stereotypes became internalised in the formation of the national identity in various Latin American nations as a consequence.31 Examples of this pessimistic interpretation of national ‘character’ in Latin America can be found throughout various documents, most notably in literature produced in this time period, as Larraín explains. Despite the fact that Anderson emphasises nationalism as a political project and Larraín puts his focus on the cultural aspect and the importance of modernity, these two lines of argument come together when it comes to the start of national identity thinking in Latin America: the criollo self-awareness as a consequence of political

28 Joep Leerssen, p. 125. 29 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 2006), chapter 4. 30 Jorge Larraín, “Identity and Modernity in Latin America” (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), p. 14. 31 Jorge Larraín, p. 107.

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exclusion. As Larraín argues: “The obstacles against free trade with Europe coupled with the political exclusion of the locally born criollos from administrative and governmental tasks were the two main motivations behind the independence process.[…] during the eighteenth century the local criollos had increasingly acquired self-consciousness as a group, and their distinct identity manifested itself in many struggles for recognition.”32 Not only the definitions of nations, states and nation states are of importance for this thesis. The processes leading to a national identity that is recognised by the people of that nation, are also of importance. Literature, poetry and other written media have played an important role in the process of national identity formation as it functioned as an instrument for the creation (national) narratives. Within these narratives, a shared sense of history, customs and culture is referred to. The authenticity of traditions, culture and customs is discussed in debates on national identity by referring to the concept of invented tradition and the related concept of ‘fakelore’. As Hobsbawm and Ranger explain, referring to (memories) of shared culture, tradition or customs is a part of the process of national identity building for it ensures a connection to and continuation of the (constructed) shared past.33 Therefore, the invention of tradition often occurs in times of social change that might be perceived as a threat to a specific imagined community. In present time, not only literature and written media influence the process of nation building, also modern mass media such as television and internet do so. Moreover, as the middle class in Latin America grew, the influence of popular culture, closely related to the rise of the modern media, on processes of national identity formation also grew and continues to grow.34 The growing importance of popular culture and modern media in present-day national identity formation also creates a shift from elite-based national identity constructions to popular imaginations of the nation. According to Radcliffe and Westwood, popular culture serves as an instrument to renegotiate official narratives of national identity, which are often formulated by an elite group of society.35 A final concept that should be addressed here is the distinction between civic and ethnic (sub)nationalism. As described above, processes of national identity construction are based on inclusion and exclusion, on the framing of the Self and the Other. A long established distinction exists in the literature between civic nationalism and ethno-nationalism.36 Civic nationalism in this context refers to an appeal to the willingness of an imagined community to comply with its civic

32 Jorge Larraín, p.70. 33 Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1983, p.1. 34 Sarah Radcliffe and Sallie Westwood, Remaking the Nation: Place, Identity and Politics in Latin America. London: Routledge, 1996, chapter 4. 35 Sarah Radcliffe and Sallie Westwood, chapter 4. 36 See for example Brubaker (1999) Habermas (1994), Gellner (1996) and Smith (1991) for an extensive debate on the topic.

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duties as a nation, which formulates a Self that is based on character traits of the imagined community rather than on ethnicity as is the case in ethno-nationalism. As Fozdar and Low argue based on reviewing the academic debate on this distinction: “Civic nationalism is generally perceived as a more appropriate model in a globalised world […].”37 Notwithstanding this ‘preference’ of civic nationalism over ethno-nationalism, it is argued in the literature that both forms always are form of exclusion and therefore the nation as a political project is based on the exclusion of the Other from the community that forms the Self, notwithstanding the grounds for this exclusion. Additionally, the concept of ‘civic culture’ as explained by Almond and Verba, which highlights the importance of a belief in citizen participation through civic duties will be explored as part of the cultural narrative in the case study.38 The concepts explained above, form the core of many debates on nationalism, nations and nation states. Since it is impossible to discuss all previous and current debates on the subject in detail, the definitions and explanations provided above function as a instruments for the analysis of the narratives of (sub)national identity throughout this thesis. In the following section, I explore the key concepts and debates in the field of subnationalism and more specifically the use of subnational cultural identities as a strategy for political mobilisation.

Decentralisation, Subnationalism and the Politics of Subnational Identities

Latin America includes four states that are classified as federations: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela. Within a federation the concept and interpretation of decentralisation is key to the relationship between the separate levels of government. In the Brazilian federation, the division of the state in three levels of government has played various roles of importance throughout history. Moreover, since the implementation of the 1988 constitution, the recognition of the three levels of government is institutionalised.39 It is important to note this three-level federal system, for most federations only recognise two official layers, often federal and state level only. The official recognition of the third level, the municipal level, is important for the understanding of the decentralised federation that Brazil is today. With the official recognition of three levels of government comes the implication that the local, municipal level in Brazil is actually a substantial political actor that is granted access to decision making instruments, budgets and administrative bodies that, in two level federations, usually are not directly available for these local level of government. As Falleti shows in her analysis of the decentralisation processes in

37 Farida Fozdar and Mitchell Low, “They have to abide by our laws … and stuff’: Ethnonationalism masquerading as civic nationalism”, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 21, Issue 3, July 2015, p. 525. 38 Gabriel A. Almond, Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture : Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations : An Analytic Study, (Boston: Little Brown, 1968). 39 Tracy Beck Fenwick, “The Institutional Feasibility of National-Local Policy Collaboration: Insights from Brazil and Argentina”, Journal of Politics in Latin America, vol. 2(2), 2010, p. 163.

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Brazil, these processes accomplished an increase of (political) power on the municipal level, in terms of access to decision making power for example, which is considered to be the most desirable outcome of decentralisation.40 Based on the existing structure of the Brazilian federation, I would argue that Brazil is a decentralised state. This is important because the case study that will be discussed in the next chapters interprets the structure of the Brazilian federation as limiting to their power of decision on a local level, or more specifically limiting the sense of autonomy the movement in the case study desires. Therefore it seems that a decentral federation, despite a transfer of administrative, fiscal and political power to the different levels of government, could nevertheless still inspire subnational separatist movements to seek secession from the federal nation state, as is the case in this study. As Siroky and Cuffe argue in their extensive comparison between case studies of separatist movements that currently have, never had or have recently had autonomy,41 separatist movements are most likely to advocate secession when the group has been independent before, especially when this was recently revoked.42 Since Siroky and Cuffe compare 324 groups in over 100 countries, it is not their scope to identify the exact conditions under which separatist movements advocate for secession. However, it seems that administrative, fiscal and political power are not sufficient for these groups. What seems to be lacking is territorial power as argued by Siroky and Cuffe, which is also emphasised by Guibernau in her definition of a nation. Besides the lack of territorial power, I argue that another factor for secession for separatist movements in federal states could be the lack of ‘cultural power’. Despite the transfer of tangible forms of power to the local level in this type of government, the national identity constructed on the federal level is still the ‘cultural power’ that is dominant in the federation. This emotive argument relates to the idea that the federal state remains the Other that the subnational Self contrasts itself against, causing the duality of calls for separatism in a decentralised federal state. As Guibernau demonstrated in her work, there are many cases where subnationalisms are non-secessionist.43 In the case of subnationalism in a decentralised federation, non-secessionism would follow as a logical consequence, for in this particular form of government the federal state is aware of local interest in power, and therefore grants administrative, fiscal or political power to local actors. However, in the case studied here, the subnationalism is formulated in a

40 Tulia Falleti, Decentralization and Subnational Politics in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 3. 41 In the article by Siroky and Cuffe, autonomy is interpreted as “territorial self-governance” as defined by Wolff (2013). 42 David Siroky and John Cuffe, “Lost Autonomy, Nationalism and Separatism”, Comparative Political Studies, Vol 48, Issue 1, 2015, pp. 3-34. 43 Montserrat Guibernau, “Nationalism without States” in The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism, chapter 30, ed. J. Breuilly (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013), p. 2.

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decentralised federation and still leads to secessionist objectives from an active social movement. In their argumentation, said movement uses their cultural otherness and the unsatisfactory federal construction of present-day Brazil as their main arguments for said secessionist objectives. Therefore, it is interesting to look at the case study in this thesis as contrasting this logical consequence. Even though not all subnationalisms advocate independence, the use of subnational identities as a political strategy is not uncommon.44 Eaton argues in his comparative analysis on political mobilisation of subnational identity to counter recentralisation processes in Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela that subnational political actors could “[…] [encourage] locals to see these [subnational] identities as unique and important, and to perceive that these identities would best be protected by continued - if not deeper - decentralization.”45 Eaton describes two factors that are important in determining the degree of success in mobilisation of subnational identities as a political strategy. The first factor is that the political mobilisation of subnational identities is most likely to succeed when they are framed in “binary oppositions: Black versus White, colonizer versus colonized, us versus them.” Secondly, he argues that to “[…] actually mobilize identities, political entrepreneurs need mobilizing structures.”46 These mobilising structures are usually social movements who are able to mobilise groups of people relatively easily. Consequently, it would be interesting to see how subnationalism as a political strategy could then be put into practise. In his analysis of subnationalist movements in South Asia, Mitra formulates a ‘pathway’ that subnationalist groups follow on their way to becoming a political actor with secessionist objectives. The pathway consists of three main ‘steps’: (1) setting the agenda, (2) political entrepreneurs join the movement, (3) ‘less-adventurous’ stake-holders align themselves with the movement.47 The social movement that is studied in this thesis, has yet to transition from NGO to political organisation. However, as O Sul É O Meu País is on the verge of doing so, it is interesting to apply the framework that Mitra builds in his article on South Asia, on the case of subnationalism in South Brazil, to find out whether the pathway also fits this particular example. The following section of this chapter will discuss national and subnational identity constructions in Brazil, in order to illustrate the rather abstract concepts discussed in this chapter so far.

44 See for example Eaton (2014), Guibernau (2013), Mitra (1995) and Olivieri (2015). 45 Kent Eaton, “Recentralization and the Left Turn in Latin America: Diverging Outcomes in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 47(8), 2014, p. 1140. 46 Kent Eaton, p. 1140. 47 Subrata Mitra, “The Rational Politics of Cultural Nationalism: Subnational Movements in South Asia in Comparative Perspective”, British Journal of Political Science, vol. 25(1), 1995, pp. 70-73.

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Building Brasilidade: the Process of National Identity Construction in Brazil

National identity formation in Brazil, as in other nation states, is an ongoing and fluid process. To understand the development of national identity in the Brazilian nation state, it is important to understand Brazil’s history and in particular the period from Independence onwards. Since the in-depth discussion of Brazil’s history of independence is not the scope of this thesis, this will not be discussed in detail. As a point of departure I take 1822, when Emperor Dom was crowned.48 As the head of state of an newly independent Brazil, Dom Pedro I saw himself as a modernising actor. He was in favour of concentrating the Brazilian economy on export and the unification of the state in a central power, which in turn he and other Brazilian elites believed would create a modern nation.49 Another concern of the elites was finding ways to achieve ‘whitening’ of the Brazilian population. Based on mostly Eurocentric and North-American interpretations of nation building, this was believed to contribute to the modernity of a nation state. Therefore, the role of European immigrants in the newly independent state became an important one early on. However, not only the desired European immigrants arrived in Brazil. Present-day Brazil consists of people from all over the world, with significant African, European and Asian ethnic groups who have been calling Brazil ‘home’ for generations. The role of immigrant groups in the process of building Brasilidade has thus been from the start a very important one. In describing the influence of immigrants on Brazilian national identity, Lesser refers to the following illustrative description for an inhabitant of Brazil’s largest city, São Paulo: “[a paulistano] is a Japanese who speaks Portuguese with an Italian accent while eating esfiha.”50 To understand how Brazil became “everyone’s country”,51 a historic overview of the construction of Brasilidade is needed. As could be argued for other Latin American states too,52 the Brazilian elite of the nineteenth century framed the national identity of their nation state in comparison to European nation states. In this comparison, elites often stressed the “[…] sense of inferiority based on Brazilian colonialism, backwardness and dependence on foreign culture”53 as the basis of Brazilian national identity. Confronted with ideas about development and national identity building coming mainly from European and North-American schools of thought, the above

48 Jeffrey Lesser, Immigration, Ethnicity, and National Identity in Brazil, 1808 to the Present.(New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 25. 49 Jeffrey Lesser, p. 26. 50 Jeffrey Lesser, p. 4. 51 “Brasil, um país de todos” was the slogan of the Brazilian federal government under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. 52 Jorge Larraín, “Identity and Modernity in Latin America” (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000). 53 Robert Chilcote, Intellectuals and the Search for National Identity in Twentieth-Century Brazil. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 9.

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described sense of inferiority has played an important role in Brazilian national thinking. As the twentieth century arrived, the emphasis in national thinking in Brazil shifted from the sense of inferiority towards linking the will to modernise with the construction of Brazilian national identity.54 The crises experienced in both North-America as well as in Europe in the first part of the twentieth century forced Brazil, and Latin America as a region, to refocus on their own (cultural) identity formulations, rather than copying the (then not too successful) examples from North-America or Europe. However, as Larraín argues: “[…] the assessment of others on the Self seems Latin America’s self-evaluation”.55 He continues that an incredible pessimistic view on Latin American (self-)identification still prevailed in the first half of the twentieth century. Despite Larraín’s critique on the process of identity formation in Latin America as whole in this time period, he notes one exception: Brazil’s novelists and essayists, most notably the works Casa Grande e Senzala by Freye and Raízes do Brasil by Buarque da Holanda, who are more optimistic about the formulation of a national identity in their nation state.56 With the Brazilian Revolution of 1930, a new area in Brazilian politics and national identity construction arrived. Riograndean Getúlio Vargas was installed as the head of the government until his overthrow in 1945.57 Looking at the historic placement of this new regime, it is not surprising that, as part of a counter reaction to the economic and political crises of the 1930s globally, the focus of the Estado Novo was on inward centralisation and unification. In terms of national identity formation, this meant that subnational identities during this era were actively suppressed. Oliven describes how one of the first acts of Vargas was the Ceremony of the Burning of the State Flags. “In this ritual, which symbolised a greater unification of the country and a weakening of regional and state powers, twenty-one Brazilian flags were raised in the place of twenty-one state flags which were burned on a large bonfire in the middle of a plaza in Rio de Janeiro, the then federal capital, to the sound of the national anthem played by several bands and sung by thousands of schoolchildren under the direction of Heitor Villa Lobos, the celebrated Brazilian composer.”58 Not only state officials followed this path of focussing on internal affairs rather than external ones, also Brazil’s intellectuals, particularly those part of the Modernist Movement of 1922, generally agreed that “the only way Brazil could become modern, was to become national first.”59 Instruments created for this process of ‘becoming Brazilian’ were for example national

54 Jorge Larraín, “Identity and Modernity in Latin America” (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), p. 94. 55 Jorge Larraín, p. 107. 56 Jorge Larraín, p. 108. 57 Ruben Oliven, “National and Regional Identities in Brazil: Rio Grande do Sul and its Peculiarities”, in: Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 12(2), 2006, p. 305. 58 Ruben Oliven, p. 305. 59 Ruben Oliven, p. 306.

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school curricula, a strong interest in cultural heritage and traditions with as most well-known example carnival and other cultural expressions that could contribute to building a single Brazilian national identity.60 After the overthrow of Vargas in 1945, the Second Brazilian Republic continued policies of populism and nationalism throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. When the military took power in 1964, emphasis on the national market, in various forms, continued. The military followed a policy of conservative modernism with an “increased political, economic, and administrative centralisation through the integration of the national market, the deployment of road networks, telephony, mass communication, the concentration of taxes at the federal level, the control of state military forces by the army and interference in state policy.”61 The regime continued to some extent the centralist, nationalist policies that were also accentuated by the regime of the Estado Novo, albeit from a perspective of conservative modernisation, as explained by Martins.62 Continuations on a cultural level are also visible. As the military emphasised the need to develop the Brazilian internal market in all possible ways, also television and other mass media communications were part of that strategy. As such, mass media have had a considerable impact on the development of a national identity in Brazil, most notably through the use of national television networks to broadcast programmes that promoted or at least included the idea of Brasilidade. An often used example of the communication of national identity through national television networks are the telenovelas, soap operas that were, and still are, an important factor in the creation of popular Brazilian identity until this day.63 Another important instrument for national identity construction have been and still are (sub)national flags. In Brazil, a state flag that illustrates the symbolism that a flag carries, is the state flag from Rio Grande do Sul. Brazil’s national flag is one that is assumed to be recognisable to most. It consists of a green base and a yellow rhombus with a blue disk in its centre. In the blue disk a starry sky is depicted, with a white banner that includes the motto ‘order and progress’ (ordem e progresso), running across. The flag of Brazil’s southernmost state Rio Grande do Sul, is perhaps less familiar to most. The flag consists of three banners in the form of coloured stripes that are placed diagonally over the flag and a coat of arms with a motto in the centre. The first coloured stripe is a green one, and the second a yellow one, not by coincidence the same colours as are on the Brazilian national flag. The third coloured stripe, crossing through the middle of the

60 Ruben Oliven, p. 306. 61 Ruben Oliven, A Parte e o Todo: A Diversidade Cultural no Brasil-Nação, (Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, 2006), p. 55. 62 Luciano Martins, “Reforma da Administração Pública e Cultura Política no Brasil: uma Visão Geral”, Cadernos ENAP, No. 8, 1997, pp. 20-21. 63 Sarah Radcliffe and Sallie Westwood, Remaking the Nation: Place, Identity and Politics in Latin America. (London: Routledge, 1996), chapter 4.

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other two stripes, is a red one. This colour refers to the spilling of blood in the history of the state. The coat of arms that is placed in the centre of the red stripe carries an emblem that notes the name of the independent republic the state formed from 1835 to 1845 and the start date of the war that initiated this period of independence, the Revolução Farroupilha. As a motto the flag notes the words liberty, equality and humanity. This was also the motto of the revolutionaries who fought for independence in 1835.64 As the elaboration on the significance of the state’s flag in comparison to the national Brazilian flag clearly demonstrates, the memory of a once independent República Rio-Grandense is of great importance in Rio Grande do Sul, even though the state now is part of the Brazilian nation state.

Figure 1. Brazilian national flag Figure 2. Rio Grande do Sul state flag Brazilians by Choice: Subnationalism in the South of Brazil

The section below will illustrate the counter reaction to the focus on Brasilidade and how this reignited subnational identities in Brazil and particularly in the southernmost state Rio Grande do Sul. Despite the existence of various other subnationalisms and related separatist movements in other parts of the country,65 the focus here is on the subnational identity of Rio Grande do Sul as an example of subnationalism in southern Brazil. One could also consider discussing the peculiarities of identity formation in Santa Catarina and Paraná in this section, however, due to the distinctiveness of the process of identity formation in Rio Grande do Sul and the influence this particular identity has had to the subnational identities of neighbouring Santa Catarina and Paraná through migration flows, only the first will be discussed here in detail and will serve as an example for the otherness of Região Sul. As the southernmost state of Brazil, the history of Rio Grande do Sul is strongly connected to wars and conflicts to settle the political frontiers between the Portuguese and Spanish Empires in the region, as well as conflicts between the Brazilian state and insurgent

64 Ruben Oliven, “National and Regional Identities in Brazil: Rio Grande do Sul and its Peculiarities”, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 12(2), 2006, p. 314. 65 Movements similar to O Sul É O Meu País exist most notably in the Northeast region, the state of São Paulo and the Amazon region.

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groups fighting for an independent republic. The area that is now Rio Grande do Sul became relatively late of economic and political importance within the Portuguese Empire.66 For the purpose of this thesis, the point of departure for the historic overview of the region will be the (Revolução Farroupilha) that started on the twentieth of September 1835 and created the independent República Rio-Grandense from 1835 until 1845. This confrontation of armed groups against the Brazilian Empire is explained by various authors67 as an “armed insurgency of the landed elites of Rio Grande do Sul against the authoritarian power of the Brazilian Empire established with independence from Portugal in 1822”68 and can be interpreted as a direct reaction against the centralising policies created on both the political and economic level by the central state. The ten year period of independence that followed this conflict, is still widely commemorated in Rio Grande do Sul. The twentieth of September still marks an important state-wide holiday and is celebrated with festivities, parades and cultural activities throughout the month September. The collapse of the Brazilian Empire, eventually brought Getúlio Vargas to power. In his politics, this politician from Rio Grande do Sul and member of the PRR (Partido Republicana Rio- Grandense) since his youth,69 reacted strongly against the decentralised Old Republic (1889-1930), by emphasising the centralisation of the state and the creation of a national identity that left little room for expressions of subnational identities, as discussed above. This emphasis on the unification of Brazil as a nation state with a corresponding single national identity continued under the military regime that lasted from 1964 until the mid-1980s. From the late 1970s onwards however, when the military regime started its policy of political openness (abertura), Brazil’s population started to gather in various social movements, varying from environmental activist groups to gay rights groups. In this frame of increasing openness of the military regime, a revival of interest in subnational cultural identities, including the Gaúcho-identity in Rio Grande do Sul, emerged. As Oliven describes: “Once the integration of the nation has been achieved there is once again room for a greater degree of diversity, allowing different groups and regions to express their identities and differences.”70

66 Oliven, “National and Regional Identities in Brazil: Rio Grande do Sul and its Peculiarities”, p. 309. 67 See for example various works by Campelo Bornholt, Maestri (2003), Oliven (2006) and Shirley (1991) on this topic. 68 Luciano Campelo Bornholt, “What is a Gaúcho? Intersections between State, Identities and Domination in Southern Brazil”, (Con)textos. Revista d’antropologia i investigació social, Vol.4, 2010, p. 26. 69 Campelo Bornholt, p. 27. 70 Ruben Oliven, “National and Regional Identities in Brazil: Rio Grande do Sul and its Peculiarities”, in: Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 12(2), 2006, p. 304.

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Especially since the late 1980s and 1990s, the Gaúcho-culture in Rio Grande do Sul has seen a popular revival among various groups of the population throughout the state.71 The figure of the gaúcho, once a rural, cattle stealing enemy of the state turned state icon, is difficult to define as a concept. There are, as the similarity to the Spanish term gaucho suggests, close relations between the cattle hoarding, free spirited country side icon as is known in other Latin American countries. However, as the gaucho specifically in Argentina and refers to a national icon, the gaúcho in Brazil is exclusively linked to one state: Rio Grande do Sul.72 The name functions as both a self-identification for the inhabitants of Rio Grande do Sul, as well as the name that other Brazilians often use to refer to the inhabitants of said state. Therefore, the term gaúcho, as well as the female variation gaúcha, could be identified as one of the cultural markers of the subnational identity in Rio Grande do Sul. One of the state’s most famous authors Érico Veríssimo described the importance of the gaúcho as follows:

We are a frontier. In the eighteenth century, when the Portuguese and the Spanish soldiers fought for the decisive occupation of this then immense desert, we had to make a choice: remain with the Portuguese or with the Spanish. We paid a heavy tribute in suffering and blood to remain on this side of the southernmost border of Brazil. How can you accuse of behaving like Spaniards? We have been, from colonial times until the end of the century, a chronically incendiary territory. In seventy-seven years we have had twelve armed conflicts, including the revolutions. We lived in permanent readiness for war. Our women have seldom been out of mourning. Think of the harsh activities of country life - rounding up, breaking in and branding the wild horses, herding the cattle, braving the heavy frosts of winter daybreaks to embark on the daily routine - and you will understand why virility became the most sought after and appreciated quality of the gaúcho. This type of life is responsible for the somewhat impetuous tendencies that remained in the collective unconscious of these populations.73

Veríssimo refers in the passage above to several of the dimensions listed earlier in this chapter that are part of (sub)nationalism. In the first place, he refers to a shared history and culture, the historic and cultural dimensions of nationalism. Secondly, he evokes a memory of the willingness of the imagined community, the inhabitants of Rio Grande do Sul in this case, to choose to belong to the Portuguese, rather than the Spanish empire. Thirdly, he refers to the conceptualisation of Rio Grande do Sul as being the forever frontier state. This motive of otherness based on geographical location on the edge of the Brazilian nation state is a reason that will play a role throughout this thesis. Moreover, the combination of reasons based on being Brazilians ‘by choice’ and the geographical location of Região Sul on the edge of the nation state,

71 Ruben Oliven, “Two Sides of the Same Coin: Modern Gaúcho Identity in Rio Grande do Sul”, in: Journal of Latin American Anthropology, Vol. 4 (2), 2000, p. 109. 72 Luciano Campelo Bornholt, “What is a Gaúcho? Intersections between State, Identities and Domination in Southern Brazil”, in: (Con)textos. Revista d’antropologia i investigació social, vol.4, 2010, p. 23. 73 Érico Veríssimo, “Um Romancista Apresenta sua Terra”, in: Rio Grande do Sul: Terra e Povo (Porto Alegre: Globo, 1969), pp. 3-4. Translation as published in Ruben Oliven, “National and Regional Identities in Brazil: Rio Grande do Sul and its Peculiarities”, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 12, Issue 2, 2006, pp. 309-310.

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as will be elaborated upon later in this thesis, still plays a role in the framing of subnational identity in Rio Grande do Sul and Região Sul in general. Finally, the suffering of the people of Rio Grande do Sul for the benefits of Brazil as a nation state, albeit economically rather than military in recent days, is a prominent motive used in the case study of this thesis. As becomes clear from the origin of the figure of the gaúcho as well as from the imaginations and traditions surrounding him, the gaúcho is traditionally a rural figure. In present- day Rio Grande do Sul, which is overwhelmingly urbanised as is most of Brazil and Latin America, this raises the question as to how a rural figure became an urban icon. This section will discuss the emergence of a rural figure as an icon of an largely urbanised society. As a historically rural figure, the gaúcho finds its origins in the rural south-western region of Rio Grande do Sul that is called Campanha and borders Argentina and Uruguay. Since the gaúcho is a rural figure, its cultural products were initially consumed mostly in the rural parts of Rio Grande do Sul. Interestingly enough, the interest in and demand for these cultural products expanded to a largely urban, young, middle class group of the state’s population since the 1990s.74 The expressions of these cultural products are for example drinking chimarrão, an erva mate tea and wearing traditional items of clothing such as the bombacha, and an appreciation for local music. The consumption of these cultural productions had before the revival of Gaúcho-culture in the state a “stigma of inferiority”,75 especially among the younger urban population of Rio Grande do Sul. The renewed interest of this particular group of the state’s population who would “almost certainly fall off a horse if they tried to ride”,76 in Gaúcho-culture and traditions, forms a strong contrast that makes the ongoing use of this rural figure as a state icon highly interesting. Throughout the academic literature, possible explanations for the revival of Gaúcho-culture can be found in a longing for a ‘glorious past’, as is a characteristic attributed to (sub)nationalism in general, as well as a counter reaction to the centralisation of national identity processes as has been the case in Brazil since independence. Besides the namesake figure of the inhabitants of Rio Grande do Sul, there is another group of people who have had an outspoken influence on the cultural identity of the state and Região Sul in general: European immigrants. Influenced by European and North-American ideas on modernity and national identity building, Dom Pedro I and other Brazilian state elites in the early nineteenth century saw the ‘whitening’ of the Brazilian population as a condition for the creation of a modern Brazilian state. The large percentage of the Brazilian population who were

74 Ruben Oliven, “Two Sides of the Same Coin: Modern Gaúcho Identity in Rio Grande do Sul”, in: Journal of Latin American Anthropology, Vol. 4 (2), 2000, p. 109. 75 Ruben Oliven, p. 109. 76 Ruben Oliven, “National and Regional Identities in Brazil: Rio Grande do Sul and its Peculiarities”, in: Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 12(2), 2006, p. 316.

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from African decent and the fact that slavery in Brazil did not get abolished until the late nineteenth century, challenged this ideal for the Brazilian state elites. In order to find a solution, state elites began to search for the ‘perfect’ immigrants that would be able to reach this goal for Brazil’s national identity building process.77 With its elites always having one eye on Europe, the idea to bring Europeans to Brazil was not surprising. The large, already existing European immigrant group, the Portuguese, were seen as unable to whiten the Brazilian population or to transform the rural economy in an export based one.78 The ideal type of European migrant at that time would be used to farming and ‘white enough’ to whiten the Brazilian population. Therefore, Europeans from preferably German speaking parts of Europe were sought after. The first attempt to lure the prospected European migrants to Brazil was by aiming at the Swiss population by means of creating the colony of Nova Friburgo.79 After the failure of this first attempt, largely due to the unpreparedness of the Swiss to the tropics as well as the fact that the newcomers were primarily Protestant instead of the desired Catholics, the policies were adjusted and the aim was on German speaking farmers from various locations throughout central Europe. Despite the promises of free land, tax exemptions for the first ten years and the system of Private Colonisation Societies (PCS) for the new Euro-Brazilians,80 stories of the harsh climate, working conditions and the rapid spread of illnesses limited the attractiveness of migrating to Brazil for many Europeans. The people who did take up the adventure were usually relocated to the areas close to the Argentinian border as to protect Brazil from Argentina in the until then sparsely populated areas of what is present day Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina.81 Since these newcomers were located rather isolated and often arriving in groups of various families from the same region, it was easy for them to maintain a level of German culture and language, even though the Brazilian central state intended for them to contribute to and adopt the newly created national identity rather sooner than later. A similar story can be told in the case of the group of Italian migrants who arrived in Brazil. They arrived significantly later than the Germans, from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards, when the Brazilian elites decided that any Europeans would be better than no Europeans and hence expanded their search for Europeans willing to migrate to Brazil to southern European countries.82 Moreover, although German and Italian immigrants made up the majority of European migrants crossing the ocean to Brazil, there were also groups

77 Jeffrey Lesser, Immigration, Ethnicity, and National Identity in Brazil, 1808 to the Present.(New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p.26. 78 Jeffrey Lesser, p.26. 79 Jeffrey Lesser, p. 18. 80 Jeffrey Lesser, pp. 34-39. 81 Jeffrey Lesser, p. 52. 82 Jeffrey Lesser, pp. 83-84.

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from other parts of Europe (and the world) with that same destination. A group of central and eastern European migrants, mainly from present-day Ukrainian and Polish descent, ended up in Paraná, where they started colonies similar to the German and Italian ones, strongly focusing on a sense of community and maintaining cultural practices and languages from their native countries.83 Lastly, it is also of importance to be aware of migration flows within southern Brazil, specifically from Rio Grande do Sul to Santa Catarina and Paraná. In the beginning of the twentieth century, migration flows from Rio Grande do Sul towards the west of Santa Catarina as well as the west and southwest of Paraná initiated. With these migration flows, elements of Gaúcho-culture were exported with the Gaúchos to their new home states.84

Conclusion

This chapter explores academic debates and interpretations of subnationalism, national identity and the political mobilisation of cultural identities in order to outline an analytical context for the case study presented in the following chapters. It argues that in studies of subnationalism there is a divide between the ‘rational’ motives for secession as well as emotive ones. These rational motives usually relate to questions of decision making power, in an administrative, fiscal or political sense. However, as the duality of separatist movements in a decentralised federal state indicate, the emotive reasons for secession go beyond the transfer of these rational forms of power. This duality will be used as the analytical framework for the case study in the following chapters. To illustrate the fluid and abstract concepts in studies on (sub)nationalism, this chapter explored the rise of national identity projects in Europe and Latin America and the subnational identities, especially in the southern part of Brazil that have been formulated as a reaction to this central Brasilidade. In regions where this subnational identity is strong, there are possibilities for political entrepreneurs to use this cultural otherness as a means to political mobilisation. With this in mind, the next chapter introduces the case study of this thesis, a social movement with political objectives that frames subnational cultural otherness as part of their narrative to build political mobilisation for secession in Região Sul.

83 Jeffrey Lesser, chapter 3. 84 Ruben Oliven, A Parte E O Todo: A Diversidade Cultural de Brasil-nação (Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, 2006), chapter 5.

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Chapter 3. Manifestations and Direct Democracy: the Organisation O Sul É O Meu País

Saturday 13 May 2017 was my first official interaction with O Sul É O Meu País (OSEOMP). Prior to my arrival in Porto Alegre, I had only been in touch with members of the movement digitally. I would go and observe a manifestation the movement called Ação Democrática, which was planned in various cities and towns throughout Região Sul. I was walking towards Porto Alegre’s city centre, a buzzing area with lots of people shopping and meeting on a Saturday morning. Unfortunately, the south-Brazilian climate did what it is known for: it was raining cats and dogs. When I arrived there was no sign of the movement. Convinced that I must have been mistaken about the location, I continued following the main street leading to the Mercado Público. From one of the shops in the passages to my right, I heard someone speaking through a megaphone; the four members of the movement who attended this manifestation in this weather, found a place where they could spread their message without getting fully soaked. This chapter focuses on the organisational structure and the strategies used by OSEOMP. In order to study the movement, it is important to understand the organisational structure of the movement, their objectives and the strategies they use to achieve said objectives.

National, Regional and Municipal: the Three Organisational Levels of O Sul É O Meu País

The organisation O Sul É O Meu País is divided in three layers: a national board (Comissão or Diretoria Nacional), regional committees (Comissões Regionais) and municipal committees (Comissões Municipais). From this particular structure, two things stand out: firstly, the resemblance to the three layered structure of the current Brazilian federal state and secondly, that the highest level in this structure, is called Diretoria Nacional. The use of ‘national’ could be indicative for this committee’s future role in a hypothetical independent state. Moreover, this highest level of the organisation is responsible for the outline of the movement’s political strategy, which it creates together with the movement’s think tank GESUL. As the responsible branch for the planning of the future of the movement, in interviews with members of this committee, conversation often moved towards the future structure of the independent state, which should ideally become a municipal federation:

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[…] Then came the idea that we should create an institution. The first objective: to revive the movement for independence. [Independence] in the terms self-government, but more than self-government, we should create an independent country. Based on which principles? Firstly: the decentralisation of power, in a municipal confederation.85

The members of the national board are elected at the movement’s General Assemblies and are installed for a time period of four years. The members of the regional and municipal committees are elected at regional and municipal meetings of the movement. A schematic overview of the organisational structure on all three levels can be found in Figure 3 below.

Figure 3. Organisational structure O Sul É O Meu País The movement’s website keeps track of all the registered municipal committees via an interactive map. This map is depicted here as Figure 4 and sheds a light on the distribution of municipal committees throughout Região Sul. Based on the data displayed on the map on 2 October 2017, the movement has 110 registered municipal committees. Of this total, 18 are registered in the state of Paraná, 34 are registered in Santa Catarina and the remaining 58 are registered in Rio Grande do Sul. Looking at the distribution of the municipal committees as shown on the map, several elements stand out. In general, the municipal committees are registered in urban areas, close to major cities in the states, for example the large cluster of registered municipal committees around the capital of Rio Grande do Sul. This observation is in line with data collected via the survey as demonstrated in Table 3.1, which shows that based on the sample of 429 respondents used in this thesis, the vast majority of this group resides in urban areas.86

85 Interview with a member of the Diretoria Nacional of O Sul É O Meu País, Brusque, Santa Catarina, Brazil, 13 June 2017. 86 In the author’s survey respondents could indicate if they considered their area of residence as urban or rural. The official IBGE criteria for urban areas are: areas of dense occupation, proportion of the population in areas of dense

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Figure 4. Distribution of municipal committees of O Sul É O Meu País

Table 3.1. Urban or rural residence members O Sul É O Meu País

State of residence Rural Urban Total Rio Grande do Sul 13.9% 86.1% 100%

Santa Catarina 10.6% 89.4% 100%

Paraná 5.4% 94.6% 100%

Total 11.4% 88.6% 100%

Note: N=429. Data retrieved from survey conducted by the author between May 2017 and August 2017. Moreover, when zooming in on Rio Grande do Sul it stands out that most municipal committees are located in the predominantly urban eastern part of the state rather than the more rural areas in the western part of the state. Regarding the distribution of municipal committees in Santa Catarina, it becomes apparent that there is a high concentration of registered committees in the north-eastern part of the state. This region around the urban centres , Balneário Camboriú and includes various former colonies founded by European migrants entering Brazil in the nineteenth century as explained in chapter two. Also in Paraná this trend of concentrating around urban centres is showing, with a concentration of registered municipal committees around the state’s capital Curitiba. Furthermore, concentrations of municipal committees are visible in the southwestern parts of Paraná. This region has a history of migration flows of European migrants in the nineteenth century and later on residents of Rio Grande do

occupation relative to the population total and location. Criteria accessed digitally via: https://biblioteca.ibge.gov.br/visualizacao/livros/liv100643.pdf. Consulted on 4 October 2017.

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Sul. A regional leader of the movement in Paraná, ascribed the concentration of support for the movement in the south of the region as follows: “Northern Paraná is more on the side of Brazil, because the north of Paraná was colonized partially by other Brazilian states like São Paulo and . [...] However, I observe, as São Paulo also wants to separate, it will become more separatist. In the rest of the state that is more in the south, [...], Paraná is already more European. So there is a great adhesion to the movement."87 These migration flows support the idea that many of the movement’s members share non- Portuguese European heritage and consequently contribute to the relatively high concentration of registered municipal committees of the movement in those parts of the three states. A municipal committee can be created by applying for registration online. If the request is approved, the movement publishes the new local committee on their Facebook-page and their website. (Regional) movement leaders are usually asked to visit a new local committee too and new leaders are invited to the future leadership conferences that will be discussed below. Regional committees can be formed if local committees prefer so and are created upon agreement with the Diretoria Nacional.88

From A-Political to Political Movement?

From interviews with members and leaders of the movement, it became clear that in its current form, the movement frames itself as independent from any existing political party and therefore refers to itself explicitly as an a-political movement rather than a political movement. In this sense, the concept ‘a-political’ relates more to not being affiliated with an existing political party rather than to stay away from politics at all, since the movement’s entire existence could be argued to be political to begin with. The main reason according the movement’s leadership for its a-political position is formulated as follows:

The movement needs a political branch, it is necessary, but we have created the movement [...] to be a-political, and it will continue to be, why? Because people in Brazil are tired of politics. The people of Brazil are neither of the type for political participation […]. However, this [politics] is what we are doing here, the Popular Law Initiative projects are already political projects. This depends on the deputies, to convince them to support us.89

Therefore, plans are being developed within the leadership of the movement to transform the movement from an explicitly a-political movement towards a political organisation, as it becomes a necessary step to achieve the movement’s objectives. Notwithstanding the a-political stand of OSEOMP regarding existing political parties, a clear political ideology is expressed within the

87 Interview with a regional leader of O Sul É O Meu País, Curitiba, Paraná, 23 July 2017. 88 Informal conversation with a long term member of the movement, Santa Catarina, 13 June 2017. 89 Interview with a member of the Diretoria Nacional of O Sul É O Meu País in Brusque, Santa Catarina, Brazil, 13 June 2017.

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movement’s leadership and members, often framed as an entrepreneurial vision on the state and on public management.90 In order to find out the history of this a-political stand of the movement, I used the book that is published by and about the organisation. This book is written by Celso Deucher, an active member of the movement, who is the Diretor de Mobilização Estratégica in the current Diretoria Nacional and is also one of the founders of the GESUL. This Grupo de Estudos Sul Livre (GESUL) functions as a think tank for the movement. In 1990 one of the organisations that merged into the current organisation of OSEOMP in 1992, tried to register as a political party in Rio Grande do Sul. The name of this party was Partido da República Farroupilha (PRF) and was denied official registration as a political party by the Tribunal Regional Eleitoral do Rio Grande do Sul (TRE-RS). According to Deucher, the reason for the rejection of this request was that the recently reinstalled democracy in the country was not interested in having a political party that was not focused on unity of the Brazilian nation state. Deucher describes:

In an incipient democracy like the Brazilian one, […], imagine Brasília allowing the creation of a political party aimed at independence and with a regional character like PRF. There was no other option, the central power acted swiftly and through the powerful, invisible hands of the system it intervened and provoked the first setback to the PRF. The TER-RS rejected the party's registration request, with the support of only one judge.91

The official reason of the TRE-RS for denying the registration was: “[…]Registration denied. It is not possible to authorise registration of a party entity that openly offends the federal constitution, because it intends to violate the principle of sovereignty, national integrity, and federation, constituting grounds for federal intervention in the state”.92 The comparison of the two interpretations of the same line of argument, is not only indicative for the specific situation of OSEOMP in Brazil, but also for other subnationalist movements. The reason for denial of the registration of a political party with an aim to break the national integrity of a nation state, is framed in two different narratives. On the one hand, OSEOMP frames this decision in such words here suggests that the central power of the nation state felt threatened by the foundation of this political party and therefore works the system and its power to deny the party access to the political system. On the other hand, the argumentation of TRE- RS is based solely on the Brazilian constitution, the idea of the indivisibility of the Brazilian federation and the rule of law in democracy. Similar arguments between separatist movement and

90 This aspect is discussed further in chapter 5. 91 Celso Deucher, O Sul É O Meu País, (Santa Maria, RS: GESUL), 2016, pp. 51-53. 92 Tribunal de Justiça do Rio Grande do Sul, “Embargos Infringentes: EI 591030341 RS”, 14 June 1991. Accessed digitally via: https://tj-rs.jusbrasil.com.br/jurisprudencia/5426304/embargos-infringentes-ei-591030341-rs-tjrs. Consulted on 3 October 2017.

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central governments occurred for example in the recent escalation between Catalonia and the Spanish central state. It seems unlikely that, as long as these remain the two perspectives from both sides, a solution will be found that pleases both actors.

Democratic Values and Unification of Região Sul: Objectives and Strategies

In short, the movement summarises their objectives through three different aspects: its mission, vision and values.93 As their mission, the movement formulates the following: “To enable the political and administrative emancipation of the three southern states in a peaceful and democratic way.” Through this formulation, OSEOMP emphasises their secessionist objective and consequently their politically orientated focus as well as framing the movement as pacifist and democratic. Since economic and fiscal arguments are among the most important reasons for support of the movement as will be discussed in chapter five, it can be considered surprising that this aspect is not specifically mentioned in the organisation’s mission, which only lists political and administrative emancipation for the three states. The focus on democratic processes are most notably brought into practice by the movement via the organisation of various regional and local meetings and by facilitating a consultative plebiscite. In terms of the pacifist nature of the movement, it is interesting to see for example how the movement’s leadership refers to this part of the mission to members who call for violence in name of the cause online. Moreover, on 16 June 2017 the movement published an article on their website calling for new members but referring to them as pacifist revolutionaries (pacifistas revolucionários).94 The movement’s leadership describes its vision as: “To be recognised as the movement that enabled the union of the three states in a sovereign nation.” By focusing solely on the secessionist aspect of the movement in this vision, the aim of mobilising the movement’s members for political action based on their shared otherness, is emphasised. Lastly, the values as formulated by the movement, determination, democracy, ethics, transparency and commitment, highlight the open and democratic character the movement envisions. A clear visual source that is connected to the movement’s mission, values and vision, is the official flag. This flag, a cobalt blue base with three white stars in a triangle formulation in its upper-left corner, became the movement’s official flag in 2003. It is emphasised, both in conversation with local members of the movement, as well as in the book the movement

93 O Sul É O Meu País, “Sobre o Movimento”. Accessed digitally via: http://www.sullivre.org/sobre-o-movimento/. Consulted on 2 October 2017. 94 O Sul É O Meu País, “O Movimento Sulista Precisa de Mais Pacifistas Revolucionários”. Accessed digitally via: https://www.sullivre.org/o-movimento-sulista-precisa-de-mais-pacifistas-revolucionarios/. Consulted on 16 October 2017.

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published, that the three stars are of equal size and therefore of equal importance. An anecdote that kept on appearing in conversations about the flag, is also in Deucher’s book:

The new flag of the Movement simply disappeared during the event. The national leadership had concluded an agreement with the regional committee from Paraná anticipating that this first flag would be placed in a frame and later there would be an auction among the activists of the cause. The plan was to raise funds with this auction to make a large amount of flags. After more than ten years, this historic flag is still missing.95

Moreover, to emphasise equality among the three different states, when asked about the possible capital of the new state in a conversation with a member of the national board and another long term member of the movement, both agreed that it was highly likely that there would be three capitals, with each their own responsibilities.96

Online and Offline Visibility: Building Support for the Cause

It is interesting to analyse the strategies, methods and activities the movement uses to reach their objectives. In the outline of the organisational structure, the main internal activities, the General Assemblies and the regional meetings, are mentioned. These meetings discuss local and regional strategies, planning of activities and the election of members for (local and regional) board positions. I have not attended any of these meetings during my fieldwork. After an interview with a local member of the movement in Porto Alegre, he told me there was a meeting scheduled, but due to the strategic nature of the meeting, only members were allowed to attend.97 An interesting internal activity that the movement organises for its members, are the so-called future leadership conferences. In these training-style meetings, future leaders of the movement learn about their presence and narrative towards the media.98 The main reason for this, as became apparent in interviews with both local members as well as members of the Diretoria Nacional, is that the approach of the media towards the movement is often rather aggressive and accusatory, which might be overwhelming for new members or trigger them to respond in ways that are not in line with the official narratives of the movement. Without question is it understandable that future leaders benefit from some type of media training before giving interviews as representatives of the movement. However, it also demonstrates the level of unity that the current leadership of the movement prefers in terms of spreading the official narratives and discourse that they formulated for the movement.

95 Celso Deucher, “O Sul É O Meu País”, (Santa Maria, RS: GESUL), 2016, p. 131. 96 Informal conversation with long-term member of O Sul É O Meu País, Balneário Camboriú, Santa Catarina, 14 June 2017. 97 Informal conversation with a local member of O Sul É O Meu País, Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, 23 June 2017. 98 Interview with a local member of O Sul É O Meu País, Brusque, Santa Catarina, Brazil, 13 June 2017.

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The external activities of the movement are focused on the visibility of the movement in the region. One of the key external activities of the movement is their active presence on social media. The movement is active on platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. Currently, the official Facebook-page of the movement has 124,270 followers and new content is released on a regular basis.99 This content consists of links to news items about the movement itself and other separatist movements around the world, videos by leaders of the various committees discussing a current theme or pictures from regional and local meetings and manifestations. The YouTube channel is used for promotional videos and for cut outs of TV programmes in which members were interviewed. Throughout the videos posted on this channel, a Sulista Self is assumed. This becomes clear through the constant referring to phrasings such as ‘us, Sulistas’ for example. Another type of external activities include radio and television interviews and debates. Interviews with radio and television are usually broadcasted on local stations, which on the one hand suits the movement’s approach of focus on the local levels of society. On the other hand, it shows that the issue this movement is fighting for, is mainly a local one in Região Sul. A clear exception to the locality of their media presence takes place around October, when the movement organises their consultative Plebisul, which is also covered by national and international media.100 The rather large group of followers, the active social media and traditional media presence of this movement, seems to indicate that OSEOMP has been able to mobilise a base of followers online. This use of social (mass) media confirms Anderson’s idea of the importance of mass media in the construction of a popular (sub)national identity. In the next section of this chapter, the offline support for the movement is explored.

Basta de Brasília: to the Streets for O Sul É O Meu País

An example of events that are often organised by the movement are manifestations, in particular the ‘Basta de Brasília’-manifestations. These events take place at a central square or street in cities or towns and are aimed at spreading the movement’s objectives and attracting new members. Often, the members who gather at these events wear items of clothing with the movement’s logo on it. Other common items at these manifestations are the flag, banners and leaflets explaining the movement’s cause. During my fieldwork, I visited these type of manifestations only in Porto Alegre. The reason for this is that these manifestations were usually announced online a week or less before they took place, leaving me with little time to plan a trip to the other states to visit these events. The first manifestation I visited during my fieldwork,

99 Facebook-page O Sul É O Meu País. Accessed digitally via: https://www.facebook.com/FLNBR/. Consulted on 3 October 2017. 100 See for example: BBC News, “Brazilians in the south asked to vote on secession”. Accessed digitally via: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-41541063. Consulted on 15 October 2017.

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took place on Saturday 13 May 2017 in Porto Alegre and is described in the introduction of this chapter. The second manifestation I visited, was more fortunate in terms of the weather. This ‘Basta de Brasília’-manifestation was scheduled for the same location and time as the first event and took place on 3 June 2017. For this manifestation, seven members of the movement, most dressed in clothing in the colours and logo of the movement, were present. They brought a large banner saying “Fed up with Brasília – The South Is My Country” (Basta de Brasília – O Sul É O Meu País) and set up a table to sign up new members and to display their various leaflets.101 For two and a half hours I observed the manifestation, after shortly greeting and talking to the members upon arrival. Many people stopped by the movement were willing to start a short conversation about the movement’s ideas. However, there were also some people who called the members of the movement fascistas as soon as they saw them. The second Basta-de-Brasília- manifestation I visited took place strategically between Porto Alegre’s two main shopping malls, on a busy Saturday morning and early afternoon. This manifestation took place on 8 July 2017 and included members from other local committees besides the members from the Porto Alegre branch. Since the street where this manifestation took place is one between two shopping malls, it created an opportunity for the members to walk up to people in their cars waiting for the traffic lights to quickly talk to them and to put a sticker with the logo of O Sul É O Meu País on their cars, if they agreed to. Between ten thirty in the morning and one o’clock in the afternoon, twelve members of the movement were present at this manifestation. As these are region-wide manifestations, the same thing happened in other cities and towns that have a registered municipal committee of the movement. It must be noted here that the differences in openness or acceptance of the movement’s narrative at this particular manifestation compared to the ones organised in the city centre, could be caused by the different publics that visit these two locations. In the city centre, there is a wide variety of people from all walks of life, whereas the manifestation between the two largest shopping malls of the city, might have reached a more middle class public. Overall, the atmosphere at these manifestations was positive and aimed at increasing the visibility of the movement to the citizens of the region. The movement tries to increase its visibility by spreading leaflets, signing up new members and broadcasting parts of the manifestations via a livestream on their Facebook-page. The third manifestation I visited in particular also promoted the upcoming consultative plebiscite that will be discussed in the following section.

101 Images of the banners, leaflets and other promotion material of the movement can be found in Appendix 3.

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Plebisul: Testing Secessionist Ideas on the General Public

On the first of October 2016 O Sul É O Meu País organised its first consultative plebiscite, or ‘Plebisul’ as it is known colloquially. Voting is open to all citizens of the three southern states and is explicitly described to have no legal consequences, for it is a unofficial popular consultation and not an official plebiscite. However, the goal of this action as described by the movement strongly expresses the movement’s discontent with the impossibility of expressing their secessionist idea in an official referendum:

The Southern People never had the opportunity to express their opinion whether or not they would like to remain Brazilian. The Movement The South is My Country is providing this opportunity for the second time in history. The results of this PLEBISUL will be used to unequivocally prove the opinion of our People on the subject. Likewise, once the established goal has been reached, the results will be communicated to international organisations defending the right of self-determination of the peoples, the state governments and Brazil, demonstrating that the Movement O Sul É O Meu País is the legitimate representative entity of the Southern People and consequently of their sovereign will of freedom.102

What is interesting in the quote above, is the emphasis on the idea of this region as ‘Brazilians by choice’ as described by Oliven in chapter two. It shows that it is, according to the movement, still uncertain whether the people of Região Sul continue choosing to be part of the Brazilian national identity. Moreover, this formulation forms a break with the otherwise consequent reference of the movement’s leadership to Brazil as ‘América Portuguesa’. The first Plebisul facilitated the voting of over 600,000 people in the three states. Since the population of the region is currently registered to be 29,439,773 people, this would mean that the first edition attracted 2,04% of the population to vote. As the final results of the Plebisul of 2017 demonstrate, this edition was not able to get more people to vote than in 2016. During the first one, the movement organised 1030 polling stations throughout the region.103 The 2017 Plebisul installed 1612 official polling stations, an increase of 56.5 %. This increase in polling stations has not led to more people voting for in this consultative plebiscite. On 10 October , the official result came out that stated that 364,256 people voted in this year’s consultative plebiscite. Compared to the 2016 edition, this is a rather spectacular decrease in votes of 41%. In the light of the attention for recent similar plebiscites in both Catalonia and Kurdistan, it was hoped by the movement’s leadership that the turn-out of this year’s consultative plebiscite would be over one million voters. Of the people who voted, 350,633 people voted in favour of separation of the

102 O Sul É O Meu País, “Cartilha Explicativa Plebisul 2017: Tudo Que Você Precisa Saber Sobre A Maior Consulta Popular Da América Portuguesa”. Accessed digitally via: https://www.sullivre.org/cartilha-explicativa-plebisul-2017-tudo-que- voce-precisa-saber-sobre-a-maior-consulta-popular-da-america-portuguesa/. Consulted on 15 October 2017. 103 O Sul É O Meu País, “Resultado de 2016”. Accessed digitally via: http://plebisul.sullivre.org/Resultado/Resultado2016. Consulted on 10 October 2017.

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three southern states from the Brazilian federation and the other 13,623 people voted against this idea.104 This does indicate that 96.26% of the people who voted, have voted affirmative to the idea of separatism. However, this could also indicate the confirmation of a bias where people who are open and positive towards the idea are more likely to vote than people who oppose the idea or who do not feel strongly enough about it to cast a unofficial vote. The leadership of the movement has published an official reflection on the results on their website and social media. The statement starts off with a claim of four main victories in this edition of the consultative plebiscite: (1) the number of signatures collected for the ‘Projeto de Lei de Iniciativa Popular’ (PLIP), (2) the percentage of voters in favour of separation, (3) the successful campaign in Paraná and (4) the expansion of polling stations to more than 200 municipalities in the region.105 What stands out from these four points is the emphasis of the success in Paraná as the third victory. Prior to the Plebisul on 7 October, a councilman from Paraná wanted to stop the consultation from taking place in his city, Curitiba. Mr. Goura, a member of the Partido Democrático Trabalhista (PDT), asked the Ministério Público Eleitoral and the Tribunal Regional Eleitoral (TRE) of his state Paraná to prohibit the popular consultation.106 He formulated his argument in a similar fashion as the TRE-RS did when prohibiting the predecessor of OSEOMP to form a political party, stating that the Brazilian federation is an inseparable unity. After expressing his desire to stop the Plebisul, he accordingly received personal threats via social media and was criticised heavily in an article written by one of the movement’s leaders.107 In the article, published on the movement’s website on 2 October 2017, one of the members of the Diretoria Nacional, accused the councilman of fascism for trying to block the Plebisul.108 With this background in mind, it is clear that the emphasis of the results in Paraná are of importance to the movement’s leadership at this point. Moreover, in the 2016 edition of the Plebisul, Paraná had the highest percentage of voters who voted against separation, which most likely also contributed to putting a spotlight on Paraná in the discussion of the results in said publication. The leadership points out several causes for not achieving the goal of having more than one million voters in this edition. Firstly, they argue that they sacrificed the Plebisul for the

104 O Sul É O Meu País, “Resultados 2017”. Accessed digitally via: http://plebisul.sullivre.org/Resultado/Index. Consulted on 11 October 2017. 105 O Sul É O Meu País, “Nota Oficial: Resultados Finais e Avaliação do PLEBISUL 2017”. Accessed digitally via: http://www.sullivre.org/nota-oficial-resultados-finais-e-avaliacao-do-plebisul-2017/. Consulted on 11 October 2017. 106 Felipe Aníbal, João Frey, “Vereador de Curitiba pede suspensão de plebiscito “O Sul É O Meu País””, Gazeta do Povo, 2 October 2017. Accessed digitally via: http://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/politica/parana/vereador-de- curitiba-pede-suspensao-de-plebiscito-o-sul-e-meu-pais-6hpvd4sz485u477l2z74dylef. Consulted on 11 October 2017. 107 João Frey, “Vereador que pediu suspensão do plebiscito “O Sul É O Meu País” sofre ameaça”, Gazeta do Povo, 3 October 2017. Accessed digitally via: http://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/politica/parana/vereador-que-pediu-suspensao-do- plebiscito-o-sul-e-meu-pais-sofre-ameaca-5qm6sk4i060bvrlz7m2vtw2jb. Consulted on 11 October 2017. 108 Celso Deucher, “Inacreditável: Vereador Fascista Quer Proibir O Plebisul”, 2 October 2017. Accessed digitally via: http://www.sullivre.org/inacreditavel-vereador-fascista-quer-proibir-o-plebisul/. Consulted on 11 October 2017.

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campaign on collecting signatures for the PLIP, to be discussed below. This is reason seems to be not fully correct, for people could vote for the Plebisul and sign for the PLIP at the same polling stations. As the movement states: “[...] Therefore it is a single act, Vote [for the Plebisul] and Sign the PLIP. One cannot be done without the other, because it is a single action.”109 As other reasons, the leadership mentions the bad weather on the day of the consultative plebiscite and a lack of commitment from members in charge of the polling stations, for it is claimed that more than 40% of the planned polling stations were not active due to said lack of commitment. Moreover, since the signature for the PLIP requires official and extensive registration per person who signs it, there were long queues which might have caused people to give up on voting for the Plebisul too.110

A New Political Strategy: Popular Law Initiatives (PLIP)

One of the alleged causes for the lack of voters in this year’s consultative plebiscite, was the ‘Projeto de Lei de Iniciativa Popular’(PLIP). This project to initiate a new law by mobilising citizens through collecting signatures, is a new strategy of the movement. This form of direct democracy fits the profile of the movement, for it emphasises democracy and popular initiative. In Brazil, there is a set of requirements that need to be met in order to have a legal popular law initiative. Article 61, paragraph 2 of the Brazilian Constitution, explains the procedure and requirements for popular law initiatives as follows: “The initiative of the people may be exercised by means of the presentation to the Chamber of Deputies of a bill of law subscribed by at least one percent of the national electorate, distributed throughout at least five states, with not less than three-tenths of one percent of the voters in each of them.” 111 Since the population eligible to vote in Brazil is 144,088,912 people,112 and the movement formally exists only in three states, it remains to be seen if they will meet the requirements listed in the law above. Notwithstanding these strict criteria, the movement has started two of these projects: one about the Plebisul and another on a so-called ‘Bloco Sul Brasileiro’. The PLIP on the Plebisul is aimed at demonstrating the (dis)content of the three southern states with the current federal system to the federal authorities and to have the right to officially organise a consultative plebiscite that is recognised as such by the federal government. As the movement argues: “This

109 O Sul É O Meu País, “Projeto de Lei Plebiscito”. Accessed digitally via: http://www.sullivre.org/plebiscito/. Consulted on 11 October 2017. 110 Celso Deucher, “Nota Oficial: Resultados Finais e Avaliação do Plebisul 2017”, 10 October 2017. Accessed digitally via: http://www.sullivre.org/nota-oficial-resultados-finais-e-avaliacao-do-plebisul-2017/. Consulted on 11 October 2017. 111 Brazilian Constitution, article 61, paragraph 2. Accessed digitally via: http://english.tse.jus.br/arquivos/federal- constitution. Consulted on 15 October 2017. 112 Voter statistics of 2016 as published by the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral. Accessed digitally via: http://www.tse.jus.br/eleitor-e-eleicoes/estatisticas/eleicoes/eleicoes-anteriores/estatisticas-eleitorais- 2016/eleicoes-2016. Consulted on 5 November 2017.

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Popular Law Initiative aims to propose a renewed discussion of the political and administrative relationship of the Região Sul with a Brazilian federation, due to the total bankruptcy of the current federative pact. [...] The three states want to send this proposal to Brasília, since our unofficial ways have until today not received a response to the claims.”113 The second PLIP that the movement has been working on, is about the creation of a south-Brazilian (political) block. This initiative focuses on creating a formal cooperation and further integration between the three southern states. As their main objective for this initiative, the movement states:

The proposal aims to formalise and organise the union and regional cooperation that already exists. We understand that this region has great potential in several important areas, be it human knowledge, economics, natural resources or even cultural, and that the Brazilian State has worked to disunite us and often to exploit us, treating us as simple colonies the state. It is also the union of a people who are no better or worse, no more, no less than other peoples of other regions, just different and who want a better future for themselves and for their fellow men. After all, we have virtues that need to be preserved and amplified, as well as exercised by this human collective, whose desire for freedom and self-determination is an inseparable part of our history.114

Several elements stand out. Firstly, it emphasises the assumed existing union between the three southern states. Secondly, it elaborates on the movement’s argumentation that the Brazilian federal state is always treating the southern states inferiorly. Thirdly, although stressing that the idea behind this initiative is not to demonstrate that the people of Região Sul are better than others, it does stress that there are virtues only attributed to the people of this region which should be cherished. These two initiatives discussed above are a recent development of the movement and are therefore a work in progress. As described earlier in this chapter, the movement is currently planning to include more political actions in its activities and strategies. Therefore, taking the step from unofficial consultative plebiscites towards initiatives that are aimed to open a discussion with state and federal governments about the self-determination of this region, could be seen as a step towards a more political approach of the movement and consequently to the use of a subnational identity for political mobilisation. This step is described by Mitra as the first step in the process to mobilise subnational identity for a political cause.115 Since its foundation in its current form in 1992, the movement has taken its time to map the desires of the people who support their movement. Its leaders have invested in building an organisational structure, a claimed base of 25,000 registered members that are supporting their

113 O Sul É O Meu País, “Projeto de Lei Plebiscito”. Accessed digitally via: http://www.sullivre.org/plebiscito/. Consulted on 11 October 2017. 114 O Sul É O Meu País, “PLIP – Projeto de Lei de Iniciativa Popular Bloco Sul Brasileiro de Integração e Cooperação”. Accessed digitally via: http://www.sullivre.org/blocosul/. Consulted on 11 October 2017. 115 Subrata Mitra, “The Rational Politics of Cultural Nationalism: Subnational Movements of South Asia in Comparative Perspective”. British Journal of Political Science, 1995, vol.25(1), pp.57-77.

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cause and they have tested the potential of mobilisation of this subgroup in the region twice. In the light of these events and with the main objective of the movement, secession from the Brazilian federal state, in mind, moving towards political recognition via direct democracy as is a Popular Law Initiative, follows as a next step.

Conclusion

This chapter zoomed in on two sub-themes of this research: the organisational structure of O Sul É O Meu País and the strategies the movement uses to reach their objectives. I would like to highlight two points here. Firstly, the motives of the movement on the one hand and the federal government on the other hand in preventing the predecessor of the movement to register as a political party. This history is of importance and might be key in understanding subnationalism as a phenomenon and the impasse between subnationalist groups and central governments on the matter. One the one hand, subnationalist movements like OSEOMP appeal to the constitution for their rights as citizens of the nation state to express their opinions, even if this would then lead to a referendum on secession from the nation state. On the other hand, the central state appeals to that same national constitution, where it emphasises the unity and inseparability of the nation state. Secondly, studying OSEOMP as an organisation seems to indicate that there is a gap between the mobilisation of citizens of Região Sul for their cause offline and online. In the virtual world and on social media, the movement has been able to create a platform for supporters, members and the occasional critic to discuss and talk about the movement’s objectives and narratives. As their activities online show, this seems to be a successful outlet for their discourse. However, the step to mobilising similar amounts of support offline, seems to be complicated. The manifestations I visited were only attended by a few members, despite the active sharing and supporting of the manifestations online. Moreover, other social movements in Brazil are able to mobilise people in great numbers offline. Therefore, both the impasse between subnational groups and central governments discussed above and said difference between offline and online support would be suggestions for further research on this subject.

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Chapter 4. Subnational Cultural Identity in Região Sul

“Here in the south, we do not like Carnival”. This quote is a response to one of the open questions in the survey that is part of this thesis, asking respondents to list three differences between Brazilian culture and the culture in Região Sul. Though it is not the movement’s main motive, the cultural otherness and identity of the region do play a role in its narratives and discourse. Within O Sul É O Meu País a cultural otherness of the region is assumed, but how is this otherness formulated? This chapter explores the concepts of the binary othering that is used by the movement. Moreover, the chapter compares the official narratives as used by the movement’s leadership to the interpretations of these concepts among a broader group of members of the movement. This comparison is based on open interviews with the movement’s leaders and other members of the organisation, official documents published by the movement and the survey distributed among members of the movement during my fieldwork.116 Table 4.1 demonstrates that the distribution of the respondents throughout the three states is rather uneven, as was also the case for the distribution of municipal committees in the previous chapter. The data show that most respondents reside in either Rio Grande do Sul or Santa Catarina and relatively few in Paraná, which is in line with the uneven distribution of the total population that was expected in this research for it reflects the reality of the distribution of the movement through the three states. As discussed in chapter three, the support of the movement measured by the amount of registered municipal committees is also clearly lower in Paraná than in the two other states. The quantitative survey data discussed below are, as explained elsewhere, explicitly of exploratory nature. Table 4.1. State of residence of respondents and percentage of registered municipal committees per state State of residence Respondents per state Number of municipal committees per state Rio Grande do Sul 45.2 52.7% Santa Catarina 41.7 30.9% Paraná 13.1 16.4% Total 100% 100% Note: N=429. Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017 and Figure 4 of this thesis.

Official Narratives on Sulista-culture in O Sul É O Meu País

The official narratives and discourse of the movement attributes a variety of values, characteristics and concepts to its people, which builds on the binary othering between the Sulista Self and the Brazilian Other. From official documents published by O Sul É O Meu País, I

116 A detailed methodological elaboration can be found in the Introduction of this thesis.

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selected cultural concepts and aspects that were explicitly attributed to the people of Região Sul by the movement. These concepts are: referring to the country as a whole as Portuguese America (América Portuguesa) instead of Brazil, (supporting) participatory democracy and a horizontal administrative power structure, the acceptance of and openness towards other cultures, non- Portuguese European heritage and indigenous heritage. I chose these concepts for they are prominently framed as belonging to Região Sul throughout the movement’s narrative. In order to compare the official interpretations of Sulista-culture to how individual members of the movement interpret Sulista-culture, four questions in the survey were focused on this theme. The use of América Portuguesa instead of Brazil to refer to the nation state, is a common practice within the movement and the national, regional and local leaders I have spoken to. As explained by a member of O Sul É O Meu País in an informal interview, he prefers the name América Portuguesa over Brazil, for Brazil implies a nation state that does not exist in his eyes.117 Moreover, by referring to the federation as América Portuguesa, another implication of the use of this name instead of the official one, becomes apparent. In various conversations with members of the movement, the federal state is compared to the former Brazilian Empire and Região Sul is in this context seen as an exploited colony: “We in the South, we feel exploited by Brasília.”118 Not only in conversations this feeling of exploitation is expressed, it is also used in published works on the movement’s website:

We understand that this region has great potential in several important areas, be it human knowledge, economics, natural resources or even cultural, and that the Brazilian State has worked to disunite us and often to exploit us, treating us as simple colonies of the state.119

Attributing (the support for) participatory democracy as a specific aspect of their cultural otherness can be seen throughout the movement’s official narratives and discourses. For example, in the ‘Declarations of Rights of the People of South-Brazil’,120 participatory democracy and the use of it is clearly stated. This form of participatory democracy has been applied before in the south of Brazil, most notably in Porto Alegre in the form of participatory budgeting, initiated in 1990 by the Leftist Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT).121 Due to this successful experience with participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre and other cities in the country, the idea of participatory democracy in Brazil is now often associated with the Left. Moreover, in various interviews as well

117 Informal interview with a local member of O Sul É O Meu País, Laguna, Santa Catarina, Brazil, 14 June 2017. 118 Interview with a regional leader of O Sul É O Meu País, Curitiba, Paraná, 23 July 2017. 119 O Sul É O Meu País, “PLIP – Projeto de Lei de Iniciativa Popular – Bloco Sul Brasileiro de Integração e Cooperação”. Accessed digitally via: https://www.sullivre.org/blocosul/. Consulted on 16 October 2017. 120 O Sul É O Meu País, “Declaração de Direitos do Povo Sul-Brasileiro”. Accessed digitally via: https://www.sullivre.org/declaracao-de-direitos-do-povo-sul-brasileiro/. Consulted on 17 October 2017. 121 Kees Koonings, “Strengthening Citizenship in Brazil’s Democracy: Local Participatory Governance in Porto Alegre”, Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol.23, No.1, 2004, pp.79-99.

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as in formal conversations, it was emphasised how important the role of the citizen is and should be in the movement’s vision. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Plebisul and the PLIPs are clear examples of the importance of this style of democracy for the movement. However, when discussing direct democracy with a regional leader of the movement in Rio Grande do Sul, he told me that in his experience:

[…] the majority of the Brazilian population does not want the responsibility that comes with being a citizen.” He explains that in conversations with people about the movement, the conversation often goes like this: “Do you want to be part of a project to create a new nation?” “I want to.” “Okay, great. You have to take up certain responsibilities within your city to do so.” “Then I do not want to.” People do not want such responsibilities.122

This quote contrasts the idea used by OSEOMP that participatory democracy and consequently an active role of citizens in decision making processes, is an attribute that distinguishes the people in Região Sul from the rest of Brazil. A related concept that is often used in the same line of argumentation, is the preference for a horizontal power structure on a state level. As discussed before, far going decentralisation and ideally secession, is an important objective for the movement. Therefore, attributing this preference to the subnational cultural otherness of Região Sul, serves the objectives of O Sul É O Meu País. Another important cultural aspect that the movement assigns to Sulista-culture is the region’s openness towards and acceptance of other cultures. In conversations with members of the movement from all three states, it was often emphasised that the critique that the movement is merely an ethnic movement is clearly false for everyone could join the movement, of any culture, background or class. The importance was, as stressed in these conversations, that people are willing to work and contribute to the new state. This highlights again the importance of the civic nature of the subnationalism as framed by OSEOMP. Moreover, the mixture of cultures within the region itself, is also framed as a historic attribute of the culture and people of the region: “We have all of them. It is part of us. [...] In 1829, 1830, when the Germans, the Italians, the Poles, the Russians, the Europeans began to arrive [...] we had already mixed with Africans, with the Guarani, the Spanish, and the French.”123 The informant here refers to the large groups of European immigrants that arrived in the region since the nineteenth century, as is explained in chapter two. Mixed heritage is also attributed to the Sulista-identity in the movement’s published works. For example, the ‘Letter of Principles’ (Carta de Princípios) where the movement states its main reasons for secession, the mix of cultures is also highlighted as a cultural reason:

122 Interview with a regional leader of O Sul É O Meu País, Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul, 23 June 2017. 123 Interview with a member of the Diretoria Nacional and a long-term member of O Sul É O Meu País, Brusque, Santa Catarina, Brazil, 13 June 2017.

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The Sulista population today consist of about 25 million people, of European origin, mixed with the African, Native American and Asian origins. This miscegenation that absorbed culture, customs and traditions from four continents, associated with the climatic and geographic factors inherent to the Southern Region, shaped the profile that is peculiar to the southern one, differentiating it from the other Brazilian regions. The Sulista people thus became the holders of a very diversified culture, expressed through the customs and traditions that the region cultivated.124

Related to the role of mixed cultures as described by the quote before, is the prominent place for non-Portuguese European heritage in Sulista-culture. All members of the movement that I have met and spoken to during my fieldwork, had at least on one side of their family non-Portuguese European ancestors. One of the movement’s leaders explained:

Today I speak only a single language. I could be speaking five, six languages. My mother's Portuguese, my father's German, my uncles’ and aunts’ French [ancestors originate from Switzerland], Spanish, Guarani ... I could communicate with the whole world. But I cannot, because I speak one single language that is not spoken by anyone.125

As mentioned before, the region still has communities where German or Italian is the inhabitants’ first language instead of Portuguese. Non-Portuguese European influences on the culture in Região Sul are prominent in many ways, from the last names of many inhabitants that are clearly Italian, German or eastern-European to the colloquialisms and influences on the gastronomy of the region. Within this mixture of cultural influences, indigenous heritage is also of importance in the official narratives and discourse. This emphasis on indigenous heritage of the Guaraní-people in Região Sul, is often framed by the movement in narratives of resistance and oppression against the central power exploiting the region. This line of argumentation is part of the historic argument that the movement built:

We created a new civilisation that had nothing. Abandoned, in the middle of the woods, we managed to build these cities like Brusque, like Blumenau, like Itajaí . […] and here comes a very strong repression on us to force us to “become Brazilians”. How do you do this? Creating a cultural genocide. This was the spirit of ‘42, ‘43, in the Second [World] War.126

One of the interviews with a member of the Diretoria Nacional started with the reference to the indigenous heritage in the region: “They [the Portuguese] imagined that our southern Guaraní were not people, but that they were animals. So, what did they do? They imprisoned or killed our people from the South, because they were animals, they were not people. They discarded all the

124 O Sul É O Meu País, “Carta de Princípios”. Accessed digitally via: https://www.sullivre.org/carta-de-principios/. Consulted on 18 October 2017. 125 Interview with a member of the Diretoria Nacional and a long-term member of O Sul É O Meu País, Brusque, Santa Catarina, Brazil, 13 June 2017. 126 Interview with a member of the Diretoria Nacional of O Sul É O Meu País, Brusque, Santa Catarina, Brazil, 13 June 2017.

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ancestral culture that we had with the Guaraní.”127 Moreover, while I was travelling with a long term member of the movement through Santa Catarina to visit important places and sights related to the history of the region, we passed various parts of the state that were still designated as indigenous territories and the importance of these areas as part of the narrative of OSEOMP was constantly stressed in Santa Catarina.128

Interpretations of Sulista-culture among the Members of O Sul É O Meu País

The aspects of Sulista-culture as formulated by the movement’s leadership as discussed above, have been presented to the respondents of the survey through a series of closed questions. The first question on this topic asked about the distinctness of the culture in Região Sul compared to the rest of Brazil. Respondents were asked to indicate if they considered the culture in their region to be very different or not different at all on a five-point Likert-scale. Within this question there were five missings, therefore the data of this question is based on 424 respondents. Table 4.2 demonstrates the responses to this question. Then followed a question on referring to Brazil as América Portuguesa. This question was formulated as: “Do you refer to your country as América Portuguesa instead of Brazil?”, which allowed for either an affirmative or a negative response. Lastly, a series of questions asked the respondent to indicate if a concept in their opinion was part of Sulista-culture, of Brazilian culture, of both or belonged to neither of these cultures. Table 4.2. The culture of Região Sul differs from the rest of Brazil State of residence Fully agree Agree Neutral Disagree Fully disagree Total Rio Grande do Sul % within state 59.9% 37.5% 2.6% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% % share of total 45.8% 48.0% 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 45.3% Santa Catarina % within state 55.9% 37.3% 6.8% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% % share of total 39.4% 44.0% 60.0% 0.0% 0.0% 41.7% Paraná % within state 67.3% 21.8% 5.5% 5.5% 0.0% 100.0% % share of total 14.7% 8.0% 15.0% 100.0% 0.0% 13.0% Total % share of total 59.2% 35.4% 4.7% 0.7% 0.0% 100.0% Note: N=424. Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017. From the data in Table 4.2 it stands out that the respondents to the survey agree with the leadership of the movement who frame an assumed cultural otherness of Região Sul as compared to the rest of Brazil. I expected that the respondents, being registered members of the movement, and often activists for the movement’s cause, to agree with this interpretation of Sulista-culture and its otherness compared to the rest of Brazil. The following section of this chapter discusses

127 Interview with a member of the Diretoria Nacional of O Sul É O Meu País, Brusque, Santa Catarina, Brazil, 13 June 2017. 128 Examples of indigenous territories I passed through during my fieldwork were around the municipalities of Biguaçu and Palhoça in the state of Santa Catarina.

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the concepts of Sulista-culture as framed by the movement’s leadership discussed above. In the dataset, two respondents did not fully complete all questions about the aspects discussed above, therefore the total number of respondents in this section will be 427 instead of the otherwise used 429. Table 4.3 demonstrates the responses to the question about América Portuguesa per state of residence. Table 4.3. Would you refer to Brazil as América Portuguesa? State of residence I do I do not Total Rio Grande do Sul 43.0% 57.0% 100% Santa Catarina 46.1% 53.9% 100% Paraná 44.6% 55.4% 100% Total 44.5% 55.5% 100% Note: N=427. Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017. As Table 4.3 demonstrates, referring to the country as América Portuguesa instead of Brazil, does not seem to be as important to the respondents of the survey as it is to the movement’s leadership. In fact, the majority of the respondents prefers to refer to their country as Brazil rather than as América Portuguesa. These findings seem to contrast the importance that is given by the movement’s leadership regarding this issue, where official documentation almost exclusively uses América Portuguesa instead of Brazil. In informal conversations with members of the movement and national, regional and local leaders of the movement, it also stood out that referring to Brazil as América Portuguesa was more used in contexts where the inferior treatment of the central government of Região Sul was stressed rather than in everyday use. This difference could explain the use of América Portuguesa instead of Brazil in the official narratives of the movement and less within the respondents of the survey. Regarding the idea that (support for) participatory democracy is a characteristic of Sulista- culture, a majority of respondents in all three states agreed that this would fit in their interpretation of Sulista-culture, as is demonstrated in Table 4.4. This majority was largest (66%) in Rio Grande do Sul and smallest in Santa Catarina (58%). Since strategies such as the consultative plebiscite and Popular Law Initiatives are the movement’s most visible actions, I expected respondents to assign (support for) participatory democracy as a part of Sulista-culture. Moreover, when asked about (support for) a horizontal governmental structure, respondents attributed this to Sulista-culture mostly, which is in accordance to the movement’s official narrative on decentralisation and municipal federalism. Additionally, as Table 4.5 demonstrates, the idea that (support for) a horizontal administrative structure is part of Sulista-culture, is especially high among respondents from Paraná (77%). In the light of current Brazilian politics, where Paraná and several of its politicians and judges play key roles in the credibility of the

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Brazilian rule of law, the attribution of this value being part of Sulista-culture in this particular state, stands out. Table 4.4. To which culture belongs (support for) participatory democracy most? State of residence Sulista Brazilian Both Neither Total Rio Grande do Sul 66.3% 5.2% 15.5% 13.0% 100.0% Santa Catarina 57.9% 8.4% 21.3% 12.4% 100.0% Paraná 62.5% 16.1% 8.9% 12.5% 100.0% Total 62.3% 8.0% 17.1% 12.6% 100.0% Note: N=427. Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017. Table 4.5. To which culture belongs (support for) a horizontal administrative structure most? State of residence Sulista Brazilian Both Neither Total Rio Grande do Sul 52.8% 13.5% 11.4% 22.3% 100.0% Santa Catarina 57.9% 7.3% 14.0% 20.8% 100.0% Paraná 76.8% 8.9% 3.6% 10.7% 100.0% Total 58.1% 10.3% 11.5% 20.1% 100.0% Note: N=427. Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017. The third aspect of Sulista-culture that was listed for the respondents in the survey, was the acceptance of and openness towards cultural diversity. This aspect is illustrated by Table 4.6. As discussed in chapter two, this diversity is also stressed by various former central governments in Brazil, for example through the motto used during Lula’s presidency: “Brazil, Everyone’s Country”, as discussed by Lesser.129 Therefore, it is interesting to see if respondents consider this to be a particular characteristic of Região Sul of Brazilian national identity, or possibly part of both or neither of the cultures. The data show that in Santa Catarina, just short of half of the respondents considered this concept to be part of Sulista-culture. This is particularly noteworthy for most people I interviewed in that state as well as the leaders of the movement from that state, emphasised the importance of mixed culture in their movement, referring multiple times to both Guaraní-heritage as well as non-Portuguese heritage. This aspect will be explored further below. Moreover, the data show that more than 20% of respondents categorise this aspect as belonging to both cultures, which is in line with the framing of Brazil as a mixed nation state that has been part of the narrative of central governments in various moments in Brazil’s history. Table 4.6. To which culture belongs the openness towards and acceptance of other cultures the most? State of residence Sulista Brazilian Both Neither Total Rio Grande do Sul 58.5% 13.0% 19.2% 9.3% 100.0%

Santa Catarina 49.4% 16.9% 28.1% 5.6% 100.0% Paraná 53.6% 14.3% 17.9% 14.3% 100.0% Total 54.1% 14.8% 22.7% 8.4% 100.0% Note: N=427. Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017.

129 Jeffrey Lesser, Immigration, Ethnicity, and National Identity in Brazil, 1808 to the Present, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press), 2013, p. 3.

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Non-Portuguese European heritage was, as I expected, considered to be a convincing aspect of Sulista-heritage for most respondents. In all three states, a relatively large majority assigned this heritage specifically to the culture of their region. A regional leader of O Sul É O Meu País that I interviewed in Curitiba, Paraná said he sometimes identified even stronger as a European through his European heritage than he did as a Brazilian. He said: “[…] I feel this way, you know? Sometimes I feel more Ukrainian than Brazilian.”130 Table 4.7. To which culture belongs non-Portuguese European heritage most? State of residence Sulista Brazilian Both Neither Total Rio Grande do Sul 72.5% 6.7% 10.9% 9.8% 100.0% Santa Catarina 83.7% 2.2% 9.6% 4.5% 100.0% Paraná 75.0% 5.4% 8.9% 10.7% 100.0% Total 77.5% 4.7% 10.1% 7.7% 100.0% Note: N=427. Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017. Regarding indigenous heritage, respondents to the survey rarely assigned said heritage exclusively to Sulista-culture. The responses to this question are demonstrated in Table 4.8. Connections to indigenous heritage were not included in my lists of questions during interviews or in informal conversations. Every time this heritage was discussed, it was initiated by the members of the movement themselves. I included it in the survey because I wanted to asked members of the movement about the various heritages in Região Sul, including indigenous, but also Asian and African for example. In interviews and conversations with members of O Sul É O Meu País, the connection between Região Sul and indigenous or specifically Guaraní-heritage was mostly mentioned by members from Santa Catarina. In Rio Grande do Sul and Paraná, the topic of indigenous heritage was rarely discussed nor brought up as an argument by members of the movement. Therefore, the responses from respondents from Santa Catarina to the question about openness to and acceptance of cultural differences, were surprising to find, as discussed above. However, what is most striking about the data in Table 4.8 is the amount of respondents (28.8%) who regarded indigenous heritage to be part of neither Sulista or Brazilian culture. For a country with a rich and visible heritage of various indigenous people throughout the country, this result is unexpected. Table 4.8. To which culture belongs indigenous heritage most? State of residence Sulista Brazilian Both Neither Total Rio Grande do Sul 26.4% 16.1% 25.4% 32.1% 100.0% Santa Catarina 15.7% 20.8% 36.5% 27.0% 100.0% Paraná 26.8% 16.1% 33.9% 23.2% 100.0% Total 22.0% 18.0% 31.1% 28.8% 100.0% Note: N=427. Data retrieved from author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017.

130 Interview with a regional leader of O Sul É O Meu País, Curitiba, Paraná, 23 July 2017.

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The survey also included other questions related to heritage of the respondents. For example, respondents were asked to indicate where their family, up to their grandparents’ generation, were born both within Brazil or outside of Brazil. The tables in Appendix 4 demonstrate the origin of (the ancestors) of the respondents. What stands out from these responses, is that of the ancestors who were born outside of Brazil, most were born in either Germany or Italy, as is in line with the migration flows to the south of Brazil that have been discussed elsewhere in this thesis. However, the vast majority of respondents’ family was born in Brazil. Moreover, what also stood out is that in all three states, most respondents and their ancestors too were born in Região Sul. Therefore, the heritage and traditions that most respondents refer to in their answers, are traditions passed on to them in a different way than direct exposure to those cultural elements in the country of origin, as most respondents have indicated that they have not lived in a different state than their current state of residence nor have lived abroad.131 However, this cultural heritage, possibly linked to narratives of a ‘glorious past’, forms an important base for constructing (sub)national identities as is argued in chapter two.

Cultural Differences between Região Sul and Brazil through the Eyes of Members

In order to get an insight to which other differences between the subnational culture in the three southern states compared to the rest of Brazil are important for supporters of the movement, the survey asked respondents to list three cultural differences between Região Sul and the rest of Brazil. This was an open question without a system of ranking and respondents could therefore respond in any way they saw fit. After closing the survey, I divided the answers to this open question in eight broad categories: Artistic cultural expression and gastronomy, Subnational character, Immigration, colonisation and ethnicity, worldview and ideology, language, climate and geography and administrative organisation. Since the open questions were not obligatory to answer in order to complete the survey, the total amount of respondents who completed to list three differences was 237 respondents, who listed a total of 729 aspects of cultural differences. The results of this question are displayed in Table 4.9. Notwithstanding that therefore these responses to the open questions are not fully representative for the total universe, it is interesting to look at what respondents consider to be cultural differences between the southern region and the rest of Brazil, for it allows to explore narratives beyond the official narrative as used by the movement’s leadership. Moreover, Table 4.10 demonstrates the responses to the same question, but then labelled according to the official ‘factors for support’ as formulated in the movement’s official narrative, which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

131 Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017.

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Table 4.9. Cultural differences between Região Sul and the rest of Brazil – Author’s labels Author's labels Frequency Percentage Artistic cultural expression and gastronomy 248 34.0% Subnational character 225 30.9% Immigration, colonisation and ethnicity 81 11.1% Worldview and ideology 71 9.7% Language 64 8.8% Climate and geography 24 3.3% Administrative organisation 16 2.2% Total 729 100% Note: N= 729. Data retrieved from author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017. Table 4.10. Cultural differences between Região Sul and the rest of Brazil – Official factors for support Official factors for support Frequency Percentage Cultural 566 77.6% Economic 17 2.3% Geographical 25 3.4% Historical 56 7.7% Moral 3 0.4% Political 40 5.5% Social 22 3.1% Total 729 100% Note: N= 729. Data retrieved from author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017. The artistic cultural differences and gastronomy accounted for most listed differences. Examples that are given by respondents are the dislike of carnival as described in the introduction of this chapter, Gaúcho-traditions such as drinking chimarrão and traditional clothing and cultural heritage from Germany and Italy. Music and dances are also often mentioned as a difference in this category. Emphasis throughout answers in this category is put on the traditional way in which these customs are practiced. In the category subnational character, many respondents referred to the work ethic and moral of the people in their region compared to the rest of Brazil. This work ethic as a an attribute of the people of the three southern states, was also claimed by a member of the Diretoria Nacional in an interview:

We have a way of life of our own. That is another motive. It is [cultural]. With this comes the cultural motive of which people do not realise that it is also culture. And this motive is related to work. The way we do work. Why does the South see work in a different way? Because we adopted Protestant culture. The Lutheranism. [...] Lutheranism says: “Wealth is a gift from God.” […] We adopted this Protestant ethic in the workplace, with the idea that only work ennobles mankind. If you do not want to work, my friend, […] that’s fine, that’s your problem, but you will die of hunger and I am not going to help you.132

132 Interview with a member of the Diretoria Nacional of O Sul É O Meu País, Brusque, Santa Catarina, Brazil, 13 June 2017.

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Moreover, the quote above also suggests the narrative of civic subnationalism and culture within the movement, for it emphasises the importance of active participation of citizens in their society. What stands out from the data in Table 4.9, is that the emphasis put on (decentral) administrative organisation by the leadership of the movement as an attribute of ‘cultural otherness’ of Região Sul, does not seem to be perceived as such by the respondents of the survey. The category migration and ethnicity captures the responses that referred to Non-Portuguese European migration and ancestors in the region. A small category captures the differences that focus on climate and geography as a cultural difference. Most examples only read ‘climate’ or ‘geography’. However, one respondent formulated the difference as the proximity to the nations of the Rio de la Plata in the south of Brazil as a contrast to the tropical culture of the rest of Brazil. In the category language, most respondents referred to the colloquialisms that people in the region use from either the German or Italian language. Table 4.10 demonstrates the same responses to the same question as in Table 4.9, but then labelled according to the ‘official’ factors to support the movement as formulated by the OSEOMP-leadership.133 Table 4.10 consequently demonstrates that the concept ‘cultural differences’ evokes different interpretations among respondents than mere cultural aspects in the academic sense of the word. The table shows that what respondents listed as ‘cultural differences’ are labelled differently in the movement’s official narrative. The only factor from the official narrative that was not framed as a ‘cultural difference’ by respondents to the survey, are fiscal factors. The comparison between Table 4.9 and Table 4.10 indicates the fluidity of the concept of ‘culture’ and the difference in interpretations of (cultural) concepts between the movement’s official narrative and the members who responded to the survey, which I elaborate further in the next chapter.

Conclusion

The first thing that stood out from comparing the official narratives of O Sul É O Meu País regarding Sulista-culture to the interpretations of the respondents of the survey, is that many respondents agree with the official narratives that the movement produces. In the open question about differences between the southern states and the rest of Brazil, the categories of binary othering that are used by the movement’s leadership, are similar to the differences listed by respondents to the survey. This homogeneity in the responses was expected to the extent that in an organisation focused on subnational identity such as O Sul É O Meu País, supporters are

133 O Sul É O Meu País, “Carta de Princípios”. Accessed digitally via: https://www.sullivre.org/carta-de-principios/. Consulted on 24 October 2017.

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likely to agree with the lines of argumentation used by the movement’s leadership. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see how cultural arguments are sometimes downplayed in the official narratives of the movement, since the official narratives focus on economic and political arguments, especially when aimed at recruiting new members. This becomes apparent for example via the leaflet the movement distributes, which solely bases its argument on political and economic factors.134 Furthermore, said economic and political aspects are also most important for supporters of the movement, as will be discussed in the next chapter. Nevertheless, various aspects assigned to Sulista-culture by the movement’s leadership were not interpreted as such by the survey respondents. An example is the use of América Portuguesa instead of Brazil or the emphasis on indigenous heritage. A possible explanation for the differences between the interpretations of Sulista-culture as framed by the movement’s leadership compared to the responses to the survey could be related to the fact that the movement prefers to present itself as a transparent, democratic movement, as discussed before, and tries to accentuate these motives rather than cultural and more ethnic motives, for this might lead to people associating the movement to other, more radical and violent separatist movements in the region that were active in the past. Nevertheless, the responses to the survey indicate that cultural aspects do play an important role in the support of the movement.

134 An overview of propaganda material created and used by the movement can be found in Appendix 3 of this thesis.

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Chapter 5. Reasons to Support OSEOMP and Preferred Outcomes

What are the most important reasons for members of O Sul É O Meu País to support the movement? Are there differences between the reasons that are important for the movement’s leadership compared to the other members? What is the preferred outcome of the actions of the movement? In this chapter, the reasons for supporting the movement and the preferred outcomes of its actions will be discussed. The chapter starts with the main reasons for support for the movement’s cause as framed in its official narrative. Consequently, these factors will be compared to the ranking of these factors as asked to respondents in the author’s survey. The questions about the main reasons for support are divided in two groups: Firstly, respondents were asked to rank the reasons for supporting the movement from most important (first place) to least important (eighth place), based on the factors identified by the movement’s Letter of Principles (Carta de Princípios).135 This question is discussed using the complete dataset of 429 respondents.136 Secondly, an open question “What is your main reason to support O Sul É O Meu País?”, allowed respondents to answer in whichever way they preferred. Due to the fact that this question was non-obligatory, 317 responses are recorded and discussed in reference to this particular question. The most preferred outcomes of the movement’s actions are discussed based on the responses per state to a closed question about the most preferred outcome of the actions of OSEOMP. Since this question was one of the last questions in the survey, the response rate was low at 323 respondents. Lastly, this chapter looks ahead at what a future ‘Sulista nation state’ would look like in order to outline the movement’s political points of view on government and state policies.

Eight Reasons for Supporting O Sul É O Meu País

As has become clear from previous chapters, the movement’s leadership frames their narratives and objectives in a rather precise manner. This is also the case in their formulation of the factors that could be decisive in supporting the movement for (future) members. On their website and in their self-published book, the movement explains eight factors for supporting their cause. Since it does not become clear if the order of these factors is of importance from the official documentation of the movement, the factors will be listed here in alphabetical order: cultural factors, economic factors, fiscal factors, geographical factors, historical factors, moral factors, political factors, and social factors. Cultural factors have been discussed in detail in the

135 O Sul É O Meu País, “Carta de Princípios”. Accessed digitally via: https://www.sullivre.org/carta-de-principios/. Consulted on 24 October 2017. 136 A detailed overview of all rankings per factor per state can be found in Appendix 5.

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previous chapter and will therefore not be elaborated here. Economic factors are according to the movement’s leadership related to the richness of their region. Human, social and economic capital are listed as part of this richness, however these are not further specified. Geographical factors are according to the movement related to the location, size and climate of the region, which is in their view distinct from the rest of Brazil and therefore a contributing factor to the objective of independence of the region. The historical factors that are part of the movement’s narrative are strongly linked to the history of primarily Rio Grande do Sul. Examples of the historic claim to independence in the region have also been discussed before, most notably the República Rio-Grandense (1835-1845) and the non-Portuguese European heritage are cited. The moral factors have not been discussed in detail so far. As moral factors, OSEOMP’s leadership refers to the current political situation in Brazil, the ongoing investigations into accusations of corruption and role in it for Brazilian politicians and politics. This factor plays into current Brazilian national politics related to the large investigations into corruption in recent years. Political factors have also been highlighted in previous chapters, demonstrating the objectives of participatory democracy and decentralised forms of government such as a municipal federation in the movement’s vision for their independent nation state, which will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. Social factors are according to the movement’s leadership related to an assumed increasing poverty in Região Sul and related social issues, such as homelessness. In this line of argumentation as explained by the leadership, the rapid social decline in the region is managed incorrectly by the Brazilian federation. Lastly, the official narrative focuses on the fiscal factors.137 Prominently displayed on leaflets distributed by the movement, this factor is used often in convincing new members to register during the manifestations that have been discussed in chapter three.138 The importance of fiscal factors was illustratively framed by a member from Paraná as: “There are two types of Brazilians: separatists and those who do not know where their taxes go!”.139 The connections between and importance of these factors will be discussed throughout this chapter.

Reasons for Support in Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina and Paraná

In general, the survey questions on the reasons for supporting O Sul É O Meu País showed that in all three states, fiscal factors were ranked as most important. Moreover, political factors ranked

137 All eight of the discussed factors can be found in the Carta de Princípios on either the website of O Sul É O Meu País or the book published by C. Deucher, “O Sul É O Meu País”. For this chapter, I consulted the digital version of the Carta de Princípios. 138 An overview of the propaganda materials distributed by O Sul É O Meu País can be found in Appendix 3. 139 Interview with a regional leader of O Sul É O Meu País, Curitiba, Paraná, Brazil, 23 July 2017.

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in second place throughout Região Sul. Contrary to these ‘rational’ reasons for support, the cultural factor was ranked in the top three by 42% of the respondents. The respondents from Rio Grande do Sul showed that the fiscal factor (71.6%) and the political factor (71.2%) are fighting for the first place in importance in this state. Surprisingly enough, the factor that was ranked most often in the bottom three in this state, is the historical factor (70.1%). At the same time this factor was also ranked relatively most often in first place (5.7%) in this state compared to the other two states. Moreover, the cultural factor was also only ranked in the top three by 39.8% of the respondents from this state, which is the lowest percentage of all three states. The relatively low ranking of the historical and cultural factors was not expected. Rio Grande do Sul is, as discussed in chapter two, a state with a distinct history and lively memory of independence as well as a strong cultural subnational identity which is still important in both popular as well as official state narratives today. Therefore, I expected that the historical and cultural factors would rank as relatively important within this state. Another interesting factor for Rio Grande do Sul in particular is the geographical factor. The literature on subnational identity in Rio Grande do Sul often emphasises its location as a frontier state as a contributing factor to its perceived otherness. The survey data demonstrates that only 7.7% of respondents from this state ranks this factor in their top three. Therefore, it could be argued that the notion of the most southern or frontier state does not seem to form an important part of the reasons for Rio-grandenses to support O Sul É O Meu País. Moreover, the low ranking of this factor in the survey could also indicate that the idea of Rio Grande do Sul as a frontier state could be more imagined as a historical reason rather than an interpretation to the actual geographical location of the state. Respondents from Santa Catarina ranked fiscal factors (73.2%) and political factors (67.5%) most often in their top three. Catarinenses selected historical factors to be least important with 73.8% of respondents ranking this factor in the bottom three places. Despite being ranked as most important by only 4.5% of respondents in this state, the share of respondents who ranked geographical factors as most important in this state makes up 50% of the total amount of respondents who did so for this factor. Also from Santa Catarina’s share in the total ranking of this factor in the second place (66.7%) and third place (50%), it stands out that this factor is relatively more important to respondents from here than for those from Paraná or Rio Grande do Sul. As described by Radcliffe and Westwood: “[…] geographies of identity are lived geographies – […] – through which identities are continuously constituted and undone by the

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daily social relations, technical materialities and discursive forms they are lived through.”140 In informal conversations with a long term member of the movement in Santa Catarina as well as during an interview with a leader of the movement from this state, the concept of geographies of identity seemed to become part of their narrative without them being familiar with the concept. The informant that I travelled with through this state on various occasions referred to his natural surroundings, the hills, the coast lines and the vegetation as part of the way in which he framed his subnational identity and how he imagined his community in Região Sul and in Santa Catarina specifically.141 Paraná has, as discussed, the smallest share of respondents in this survey. In total, these respondents represent only 13.1% of the survey respondents. This uneven distribution however does reflect the distribution of support for the movement in general, since the majority of supporters are located in either Santa Catarina or Rio Grande do Sul.142 Respondents from this state have ranked the role of fiscal factors most often in the first three places (76.8%) and historical factors most often in the three lowest places (69.7%). Moreover, political factors were ranked as highly important (place 1, 2 or 3) by 60.7% of the respondents from this state. The high rankings of both fiscal factors as well as political factors is a trend that became visible throughout the responses from all three states. The ranking of the importance of cultural factors in this state deserves highlighting. The data show that more than half of the respondents from Paraná (51.9%) ranked this factor in the top three. This is highly surprising for it shows that from all three states, Paranaenses have ranked this factor relatively most often in the top three, with Santa Catarina scoring 41.3% and Rio Grande do Sul 39.8%. It was expected that, due to its history and distinct cultural otherness, this factor would be more important to respondents from Rio Grande do Sul or possibly from Santa Catarina than from Paraná. The survey however indicates that supporters of the movement in Paraná identify relatively more strongly with the cultural argument of the movement, which is in line with the impressions I got from interviews and conversations with local members who stressed their non-Portuguese European descent. Based on this research it could be argued that the supporters of the movement in this state are a small group but one that is strongly supporting the cause for reasons that would be more expected in states with a stronger subnational cultural otherness such as Rio Grande do Sul.

140 Sarah Radcliffe and Sallie Westwood, Remaking the Nation: Place, Identity and Politics in Latin America. (London: Routledge,1996), p. 27. 141 Various informal conversations during car rides with a long term member of O Sul É O Meu País, Santa Catarina, Brazil, 12 – 15 June 2017. 142 Respondents to the survey from Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul represent respectively 41.7% and 45.2% of the total respondents in the author’s survey.

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“To feel Sulista and not Brazilian”: General Trends in Supporting O Sul É O Meu País

Besides the ranking question discussed above, the survey also asked respondents in an open question to formulate their most important reason for supporting OSEOMP. These responses have been labelled using the eight broad factors outlined by the movement’s leadership, in order to compare them best. However, the responses to this question were often more detailed than the labels used by the movement, and therefore some subgroups within these broad labels will be discussed in this section as well. As Table 5.1 shows, fiscal and political factors were also among the most prominent reasons for support in this open question. Furthermore, it is interesting that answers that fit the definition of moral factors as defined by the movement were more prominent in the responses to the open question than this factor was in the ranking of the factors discussed above, where only 20.5% of all respondents ranked moral factors in their top three. Furthermore, from labelling the answers to this open questions it became apparent that there is a discrepancy between the interpretation of moral factors between the movement’s leadership and the interpretations of the respondents. Moral factors according to the movement’s official narrative relate to the current political situation in Brazil where accusations of corruption are investigated on the largest scale ever. However, it is possible that many respondents do agree that this is an important motive for supporting OSEOMP but that they frame it as a political reason. An example of the difference in interpretation in the definition of the moral factor can be found in the following response to the open question, in this case from a respondent from Rio Grande do Sul: “[I am] tired of so much corruption, impunity, so much disrespect for the Gaúcho people. Ex[ample]: World Cup and Olympics.”143 Following the definition of the moral factor as is used in the movement’s official documentation, this reason qualifies as a moral reason and is therefore listed as such in this thesis. However, one could also argue that it is a political argument or an economic argument with similar ease.

143 Response to open question on respondent’s main reason for supporting O Sul É O Meu País. Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017.

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Table 5.1. Main reason to support O Sul É O Meu País Categories Frequency Percentage Political factors 115 36.3% Fiscal factors 55 17.4% Cultural factors 46 14.5% Moral factors 43 13.6% Social factors 27 8.5% Economic factors 23 7.3% Historic factors 5 1.6% Geographical Factors 3 0.9% Total 317 100% Note: N=317. Source: Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017. The example above marks a trend throughout the responses to this open question. Most respondents listed more than one reason for their support. Most answers included a variety of aspects, ranging from political motives combined with subnational cultural otherness or economic arguments complimented by geographical factors. Within the various broad reasons as categorised in Table 5.1, there are many subcategories possible. For example, within the category political factors, there were clear examples of people who are generally ‘fed up with Brasília’ (Basta de Brasília), but also people who argued that a smaller state and further decentralisation was their main reason for supporting the movement. Also within the category cultural factors several subcategories emerged. These relate for example to cultural reasons based on Non-Portuguese heritage and Gaúcho-traditions, but also to a sense of ‘shared subnational character’ where respondents refer to the characteristics assigned to the people of Região Sul in particular: “The Brazilian culture is totally different from the culture of the south, we love our neighbours and love to work, unlike the rest of the country that is corrupt and hate their fellow men.”144 This quote suggests the previously discussed concept of civic culture in the movement’s official narratives, which has been applied here by a respondent to the survey. Overall, the responses to this open question are very valuable in terms of understanding the nuances and the personal interpretations of the respondents regarding their support for O Sul É O Meu País.

Let’s Dream: Preferred Outcomes of the Activities of O Sul É O Meu País

“Let’s dream: what will the future of Região Sul be like?” was my final question in all interviews with informants from the movement. Since the creation of an independent nation state for Região Sul is the main objective of O Sul É O Meu País, the respondents to the survey were asked what the most preferred outcome of the movement’s actions would be in their opinion. Overwhelmingly, 91.3% of all respondents agreed with the movement’s leadership that

144 Response to open question on respondent’s main reason for supporting O Sul É O Meu País. Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017.

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an independent nation state consisting of Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina and Paraná was their preferred outcome. Table 5.2 demonstrates the responses per state to the preferred outcome of the movement’s actions. Table 5.2. Most preferred outcome of actions O Sul É O Meu País More autonomy Remain Independent for region in current Independent Independent State of Sulista in Brazilian Rio Grande Santa Independent residence nation state federation federation do Sul Catarina Paraná Total Rio % Grande within do Sul state 88.6% 5.7% 0.0% 5.0% 0.0% 0.7% 100.0% % share within total 42.0% 50.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 43.3% % Santa within Catarina state 92.8% 4.3% 0.0% 0.0% 2.9% 0.0% 100.0% % share within total 43.4% 37.5% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 42.7% % within Paraná state 95.6% 4.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% % share within total 14.6% 12.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 13.9% Total 91.3% 5.0% 0.0% 2.2% 1.2% 0.3% 100.0% Note: N=323. Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017. Since agreeing with the movement’s main objective by the respondents was an expected outcome, it is more interesting to look at the responses to the other options. Of the options beside an independent nation state for Região Sul, more autonomy for the region ended up in second place among the respondents to the survey, albeit with small percentages. Only in Santa Catarina and relatively more in Rio Grande do Sul a small percentage of respondents opted for an independent nation state consisting of only their state. In the case of Rio Grande do Sul, this could be explained through its history of independence during the República Rio-Grandense (1835- 1845) which is still part of the otherness of Rio Grande do Sul. In this state the memory of independence and the conceptualisation of ‘Brazilians by choice’ as elaborated upon by Oliven, are still highly visible in both popular culture and official (state) narratives. Therefore, the fact that a part of the respondents from this state voted for an independence for their state only as their most preferred option, is probably related to these factors.

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Looking Ahead: Outlines of an Independent Sulista Nation State

From the survey as well as from the qualitative data it stands out that political and fiscal factors are often named as most important in supporting the movement’s cause both by the movement’s official narratives as well as the other members of O Sul É O Meu País. This section will therefore outline what the political and fiscal factors that are important for this movement, would look like in an independent nation state. Firstly, the governmental structure of the desired nation state will be elaborated upon, followed by the taxation system that the movement’s leadership has roughly outlined in their official documentation. As the movement has officially not selected a name for their future state for it would distract the members too much from the more important objectives and actions of the movement,145 I will refer in this section to the desired independent nation state as the Sulista state, where it should be emphasised that this is the author’s decision and does not reflect a possible name for the independent nation state as desired by O Sul É O Meu País. Lastly, the political ideology that stands out from interviews and conversations with leaders of the movement will be discussed in order to provide an insight in the political stands of the organisation as well as creating an opportunity to place OSEOMP in a global perspective in the concluding chapter. Throughout the movement’s official documentation and the qualitative data in this research it stands out that a strongly decentralised state with two levels of government is the desired state form for the Sulista state, which the leadership refers to as a “municipal confederation with a municipal collection system [of taxes]”.146 Therefore, O Sul É O Meu País suggests a system where the municipalities are the most important layer of government with authority over all governmental issues except for three specific fields that should be handled by the union level: currency, representation abroad and the military.147 Moreover, as the moral factors for support for the movement already indicated above, the Sulista state aims at limiting bureaucracy and the size of the state in order to enhance productivity and limit chances for corruption. In their view, the best way to combat corruption is to limit the amount of government officials and use as much technology as possible for all the tasks that are now taking up extra work in all layers of government, which causes a “heavy bureaucracy”.148 In terms of taxation and the distribution of tax revenues in particular, the movement’s leadership has outlined a desired division of collected taxes: 80% of tax revenues should remain

145 Interview with a member of the Diretoria Nacional, Brusque, Santa Catarina, Brazil, 14 June 2017. 146 Member of the Diretoria Nacional, 14 June 2017. 147 Member of the Diretoria Nacional, 14 June 2017. 148 Member of the Diretoria Nacional, 14 June 2017.

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at the municipal level and only 20% is to go to the union. The idea behind this division is explained as:

[…] Taxes: 80% of the tax revenues has to stay in the municipality and 20% should go to the union. This is in order to end centralism and spend the money where the problems are. The national state does not exist, it is [just] an entity, it produces nothing, it has no effectivity at all. Who produces, who has problems? The municipality.149

This view on taxations and the desire for the money to stay in the hands of local authorities, who are in the movement’s view better at distributing the money to solve the problems in their municipality, is also key to the fiscal factors as discussed above and is a main reason for members of the movement to support the cause. However, it is debatable whether this type of ‘fiscal decentralisation’ would in practise achieve an actual transfer of power to the local level of government and eliminate bureaucracy as desired by the movement. Taking into account the factors for support discussed above, the cultural aspects discussed in the previous chapter and the envisioned outline of the desired independent Sulista state, there are several aspects that stand out regarding the political ideology of the movement. As discussed in chapter three, the movement’s leadership frames OSEOMP to be an a-political movement which they argue means that they are not associated with any (existing) political party in present-day Brazil. However, as their cause itself is fundamentally political, a certain ideology does come out of their narratives. As the Plebisul and PLIPs indicate, OSEOMP is interested in forms of participatory and direct democracy, a concept that is often connected to leftist political groups in Brazil, as discussed in the example of Porto Alegre’s participatory budgeting experiment in chapter four. However, the focus on decreasing bureaucracy, the focus on lowering taxes, placing decision making power on a local level and the emphasis on the need to participate as a citizen, lean more towards a liberal perspective. A telling example comes from a member from Paraná, describing the role of the mayor in the desired Sulista state:

[…] and there will be municipalities with a mayor who does not always need to be a mayor, but it will be a person… [Pauses to think]. The municipality does not need to have a mayor in a political sense, chosen by rest of the town. He needs to be an administrator, so that the municipality can function as a company.150

The description above highlights the entrepreneurial interpretation of the state and of public management within the movement for it emphasises a sense of efficiency that the movement is looking for in their government. Furthermore, several members of the movement highlighted the importance of traditional values and the role of the family, indicating a more conservative point

149 Member of the Diretoria Nacional, 14 June 2017. 150 Interview with a regional leader of O Sul É O Meu País, Curitiba, Paraná, Brazil, 23 July 2017.

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of view. Also in the open questions of the survey these examples were present. For example, when discussing the role of education in the current situation of Brazil, a local leader from Paraná who is a teacher in a public school, stated with frustration that:

[…] as education gets so bad, it contributes [to the fact that] in the last 30 years, it listens to the communist ideology in Brazil that has a strong desire to destroy the values of the political Right. [It goes] against religious values, against family values, the family does not have to be traditional, the church does not have to be Christian, and so on.151

The quote above demonstrates a trend I encountered often in interviews and conversations with the members and leaders of OSEOMP. Regarding their political ideology, most informants leaned towards an entrepreneurial state vision, often complemented with conservative social views, as demonstrated above. In general, the leadership of the movement as well as the individual supporters that I spoke to both formally and informally, seemed to agree that a small state where decision making power is delegated to the local level of government is the most desired state form for an independent Sulista nation state.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have demonstrated what the most important reasons for members of the movement are to support O Sul É O Meu País. Moreover, it stood out that in all three states respondents ranked fiscal and political factors as most important. However, as the open question on the reasons for support demonstrated, many nuances and personal interpretations are visible within the factors that determine the support for the cause. Most notably there seems to be a discrepancy between the interpretations of the respondents regarding the moral factors and the use of this factor in the official narratives of the movement. Despite the emphasis by the movement’s leadership that O Sul É O Meu País is an a-political organisation, not aligned with any Brazilian political party, it is possible to indicate a preference for its members towards political ideologies on the political Right of the spectrum, with an emphasis on an entrepreneurial view on governance and conservative views on social policy. Additionally, this chapter contrasts chapter four in the sense that the two chapters demonstrate a duality in the lines of argumentation in the official narratives of OSEOMP’s leadership and the respondents to the survey. Their narratives are on the one hand emotive when they evoke the shared history, ‘subnational character’ and values of the citizens of Região Sul. On the other hand there is an emphasis on more rational reasons for secession, which are illustrated by the political and fiscal factors in this chapter.

151 Regional leader of O Sul É O Meu País, 23 July 2017.

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Chapter 6. Subnationalism and Separatism in Southern Brazil: Conclusions

O Sul É O Meu País is a social movement with political objectives that currently has a group of supporters for their cause of about 25,000 citizens almost exclusively in Região Sul of Brazil. In a region that has 29,439,773 inhabitants within a federal state of over 200 million citizens, I would argue that this movement operates relatively on the margins of Brazilian society as a whole. Notwithstanding their position as a fringe movement, their narratives, strategies and objectives are important to understand why a group of Brazilian citizens does not identify with the constructed Brazilian national identity and is even supporting a radical idea, secession of their region from the Brazilian federation. Their narratives and strategies demonstrate a discontent of this group of Brazilian citizens with the current Brazilian political, social and economic situation. Moreover, OSEOMP serves as an example to demonstrate the duality between rational and emotive reasons in narratives on separatism and as a case study for researching the mobilisation of subnational cultural identity as a political strategy.

The Construction of a Sulista Subnational Cultural Identity

A first interesting result when comparing the case study to the literature on (sub)nationalism and separatism comes up with the application of Guibernau’s definition of a nation. She defines a nation as: “a human group conscious of forming a community, sharing a common culture, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, having a common past and a common project for the future, and claiming the right to decide upon its political destiny. This definition attributes five dimensions to the nation: psychological, cultural, territorial, political, and historical.”152 I argue that O Sul É O Meu País identifies itself and its followers as a group that shares a common Sulista-culture, in a clearly demarcated territory: Região Sul. OSEOMP bases its narrative of a shared history on memories of independence and revolt against what is now the Brazilian federal state. Moreover, the movement clearly formulates a common project for the future: an independent Sulista nation state. OSEOMP’s leadership places itself in a position where they, most notably through their think tank GESUL, claim the right to decide upon the political destiny of said political objective, albeit more on the desired government structure of said future nation state rather than claiming their place in its future government. Based on the data from the survey and the qualitative data, I argue that the dimensions Guibernau attributes to a nation, are used in both the official narrative of OSEOMP in constructing the Sulista nation as well as by the responses to the author’s survey. For example, both refer to a psychological

152 Montserrat Guibernau, “Nationalism without States” in The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism, chapter 30, ed. J. Breuilly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p.2.

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dimension such as work ethic and honour as character traits of Sulistas. The cultural dimension become apparent in the references to artistic cultural expressions and traditions, as discussed in chapter four. The territorial dimension is clear to both the leadership and the supporters: the three southern states of the current Brazilian federation form the Sulista nation. As a political dimension, the (support for) participatory democracy, decentralisation and support for an entrepreneurial form of government could be named. Lastly, the historic argument of both the movement’s leadership as well as the respondents to the survey emphasise a shared history of indigenous and non-Portuguese European heritage and a historical claim to independence, for example through references to the Revolução Farroupilha. Through the lens of Guibernau’s definition of a nation, Região Sul as presented in the narratives of OSEOMP fits that definition. Using Anderson’s interpretation of a nation that goes beyond the sole political organisation of a territory, the imagined, or emotive aspect of a nation where people identify themselves as members of this socially constructed community, plays an important role in the politicisation of the subnational cultural identity of the movement. For example, the emphasis on the characteristics of Sulistas versus Brazilians is often expressed as a strong othering based on personal trades rather than tangible differences, as discussed in chapter four. Moreover, the community-building strategies of the movement aim at unifying the people of Região Sul and to have their voice heard. Online, this strategy is executed through their active presence on social media. Offline, this community-building is realised through the distribution of shared symbols such as the Sulista flag, but also through quite literally making the Sulista-voice heard via the manifestations and the Plebisul. The binary othering of Sulista Self contrary to the Brazilian Other is clearly present in the narratives and evoke the image of shared ‘psychological attributes’ such as the work ethic and other values as part of the ‘subnational character’ of the Sulista- community. Contrastingly, OSEOMP’s leadership emphasises its openness towards the Other in its narratives, for example by framing acceptance of cultural diversity as a trait of the Sulista Self and through the emphasis on not being affiliated to any Brazilian political party or their support for other similar movements both within and outside Brazil. Continuing on exploring the modernist interpretations of nation building, Hobsbawm’s criticism on nationalism as a top-down construction by elites is contrasted in this case study for the narratives on the ‘Sulista-nation’ are generally constructed by non-academic intellectuals, in the Gramscian sense of the word, for the leadership and the think tank of the movement are not affiliated to official research institutions, but do still play an important role in spreading discourses on nation and state building to their

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supporters. Therefore, the popular construction of the subnational (cultural) identity in Região Sul also stands out from both theory as well as in the case study.

Small Bureaucracy and Participatory Democracy: the Politics of O Sul É O Meu País

From the quantitative as well as the qualitative data in this research, the importance of political and fiscal factors in support for the movement stood out. Outlining O Sul É O Meu País’s position on the political spectrum helped to identify their view on government and to explain their strategies. The section below combines the movement’s various political stands as discussed to place OSEOMP in a broader perspective as a separatist movement. The Brazilian federation recognises three official levels of government: national, state and municipal levels of government and can therefore be classified as a decentralised federation, where power, either administrative, political or fiscal, is also transferred to ‘lower’ and therefore often smaller, levels of government.153 Despite this transfer of power to a lower level of government, which according to Falleti has been relatively successful in the Brazilian federation compared to other Latin American federations, O Sul É O Meu País still has secession from the Brazilian federation as its primary objective. Interpreting the current Brazilian federation as relatively successful in terms of transfers of power to lower levels of government, as argued by Falleti, sparks therefore an interesting paradox: the idea that a federal state, despite the recognition of and transfer of power to different levels of government, could still inspire subnationalist movements to seek independence from the federal nation state. It would be interesting to see further (comparative) research on this duality. Another aspect of the political view of O Sul É O Meu País’s leadership that helps in outlining their political ideology, is their support for similar movements throughout the world as well as within Brazil itself. As mentioned in chapter two, similar movements exist in São Paulo, the North-eastern and Amazon region of Brazil, which are all endorsed by OSEOMP. Moreover, combined with the official narratives that use the term América Portuguesa to refer to Brazil, these arguments indicate that the movement does not only envisions independence for Região Sul, but also supports the idea of the disassembling of the Brazilian federal nation state as a whole. Partially contrasting their political ideas based on efficiency and preventing heavy bureaucracy and the risk of corruption that a heavy bureaucracy brings in the eyes of OSEOMP, is the emphasis the movement puts on citizen participation. The instruments for participatory democracy that OSEOMP uses to reach their objectives, most notably the Plebisul and the

153 Tulia Falleti, Decentralization and Subnational Politics in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 3.

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popular law initiatives (PLIP), rely heavily on administrative, bureaucratic tasks. In the movement’s narrative, this bureaucracy should be prevented through the use of technology. Should the importance of participatory democracy continue once the objective of independence is achieved, it is hard to imagine this being possible without a rather extensive bureaucracy. As discussed, the leadership of O Sul É O Meu País is currently working on more explicit steps towards becoming a political movement. In his study on subnationalist movements in South Asia, Mitra focuses on subnationalist groups who, post-independence, claim exclusive control over a part of the nation state. Since the historical construction of the Brazilian nation state and the nation states discussed by Mitra differ a lot, and the emphasis of OSEOMP is not exclusively on a cultural narrative as is the case in Mitra’s examples, a one-on-one application of his framework onto the Brazilian situation is not desirable. Nevertheless, the ‘pathway to independence’ for the separatist groups that he elaborates, is interesting to apply to the objectives and plans of O Sul É O Meu País. Mitra’s ‘pathway to independence consists of three general steps: (1) setting the agenda, (2) political entrepreneurs join the movement, (3) ‘less-adventurous’ stakeholders align themselves with the movement.154 Based on the case study, I would argue that OSEOMP is currently transferring from setting the agenda towards the moment where political entrepreneurs join the movement. The setting of the agenda through the popular construction of the Sulista-culture and the building of a group of supporters to test their ideas on in the form of participatory democracy instruments as the Plebisul and the PLIPs have been discussed in this thesis. The second step, when political entrepreneurs join the subnationalist movement, is the challenge that is ahead of OSEOMP once the movement officially moves from apolitical to political movement.

Reflections on O Sul É O Meu País as a Movement in a broader Context

Regarding the use of subnational cultural identity in Região Sul as a mobilisation strategy for political objectives, I argued that the movement’s leadership currently aims to frame its subnational cultural narratives as a type of civic subnationalism in order to move away from previous connections to more ethno-separatist movements with similar objectives. Additionally, the official narratives emphasise what Almond and Verba describe as civic culture, in this case where the movement’s leadership highlights the active role of citizens and the importance of civic duties. The instruments to do so, most notably the emphasis on transparency, participatory democracy and distancing from existing Brazilian political parties have been discussed as examples of this narrative in this thesis. However, as argued by Kraus Luvizotto in her study on

154 Subrata Mitra, “The Rational Politics of Cultural Nationalism: Subnational Movements in South Asia in Comparative Perspective”, British Journal of Political Science, vol. 25(1), 1995, pp. 70-73.

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separatist movements in Rio Grande do Sul in particular, separatist movements in Região Sul were in the past and sometimes still are, associated by the general public with radical separatist organisations or racist political ideologies.155 In interviews and conversations with both informed outsiders as well as other citizens of Região Sul, the connection to said groups was referred to constantly. Overall, the data in this research demonstrates that the movement O Sul É O Meu País in its current form aims at framing itself as a transparent, democratic movement that is leaning towards the political Right, but that it is also clearly trying to move away from its more radical predecessors. This stood out in all their official narratives and documentation. Nevertheless, the expression of strong negative stereotypes of other regions of Brazil, most notably about the North-eastern region, have in my experience been part of almost every interview and conversation with members and leaders of the movement. Another political aspect that became apparent from this research is the ‘constitutional impasse’ between the separatist movements and the central government of the nation state. As the recent developments in Catalonia demonstrate too, both actors base their argument on the Constitution. The separatists argue that they have the right as citizens to express their opinion and in turn to be heard by their government, even if this would result in a vote for secession from the nation state. The central government bases their argument on the inseparability of the nation state to counter the argument of the separatists. This impasse between the (federal) nation state and the separatist movements in general would be an interesting topic for further research. Lastly, the main research question of this thesis was: how does the movement O Sul É O Meu País use the cultural otherness of the southern region of Brazil to mobilise support for political goals? The official narratives of the movement’s leadership indicate that the othering of the Sulista Self against the Brazilian Other is often framed as cultural otherness, for example referring to non-Portuguese European heritage, but also as ‘civic otherness’ that aims to highlight the civic morals of the Sulista Self. The data show that through the official narrative of an open, democratic and transparent organisation, the movement is trying to attract a broader following for their political objectives. So far, this strategy is more successful online rather than offline. To emphasise the democratic character of the organisation, the main strategies of the movement at this moment are connected to projects of participatory democracy as the initiatives of the Plebisul and the PLIPs demonstrate. The importance of political as well as fiscal factors in the support for the movement stood out as most important from the quantitative data. These motives align with the movement’s official narratives that emphasise their rational motives for

155 Caroline Kraus Luvizotto, Cultura Gaúcha e Separatismo no Rio Grande do Sul, (São Paulo: SciELO - Ed. UNESP, 2009).

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secession from the Brazilian federation. However, subnationalism goes beyond these rational motives and also relies on the emotive reasons such as a shared heritage and cultural identification with the imagined community. Therefore, this duality forms the core of this thesis. As became apparent from the survey data as well as the interviews with the leadership, the subnational cultural identity that is framed as the Sulista-culture within O Sul É O Meu País is not the main reason for support nor is it the exclusive focus of the movement’s narrative. Nevertheless, it is of importance for the movement as a whole, for it goes beyond the more rational factors of political and fiscal change that are demonstrated to be among the most important reasons to support the movement. The emotive aspect where a shared ‘glorious past’, shared traditions and a shared otherness create an imagined subnational community, forms the ‘cherry on top’ of the narrative of this separatist movement and is in my view therefore both valid and important, as it is used as a motive to distance the Sulista Self from the ‘problematic’ Brazilian Other. In the politically and economic unstable situation of present-day Brazil, the reassurance of a continuation of (invented) traditions through the existence of a Self that contrasts the problematic Other, creates hope for the future in uncertain times for the supporters of O Sul É O Meu País. As a final point and to stress the role of the subnational cultural identity within separatist movements, I would argue that it is easy to imagine a nation without a state but is it just as easy to imagine a state without a nation?

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Appendix 1. Survey Questions in Portuguese and English

Introdução

Caro respondente,

Obrigada por dar um momento para dar a sua opinião! No questionário abaixo você encontrará um conjunto de perguntas sobre a identidade cultural na região Sul, sobre a autodeterminação do Povo Sulino e sobre o seu apoio ao movimento O Sul É O Meu País. Este questionário é exclusivamente concebido para apoiantes do movimento. O resultado deste questionário será utilizado em um estudo de mestrado sobre identidade e autodeterminação na Universidade de Amsterdã, Países Baixos. Caso você esteja interessado em participar em uma entrevista sobre este tema ou esteja interessado em mais informações sobre a pesquisa e a pesquisadora, por favor deixe seus detalhes de contato no final da pesquisa.

Atenciosamente,

Alexine van Olst Estudante de Mestrado Universidade de Amsterdã

Q1 Onde você mora? o Rio Grande do Sul o Santa Catarina o Paraná

Q2 Você já viveu em algum lugar diferente do que seu estado atual? o Não, eu nunca vivi em outro estado o Sim, eu vivi anteriormente em outro estado na região sul o Sim, eu vivi anteriormente em outro estado no país o Sim, eu vivi anteriormente fora do Brasil

Q3 Você mora em uma área rural ou urbana? o Rural o Urbana

Q4 No Brasil, muitas pessoas têm antepassados que nasceram nas outras partes do país. Onde você nasceu? Onde nasceram os seus pais? Onde nasceram os seus avós? Fora do Sul Centro-Oeste Nordeste Norte Sudeste Brasil

Você o o o o o o Seu pai o o o o o o Sua mãe o o o o o o Seu avô paterno o o o o o o Sua avó paterna o o o o o o

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Seu avô materno o o o o o o Sua avó materna o o o o o o

Q5 No caso de você, seus pais ou seus avós nascerem no exterior, onde nasceram? Se ninguém em sua família nasce fora do Brasil, você pode ignorar esta pergunta.

Outro país em Outro outro Outro país na parte país na América do Alemanha Itália Portugal Espanha Europa Argentina Uruguai Latina mundo Brasil

Você o o o o o o o o o o Seu pai o o o o o o o o o o Sua mãe o o o o o o o o o o Avô paterno o o o o o o o o o o Avó paterna o o o o o o o o o o Avô materno o o o o o o o o o o Avó materna o o o o o o o o o o

Q6 Como você se referiria a si mesmo com as seguintes opções? Sempre Às vezes Nunca

Brasileiro(a) o o o Rio Grandense o o o Gaúcho(a) o o o Catarinense o o o Paranaense o o o Sulista o o o Barriga-verde o o o

Q7 Qual opção você usa para se apresentar a outras pessoas? Brasileiros de outras regiões do Família Amigos Colegas que região Sul Estrangeiros

Brasileiro(a) o o o o o Rio Grandense o o o o o Gaúcho(a) o o o o o

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Catarinense o o o o o Paranaense o o o o o Sulista o o o o o Barriga-verde o o o o o

Q8 Você acha que a cultura na Região Sul é diferente do resto do país? o Muitíssimo o Muito o Neutral o Na verdade não o De modo nenhum

Q9 Você usa ‘América Portuguesa’ mais do que o ‘Brasil’ para se referir ao país? o Uso o Não usa

Q10 Você considera os seguintes conceitos como parte da cultura sulina, da cultura brasileira, de ambas cultural ou de nenhuma das culturas no geral? Nenhuma das Sulista Brasileira Ambas culturas

Democracia participaria o o o o Estrutura administrativa horizontal o o o o Abertura e tolerância cultural o o o o Herança europeia não portuguesa o o o o Herança africana o o o o Herança indígena o o o o Herança asiática o o o o

Q11 Você poderia listar três diferenças culturais entre Região Sul e o Brasil no geral? Diferença cultural #1 ______Diferença cultural #2 ______Diferença cultural #3 ______

Q12 Qual é a sua principal razão para apoiar o movimento O Sul É O Meu País? ______

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Q13 Quais são fatores importantes para o seu apoio ao movimento O Sul É O Meu País? De modo Muitíssimo Muito Neutral Na verdade não nenhum

Fatores Políticos o o o o o Fatores Culturais o o o o o Fatores Tributários o o o o o Fatores Econômicos o o o o o Fatores Geográficos o o o o o Fatores Sociais o o o o o Fatores Morais o o o o o Fatores Históricos o o o o o

Q14 Qual é a melhor sequência destes fatores que motivam a busca da autodeterminação? Por favor, classifique as opções de 1 a 8. 1 seria o mais importante, 8 seria o menos importante. ______Fatores Políticos ______Fatores Culturais ______Fatores Tributários ______Fatores Econômicos ______Fatores Geográficos ______Fatores Sociais ______Fatores Morais ______Fatores Históricos

Q15 Qual das opções abaixo é a sua preferida? o A união dos três estados em uma nação soberana o Ficar parte da federação brasileira, com mais autonomia para a região Sul o Ficar parte da federação brasileira como está no momento o Um estado-nação independente, constituído exclusivamente pelo estado do Rio Grande do Sul o Um estado-nação independente, constituído exclusivamente pelo estado de Santa Catarina o Um estado-nação independente, constituído exclusivamente pelo estado de Paraná

Q16 O que você espera que o movimento O Sul É O Meu País atinja? ______

Q17 Você votou no "Plebisul" no ano passado? o Votei o Não votei

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Q18 Quantas vezes você visita eventos organizados pelo movimento O Sul É O Meu País? o Menos do que uma vez por ano o Uma vez por ano o Mais do que 5 vezes por ano o Mais do que 10 vezes por ano

Q19 Quantos anos você tem? ______

Q20 Qual é o seu sexo? o Masculino o Feminino

Q21 Qual é o seu nível de escolaridade? o Escola primaria o Ensino médio o Ensino superior o Pós-graduação o Nenhuma das opções acima

Q22 Se você estiver interessado em elaborar suas respostas nesta pesquisa com uma entrevista (digital), por favor deixe seus dados de contato abaixo: Nome ______E-mail ______

English translation survey

Introduction

Dear respondent,

Thank you for sparing a moment of your time to give your opinion! In the survey below you will find a combination of questions about the cultural identity in the South of Brazil, about the right to self-determination of the people of Southern Brazil and about your support to the movement O Sul É O Meu País. This survey is exclusively designed for and aimed at registered members of the movement. The results of the survey will be used in a Master thesis about identity and self-determination at the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. In case you are interested to participate in an interview about this subject or if you would like more information about the research and the researcher, please leave your contact information at the end of the survey.

Kind regards,

Alexine van Olst Master student University of Amsterdam

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Q1 Where do you live? o Rio Grande do Sul o Santa Catarina o Paraná

Q2 Have you ever lived in another state than the one you currently reside in? o No, I have never lived in another state o Yes, I have lived in another state in Região Sul o Yes, I have lived in another state in another region of Brazil o Yes, I have lived outside of Brazil

Q3 Do you live in a rural or urban region? o Rural o Urban

Q4 In Brazil, there are many people who were born in a different part of the country than the one they reside in. Where were you born? Where were your parents born? Where were your grandparents born? Outside South Central East Northeast North Southeast Brazil

You o o o o o o Your father o o o o o o Your mother o o o o o o Your paternal grandfather o o o o o o Your paternal grandmother o o o o o o Your maternal grandfather o o o o o o Your maternal grandmother o o o o o o

Q5 In case you or your (grand)parents were born abroad, where were they born? If neither you nor your family members were born abroad, you can skip this question.

Other Other Latin Other European American country Germany Italy Portugal Spain country Argentina Uruguay country globally Brazil

You o o o o o o o o o o Your father o o o o o o o o o o Your mother o o o o o o o o o o Your paternal o o o o o o o o o o

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grandfather Your paternal grandmother o o o o o o o o o o Your maternal grandfather o o o o o o o o o o Your maternal grandmother o o o o o o o o o o

Q6 How would you refer to yourself when you need to choose from the following options? Always Sometimes Never

Brazilian o o o Rio Grandense o o o Gaúcho(a) o o o Catarinense o o o Paranaense o o o Sulista o o o Barriga-verde o o o

Q7 Which option would you use to present yourself to other people? Brazilians from outside Região Family Friends Coworkers Sul Foreigners

Brazilian o o o o o Rio Grandense o o o o o Gaúcho(a) o o o o o Catarinense o o o o o Paranaense o o o o o Sulista o o o o o Barriga-verde o o o o o

Q8 Do you think Região Sul has a different culture than the rest of the country? o Very much o Much o Neutral o Not really o Absolutely not

Q9 Do you use the term ‘América Portuguesa’ instead of Brazil to refer to your country? o I use América Portuguesa o I do not use América Portuguesa

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Q10 Do you consider the following concepts to be part of Sulista culture, of Brazilian culture, of both or neither? Neither of the Sulista Brazilian Both cultures cultures

Participatory Democracy o o o o Horizontal administrative structures o o o o Cultural tolerance o o o o Non-Portuguese European heritage o o o o African heritage o o o o Indigenous heritage o o o o Asian heritage o o o o

Q11 Could you list three cultural differences of Região Sul compared to the rest of Brazil? Cultural difference #1 ______Cultural difference #2 ______Cultural difference #3 ______

Q12 What is your main reason for supporting the movement O Sul É O Meu País? ______

Q13 What are important factors in your support for the movement O Sul É O Meu País? Not really Absolutely not Very important Important Neutral important important

Political factors o o o o o Cultural factors o o o o o Fiscal factors o o o o o Economic factors o o o o o Geographical factors o o o o o

Social factors o o o o o Moral factors o o o o o Historic factors o o o o o

Q14 What is the best order to rank the factors motivating self-determination? Please, rank the factors from 1 to 8, with 1 being most important and 8 being least important. ______Political factors

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______Cultural factors ______Fiscal factors ______Economic factors ______Geographic factors ______Social factors ______Moral factors ______Historic factors

Q15 Which of the following options do you prefer? o A union of the three Southern states in an independent nation state o To stay part of the Brazilian federation, with more autonomy for the southern states o To stay part of the Brazilian federation in its current form o An independent nation state formed only by Rio Grande do Sul o An independent nation state formed only by Santa Catarina o An independent nation state formed only by Paraná

Q16 What do you hope the movement O Sul É O Meu País achieves? ______

Q17 Did you vote in last year’s ‘Plebisul’? o Yes o No

Q18 How often do you visit or participate in an event organised by O Sul É O Meu País? o Less than once a year o Once a year o More than 5 times per year o More than 10 times per year

Q19 What is your age? ______

Q20 What is your gender? o Male o Female

Q21 What is your level of education? o Primary education o Secondary education o Higher education o Postgraduate studies o None of the above

Q22 If you are interested in elaborating upon your answers to this survey in an interview, please leave your contact details below: Name ______E-mail ______

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Appendix 2. Research Question, Subquestions and sub-Subquestions

SQ I: What are the objectives of the movement? SQ II: How is the movement organised? SSQ I: What is the organisational structure (organigram) of the movement? SSQ II: How is the board (s)elected? SSQ III: How are the members (s)elected? SSQ IV: What role do the municipal commissions play in the movement? SSQ V: Which strategies, methods and activities does the movement use? SQ III: Which aspects of Sulista-identity are used in the movement’s narrative? SSQ I: How does the movement frame Sulista-identity? SSQ II: How do the members/supporters in Rio Grande do Sul frame Sulista-identity? SSQ III: How do the members/supporters in Santa Catarina frame Sulista-identity? SSQ IV: How do the members/supporters in Paraná frame Sulista-identity? SQ IV: What are the reasons for citizens of Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina and Paraná to join or support the movement and is support related to a shared Sulista-identity? SSQ I: What are the reasons for citizens of Rio Grande do Sul to join or support the movement? SSQ II: What are the reasons for citizens of Santa Catarina to join or support the movement? SSQ III: What are the reasons for citizens of Paraná to join or support the movement? SQ V: What would be the most preferred outcome of the movement’s actions regarding the relationship between Região Sul and the Brazilian federation and to what extent is this outcome supported by members and followers? SSQ I: What does the movement’s board see as the most preferred outcome? SSQ II: What do the members from Rio Grande do Sul see as the most preferred outcome? SSQ III: What do the members from Santa Catarina see as the most preferred outcome? SSQ IV: What do the members from Paraná see as the most preferred outcome? SSQ V: What do outsiders of the movement see as preferred/potential outcome?

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Appendix 3. Publicity Materials O Sul É O Meu País

Figure 5. Official logo O Sul É O Meu País

Figure 6. Official Flag O Sul É O Meu País

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Figure 7. Members of O Sul É O Meu País during manifestation in Porto Alegre on 8 July 2017.

Figure 8. Leaflet O Sul É O Meu País: Plebisul 2017

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Figure 9. Leaflet O Sul É O Meu País: PLIP

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Appendix 4. Overview Place of Birth Respondents and Ancestors

In which region of Brazil is your family born?

Table A4.1. Where were you born? State of residence Região Sul Centro-Oeste Nordeste Norte Sudeste Fora do Brasil Total Rio Grande do Sul 98% 1% 0% 0% 0% 2% 100% Santa Catarina 93% 1% 0% 1% 5% 1% 100% Paraná 95% 2% 2% 0% 2% 0% 100% Note: N= 425. Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017.

Table A4.2. Where was your father born? State of residence Região Sul Centro-Oeste Nordeste Norte Sudeste Fora do Brasil Total Rio Grande do Sul 96% 0% 1% 0% 1% 3% 100% Santa Catarina 93% 1% 1% 1% 3% 1% 100% Paraná 88% 0% 4% 0% 5% 4% 100% Note: N= 425. Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017.

Table A4.3. Where was your mother born? State of residence Região Sul Centro-Oeste Nordeste Norte Sudeste Fora do Brasil Total Rio Grande do Sul 96% 0% 1% 0% 0% 3% 100% Santa Catarina 93% 1% 1% 0% 5% 1% 100% Paraná 91% 0% 2% 2% 2% 4% 100% Note: N= 425. Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017.

Table A4.4. Where was your paternal grandfather born? State of residence Região Sul Centro-Oeste Nordeste Norte Sudeste Fora do Brasil Total Rio Grande do Sul 84% 0% 2% 0% 0% 14% 100% Santa Catarina 87% 0% 2% 1% 2% 9% 100% Paraná 78% 0% 4% 0% 6% 13% 100% Note: N= 425. Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017.

Table A4.5. Where was your paternal grandmother born? State of residence Região Sul Centro-Oeste Nordeste Norte Sudeste Fora do Brasil Total Rio Grande do Sul 83% 1% 1% 1% 0% 15% 100% Santa Catarina 91% 1% 1% 1% 3% 4% 100% Paraná 80% 0% 4% 0% 5% 11% 100% Note: N= 425. Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017.

Table A4.6. Where was your maternal grandfather born? State of residence Região Sul Centro-Oeste Nordeste Norte Sudeste Fora do Brasil Total Rio Grande do Sul 87% 1% 0% 0% 1% 12% 100% Santa Catarina 84% 1% 2% 0% 4% 9% 100% Paraná 87% 0% 2% 2% 2% 8% 100% Note: N= 425. Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017.

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Table A4.7. Where was your maternal grandmother born? State of residence Região Sul Nordeste Norte Sudeste Fora do Brasil Total Rio Grande do Sul 85% 0% 1% 0% 14% 100% Santa Catarina 87% 1% 0% 4% 7% 100% Paraná 89% 5% 0% 2% 4% 100% Note: N= 425. Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017.

In case your family was born abroad, where were they born? Table A4.8. Where were you born?

Italy Spain Brazil Portugal Uruguay Germany Argentina Other: GlobalOther: Other: EuropeOther: Other: Latin Other: America State of residence Total 8% 9% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 78% 100% Rio Grande do Sul 5% 4% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 2% 85% 100% Santa Catarina 5% 9% 2% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 82% 100% Paraná Note: N=429. Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017. Table A4.9. Where was your father born?

Italy Spain Brazil Portugal Uruguay Germany Argentina Other: GlobalOther: Other: EuropeOther:

State of residence Latin Other: America Total 100% Rio Grande do Sul 4% 4% 0% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 87% 100% Santa Catarina 2% 2% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 2% 93% 100% Paraná 0% 4% 7% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 89% Note: N=429. Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017.

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Table 4.10. Where was your mother born?

Italy Spain Brazil Portugal Uruguay Germany Argentina Other: GlobalOther: Other: EuropeOther:

State of residence Latin Other: America Total 3% 4% 1% 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 89% 100% Rio Grande do Sul 2% 1% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 97% 100% Santa Catarina 2% 0% 2% 0% 2% 2% 0% 0% 0% 93% 100% Paraná Note: N=429. Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017.

Table A4.11. Where was your paternal grandfather born?

Italy Spain Brazil Portugal Uruguay Germany Argentina Other: GlobalOther: Other: EuropeOther:

State of residence Latin Other: America Total 5% 7% 1% 2% 1% 2% 3% 1% 1% 79% 100% Rio Grande do Sul 3% 3% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 90% 100% Santa Catarina 2% 5% 5% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 2% 84% 100% Paraná Note: N=429. Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017.

Table A4.12. Where was your paternal grandmother born?

Italy Spain Brazil Portugal Uruguay Germany Argentina Other: GlobalOther: Other: EuropeOther:

State of residence Latin Other: America Total 5% 6% 0% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 83% 100% Rio Grande do Sul 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 94% 100% Santa Catarina 2% 5% 5% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 2% 84% 100% Paraná Note: N=429. Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017.

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Table A4.13. Where was your maternal grandfather born?

Italy Spain Brazil Portugal Uruguay Germany Argentina Other: GlobalOther: Other: EuropeOther:

State of residence Latin Other: America Total 4% 7% 1% 1% 2% 1% 2% 0% 1% 84% 100% Rio Grande do Sul 5% 4% 1% 0% 1% 0% 0% 1% 1% 88% 100% Santa Catarina 2% 2% 2% 2% 4% 2% 0% 0% 0% 88% 100% Paraná Note: N=429. Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017. Table A4.14. Where was your maternal grandmother born?

Italy Spain Brazil Portugal Uruguay Germany Argentina Other: GlobalOther: Other: EuropeOther:

State of residence Latin Other: America Total 6% 7% 1% 1% 2% 1% 2% 1% 1% 81% 100% Rio Grande do Sul 6% 2% 1% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 90% 100% Santa Catarina 0% 2% 2% 0% 4% 0% 0% 0% 2% 91% 100% Paraná Note: N=429. Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017.

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Appendix 5. Ranking of Importance of Factors for Support for O Sul É O Meu País

Table A5.1. Ranking of importance of political factors per state State of residence 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total % Ranking political 28.9% 22.2% 20.1% 7.2% 3.6% 2.1% 5.2% 10.8% 100.0% factor in state % Share Rio Grande do Sul of state per placement 42.4% 53.1% 48.8% 37.8% 50.0% 30.8% 52.6% 39.6% 45.2% of all three states % Ranking political 31.8% 17.3% 18.4% 9.5% 2.2% 3.9% 3.9% 12.8% 100.0% factor in all states Santa Catarina % Share of state per 43.2% 38.3% 41.3% 45.9% 28.6% 53.8% 36.8% 43.4% 41.7% placement in ranking % Ranking order 33.9% 12.5% 14.3% 10.7% 5.4% 3.6% 3.6% 16.1% 100.0% political factor in Paraná all states % Share of state per 14.4% 8.6% 10.0% 16.2% 21.4% 15.4% 10.5% 17.0% 13.1% placement in ranking % Placement of Total political 30.8% 18.9% 18.6% 8.6% 3.3% 3.0% 4.4% 12.4% 100.0% factor in all rankings Note: N=429. Ranking from most important (1) to least important (8). Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017.

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Table A5.2. Ranking of importance of cultural factors per state State of residence 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total % Ranking cultural 18.6% 12.4% 8.8% 24.7% 8.8% 6.7% 16.5% 3.6% 100.0% factor in all states Rio Grande do Sul % Share of state per 51.4% 40.0% 34.0% 56.5% 37.8% 35.1% 57.1% 26.9% 45.2% placement in ranking % Ranking cultural 14.0% 14.5% 12.8% 15.6% 12.3% 11.7% 11.7% 7.3% 100.0% factor in all states Santa Catarina % Share of state per 35.7% 43.3% 46.0% 32.9% 48.9% 56.8% 37.5% 50.0% 41.7% placement in ranking % Ranking cultural 16.1% 17.9% 17.9% 16.1% 10.7% 5.4% 5.4% 10.7% 100.0% factor in all states Paraná % Share of state per 12.9% 16.7% 20.0% 10.6% 13.3% 8.1% 5.4% 23.1% 13.1% placement in ranking % Placement of cultural Total 16.3% 14.0% 11.7% 19.8% 10.5% 8.6% 13.1% 6.1% 100.0% factor in all rankings Note: N=429. Ranking from most important (1) to least important (8). Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017.

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Table A5.3. Ranking of importance of fiscal factors per state State of residence 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 % Ranking fiscal 24.7% 27.8% 19.1% 4.1% 5.2% 11.9% 3.6% 3.6% 100.0% factor in state Rio Grande do Sul % Share of state per 43.2% 45.0% 45.1% 29.6% 52.6% 59.0% 38.9% 53.8% 45.2% placement in ranking % Ranking fiscal 30.2% 25.1% 17.9% 8.9% 3.4% 7.3% 5.6% 1.7% 100.0% factor in all states Santa Catarina % Share of state per 48.6% 37.5% 39.0% 59.3% 31.6% 33.3% 55.6% 23.1% 41.7% placement in ranking % Ranking order of 16.1% 37.5% 23.2% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 1.8% 5.4% 100.0% fiscal factor in Paraná all states % Share of state per 8.1% 17.5% 15.9% 11.1% 15.8% 7.7% 5.6% 23.1% 13.1% placement in ranking % Placement of fiscal Total 25.9% 28.0% 19.1% 6.3% 4.4% 9.1% 4.2% 3.0% 100.0% factor in all rankings Note: N=429. Ranking from most important (1) to least important (8). Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017.

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Table A5.4. Ranking of importance economic factors per state State of residence 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total % Ranking economic 13.4% 19.6% 23.7% 14.4% 16.0% 6.7% 3.1% 3.1% 100.0% factor in all states Rio Grande do Sul % Share of state per 52.0% 44.7% 45.1% 38.4% 50.8% 39.4% 35.3% 75.0% 45.2% placement in ranking % Ranking economic 8.4% 22.3% 22.9% 18.4% 16.2% 7.3% 3.4% 1.1% 100.0% factor in all states Santa Catarina % Share of state per 30.0% 47.1% 40.2% 45.2% 47.5% 39.4% 35.3% 25.0% 41.7% placement in ranking % Ranking economic 16.1% 12.5% 26.8% 21.4% 1.8% 12.5% 8.9% 0.0% 100.0% factor in all states Paraná % Share of state per 18.0% 8.2% 14.7% 16.4% 1.6% 21.2% 29.4% 0.0% 13.1% placement in ranking % Placement of Total economic 11.7% 19.8% 23.8% 17.0% 14.2% 7.7% 4.0% 1.9% 100.0% factor in all rankings Note: N=429. Ranking from most important (1) to least important (8). Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017.

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Table A5.5. Ranking of importance of social factors per state State of residence 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total % Ranking social 1.0% 2.1% 16.0% 11.3% 20.6% 27.3% 8.8% 12.9% 100.0% factor in all states Rio Grande do Sul % Share of state per 25.0% 33.3% 51.7% 35.5% 47.6% 42.7% 45.9% 59.5% 45.2% placement in ranking % Ranking social 2.2% 1.1% 14.5% 16.8% 20.1% 27.9% 8.4% 8.9% 100.0% factor in all states Santa Catarina % Share of state per 50.0% 16.7% 43.3% 48.4% 42.9% 40.3% 40.5% 38.1% 41.7% placement in ranking % Ranking social 3.6% 10.7% 5.4% 17.9% 14.3% 37.5% 8.9% 1.8% 100.0% factor in all states Paraná % Share of state per 25.0% 50.0% 5.0% 16.1% 9.5% 16.9% 13.5% 2.4% 13.1% placement in ranking % Placement of social Total 1.9% 2.8% 14.0% 14.5% 19.6% 28.9% 8.6% 9.8% 100.0% factor in all rankings Note: N=429. Ranking from most important (1) to least important (8). Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017.

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Table A5.6. Ranking of importance of moral factors per state State of residence 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total % Ranking moral 5.7% 12.4% 4.1% 11.3% 12.9% 18.0% 29.9% 5.7% 100.0% factor in all states Rio Grande do Sul % Share of state per 55.0% 52.2% 36.4% 41.5% 37.9% 43.8% 51.3% 37.9% 45.2% placement in ranking Ranking order of moral 3.9% 11.7% 5.0% 12.8% 16.2% 20.7% 21.2% 8.4% 100.0% factor in all states Santa Catarina % Share of state per 35.0% 45.7% 40.9% 43.4% 43.9% 46.3% 33.6% 51.7% 41.7% placement in ranking Ranking order of moral 3.6% 1.8% 8.9% 14.3% 21.4% 14.3% 30.4% 5.4% 100.0% factor in all states Paraná % Share of state per 10.0% 2.2% 22.7% 15.1% 18.2% 10.0% 15.0% 10.3% 13.1% placement in ranking % Placement of moral Total 4.7% 10.7% 5.1% 12.4% 15.4% 18.6% 26.3% 6.8% 100.0% factor in all rankings Note: N=429. Ranking from most important (1) to least important (8). Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017.

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Table A5.7. Ranking of importance of historical factors per state State of residence 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total % Ranking historical 5.7% 3.1% 4.1% 3.6% 13.4% 17.5% 19.1% 33.5% 100.0% factor in all states Rio Grande do Sul % Share of state per 47.8% 35.3% 53.3% 38.9% 53.1% 50.0% 35.6% 48.1% 45.2% placement in ranking % Ranking historical 5.0% 4.5% 3.4% 2.8% 10.6% 15.1% 29.1% 29.6% 100.0% factor in all states Santa Catarina % Share of state per 39.1% 47.1% 40.0% 27.8% 38.8% 39.7% 50.0% 39.3% 41.7% placement in ranking % Ranking historical 5.4% 5.4% 1.8% 10.7% 7.1% 12.5% 26.8% 30.4% 100.0% factor in all states Paraná % Share of state per 13.0% 17.6% 6.7% 33.3% 8.2% 10.3% 14.4% 12.6% 13.1% placement in ranking % Placement of Total historical 5.4% 4.0% 3.5% 4.2% 11.4% 15.9% 24.2% 31.5% 100.0% factor in all rankings Note: N=429. Ranking from most important (1) to least important (8). Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017.

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Table A5.8. Ranking of importance of geographical factors per state

State of residence Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 % Ranking geographical 2.6% 1.0% 4.1% 23.7% 19.6% 10.3% 13.4% 25.3% 100.0% factor in all states Rio Grande do Sul % Share of state per 31.3% 22.2% 44.4% 60.5% 41.8% 55.6% 41.3% 40.8% 45.2% placement in ranking % Ranking geographical 4.5% 3.4% 5.0% 15.1% 19.0% 6.1% 16.8% 30.2% 100.0% factor in all states Santa Catarina % Share of state per 50.0% 66.7% 50.0% 35.5% 37.4% 30.6% 47.6% 45.0% 41.7% placement in ranking % Ranking geographical 5.4% 1.8% 1.8% 5.4% 33.9% 8.9% 12.5% 30.4% 100.0% factor in all states Paraná % Share of state per 18.8% 11.1% 5.6% 3.9% 20.9% 13.9% 11.1% 14.2% 13.1% placement in ranking % Placement Total of historical 3.7% 2.1% 4.2% 17.7% 21.2% 8.4% 14.7% 28.0% 100.0% factor in all rankings Note: N=429. Ranking from most important (1) to least important (8). Data based on author’s survey distributed between May and August 2017.

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Appendix 6. Original Quotes in Portuguese per Chapter

Quotes in Portuguese – Chapter 1

“Não me identifico com o estereótipo brasileiro.” “Porque não me considero brasileiro.” “Porque o Sul é o meu país e pouco me identifico com o resto do Brasil.”156

“Você quer que o Paraná, Santa Catarina e Rio Grande do Sul formem um país independente?”157

Quotes in Portuguese – Chapter 2

“[...] crescente centralização política, econômica, e administrativa, através da integração do mercado nacional, da implantação de redes de estradas, de telefonia, de comunicação de massa, da concentração de tributos em nível federal, do controle das forças militares estaduais pelo Exército e da ingerência na política estadual.”158

Quotes in Portuguese – Chapter 3

“Surgiu então a ideia que nos criamos uma instituição. O primeiro objetivo: tornar vivo novamente o movimente da independência. Que nos termos autogoverno, mas mais do que autogoverno, nos formamos um país independente. Baseado em que princípios? Primeiro: na desconcentração de poder, na confederação municipalista. Segundo: numa baixa trácia na nível dos impostos.”159

“O norte do Paraná está mais do lado do Brasil, porque o norte do Paraná foi colonizado parcialmente por outros estados brasileiros como São Paulo e Minas Gerais. [...] No entanto, observo, como São Paulo quer separar, vai se tornar mais separatista. No resto do estado que está mais no sul, [...], o Paraná já é mais europeu. Portanto, há uma grande adesão ao movimento.”160

“O movimento precisa uma braça política. É necessário. No entanto, nos criamos o movimento [...] era pra ele ser apolítica. Ele vai continuar ser. Porque? Por que as pessoas do Brasil estão cansadas de político. Todo mundo quer se librar desta gente. [...] As pessoas de Brasil não querem nem tipo de participação politica. No entanto, isso é que nos estamos fazendo ali, os projetos da Lei Iniciativas, já são projetos políticos. [..] que dependem dos deputados, convencê- los a nos apoiar.” 161

“Numa democracia incipiente como a brasileira, que sequer admite as autonomias estaduais, imagine-se Brasília deixar criar um Partido de caráter independentista e regional como PRF. Não deu outra, o poder central entrou em polvorosa e as poderosas mãos invisíveis do sistema

156 Quotes retrieved from open question on reasons to support O Sul É O Meu País in author’s survey. 157 O Sul É O Meu País, “Plebisul”, http://www.sullivre.org/. Consulted on 25 September 2017. 158 Ruben Oliven, A Parte e o Todo: A Diversidade Cultural no Brasil-Nação, (Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, 2006), p. 55. 159 Interview with a member of the Diretoria Nacional of O Sul É O Meu País, Brusque, Santa Catarina, Brazil, 13 June 2017. 160 Interview with a regional leader of O Sul É O Meu País, Curitiba, Paraná, 23 July 2017. 161 Interview with a member of the Diretoria Nacional of O Sul É O Meu País in Brusque, Santa Catarina, Brazil, 13 June 2017.

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intervieram e provocaram o primeiro revés ao PRF. O TER-RS negou o pedido de registro do partido, com voto de apoio de apenas um desembargador.”162

“Registro negativo. Não é possível autorizar o registro de entidade partidária que ofende abertamente a constituição federal, porque pretende violar o princípio da soberania, da integridade nacional, da federação, constituindo motivo de intervenção federal no estado.”163

“Viabilizar a emancipação política e administrativa dos três estados do sul, de forma pacífica e democrática.”, “Ser reconhecido como o Movimento que possibilitou a união dos três estados em uma nação soberana.”164

“A nova bandeira do Movimento simplesmente desapareceu durante o evento. A direção nacional havia fechado um acordo com a Comissão paranaense prevendo que esta primeira bandeira seria posta em uma moldura e posteriormente se faria um leilão entre os ativistas da causa. A proposta era arrecadar recursos com este leilão para fazer uma grande quantidade de bandeiras em pano. Passado mais de 10 anos esta bandeira histórica continua sumida.”165

“O Povo Sulista nunca teve a oportunidade de expressar sua opinião se gostaria, ou não, de continuar sendo brasileiro. O Movimento O Sul é o Meu País está proporcionando esta oportunidade pela segunda vez na história. Os resultados deste PLEBISUL serão utilizados para comprovar, de forma inequívoca, a opinião do nosso Povo sobre o tema. Da mesma forma, alcançada a meta estabelecida, os resultados serão comunicados a entidades internacionais de defesa do direito de autodeterminação dos povos, aos governos estaduais e do Brasil, demonstrando que o Movimento O Sul é o Meu País é a entidade legítima representante do Povo Sulista e consequentemente da sua vontade soberana de liberdade.”166 “Portanto trata-se de um ato só, Votar [pelo ‘‘Plebisul’] e Assinar o PLIP. Um não pode ser feito sem o outro, pois trata-se de uma única ação.”167

“Este Projeto de Lei de Iniciativa Popular tem como objetivo propor a rediscussão da relação política e administrativa da região Sul com a federação brasileira, em face da falência total do pacto federativo atual. Pretende demonstrar inequivocamente a Brasília qual a opinião dos cidadãos da região Sul. [...] Os três estados querem oficialmente enviar esta proposta a Brasília, já que de maneira extraoficial, até hoje não conseguimos nenhuma resposta quanto as nossas reivindicações.”168

“A proposta é formalizar e organizar a união e a cooperação regional que já existe de fato. Entendemos que esta região tem grande potencial em diversas e importantes áreas, seja do conhecimento humano, da economia, dos recursos naturais ou ainda cultural e que, o Estado

162 Celso Deucher, O Sul É O Meu País, (Santa Maria, RS: GESUL), 2016, pp. 51-53. 163 Tribunal de Justiça do Rio Grande do Sul, “Embargos Infringentes: EI 591030341 RS”, 14 June 1991. Accessed digitally via: https://tj-rs.jusbrasil.com.br/jurisprudencia/5426304/embargos-infringentes-ei-591030341-rs-tjrs. Consulted on 3 October 2017. 164 O Sul É O Meu País, “Sobre o Movimento”. Accessed digitally via: http://www.sullivre.org/sobre-o-movimento/. Consulted on 2 October 2017. 165 Celso Deucher, “O Sul É O Meu País”, (Santa Maria, RS: GESUL), 2016, p. 131. 166 O Sul É O Meu País, “Cartilha Explicativa Plebisul 2017: Tudo Que Você Precisa Saber Sobre A Maior Consulta Popular Da América Portuguesa”. Accessed digitally via: https://www.sullivre.org/cartilha-explicativa-plebisul-2017-tudo-que- voce-precisa-saber-sobre-a-maior-consulta-popular-da-america-portuguesa/. Consulted on 15 October 2017. 167 O Sul É O Meu País, “Projeto de Lei Plebiscito”. Accessed digitally via: http://www.sullivre.org/plebiscito/. Consulted on 11 October 2017. 168 O Sul É O Meu País, “PLIP – Projeto de Lei de Iniciativa Popular Bloco Sul Brasileiro de Integração e Cooperação”. Accessed digitally via: http://www.sullivre.org/blocosul/. Consulted on 11 October 2017.

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brasileiro, tem trabalhado para nos desunir e muitas vezes explorar, tratando-nos como simples colônias estaduais. Trata-se também da união de um povo que não é melhor ou pior, nem mais, nem menos que outros povos de outras regiões, apenas diferente e que quer um futuro melhor para si e para os seus semelhantes. Afinal, temos virtudes que precisam ser preservadas e ampliadas, bem como exercitadas por este coletivo humano, cujo desejo de liberdade e autodeterminação, é parte inseparável da nossa história”169

Quotes in Portuguese – Chapter 4

“Aqui no Sul, a gente não gosta de Carnaval.”170

“Nos no Sul, nos sentimos explorados por Brasília.”171

“Entendemos que esta região tem grande potencial em diversas e importantes áreas, seja do conhecimento humano, da economia, dos recursos naturais ou ainda cultural e que, o Estado brasileiro, tem trabalhado para nos desunir e muitas vezes explorar, tratando-nos como simples colônias estaduais.”172

“A maioria da população no Brasil parece que elas não querem assumir uma responsabilidade cidadão. [...] “Tu quer participar de um projeto de formar uma nova nação?” “Olha, quero.” “Tá, beleza, tu vai ter certos responsabilidades para fazer coisas para a cidade.” Ah, depois ele não quer”.”173

“Nos temos todos. Faz parte de nos. [...]Quando começaram a chegar os Alemães, os Italianos, os Poloneses, Russos, enfim, Europeus [...] nos já tínhamos misturados com os Africanos, nos já tínhamos o Guarani, os Espanholes, e Franceses.”174

“A população Sulina hoje é de cerca de 25 milhões de pessoas, de origem europeia, miscigenada ao africano, ao americano nativo e ao asiático. Esta miscigenação que absorveu cultura, costumes e tradições de quatro continentes, associada aos fatores climáticos e geográficos inerentes à Região Sul, moldou o perfil que é peculiar do sulino, diferenciando-o das demais regiões brasileiras. O povo Sulino tornou-se assim detentor de uma diversificadíssima cultura, que se expressa através dos costumes e das tradições que a região cultiva, de onde se projetaram expressões artísticas para o mundo inteiro.”175

“Hoje eu fala um único idioma. Eu poderia estar falando 5, 6 idiomas. O Português da minha mãe, o Alemão do meu pai, Francês dos meus tios e tias, o Espanhol, o Guarani… Poderia me comunicar com o mundo inteiro. Mas eu não consigo, porque eu estou com uma única língua que não se comunica praticamente com ninguém.”176

169 O Sul É O Meu País, “PLIP – Projeto de Lei de Iniciativa Popular Bloco Sul Brasileiro de Integração e Cooperação”. Accessed digitally via: http://www.sullivre.org/blocosul/. Consulted on 11 October 2017. 170 Quote retrieved from open question on the cultural differences between Região Sul and Brazil in author’s survey. 171 Interview with a regional leader of O Sul É O Meu País, Curitiba, Paraná, 23 July 2017. 172 O Sul É O Meu País, “PLIP – Projeto de Lei de Iniciativa Popular – Bloco Sul Brasileiro de Integração e Cooperação”. Accessed digitally via: https://www.sullivre.org/blocosul/. Consulted on 16 October 2017. 173 Interview with a regional leader of O Sul É O Meu País, Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul, 23 June 2017. 174 Interview with a member of the Diretoria Nacional and a long-term member of O Sul É O Meu País, Brusque, Santa Catarina, Brazil, 13 June 2017. 175 O Sul É O Meu País, “Carta de Princípios”. Accessed digitally via: https://www.sullivre.org/carta-de-principios/. Consulted on 18 October 2017. 176 Interview with a member of the Diretoria Nacional and a long term member of O Sul É O Meu País, Brusque, Santa Catarina, Brazil, 13 June 2017.

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“E aí vem mais uma vez uma repressão muito forte encima de nos pra nos obrigar a nos abrasileirar nos na marra. Como é que você faz isso? Criando um genocídio cultural. O seja matando aquele homem antiga que estava dando a tua cabeça pra nascer tal de novo homem. Esse era o espírito de 42, 43, na segunda Guerra. […] As caras mataram metade de nos.” [...] “Criamos uma civilização nova que aonde não tinha nada. Abandonado, do meio da mata, nós conseguimos levantar estas cidades como Brusque, como Blumenau, Itajaí.”177

“Eles imaginaram que nossos Guarani do sul não eram pessoas, mas que eram animais. Então, o que eles fizeram? Eles prenderam ou mataram nosso povo do Sul, porque eram animais, não eram pessoas. Eles descartaram toda a cultura ancestral que tivemos com os guaranis.”178

“Nos temos um modo de vida próprio. Muito bem. É outro motivo. É. Mais ali também vem o motivo cultural que as pessoas não se dão conta que é cultura. E é trabalho. A forma como nos fazemos o trabalho. Porque o Sul vê o trabalho de uma forma diferenciada? Porque nos adotamos a cultura protestante. O Luteranismo. [...] O Luteranismo diz: “A riqueza é um doa de Deus”. Nos adotamos esse ética protestante na área de trabalho. Com aquela ideia de que só o trabalho enobrece o homem. Que se você não trabalhar, mi amiga, tudo bem, problema teu, mas você vai morar de fome e foda se, não vou te ajudar.”179

Quotes in Portuguese – Chapter 5

“Tem dois tipos de Brasileiros: separatistas e aqueles que não sabem aonde vão os impostos.”180

“Por me considerar sulista e não brasileiro”181

“Cansado de tanta corrupção, impunidade, tanto desrespeito com o povo gaúcho ex:copa do mundo e olimpíadas”182

“[...] um confederação municipalista com sistema arrecadatório municipalista.”183

“Impostos: 80% de recursos pagados pra município e 20% pro união. Pra você acabar com o centralismo e gastar a grana aonde existe o problema. O estado nacional, ele não existe, ele é uma entidade, não produz nada, ele não tem efetividade nenhuma. Quem é que produza, quem é que tem problemas? O município.”184

“Burocracia pesada [...]”185

177 Interview with a member of the Diretoria Nacional and a long-term member of O Sul É O Meu País, Brusque, Santa Catarina, Brazil, 13 June 2017. 178 Interview with a member of the Diretoria Nacional and a long-term member of O Sul É O Meu País, Brusque, Santa Catarina, Brazil, 13 June 2017. 179 Interview with a member of the Diretoria Nacional and a long-term member of O Sul É O Meu País, Brusque, Santa Catarina, Brazil, 13 June 2017. 180 Interview with a regional leader of O Sul É O Meu País, Curitiba, Paraná, 23 July 2017. 181 Quote retrieved from open question on reasons to support O Sul É O Meu País in author’s survey. 182 Quote retrieved from open question on reasons to support O Sul É O Meu País in author’s survey. 183 Interview with a member of the Diretoria Nacional and a long term member of O Sul É O Meu País, Brusque, Santa Catarina, Brazil, 13 June 2017. 184 Interview with a member of the Diretoria Nacional and a long-term member of O Sul É O Meu País, Brusque, Santa Catarina, Brazil, 13 June 2017. 185 Interview with a member of the Diretoria Nacional and a long-term member of O Sul É O Meu País, Brusque, Santa Catarina, Brazil, 13 June 2017.

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“E terá o município com um Prefeito que nem sempre será um prefeito, mas será uma pessoa... Será que o município não precisa ter um prefeito politicamente, eleita por resto do povo. Ele precisa ser uma administrador, que o município funcionar como uma empresa.”186

“Como a educação fica tão ruim, contribuísse em os últimos 30 anos pelo fato que ouve por parte da ideologia comunista no Brasil, uma forte vontade de destruir os valores de direita. Tanto os valores religiosos, contra os valores familiares, a família não tem que ser tradicional, a igreja não tem que ser Christiano, etc.” 187

186 Interview with a regional leader of O Sul É O Meu País, Curitiba, Paraná, 23 July 2017. 187 Interview with a regional leader of O Sul É O Meu País, Curitiba, Paraná, 23 July 2017.

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Oliven, R.: “Two Sides of the Same Coin: Modern Gaucho Identity in Brazil”. Journal of Latin American Anthropology, Vol.4(2), 1999, pp. 106-125. Olivieri, V.: “Sub-state Nationalism in Spain: Primers and Triggers of Identity Politics in Catalonia and the Basque Country”. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 2015, p.1-17. O Sul É O Meu País: “Carta de Princípios” [ Letter of Principles]. Accessed digitally via: http://www.sullivre.org/carta-de-principios/. Consulted 5 September 2017. O Sul É O Meu País: “Comissões Municipais”[Municipal Committees]. Accessed digitally via: http://www.sullivre.org/comissoes/. Consulted on 5 September 2017. O Sul É O Meu País: “Declaração de Direitos do Povo Sul Brasileiro” [Declaration of Rights of the People of South Brazil]. Accessed digitally via: http://www.sullivre.org/declaracao-de-direitos- do-povo-sul-brasileiro/. Consulted on 5 September 2017. O Sul É O Meu País: “Estatuto” [Statues]. Accessed digitally via: http://www.sullivre.org/estatuto/. Consulted on 5 September 2017. O Sul É O Meu País: “Manifesto Libertário”[Libertarian Manifest]. Accessed digitally via: http://www.sullivre.org/manifesto-libertario/. Consulted on 5 September 2017. O Sul É O Meu País, “PLIP – Projeto de Lei de Iniciativa Popular – Bloco Sul Brasileiro de Integração e Cooperação” [PLIP – Popular Law Initiative – Block of South Brazilian Integration and Cooperation]. Accessed digitally via: https://www.sullivre.org/blocosul/. Consulted on 16 October 2017. O Sul É O Meu País: “Proclamação de Piratini”[Piratini Proclamation]. Accessed digitally via: http://www.sullivre.org/proclamacao-de-piratini/. Consulted on 5 September 2017. Payne, L.A.: Uncivil Movements: The Armed Right Wing and Democracy in Latin America. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000. Possamai, P.: “Dall’Italia Siamo Partiti”: A Questão da Identidade entre os Imigrantes Italianos e suas Descendentes no Rio Grande do Sul (1875-1945) [“Dall’Italia Siamo Partiti”: the Question of Identity among Italian Immigrants and their Descendants in Rio Grande do Sul]. Passo Fundo: UPF Editora, 2005. Radcliffe, S., S. Westwood: Remaking the Nation: Place, Identity and Politics in Latin America. London: Routledge, 1996. Siroky, D., J. Cuffe: “Lost Autonomy, Nationalism and Separatism. Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 48, Issue 1, 2015, pp. 3-34. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414013516927. Smith, A.: National Identity. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991. Spencer, P. and Wollman, H.: Nationalism: A Critical Introduction. London: SAGE, 2002.

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Figures and Images

Figure 1: “Brazilian National Flag”. Retrieved digitally from: http://www2.planalto.gov.br/acervo/simbolos-nacionais/bandeira. Consulted on 12 September 2017. Figure 2: “Rio Grande do Sul State Flag”. Retrieved digitally from: http://www.portal.rs.gov.br/lista/676/brasao-e-bandeira. Consulted on 12 September 2017. Figure 3: “Organisational Structure of O Sul É O Meu País”. Based on interviews with a member of the Diretoria Nacional of O Sul É O Meu País and other regional and local members of O Sul É O Meu País. Figure 4: “Distribution of Registered Municipal Committees”. Retrieved digitally from: https://www.sullivre.org/comissoes/. Consulted on 5 November 2017. Figure 5: “Logo O Sul É O Meu País”. Retrieved digitally from: https://www.sullivre.org/padrao- oficial-de-bandeira-e-logotipo/. Figure 6: “Flag O Sul É O Meu País”. Retrieved digitally from: https://www.sullivre.org/padrao- oficial-de-bandeira-e-logotipo/. Figure 7: “Basta de Brasília-manifestation on 8 July 2017, Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul.” Picture published on the official Facebook-page of Porto Alegre’s Municipal Committee of O Sul É O Meu País. Retrieved digitally via: https://www.facebook.com/MSMPOA/photos/a.1754731084742184.1073741828.17547007514 11884/1970814376467186/?type=3&theater. Consulted on 4 November 2017.

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Figure 8: “Leaflet O Sul É O Meu País – Plebisul”. Scanned digitally from original retrieved during manifestations. Figure 9: “Leaflet O Sul É O Meu País – PLIP”. Scanned digitally from original retrieved during manifestations.

Recorded Interviews

Interview with a member of the Diretoria Nacional of O Sul É O Meu País. Brusque, Santa Catarina, Brazil. 13 June 2017. Interview with a regional leader of O Sul É O Meu País. Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. 23 June 2017. Interview with a regional leader of O Sul É O Meu País. Curitiba, Paraná, Brazil. 23 July 2017. Interview with PhD candidate. Recife, Pernambuco, Brazil. 12 July 2017. Interview with Professor Ruben George Oliven. Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. 25 July 2017.

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