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THE CBW CONVENTIONS BULLETIN News, Background and Comment on Chemical and Biological Weapons Issues

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THE CBW CONVENTIONS BULLETIN News, Background and Comment on Chemical and Biological Weapons Issues THE CBW CONVENTIONS BULLETIN News, Background and Comment on Chemical and Biological Weapons Issues ISSUE NO. 41 SEPTEMBER 1998 Quarterly Journal of the Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation THE CWC: THE BWC: VERIFICATION IN ACTION CHALLENGE INVESTIGATION VOTING PROCEDURES Huang Yu Director, External Relations, Lynn C Klotz and Mark C Sims Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Federation of American Scientists Working Group on Weapons Biological Weapons Verification More than one year after the entry into force of the There are two general procedures, dubbed red-light and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) many commenta- green-light, under consideration for approving or denying tors have attempted to assess its achievements so far. Most requests for challenge investigations under a compliance re- observers have their own ideas of the assumptions upon gime for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention which the CWC was negotiated, but those assumptions dif- (BWC). In most procedures under discussion, the vote per- fer from person to person, as they differed from delegation centages required to approve or deny a challenge investiga- to delegation during the negotiations in Geneva. Each na- tion are based on the whole Executive Council. Thus, the tional delegation had its own position on the shape of the outcome could be determined by abstentions. CWC and it was not clear until the very end of the negotiat- In either procedure, a state party requests a challenge in- ing process what the final package would consist of. vestigation. Under red-light procedures, the investigation However, the negotiating phase is now a long way be- goes forward unless the BWC Executive Council votes to hind us, and, while some unresolved issues are still being deny the request. The CWC employs a red-light procedure resolved through practice, the Organization for the Prohibi- with three-quarters of the whole Executive Council needed tion of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague is well to deny a request. The identical procedure has been pro- advanced in the implementation of the CWC. Over the past posed for the BWC compliance regime. year, the OPCW has been widely accepted by the interna- In green-light procedures, the investigation does not tional community and the arrival of its inspectors has be- proceed unless the Executive Council votes to approve the come a routine event in many countries. Besides proving request. A green-light procedure proposed for the BWC that multilateral disarmament agreements can be made to compliance regime requires that three-quarters of the whole work, the activities of the OPCW during the past year have Executive Council approve an investigation request. also demonstrated that the ideas of the negotiators in Ge- Red-light and green-light procedures can be very far neva have finally borne fruit. apart philosophically and politically, particularly if absten- The question of whether the OPCW Technical Secretar- tions are taken into account in decisions of the Executive iat can deliver on the technical requirements of CWC im- plementation was raised in an article entitled “The Chemi- Continued on page 3 cal Weapons Convention Today” which appeared in the March 1998 issue of The CBW Conventions Bulletin. It Invited Article by Huang Yu 1–3 was never anticipated that the CWC could provide a 100 per cent guarantee against clandestine production of chemical Invited Article by Lynn Klotz and Mark Sims 1, 3 weapons. Such an assumption in relation to any arms con- Statement of the Trieste Conference on the BWC 4–5 trol treaty would be unrealistic. However, the tide has been CWC Signatures, Ratifications and Accessions 5–6 turned and the possession of chemical weapons is no longer seen as acceptable in the majority of countries around the Progress in The Hague: 23rd Quarterly Review 6–15 world. As we progress towards universal adherence to the Progress in Geneva: 4th Quarterly Review 15–18 Convention the unacceptability of chemical weapons will grow to the point where their use will no longer be seen as News Chronology: May–August 1998 19–43 a viable option. Chemical munitions and their production Forthcoming Events 42 facilities are being destroyed under international supervi- Recent Publications 43–44 Continued on page 2 Continued from page 1 or have submitted only partial declarations, are being helped through various programmes organised by the Tech- sion. It is not being overly optimistic to believe that all the nical Secretariat. These include the provision of on-site as- declared stockpiles of chemical weapons can be destroyed sistance by experts and the convening of workshops, either within the specified ten year period. In fact, the destruction regionally or in The Hague. To make declarations and to of chemical weapons under OPCW supervision is already allow inspections on their territory is the sovereign right of proceeding at a satisfactory rate. OPCW inspectors have states parties. The fact that 117 states have so far chosen to been overseeing destruction activities in the USA since 1 exercise this right by joining the CWC points to the confi- June 1997, and will soon be doing so in other countries too. dence which states parties have in the Convention. It is Rather than casting doubts on the implementation of the therefore perhaps unwise for the article to point to delayed CWC, the fact that eight states have come forward and de- or incomplete declarations so early in the Organization’s clared past or existing chemical weapons capabilities is one life as amounting to a failure of the CWC. In the main, the of the most significant achievements in international disar- slow rate of submission of full declarations is not due to po- mament of the past year. It demonstrates that even those litical problems, but most often for administrative or legis- states with regional security concerns are prepared to take lative reasons. Additionally, in a number of cases, states the bold decision to declare national programmes which parties were unaware of the precise requirements and they might previously have kept hidden. This has led to timelines for the national implementation of the CWC. Ac- much greater transparency about the location and quantities tive efforts are being made to remedy all of these situations. of chemical weapons and their related facilities around the Many governments have made it clear that they do want world, a fact which has frequently been stressed in meetings their national legislation to be in compliance with the CWC, of the Executive Council, and particularly by the OPCW’s for example the US Secretary of State who urged Congress Director-General, Jose Bustani. not to incorporate legislative provisions which are “not con- A number of states have included declarations when de- sistent with the Convention and would diminish its positing their instruments of ratification to the CWC. How- effectiveness”. ever, none of the declarations submitted go against the main Technical issues which have remained unresolved from articles of the CWC, although some, such as those related to the days of the Preparatory Commission, such as aggregate sampling, go against the CWC’s intended verification re- national data and low concentrations, are being actively gime. Issues raised by these declarations have been dealt tackled through broad-based informal consultations. Deci- with through national implementing legislation and through sions on aspects of some of these issues have already been understandings which have been reached between the Tech- approved by the Executive Council during 1998, and inten- nical Secretariat and member states. The fact that such is- sive work is continuing. For example, agreement has re- sues can be discussed, and in some cases resolved, points to the spirit of accommodation which prevails within the cently been reached at the eleventh session of the Executive OPCW. Council on two long-standing issues: costs of verification Another concern expressed in the same article was that for Article IV and V inspections, and a model facility agree- the OPCW has too few inspectors to satisfactorily carry out ment for Schedule 2 facilities. Some issues of a technical its tasks. It is true that the number of declared possessors of nature have also been referred to the recently established chemical weapons and the number of facilities declared ex- Scientific Advisory Board, which has a mandate to provide ceeded the planning assumptions used by the Technical advice on such issues and which will hold its first meeting Secretariat prior to entry into force. However, the fact is during 21–25 September 1998. that during 1997 the Technical Secretariat did indeed com- It is also not correct to presume that a clearer picture of plete 126 inspections including all chemical weapons re- global chemical activities has not emerged due to the efforts lated and Schedule 1 inspections within the deadlines laid of the OPCW. The improving accuracy of the planning as- down in the CWC, despite operating with a depleted inspec- sumptions in the OPCW budgets for 1997, 1998 and 1999 torate of only 126 inspectors and inspection assistants. demonstrates that a clearer picture is indeed emerging. In During 1998 the strength of the inspectorate has been aug- monitoring worldwide chemical activities, the Technical mented by new recruits, bringing the current total to 206 in- Secretariat also works closely with a variety of international spectors and inspection assistants. All of these personnel organisations. have been through the rigorous twenty-week training The universality of the CWC is, of course, especially im- course organized by the Technical Secretariat and member portant. Who could deny that 117 ratifications and acces- states. During 1998, in addition to follow-on inspections to sions and 52 signatures a year and a half after entry into chemical weapons related facilities which received initial force is a significant achievement for a disarmament agree- inspections last year, the OPCW is also undertaking inspec- ment of this nature? However, the effort must continue, par- tions of Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 facilities within the ticularly in the Middle East.
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